CRITIQUE OF DEWEYS INSTRUMENTALIST PRAGMATISM

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2013.

The American pragmatist philosopher (whose version of pragmatism is called

instrumentalism) John Dewey (1859-1952)1 was born on October 20, 1859 in Burlington,
1

Studies on Dewey: R. S. BOURNE, John Deweys Philosophy, New Republic, 2 (1915), pp. 154-156 ; H. W.
SCHNEIDER, John Dewey and His Influence, New Era, 2 (1921), pp. 136-140 ; J. T. BARRON, Professor
Dewey and Truth, Catholic World, 116 (1922), pp. 212-221 ; S. P. LAMPRECHT, An Idealistic Source of
Instrumentalist Logic, Mind, 32 (1924), pp. 415-427 ; J. W. BEACH, Incoherence in the Philosopher: Mr. John
Dewey, in The Outlook for American Prose, Chicago, 1926, pp. 41-52 ; A. E. MURPHY, Objective Relativism in
Dewey and Whitehead, Philosophical Review, 36 (1927), pp. 121-124 ; M. CIMMARUTA, La pedagogia di
Giovanni Dewey, Leducazione nazionale, 9 (1927), pp. 446-457 ; M. L. ROSSI-LONGHI, La pedagogia di
Giovanni Dewey, Leducazione nazionale, 9 (1927), pp. 582-589 ; P. CRISSMANN, Deweys Theory of the Moral
Good, Monist, 38 (1928), pp. 592-619 ; J. KAMINSKI, The Influence of Dewey Abroad, School and Society, 30
(1929), pp. 239-244 ; S. P. LAMPRECHT, The Philosophy of John Dewey, New World Monthly, 1 (1930), pp. 116 ; H. SLOCHOVER, John Dewey, Kant-Studien, 35 (1930), pp. 398-402 ; G. LOMBARDO RADICE,
Limpostazione del problema pedagogico in John Dewey, Leducazione nazionale, 12 (1930), pp. 281-287 ; E.
DUPRAT, Les rapports de la connaissance et de laction daprs John Dewey, Revue de mtaphysique et de
morale, 27 (1930), pp. 534-553, 28 (1931), pp. 107-123 ; G. DE RUGGIERO, Note sulla pi recente filosofia
europea e americana: John Dewey, La Critica, 29 (1931), pp. 341-357 ; C. KLING, On the Instrumental Analysis
of Thought, Journal of Philosophy, 29 (1932), pp. 259-265 ; E. S. BATES, John Dewey, Americas Philosophic
Engineer, Modern Philosophy, 7 (1933), pp. 387-396 ; G. H. MEAD, The Philosophy of John Dewey,
International Journal of Ethics, 46 (1935), pp. 64-81 ; A. E. HAYDON, Mr. Dewey on Religion and God, Journal
of Religion, 15 (1935), pp. 22-25 ; M. C. OTTO, Mr. Dewey and Religion, New Humanist, 8 (1935), pp. 41-47 ;
J. A. McWILLIAMS, Deweys Esthetic Experience as a Substitute for Religion, Modern Schoolman, 15 (1937),
pp. 9-13 ; E. VIVAS, A Note on the Emotions in Mr. Deweys Theory of Art, Philosophical Review, 47 (1938), pp.
527-531 ; P. A. SCHILPP (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, IL, 1939
; S. HOOK, John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait, Day, New York, 1939 ; C. D. AYRES, Dewey: Master of the
Commonplace, New Republic, 87 (1939), pp. 303-306 ; W. E. HOCKING, Deweys Concepts of Experience and
Nature, Philosophical Review, 46 (1940), pp. 228-244 ; M. G. WHITE, The Origin of Deweys Instrumentalism,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1943 ; V. C. ALDRICH, John Deweys Use of Language, Journal of
Philosophy, 41 (1944), pp. 261-271 ; H. SLOCHOVER, John Dewey: Philosopher of the Possible, Sewanee
Review, 52 (1944), pp. 151-168 ; R. W. SELLAR, Dewey on Materialism, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 3 (1943), pp. 381-392 ; S. ZINK, The Concept of Continuity in Deweys Theory of Esthetics,
Philosophical Review, 52 (1943), pp. 392-400 ; N. ABBAGNANO, Verso il nuovo illuminismo: John Dewey,
Rivista di filosofia, 39 (1948), pp. 313-325 ; S. KANN, Experience and Existence in Deweys Naturalistic
Metaphysics, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 9 (1948), pp. 316-321 ; B. WOLSTEIN, Deweys
Theory of Human Nature, Psychiatry, 12 (1949), pp. 77-85 ; S. HOOK (ed.), John Dewey: Philosopher of Science
and Freedom, Dial, New York, 1950 ; A. BARONI, Lesperienza di John Dewey, Studium, 46 (1950), pp. 401405 ; F. FANIZZA, Dewey filosofo dellesistenza e filosofo della scienza, Rivista di filosofia, 51 (1950), pp. 293302 ; N. PETRUZZELLIS, Il concetto di ricerca e la struttura del guidizio secondo Dewey, Rassegna di scienze
filosofiche, 3 (1950), pp. 75-91 ; E. PACI, Il problematicismo positivo di John Dewey, Il pensiero critico, (1950),
pp. 66-73 ; F. BRANCATISANO, La concezione pedagogica di J. Dewey, Rassegna di pedagogia, 8 (1950), pp.
125-127, 214-233 ; M. MAYEROFF, The Nature of Propositions in John Deweys Logic, Journal of
Philosophy, 47 (1950), pp. 353-358 ; G. DELEDALLE, La pdagogie de John Dewey, Pedagogie, (1950), pp.
478-482 ; A. BANFI, Ripensando a Dewey, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 269-274 ; D.
FORMAGGIO, Lestetica di John Dewey, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 360-372 ; F.
BRANCATISANO, Sulla formazione di John Dewey, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 409426 ; S. RATNER, The Evolutionary Naturalism of John Dewey, Social Research, 18 (1951), pp. 435-448 ; M. E.
REINA, Il circolo di esperienza e natura in Dewey, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 398401 ; M. DAL PRA, Anti-metafisica e metafisica nella logica di Dewey, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 6

(1951), pp. 275-285 ; L. GEYMONAT, La logica di Dewey e il nuovo razionalismo, Rivista critica di storia della
filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 319-327 ; F. CAFARO, John Dewey e la critica italiana, Rivista critica di storia della
filosofia, 4 (1951), pp. 427-441 ; M. G. SINGER, Formal Logic and Deweys Logic, Philosophical Review, 60
(1951), pp. 375-385 ; H. S. THAYER, Critical Notes on Deweys Theory of Propositions, Journal of Philosophy,
48 (1951), pp. 607-613 ; A. VASA, Epistemologia e sapere pragmatico nella logica del Dewey, Rivista critica di
storia della filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 304-318 ; S. ONUFRIO, John Dewey e la storia come esperienza e come
indagine, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 402-408 ; M. FOX, On the Diversity of Method in
Deweys Ethical Theory, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12 (1951), pp. 123-129 ; L. BORGHI, I
fondamenti della concezione pedagogica di John Dewey, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 6 (1951), pp. 342359 ; H. S. THAYER, The Logic of Pragmatism: An Examination of John Deweys Logic, Humanities Press, New
York, 1952 ; F. BRANCATISANO, John Dewey nella filosofia moderna, Scuola e citt, (1952), pp. 62-66, 96100, 135-143 ; R. CANTONI, John Dewey e lestetica, Il pensiero critico, 2 (1952), pp. 1-14 ; J. A. HARDON,
John Dewey, educatore sociale radicale, Civilt cattolica, 103 (1952), pp. 40-52 ; J. A. HARDON, La leggenda di
John Dewey nel campo delleducazione americana, Civilt cattolica, 103 (1952), pp. 272-283 ; F.
BRANCATISANO, La posizione di Dewey nella filosofia moderna, Il Saggiatore, 2 (1952), pp. 286-337 ; P.
ROSSI, Storicit e mondo umano in John Dewey, Rivista di filosofia, 43 (1952), pp. 399-419 ; G. CHERUBINI,
Strumentalismo e materialismo dialettico, Societ, 7 (1952), pp. 63-79 ; G. J. GUSTAFSON, John Dewey,
Catholic Mind, 50 (1952), pp. 513-519 ; W. H. KILPATRICK, John Dewey and His Educational Theory,
Educational Theory, 2 (1952), pp. 217-221 ; S. RATNER, The Development of Deweys Evolutionary Naturalism,
Social Research, 20 (1953), pp. 127-154 ; D. HOLDEN, John Dewey and His Aims of Education, Educational
Forum, 18 (1953), pp. 72-81 ; G. SNYDERS, La pdagogie de Dewey, La pense, (1953), pp. 129-151 ; W. H.
KILPATRICK, Deweys Philosophy of Education, Educational Forum, 18 (1953), pp. 143-154 ; R. ZAZZO, John
Dewey et linstrumentalisme, Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique, 46 (1953), pp. 125-132 ; D.
MEENAN, John Deweys Theory of Valuation, Modern Schoolman, 30 (1953), pp. 187-201 ; S. C. PEPPER, The
Concept of Fusion in Deweys Aesthetic Theory, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 12 (1953), pp. 169-176 ;
G. BOAS, Communication in Deweys Aesthetics, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 12 (1953), pp. 177-183
; G. KENNEDY, Science and the Transformation of Common Sense: The Basic Problem of Deweys Philosophy,
Journal of Philosophy, 51 (1954), pp. 313-325 ; P. WELSH, Some Metaphysical Assumptions in Deweys
Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy, 51 (1954), pp. 861-867 ; I. SCHEFFLER, Is the Dewey-Like Notion of
Desirability Absurd?, Journal of Philosophy, 51 (1954), pp. 577-582 ; J. L. CHILDS, John Dewey, Educational
Theory, 4 (1954), pp. 183-186 ; W. E. ARNETT, Critique of Deweys Anticlerical Religious Philosophy, Journal
of Religion, 34 (1954), pp. 256-266 ; A. BAUSOLA, Lantimetafisicismo di John Dewey, Rivista di filosofia
neoscolastica, 57 (1955), pp. 41-67 ; S. SIMEC, Human Nature According to John Dewey, Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association, 29 (1955), pp. 225-234 ; F. SMITH, A Thomistic Appraisal of the
Philosophy of John Dewey, Thomist, 18 (1955), pp. 127-185 ; D. CAMPANALE, Significato e aporie della logica
naturalistica del pensiero di John Dewey, Rassegna di scienze filosofiche, 8 (1955), pp. 18-45, 277-306 ; L.
BORGHI, Pensiero e socialit nella concezione pedagogica di John Dewey, Scuola e citt, (1955), pp. 217-226 ;
G. GIULIETTI, I fondamenti delloperativismo logico di John Dewey, Giornale di metafisica, 11 (1956), pp. 1333 ; I. SCHEFFLER, Educational Liberalism and Deweys Philosophy, Harvard Educational Review, 24 (1956),
pp. 190-198 ; L. BORGHI, La motivazione storica dello sperimentalismo del Dewey, Scuola e citt, 1957, pp. 8188 ; J. KAMINSKY, Deweys Concept of an Experience, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 17 (1957),
pp. 216-230 ; A. GUCCIONE MONROY, Logica della mente e logica della responsabilit in J. Dewey, Scuola e
citt, (1957), pp. 343-351, 402-411 ; E. RODOLFI, A proposito della teoria del valore di Dewey, Rivista di
filosofia neo-scolastica, 49 (1957), pp. 368-370 ; D. J. NEWBURY, A Theory of Discipline Derived from Deweys
Theory of Inquiry, Educational Theory, 7 (1957), pp. 102-111 ; E. M. EAMES, Quality and Relation as
Metaphysical Assumption in the Philosophy of John Dewey, Journal of Philosophy, 55 (1958), pp. 166-169 ; G. R.
GEIGER, John Dewey in Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1958 ; J. P. ANTON, John Dewey and the
Ancient Philosophies, Journal of Philosophy, 56 (1959), pp. 963-965 ; J. L. CHILDS, John Dewey and American
Education, Teachers College Record, 61 (1959), pp. 128-133 ; R. J. BERNSTEIN, Deweys Naturalism, Review
of Metaphysics, 12 (1959), pp. 340-353 ; M. BRODBECK, La filosofia di John Dewey, Rivista di Filosofia, 50
(1959), pp. 191-222 ; C. COMEL, Sul significato della religiosit in Dewey, Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica, 51
(1959), pp. 353-341 ; J. L. BLAU, John Dewey and American Social Thought, Teachers College Record, 61
(1959), pp. 121-127 ; G. KENNEDY, Deweys Concept of Experience: Determinate, Indeterminate, and
Problematic, Journal of Philosophy, 56 (1959), pp. 801-804 ; F. SMITH, John Dewey: Philosopher of Experience,
Review of Metaphysics, 13 (1959), pp. 60-78 ; F. KAUFFMANN, John Deweys Theory of Inquiry, Journal of

Philosophy, 56 (1959), pp. 826-836 ; A. PASCH, Dewey and the Analytical Philosophers, Journal of Philsoophy,
56 (1959), pp. 814-826 ; R. R. BARRY and J. D. FEARON, John Dewey and American Thomism, American
Benedictine Review, 10 (1959), pp. 219-228, 11 (1960), pp. 268-280 ; H. L. PARSONS, The Meaning and
Significance of Deweys Religious Thought, Journal of Religion, 40 (1960), pp. 170-190 ; G. SEMERARI, Il
criticismo religioso di Dewey, Rivista di filosofia, 51 (1960), pp. 343-362 ; L. BORGHI, Personalit, attivit
immaginativa ed esperienza religiosa in John Dewey, Rivista di filosofia, 51 (1960), pp. 262-278 ; G.
MORPURGO-TAGLIABUE, J. Dewey e la metafisica, Rivista di filosofia, 51 (1960), pp. 322-334 ; G.
MORPURGO-TAGLIABUE, Metafisica e gnoseologia nel pensiero di J. Dewey, Pensiero, 5 (1960), pp. 176-206
; R. RAGGIUNTI, Esperienza artistica e esperienza scientifica nel pensiero di John Dewey, Filosofia, 11 (1960),
pp. 69-92 ; A. BAUSOLA, Letica di John Dewey, Milan, 1960 ; E. A. BURTT, The Core of Deweys Way of
Thinking, Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1960), pp. 401-419 ; R. RAGGIUNTI, Due possibili criteri di
interpretazione del linguaggio filosofico di J. Dewey, Rivista di filosofia, 51 (1960), pp. 335-342 ; R. W.
SLEEPER, Deweys Metaphysical Perspective, Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1960), pp. 100-115 ; G. BOGNETTI,
Stato e diritto nel pensiero di Dewey, Rivista di filosofia, 51 (1960), pp. 254-261 ; I. N. THAT, The Status of
John Deweys Philosophical Position Today, Educational Theory, 10 (1960), pp. 40-49 ; C. METELLI DI
LALLO, Il significato del termine esperienza nelle opere di J. Dewey, Rivista di filosofia, 51 (1960), pp. 303-321
; E. BECCHI, Aspetti del criterio transazionale e del concetto di Gestalt nella logica di Dewey, Rivista di
filosofia, 51 (1960), pp. 247-253 ; G. TARELLO, Norma e giuridificazione nella logica di Dewey, Rivista
internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 37 (1960), pp. 280-292 ; J. L. BLAU, John Deweys Theory of History,
Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1960), pp. 89-100 ; R. J. BERNSTEIN, John Deweys Metaphysics of Experience,
Journal of Philosophy, 57 (1961), pp. 5-14 ; G. F. VESCOVINI, La fortuna di John Dewey in Italia, Rivista di
filosofia, 52 (1961), pp. 52-96 ; C. B. DOWNES, Some Problems Concerning Deweys View of Reason, Journal of
Philosophy, 58 (1961), pp. 121-237 ; P. HENLE, Deweys Views on Truth and Verification, University of
Colorado Studies (Series in Philosophy), 2 (1961), pp. 11-25 ; C. LAMONT, New Light on Deweys Common
Faith, Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1961), pp. 21-28 ; S. M. EAMES, The Cognitive and Non-Cognitive in Deweys
Theory of Valuation, Journal of Philosophy, 58 (1961), pp. 179-195 ; R. M. GALE, Dewey and the Problem of the
Alleged Futurity of Yesterday, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 22 (1962), pp. 501-511 ; A.
GRANESE, Valori e interessi nel pensiero filosofico e pedagogico del Dewey, I problemi della pedagogia, (1962),
pp. 543-571, 723-746 ; T. MANFERDINI, LIo e lesperienza religiosa in John Dewey, Patron, Bologna, 1963 ; R.
J. ROTH, How Closed is John Deweys Naturalism?, International Philosophical Quarterly, 3 (1963), pp. 106120 ; P. BAIRATI, Storia della filosofia ed esperienza in Dewey, Rivista di filosofia, 61 (1970), pp. 48-70 ; L.
GIOCA, Il concetto di significato in Dewey, Filosofia, 21 (1970), pp. 361-370 ; G. CORALLO, John Dewey,
Morcelliana, Brescia, 1972 ; J. GOUINLOCK, John Deweys Philosophy of Value, Humanities Press, New York,
1972 ; G. DYKHUIZEN, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1973 ;
A. J. DAMICO, Individuality and Community: The Social and Political Thought of John Dewey, University Presses
of Florida, Gainesville, FL, 1978 ; T. M. ALEXANDER, The Horizons of Feeling: John Deweys Theory of Art,
Experience, and Nature, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1987 ; R. SLEEPER, The Necessity of Pragmatism: John
Deweys Conception of Philosophy, Yale University Press, New York, 1987 ; R. D. BOISVERT, Deweys
Metaphysics, Fordham University Press, New York, 1988 ; J. E. TILES, Dewey, Routledge, London, 1988 ; L.
HICKMAN, John Deweys Pragmatic Technology, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1990 ; R. B.
WESTBROOK, John Dewey and American Democracy, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1991 ; J. TILES
(ed.), John Dewey: Critical Assessments, Routledge, London and New York, 1992 ; A. RYAN, John Dewey and the
High Tide of American Liberalism, W. W. Norton, New York, 1995 ; J. CAMPBELL, Understanding John Dewey:
Nature and Cooperative Intelligence, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle, 1995 ; J. WELCHMANN, Deweys
Ethical Thought, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1995 ; J. W. GARRISON (ed.), The New Scholarship on Dewey,
Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht and Boston, 1995 ; B. LEVINE, Works about John Dewey: 1886-1995, Southern
Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1996 ; R. D. BOISVERT, John Dewey: Rethinking Our
Time, SUNY Press, Albany, NY, 1998 ; M. ELDRIDGE, Transforming Experience: John Deweys Cultural
Instrumentalism, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1998 ; D. FOTT, John Dewey: Americas Philosopher of
Democracy, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 1998 ; L. A. HICKMAN (ed.), Reading Dewey: Interpretations
for a Postmodern Generation, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1998 ; P. W. JACKSON,
John Dewey and the Lessons of Art, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1998 ; C. HASKINS and D. I. SEIPLE
(eds.), Dewey Reconfigured: Essays on Deweyan Pragmatism, SUNY Press, Albany, 1999 ; J. R. SHOOK, Deweys
Empirical Theory of Knowledge and Reality, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, TN, 2000 ; T. DALTON,
Becoming John Dewey: Dilemmas of a Philosopher and a Naturalist, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN,

Vermont, the third of four sons, to Archibald Sprague Dewey and Lucina Artemesia Rich. The
young John Dewey attended public schools in Burlington, Vermont and in 1875 enrolled at the
University of Vermont. After graduating from that University in 1879 he taught high school for
two years in Oil City, Pennsylvania. Not content with a career teaching in high school, Dewey
enrolled in the philosophy program at the newly founded Johns Hopkins University in 1882 and
was profoundly influenced by the Hegelianism of George Sylvester Morris. Dewey graduated
with a Ph.D. in philosophy at Johns Hopkins in June of 1884 with a dissertation (now lost)
entitled The Psychology of Kant. He joined the faculty of philosophy at the University of
Michigan at Ann Arbor in 1884. Aside from a brief stint at the University of Minnessota in 1888,
Dewey taught at the University of Michigan until 1894, having become head of the philosophy
department there in 1889 after the death of his mentor Morris, who had been the previous
philosophy department head at Michigan. Early during his teaching period at the University of
Michigan, Dewey met and married Alice Chipman in 1886. Three children were born during
John and Alice Deweys stay in Michigan: Fred in 1887, Evelyn in 1889, and Morris in 1892.
While teaching at the University of Michigan, Dewey penned his first two books: Psychology,
which was published in 1887, and Leibnizs New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding
in 1888. Both works reveal Deweys Hegelianism at this early period in his philosophical career.
In 1894 John and Alice Dewey moved to Chicago where John became Professor of
Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy at the newly established University of Chicago. While in
Chicago, the Deweys had three more children: Gordon in 1896, Lucy in 1897 and Jane in 1900.
Two of their sons, Morris and Gordon, would die of illnesses in childhood. It was while teaching
at the University of Chicago that Dewey gradually abandoned his Hegelianism for the more
2002 ; E. R. EAMES and R. W. FIELD (eds.), Experience and Value: Essays on John Dewey and Pragmatic
Naturalism, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 2003 ; J. MARTIN, The Education of John Dewey,
Columbia University Press, New York, 2003 ; S. FESMIRE, John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in
Ethics, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2003 ; H. T. EDMONDSON III, John Dewey & the Decline of
American Education: How the Patron Saint of Schools Has Corrupted Teaching and Learning, ISI Books,
Wilmington, DE, 2006 ; D. J. SIMPSON, John Dewey (Peter Lang Primer), Peter Lang, New York, 2006 ; S.
FISHMAN and L. McCARTHY, John Dewey and the Philosophy and Practice of Hope, University of Illinois Press,
Champaign, IL, 2007 ; R. M. GALE, John Deweys Quest for Unity: The Journey of a Promethean Mystic,
Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 2008 ; D. HILDEBRAND, Dewey: A Beginners Guide, Oneworld, Oxford, 2008
; G. PAPPAS, John Deweys Ethics: Democracy as Experience, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2008 ; R.
FREGA, From Judgment to Rationality: Deweys Epistemology of Practice, Transactions of the Charles S. Pierce
Society: A Quarterly Journal in American Philosophy, 46.4 (2010), pp. 591-610 ; J. R. SHOOK, Deweys Enduring
Impact: Essays on Americas Philosopher, Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 2010 ; L. A. HICKMAN, M. C.
FLAMM, and K. P. SKOWRONSKI (eds.), The Continuing Relevance of John Dewey: Reflections on Aesthetics,
Morality, Science, and Society, Rodopi, New York, 2010 ; M. COCHRAN, The Cambridge Companion to Dewey,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010 ; S. R. STROUD, John Dewey and the Artful Life: Pragmatism,
Aesthetics, and Morality, Penn State Press, University Park, PA, 2011 ; D. J. MORSE, Faith in Life: John Deweys
Early Philosophy, Fordham University Press, New York, 2011 ; J. GARRISON, S. NEUBERT, K. REICH, John
Deweys Philosophy of Education: An Introduction and Recontextualization for Our Times, Palgrave Macmillan,
New York, 2012 ; A. J. GHILONI, John Dewey Among the Theologians, Peter Lang, New York, 2012 ; J. QUAY
and J. SEAMAN, John Dewey and Education Outdoors: Making Sense of the Educational Situation Through More
Than a Century of Progressive Reforms, Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, 2013 ; S. BRINKMANN, John Dewey:
Science for a Changing World, Transaction Publishers, Piscataway, NJ, 2013 ; L. HICKMAN, S. NEUBERT, and
K. REICH, John Dewey Between Pragmatism and Constructivism, Fordham University Press, New York, 2013 ; C.
HUTT, John Dewey and the Ethics of Historical Belief: Religion and the Representation of the Past, SUNY Press,
Albany, 2013 ; M. McGINN, Instrumentalism and Poetic Thinking: A Critique of Deweys Logic of Thought,
Stance, 6 (2013), pp. 45-52.

empiricist and positivist oriented philosophies of pragmatism and evolutionary naturalism. Also,
while at Chicago, Dewey founded and directed the Laboratory School at the University which
enabled him to develop his many ideas on education. This experience at the Laborary School
gave Dewey ample material for his first major pedagogical work, The School and Society,
published in 1899. Deweys other works during this period include My Pedagogic Creed (1897),
Studies in Logical Theory (1903) and Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment of Morality
(1903).
Following a dispute with William Rainey Harper, then President of the University of
Chicago, regarding the administration of the Laboratory School, Dewey resigned from the
University of Chicago in 1904 and was promptly invited to become professor of Philosophy at
Columbia University in New York, where he moved to in 1905. Dewey spent the rest of his
philosophical carrer at Columbia, retiring as full professor and becoming professor emeritus in
1929. It was during this period at Columbia that Dewey made his many trips abroad, including
trips to various countries in Europe and the Far East, as well as to Mexico and, in 1928, to
Russia. During this period teaching at Columbia University, Dewey published many works,
including Ethics (1908 in collaboration with J. H. Tufts), How We Think (1910), The Influence of
Darwin and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought (1910), Schools of Tomorrow (1915),
Democracy and Education (1916), Essays in Experimental Logic (1916), Reconstruction in
Philosophy (1920), Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature (1925), The
Quest for Certainty (1929). Later published works of Dewey include: Art as Experience (1934),
A Common Faith (1934), Experience and Education (1934), Logic: The Theory of Inquiry
(1938), Theory of Valuation (1939), Education Today (1940), Problems of Men (1946), and
Knowing and the Known (1949).
After a four month period of recovery due to a fall which resulted in a broken hip, John
Dewey died of pneumonia at his home in New York City on June 1, 1952 at the old age of 92.
Deweys second wife (his first wife Alice died of a heart condition in 1927, and Dewey
remarried in 1946) Roberta Lowitz (born 1904) died in 1970. Both John and Roberta Deweys
ashes are interred at the University of Vermont.
What is Pragmatism?
The most notable names in the philosophy of pragmatism are Charles Sanders Pierce
(1839-1914), William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952). What exactly is
pragmatism? For this we must look to the pragmatisms most famous exponent, the name most
associated with pragmatism, namely, William James (although Dewey would later become
pragmatisms most influential thinker, especially when one considers his massive influence on
the modern educational system and methods of pedagogy). In his 1907 book Pragmatism, James
describes the empiricist, nominalist, positivist and utilitarianist inspirations of his pragmatist
philosophy, which in many places in his works he describes as a radical empiricism:
Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it
represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has
ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate
habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from
verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended
5

absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards
action and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant and the rationalist temper
sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature as against dogma,
artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth. At the same time it does not stand for any
special results. It is a method onlyBeing nothing essentially new, it harmonizes with many
ancient philosophic tendencies. It agrees with nominalism for instance, in always appealing to
particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for
verbal solutions, useless questions and metaphysical abstractionsNo particular results then, so
far, but only an attitude of orientation, is what the pragmatic method means. The attitude of
looking away from the first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities; and of looking
towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts.2
Concerning Jamess pragmatic theory of truth, Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood write:
Pragmatism is a method of determining the truth or falsity of propositions according as they do
or do not fulfill our purposes and satisfy our biological and emotional needs; a true proposition is
one the acceptance of which leads to success, a false proposition is one which produces failure
and frustration. In introducing a reference to satisfactoriness, expediency, practicality and
instrumentality in his definition of truth, James drastically alters the complexion of the
pragmatism of Pierces more intellectualistic formulation.
The test, then, of a theory, a belief, a doctrine, must be its effects on us, its practical
consequences. This is the pragmatic test. Always ask yourself what difference it will make in
your experience whether you accept materialism or idealism, determinism or free will, monism
or pluralism, atheism or theism. On the one side, it is a doctrine of despair, on the other a
doctrine of hope. On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily, in the
widest sense of the word, it is true. The test of truth, then, it its practical consequences; the
possession of truth is not an end in itself, but only a preliminary means to other vital
satisfactions. Knowledge is an instrument; it exists for the sake of life, not life for the sake of
knowledge. James enlarges this pragmatic or instrumental conception so as to include in the idea
of practical utility logical consistency and verification. True ideas are those we can assimilate,
validate, corroborate, and verify. Ideas that tell us which of the realities to expect count as true
ideas. We can, therefore, say of truth that it is useful because it is true, or that it is true because it
is useful. Truth in science is what gives us the maximum possible sum of satisfaction, taste
included, but consistency both with previous truth and novel fact is always the most imperious
claimant.3
In pragmatism truth is produced, manufactured, made by means of postulation and
experimentation. For the pragmatist, something is true if it is able to satisfy some human need; it
is false if it fails to do so. In the words of the noted pragmatist, the advocate of humanism F. C.
S. Schiller: Pragmatism essays to trace the actual making of truth, the actual ways in which
discriminations between the true and the false are effected, and derives from these its
generalizations about the method of determining the nature of truth. It is from such empirical
observations that it derives its doctrine that when an assertion claims truth, its consequences are
always used to test its claim. In other words, what follows from its truth for any human interest,
2
3

W. JAMES, Pragmatism, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1907, pp. 51 ff.
F. THILLY and L. WOOD, A History of Philosophy, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1957, p. 639.

and more particularly in the first place, for the interest with which it is directly concerned, is
what establishes its real truth and validityHuman interest, then, is vital to the existence of
truth: to say that a truth has consequences and that what has none is meaningless, means that it
has a bearing upon some human interest. Its consequences must be consequences to some one
for some purpose.4
For pragmatism, truth is not permanent, necessary, universal, objective or absolute;
instead, truth, for the pragmatist, is essentially relative, particular, provisional, transformable,
subjective. In pragmatism, the sense of any proposition, and therefore its truth or falsity, is to be
judged by the mental habit it induces, the effect it has in action, and its pragmatic or working
value. In pragmatism the truth or knowledge-value of a particular proposition is not at all any
insight it is supposed to give us into things, but rather its relation of utility to human living.
Hence, the pragmatists disdain for traditional metaphysics or ontology. In pragmatism, human
functions, including all intellectual functions of cognition or belief, are essentially subordinated
and subservient to mans practical needs, to mans life, his conduct, and behaviour. For the
pragmatist, religious belief, like all beliefs, have their truth value in the degree of their usefulness
to human living and well-being. Therefore, pragmatism is more than just a method; rather, it is a
doctrine, a theory of knowledge or a type of epistemology, a philosophy.
In the pragmatist world, if a particular judgment, or assumption, or axiom, or postulate,
or theory, or system of thought works, and satisfies our psychical or emotional or social needs,
then, so far and so long as it does this, it is useful, valuable, and true. James writes in his
Pragmatism: True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify.
False ideas are those that we cannot. That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true
ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known as.
This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property
inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in
fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is
the process of its valid-ation.5
James maintains that any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one part of our
experience to any other part, linking things satisfactorily, working securely, saving labor, is true
for just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.6 For James, an idea is not simply a
mirror or passive reflection of reality; it is a habit of acting in a certain way, and therefore it is
plan or guide for our action. If we follow out this plan, we will have a series of experiences that
either lead up to the reality or do not. For example, our idea of tigers prompts us to perform
certain actions that either lead us into the presence of tigers or do not. If these experiences carry
us to the reality, the idea that prompted them is true, if they fail to do so it is false. In short, an
idea is true if it leads us to its object. The series of experiences linking the idea with the reality is
the concrete relation of agreement or pointing.

F. C. S. SCHILLER, Studies in Humanism, Macmillan, London, 1907, pp. 4-6.

W. JAMES, op. cit., pp. 200-202.
6
W. JAMES, op. cit., p. 58.
5

Accordingly, for James, truth is not an unchanging or inherent property of an idea; it

is something that happens to an idea when it is verified by experienceNeither is truth
something we discover in reality, as though it existed there before we thought about it. We make
truth by formulating ideas and acting upon them; the process of verification (as the word
indicates) is indeed one of truth-making. Bergson puts his finger on the essential nature of truth
in Jamess philosophy when he writes: We invent truth in order to use reality, as we create
mechanical devices to use natural forces. It seems to me that we can sum up the whole essence of
the pragmatic conception of truth in a formula such as this: while in other doctrines a new truth
is a discovery, for pragmatism it is an invention.7
Although James insists that it is one of mans primary duties to pursue true ideas, he
does not regard their possession as an end in itself but only as a preliminary means towards
other vital satisfactions.8 This is understandable against the background of his voluntaristic
psychology, which claims that perception and thinking are only for the sake of action, and action
is for the satisfaction of some human need.9 Hence James sees little value in a purely objective
knowledge divorced from human desires and human reasons for knowing. True ideas are always
useful ones; they enable us to use reality in order to satisfy some need. Thus truth is a species of
good: The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good,
too, for definite, assignable reasons.10
There are, accordingly, two aspects to a true idea: its verification by the facts, and its
usefulness for life. These can be distinguished but not separated; unless we have some need or
desire for an object, we will not be led to verify our idea of it. If we have no interest in tigers,
will will not be prompted to set in motion the actions that will lead us into their presence. An
idea is nothing but an instrument for satisfying some desire or need, and its verification in
experience is not an end in itself but a process that is fulfilled only in its actual use.
Since individuals differ in their needs and desires, it is understandable that Jamess
pragmatism should stress the role of the individual in determining the truth. An idea is true
insofar as it is satisfactory, but what satisfies one person does not always satisfy another. Hence
truth is to a certain degree plastic and relative to the individual.1112
As regards Jamess pragmatic theory of truth as an expression of purpose, B. A. G. Fuller
writes: By what principle is the selective activity of consciousness motivated? By the total
purpose of the consciousness in question, James answers. We attend to and promote what gives
our total nature, including our emotions and yearnings and aspirations, the greatest satisfaction.
The ideas that interest us are previews of situations that have bearing upon the achievement of
that satisfaction. They are not mere memories of situations that are dead and gone. When we
think, we are not dully looking over photographs of the past. We are trying to paint a portrait of
7

H. BERGSON, Sur la pragmatisme de William James, vrit et ralit, written as a prefece to Jamess
Pragmatism, Flammarion, Paris, 1911.
8
W. JAMES, op. cit., p. 203.
9
Cf. W. JAMES, The Will to Believe, Longmans, New York, 1897, p. 114.
10
W. JAMES, Pragmatism, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1907, p. 76.
11
Cf. W. JAMES, op. cit., p. 61.
12
E. GILSON, T. LANGAN, and A. MAURER, Recent Philosophy: Hegel to Present, Random House, New York,
1966, pp. 640-642.

future experiences that will answer to our desires and fulfill our total purpose. These experiences
are the objects to which ideas are supposed to refer.
Furthermore, and here we come to Jamess pragmatic view of the nature of truth, the
feel of truth which some ideas have is simply the feeling that they do anticipate the desired and
satisfying experience. They correspond to their objects by producing them. Conversely, the
falsity of an idea is the feeling that the experience it pictures is undesirable or unlikely to occur.
Since true ideas are regarded as forecasts of agreeable and satisfying experiences, they are in
themselves agreeable and satisfactory to entertain. Nevertheless, the proof of the pudding is in
the eating. For the idea to be truly true, it must work not merely by being pleasing in itself, but
by anticipating or producing the satisfactory experiences it promises. As long as it continues to
work in this way, it remains true. When it ceases to yield satisfactory results and no longer
works, it becomes false, and goes into the scrapbasket of outworn creeds, outgrown
hypotheses, and discredited theories.
Plainly then, for James, thinking is secondary to willing. Idea reflects impulse, and
reflects it as it wants to be reflected. The will determines how and what we shall think. Ideas,
insofar as they satisfy or disappoint the expectations of the will, envisage truth or error. The ruth
of an idea has nothing to do with anything outside experience, or even with any permanent form
and constitution of experience. It denotes simply that the idea is working satisfactorily at the
moment as a means of getting out of experience what we now want. To be true an idea must
continually come true.13
In its application as a method, pragmatism holds that a thought is true, not because it
agrees with some extra-mental reality, but because it works out right when it is applied to some
specific situation; it is false, not because it misrepresents reality, but because, when it is used, it
does not work out right. Truth, therefore, for pragmatism, consists in the usefulness of an idea in
practice: a proposition is not true or false in itself as an inactive thought in the human mind; it is
verified or falsified, that is, made true or false, by proving usable in practice.
As was said, the pragmatic is simply what will work, what is in fact effective for present
action, and pragmatism finds in this norm the sole criterion for the determination of the truth or
falsity of ideas. The very function of the human intellect is ordered towards, and gets its very
meaning from, action. The end of knowledge would be none other than the furnishing for the
pragmatist with the rules for acting. When the pragmatist discovers these sets of rules, he rests
there, content with what he deems to be belief, that is, an immediate and necessary preparation
for activity. The entire meaning of what is known lies in the action that is performed; the whole
value of human understanding would be found there. Thought receives its value and meaning in
its practical consequences.
Deweys Version of Pragmatism: Instrumentalism
Deweys version of pragmatism, called instrumentalism, emphasizes that knowledge is an
instrument to be used chiefly in the domination of our environment. Knowledge is viewed from
the evolutionary survival of the fittest point of view. The multifaceted functions of the human
13

B. A. G. FULLER, A History of Philosophy, Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1957, pp. 536-537.

mind are utilized by the thinker in response to the demands of the environment around him, and
are adaptations to that environment. For Dewey, knowing is fundamentally practical, for the sake
of action, the result of the situational interaction of a thinker with his (often hostile) environment.
Richard Field explains that Dewey came to believe that a productive, naturalistic approach to
the theory of knowledge must begin with a consideration of the development of knowledge as an
adaptive human response to environing conditions aimed at an active restructuring of these
conditions. Unlike traditional approaches in the theory of knowledge, which saw thought as a
subjective primitive out of which knowledge was composed, Deweys approach understood
thought genetically, as the product of the interaction between organism and environment, and
knowledge as having practical instrumentality in the guidance and control of that interaction.
Thus Dewey adopted the term instrumentalism as a descriptive appellation for his new
approach.14
For Dewey the function of the human mind and therefore of knowledge is to search for
the most secure ways for progress. Thinking, for him, has an essentially instrumental character
(hence his instrumentalism). Knowledge, for Dewey, is successful practice. Propositions are
instruments which may take us to the goal towards which experimental inquiry is directed.
Dewey called his version of pragmatism instrumentalism, describing its fundamental
aim and method in the following passage: Instrumentalism is an attempt to constitute a precise
logical theory of concepts, of judgments and inferences in their various forms by considering
primarily how thought functions in the experimental determinations of future consequences.15
That which stands out in pragmatism in its instrumentalist version is its references to
consequences. Dewey writes in his Essays in Experimental Logic that the term pragmatic
means only the rule of referring all thinking, all reflective considerations, to consequences for
final meaning and test.16 For Dewey, the meaning of a judgment would consist of its anticipated
consequences and its truth would be established by the actual verification of these. Hence,
judgments of any type, including categorical judgments of fact, are to be construed as a set of
hypothetical judgments embodying anticipated consequences of the judgments in question. In the
same work, Essays in Experimental Logic, he states: All propositions which state discoveries or
ascertainments, all categorical propositions, would be hypothetical, and their truth would
coincide with their tested consequences.17 And the consequences by which the meaning and
truth of judgments are tested should not be restricted, says Dewey, to those yielding an emotional
or aesthetic satisfaction since Deweyan instrumentalism is not complicated by reference to
emotional satisfactions or the play of desires.18 In instrumentalism, propositions may be
instrumentally or experimentally true even though emotionally unsatisfying to the thinker.
Describing Deweys use of ideas as instruments of successful action, B. A. G. Fuller
writes: The function of thinking is not primarily to construct general images and ideas out of
remembered perceptions or to anticipate in a general way general situations. Ideas are specific in
14

R. FIELD, John Dewey (1859-1952), IEP, 2005, par. 15.

J. DEWEY, The Development of American Pragmatism, in D. Runes, Living Schools of Philosophy, Littlefield,
Adams and Co., Amers, Iowa, 1956, pp. 410-411.
16
J. DEWEY, Essays in Experimental Logic, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1916, p. 330.
17
J. DEWEY, op. cit., p. 347.
18
Ibid.
15

10

character, are aroused by specific circumstances, and anticipate a particular occasion. They are
practical instruments for dealing with each specific situation as it arises. They are responses to
that situation, and their business is not to indulge in generalities, but to attend to it and to it alone.
Insofar as they prove effective instruments in dealing with the situation that evokes them they are
true of it. If they fail to work in any particular case, we have made a false estimate of the
situation in question.19
Operationalism Grafted Onto Instrumentalism
For Dewey, theories must have an operational import, being capable of being put into
action and yielding desirable or at least predictable consequences. William Sahakian explains
that, for Dewey, the proof of an idea consists in its being subject to predictable results.
According to experimental inquiry, the validity of the object of thought depends upon the
consequences of the operations which define the object of thought. Ideas which measure up to
the foregoing criterion of truth possess warranted assertibilityAll logical forms (with their
characteristic properties) arise within the operation of inquiry and are concerned with control of
inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions.20
Sahakian then gives, in summary form, Deweys five steps of experimental inquiry
presented in Deweys 1910 epistemological work, How We Think: The specific procedures for
solving problems are set forth as follows: (1) we observe a problem and think of its nature (main
aspects); (2) we intellectualize the problem further to analyze the total difficulty or situation of
which it is a part; (3) we make hypotheses (guiding ideas) which bear upon the problem and
constitute possible cues to a solution; (4) we analyze our hypotheses in the light of past
experience, choosing potentially feasible solutions; (5) we put these possible solutions into
practice experimentally or inductively and ascertain the results in actual experience. These five
steps comprise the process of reflective thinking, which always serves a useful purpose
beneficial to man. All sciences, according to Dewey, must be humanized, must subserve human
needs. He defined truth as a means of satisfying human needs and improving upon social
conditions which create problems. Truth is useful, publictruth benefits society, not merely the
individual. All Pragmatists agreed that practical consequences are the only valid test of truth, but
it was Dewey who worked out these five step-by-step procedures, beginning with the initial
awareness of a problem and ending with a satisfactory conclusion.21
Deweys instrumentalism is further developed in his 1929 book The Quest for Certainty,
and its fullest and definitive formulation is presented in his main epistemological work Logic:
The Theory of Inquiry, published in 1938. In The Quest for Certainty, Deweys instrumentalism
utilizes the operational theory of the meaning of scientific concepts advocated by P. W.
Bridgman. Dewey follows Bridgmans position, quoting the latters assertion that we mean by
any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with the
corresponding set of operations.22 With a combination of operational technique of conceptual
19

B. A. G. FULLER, op. cit., p. 544.

W. SAHAKIAN, History of Philosophy, Barnes and Noble, New York, 1968, p. 264.
21
W. SAHAKIAN, op. cit., pp. 264-265.
22
Quoted by Dewey in his The Quest for Certainty, p. 111. Passage from P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern
Physics, p. 5.
20

11

definition with a pragmatic emphasis on consequences, Dewey puts forward a definition of the
nature of ideas by the consequences of these operations.23 Hence, operationalism is intended to
complement and reinforce the instrumentalism and experimentalism of Deweys earlier
pragmatic method. Dewey gives credit to the operational theory with having achieved for the
first time an empirical theory of ideas free from the burdens imposed alike by sensationalism
and a priori rationalism24 and maintains that operationalism has successfully achieved the
reconciliation of rationalism and empiricism which the German transcendental idealist Immanuel
Kant tried to accomplish but was unsuccessful in doing so.
In the final and definitive formulation of his instrumentalism in Logic: The Theory of
Inquiry, Dewey states in the Preface to his work that in the proper interpretation of pragmatic,
namely the function of consequences as necessary tests of the validity of propositions, provided
these consequences are operationally initiated and are such as to resolve the specific problem
evoking the operations, the text that follows is thoroughly pragmatic. We find in this passage
that Dewey has combined the operational theory of conceptual and propositional meaning with
his elemental instrumentalism. Elemental logical forms, logical laws and logical principles are
interpreted in this operational context as postulates or stipulations. Dewey rejects rationalisms
position that the basic laws of logic are a priori principles, and maintains that they are
intrinsically postulates of and for inquiry, being formulations of conditions, discovered in the
course of inquiry itself, which further inquiries must satisfy it they are to yield warranted
assertibility as a consequence.25
Describing Deweys grafting of Bridgmans operationalism onto his own instrumentalist
and experimentalist pragmatism, Armand Maurer writes that for Dewey, ideas are plans of
operations to be performed. Their role in inquiry is the practical one of being instruments for
reaching the solution of a problem. Ideas are essentially instruments of action, whether the action
is exercised upon the physical world or upon mathematical or logical symbols. For this reason,
Deweys version of pragmatism is aptly called instrumentalism.
As plans of future operations, the truth-value of ideas will be determined by the outcome
of these operations. If the operations they direct give us the results we require, they will be sound
ideas; if they fail to yield these results, they will be unsound. Hence the test of the validity of an
idea is not its conformity to an independent reality, but its success in reconstructing a
problematic situation so as to bring about a solution.26
A true idea, then, is one that is satisfactory; but Dewey explains that the satisfaction
referred to is not just a personal one, but the satisfaction of the conditions prescribed by the
problem.27 He protests that he does not believe that just anything that satisfies him is true: I
have never identified any satisfaction with the truth of an idea, save that satisfaction which arises
23

J. DEWEY, The Quest for Certainty, Minton, Balch, New York, 1929, p. 114.
Ibid.
25
J. DEWEY, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Henry Holt, New York, 1938, p. 16.
26
J. DEWEY, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 132, 159-161. Dewey writes: The test of ideas, of thinking generally, is
found in the consequences of the acts to which the ideas lead, that is, in the new arrangements of things which are
brought into existence.
27
Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder, in The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 572.
24

12

when the idea as working hypothesis or tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a
way as to fulfill what it intends.28
This instrumental theory of ideas does away with the classic distinction between
knowing and doing. Knowing is no longer an operation distinct from action and superior to it; it
is intelligently directed action. The experimental method puts action at the center of ideas and
makes doing the very heart of knowing.29 Of what value are ideas that merely reduplicate the
already existing world? They may afford the satisfaction of a photograph, but they make no
difference in our lives. Science and philosophy should improve the world in which we live; they
should heighten its value, or else they miss their main goal. Ideas are of value only if they pass
into actions that rearrange and reconstruct the world.3031
Deweys Pragmatic Concept of Truth as Warranted Assertability
In his 1929 book Experience and Nature, Dewey presents his general notion of truth,
which is pragmatic, writing: Sometimes the use of the word truth is confined to designating a
logical property of propositions; but if we extend its significance to designate the character of
existential reference, this is the meaning of truth: processes of change so directed that they
achieve an intended consummation.32 Deweys pragmatic general concept of truth is identified
with successful activity. And he will equate successful activity itself with knowledge; and thus
knowledge and truth have an equivalency, for knowledge is the end or close of inquiry, the
attainment of truth. Dewey writes in his later work, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, that the word
knowledge is also a suitable term to designate the objective close of inquiry. But it, too, suffers
from ambiguity. When it is said that attainment of knowledge, or truth, is the end of inquiry, the
statement according to the position here taken, is a triusm.33 For Dewey, truth is equivalent to
knowledge, knowledge is equivalent to end of inquiry, and knowledge is equivalent to warranted
assertion. He states: Knowledge in its strictest and most honorific sense is warranted
assertion.34 Dewey, in fact, prefers the term warranted assertability to truth in order to avoid
ambiguity: What has been said helps to explain why the term warranted assertion is preferred
to the terms belief and knowledge. It is free from the ambiguity of these latter terms, and it
involves reference to inquiry as that which warrants assertion.35 Dewey then presents his strict
meaning of the term warranted assertability: When knowledge is taken as a general abstract
term related to inquiry in the abstract, it means warranted assertibility. The use of a term that
28

What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical?, Journal of Philosophy, 5 (1908), pp. 85-99. In this article (a
review of Jamess Pragmatism), Dewey insists that ideas are always working hypotheses concerning attaining
particular empirical results, and are tentative programs (or sketches of method) for attaining them (p. 93). He
criticizes James for sometimes abandoning this strict rule and treating any good that flows from the acceptance of a
belief as evidence of its truth. As Dewey points out, James appeals to this broader notion of pragmatic truth,
particularly when dealing with theological notions. By applying the narrower rule, Dewey eliminates these notions.
29
The Quest for Certainty, p. 38. Knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is the way of interaction by
which other natural interactions become subject to directions(ibid., p. 104).
30
Ibid., pp. 132-134.
31
A. MAURER, Pragmatism, in E. Gilson, T. Langan, and A. Maurer, Recent Philosophy: Hegel to Present,
Random House, New York, 1966, pp. 656-657.
32
J. DEWEY, Experience and Nature, W. W. Norton, New York, 1929, p. 160.
33
J. DEWEY, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, Henry Holt, New York, 1938, pp. 7-8.
34
J. DEWEY, op. cit., p. 143.
35
J. DEWEY, op. cit., p. 9.

13

designates a potentiality rather than an actuality involves recognition that all special conclusions
of special inquiries are parts of an enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a going
concern.36 So, for Dewey, truth is a kind of settlement which is very much like the resolving of
problems in the everyday personal experience. And like the progress of a persons life through
time, truth for Dewey isnt merely one successful operation but rather an accumulation of
resolved situations. Though he would accept that truth is in individual settlements of situations,
Dewey would respond by saying that it is more accurate to say that truth is rather in flux, in
process, becoming, not being static, fixed or absolute. Hence, Deweyan truth is a description of
the ongoing process of successful activity. H. S. Thayer, in his The Logic of Pragmatism,
observes that what is ordinarily called a true statement, Dewey calls a warranted assertion.
And what is usually called a theory of truth, for Dewey constitutes a description and account of
those existential conditions and the operations performed that generate warranted assertions.37
Thus, there are for Dewey valid reasons behind warranted assertions; particular conclusions are
warranted because of certain consequences that ensue, consequences validating the assertions. In
conclusion, from a consideration of Deweys general notion of truth and the terms that are
equivalent to it, we can say that for Dewey, truth is found in concrete situations and that truth
consists in the successful resolution or settlement of those concrete situations.
Deweys Pragmatic Qualities of Truth
1. Verifiability. Revealing the neo-positivist streak in instrumentalism, for Dewey, the
first quality of truth is empirical verifiability in sense experience for meaningfulness. He writes
in his 1931 work Philosophy and Civilization: It is therefore in submitting conceptions to the
control of experience, in the process of verifying them, that one finds examples of what is called
truth. Therefore, any philosopher who applies this empirical method without the least prejudice
in favor of pragmatic doctrine, can be led to conlude that truth means verification, or if one
prefers, that verification, either actual or possible, is the definition of truth.38
Contra Dewey (and His Neo-Positivist Allies): A Critique of the Principle of Verification.
The neo-positivism of the Circle of Vienna,39 basing itself on the principle of verification, had
declared metaphysics and religion to be meaningless, reducing them to the level of irrationalist
sentiment. For the neo-positivist or logical positivist system all philosophical problems must be
resolved through a sole analysis of language, linguistic analysis being identified as the proper
task of philosophy itself. All propositions that make sense are only experimental, factual, or
scientific propositions. Metaphysical propositions like God exists, as well as those
propositions of religion, ethics and aesthetics, are deprived of content inasmuch as every content
must be derived from experience, and so, for the neo-positivist, affirmations like God exists
36

Ibid.
H. S. THAYER, The Logic of Pragmatism, The Humanities Press, New York, 1952, p. 64.
38
J. DEWEY, Philosophy and Civilization, Minton, Balch & Co., New York, 1931, p. 23.
39
The Circle of Vienna (Wiener Kreis), initiated in 1895 as a chair of the philosophy of the inductive sciences in the
University of Vienna which went to Ernst Mach, who taught a series of courses there until 1901. In 1922 the chair
went to Moritz Schlick (1882-1936), who, together with a number of like-minded philosopher-physicists, published
in 1929 The Scientific Vision of the World : The Circle of Vienna (Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: der Wiener
Kries), which became the groups manifesto. Aside from Schlick, members of the group included Rudolf Carnap (its
most celebrated theorist), Kurt Gdel, Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach, Richard von Mises, Gustav Hempel, Karl
Menger, Hans Hahn, Friedrich Herbert Waismann, and Victor Kraft.
37

14

and the human soul is immortal are nonsensical. The central thesis of neo-positivism is that the
fundamental propositions of metaphysics, ethics, religion, and aesthetics, are simply
meaningless, for they fail the test of empirical verifiability.
Neo-positivism or logical positivism is an attempt to establish the validity of what man
knows by an analysis of what he says. After all, mans knowledge of reality is expressed in
propositions, so that a linguistic analysis should reveal whether a given proposition is meaningful
or simply verbal manipulation. Neo-positivists and logical positivists agree that the Humean
view of causality and empirical induction are givens, and that all philosophy is, in fact, logical
analysis, that is, it consists in the analysis of the language which ordinary people speak. There is
also a common point of agreement in the fact that such a linguistic verification eventually leads
to the rejection of metaphysical propositions such as those about causality, substance, accidents
and so forth. Such metaphysical statements are to be declared meaningless, at least in their
original intent. A certain proposition can only be sensical, and therefore true, if the elements of
such a proposition, after a linguistic analysis, can be reduced either directly or indirectly to some
sense experience or some sense data. If this is not possible, then the proposition is rendered
nonsensical or meaningless.
An example. What does the common expression apples exist mean? This philosophical
system will answer that there are no such things in reality as apples, for this is simply a verbal
constant applied to what is an almost unlimited number of sense impressions and sense
references, organized and focused upon by the thinker. The logical positivist declares that there
can be no such thing in reality as a substance apple, and since this is a fact, apples do not
exist. Locked up in an anthropocentric immanentism and empirical phenomenalism, it is not
possible to apply the existential metaphysical word exist to apples, but only to the
conglomeration of what is sensibly perceived when we see what we call an apple. Ideally, a
proposition like apples exist would have to read: there is something such that this something
is an apple. But can the expression apples exist have any meaning? Yes, for such an
expression can be directly reduced to sense experience and sense data.
What happens when logical positivism is applied to the problem of the existence of God?
To ask the question Does God exist? is to ask whether the expression God exists has any
meaning; whether it is possible to reduce it, either directly or indirectly, to sense experience. The
answer is an obvious no, for it is impossible to have an experience of the verbal elements in any
way; the proposition cannot be transcribed in terms of any known experience. Therefore, the
expression God exists is meaningless; not true or false, but simply nonsensical. Aside from
adopting the erroneous positions of Humean empiricism, logical positivism adds its own socalled principle of verification which is the principle that maintains that every meaningful
proposition must be verifiable in sense experience. The only trouble with such a principle is that
it fails to pass its own test: the principle of verification is itself unverifiable in sense experience;
it is a metaphysical principle grasped by the intellect and not by the senses. In his critique of the
neo-positivist or logical positivist principle of verification, Frederick Wilhelmsen writes: If all
propositions must be verified in sense experience, when why not the principle of verification
itself? The principle is a complex of meaning, no element of which is identified with sense
experience. Every meaningful proposition is verifiable in sense experience. The predicate,
sense experience, is not sensible; it is abstract, intelligible content; it is not identified with any
15

given sense experience. Meaningful is not a sense experience. What is the meaning of
meaning? Whatever it might be, it cannot be identified and understood simply by pointing at
something and punching it. The whole proposition might be said to stand for the totality of sense
experiences and thus to symbolize them all. If this is so, then there is a meaning beyond
experience, and this meaning is meaning itself.40
2. Workability. The second quality of truth espoused by Deweys pragmatist
instrumentalism is workability, that is, that there is a working out to provide a solution to a
practical problem. When there is a solving of a practical problem then there is truth.
3. Changeability. Truth, for Dewey is a dynamic progressive action in time, not stable or
fixed, and as such, truths are always changeable as man progresses throughout history. Frederick
Copleston observes that Deweys instrumentalism is opposed to that of eternal, unchanging
truths. Indeed, he obviously intends this opposition. He regards the theory of eternal, unchanging
truths as implying a certain metaphysics or view of reality, namely the distinction between the
phenomenal sphere of becoming and the sphere of perfect and unchanging being, which is
apprehended in the form of eternal truths. This metaphysics is, of course, at variance with
Deweys naturalism. Hence, the so-called timeless truths have to be represented by him as being
simply instruments for application in knowing the one world of becoming, instruments which
constantly show their value in use. In other words, their significance is functional rather than
ontological. No truth is absolutely sacrosanct, but some truths possess in practice a constant
functional value.
This theory that there are no sacrosanct eternal truths, but that all statements which we
believe to be true are revisible in principle or from the purely logical point of view, obviously
has important implications in the fields of morals and politics. To generalize the recognition that
the true means the verified and nothing else place upon men the responsibility for surrendering
political and moral dogmas, and subjecting to the test of consequences their most cherished
prejudices.41 In Deweys opinion this is one of the main reasons why the instrumentalist theory
of truth raises fear and hostility in many minds.42
4. Successful Application in Concrete Circumstances or Situations. Instrumentalisms
fourth quality of truth is that it succesfully submit to the crucial test of circumstances. Truths
have definite relations to concrete situations, and requires that they prove their worth in these
situations. Dewey states: Truth and falsity present themselves as significant facts only in
situations in which specific meanings and their already experienced fulfilments and nonfulfilments are intentionally compared and contrasted with reference to the question of the
worth, as to reliability of meaning of the given meaning or class of meaningsTruth is an
experienced relation of things, and it has no meaning outside of such relations.43

40

F. WILHELMSEN, Mans Knowledge of Reality, Prentice-Hall, Englewood-Cliffs, NJ, 1956, pp. 50-51.
J. DEWEY, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Henry Holt, New York, 1920, p. 160.
42
F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, Book III (vol. 8), Image Books, Doubleday, New York, 1985, p. 366.
43
J. DEWEY, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Henry Holt, New York, 1910, p. 95.
41

16

Critiques of Pragmatism
Celestine Bittles Critique of Pragmatism. Bittle describes the various contradictions,
confusions and inconsistencies inherent in the pragmatist epistemological system, writing that,
for pragmatism, which is a voluntarist system, the truth of judgments does not arise from their
correspondence to reality. The pragmatist criterion of truth consists in the utility of a belief in
satisfying human needs in a social way. That is true which works, which has practical value,
which leads to beneficial results for human progress, which promotes the best interest of
mankind through living experience. Results make a belief true or false for the time being. Beliefs
become true, when they function for the social welfare of humanity; and false, when they cease
to function along these lines. Truth is, therefore, nothing static and immutable, but something
dynamic and perpetually changing. Consequently, a belief may be true at one stage of
development, and the same belief may be false at a different stage; something may be true under
one set of conditions and false under another; a theory may be true for one class of people and
false for another class, depending on the intellectual and cultural conditions prevailing at a
particular time and in a particular locality. Truth, as will be seen, is entirely subjective in
character.
This interpretation of truth is contrary to the accepted meaning attached to the world by
all men, whether educated or uneducated, and amounts to a perversion of language. To identify
truth with utility is nothing less than to reduce the true to the good. The good, however,
is the object of the will, not of the intellect, while the true has been considered by men at all
times to be the proper object of the intellect. A lamentable confusion of thought must result from
this identification of the true with the good. If both are identical, so that truth is the object of
the will, what can possibly be the object of the intellect? As a natural faculty of man it must have
a natural object, just as well as the will; but if we remove truth from the intellect, the latter is
without a proper object with which to exercise its power. The exercise of any power or faculty
involves the striving to realize something, and that demands an object within its own proper
sphere of activity. Every power or faculty of the human organism, internal as well as external,
had its proper object; the will, for instance, strives toward the realization of the good. But what
could possibly be the object of the intellect except the realization and acquisition of truth?
There is no other object assignable or discoverable. Pragmatists may assert that the true is
identical with the good, but that will never really identify such totally disparate things. Their
attitude is unjustifiable, because contrary to the fundamental conceptions of men.
Besides, in identifying the true with the good, pragmatists do not solve the
epistemological problem of knowledge. The problem of knowledge remains just as acute as
before; it cannot be solved by transferring the concept of truth from the field of knowledge to
the field of action and then denying that a problem of knowledge exists. We must still answer
the questions: Is there an objective reality which is extra-mental? Can this reality be known?
How is it known? How do our judgments interpret this reality? Do they correspond with it? How
can we have certitude about this? These questions constitute the problem of knowledge and the
mind of man will not be satisfied, and will continue to exert its powers of reasoning, until these
questions are answered or until the mind sinks in despair into skepticism. But ignore this
problem the mind cannot. Whether we call the answers to these questions truth or whether we
give it another name, makes little difference: it is the problem and its solution that count, and
17

they pertain to the province of the intellect and must be solved by the intellect and not by the
will. Pragmatism, therefore, does not solve the problem of knowledge by dubbing it
metaphysics and then ignoring its existence.
And pragmatists are inconsistent. They identify truth with utility and thus transfer it
to the province of the will. Nevertheless, they appeal to the intellect with a great array of
arguments, to prove that truth is to be judged according to its beneficial results. Thereby they
surreptitiously substitute the intellect for the will as the arbiter of truth and error and
unconsciously admit after all that it is in the intellect, and not the will, which must decide
whether their theory or opposite theories give the correct (or true) solution of the problem of
knowledge and truth. Since they appeal to the reasoning intellect, they must abide by its verdict.
Now, it is the verdict of the reasoning intellect, as we have shown, that truth is found in the
judgment interpreting reality and not in the results which flow from a certain belief. It is not
utility which determines the truth of judgments, beliefs and theories, but the objective
evidence of reality. In fact, when pragmatists attempt to prove their own theory, they marshall
numerous facts and reasons in order to show that utility and not objective evidence is the
criterion of truth and the motive of certitude; and in doing so, they appeal to the objective
evidence of these facts and reasons to establish their case. Their own attitude and action is their
best refutation.
Moreover, pragmatists claim that those beliefs are true which satisfy human needs and
produce beneficial results for man in a social way. What needs, and what beneficial results? We
must know them, so as to be able to ascertain which beliefs contain truth and which error. In
order to know whether needs are real or apparent and whether results are beneficial or harmful, it
is necessary for the intellect to discover the facts regarding these needs and results and then pass
judgment on the truth or error of the beliefs. But here again, if any judgment corresponds to the
facts at issue, it is true; and if it does not, it is false. Thus it can be seen that truth and error
reside in the judgment and their presence is determined by the objective evidence of the facts.
The good results may be taken as an index or sign of truth, but the ultimate criterion of truth lies
in the objective evidence before the mind. As long as it is necessary to have a criterion to
discriminate between real and apparent needs, between beneficial and harmful results,
between beliefs which work and those which do not work, results cannot be considered the
ultimate criterion. Results do not appear with labels attached; they can be discerned only by the
intellect. Even from a pragmatist standpoint, then, the truth or error of beliefs cannot be decided
without the judging power of the intellect. The ultimate criterion for the intellect, however, as
has been seen, consists in the clear self-manifestation of reality or self-evidence. Hence,
pragmatism does not satisfy the needs of the intellect as a theory of truth and knowledge and,
judged by its own criterion, is unsatisfactory and therefore false.
Finally, how can I apply the pragmatist criterion to everyday existential judgments? I
judge that My watch is slow, a car is passing, my feet are cold, and so on. These statements
contain truth or error. By what possible results for human progress and welfare am I to decide
whether they are true or false? Or will a pragmatist seriously assert that there is no truth or error
in these and similar judgments? If he claims there is not, we must dissent; if he agrees that there

18

is, he must admit that his criterion does not apply. A criterion, however, which fails in its
essential function, is worthless, because it is no criterion at all: it does not work.44
P. Coffeys Critique of the Pragmatist Criterion of Utility in Relation to Truth: We do
not deny that the practical issues of a belief can create a presumption for or against its truth, that
the fruits of a doctrine can be even a criterion, a subsidiary test, of its truth or falsity, i.e. its
practical fruits: for of course if speculatively false conclusions follow logically from any
doctrine as antecedent, this is a certain index that the doctrine is false.45 But in some measure the
truth or otherwise of doctrines that have or ought to have a bearing on human conduct can be
judged by their moral consequences. Let us see how, and how far.
Firstly, man ought to find in his fundamental beliefs, in his philosophy of life, his
general world-outlook or Weltanschauung, principles whereby to guide and direct his conduct:
all philosophy should embody an Ethic or practical philosophy, a philosophy of conduct. Hence
if any philosophy contains no directive principles, throws no light on the problem of conduct
(e.g., skepticism, agnosticism), or contains ethical principles the application of which would do
violence to mans moral nature, subvert the whole moral order and lead to moral chaos, e.g., by
opening the way to murder, suicide, fraud, injustice, sexual immorality, etc. (as would atheism,
materialism, evolutionism or the survival of the fittest, meaning the strongest, with the
Nietzschean corollary that Might is Right, etc.), such philosophy cannot be sound or true but
must have something rotten in it. Yet, obviously, the test is not ultimate, for it assumes that we
know (otherwise and independently) what kind of conduct is right, and what kind is criminal:
which implies knowledge of the real nature, destiny and end of man.
Hence, secondly, it yields only a presumption, or a practical confirmation, of the truth or
falsity of doctrines. The moral issues of a system, therefore, should arouse inquiry, stimulate
reflection, and urge us to verify by speculative investigation the conclusion they suggest to us
regarding the truth or falsity of the system.
Thirdly, when the moral issues of a philosophy are perverse, noxious, disastrous,
scholastics use thus argumentum ex consectariis, this discerning of systems by their fruits:
ex fructibus eorum cognoscetis eos, as a negative, indirect and confirmatory argument in
refutation of such systems. It is an argument which can have much force and can make a strong
and effective appeal to right-minded people. But for grounding human certitude it can never be
ultimate.
Pragmatism, however, goes much farther than all this, for (a) it identifies the truth of a
judgment or belief with its utility; (b) it denies that truth in the sense of conformity of the
judgment with reality is intellectually attainable; (c) it holds that the only and universal test of
the truth of a judgment, i.e. of its real conformity or harmony with the veritable needs of human
life and existence, is to be found by living it, by experiencing how it works, whether it succeeds
by being assimilated, incorporated in the progressive current of human existence, or fails by
being rejected and eliminated from among the beliefs that are found really helpful and
beneficent. Against all of which we assert that experienced utility is neither identical with truth,
44
45

C. BITTLE, op. cit., pp. 322-325.

Cf. P. COFFEY, The Science of Logic, Peter Smith, New York, 1938, pp. 296-297 (vol. 1) and p. 313 (vol. 2).

19

nor is it the only or the adequate test of truth, nor is the Pragmatist application of it any more
than a misleading evasion of the real problem as to the ultimate ground and motive of human
certitude.
What do Pragmatists mean by the utility of a belief, its suitability, its working-value, its
success, the character of its practical issues, its harmony with the process and purpose of human
existence? We are told that a belief or judgment is true if it verifies or realizes what those and
other similar expressions imply. But what do they imply? They are all relative to an end. They
are all unintelligible unless in reference to an end, and to a known end, to something certainly
known to be an end, a good, a perfection, a something really worthy of attainment. A belief is
true if it proves useful, suitable, workable, successful. But useful, etc., for what? For helping,
developing, enlarging, perfecting human life and existence generally? But what is the end or
object or aim of human existence? Until I know this how am I to know whether the actual
working of a belief is good or bad, successful or unsuccessful? How am I to judge of a means
unless and until I know the nature of the end to which it is a means? And how can I discover the
supreme, essential end or perfection of human nature, and the veritable goal of human existence,
unless by the use of my intellect or reason on the data of experience. But there we are back into
the intellectualism, and metaphysics which it was the raison dtre of Pragmatism to
demolish.
The pragmatist criterion of the experienced success of a belief in helping, developing,
forwarding, enlarging, perfecting human existence, will not itself work, and cannot itself even
begin to be applied, until we know whether human life has a purpose, whether there is a good
towards which it moves, and what this good is: for only then can we judge what movements,
what conduct, what beliefs, tend to develop and perfect life, and what ones tend in the opposite
direction. But hiw can we know these things? Only by intellect, if at all. They are some of the
problems of metaphysics; and their solution is a piece of amusement in which pragmatists
might profitably indulge.
Again: if it is only by the actual living of a belief that men generally can discover its
truth by assimilating it with their vital experience, or its falsity by rejecting or eliminating it
from their vital experience; if its truth or falsity consists in the relation it gets to vital
experience through this alternative process, and is always relative to the actual stage of human
progress at which this sifting process is going on; and if also the whole general human
movement, or the whole cosmic movement, with which all human vital experience, intellectual
or intuitional, is one and continuous, be the whole of (the ever-evolving) reality, and be an end
in itself, does it not follow that all beliefs, while entertained by any one and in any degree
operative, are eo ipso true? And moreover, do not these questions inevitably arise: Are not all
beliefs and all conduct equally right or equally wrong? Is it not that whatever is, is right? or
rather that right and wrong become unintelligible? Is man really responsible and free? or is the
process of perpetual change, or fieri, in which reality is supposed to consist, subject to a rigid
and blind determinism? Once more, these are all questions for which we must find an answer
before the test proposed by pragmatists can be intelligently reduced to practice. They are
questions which the Pragmatist test cannot decide, and which must be decided, if at all, by
intellect interpreting the data of experience.

20

Finally, if we apply to beliefs the test of success, or harmonizing or not harmonizing

with the progressive development of our human activity, it must be remembered that no small
department of that activity is intellectual; and, what is more, that intellect exercises and that as
rational beings we should not try to prevent it, and cannot succeed even if we try to prevent it,
from exercizing a supreme suzerainty over all other domains of mental life and action. If a
belief cannot be assimilated or lived because it is intellectually incompatible with some
already accepted belief, is this failure a practical issue which determines the falsity of the former
belief? If so, and the pragmatist cannot consistently deny it, the whole intellectual domain
becomes practical, and the intellectual failure of any belief becomes the index of its falsity. But
the intellectual failure of a belief to impose itself arises from its apprehended incompatibility
with other judgments known to be true, or from its opposition to the objective evidence of the
data of experience, or from its want of adequate objective grounds for intellectual assent. The
Pragmatist test, therefore, as applied to the domain of intellectual needs and functions and
interests, becomes the test demanded by intellectualism, viz. objective evidence. Now there is an
exceedingly wide department of human judgements, belief in which can have no other human
interest to test them than this purely intellectual kind of success or failure: all purely speculative
judgments the knowledge of which can have no other cause than mans intellectual desire for
knowledge, and no other practical effect or interest (by which to test how they work) than the
satisfaction of this natural cupiditas sciendi. And if, further, intellect will nolens volens assert its
supremacy over all our beliefs, and its right to judge all their sources and motives, then the
intellectual test of objective evidence must remain supreme and ultimate.46
Joseph T. Barrons Critique of Pragmatism: Pragmatisms Faulty Theory of
Consciousness. This school regards experience as a continuous stream out of which the mind
selects certain aspects because of their usefulness or aptitude for service. Thought is
fundamentally selective. The mind is not necessitated by the presentation of experience to select
this or that particular aspect. It is essentially free in the exercise of its preferences. But does
introspection bear out this contention? When we examine the way in which our knowledge is
formed, is it not apparent that our environment often forces knowledge upon us, in the sense that
we feel ourselves under compulsion as to what we cognize? Is it not equally apparent that very
frequently we are compelled to become aware of realities which are antagonistic to our needs,
and which thwart our desires? If our knowledge is to be true must we not adjust our judgments
about reality to the reality which we are judging? If the verdict of introspection is worthy of
credence the basic note in the pragmatic doctrine of knowledge is not founded on fact.
Knowledge is Not Wholly Practical. Granting that knowledge is the result of the
interaction of a mind with its environment, the deduction that knowledge never transcends the
sphere of the practical is illicit it is an undue restriction of the scope of cognitive interest.
Knowledge, considered either phylogenetically or ontogenetically, may have emerged as a
practical interest, but that is no warrant for the assertion that it must remain practical.
Pragmatism stresses unduly the instrumental aspect of thinking. The falsity of its position is due
to the fallacious assumption that a being can only function within the limits of the causes which
brought it into being. Once a being has been realized it can develop new needs which go beyond
the causes which produced it. Thought may have been practical at its inception but introspection
tells us that it goes beyond its practical beginnings. When man begins to think he becomes a
46

P. COFFEY, op. cit., pp. 360-365.

21

thinking being, and he is thereby released from the necessity of confining his thinking to facts of
practical interest. Human beings no longer have merely the need to live, they have also the need
to know. Man began to think in order that he might eat; he has evolved to the point where he eats
in order that he may think.47
Knowledge is scientific or contemplative as well as practical because the world is
intelligible as well as plastic. We all feel within us the urge to know for the mere sake of
knowing. Curiosity, a species of divine discontent, impels us to acquire knowledge, much of
which is utterly impractical. Thinking is a means to an end, but it can become an end in itself.
The enjoyment which comes from knowledge is one of the values which enrich life for us, and
hence contemplative thinking is not necessarily otiose. Disinterested contemplation and
enjoyment of the beauty, grandeur, meaning, and order of things for their own sake are for some
human beings inherently worthful functions of consciousness.48
This summary discussion of the pragmatic doctrine on the nature of knowledge cannot
be dismissed without mention of the deprecatory attitude of this school toward metaphysical
reasoning, and toward speculative philosophy in general. Pragmatists inveigh against abstract
speculation alleging that it is futile and barren. They maintain that philosophy should be put to
work. It should descend from the clouds and become pedestrian. It should busy itself in the
answering of those urgent social problems that are clamoring for solution. This is an attitude of
mind that is found not only among those of a pragmatic bent it is found also among scientists.
Despite its widespread acceptance this view cannot be sustained.
The chief reason forbidding its acceptance is that it is too exclusive. Philosophy should
be practical but should it be confined to that realm alone? A more comprehensive and a truer
view of the function of philosophy includes its speculative as well as its practical function. It is
worthy of note that in establishing his view of the instrumental character of our thinking Dewey
has created a speculative philosophy. He proves that thought should not be speculative by a
speculation. The practical value of his speculation seems at best only the negative one of
clearing away supposed mental obstacles to change and reconstruction, and since its own
metaphysical peculiarities are far more obscure and doubt-provoking than the practical attitude
for which they are intended to supply a foundation, they are liable to weaken, rather than
increase the possible influence for good which philosophy may exert.49
It may be asserted that those who deny the validity of metaphysical and speculative
thinking do so at the risk of self-contradiction, for their very assertion that metaphysical thinking
is nugatory is itself metaphysical.50

47

W. P. MONTAGUE, The Ways of Knowing, Macmillan, New York, 1925, p. 158.

J. A. LEIGHTON, The Field of Philosophy, Appleton Co., New York, 1922, p. 360.
49
A. K. ROGERS, English and American Philosophy since 1800, Macmillan, New York, 1922, p. 393.
50
J. T. BARRON, Elements of Epistemology, Macmillan, New York, 1936, 48-50.
48

22