Castillo Munoz 1

Pedro Castillo Munoz

Professor Lynda Haas
Writing 39C
April 26th, 2015
Equality Extended Beyond Humans: The Great Apes
For the last sixty years, primatologists have conducted research that proves non-human
primates communicate, mourn, socialize, and have consciousness that is very close to
humans. Furthermore, organizations, such as The Great Ape Project are conducting research
that proves between chimpanzees and humans there is only a 1.23% difference in DNA. This
substantial scientific evidence has led researchers like Allison Jolly to claim that non-human
primates should be granted the fundamental rights to life and freedom (250). Jane Goodall,
English primatologist and expert on chimpanzees, for example, has been studying non-human
primates since the late 60s focusing on social and family interactions among themselves
(Goodall 2). The ethical problem voiced by Goodall over fifty years ago is still portrayed
through different mediums such as through theaters as the movie Monkey Kingdom was
recently released over numerous countries of the world. Anyhow, this issue discusses
different behaviors that have been detected in non-human primates during harmless
experiments; behaviors that could definitely be considered signs of consciousness in these
animals. The discussion opens up with experiments that post the question whether apes
communicate, such as Scott-Phillips article on Primate communication and pragmatics.
Moreover, Doran-Sheehy and Salmis experiment that analyzes communication amongst
Gorillas through what they refer to as hoot series (The Function of Loud Calls (Hoot
Series) in Wild Western Gorillas). Next, a review of Barbara Kings book chapters on ape

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grief and mourning to tie the social conduct with their physical activities . Lastly, a review of
the ethics behind all of these experiments which is discussed in Kristin Andrews article The
First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds. The purpose
behind this review is to familiarize the audience with the fact that non-human primates are
conscious living creatures and should therefore be considered as equal individuals that
deserve to be granted fundamental rights such as the right to live and be free.
Professor Scott-Phillips from Durham University focuses his research on nonhuman primate
communication and ties his results to the origins of language. In other words, Scott-Phillips
article, Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins of Language,
traces back the origins of human language to great ape communication by specifically telling
us that great ape communication involves the use of metacognitive abilities that ... were
exapted for use in what is an evolutionarily novel form of communication: human ostensive
communication (56). Scott-Phillips firstly makes reference to the first experiments that
focused on comparing human to ape communication. As a early as 1892 playback
experiments in which animal vocalization were recorded and then played to a different group
of animals, but of the same species. Their reactions were then observed and compared to
words in human language (Seyfarth, Cheney, Marler 1980b). Nevertheless, Scott-Phillips
mentions that words and monkey reactions to alarm calls identified in this research
completely rely on different cognitive mechanism and cannot be directly compared to one
another (53). This rose question whether apes communicate intentionally. As well as ScottPhillips, other scientists such as Call and Tomasello agree that ape communication is not
intentional. Anyhow, Scott-Phillips argues that there are other aspects of communication
that are at least as important as intentionality that have received far less attention(53). In
the section Does Nonhuman Primate Communication Use Ostension and Inference of his
article, he proves that ape communication is not ostensive, thus assuming that ape

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communication uses a form of code model that allows apes to communicate. He mentions
that ape gestural communication is very sophisticated and it is based on a process that
scientist refer to as ontogenetic ritualization, in which a behavior takes on a communicative
function by virtue of its repeated use in the interactions of two (or more) individuals (Call
and Tomasello 2007). As a result, if one sees the view that this code was simply enhanced by
metapsychological abilities that humans use to communicate, it is clear to see that human
language evolved from this simplistic form of ape communication.
In addition to Scott-Phillips findings, Doctor Roberta Salmi and professor Diane DoranSheehy narrowed down the topic of great ape communication to a specific form exhibited in
western gorillas. In the article The Function of Load Calls (Hoot Series) in Wild Western
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) Salmi and Doran-Sheehy established that western gorillas use loud,
long-distance calls (Hoot Series) to bring the reunite the group in a specific place (379). To
begin their research, they first established whether hoot series were used to establish spatial
proximity among them. They outlined four criteria that needed to be met in order to exactly
tell what the function of hoot series is. First, the hoot series should vary from one individual
to the other in order to allow recipient to distinguish who was making the call and respond to
the sender correspondingly. Secondly, the call should only be emitted when the sender and
the recipient become further apart than normal. Thirdly, the distance between the sender and
the caller should be either stable or increasing before the call is emitted and should
immediately decrease after the call has been emitted. Lastly, the call should differ from those
recipients that are in the group from those that are not (380). In order to make sure these
criteria were met, Salmi and Doran-Sheehy collected all the behavioral data and vocal
recordings over a period of fifteen months from a healthy, well-habituated group of gorillas
that lived in the Mondika Research Center located in the Republic of Congo. The conclusion
of the experiment was that between the beginning and the start of a hooting series the

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distance between the sender(s) and the recipient(s) decreased significantly. As a result, Salmi
and

Doran-Sheehy proved that

because inter-individual distances
were increasing prior to the calls and
decreasing only after, we [Salmi and
Doran-Sheehy] conclude that hoot

series

function as signals for individuals to

regroup (386). Taking the two
experiments outlined above as reference,

it is obvious to conclude that non-human primates, gorillas in this case, communicate in

highly sophisticated ways that might not seem very clear to humans right away. It is
important, though, to note that there are many other aspects about nonhuman primates that
tell us that they are conscious and should therefore be granted rights and equality; other
aspects about nonhuman primates that reflect this idea include grief and mourning.
In chapter twelve of her book, How Animals Grieve, Barbara King describes ape grief. King
starts off by describing two different situations, one in the wild and one in captivity, in which
chimpanzees show specific behaviors that signal animal grief. She mentions that the apes eat
less than normal, sleep less and in different places than they are used to when a companion or
a member of their group dies. King describes these behaviors as an altered routine and as a
disturbed mood (129). To illustrate, King describes the death of chimpanzee Pansy who
lived in a Scottish safari park together with another chimpanzee mother called Blossom.
Pansy fell ill, describes King, and started having problems to breathe, to the point that the
owners of the park anticipated her death. The mothers offspring, Chippy and Rosie, both
seemed to know that something was not in order and immediately started showing signs of
agitation and desperation. In Kings own words in the ten minutes before her death, they

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groomed her or caressed her at what the observers judged to be a higher than usual rate
(King 130). After Pansys death different behaviors were observed: Chippy (Blossoms son)
attacked Pansys corpse by pounding her torso repeatedly times that night; Rosie (Pansys
daughter) stayed near the corpse for long periods of time; Blossom (the other mother
chimpanzee) did not sleep much and although she used to sleep on the platform on which
Pansys body lay, she did not sleep there neither did the other chimpanzees (King 131).
Despite the fact that these behaviors have no scientific explanations, there are not any other
explanations for these random acts. King expands on another example of a strange behavior
in monkeys when another monkey dies. More specifically, King discusses the action that
mother chimpanzees take when their offspring die shortly after they have been born.

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King
makes reference to Peter Fashings and his colleagues research in which they observed
gelada monkey of Guassa, Ethiopia. King give specific attention to three cases that in which
three mother gelada monkeys carry their offspring after they had died for thirteen, sixteen,
and forty-eight days. King notes that the carrying behavior does, after all, represent a
substantial energy expenditure by the mother (66). So the question remains, why do
monkeys exhibit these behaviors? To the plain human eye it might seem like the mother just
does not know the baby has died, or to some it might look like a way for the mom to express
the pain for the loss. In any event, these kind of behaviors have over time influenced humans
in a way that we start considering animals and relating with them through stronger bonds. To
conclude this review I would like to discuss some of the steps that humans have taken in
considering apes as equals.
Philosophy professor from the University of New York (Toronto), Kristin Andrews, focuses
her research on the nature of social cognition and examines human social relations and the
relationships among, and between, animals of different species. In her essay The First Step
in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for Other Minds, Andrews states that

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before great apes can be considered equal, the idea that they (and other animals) are not
conscious much be demolished (131). Andews argument is partially based on the fact that
great apes can also rationally think and also possess some problem-solving skills. Andrews
makes reference to Wolfgang Koehlers studies in which he hung food out of the monkeys
reach, locked it in a box, and kept it outside their cage. Koehler observed that almost every
time the monkey would find a way to obtain the food, simply by using common objects kept
in the cage (138). This indicates that monkeys have the ability to use human tools in order to
achieve a desired goal, in other words chimps have what Andrews refer to as instrumental
rationality (138). Andrews then argues that this behavior can also be observed in the wild as
chimpanzees use several tools to gather food and seek protection. For example, Andrews says
that chimps use hammers or anvil type tools to open nuts, use tools as weapons to threaten or
attack intruders, and use leaves to clean their bodies of blood and feces (139). Although
Andrews also covers communicative ability, I will not expand on that section of her essay
simply because I have already made reference to other sources. Lastly, to support her
argument that great apes are conscious, Andrews states that if humans believe that other
humans are conscious based on the argument from analogy, the rational conclusion is to
believe that apes are also conscious. In her own words she states that one who accepts the
existence of humans minds is then rationally compelled to accept the existence of great ape
minds in general (132). Putting all the pieces together, we can conclude that because of the
criteria outlined in this paragraph and the rest of the body, great apes are conscious
individuals and should therefore be considered as equal in our community.
In conclusion, there are numerous studies and experiments that point to the conclusion that
animals, for my purpose great apes, are conscious and explicitly show that great ape are very
organized and charismatic living creatures. But the question that remains is the following:
what influence does this statements have in humans? Some of the treatment that these

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animals experience seem to disregard the results outlined in this paper. Taking offspring away
from their mothers, performing painful experiments with long-lasting effects, and keeping
them [great apes] in captivity are just some of the mistreats that these great animals have to
endure. Now presented with the facts it is up to us to decide what we want to change; I am
aware, however, that things do not change from one day to another and that many things need
to happen before anything is settled, but the advocacy of animal consideration can start by
simply loving animals. As doctor Kathy Rudy argues in her book Loving Animals, the best
way to stop mistreat of animals is through love and affection, given that we (humans) are
emotionally driven (Rudy 4). Despite the fact that over time we have become very
knowledgeable about animals, there is still a lot left to and the sooner we start the better for
these creatures will be.

Work Cited
Andrews, Kristin. The First Step in the Case for Great Ape Equality: The Argument for
Other Minds. Etica & Animali: The Great Ape Project. (1996): 131-141.
Scott-Phillips, Thomas C. "Nonhuman Primate Communication, Pragmatics, and the Origins
of Language." Current Anthropology 51.6 (2015): 56-80.
Doran-Sheehy, Diane, R. Salmi. The Function of Load Calls (Hoot Series) in Wild Western
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla). American Journal of Physical Anthropology 155.1 (2014):
379-391.
Goodall, Jane, and Hugo Van Lawick. My Friends, the Wild Chimpanzees. Washington, D.C.:
Society, 1967. Print.

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Jolly, Allison. Conscious Chimpanzees? A Review of Recent Literature. Cognitive

Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
1991. 231-252. Print.
King, Barbara J. How Animals Grieve. Chicago: Univ of Chicago, 2014. Print.
Rudy, Kathy. Loving Animals: Toward a New Animal Advocacy. Minneapolis: U of
Minnesota, 2011. Print.
Seyfarth, R. M., D. L. Cheney, and P. Marler. 1980a. Monkey responses to three different
alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic communication. Science
210:801803.
Tomasello, M., J. Call, and A. Gluckman. 1997. Comprehension of novel communicative
signs by apes and human children. Child Development 68(6):10671080.