COMMUNIST RULE, MUSLIM

RESISTANCE AND US
INTERVENTION
KHALQIS TAKE POWER ON APRIL 27, 1978
NUR MUHAMMAD TARAKI AND HAFIZULLAH AMIN HAVE
UNEASY LEADERSHIP
FACTIONAL INFIGHTING AMONG KHALQIS
SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN, DECEMBER 1979
RISE OF ISLAMIC RESISTANCE WITH DIFFERENT FACTIONS BY
UNITED STATES THROUGH PAKISTAN
BIRTH OF AL QAEDA
SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND ABANDONEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMISM
Violence became the main factor in
state-society relations
Soviet support kept the Afghan
Communists in power and able to
suppress resistant Afghan population
Massive violence, countless victims,
transformative and disruptive force
in changing fabric of Afghan society

PDPA/COMMUNISTS TAKE
POWER
KHALQIS LED BY NUR MUHAMMAD TARAKI
ASSUME POWER IN A BLOODY COUP DETAT
PARCHAM IN GOVERNMENT BUT HAD NO REAL
POWER
DAUD AND HIS ENTIRE FAMILY NETWORK KILLED
BY KHALKIS
COMMUNISTS LACKED LEGITIMACY,
ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITY AND POPULAR
SUPPORT
NOT EQUIPPED TO RULE OVER MUSLIM AND
TRIBAL SOCIETY

SOVIET RESPONSE TO PDPA

COMING TO POWER
SOVIETS SUPPORTED PDPA
TAKEOVER OF POWER FOR
PRACTICAL, NOT IDELOGICAL
REASONS
SOVIETS WANTED FRIENDLY REGIME
IN KABUL

INTERNAL FIGHTING
KHALQI LEADERS TARAKI AND AMIN GAINING
ASCENDANCY IN LEADERSHIP OF COMMUNIST
GOVERNMENT
PARCHAMIS IN GOVERNMENT BUT DENIED REAL
AUTHORITY
BY SUMMER 1978 TARAKI CONSOLIDATED POSITION AS
PDPA GENERAL SECRETARY AND AMIN BECAME
REGIME STRONGMAN, HUNDREDS OF PARCHAMIS
WERE PURGED AND ARRESTED OR EXECUTED ON
CHARGES OF COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
BY END OF 1978 KHALQI DOMINATING POSITION IN ALL
GOVERNING BODIES WAS DOMINANT

KHALQI MISCALCULATED POLICIES

3 DECREES PROVOKED ARMED RESISTANCE TO
KHALQI RULE
DECREE NO.6 LIQUIDATION OF USURY IN
AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES AND PRODUCTION
OF PRODUCTION COOPERATIVES
DECREE NO.7 IMPOSED AGE RESTRICTIONS ON
MARRIAGE, CURTAILED POLYGAMY, ABOLISHED
MAHR
DECREE NO.8 CONFISCATION AND REDISTRIBUTION
OF LAND WHICH PROVED TO BE DISASTROUS AND
NOT BENEFICIAL TO ANYONE

PDPA COULD NOT SURVIVE

WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT
Within 6 months of the coup, 30
agreements worth more than US $14
billion had been concluded between
Soviet Union and Afghanistan
Many Soviet military advisors came to
Afghanistan
Number of Soviet military advisors
increased fast, 700 by June 1978 and
2,000 by November 1979

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT
SOVIET ADVISORS WERE PLACED IN EVERY
ARMY UNIT FROM BATTALION UPWARDS AND
TOOK ACTIVE PART IN PLANNING AND
IMPLEMENTING SECURITY MILITARY
OPERATIONS
TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION,
DECEMBER 5, 1978, ARTICLE 4 PAVED THE
WAY FOR SOVIETS TO INTERVENE MILITARILY
IF NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE SECURITY,
INDPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL UNITY OF
AFGHANISTAN

PRESSURE ON PDPA REGIME

THROUGHOUT 1979 KHALQI REGIME FACED PRESSURE FROM 3
FRONTS
1. UNCOORDINATED LOW-LEVEL ARMED RESISTANCE IN 24 OUT OF
28 PROVINCES OF AFGHANISTAN
2. ORGANIZED ISLAMIC OPPOSITION LATER BECAME KNOWN AS
MUJAHIDEEN
3. PDPA INTERNAL FIGHTING
IN MARCH 1979 17TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN HEART REBELLED,
DOZENS OF SOVIET CITIZENS, ADVISERS AND FAMILY MEMBERS
WERE SLAUGHTERED
ALARMING DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN WORRIED SOVIETS
AND THEY SENT MORE MILITARY HARDWARE, WEHAT AND OTHER
STRATEGIC COMMODITIES TO SUPPORT COMMUNIST REGIME IN
KABUL BUT PDPA WANTED THE DISPATCH OF SOVIET TROOPS TO
AFGHANISTAN

SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

1979
MARCH 1979 TARAKI ASKED SOVIETS FOR
SOVIET TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN TO
SUPPORT PDPA REGIME BUT SOVIETS
REFUSED ON THIS OCCASION
BETWEEN APRIL AND DECEMBER 1979
PDPA LEADERS ASKED MOSCOW FOR
DIRECT COMBAT SUPPORT ABOUT 20
TIMES
SOVIETS INITIALLY WERE NOT KEEN ON
INVADING AFGHANISTAN

HAFIZULLAH AMINS CRUDE

LEADERSHIP
RELIED ON TERROR TO ADVANCE POLICIES
POWER HUNGRY PASHTUN GHILZAI
NATIONALIST
BY SEPTEMBER 1979 PUL-I CHARKHI
OVERFLOWING WITH 12,000 POLITICAL
PRISONERS WHO WERE BEING KILLED OFF
BY FIRING SQUADS TO MAKE ROOM FOR
MORE VICTIMS
PARCHAMIS AND TARAKI PURGED BY AMIN

TARAKI AND AMIN RIVALRY

AMIN EMERGED AS REGIME
STRONGMAN AND POWER HUNGRY,
RUTHLESS GHILZAI PASHTUN
NATIONALIST
TARAKI WAS AGING MENTOR OF AMIN
AMIN PURGED TARAKI AND HIS
SUPPORTERS
TARAKI IMPRISONED AND
STRANGLED IN PRISION

KHALQI REGIME FAILING AND

SOVIET ALARM
KILLING OF TARAKI BY AMIN ANGERED
SOVIETS
GOVERNMENT OF PDPA LOST CONTROL
OVER COUNTRYSIDE TO MUJAHIDEEN AND
SUPPORTERS, HALF OF ARMY DESERTED TO
RESISTANCE
SOVIETS FACED TWO SCENARIOS, EITHER
TO INVADE AND PREVENT AFGHAN
COMMINIST REGIME FROM FAILING OR TO
LET ISLAMIC REGIME TAKE OVER

DECEMBER 27, 1979 SOVIET

INVASION
SOVIETS INVADED TO REPLACE KHALQI REGIME
WITH PARCHAMI REGIME
RIGHT BEFORE INVASION SOVIET SECURITY
FORCES TOLD AMIN TO CHANGE RESIDENCE
DECEMBER 27, 1979 SOVIET SPECIAL FORCES
KILLED HAFIZULLAH AMIN
SOVIET INVASION FOLLOWED LONG AND
COMPLEX PERIOD OF GROWING SOVIET
INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN
PREVENT IMMINENT COLLAPSE OF PDPA UNDER
AMIN

SOVIET TACTICS IN
WARFARE

SOVIET TACTICS
INFANTRY
ARMOUR
TACTICAL AIRPOWER
SPETSNAZ FORCES AND SABOTAGE
SCORCHED EARTH
MINE WARFARE
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
OPERATIONAL RELATIONS WITH AFGHAN ARMY
PROBLEMS
DOMESTIC UNPOPULARITY OF THE WAR
MANAGING THE HUMAN AND MATERIAL COSTS OF THE WAR FOR THE USSR
NARROW SUPPORT BASE OF THE KARMAL REGIME
PROPENSITY OF RESISTANCE TO INTENSIFY AS A RESULT OF THE REGIMES DEPENDENCE
UPON SOVIET BACKING LIMITED USSRs options in meeting the challenge

MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS

The Mujahideen Groups

Seven Sunni Mujahideen Groups
Moderate Parties
Mahaz Milli-i Islami Afghanistan led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, a notable Sufi who had been pir of
Qaderriya Sufi order since 1947
Jabha Milli-i Nijat-e Afghanistan led by Sebghatullah Mojaddidi-member of Naqshbandiya Sufi order
Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami Afghanistan led by Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi
Fundamentalist Parties
Hizb-i Islami led by Mawlawi Muhammad Younus Khalis
Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Ittehad-i Islami of Abdul Rab al Rasul Sayyaf
Jamiat Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani
Shia Parties
Shura-i Ettefaq of Ayatullah Beheshti
Sazman-i Nasr of Abdul Ali Mazari
Hizb-i Wahdat
Muhammad Akbaris Sepah-i Pasdaran
Harakat-i Islami of Asif Mohseni

US COUNTERINTERVENTIONIST
STRATEGY
WASHINGTON BEGAN A PROGRAM OF MASSIVE
ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN AS A
FRONTLINE STATE AND CONDUIT FOR SIMILAR
ASSISTANCE AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN
ISLAMIC RESISTANCE FORCES, MUJAHIDEEN
WORLDWIDE CONDEMNATION OF SOVIET INVASION
CIA DELIVERED INTERNATIONAL ARMS TO MUJAHIDEEN
VIA PAKISTAN AND DEVELOPED STRONG RELATIONSHIP
WITH PAKISTANI MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (ISI)
USA WAS ONLY INTERESTED IN DEFEATING THE SOVIET
UNION AND COMMUNISM/REVENGE FOR VIETNAM
NOT INTERESTED IN AFGHANISTAN

BIRTH OF AL QAEDA
AS PART OF ITS COUNTER-INTERVENTIONIST POLICY, THE
USA ENCOURAGED ARAB FIGHTERS TO COME TO
AFGHANISTAN AND FIGHT AGAINST THE SOVIETS
THESE ARAB FIGHTERS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN FIGHT
THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR, THEY WERE USING
AFGHANISTAN AS A LAUNCHING PAD TO CONDUCT THEIR
GLOBAL WAR AGAINST THE WESTAL QAEDA WAS BORN
ABDUL RASUL SAYAF GAVE ACCESS TO THE FIRST
TRAINING CAMP TO AL-QAEDA
ARAB FIGHTERS PERFORMED VERY POORLY IN SOVIETAFGHAN WAR AND DID NOT DO MUCH FIGHTING IN THE
FIRST PLACE

FACTORS LEADING TO SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM

AFGHANISTAN
CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN SOVIET UNION AND STINGERL
MISSLES

CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN SOVIET UNION IN

1985YOUNGER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV
COMES TO POWER AND CALLS AFGHANISTAN
BLEEDING WOUND, WANTED TO WITHDRAW
FROM AFGHANISTAN BUT IN A WAY TO MAKE
IT SEEM LIKE IT WAS A VICTORY FOR SOVIETS
SOVIETS WANTED AN HONORABLE
WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
ACHIEVE POLITICALLY WHAT IT COULD NOT
ACHIEVE MILITARILY

MUJAHIDEEN RECEIVE STINGER

MISSLES
IN 1986 THE MUJAHIDEEN RECEIVED
STINGER MISSLES WHICH ALLOWED
THEM TO COUNTER SOVIET
AIRPOWER
THIS RAISED THE MATERIAL AND
HUMAN COST OF THE WAR FOR THE
SOVIETS

GENEVA ACCORDS AND

HONORABLE WITHDRAWAL
APRIL 14, 1988 PDPA AND PAKISTAN
SIGNED AFGHAN GENEVA ACCORDS WITH
USA AND USSR AS CO-GUARANTORS
FOUR ELEMENTS
1. NON-INTERFERENCE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAKISTAN
AND AFGHANISTAN
2. SOVIET COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS
WITHIN 10 MONTHS BY FEBRUARY 15, 1989
3. VOLUNTARY AND SAFE REPATRIATION OF AFGHAN
REFUGEES FROM PAKISTAN
4. GUARANTEES OF THE ACCORDS BY THE USA AND USSR

CONTINUED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR

PDPA AFTER WITHDRAWAL
GENEVA ACCORDS ALLOWED THE SOVIETS TO
MAINTAIN AS MUCH NON COMBAT SUPPORT TO
PDPA REGIME IN KABUL AS WAS NEEDED TO
MAINTAIN COMMUNISTS IN POWER AFTER
WITHDRAWAL FROM COUNTRY IN FEBRUARY 1989
GENEVA ACCORDS WAS NOT A PEACE ACCORD
AND DID NOT BRING ABOUT PEACE, IT MERELY
ALLOWED THE SOVIETS TO CONTINUE THE WAR IN
AN INDIRECT WAY
WAR CONTINUED AS USA CONTINUED ARMS
SUPPLY TO MUJAHIDEEN AFTER 1989

PDPA IN POWER UNTIL 1992

BABRAK KARMAL WAS REPLACED BY DR.
NAJBULLAH IN 1986
GOVERNMENT OF DR. NAJIBULLAH CONTINUED
TO RECEIVE ARMS AND MONEY FROM SOVIET
UNION AFTER 1989 BUT NAJIBULLAH BEGAN
CHANGING HIS IMAGE AND DISTANCED
HIMSELF FROM COMMUNISM AND EMBRACED
ISLAMIC UNDERTONES
DECEMBER 1991COLLAPSE OF SOVIET UNION
AND NO MORE AID FROM SOVIET UNION FOR
NAJIBULLAH GOVERNMENT

FALL OF NAJIBULLAH
REGIME
WITH THE FALL OF THE SOVIET
UNION, SUPPORT TO THE AFGHAN
COMMUNIST REGIME ALSO DIED
AMERICANS ALSO STOP AID TO
MUJAHIDEEN
AND ABANDON AFGHANISTAN
AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS FAIL TO
REACH ELITE SETTLEMENT AND CIVIL
WAR STARTS