Home>CommunisminRussianHistory

Saturday,December1,1990
CommunisminRussianHistory
GeorgeF.Kennan
GeorgeF.KennanisProfessorEmeritusintheSchoolofHistoricalStudiesattheInstitutefor
AdvancedStudyinPrinceton,NJ.Copyright(c)1990byGeorgeF.Kennan.
Russiawasformanycenturiesseparated,geographicallyandpolitically,fromthe
developmentofWesterncivilizationandculture,andthuscamelateintowhat,formostof
Europe,wouldbecalledthemodernage.1Buttheeighteenthandnineteenthcenturies,
witnessingastheydidanextensiveovercomingoftheseearlierbarriers,permittedavery
considerableprogressinthemodernizationofRussiansociety.Bythetimethecountrywas
overtakenbytheFirstWorldWar,itssituationwasnotentirelydiscouraging.Industrialization
wasproceedingatalevelonlytwoorthreedecadesbehindthatoftheUnitedStates.There
wasunderimplementationaprogramofeducationreformwhich,ifallowedtocontinue
unimpeded,wouldhaveassuredtotalliteracywithinanothertwodecades.Andthefirstreally
promisingprogramforthemodernizationofRussianagriculture(thesocalledStolypin
reforms),whilebynomeansyetcompleted,wasproceedingsteadilyandwithgoodchances
forultimatesuccess.
Theseachievements,ofcourse,hadnotbeenreachedwithoutconflictsandsetbacks.Nor
werethey,alone,allthatwasneeded.Stilltobeovercomeasthewarintercededweremany
archaicfeaturesinthesystemofgovernment,amongthemtheabsolutismofthecrown,the
absenceofanyproperparliamentaryinstitutionsandtheinordinatepowersofthesecret
police.Stilltobeovercome,too,wastheproblemofthenonRussiannationalitieswithinthe
RussianEmpire.Thisempire,likeothermultinationalandmultilingualpoliticalconstellations,
wasrapidlybecomingananachronismthemaintenanceofitwasbeginningtocomeunder
considerablepressure.
Butnoneoftheseproblemsrequiredabloodyrevolutionfortheirsolution.Theremovalofthe
autocracywas,afterall,destinedtobeachievedrelativelybloodlessly,andthefoundationsof
aproperparliamentarysystemlaid,inthefirstmonthsof1917.Andtherewasnoreasonto
despairofthepossibilitythatRussia,ifallowedtodevelopwithoutwarorviolentrevolution,
mightstillencompassasuccessfulandreasonablypeacefuladvanceintothemodernage.It
was,however,justthissituation,andjusttheseexpectations,thatweretobeshatteredby
theeventsofthefinalmonthsinthatfatefulyearof1917.
II
TheRussianoppositionalmovementofthelasthalfofthenineteenthcenturyandthefirst
yearsofthetwentiethhadalwaysincludedextremeradicalfactionsthatdidnotwantreform
toproceedgradually,peacefullyandsuccessfully.Theywantednothinglessthanthe
immediateandtotaldestructionoftsaristpowerandofthesocialorderinwhichitoperated.

Thefactthattheirownideasofwhatmightfollowuponthatdestructionwerevague,
unformedandlargelyutopianwasnotallowedtomoderatetheviolenceoftheirintentions.
Participating,thoughinquitedifferentways,inbothofthemajorrevolutionaryparties,the
SocialistRevolutionariesandtheSocialDemocrats(outofwhomtheCommunistsemerged),
thesefactionsfoundthemselves,intheirbitteroppositiontogradualreform,inastateof
limitedandinvoluntaryalliancewiththemostradicalreactionarycirclesattheconservative
endofthepoliticalspectrum.Afterall,theselatteralsodidnotwanttoseechangeproceed
graduallyandpeacefully,fortheydidnotwantittooccuratall.Soitwasnotbyaccidentthat
theideasandaimsofbothextremistelementsweretofindacommonexpression,asRobert
C.Tuckerhassopersuasivelypointedoutinhisrecentwork,intheStalinofthefuture.
Uptotheoutbreakofwar,to1917infact,theleftistextremistshadmetwithverylimited
success.Inthefinalprewaryearstheyhadactuallybeenlosingpoliticalpositionandsupport.
Whatchangedallthis,andgavethemopportunitiesfewofthemhadeverexpected,was
Russia'sinvolvementinthewar,andparticularlytheillconsideredattemptbytheprovisional
governmenttocontinuethewareffortintothesummerof1917,inthefaceoftheepochal
internalpoliticalcrisisalreadybroughtaboutbytherecentfallofthemonarchy.
Ithadbeenafolly,ofcourse,forRussiatoinvolveitselfadecadeearlierin190405inthe
waragainstJapan.Thisalonehadbroughtthecountrytotheverybrinkofrevolution.Itwasa
greaterfolly(andthismighthavebeenclear,onewouldthink,toRussianstatesmenatthe
time)toinvolveRussiainthefarlargerstrainsofparticipationinagreatEuropeanwar.The
warwas,ofcourse,nottheonlycauseofthebreakdownofthetsaristsystemin1917itmay
befairlysaid,however,thatwithoutRussia'sinvolvementinthewarthatbreakdownwould
nothavecomewhenitdidortakentheformsthatitdid,andthatanythinglikeaseizureof
powerbytheBolshevistfactionwouldhavebeenimprobableintheextreme.Seeninthis
way,theestablishmentofcommunistpowerinRussiainNovember1917hastoberegarded
asonlyonepartoftheimmensetragedythatWorldWarIspelledformostofEuropean
civilization.ButtheconsequencesoftheRussianRevolutionweredestinedlongtooutlivethe
otherimmediateeffectsofthewarandtocomplicatetheworldsituationovermostofthe
remainderofthecentury.
Bymid1917inanycase,thediewascastforRussia.Thestressesofthefirsttwoandahalf
yearsofwar,togetherwiththoseoftheearliermonthsofthatyeartheexhaustionofarmy
andsociety,thesuddencollapseofthetsaristpoliceforce,andtheprogramoflandreform
thatlentitselfsoeasilytodemagogicexploitationmadepossiblethesuccessfulseizureof
power,firstinthemajorcities,thenthroughoutthecountry,byLeninandhisassociates.
Thusthestraitjacketofcommunistdictatorshiptherestraintunderwhichitwasdestinedto
writhethroughoutthelifespannotonlyofthegenerationthenalivebutofitschildrenand
grandchildrenaswellwasfasteneduponanunpreparedandbewilderedRussiansociety.
OnehesitatestosummarizewhatthisdevelopmentwastomeanforRussia.Nosummary
couldbeotherthaninadequate.Buttheeffortmustbemade,forwithoutitthecommunist
epochnowcomingtoanendcannotbeseeninhistoricalperspective.
Letusstartwithwhathappenedtomostoftheeducatedandculturallyimportantelementsof
theRussiansocietyofthattime.TheLeninistregime,intheinitialyearsofSovietpower,
succeededinphysicallydestroyingordrivingoutofthecountrythegreaterpartmostofan
entiregeneration,infactofwhatwouldhavebeencalled,intheMarxistvocabularyofthat
day,the"bourgeois"intelligentsia.Stalinlatercompletedtheprocessbydoingthesameto
mostoftheMarxistintelligentsiathatremained.ThusLeninandStalincontrived,betweenthe

twoofthem,toeliminateaverylargeportionoftheratherformidableculturalcommunitythat
hadcomeintobeinginthefinaldecadesoftsardom.Andwiththislosstherewent,more
importantstill,thelossofmuchoftheveryculturalcontinuityofwhichthisgenerationwasan
indispensablepart.Itwouldneverthereafterbepossibletoreunitefullythetwofrayedends
ofthisgreatchainofnationaldevelopment,nowsobrutallysevered.
Notcontentwiththeseheavyblowstothecountry'sintellectualandculturalsubstance,
Stalin,assoonashispowerwasconsolidatedin1928,turnedtothepeasantryand
proceededtoinflictuponthisgreatportionofthepopulation(some80percentatthattime)an
evenmoreterribleinjury.IntheStolypinreforms,emphasishadwiselybeenplacedonthe
supportandencouragementofthemostcompetentandsuccessfulsegmentofthefarming
population.Stalin,inhissweepingcampaignofcollectivizationlaunchedin1929,didexactly
theopposite.Hesetouttoeliminatepreciselythiselement(nowreferredtobythepejorative
Russiantermof"kulaks"),toeliminateitbyruthlessconfiscationofwhatlittlepropertymost
ofitsmemberspossessed,bydeportationofahighproportionofthoseandotherpeasant
families,andbythepunishmentinmanycasestheexecutionofthosewhoresisted.
Theresultsweresimplycalamitous.Theyincludedamajorfamineincertainkeyagricultural
regionsofthecountryandtheloss,withinashorttime,ofsometwothirdsofthecountry's
livestock.Throughthesecruelandillconsideredmeasures,ablowwasdealttoRussian
agriculturethatsetitbackbydecades,andfromwhichithasnotfullyrecoveredtothe
presentday.
ThecollectivizationcampaignroughlycoincidedintimewiththeFirstFiveYearPlan,the
announcementofwhichin192829madesodeepandsofavorableanimpressionupon
manywellmeaningpeopleintheWest.Actually,theplanasannounced,andlaterthe
claimedstatisticsonitscompletion,maskedaruthlessandrecklessprogramofmilitary
industrialization.Thisprogramdidindeedprovidecertainbasiccomponentsofagreat
militaryindustry,butdidsoinanextremelyhastyandwastefulmanner,atvastexpensein
humandeprivationandsuffering,andwithrecklessabuseofthenaturalenvironment.
Despitelimitedimprovementsinlateryears,thesesamefeaturesweredestinedtomark
muchofSovietindustrializationdownthroughtheensuingdecades.
ItwasontheheelsoftheseearlyStalinisteffortsatrevolutionizingtheSovieteconomythat
therewasthenunleasheduponSovietsocietythatterribleandalmostincomprehensible
seriesofeventsknownhistoricallyas"thepurges."Beginningwithanobviousefforton
Stalin'sparttoremovefromofficeanddestroyallthoseremnantsfromtheLeninleadership
inwhomhesuspectedeventheslightesttracesofresistancetohispersonalrule,theseinitial
efforts,savageenoughinthemselves,soongrewintoamassivewaveofreprisalsagainsta
greatportionofthosewhoatthattimeweretakinganypartinthegoverningofthecountryor
whoenjoyedanyprominenceasmembersoftheculturalintelligentsia.Soterriblewerethese
measures,soarbitrary,indiscriminateandunpredictablewastheirapplication,thatthey
culminated,intheyears1937and1938,inadeliberatelyinducedmassfrenzyof
denunciationafrenzyovercomingmillionsofinnocentbutfrightenedpeoplewhohadbeen
encouragedtoseeintherecklessdenunciationofothers,evenotherstheyknewtobeas
guiltlessasthemselves,theonlypossibleassuranceoftheirownimmunitytoarrestand
punishment.Inthecourseofthishysteria,friendwassetagainstfriend,neighboragainst
neighbor,colleagueagainstcolleague,brotheragainstbrother,andchildagainstparent,until
mostofSovietsocietywasreducedtoaquiveringmassofterrorandpanic.Inthiswayavery
considerableproportionoftheadministrativeandculturaleliteoftheSovietUniontensof
thousandsupontensofthousandsofthemwereinducedtodestroyeachotherforthe

edification,perhapseventheenjoyment,ofasingleleader,andthis,whilelending
themselvestothemostextravagantdemonstrationsofadmirationforanddevotiontothis
sameman.Onesearchestheannalsofmoderncivilizationinvainforanythingapproaching,
incynicismifnotinheartlessness,thisappallingspectacle.
Sopreposterous,sobizarre,somonstrouslydestructive,andsolackinginanyconceivable
necessityoradvantagetoanyoneatallwerethesemeasuresthatitisimpossibletoimagine
anyrationalexplanationforthem,evenfromthestandpointofthemostfearful,jealousand
suspiciousoftyrants.What,inthesecircumstances,explainedStalin'smotivesinlaunching
anddirectingthem?Andhowwasitpossiblethatanentiresocietycouldsubmitpassivelyto
sodreadfulanabuseofitssocialintactnessandmoralintegrity?Thesearecrucial
questions.2
SufficeittosaythatwhenStalinfinallyperceivedthatthingshadgonetoofar,whenhe
realizedthatevenhisowninterestswerebeingendangeredandfinallybegantotake
measurestodampentheterrorandtheslaughter,severalmillionpeoplewerealreadyeither
languishingordyinginthelaborcamps,andafurthernumber,sometimesestimatedinthe
neighborhoodofamillion,hadbeenexecutedorhaddiedofmistreatment.Towhichtragic
countmustbeaddedthosefurthermillionswhohadthemselvesescapedpersecutionbut
whocaredabouttheimmediatevictimstheirparents,lovers,childrenorfriends,andfor
whommuchofthemeaningoflifewentoutwiththeknowledge,orthesuspicion,ofthe
sufferingsofthelatter.Bereavement,inshort,hadtakenitstollonenthusiasmforlife.Fear
anduncertaintyhadshatterednerves,hopesandinnersecurity.
III
Itwas,then,onashaken,badlydepleted,sociallyandspirituallyweakenedRussianpeople
thattherefell,inthefirstyearsofthe1940s,theevengreaterstrainsoftheSecondWorld
War.Russia,tobesure,didnotbecomeformallyinvolvedinthatwarassuchuntilJune
1941.ButtheintervalhadbeeninparttakenupwiththewarwithFinland,whichalonehad
causedsomehundredsofthousandsofRussiancasualties.Andwhatwasthentofollow,
aftertheGermanattack,washorroronascalethatputintoshadeallthesufferingsofthe
previousdecades:thesweepingdestructionofphysicalinstallationsdwellings,other
buildings,railways,everythingingreatpartsofEuropeanRussia,andalossoflifetheexact
amountofwhichisnoteasytodeterminebutwhichmusthaveruntoclosetothirtymillion
souls.Itisvirtuallyimpossibletoenvisage,behindthesebarewordsandfigures,theenormity
ofthesufferinginvolved.
Itwillofcoursebeobservedthat,ifthetragediesofthe1920sand1930swerebroughtto
Russiabyitsowncommunistregime,thesamecannotbesaidofthoseofthe1940s.These
werethedoingofHitlerStalinhadactuallygonetogreatlengthstoappeaseHitlerwitha
viewtodivertingtheattackitwasnothisfaultthathedidnotsucceed.
Thereismuchtruthinthisstatement.NothingcandiminishHitler'sresponsibilityforbringing
onwhattheSovietshavesubsequentlyreferredto(ignoringmostoftheothertheatersof
operationinWorldWarII)astheGreatPatrioticWar.Butitwasnotthewholetruth.Stalin
himselfheightenedinmanywaysthehorrorsofthestruggle:bythecynicismofhisdealwith
Hitlerin1939bythesubsequenttreatmentofRussianswhohadbecomeprisonersofwarin
Germanybyhissimilartreatmentofthosecivilianswhohadfoundthemselvesonterritory
thatfellunderGermancontrolbythebrutaldeportationofentiresubordinatenationalities
suspectedofharboringsympathiesfortheGermaninvaderbytheexcessesofhisown

policeintheoccupiedareas,ofwhicheventheappallingKatynmassacreofPolishofficers
wasonlyasmallpartandbythelibertiesallowedtohisownsoldieryastheymadetheir
entryintoEurope.Moreimportantstill,onewillneverknowwhatmighthavebeenthe
collaborationintheprewaryearsbetweenRussiaandtheWesternpowersinthe
confrontationwithHitler,hadtheregimewithwhichthosepowerswerefacedontheRussian
sidebeenanormal,friendlyandopenone.Instead,tomanyinEurope,theSovietstate
lookedlittleifanymorereliableandreassuringasapartnerthandidtheNaziregime.Letus,
however,leavesuchspeculationsasideandproceedwithourrecitationofthemiseriesthat
overtooktheRussianpeopleinthesesevendecadesofcommunistpower.
Itwasanevenmoreweary,evenmoredecimatedandravagedRussianpeoplethatsurvived
thetrialsandsacrificesofthewar.Andtheirmiseries,asitturnedout,werenotyetatanend.
Waragainstahatedenemyhadarousedelementarynationalisticfeelingsamongthe
Russianpeople.Solongashostilitieswereinprogress,Stalinhadwisely(ifpresumably
cynically)associatedhimselfwiththosefeelings.Thepeopleandregimehadthus,asit
seemed,beenbroughttogetherinthecommoneffortofresistancetotheNaziinvasion.And
thishadproducednewexpectations.Notunnaturally,therewashopeinallquarters,asthe
warneareditsend,thatvictorywouldbefollowedbyachangeinthehabitsandmethodsof
theregimeachangethatwouldmakepossiblesomethingresemblinganormalrelationship
betweenrulerandruled,andwouldopenupnewpossibilitiesforselfexpression,culturaland
political,onthepartofapeoplelongdeprivedofanyatall.
ButStalinsoonmadeitclearthatthiswasnottobe.Governmentwouldcontinueasithad
before.TherewouldbenoconcessionstotheSovietconsumertherewouldonlybemoreof
thesameruthlesseffortofmilitaryindustrialization,thesamesuppressionoflivingstandards,
thesamefamiliaryokeofsecretpolicecontrol.Seldom,surely,hasamorebitter
disillusionmentbeenbroughttoanentirepeoplethanthiscallousindifferenceonStalin'spart
totheneedsofasorelytriedpopulationjustemergingfromthesufferingsofagreatand
terriblewar.
This,however,wasthewaythingsweretobe.AndthefinalyearsofStalin'slife,from1945
to1953,woretheirwaymuchasthefinalprewaryearshaddone:thesametiredlitaniesof
thepropagandamachinethesamesecrecyandmystificationaboutthedoingsofthe
Kremlinthesamematerialdiscomfortsandthesameexactionsofapoliceregimethe
ferocityofwhichseemed,ifanything,tobeheightenedasanagingStalinbecame
increasinglyawareofhisdependenceuponitforhispersonalsecurityandforthe
preservationofhisownpower.
EvenStalin'sdeath,in1953,broughtaboutnosuddenordrasticchangeinthesituation.
Stalinism,asagoverningsystem,wasbynowfartoodeeplyplantedinRussianlifetobe
removedorbasicallychangedinanyshortspaceoftime.Therewasnoorganizedalternative
toit,andnoorganizedopposition.IttookfourmoreyearsbeforeKhrushchevandhis
associatessucceededinremovingfrompowereventhoseintheleadershipwhohadbeen
mostcloselyassociatedwithStalinintheworstexcessesofhisruleandwhowouldhave
preferredtocarryoninmuchthesamemanner.
ButKhrushchevhimselfdidnotlastverylongthereafter,andintheensuingyears,downto
themid1980s,thecountrywasruledbyanumberofmediocremen(YuriAndropov,Mikhail
Gorbachev'spatron,wasanexception).Whiletheyhadnotasteforthepathological
excessesofStalinistrule(which,astheycorrectlysaw,hadendangeredeveryone,

themselvesincluded),thesemenwereheirstothesystemthathadmadetheseexcesses
possible,andtheysawnoreasontochangeit.Itrepresented,intheireyes,theonly
conceivablelegitimationoftheirpowerandtheonlyapparentassuranceofitscontinuation.It
wasalltheyhadandalltheyknew.ThesortofsystemicchangesGorbachevwould
eventuallyendeavortobringaboutwouldhavesurpassedthereachesoftheirimaginations.
Andafterall,fromtheirstandpoint,thesystemappearedtowork.
Butitdidnot,ofcourse,workverywell.TheSovietsysteminvolvedthecontinuingnecessity
ofsuppressingarestlessyoungerintelligentsia,increasinglyopentotheinfluencesofthe
outsideworldinanageofelectroniccommunication,andincreasinglyresentfulofthe
remaininglimitationsonitsabilitytotravelandtoexpressitself.Beyondthat,itrestedupon
aneconomythat,justatthetimewhentheremainderoftheindustrializedworldwas
recoveringfromthewarandmovingintotheeconomicrevolutionofthecomputerage,was
continuingtoliveinmanyrespectsintheconceptualandtechnologicalworldofthe
nineteenthcentury,andwasconsequentlybecoming,ontheinternationalscene,increasingly
uncompetitive.
Finally,theideologyasinheritedfromLeninwasnolongerreallytheretosupportthissystem.
Itremainedasalifelessorthodoxy,andSovietleaderswouldcontinueonallceremonial
occasionstotakerecoursetoitsritualsandvocabulary.Butithadbeenkilledintheheartsof
thepeople:killedbythegreatabusesofearlierdecades,killedbythecircumstancesofthe
greatwarforwhichMarxistdoctrineofferednoexplanations,killedbythegreat
disillusionmentthatfollowedthatwar.
Itbegantobecomeevident,inshort,inthoseyearsofthe1970sandearly1980sthattime
wasrunningoutonallthatwasleftofthegreatstructureofpowerLeninandStalinhad
created.Stillabletocommandafeignedandreluctantobedience,ithadlostallcapacityto
inspireandwasnolongerabletoconfrontcreativelythechallengeofitsownfuture.Thefirst
leadertoperceivethis,toreaditsimplicationsandtogiveadyingsystemthecoupdegrace
itdeserved,wasGorbachev.
OnecannotendthisreviewoftheblowssufferedbyRussiansocietyatthehandsofitsown
rulersoverthedecadesofcommunistpowerwithoutbeingawareofthedangerofacertain
Manichaeanextremisminthejudgingofthoserulersandofthosewhotriedfaithfullytofollow
them.NotallthatwentbythenameofcommunisminRussiawasbadnorwereallofthose
whobelievedinit.Andtorecognizethetragicconsequencesofitsexerciseofpowerisnotto
questiontheintellectualseriousnessorthelegitimacyortheidealismoftheworldsocialist
movementoutofwhich,initially,communismarose.One'sheartcangoout,infact,tothose
manywellmeaningpeopleinRussiaandelsewherewhoplacedtheirfaithandtheir
enthusiasminwhattheyviewedassocialismandwhosawinitawayofbringingRussiainto
themodernagewithoutincurringwhattheyhadbeentaughttoseeasthedarksideof
Westerncapitalism.ItisimportanttorecognizethatRussiancommunismwasatragedynot
justinitsrelationstoothers,butalsoatragedywithinitself,onitsownterms.
Butitisimpossible,intheviewofthiswriter,toreviewthehistoryofcommunisminpowerin
RussiawithoutrecognizingthattheleftextremistwingoftheRussianrevolutionary
movement,asitseizedpowerin1917andexerciseditforsomanyyears,wasthecaptiveof
certainprofoundanddangerousmisconceptionsofapoliticalphilosophicalnature,revolving
aroundtherelationshipsbetweenmeansandends,betweenpersonalandcollectivemorality,
betweenmoderationandunrestrainedextremismintheexerciseofpoliticalpower
misconceptionsthatweredestinedtohavethemostdireeffectsonthenatureoftheauthority

itwasassumingtoitself.ItwastheRussianpeoplewhohadtopaythepriceforthese
misconceptions,intheformofsomeofthemostterriblepassagesintheirnation'slongand
torturedhistory.Seeninthisway,theOctoberRevolutionof1917cannotbeviewed
otherwisethanasacalamityofepochaldimensionsforthepeoplesuponwhomitwas
imposed.
IV
Andwhatofthefuture?
Itisnoteasy,inanydiscussionofRussia'sfuture,toavoidpreoccupationwiththedistressing
anddangerousstateofdisarraythatprevailsinthatcountrytoday,andtodistinguishthe
shorttermaspectsofthissituationfromthosecausalfeaturesthatmaybeexpectedtohave
determiningsignificanceinthelongerfuture.
ThepostcommunistRussiawenowhavebeforeusfindsitselfnotonlyconfrontedwith,but
heavilyinvolvedin,theHerculeanefforttocarryoutthreefundamentalchangesinthe
nationallifeofthecountry.
ThefirstofthesechangesistheshiftofthevitalcenterofpoliticalpowerfromtheCommunist
Party,whichhashadamonopolyonpowerforsomanyyears,toanelectedandbasically
democraticgovernmentalstructure.Thesecondistheshiftoftheeconomyfromthehighly
centralizedandauthoritarianadministrativebasisthathasgoverneditsincethe1920stoa
decentralizedfreeenterprisesystem.Thethirdisthedecentralizationofthestructureof
interrelationshipsamongthevariousnationalcomponents,originallyofthetsaristempireand
morerecentlyoftheSovietUnion,thathasgenerallyprevailedoverthelastthreecenturies.
Thesethreechanges,ifsuccessfullyimplemented,wouldrepresentinmanyrespectsan
alterationofthelifeoftheRussianstatemorefundamentalthanthatwhichthecommunists
endeavoredtointroduceintoRussianlifein1917morefundamental,becausewhereasthe
communists'changespurported,rathervaingloriously,todeny,ignoreandconsigntooblivion
theRussianpast,thepresenteffortsatchangearelinked,consciouslyorotherwise,tothat
past,andreflectaninclinationnotonlytorespectbutinparttoresumethestrugglesfor
modernizationthatmarkedthefinaldecadesoftsardom.Ifsuccessfullycarriedthrough,
thesechangeswouldconstitutethegreatestwatershedinRussianlifesincethePetrine
reformsoftheearly18thcentury.
Whatarethechancesforsuccessinthismomentouseffort?Manyfactorswouldhaveto
enterintoanyadequateanswertothatquestiontheycannotallbetreatedhere.Butcertain
outstandingonesmaywelldeserveattentioninthiscontext.
First,inestimatingthechancesforsuccessofthefirsttwooftheseeffortsatchangethe
basicreformsofthepoliticalandeconomicsystemsonehastotakeaccountoftheenduring
effectsofsevendecadesofcommunistpower.Oneisobligedtonotethat,whenitcomesto
thebulkofthepopulation,thestateofpreparednesstomeetthesechallengesissmallerthan
itprobablywouldhavebeenin1917.Itissadtoreflectthatamongthemanyother
disservicesthattheSovietregimedidtotraditionalRussia,nottheleastwasthefactthatit
left,asitdeparted,apeoplesopoorlyqualifiedtodisplaceitwithanythingbetter.
Itwouldbeeasytoregardthecommunistdecadesasatragicseventyyearinterruptioninthe
normalprogressofagreatcountryandtoassumethat,theinterruptionnowbeingover,the

countrycouldpickupwherethingsleftoffin1917andproceedasthoughtheinterruptionhad
neveroccurred.Thetemptationtoviewthingsthatwayisheightenedbytheevidencethat
manyoftheproblemsthecountrynowfaces,astheheavycommunisthandwithdraws,
representtheunfinishedbusinessof1917,existingmuchasitthendidbecausesolittleofit
was,intheinterval,sensiblyandeffectivelyaddressed.
Butthingsarenotquitelikethat.ThepeoplewenowhavebeforeusinRussiaarenotthose
whoexperiencedtheeventsof1917theyarethechildrenandgrandchildrenofthepeopleof
thattimeofthoseofthem,atleast,whosurvivedenoughofthehorrorsoftheensuingyears
toleaveprogenyatall.Andthesechildrenandgrandchildrenaredividedfromtheirparents
andgrandparentsbysomethingmorethanjustthenormalgenerationalchange.The
interveningevents,primarilyStalinismandthecarnageofthewartimebattlefields,were
decisive,eachinitsownway,intheirlegacyforfuturegenerations.Certainpeoplewere
morelikelythanotherstosurvivethemitistotheselatterthatthenextgenerationwasborn.
WehavealreadynotedthedecimationofmuchoftheprerevolutionaryRussianintelligentsia
intheearlyyearsofcommunistpower.Thishashaditseffectsofthosewhosawsomething
ofRussiabeforethatdecimationwascompleted,thiswritersurelyisnotaloneinnotinga
certaincomparativebrutalizationinthefacesonenowencountersontheMoscowstreetsa
result,nodoubt,oflongexposuretonotonlytheexactionsofapitilessdictatorshipbutalso
theferociouspettyfrictionsofdailylifeinashortageeconomy.
Normayweignorethesocialeffectsofalltheseupheavals.Politicalpersecutionandwarleft
tragicgapsinthemaleparentalpopulation,particularlyinthevillages.Familystructurewas
deeplydestabilized,andwithitsstabilitytherewereforfeitedthosesourcesofinnerpersonal
securitythatonlythefamilycanprovide.Assooftenbeforeinthemoreviolentpassagesof
Russianhistory,ithasbeenthebroadandlongsufferingbackoftheRussianwoman,
capableofbearingagreatdealbutalsonotwithoutitslimits,onwhichaninordinateshareof
theburdensofthemaintenanceofcivilizationhascometorest.Theeffectsarepainfully
visibleinawholeseriesofphenomenaofthatwoman'slife:theweariness,thecynicism,the
multitudinousabortions,thefatherlessfamilies.
Particularlydistressingisthefactthatsomanyofthepresentyoungergenerationhavevery
littleideaofwhathashappenedtoRussiainthesepastdecades,ofwhyithappened,orofits
effects.Withthelivesofthetensofmillionswhoperishedintheearliervicissitudeswentalso
theirmemoriesandthelessonslearnedfromtheeventsofthosetimes.Thisyounger
generationhasbeenthrustwithlittleparentalguidanceandalmostnohistoricalmemoryinto
aworldwhoseoriginsitdoesnotknoworcomprehend.
Itwasinevitablethatthisstateofaffairsshouldhavehaditseffectsonintellectualoutlooks.It
istruethatalargerpartofthepopulationthanwasthecaseatthetimeoftherevolutionhas
nowreceivedatleastagradeschooleducationandsometechnologicaltraining.Butonthe
philosophical,intellectualandeconomicsidesthepictureisadisturbingone.
Thegovernmentalstructuretowhichthecenterofgravityofpoliticalpowerisnowbeing
transferredfromwhatwasformerlytheparty'spoliticalmonopolymayadequatelyserveas
theoutwardframeworkforanewanddemocraticformofpoliticallife,butonlythat.Itwill
havetobefilledinatmanypointswithanentirelynewbodyofmethods,habitsand
eventuallytraditionsofselfrule.Forthis,themindsoftheyoungergenerationarepoorly
prepared.Itisnottoomuchtosaythattherewasmuchmorerealunderstandingforthe
principlesandnecessitiesofdemocraticruleforthecompromises,therestraints,the
patienceandthetoleranceitdemandsintheRussiaof1910thanisthecasetoday.

Andthesameapplieswhenitcomestoanunderstandingofeconomicrealities.Seven
decadesofrelentlesssuppressionofeveryformofprivateinitiativeorspontaneityhavelefta
peopletrainedtoregardthemselvesasthehelplessandpassivewardsofthestate.Seven
decadesofeconomichardshipandlowlivingstandardshavelargelydestroyedgood
neighborlyrelations,andhaveproducedanatmosphereinwhichagreatmanypeoplepeer
spitefullyandjealouslyeverydayoverthebackyardfencetoassurethemselvesthattheir
neighborshavenotcontrivedtogetsomethingtheythemselvesdonotpossess,and,ifthe
neighborshavedoneso,todenouncethem.Allthishasencouragedtheprevalenceofa
sweepingandexaggeratedegalitarianism,undertheinfluenceofwhichitissometimesheld
tobebetterthatallshouldcontinuetoliveinastateofsemipovertyandabjectdependence
uponcentralizedpowerthanthatanyshouldbepermittedtotakethelead,bytheirowneffort
andinitiative,inelevatingthemselveseventemporarilyoverthelivingstandardsofothers.
Facedwithsuchattitudesitwillnotbeeasytomakequickprogressinthesystemicchanges
Gorbachevandothersaretryingtobringabout.Thesearenottheonlyhandicapsofthissort,
buttheywillperhapsprovethemostrecalcitrantandlonglasting.Forwhatwillberequired
fortheircorrectionwillbealongandpersistenteducationaleffortaneffortforwhich,inmany
instances,anewgenerationofteacherswillhavetobeprovided,andonethatwill
presumablyhavetoproceedinthefaceofmuchinstabilityinRussianlife.
Ifthefullseriousnessoftheproblemisrecognizedandtakenintoaccount,andiftherequisite
patienceandpersistencecanbemustered,thereisnoreasontoprecludethepossibilityof
eventualsuccess.Buttheeffortcannotbeotherthanalongoneuntilitiscompleted,the
prejudicesandtheformsofignorancejustdescribedwillcontinuetolieheavilyacrossthe
pathofGorbachev'seffortsatreform.
WecomenowtothethirdofthegreatelementsintheprocessofchangeinwhichRussiais
nowinvolved:thereadjustmentoftheinterrelationshipsamongthevariousnationaland
ethnicelementsthathaveheretoforemadeupthetsarist/Sovietstate.
Thisreadjustmentisinevitable.Thecompletemaintenanceinanyofitsformerformsofthe
multinationalandmultilingualempireofpastdecadesandcenturiesisincompatiblewiththe
powerfulforceofmodernnationalism.Mostoftheotherempiresofthisnaturehavealready
beencompelledtoyieldtothatforce.Russia,too,hadbeguntoyieldtoitin1917buthere,
too,theprocesswasinterruptedandlongpostponedbytheestablishmentofcommunist
power.Nowthedemandforithasreasserteditselfwithredoubledvigor,andnotallofit,
surely,istobewithstood.Butthisisahighlycomplexandevendangerousproblem,which
eventhebenevolentlyinclinedoutsidershouldapproachonlywithgreatestcircumspection.
ThatthethreeBalticstatesdeservetheirindependence,andwilleventuallyhaveit,seems
beyondquestion.Thereareothersthataredemandingsovereignstatusbutinwhomthe
requisiteexperienceandmaturityofleadership,aswellasotheressentialresources,have
yettobedemonstrated.TherearestillothernonRussianentitieswherethedemandfor
independencehasnotevenbeenseriouslyraisedandwheretheabilitytobearthestrains
andresponsibilitiesofanindependentstatusisevenmorequestionable.Thereis,inshort,
nouniformityintheneedsandthequalificationsthattherespectiveSovietpeoplesbringto
anyfarreachingalterationintheirrelationshiptotheRussiancenter.Andnosinglemodel,
notevenonefromtheoutsideworld,couldpossiblyprovideausefulresponsetoallthe
problemssuchanalterationwouldpresent.
Veryspecial,highlyintricate,andfullofdangerouspitfallsarethoseproblemsthatpresent

themselvesinthecaseoftherelationshipbetweentheUkraineandRussiaproper.Many
Ukrainianscananddooffercompellingreasonswhytheircountryshouldhaveatleasta
greatlychangedifnotfullyindependentstatusinthenewera.ButUkrainiansdonotalways
speakwithonevoice.SomespeakwithaPolishvoice,somewithaRussian,andsomewith
amorepurelyUkrainianone.ItwillnotbeeasyforthemalltoagreeonhowafutureUkraine
istobeindependentlygoverned,orindeed,evenonwhatitsbordersshouldbe.Towhich
mustbeaddedthefactthatsoextensiveistheinterweavingoftheRussianandUkrainian
economiesthatanysignificantdetachmentofthetwogovernmentswouldhavetobe
accompaniedbythewidestpossiblearrangementsforfreedomofcommercialandfinancial
exchangesbetweenthem,ifconfusionandevenhardshipweretobeavoided.
Pregnantwithproblemsofequal,ifnotgreater,gravityarethedemandsforavirtual
independenceonthepartoftheRussiancenterthatnowembracesnearlyhalfofthe
population,andanevenlargerproportionofthematerialresources,oftheSovietUnion.
Thesedemands,too,arenotlackinginseriousfoundation.Russiannationalfeeling,while
notwithoutweaknessesanddistortions(notablyinthetendenciestowardsxenophobiaand
intolerance),isdeeplyrootedintheculture,thereligionandthetraditionsoftheRussian
people.NolessthanthesimilarfeelingsoftheothernationalpartsoftheSovietUniondo
theydeserverecognitionandconsideration.Towhichmustbeaddedthefactthattherecent
discussionwithinRussiaproperoftheseparatefutureofthatpartofthecountryhasbeen
marked,notwithstandingallthehandicapsnotedaboveinthisarticle,byanencouraging
levelofseriousnessandresponsibility.
Buthere,veryseriouscomplicationspresentthemselves.Forweretheprocessofdesigning
anindependentfuturefortheRussianpeoplealonetogotoofar,thiswouldplaceinquestion
theveryraisond'treforanysupranationalcentersuchastheSovietgovernmentnow
presents.WeretheRussians,inotherwords,toestablishaseparatesovereignty,orevena
farreachingdegreeofnationalindependence,this,comingtogetherwiththesimilar
detachmentofothernationalitiesofthepresentSovietUnion,wouldraisethequestionasto
whetherenoughwouldbeleftofthetraditionaltsarist/Sovietempiretojustifyanygreat
coordinatingcenteratall.
TherelationshipsthathaveexistedbetweenthemanynonRussianpartsofthistraditional
multinationalstructureandtheRussiancenterhavedeephistoricalroots.Fewwouldbe
preparedforthesituationthatwoulddevelopifallthesetiesweretobeabruptlysevered.The
economicconfusionwouldbeenormous.Worsestillisthegrowingevidencethatcertainof
thesenonRussianentities,ifleftsuddenlytothemselves,wouldeithermakewaragainst
eachotherorbecomesubjecttohighlydestructivecivilconflictswithintheirownconfines.
Finally,thereistheveryseriousproblemthatwouldbecreatedbythefragmentationof
responsibilityforthenuclearweaponrynowinSoviethands.
Beyondthis,thereistheneedofthisentireregionforasinglevoiceamatureand
experiencedvoiceinworldaffairs.Theimportanceofthisproblemisapparentinthe
commandingfigureandpresentpositionofGorbachev,astatesmanofworldstatureand
competence,withoutwhoseserviceasaspokesmanforpeoplesofthisentireareaallwould
beimpoverished.Itishardtothinkofanyoftheaspirantsforindependencewho,tryingto
"goitalone,"couldbeasusefultoworldpeace,oreventothemselves,asthisonecommon
andenlightenedvoiceinworldaffairscouldbetoallofthem.ThepreservationoftheSoviet
governmentasacoordinatingcenterwilldemand,mostcertainly,afarhigherlevelofinput
onthepartoftheseotherentitiesintothedevelopmentofacommonforeignpolicythanthey
haveenjoyedinthepast,buttoforfeittheadvantagesofthisarrangementwouldbe,formost

ifnotallofthem,tolosemorethantheywouldgain.
Ofgreatestimportanceinthisconnectionwouldbetheeffectoninternationallifeofany
completebreakupoftheRussian/Sovietstate.Theabandonmentofanygeneralpolitical
centerforthepeoplesoftheregionwouldmeantheremovalfromtheinternationalsceneof
oneofthosegreatpowerswhoseinterrelationships,withalltheirupsanddowns,have
constitutedacentralfeatureofthestructureofinternationallifeformostofthiscentury.
Experiencehasshown(notleastinthesuddenbreakupoftheAustroHungarianEmpirein
191819)thatanymajorchangeinthecompositionoftheinternationalcommunity,although
perhapsunavoidableorevendesirableoverthelongterm,ispregnantwithpossibilitiesfor
unpredictablecomplicationsandforgravedangersifittakesplacetooabruptlyandwithout
carefulpreparation.
Itisclear,then,thatnosatisfactorysolutiontotheseproblemswillbefoundateitherofthe
extremesofcontemporaryopinionintheSovietUnionneitheratthatoftotalindependence
foreveryonenoratthatofatotalpreservationofthesortofsubordinationtoasinglecentral
politicalauthoritythatitscomponentnationalentitieshaveknowninthepast.Compromises
willhavetobefound,restraintandpatiencewillhavetobeobservedonallsides.
Allthiswouldsuggestthenecessityforsomesortofafederatedinterrelationshipamong
thoseofthepresentcomponentsoftheSovietUnionthatarenottobecomeentirely
independent.Thiswouldhavetobeahighlyflexiblearrangement,andprobablyalooserone
thanthatwhichGorbachevnowenvisages.Butthetotalabsenceofsuchtieswouldpresent
dangersofgreatgravityforRussiaitself,fortheotherSovietnationalitiesandforthepeace
ofsurroundingregions.
V
Letthefollowingstand,then,asasummaryoftheconsiderationssetforthabove.
WhatisnowemergingontheterritorytraditionallyknownasRussiawillnotbecannotbethe
Russiaofthetsars.NorcanitbetheRussiaofthecommunists.Itcanonlybesomething
essentiallynew,thecontoursofwhicharestill,forusandfortheRussiansthemselves,
obscure.
Thetaskstobeencompassedareimmense.Aworkablesystemofhumanerepresentative
governmentsomethingofwhichRussianhistoryprovidesonlythemostrudimentary
experiencewillhavetobedevisedandrenderedacceptabletoapeopleamongwhomthe
principleofreasonablecompromise,essentialtoitssuccess,islargelyforeign.Anew
economicsystem,compatiblewithRussiantraditionsbutnotlimitedbythem,willhavetobe
devisedandanessentialfeatureofthisnewsystemwillhavetobeawhollynew
organizationoftheagriculturalprocessforwhich,inthemain,therewillbenoprecedentin
Russianexperience.And,finally,theimmenselycomplexanddangerousprocessofpolitical
andinstitutionaldecentralizationofthetraditionalRussianstatewillhavetobeinsomeway
managed.
ForthemeetingofthesedemandstheRussianpeoplearetodaypoorlyprepared.Theevents
ofthiscenturyhave,aswehaveseen,takenaterribletollontheirsocialandspiritual
resources.Theirownhistoryhaspatheticallylittletotellthem.Agreatdealwillhavetobe
startedfromscratch.Theroadwillbelong,roughandperilous.

Howcanwebestrelatetoapeoplethatfindsitselfinsuchstraits,confrontedwithsuch
tremendousanddifficulttasks?ThelingeringtendenciesinthiscountrytoseeRussiaasa
greatanddangerousenemyaresimplysilly,andshouldhavenoplaceinourthinking.We
haveneverbeenatwarwithRussia,shouldneverneedtobe,andmustnotbe.As
Gorbachevhasoftenpointedout,weliveinanagewhenotherpeople'sproblemsare
essentiallyourown.ThisisthewaywemustcometoviewRussia's.
TheRussianswillneedhelpfromwherevertheycangetit.Someofthathelp,inourcase,
mayfromtimetotimetaketheformofeconomicassistancebutthiswillbeofminor
importance.Thegreatesthelpwecangivewillbeoftwokinds:understandingandexample.
Theexamplewillofcoursedependuponthequalityofourowncivilization.Itisour
responsibilitytoassurethatthisqualityissuchastobeusefulinthisrespect.Wemustask
ourselveswhatsortofexampleisgoingtobesetforRussiabyacountrythatfindsitself
unabletosolvesuchproblemsasdrugs,crime,decayoftheinnercities,declining
educationallevels,acrumblingmaterialsubstructure,andadeterioratingenvironment.
Theunderstanding,ontheotherhand,willhavetoincludetherecognitionthatthisisinmany
waysahardandlowmomentinthehistoricaldevelopmentoftheRussianpeople.Theyare
justinprocessofrecoveryfromalltheheartrendingreversesthatthisbrutalcenturyhas
broughttothem.Theyarenot,seeninthehistoricaldimension,entirelythemselves.We
shouldbearthisinmind.We,too,maysomedayhaveourlowmoments.Andwhilewe
shouldbewareofourAmericantendencytoidealizethoseforeignpeopleswhomwe
considertobeparticularlyunfortunate,thereisnoreasonwhyanunderstandingAmerican
attitudetowardsRussiaatthisjunctureinitshistoryshouldnotincludeareasonablemeasure
ofcompassion.
Beyondthis,whilewespeakofunderstanding,wecantrytobearinmindthatalongwithall
thedarkaspectsoftheirdevelopment,theRussianshaveshownthemselveshistoricallyto
beagreatpeopleapeopleofmanytalents,capableofrenderingsignificantcontributions,
spiritual,intellectualandaesthetic,tothedevelopmentofworldcivilization.Theyhavemade
suchcontributionsattimesinthepast.Theyhavethepotentialityfordoingitagaininabetter
future.
Theobligationtorespectandcherishthatpotentialityisprimarilytheirown.Butinanother
senseitisoursaswell.Letusacceptthatresponsibility,andmeetitthoughtfully,
imaginativelyandcreativelywhereverwecan.
1MyreflectionshavebeenstimulatedbyProfessorRobertC.Tucker'snewstudyofthe
crucialandformativeyearsoftheStalindictatorship(StalininPower:TheRevolutionFrom
Above,19281941,W.W.Norton,1990).Foranyonewho,likethewriter,livedinMoscow
throughpartsoftheperiodhedescribes,Tucker'saccountwasboundtostirmanyreflections
abouttheplaceofthoseterribleyears,andindeedoftheentirecommunistepochnow
comingtoanend,inthehistoricaldevelopmentoftheRussianstate.Someofthese
reflectionsfindexpressioninthepresentarticle.
2Insofarasthehistoricalevidencesprovideanswers,Tuckerhasgiventheminhisbook,
andtheyrichlydeservereading.Buttheyareextraneoustothisbarelistingofthe
misfortunesenduredbytheSovietpeoplesundercommunistrule.
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