Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Seeds of Thought
Issue 15-30
August 16, 2015
event far more impactful than even the change in currency policy, and in my mind, it may very well
wind up being what makes this weeks action truly significant. By that I mean it opens the door to a
number of new strategies and creates a new reassessment trigger for just about every position in any
portfolio.
The Epiphany
In discussing the Reserves chart with a client, I suddenly had an epiphany. After years and years of every
expert calling for a dramatic drop in the value of the EUR with very little satisfaction achieved and a
whole lot of frustration experienced, all of a sudden, beginning in April of last year, Success! The
reason? QE of course, right? Perhaps youre right, but I now think QE may have been more coincidental
than causal.
What Im about to explain is yet another way in which China has been far more influential in driving
markets than most are willing to admit, or even fathom. Take a look at the Reserves vs the US Dollar
Index chart showing the 12 month moving average in the monthly change in Chinas reserves (inverted)
overlaid with the US Dollar Index (DXY), using data going back to when China first began the managed
revaluation in 2005. Im not a big believer in my (or anyones) ability to simply eyeball correlations, so I
ran the numbers. Turns out the correlation between the change in Chinas reserves and the USD Index is
roughly 70% on a monthly, quarterly and yearly basis. Its virtually identical when you replace the DXY
Index with EUR/USD, and for good reason.
Almost from the start, the Chinese understood the importance of diversifying the massive reserves they
would accumulate ($4 trillion at its peak). As a matter of process, every time they bought US Dollars
against their own currency, it would automatically trigger a transaction to exchange a portion of those
dollars for Euros. They werent alone though. South Korea, Taiwan, Russia, Brazil and nearly every
other emerging market central bank that stood in the way of their currencys appreciation did the same.
So while there may have existed a wide range of macroeconomic reasons for the Euro to depreciate
versus the dollar over the years, inspiring every hedge fund portfolio manager to fervently short it at one
time or another, inevitably it tended to result in frustration and losses far more often than not.
Functionally, as the pressure on CNY ebbed and flowed, so too did the influence of Chinas central bank
operations on currency markets. The more capital flowed into China and the other emerging markets, the
more EUR resisted the depreciation many market participants were expecting. When the flows slowed,
EUR was more malleable. Then, in April 2014, just as the ECB first mentioned the possibility of
quantitative easing, the Euro finally appeased the bears, beginning its rapid descent. Unbeknownst to
most, while we were all hyper-focused on deciphering every utterance of anyone associated with
European policymaking, something else of perhaps even more consequence had also just occurred. It
turns out, at the very same moment, CNY had begun to come under intense pressure. The rapid growth
in Chinas reserves that had gone on almost uninterrupted for nearly a decade had suddenly reversed.
Considering the correlation between China reserve accumulation and the Euro over the last decade,
combined with the timing of the reversal from accumulation to reduction of reserves that occurred at that
exact moment, it's hard to make the argument that the EUR collapse was strictly a result of QE.
If you buy into my theory, we neednt expend so much effort speculating on why the Chinese changed
tack this week, or what it implies about their own expectations for Chinese growth and its derivative
effect on the psyche of the Federal Reserve. Instead, we simply need to consider whether the downward
pressure on CNY will result in less intervention going forward, both in China and all the other emerging
markets that may take their cue from them. It matters because less intervention would mean less EUR
selling from the central bank community.
may not be out of the woods yet, but going forward, shorting temperate emerging markets may be a
good bet for playing catch up.
Going back to the impact on EUR, an interesting way to express that idea would be via options using the
same EM currencies, but against the EUR, thereby allowing you to take advantage of the lower cross
vols that are the result of the high correlation between EUR and EM until now. Theres also a possible
additional bonus that comes with expressing the view this way. If, as I believe, the US economy begins
showing its own flaws, similar to those seen in just about every other country in the entire world,
thereby altering the expectations for Fed moves and US interest rates going forward, EUR vs EM should
not only keep up with USD vs EM, but perhaps significantly outperform.
I will dig into all of this in future publications and in direct conversations, but for now, allow this to
serve as a seed of thought.