295 Jean-Baptiste GounNAT
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Jean-Baptiste GouRINAT
CNRS.Centre Léon Robin
Unity and the good: Platonists against oixelcous
L Introduction
‘A ot has been said about the debt that post-Hellenistic Platonism
owes to Aristotle and Stoics, especially in the area of ethics. In this
‘paper, [ want by contrast to focus on an important feature of Peripatetic
and Stoies ethics which is conspicuously absent from Platonism: the
theory of olzelwais, This absence is relevant to the question of the
nity of the virtues because, as [ hope to show, it is explained by
debate over how moral value is grounded. For one of the roles that
ooixetoois plays for the empiricist schools is to provide the materials
from which moral agents are supposed to derive their understanding of
‘what is “good” — indeed the very concept of “good” itself. But Platon-
ists have reasons oftheir own to doubt that tis capable of playing such
«role. Even were it possible to develop 2 concept of the good through
one’s experience of olxeloois, it would, they argue, be a subjective
and unstable guide for action. Instead, then, Platonists appeal to the
form of the good as grounding for ethical value, But in doing so, they
‘Provide the basis for a doctrine of the unity of the virtues which is quite
distinctive: certainly (and deliberetely) unlike the position of the Stoics|
‘and Peripatetics with which it tends to be compared simply because it
shares similar language. According to Platonists, the virtues become
unified ~ that is, to be precise, inseparable and interntailing’ —
{rough their common relationship withthe form of the good.
+ Inseparable (@x@quato): Alcixous, Didaskalitos 29, 183.15-16. Inter-
‘entailing (AvearohouGetv / inter se connexas): see Alcinous, Didaskalikas
29, 183.3; cf, Anon. In Theaetetum col. AO -x.2; Apuleius, On Plato 2.6,298 George Bovs-SroNes
Il. Olxeteams and the concept of “good”
Otxeiwors is offered, most famously by the Stoies, but by other
‘empiricist schools as well, asthe mechanism by which animal impulse
is explained?, As soon as they are born, we are told, animals identify
With, or have @ sense of “ownership” of, their own constitutions, and
this leads them to have pro- (and anti-) atiuudes towards things in the
‘world, namely just those things that promote (or harm) the well-being
‘of these constitutions.
‘As long as the theory relates to the explanation of animal (or, in
2 The other empiticists relevant here ate the Poripatetics (evidence in
RAW. Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to AD 200: An Iuraducton and
Callecion of Sources in Translation, Cambridge, 2010, esp. ch. 1S and 17) and
Antiochus (ge Cicero, De Fnibus V). In what follows, sal focus mainly on
the Stoics since we have the best evidence for them (cf. A.A. Long and
DN. Sedley, The Hellenic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1987, section 57).
Differences inthe treiment of olxefw between the thee schools are mostly
peripheral to my question (ough it wil be weful 10 appeal to the Peripatetic
evidence from tine 10 time). Relevant secondary literture on the Stoics
includes T. Engberg-Pedersen, The Stoic Theory of Oikeiass: Moral Develop-
tment andi Social Ineracion tnt Early Stoic Philosophy, Aathas, 1990, ad
'M. Schofield, “Two Stic approaches to uation A. Laks and M. Schofield
(et), Justice and Generosity. Studies in Helienstic Social and Political
Theory, Cambridge, 1995, p. 191-212. For the Pripatetis, Antiochus, and
the relationship of their systems to that of the Stois, sec variously
1, Gérgemanns, “Oiteiasis in Asius Didymus”, in W.W. Fonteabangh (ed,
On Stoic and Peripatetic Ethics. The Work of Arius Diéymus, Now
Brunswick/London, 1983, . 163-89 esp. 166.8 fora eview of earlier dscos-
sion); G. Tsou, Aniochus and Peripatetic ihict, dss, Cambridge, 2010
The theory of olxelomis is pointedly absent from the one major empiricist
school remaining: Epicureanism. In terms of my question, this could be
because Fpicureans are reduetonists about moral vale: for therm, “good” i a
synonym fr pleasurable, so there is nothing o be explained in our acquisition
ofthe concept. On the exceptional appearance of oinefnng in Hermarchus,
see PA. Vander Wacrdt, “Hermarchus and the Epicurean genealogy of
Ina Dransacion of he American Phill Asciton, 18 (88.
p.87-106,
‘UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIOSIE. 299
‘general, non-rational) impulse, there is nothing init for Platonists to
‘object to, Indeed, there is plenty of evidence that this is precisely the
‘mechanism for non-rational impulse that they assume, Eudorus of
‘Alexandria associates a theory of obteloars with the non-rational
{impulses towards what he calls the dmoveAc’; Taurus uses the Ian-
guage of oixeloors to understand impulses directed towards the care
and comfort of the body (I7T Gio’ = Aulus Gellius, Artic Nights
125.7), and so, T argue, does Apuleius (On Plaio 2.2: see discussion
below), Plutarch’s talk of Love as an “appropriative power for what is
beautiful” (BGvayus [.-] olxeumish meds %O naRbY: Amatorius 16,
759) might be relevant here toot. Alcinous does not make a direct
appeal to olxel«oxg as an explanation of impulse, but it is presumably
not coincidence that he derives the appetitive part ofthe embodied soul
‘from an archetypal “appropriative power” (clnewrxi) S6vajuc:
Didaskalikos 25, 178.42, 44)8. Even the anonymous commentator on
> Stobscus, Belogce 17 3c, p. 47.1248. follow the general assumption
tat Endors ifthe source on which Arius Didymus here relies: f. W. Meller,
“Philo von Alexandria ued der Bepian des kaiserzeichon Pltonismus", in
K. Fisch (el), Parasia. Studien zur Philosophie Platons und cur Prob
lemgeschichre des Platonismus, Frankfurt, 1965,p. 199-218 esp.215-14.1 am
Jess clear sbout the extent to which itis appropiate to call Budorus a “Platon-
iat: he is consistently refered to as en "Academic" in our evidence, which
includes Arius when he introduces him in the ran-up to the present passage
(Belogae 1172, p.42.7). Buin tis matter atleast his postion converges with
that of self-dfining Patoniss
“Gf. Frazier, "Bros, Asts et Aphrodite dans "Erotik, Une reconsidéra-
tion de la époate & Pemptidés (ch. 13-18)", in JR. Faeira, L, van de Stoct
aud M. do Cu Falho (eds), Philosophy in Society: Virtues ond Values in
Plutarch, Leuven/Coimbra, 2008, p. 117-35. Pato, Tinacus 42a is one pos
sible proof tox forthe identification sugested here between Love (Ero) and
the appetiive pat ofthe soul.
Remarkably, Alcinous attributes this “appropriate power” othe souls
of the gods es well (178.39-40)— perhaps, as Jon Dillon suggests onthe basis
of the suggestion in the Phaedras that rods as wel a men heve mul-patite
souls (he Middle Platonists 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, Landon, 1977, 292). But
note that this “power” i aot the immediate motor of action (as Plutrch’s300 George Boys Sox
the Theaetenus, who has well-known objections to the use of oleto-
‘ig in ethics, atthe same time makes statements in his own voice that
show that he accepts olef«ous as a mechanism for explaining bebav-
‘out’, But this is the point: where Platonists pert company with the
Stoics and others is in the further cleim made by the latter that
‘olzetiarg not only explains animal impulse but, in vttue of doing so,
constitutes the starting-point for an understanding of ethics’. As
Hierocles put it in the opening line of his Exposition of Ethics, “The
colvexauc Bias is). Thi i clear from the fact that it only realised as
“appetite” after a change subsequent 1 embodiment (urvé xO évomuerte
Ofhvar lov wevaBokiy RopPérvouat, wey obxeuorach eg wd émtoun-
‘nudy 0): 178.4344; presumably, then, itis a merely latent capacity in the
rods). 1G. Milhaven (Der Auftig der Seele bei Albus, dist, Munich, 1962,
. 50) sees characerisically Stoic vocabulary in Aleinous' use of the term
oixelog elsewhere, as what is “proper” or “natural” (e.g. a! Didaskalikos 4,
156.18-9, where the term diAA6v@10s appears as well). But this may be mislead
ing itaken wo be further gesture wards the theory of olzetens. Although it
is true thatthe tem is used by Alcinous to characterise tires for which we
sive, its never used to explain noo-rational impulse, let alone to suggest any
lnk or continuity between rational jadgemeats and non-ational dives.
‘For the criticism, see further below. The positive claim ke makes is that
there isa difference between olteliois 0 the sense of seltidentifcaion or
‘ownership one fels towards, i the fst place, one's constuion (he call this
olxeloars xndenovext): col. vii. 28), and the consequent oixelaois onc feels
‘towards those things that will promote its well-being (olneimors algerixh:
col. vii.32). Cf. on this M. Bonazzi, “The commentary es po‘emical tool: The
snonymous commentator on the’ Theaeietus agsinst the Stoics", Laval
théologique et philosophique, 64 (2008), p. 597-605, ap. 59.9.
7 The notable exception is Philo of Alexandria; he places the notion of
‘olvelas atthe heart of his this. But he does so by an act of redefinition
‘which can be mest cleerly understood inthe light of whet I shall argu isthe
‘anti-empiricist tine of thought that this paper traces in (otber) Platonists. As we
shall see, they say that olze oe is restricted to the impulsesaf the body, and
contrast his wit an inpolse to ethical val which i fouud ia ssiiation to
0d. Philo, onthe oter hand, says that obzsaig in is true form i identical
with “assinilation to god", and contrasts it with a degenerate form of
‘UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIQ2I: 301
best starting point for an exposition of ethics is an account of the pri-
‘mary appropriate thing (olxeiov) for an animal.” Balbus begins his
account of Stoic ethics in Cicero's De Finibus (at I 16) with the same
thought, and it might be possible to infer that it is how Crysippus
began his own work On Ends as well (a similar formula is quoted from
book I of that work at Diogenes Latitius VII 85)°, And it is the
‘emphatic priority of the topic in Stoic ethics, not only its distinctive
vocabulary, that makes its exclusion from Platonist ethics so striking.
Evidently, it played a role for the Stoics in linking thought about
human morality with an analysis of non-rational impulse which
Platonists consciously wanted to avoid.
Its, to start with at least, easy enough to see wihy the Stoies might
have thought that obvelno1c could be extended from the explanation of
non-rational impulse to a theory of ethics. Presumably they understood
the choices made by mature ethical beings as a kind of refinement of
the pro-atttudes which motivate the snimal or the child. As they putt:
reason “supervenes as the craftsman of impulse” (Diogenes Laértius
‘VIL 86), But what we seck as rational adults is still intimately tied to
‘our view of what we are (namely, now, as it happens, rational). To this
extent, oixelaac remains the natural framework for thinking about
‘human behaviour.
If there were nothing else to it, it would still be difficult to see why
Platonists would resile from the theory in the way that they do. But as
cobxelooig which is directed towards the body. So in fact he is in substantial
agreement with the majority of Platonists (end in polemical contrast to the Sto-
‘cs, viz. in contrasting the impulse tothe good with that towards one's physi-
‘cal nature. He differs only in the way that he remodels the language of
‘obxsiqons forthe ethical impulse rather than leaving it withthe body. CF. eg.
De Posteritate 12.2-T; 1354-6; 157.1-4; and De Gigantibus 29.12 forthe idea
that olxetwou; towards the body isa sinful perversion.
* CF. also Piso in his accoant of Antiochean ethics (Cicero, De Finibus
¥ 23-28): hine capiamus exoraium. Plutarch also remarks on the pervasive
appeal to olxelaats by Chrysippus: *in every book of physics, by God, and
ethics” (Stoic Se Contradictions 12, 1038B).302 George Bovs-Sroxes
the Stoics themselves realised, there was another, more difficult, job to
be done as well. For not only do we seek different things when we
become rational creatures, we seek them under a particular description.
‘Unlike animals and csildren, the end-directed choices made by rational
creatures are made with a view to what is “good”. Indeed, their being
‘made with a view to what is good is what brings them into the sphere of
ethics - and defines us (mature human beings) as ethical agents. And
the Stoics seem to have appealed to oixefworg in this context as well
‘The reason for the appeal is thatthe Stoics believed that ell concepts
imustbe based on einpisical experience; but obtetnats is the only mech-
anism by which we have had any experience of end-directed attitudes
(pro- or anti) at all. So it is a natural conclusion for them that
‘olxeloo.s must have some role to play in an account of our develop-
‘ment of the concept of the “good”. In short: the study of animal impulse
‘underpins the study of human ethics because a person's concept of the
‘good is extruded trom their experience of pro-attitudes which
‘olneloons explains®.
Here, of course is where Platonists have their grounds for objec-
tion. Platonists, as it happens, deny in general that empiricism of
whatever sort provides an adequate explanation for how concepts
are formed. They argue, for example, thet the infinite diversity of
experience that we are presented makes it impossible that we should
form well-grounded concepts which accurately and objectively
represent the structure ofthe natural world! But they are especially
$ For the question raised by the Stoicsthemssives of how we acquire a
concept ofthe “good”, see in general M. rede, “Oa the Stic conception of
the good”, in K lerodickonou (ed), Topics in Stoic Philosophy, Oxford, 1999,
p. 71-94; and B. Inwood, “Geting to goodness, in his Reading Seneca. Stoic
PPhilasophy at Rome, Oxford, 2005, p. 271-301
10 Cy, discussion in LP. Schrenk, “A Middle Platonic reading of Plato's
theory of recollection”, Ancient Philosophy, 11 (1991), p. 103-10 (though
Seivenk assumes tha he Patniss have ony Aristotle in view); also my own.
“Alehious, Didaskalitos 4: In defence of dogmatism”, in M. Benazzi snd
YV. Cellupica (ed), Lreditaplotonica. Seu sul platnismo da Arcesilao a
‘Proclo, Napoli, 2005, . 201-34, esp. 216-22.
UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIGETE 303
scathing about the possibility of an empirically-based concept of
‘good’. This is how Numenius put it in his lost work On the Good
(ff. 2.17 des Places)
‘We can apprehend bodies by induction from similar things an from
te distinctive marks shee by things tat ae jutapone, But thre i
no way ofapprebending the pod from something juxtaposed witht
a from some perceptible thing that is similar to i (Le ev ov
cxouure: hae hyiv Eto envaivonevors fe te uolow dd ve
sav #y tolg sagaxeyivois pogiandci Evove0 TeyOOOY BF
observes dx angaxeydvou obd€ od dud Solo aloBrwo dow
)aetv.) Another approech is needed. Imagine someone sitting at the
top of lokout: be catches quick glimpee of x small fishing boat =
‘one of those light skiffs, alone, in solitude, caught between waves —
fd be recognises it. So must one retreat far fom the objets of per
‘ception fo joi alone wit the good which lone.
‘The Stoics could give an answer of sorts to Numenius’ immediate
point: they think that all qualities are corporeal and therefore percepti-
ble. This includes the virtues ~ and it is in terms of virtue that the
Stoics define the “good”. Bu: they have another difficult of their own,
which effectively commits them nonetheless to the position that the
virtues are never perceived: forthe Stoics notoriously think that virta-
‘ous people ate vanishingly rare. Itis almost certain, for example, that
‘no human being alive has ever witnessed so much as a single instance
of human virtue, and so @ single instance of human goodness, let alone
‘enough cases to underpin the formation of a concept. Since goodness is
not a quality reducible to any other (for example to a property which
1 Bg. SVP IL 587: “The good is virtue, or what partakes in vstue”; of
Fpictets, Distertariones It 19.13; and slightly more expansive discussions
st Diogenes Leértius VII 94 (= SVF II 76) and Sextus Empiricus, Adversu
Mathematicos TX 25-27. Chrysippus is quoted as saying in so many words
thatthe vires are perceptible (Ptarch, Stoic Self Contradictions 19, 142E-F,
from Chip” On te End Yook 1: of ako the dansion at Sncen,
ers304 George Bovs-Stoxes,
‘we do regularly encounter, such as the congenial or the useful)", direct
‘experience is altogether ruled out as the means by which human beings
regularly form a concept of the good’.
‘Luckily, however, there is another possibility. For concepts do not
have to be the immediate products of direct experience: their range is
‘expanded by second-order operations we perform on concepts that
are s0 acquired: as for example when we acquire the concept of &
‘centaur by combining concepts acquired by experience of horses and
men (namely the concepts “horse” and “‘man”). In the case of the
‘200d, the Stoics tell us that we acquite it by analogy (Cicero, De
Finibus W133):
Concepts arse in the soul, when we grasp something by experience of
it, or by combination, or similarity, or analogy (collatione rationis)
‘This fourth operation, the last in my lst, gave us the concept of
“good”. When the soul ascends by analogy from those things which
are according to nature, it arrives atthe concept of good.
‘This slightly compressed explanation builds, as it happens, on
something that Cicero had already told us, in the course of deseribing
the development of impulse inthe human being (De Finibus MU 21):
‘A man’s sense of appropriations frst ofall to those things which are
according to nature. But as soon as he acquires intelligence ~ or, rather,
concepts: what they call Bvvouat ~ he sees the order in the things he
"8 ee Cicero, De Fiibus TL 34: hoe autem ipsum Bonu non accessione
neque crescendo at cum ceteris comparando, sed propia vi sua et sentinus et
appellars borum.
* i texts late enough for it to be possible that they could beve the Paton
ist theory of recollection in mind, this point is tured to satirical advantage in
pointed reaarks about the “good” not being the sort of thing one might bump
Into. Se for example Seneca, Letrs 1204 (-Certain people wh say that we
happen upon the concept something that is impossibie: to bump into the form
ofa virwe ty chance!) of Alexander, Mantssa 18, 152-27-29 (cig yevo-
évous &bivarov 200 ddr dryabot dredaryty Toye),
* Coneliaria, Cicero's tanslation of olacivas.
UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIQ2D: 303
has to do, and (soto speak) the harmony, and be values this much more
‘than all those things whicl he formerly cared for. And on the basis of
‘thought snd reflection he draws inferences in such a way that that
supreme good for human being, which is praised and sought for itself,
gets to be fimnly established in him,
So the idea seems to be that, as we acquire rationality, we reflect on
‘what itis that atracts us to those things towards which we experience
olwetavi, and understand that it has to do with the fact that they pre-
serve and promote our own natures, that is as human beings. But this is
‘where analogy comes into play: from the concept of what promotes
‘our own natures. we can infer to ¢ new concept (2) of what promotes
nature in general:
(AL) primary objects of impulse : human nature : : x > nature as,
a whole.
‘The quality, x, to which this aew concepts corresponds ~ call it
“good” ~ will be absolutely desirsble, both in the sense that itis not
desirable only relative to some paricular individual or set of individu-
als (es for example the primary objects of human impulse ae desirable
only relative to human beings), butalso in the sense that itis the source
of all value. (The primary objects of human impulse are understood to
be desirable insofar as they are natural, and only derivatively insofar as
they are human.) As the ultimate end, then, “conformity to nature” is
whet we call virtue, or the “good”,
One thing to note about the argument as we find it in Cicero is that
it seems to rely heavily on the idea that we will, as we become rational,
recognise that olxetaoic orients us towards “things in accordance with
nature”. Not everyone agrees that this isthe ease, however. Many Peri-
patetics, for example, think that ou: primary impulse is towards pleas-
1 Cf. T. Engberg Pedersen, op. c., ch. IV, with which my reading of
Cicero, De Findus 121 coincides at kat insofar as it argues tha an “objec-
tive” point of view in ethics is derived from subjective experience.306 George Boys-Srowss
ure (as the “apparent good”). The analogy they appeal to therefore
takes a different form (ap. Stobaeus, Eclogae 117.13, p. 1242-13)"
For ifthe health ofthe body is chosen for itself, so much more is the
health of the soul. But the health ofthe sou! is temperance, which frees
1s from the violence of the pussions. And if bodily strength is « good
thing, so rouch more is peychological strength chosen for itself and.
good, But the strength of the soul is courage and endurance, which
‘make souls robust. So courage and endurance would be chosen for
themselves. By analogy, if bodily beauty s chosen for itself, x0 100 is
beauty ofthe soul chosen for itself. But the beauty of the soul is jus-
tice, which makes us "beautiful and never uajust”.
In other words:
(A2) health / strength / beauty : body ::.2/b /.¢: soul
where a,b, and c are the new concepts to which we apply the names
“temperance”, “‘courage”, and “justice”, respectively. Or in general
(one can presumably infer):
(A2), physical excellence : body :: x: soul
where xis virtue, as before.
‘As it happens, the Peripatetic version of the analogy, A2, has an
advantage over A1 which the Stoics themselves may have come to see.
For even assuming thet the Stoies are right that otve(oic is in the frst
place to one’s “nature”, it does not, of course, follow that the subject of
'6 This analogy would be the more readily available to the Peripatetics
insofar as they recognise, as B. Inwood has argued, a greater distinction
between soul and body (such that, for example, ethical development might
involve reorienting oixeliwats from the Tater to the forme): see “Hierocles:
‘Theory and argument in the second century AD”, Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy, 2(1984),p. 151-83, a p. 176-7 (and f- his “Getting to goodness",
art. cit, for the “Plaionising” tone of Seneca, Leer 120 where, as I shall
shortly shew, Senoca adopts this analogy).
UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIOSIS 307
the experience will recognise the fact 2s rationality dawns”, Indeed, the
‘existence of debate over the proper abject of olvefaxaic shows both sides
of the argument that rational introspection cannot be relied on to get this
‘question right. (The point, of course, is that merely to think that i is, for
‘example, pleasure towards which your impulses had been directed is
enough to stall the analogy set out as A1, whatever the truth of the mat-
ter) This may be why itis that it isthe “Peripatetic” approach (A2) that
Seneca, atleast, ends up adopting (Letters 120.5; cf. 106.
‘What tis “analogy” i, shall say. We knew the health of the body:
from this we reasoned that there i also a “health” of te soul, We knew
the strength of the body: from this we inferred that there is also robust-
ness of soul
But A2 in its turn has a weakness, at least when considered as a
psychological mechanism for generating the new concept: why should
‘we think that there is anything at al that stands in relation to the soul as
healt, strength, and beauty do to the body? This question does not
arise in A1, because the crucial terms on Which Al relies ("good” and
“natural-for-me”) stand in a relationship which is explanatory as well
1s analogical. The “good” accounts for the value of what is “natural-
for-me”, and one can see why someone who has experienced the latter
‘might go searching for the former. But there does not seers to be any-
thing about our experience of bodily health, strength, and beauty
‘hich could explain why someone might find it necessary to posit psy-
chological analogues. (And not just someone, in fact, but everyone.)
Seneca, then, develops an additional line of thought which comple-
ments the analogy properly speaking, and is presumably meant to act
as a sort of psychological catalyst for it:
1 CF.G. Suiker’s concern thatthe Stoic argument "bogs the question by
simply assuming that accordance with nature isthe standard” for anman good:
“The role of eikeisis in Stocs ethics", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy,
1.(1983), p 145-67, atp. 158 (emphasis orginal).
1 This passage is not clearly marked 2s a new line of thought (it follows308 George Boys-ST0NES
Kind sots have sometimes stunned us, and humane sets and acts of
endurance, We started to admire them as if they were perfect. Tuere
‘were many vices underpinning them, but they were hidden by the sur-
face sheen of the conspicuous action: we overlooked them...
‘The idea seems to be that quite apart from the empirical experience
cof ousselves which underpins AL, we have empirical experience of
other people which makes us think that there is something there to be
‘explained. To be sure, we do not sce virtuous action (for the reasons
‘oullined above). But we do see people behaving in ways which seem to
ptivilege the integrity of the mind over that of the body — and what is
‘more, we find ourselves admiring them. Seneca’s examples include
Fabricius, who could not be bribed by any amount of money (120.6),
and Horatius Cocles, who endangered himself to save his country
(120-7). Examples like this, Isuggest, are meant to act asthe trigger for
us to make the analogical move from our experiences of physical well-
being to concepts of psychological excellences the trigger, and the
‘occasion for further reflection on the content of those concepts”
jmmediately onthe last that I quoted), and Inwood for one sees the appeal to
‘examples a8 part of the analogy itself, This leas him to construe the whole as
follows: as bodily sirength helps us with the notion of mental strength, 50
‘observation of admirable deeds helps generate the notion of complete virtue
(Getting to goodness”, art cit, p. 285). But this cannot be right for one very
simple reaton, which is that it looks tothe analogy for help in understanding
the means by wihich we might each a concept ofthe good (namely by looking
to admirable deeds, and then... what, exactly?), But the whole point was
‘always supposed to be tbat the analogy is itself the means, The parallel at Lei-
ters 1065 is further support for the idea thatthe analogy between the virtues of
Dody and soul is meant to be self-contained — the observation of admirable
‘deeds in others being 2 strictly complementary line of thought.
9 Since the question raised inthis leter is not just about the concept of
‘200d, but the concept ofthe honourable (uahov, honestim) as wel, there isan
alternative way of understanding the relationship between the original analogy
‘rom body to soul) and the examples of praiseworthy conduct that follow. It
‘could be that, while the analogy isthe basis for our concept ofthe good, reflec-
tion on the acts that we admire and praise (obstupefecerant (..J mirar [.]
UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIODIZ 309
UL. Assimilation to god
[By means such as these, then, the Stoics and others aimed to build
the framework for our thinking as ethical agents from the material pro-
vided by olxetooic. Needless to say, however, Platonists were still not
impressed. Even if they conceded tothe empiriistsa successful mech-
anism for concept-formation, and even if they conceded that it could
bbe used to generate some concept of the good ~ they sill have one
objection, and it is essentially the objection we find in a famous pas-
sage of the anonymous Theacterus commentary (col. v.18-42):
We feel oixelons to those similar 10 us: he [Socrates] feels more
‘olxelaorg to his own citizens. For olnetics is more and less intense.
If those who introduce justice from olwetaxnc” say that one has en
‘audand) strictly concems the basis of our concept af the “honourable”. (That
the honourable and the good are different, albeit inseparable, qualities, is
soured at 120.1.)
2° Ts sometimes assumed that Anon. has the Stoics in mind, and indeed
the Stoics are the explicit object of attack in the course ofthe discussion (cal.
‘vi20 - vill), But the Stoics only come in here as part of an embedded argu-
ment taken “from the Academy”, which attacks them on the question of
‘whether justice is compatible with an ethics premised on unequal olslavang —
‘not whether jastice is to be derived from obvetaons. In fact, our evidence for
the Stoics on this question is inconsistent (pace e.g. M. Schofield, art. cit,
1p-193;G. Striker, art cit. 146 with n, 5). There are texts that make olxeloots
{he principle of justice in so many words: e.g. Plutarch, De Sollerta Anima:
{ium 4, 9624. But a number which ae often alleged to do 0 infact say some-
thing ese. (The present passage is a casein point; another locus classicus, Pot-
hyry, De Abstinentia Il 19 = SVF 1 197, does indeed credit Zeno with the idea
that olxe(sors is the principle of justice, but only in the sense that a capacity
for obueiwons defines membership of the moral community, notin the sense
thatt leads its possessor tothe virtue of justice; Cicero, De Finibus M1 62-68
talks about community and philanthropia, not justice as suck; &c.) Most of our
evidence says that the Stoics derived justice from wissom: cf. esp. Cicero, De
Finibus IH 23-25; Plutarch, Stoic Contradictions 7, 1034D; Seneca, Letiers
121.14. may be, of course, that there were diferent views onthe issue within310 George Bovs-S10NE
cequil sense of olxeiqoug towards oneself and the farthest Mysiaa,
thes thesis preserves justice: but itis not agreed that iis equal, fortis
Js contrary to what is obvious and to co-perception (cuvaio®noW).
For olzelavoug towards oneself is natural and aoa-rational while that
‘towards one’s neighbours i also natural, but net non-rational...
In shor: olxeloois is not capable of underwriting a well-founded
sense of objective valve. (it cannot do this for justice, chen a fortiori
it cannot do it for virtue in general, or for the “good”.) “And this,” he
‘goes on to say, “is why Plato did not introduce justice from oael@os,
‘ut from ‘assimilation to god! (polars eG), a8 we shall show" (col
viil4-20).
tis true, of course, that advocates of olvelaois as the basis for
ethics can argue that one comes to identify the well-being of others as
part of one’s own well-being. Even animals view their own offspring in
this light: and human beings regularly exind their sense of
olxelqorg much more widely to encompass more remote members of
{amily and community. This extension of olxeleans presumably goes
hand in hand with one's self-discovery as a rational being: a being, that
is, capable of appreciating the wider and ulkimately the cosmic context
of one’s actions. Indeed, the Stoics may have thought that there is
nothing to stop oleiwas extending to the point where it embraces the
‘entire community of rational beings. A famous fragment of Hierocles
(ap. Stobaeus, Florilegium IV 27.23) recommencs that we aim for just
this, and I suspect that it is what is inthe minds af those philosophers
who “derived justice from olvelinig’. If such an ideal could be
the Stos. In any case, there were otber philosophers who certinly did derive
Justice from olxekoorg, and whom Anon. might have had in mind as well or
instead: notably Antiochus of Ascalon (see Cicero, De Finibus V 65-66). See
also discussion at G, Bastianini and D.N. Sedley, “Commentarium in Platonis.
‘Theacietam”, Corpus dei Papiri Filasofici Greci e Latint ii, Firenze, 1995,
p. 227-562, atp. 492.
21 For Perpetetics, of. Stobsews, Kclogae 117.13,p. 119.22 - 120:3; for the
‘Stoies,esp-Chrysippus cited st Plutarch, Stoic Sel-Contradictions 12, 10388.
2 Gf A.A. Long and DN. Sedley, op. city I, p. 353 (though they saggest
UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIQEIS 311
achieved, if one’s every decision could be based on a sense of self-
‘concem that coincides exactly with concern for the cosmos, then the
worries about subjectivity would clearly disappear®®. Anon. in fact
concedes just this. But, as he says, such an ideal is simply not possible:
it is absurd to think that I can identify with "the farthest Mysian” and
act in such a way that takes equitable stock of their needs.
‘There is another trace of this objection to be found, I think, ina
passage of Apuleius’ On Plato (2.2 (221-2]), where he tackles the
‘meaning of “good”:
‘The fire good is that which is rue and divine, best and lovable and
sirable, whose beauty rational minds seek, impelled as a matter of
‘ature towards its heat, And because not all can attain it, or have the
ability to stain the first good, they are borne towards that which is of
‘men, which is second (good) nat coramon to many nor the same 10
all" For the appetite and dosir to do something is aroused either by the
tuve good or by that which seems good. + unde natura duce cognatio
‘quaedam est cum bonis ei anime partionis quae curation’ consent.
It is clear that the drive we have towards the “true good” is, as it is
in Alcinous too, one which is fulfilled within the context of assimila-
tion to god ~ that is to say, assimilation to god is desirable for us pre~
cisely insofar as it is the stato in which we achieve contemplation of
the good. But what is the second drive, the one to the “seeming
thatthe idea of an equal sense of obetnag towards others and oneself was not
ended byte Siok); B nvod, iro, Teor and rumen a.
cit, p. 181-2.
cy. Bpictes, Distertaiones 1911-15: although we at for ourselves,
‘we ceaot achieve our own good without achieving the common good,
2 follow 1. Beaujeu here (the editor ofthe 1973 Budé tex), reading ad
id feruntur quod hominum est, secundum nec commune multis est nec
{auod) omnibus smilter bon. C. Moreschini in the latest ext he Teubner
of 1991) read. ad id feruntur quod haminur est. ecunduon nec commune
Imes ex nec [quod] omnibus silter bom.
See esp Didashaltos 27, 179.39-42 (xd weveorfuécegov dy006y(.]312 George Bovs-SroNes
good” which is “of men”? Although the lat lin inthis passage is evi-
denily corrupt (which is why I left it untranslated), and although this is
something that has been badly obscured by two centuries of editorial
intervention®, the text as transmitted is pregnant with the language of
olnetooig. We have nature (natura) and kinship (cognatio), and the
{dea of care (cura | curario}". Given this, it may not be too fanciful to
think that the verb, con-sentio, is meant here as a calque on ovy-
‘auoDévonat - a term which refers to the way in which animals per-
ceive the world in relation to themselves, something which is of central
‘importance to the mechanics of olxeiwous*. So it would be possible to
imagine that something like the following ley behind the text that we
have (a reading which has the additional advantage of expressing a
‘meaningful inference from the claim that we are also attracted to the
‘goods of the body):
tsiBero dv xh émarfyn xa Oeigig v08 apcirov dyaBob, 5x2e Beby te xa
‘vodw Toy mO@TOV MOTAyOge%CoL dv Uc). The following chapter infers that
ssinlation to god is our “end” from this consideration (olgxtzow duGhouBov
‘80g #€Bet0 Spotnow Bed nares 18 duvatby: 28, 181.19-20).
1 All editors known to me have followed Oudenomp to read something
like: unde natura duce cognatio quaedam est cwn bonis ei animae portion,
(quae cum ratione consentit Fence there is by nature some relationship with
{foods in that part of the soul that agrees with reason”). Bu this reconstruction
fs as problematic in sense asthe tradition isin language. What i “het part of
the soul Which agrees with reason”, for example? And how docs any of this
follow from what went before (ef nde)?
2 Gf. eg, Seneca, Leters 121.17: si omnia propter curam mei facto, ante
ona est mei czas
2 CF. esp. Hiccocles, Ethical Principles col. i.55 -i13 with B. Inwood,
“Hlicroclee: Theory and argument”, art. cit, and my own “Physiognoaxy in
ancient philosophy”, in S. Swain otal Seeing the Face, Seeing the Sox!,
(Oxford, 2007, p. 19.124, ap. 845. (Note too the presence of the word at
‘Anon. In Theaetetum col v. 36 as quoted above). The word has no established
[atin translation: oddly enough, Latin authors have a tendency to tread round
the concept altogether, But for what it is wort, I note that Robert Grossetest=
chose consencientes to calgue owaiaBavouevor at Anstotle, Nicomachear
Ethics 11704 (Iranslatio incolniensis)
UNITY AND THE GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKEIOQNE 313
unde natura duce cognatio quaedam est cum bonis ei animae portioni
uae curam sui consents.
Heenoe there is, as ¢ matter of nature, a certain afinity towards “goods”
in that part ofthe soal which co-perceives the care of the self
In this case, Apuleius would be saying that we experience a drive
towards the so-called goods of the body in virtue of being able to see
those things as suited for our care. This drive, in other words,
toms (specifically the kind that Anon. calls aigenxt}: cf. n. 6
ve)
this is right, then Apuleius is making a very interesting claim. He
is claiming that olueloois works as an end- Platonists find other ways to tak about the sort of “Justice” that can be
‘exercised by someane who is not yet a sage. See Apuleius, On Plato 2.7 (229)
‘with P. Dozini, “La giustizia nel medioplatonismo, in Aspasio cin Apulcio”, in
1M, Vegetti and M. Abbate(ed.),La “Repubblica” di Plarone nella tradicione
antica, Napoli, 1999, p. 131-50. (Note that the ‘good natural traits’, eiuias,
‘meationed at Alcinous, Didaskalikos 1, 152.24, are something else again: not
‘types of virtue, but merely homonyms of the virtues.)
3 There isan excellent discussion of this point in J.G. Milhaven, op. cit,
ch. 1; see also now DN. Sedley. “The Theoretikos Bios in Aleinous", in
‘T_Bénatouil and M.Bonaz2i (ed), Theoria, Praxis and che Contemplative Life
after Arisiotte and Plato, Leidea/Boston, 2012, p. 163-81; and M. Bonazzi
himself, in the same volume, arguing the point for Plutarch (“Theoria snd
Praxis: On Platerch’s Platonism”, at p. 139-61). For a muanced scoount of
PPotinus, and the rather different way in which he relates our ongoing practical
‘activity to the contemplative life, see B. Collette-Datié, “Sommeil, éveil et
attention chez Plotin”, Xdhoa: Revue d’éuudes anciennes et médiévales, 9-10
(2011-2012), p. 259-81.318 George Boys Stones
affairs no more than necessary (Didaskalios 2, 152:30-153.15); but
this in only to say that we should not look to the realm of practical
affairs for the source of ethical value, or as something which is choice-
‘worthy in its own right. He also says that we should turn to practical
affairs when we are needed: philosophers should undertake military
‘and jury service; and they are obviously expected to keep an eye on the
political health of their state, because they ough to step in when the
affairs of government are being handled badly by others (Didaskalikos
2, 153.15-20). Nor is this understood as a regrettable distrection from
‘contemplative activity: Alciaous seems clear that action within the
politcal sphere is consistent with contemplative activity (2, 153.21-24):
rates di fx xv clomutvow 10 orhoabo nbauis wis Sewplas
Gechelecodon, GON di ran rose na aDEAY, ds ExSuerOY
Béexal ei cov mpaxndy xogety Blov.
From what has been said, the philosopher ought never to leave off con-
texplation, but always nurture and increase it and only parsve the
practical life as well, as a secondary consideration
Indeed, it looks as if the fruits of contemplation are what enable the
philosopher to act well within the political sphere: note, anyway, the
‘assumption that the philosopher would be capable of such action. And
{in fac, this is not surprising, given that god himself, that is, the god to
‘whom we are supposed to become assiznilated (28), is not alienated, or
in flight, from the world, though he is involved in contemplation.
Indeed, be is engaged with the world precisely insofar as he is a con-
templator (14, 169.35-41).
% Apuleius makes much te same point see On Plato 2.28 (252-3) with
4. Annas, Platonic Ethics, Old and New, Ktnce/London, 1999, 9: of. aso
Diogenes Laériv II 78; and e.g. Plutarch, On the Generation ofthe Soul 26,
1025E fr the soul being, oft essence, “atthe same same practical ad con-
template”. For the identification ofthis “celestial” god withthe werld soul ia
‘Aleinous seo JH. Loenen,“Albious' metaphysics. An atempt at rehabilitation”,
‘Mnemosyne, 9 (1956), 9.296319; contra eC. Moreschin,“Lesegesi del
UNITY AND THR GOOD: PLATONISTS AGAINST OIKFIQD2: 319
‘Alcinous, in other words, does not see a tension between the politi-
cal and the contemplative lives. He rather see a subordination of the
(one tothe other. Someone who only seeks ethical value inthe political
sphere is in trouble — precisely, in fact, and for the very same reason, as
the empiricists who ground their ethics on olxelwog are in trouble.
But someone who pursues a contemplative life and finds value in the
divine realm is able to apply it in everyday life as well”,
V. Conclusion
AAs ever with Platonism, there is a lot of convergence in language
and thought with the systems of their predecessors. But this is not tobe
viewed either a8 a lack of originality ot as an attempt to minimise
diversity. It is part ofa systematic strategy to show that the immediate
successors of Plato were right where they followed in his tracks, and