NATURE, HISTORY, AND

EXISTENTIALISM*
BY KARL LOWITH
i

W e are accustomedto confrontnature with history,and we

do so in consequenceof a definitehistoricalsituationwhicharose
in the sixteenthcenturywith modern natural science. The
natural antithesisto nature would be not historybut art. In
epochswhenmen werecloserto naturethanwe are, as in classical
antiquity,nature,or physis,was contrastedwith art, or techn,
whichis not "by nature"but is wrought
thatis, withtheartificial,
artificer.
its
Accordingto the classicalview, art can do
by man,
no better than imitate nature. The seeming self-evidenceof
our familiardistinctionbetweennature and history,and accordinglybetweennatural sciencesand humanities,has its origin at
thebeginningofmoderntimes. Two scienceswhichcharacterized
themselvesas new ones gave the firstphilosophicalexpressionto
naturalscienceof Descartes,
thisdistinction:the anti-Aristotelian
and Vico's anti-Cartesian"Scienza Nuova." The criterionof this
distinction,however,lies primarilynot in the differenceof the
respectivefieldsbut in the secondarydistinctionas to what can
be known about nature and historyscientifically.The priority
of the problem of knowledgeand methodover the question of
subject matteris again typicallymodern.
Descartesdivided the whole realm of realityinto two kinds of
being: the res cogitansand the res extensa. From the principle
of being-thinking
he constructednature as the object of mathematical physics. There is a true and certain knowledgeabout
nature; about historynothing can be known truly and with
* This articlewas
originallypublishedin German,underthe title,"Natur und
in Neue Rundschau(1951).
Geschichte,"

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SOCIAL RESEARCH

certainty. What we seem to know about historyrestson mere

tradition,opinion,and custom.
Againstthisphilosophicalfoundationofmodernnaturalscience
by Descartes, Vico asserted in his "New Science" the more
of the historicalsciences
authenticknowabilityand truthfulness
of man and his history. He tried to demonstratethat true and
certainknowledgeis possibleonlyof thingswhichwe have made
- thatis,of theworldofhistory,
the mondocivile,where
ourselves
the true(verum) and the made (factum)controvert. The world
of nature is inaccessibleto man because he did not make it. It
is intelligibleto God alone as its creator.
With regardto the fundamentaldivision of the world into a
natural world and a historical,or mn-made,one, even Vico,
a Cartesian- like Pascal,
Descartes'opponent,remainsnevertheless
who likewisestatedthatthe whole extendeduniverseof corporeal
nature,thestarsand theearth,cannotcounterbalancethe smallest
motionof a human mind. The human mind knows the whole
universeand itself;the corporealworld is unaware of itself.
This distinctionis stillmaintainedon both sides,in the natural
sciencesas well as in the humanities. F. von Weizscker,in his
Historyof Nature, epitomizesit by sayingthat nature is much
older thanman but onlyman knowswhat natureis, workingout
a naturalsciencewhichis as such a historicalone. Vico's way of
posing the question, which was polemically conditioned by
Descartes, has developed furtherwith Herder, Hegel, Croce,
Dilthey,^nd Collingwood. It still determinesHeidegger'sBeing
and Time, where the criticismof the Cartesian ontologyrests
also on the distinctionof two kinds of being which are different
in principle: human Dasein, which "exists" because it is spontaneouslyrelated to the world and to itself;and, on the other
hand, beings which are not self-related.Further,only human
existence is pervaded by "historicity." Heidegger's existential
constructionof historyfrom the temporal finitenessof man's
existingDasein purportsto radicalizethe workof Dilthey. Actuof modern historially, Heideggerachieved the self-redemption

81
NATURE, HISTORY, EXISTENTIALISM
cism,as demandedby Dilthey,only throughabsolutizinghisitself. In Being and Time natureis conceivednot as
toricity
and creative,but as an elementthatwe encounter
autonomous
structure,
onlywithinourworld,this"world"beingan existential
thatis,relativeto historical
humanDasein.
to reducethetradiand
OnlySchelling Hegel haveattempted
betweennatureand history,
as fixedby Destionaldistinction
to a comcartesas wellas byVico,thoughin oppositedirections,
notionof natureand mindrespectively.Impossible
prehensive
to understand
thoughit is to overlookSchelling's
lifelongeffort
naturespiritually
and historically,
one easilyforgetsthateven
is but thereverseof his
of mindand history
Hegel'sphilosophy
of Hegel'sphilosophy
of
nature.
The
central
notion
philosophy
ofhistory,
the"cunningofreason,"is notat all restricted
to the
historicalphenomenonof the dialeticalperversionof human
intentions
to unintendedeffects
and results. What Hegel prereasonin worldhistory
supposesin principleis nota particular
buta reasonthatgoverns
forexamplein thelawful
theuniverse,
motionof the celestialbodies,and is therefore
iscoverablein
thehistorical
worldas well. The essentialdifference
is thatin
naturereasonoperateswithoutconsciousness.In both worlds
universalreasonunfoldsitselfin a particular
element. He says
thatone has to arriveat the insightthatthepurposeof eternal
itselfin therealmof natureas wellas in the
wisdom"manifests
realmof theactivemind." For Hegel thehistorical
worldis a
sortof "secondnature"and a "secondworld"withinthecontext
oftheoneuniverse
whichis fundamentally
determined
byreason,
in
one
of
Christian
of
the
creation
the
one
or,
terms,
God, who
is spirit.
The question,however,
is howuniversalnecessity
and rationin
contradistinction
to
can
determine
thehisality,
contingency,
toricalworldif thefreedom
of humanwill,interest,
and passion
belongsto the propercharacterof the historicalworldin distinctionto nature. To answerthisquestionHegel introduces
the "cunningof reason,"whichworks,as it were,behindthe

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SOCIAL RESEARCH

and bringsit about that

back of all particularwills and interests,
the egotisticalwill of individual personsmust will what is universallynecessaryand rational,so thatthe subjectivityof willing
receivesa substantialcontent,supersedingmere arbitrariness.
In consequenceofthisfundamentalconceptionof theone world
of spirit,Hegel's explanationsof the workingof the "cunningof
reason"referequally to quite different
phenomena:to elementary
naturalprocesses,to the buildingof a house,to the world of history. Chemical and physico-mechanical
processesare made serviceable to higherbiological ends throughthe cunningof reason.
The flameabsorbsthe air but it is, at the same time,fed by wood
whichgrowsin the treeswhichare fed by the oxygenof the air.
Thus the burningwood, while absorbingoxygenfromthe air,
fightsagainstits own source. A similardialecticcan be seen in
- fire to melt
the building of a house. The natural elements
iron, air to stimulatefire,water to operate the mill which cuts
the lumber- all help to build the house. And yetthe purposeof
the house is to protectus againstfire,water,and air. Through
a "cunningof reason" the elementsare used againstthemselves.
Similarlyin world history,human passionsand interestssatisfy
themselvesegotistically,
apparentlyfor theirown sake, but proof progressiveworld historywhich is
edifice
the
duce willy-nilly
reasonable in the whole. Seen froma narrowand single perspective,human beings fightonly for theirparticularrightsand
against a universalorder. But within this strugglea new historical order comes about which determinesall the particular
wills. The cunningof reason,like divine providence,uses the
particular passions and interests,thus bringing it about that
humanfreedomorganizesa historicalworld,insteadof dissipating
in anarchy.
Hegel's conception of spirit as comprehendingnature and
history,and Schelling'sspiritualphilosophyof nature,did not
become productive. We are still thinkingwithinthe framework
of Descartesand Vico. To overcomethe dichotomyof Descartes
and Vico it would be necessarythat our attitude toward the

NATURE,

HISTORY,

EXISTENTIALISM

83

world,the natural as well as the historicalone, be transformed.

So-calledhistoricismcannot be overcomewithoutquestioningits
older counterpart,modern natural science. Our remoteness
fromsuch a radical revision becomes evident in the historical
materialismof Marx. In his historicalthinkingMarx was inspired
by Hegel's immensehistoricalsense, and on this basis he subjected the whole historyof moderncivilizationto such a radical
criticismthat it became reduced to a mere "pre-history"
of the
future. But on the otherhand, Marx acceptedwithoutcriticism,
togetherwiththe progressof capitalistindustry,the methodsand
resultsofmodernnaturalscienceand technique,consideringthem
a marvelousprogress. He took it for grantedthat nature is a
mere means and material for the purpose of developing the
historicalforcesof human production.
This way of thinking,however,is not specificallyMarxistbut
is generallymodern,and has prevailedsince Bacon and Descartes,
who proclaimedit the end of science to make man masterover
nature. The betterman succeededin thisthe morecould natural
science be made serviceable to man's historical purposes and
projects. Not only did the inventionsof natural science expand
the range of modern historicalmovementsand accelerate their
speed,but also theyenlistednatureas neverbeforein the service
of history. So-called historicismwould be harmlessif it had
merelyhistoricizedand relativizedthe so-calledspiritualworld.
It made naturerelativeto us, withthe effectthatactuallynothing
natural was left over. In our scientificallyorganized world
naturalnessis no longer the standard of nature. What still
remainsof natural thingsseems to be a mere leftoverof that
whichhas not yetbeen thoroughlysubjectedby man. This historicalappropriationof the naturalworld is at the same time an
fromit. The earthhas not become more familiar
estrangement
to us sincewe have becomecapable of coveringimmensedistances
in a short time. The more we plan globally and exploit the
earth technicallythe furthernature recedes,in spite of all our
technicalseizureof it.

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SOCIAL RESEARCH
il

In consequenceof this moderntendencyto thinkand to act in

termsof purposes,the quest formeaninghas become focusedin
history,because only as historycan the world be relateddirectly
to man and his purposes. If the world as nature,as physisand
kosmoSjeverbecameabsorbedin theworldof historythe question
about themeaningof historywould indeed becomeidenticalwith
the question about th meaning of the universe. But who
would not feel tSat thatcannot be so? The notion of a "world
history"is actuallya misnomer,forworld historyis universalin
a verylimitedsenseonly. Our "worldhistory"of a fewthousand
yearsvanishesin time and space if seen withinthe whole of the
"history"of the universe,and the quest for its meaningcan be
raised meaningfullyonly in relation to this spurious segment.
We do not ask for the meaningof heaven and earth,the stars,
the ocean and the mountains,nor do we ask forthe meaningof
vegetableand animal life. Our quest seems to be restrictedto
ourselvesand to historyas our history. But whydo we not ask
forthemeaningofall thatexists,notalone throughus but without
our devices,by nature? Why does the natural light of the stars
- than a traffic
mean less to us- almostnothing
light? Obviously
in
its
is
because the meaningof a traffic
light
purpose,while the
human
and
artificialpurpose.
lightof sun,moon,and starshas no
Correspondingto the limitationof our so-calledworld history
to our own historicalworld,the quest forthe meaningof history
is in itselfhistoricallyconditioned. It is a specificallyWestern,
even Christian,quest. It can be tracedback to the Old and New
Testaments'faithin a purposefulstoryof salvation. It is derived
fromthe assumptionthathistoryis directedby a will, and thereforetowarda purposeand fulfilment.The end or purpose,and
thereforemeaning,was originallygroundedin the providential
will of God. Since the ancient theologiesof historybecame
supersededby the modern philosophiesof history,the will of
into the will of man, who plans creaGod became transformed
tivelyhis own historicaldestiny. Without a purposefulwill,

NATURE,

HISTORY,

EXISTENTIALISM

85

divine or human,and withouta prevision,thereis no what-for,

no purposeand end as telosand finiswhichtogetherconstitutean
eschaton. The possibilityof a philosophyof historyand of its
quest foran ultimatemeaningstandsor fallswith eschatology.
Classical antiquityand the Orient have never asked for the
meaningof worldhistory. Oriental thinkingdoes not know the
eitherwith regardto worldcontrastbetweennatureand history,
historicalindividuals or with regard to the nations that suffer
historicaldestinies. The ancient Oriental ruler rules "historically,"inasmuchas he is the "Son of Heaven," and he is a good
ruler if he followsthe Tao or the "ways of Heaven." Though
the Chinese and the Japanese notion of Heaven signifiesmore
than the visible sky,it still comprisesthis natural notion,from
which the cosmic title of Oriental emperorsis derived. As for
themassof the people, Orientalsstillsufferhistoricalcatastrophes
as naturalones. They submitto them in the same way as to a
plague,a flood,an earthquake. There has neverbeen an Oriental
Voltaire who proclaimed the historicalprogressof civilization
againstnature,and therefore
despairedof the meaningof history
at the occasion of the great earthquake of Lisbon. For the
Oriental mind such events,whethernatural or historical,are
neithermeaningfulnor meaningless. They are overrulingdesthemwith
tiniesto whichone has to submitinsteadof overstating
theWesternpathosofan "epochal" consciousnessor an existential
decision,in a unique historicalsituation.
Orientalwisdomneverquestedfora meaningfulend of history.
It did not combineworldand historyinto one singlecompound.
In comparison with this ancient wisdom all the strivingin
Americaand Russia is but the extremeconsequence of modern
Europe. The ultimateaim of thisWesternwill is the fulfilment
of historicalmeaning. The
of a historicalpurpose,and therefore
predominantphilosophiesof historyin Europe, America, and
Russia agree in the common will to achieve a meaningfulaim.
- of whateverkind:
Aims can be reached only throughprogress
progresstoward the fulfilmentof conscious freedom (Hegel),

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SOCIAL RESEARCH

toward scientificpositivism(Comte), toward a classless society

(Marx), towarda consciousdecline (Spengler),towarda universal
religion as the creative escape from a declining civilization
(Toynbee). All are directed toward an aim and are therefore
of a meaningfulpurpose.
progressivetowardthe fulfilment
One could, of course,object that Oriental thinkingis foreign
to the West,and contendwith Hegel thatthe Orient has not yet
grasped the full meaning of spirit,freedom,and will, which
manifestedthemselvesfirstwith the Greeks and then in the
Christianera. But even classical Greek thoughtis no closer to
our historicalthinking. Greek philosophyand historiography
neverfanciedthathistoryhas a purposefuland meaningfulorientation towarda futurefulfilment.No Greek philosopherever
thoughtout a philosophyof history. Axistotle,who dealt with
- animals and plants,earth and heavens,politicsand
everything
ethics,rhetoricsand poetics- did not write a single treatiseon
history,thoughhe was the teacherand friendof Alexander the
Greatand a contemporary
of one of the greatesthistoricalevents.
The Greeksasked primarilyabout the logos of the kosmos,but
not, like Jews and Christians,about the Lord of Historyas a
storyof redemption. The Greekswere deeply impressedby the
visible orderand beautyof the universe,and the natural law of
determinedalso theirvision of the
becomingand disintegrating
historicalworld. In the eyesof the Greeks,thatwhich is always
the same and everlasting,as it appears year after year in the
' of the
"revolution*
heavenlybodies, manifesteda deeper truth
and aroused a higherinterestthan any radical historicalchange.
As for the vicissitudesof human destinywithin this orderly
kosmos,theytrustedthatman is capable ofmeetingeverysituation,
even a hopelessone, withmagnanimity.
Classical humanityneverput itselfinto a vacuum with unconditionaltrustor faith,as Judaismand earlyChristianity
daringly
did. It is preciselysuch an adventureof faithwhichis demanded
by the quest for an ultimate meaning of history,because the
visibleeventsdo not showan ultimatefulfilment
and do not give

NATURE,

HISTORY,

EXISTENTIALISM

87

an answerto such a radical question. Christiantrustin a future

fulfilment
has been abandoned by modern historicalthinking,
but theperspectivetowardthefutureas suchhas been maintained.
It pervadesall European thoughtand all our concernwith the
whenceand whitherof the historicalprocess. Togetherwith the
horizonof the futurethe quest formeaningas goal and purpose
has persisted.
The futureis thetruehorizonof historyand historicalthinking
faithin a future
only if the truthrestsin the Jewish-Christian
redemption. And since the West is still a "ChristianOccident,"
its historicalconsciousnessis eschatological,fromIsaiah to Marx,
fromAugustineto Hegel, fromJoachimto Schelling. This holds
also for political history. The English, French, and Russian
revolutionswould not have taken place without the faith in
progress,and secular faithin progresswould hardlyhave come
into existencewithoutthe original faithin an ultimategoal of
human existence. "The revolutionarydesire to realize the kingdom ofGod is theflexiblestartingpointofall progressive
thinking
and the beginning of modern history" (Friedrich Schlegel).
The significance
of thiseschatologicalorientationconsistsin this:
that it was capable of conquering the ancient fear of fate and
blind fortune. Comparableto thecompasswhichgivesus orientation in space,and thusenables us to conquer it, the eschatological
compassgivesorientationin timeby pointingto an ultimategoal
and therebyto an ultimatemeaningof historicalvicissitudes.
in

The identificationof meaning and end or purpose is not an

arbitraryone, but neitheris it absolutelyrequired. The metaphysicalplace of ultimate "meaning" mightbe found precisely
where no aim is willed. Then the relation of meaning and
purposewould have to be reversed,in thesenseof ancientwisdom,
according to which it is the end of man to contemplatethe
naturaluniverseof heaven and earth,whichis freeof purpose.
The exclusiveemphasison our human existenceand on the

88

SOCIAL

RESEARCH

world as a historicalone has a concomitantin the lack of sense

forthatwhichis natural. This denaturationof human life to a
historicalexistence did not, however,arise with modern historicismand existentialism,but with modern natural science.
It is against the backgroundof nature as conceived by modern
natural science that existentialismitself comes into existence,
forits basic experienceis not the historicity
but the contingency
of human existencewithin the whole of the natural world. If
we reflectupon thehistoryof Westernthinkinga distinctturning
point can be seen when the pre-modernconcept of an essential
humanexistencewithinan orderlykosmoschangesinto a chanceexistence. The change occurredat the beginningof the seventeenthcentury,as a consequenceof the astronomicaldiscoveries
of the sixteenthcentury. From then on writersand preachers
indulgedin whatmaybe called a cosmologyof corruption. The
universeseemedto have lost all its harmonyand stability. Mutabilityextendedfromthe earthto the heavens,and man was lost
in an incoherentworld. JohnDonne expressedthis mood strikingly in his Anatomyof the World (1611), to which Burton's
Anatomyof Melancholy(1621) is the counterpart. In the words
of Donne:
calls all in doubt,
And newphilosophy
The elementof fireis quiteput out;
and no man'swit
The sun is lost,and th'earth,
Can well directhim whereto looke forit.
And freelyman confessethathis world'sspent,
Whenin thePlanets,and theFirmament
They seekeso manynew; and see thatthis
Is crumbledout againeto his Atomies.
'Tis all in pieces,all cohaerencegone;
All just supply,and all Relation:
Prince,Subject,Father,Sonne,are thingsforgot,
For everymanalone thinkeshe hathgot
To be a Phonix,and thatthencan bee
None of thatkinde,of whichhe is, but hee.
This is theworld'sconditionnow.
What men need is a "new compassfortheirway."

NATURE, HISTORY, EXISTENTIALISM

89
and theological
conIt was Pascalwhodrewthephilosophical
*
sequencesfromthe impactof the "new philosophy'of nature
upontheconditionofman. He reset,as it were,thecompassof
Christianfaithin accordancewith a changeduniverse. His
existential
pathosand his insightinto the "humancondition/'
an expression
whichwasthereafter
toreplacethe"natureofman,"
cannotbe separatedfromhis new conceptionof the universe,
in timeand space. We
ofwhichis itsinfinity
thebasiccharacter
'
becausewe are
"exist*de facto,in the senseof existentialism,
lost in the infiniteuniverseof modernnaturalscience. This
wasclearlyrealizedbyPascalwhenhe comparedthehumanconditionwiththe zero pointbetweenthe infinitely
greatand the
small. Withthe mathematization
of natureman lost
infinitely
an
intimaterelationbetweenthe
his ownnaturetoo. There is
of
absurd
a
factual,
naked,
existence,cast into the
experience
oftheworlditselfin whichwe happen
world,and theanonymity
to exist.
therisingexperience
of theconA fewinstances
mayillustrate
and
human
existence
its
of
cosmologicalimplication.
tingency
and Nietzsche.All
I takethemfromPascal,Kant,Kierkegaard,
and
illustrate
the
homelessness
of
them
of
physical metaphysical
modernmanwithinthewholeof theworld.
of Pascal'sPenseswe read: "WhenI consider
In a fragment
theshortdurationofmylife,swallowed
before
up in theeternity
and after,thelittlespacewhichI fill. . . , castintotheinfinite
and whichknowme
ofspacesofwhichI am ignorant
immensity
and shockedat beinghereratherthanthere;
not,I amfrightened,
forthereis no reasonwhyhereratherthanthere,whynowrather
thanthen. Whohasputmehere? Bywhoseorderand direction
havethisplaceand timebeenallottedto me?"
Like a quietinganswerto Pascal'sfearin faceoftheunfathomof objectivetimeand space,soundsKant'stheory
able infinities
forms
ofintuition.But Kant,too,
oftimeand spaceas subjective
theradicalcontingency
of humanexistence,
evenof
experienced
creation.
The conclusionof his Critiqueof Practical
thewhole

SOCIAL RESEARCH
go
Reason contains the well known passage of the starryheavens
above us and themorallaw withinus. The twoworlds,the outer
one of natureand the innerone of moralexistence,are connected
in our consciousness,but in themselvestheyare completelydisparate. In the face of the universenatural man is nothing;in
and the
relationto himselfas a moral personhe is all-important
naturalworld is nothing. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant
he realizesthe impossigoes further. Like a radical existentialist
bilityof establishingthe inner necessityof the whole creation.
To establishit we would have to know thatthereis an ultimate
principleof existencewhichexistsnecessarilyor essentially. But
we cannotconceiveof any existence,not even of thatof God, as
necessary. This, says Kant, is a true abyss for human reason.
"We cannot put offthe thought,nor can we supportit, that a
Being, whichwe representto ourselvesas the highestamong all
possible beings, should say to himself: I am from eternityto
eternity,thereis nothingbeside me, except that which is somethingthroughmy will- but whenceam I? Here all sinksaway
from under us, and the highest perfection,like the smallest,
passes without support before the eyes of speculative reason,
in makingthe one as well as the other
which findsno difficulty
to disappearwithoutthe slightestimpediment."
What remains is total and radical contingencyof existence,
existencewithoutsupport,a thoughtwhich Kant feltto be intolerable for human reason, while its opposite,inner necessity,is
undemonstrable. The differencebetween Kant and modern
is that the latterseem to have managed to
Frenchexistentialists
findradical contingencytolerable and even liberating,and the
of an inherentnecessityunnecessary.
demonstration
Kierkegaardstates that the interestin existence is wholly
opposed to a possible interestin the laws of the natural world.
For an "existingthinker"neitherthe cosmic law nor the moral
law has a properinterest,but only the isolatedhuman existence
as such, which is singledout religiouslyby its relation to God.
Shocked by the absolute contingencyof our worldlyexistence

NATURE, HISTORY, EXISTENTIALISM

91
advancedthefollowing
questions:"Whoam I? How
Kierkegaard
came I here? Whatis the thingcalled theworld? How did I
in thisbig enterprise?And if I am compelled
obtainan interest
to takepartin it,whereis thedirector?I shouldlike to make
a remarkto him."
In spiteof the literalresemblance
of thispassageto thatof
difference
of toneand intention.With
Pascal,thereis a distinct
existence
is apprehended
of
man's
Pascalthefrightful
contingency
the spatialand temporal
withina definiteframeof reference:
universe.
Pascaltheworldis not a
For
of thephysical
infinites
but the majesticand overwhelming
realityof
"big enterprise"
this
the universe. With Kierkegaardand the existentialists
natural
is
modern
as
conceived
science,
universe,
by
physical
existence.
ofman'sforlorn
onlyas thehiddenbackground
present
to
be
seems
existennatural
this
background
Insignificant
though
as understood
ofexistence
byexistentialism.
tially,it is thereverse
Nienihilismof modernsubjectivity
Fromthiscosmological
to recapture
the
in hisattempt
tzschedrewthelastconsequences
man.
modern
of
lostworldoftheGreekkosmosfortheexistence
thatis, the
modern
is
the
to
be
His starting
one,
sure,
point,
manhasbeen"fallingfroma center
thatsinceCopernicus
insight
towardan x." In an earlysketch"On Truthand Falsehoodin a
Transmoral[cosmic]Sense" he saysthatman is lost in some
of worldsupon
cornerof the universewithits infinite
systems
thetruthof the
worlds. He hasno keyto nature. To recapture
human
Nietzschevenof
naturalworld,and thereby
existence,
man into nature"
of "re-translating
turedhis greatexperiment
- intothelogosofthekosmos,
of the
intotheeternalrecurrence
of
disinteand
same,namely,the everlasting
process becoming
grating.
Nietzscheis also the modernphilosopherwho
Accordingly,
to overcome
thequestfora meaningas aim and
madean attempt
himselffromnihilismand to
purpose. He wantedto extricate
regainthe naturaltruthof the universeas kosmosand physis.
But howis it possibleto will thatwhichis whatit is by nature?

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SOCIAL RESEARCH

Willing aims necessarilyat an end and where-to. A will without

an aim would live in a horrorvacui. Hence Nietzsche'sinsight
that"we preferwillingnothingness
to notwillingat all." Nihilism
means to Nietzschethat the ultimateaims, or values, devaluate,
thatman as will lacksan aim. To overcomenihilism,the boundlessfreedomofemancipatedwillingmustultimatelybe overcome.
Man must learn to will "backwards,"that is, to accept all that
is alreadythere,withouthis purposefulwill; man mustbe willing
to conformto the cosmiclaw of the world,which is "innocent"
because it has no aim, no purpose and no meaning. What at
firstseems to be extremenihilism,a human existencewithout
purpose and meaning,is thus reversedto the highestpositivity:
and selfto coexistwiththe naturalworldof eternalself-creation
an
aim
in
the happy
destruction,"withoutaim, unless therebe
- unless
a
will
the
circular
without
of
movement,
self-sufficiency
a circle bear good will to itself." The reason for Nietzsche's
philosophicalshipwreckwas not thathe revivedtheclassicalvision
of the kosmosas an eternalrecurrenceof the same, but that he
attemptedto establishits truthby his own creativewill, under
the titleof a "will to power."
Modernthoughthas in no waysurpassedNietzsche'sattemptto
restorethe truthof all existencecosmologically. It is true,contemporaryexistentialismradicallyposits again the old question
but it is caughtin the contingency
about Being and Nothingness,
of humanexistencewithinthe totalityof the universe.
The world which is concretelyanalyzed by contemporary
existentialismis neithera living kosmos,seen with Greek eyes,
nor an order of creation,as understoodby Christianfaith; nor
is it the worldof mathematicalphysics. It is only our historical
world of selfhoodand interhumanrelations,in short,a world
withoutnature. In Sartre'stre et le Nant natureis an opaque
en-soioveragainstthepour-soiofhumanexistence. It is accessible
onlyin the naturalappetitesof the human body. In Heidegger's
Being and Time nature is comprisedunder the lowest category
of the merely"extant," in contrastto human existence,which

NATURE,

HISTORY,

EXISTENTIALISM

93
alone has a world and can have meaning. Kierkegaardis exclusivelyconcernedwith the inwardnessof selfhood. He scorned
thediscoveriesof telescopeand microscope. A thoughtful
person,
he says,who wants to understandwhat it means to exist as a
selfbeforeGod cannotbe interestedin naturalscience,forit does
not make the least difference
to our moral and religiousdecisions
whetherthe moon consistsof blue cheese or of somethingelse.
To busy oneselfwith billions of yearsof cosmichistory,or with
a few thousandyearsof Hegelian world historyis, accordingto
him, but an escape fromauthenticexistence.
This completesthe isolated contingencyof human existence,
its totalhomelessness.And indeed,how can one feel at home in
a universewhich is conceived as the chance result of statistical
probabilities,and which is said to have come into existence
throughan explosion? Such a universecannotinspireconfidence
or sympathy,
nor can it give orientationand meaning to man's
existencein it. We are then indeed "cast" into this world,and
have thereforeto "project" ourselves. Even the most recent
conceptionof time and space, and the assumptionthat beyond
certainlimitstheconceptsof timeand space cease to be applicable
at all, cannot restorethe universe as an encompassableworld
orderintowhichman fits. Such a universecan perhapsbe figured
out,but it is no longerimaginable,and thescientistwho calculates
it does not live in it as a human person.
Neitherclassicalphilosophynor Christiantheologyunderstood
man's positionin the world in thisway. To Aristotleexistence
meant an unquestionableelementwithinthe essentialstructure,
order,and beauty of a dependable and clearlydefinedKosmos,
whichincludesthe existenceof rational animals called men. As
an animal, man shares in the natural characterof nature; as a
reasonable being, he has the privilege of contemplatingand
the perfecthierarchyof all essentialexistences. To
investigating
man
and universe were both contingentexistences,
Augustine
but createdby God. Though onlyman was createdin the image
of God, thereforesurpassingthe animal world,the uniformcon-

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SOCIAL RESEARCH

worldand man alike. The

nevertheless
ceptionofcreationaffects
ChristianGod, it is true,does not reveal Himselfin the heavenly
bodies or in a holyanimal,but exclusivelyin mankindand thus
in "history." But JesusChristredeemsnot only fallenman but,
with him, the whole of a fallen creation.
- the
With the dissolution of these two ancient convictions
classical and the Christian historicismand existentialismcame
into being. If the universeis neithereternaland divine (Aristotle) nor contingentbut created (Augustine),if man has no
definiteplace in the hierarchyof an eternal or created cosmos,
then,and only then,does man begin to "exist,"ecstaticallyand
historically.
This explains also the boundless intensityof modern history.
Our extremeconcernwith the historicalworld as the only scene
of human destinyis the result of our estrangementfrom the
naturaltheologyand cosmologyof antiquity,and fromthe supera frameofreference
naturaltheologyofChristianity.Bothoffered
and a horizonforits understanding.
forthe experienceof history,
The loss of this delimitationby and foundation in classical
cosmology and Christian theology has created that absolute
relevanceofhistorywhichwe are now inclinedto takeforgranted.