Persons Complete Digest Law Bar Review

Persons Cases Atty.
Rivera
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TaadavsTuvera
FACTS:
Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public
concernsaswellastheprinciplethatlawstobevalidandenforceable
theymustbepublishedintheOfficialGazetteorotherwiseeffectively
promulgated,TaadaetalseekawritofmandamustocompelTuvera
to publish and/or to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various Presidential Decrees (PDs), Letters of Instructions(LOIs),
Proclamations(PPs), Executive Orders(EOs), and Administrative
Orders(AOs).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the various PDs et al must be published before they

shalltakeeffect.
HELD:
TheSupremeCourtheldthatthefactthataPDorLOIstatesitsdateof
effectivitydoesnotprecludetheirpublicationintheOfficialGazetteas
they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present
case where the president may on his own issue laws. The clear
objectiveofthisprovisionistogivethepublicgeneraladequatenotice
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maximignorantia legis non excusat.Publication is
indispensable.
PeoplevsQuePoLay
Persons Cases Atty. Rivera

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Facts:
Po Lay was accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank

compelling those who had foreign currency to sell the same to the
Central Bank. Po Lay alleged that as the circular had not yet been
published in the Official Gazette before he committed the act, the
circular should have no effect on his act and therefore, he should be
acquitted.
Issue/s:
IsPoLaysclaimvalid?
Held:
Yes.PoLayiscorrectforthecircularhastheforceoflaw,andshould
have been published. Moreover, as a rule, circulars which prescribe a
penalty for their violation should be published before becoming
effective.Thisisbasedonthegeneralprincipleandtheorythatbefore
thepublicisboundbyitscontents,especiallyitspenalprovisions,alaw,
aregulationorcircularmustfirstbepublished,andthepeopleofficially
and specifically informed of said contents and the penalties for
violationthereof.
GARCIAv.RECIO
Facts:
OnMarch1,1987,RoderickRecio,Filipino,marriedEdithaSamson,an
Australian citizen. Two years after, they divorced. After becoming an
Australiancitizenin1992,RoderickmarriedGraceGarciainCabanatuan

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City. On March 1998, Garcia filed for a declaration of nullity of

marriage. She claimed that Roderick was guilty of bigamy, because
according to Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code, Roderick was
requiredtopresenthisdivorcedecreeuponfilingforamarriagelicense
in 1994. Because he did not present this decree, Garcia claimed that
Recio was considered to still be married to his first wife. Respondent
claimed that his first divorce decree from Australia was valid and
therefore, he was legally free to remarry. Furthermore, in July 1998,
RoderickwasabletoobtainadivorcedecreeforhismarriagetoGarcia
fromtheAustraliancourts.Thetrialcourtdeclaredthattheirmarriage
hasalreadybeendissolved,basedonthevalidityofthedivorcedecree
from Australia. Since Australian courts had ended the marriage, then
thecourtmerelyvalidatedtheirdecision.Thecasewasappealed.
Issue:
(1)IsRoderickrequiredtocomplywithArticles11,13and54ofthe
PhilippineFamilyCodeinordertoobtainamarriagelicenseforhis
marriagewithGarcia?
(2)Since Roderick did not comply with the said Articles, is his
marriage,then,consideredvalid?
Held:
ThecourtfoundthatRoderick,beinganAustraliancitizenatthetimeof
his second marriage, was not required to follow the registration
requirementsofourFamilyCode.Thosepersonallawsareonlybinding
upon citizens of the Philippines (Article 15, Civil Code). Based on that
decision, the case then rested on the question of whether the
respondent was legally allowed toremarryon the basis of his divorce
decree from Australia. The court finally ruled that Rodericks divorce
didnotautomaticallyimplythathewasfreetoremarry.Thecasewas

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remanded to the trial court for the purpose of obtaining more

evidence.
DMConsunjivsCA
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M Consunji, Inc. (DMCI) fell

fourtenn (14) floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death. SPO3 Rogelio Villanueva investigated the tragedy and filed a
report. Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the trial court of Pasig a
complaint for damages against DMCI the employer. DMCI raised the
widowsprioravailmentofthebenefitsfromtheStateInsurancefund.
The trial court rendered the decision in favor of the widow. DMCI
appealed,buttheCourtofAppealsaffirmedofthetrialcourtdecision.
DMCI now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following
grounds:
(1)Theappellatecourterredinholdingthatthepolicereportwas
admissibleevidenceoftheallegednegligenceofpetitioner;
(2) The appellate court erred in holding that the doctrinal of res
ipsaloquiturisapplicabletoprovenegligenceofpetitioner;
(3) The appellate court erred in holding that the petitioner is
presumednegligentunderArticle2180oftheCivilCode;and
(4) The appellate court erred in holding that respondent is not
precludedforrecoveringdamagesundertheCivilCode.
Issue:
(1)IsthecontentionofDMCItenable?
(2) Is Joses widow still entitled to the civil damages under the Civil
CodeafterclaimingbenefitsprovidedbytheECC?

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Held:
The law provides that, The exception is that a claimant who has
alreadybeenpaidundertheWCAmaystillsuefordamagesunderthe
CivilCodeonthebasisofsupervisingfactsordevelopingoccurringafter
heoptedforthefirstremedy.Inthecaseatbar,thereisnoshowing
that the private respondent know of the remedies available to her
whentheclaimbeforetheECCwasfiled,andthatshewasnotawareof
her rights. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against
her.Thus,itexemptsherfromthegeneralruleofelectionforclaiming
damages. Wherefore, this case is remanded to the trial court for the
determinationwhethertheawarddecreedinitsdecisionismorethan
thatoftheECC.
CuivsArellanoUniversity
Facts:
Emeterio Cui, plaintiff, took up preparatory law course in Arellano

University,hereindefendant.Afterfinishinghispreparatorylawcourse,
heenrolledintheCollegeofLawinthesameuniversity,wherehewas
awarded scholarship grants for scholastic merit and made to sign a
contract waiving his right to transfer to another school without
refunding to theuniversity the amounts extended to him through the
scholarship grants in cash. On the last semester of his law studies, he
transferredtoAbadSantosUniversity.Aftergraduation,heappliedto
take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he
requested for his transcript of records from Arellano University. The
defendant refused to release his transcript unless he paid back P1,
033.87,whichthedefendantrefundedtohimonthelastsemesterhe
wasenrolledinthesaidUniversity.Cuipaidthesaidamountforhimto

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get his transcript and be able to take the bar exam. A case was filed
before the trial court of Manila, asking to recover the amount
mentioned from the defendant. The case was dismissed due to
insufficiencyofproof.Hence,thisappeal.
Issue:
Is the contract (waiver) entered into by Cui and Arellano University

valid?
Held:
Memorandum No. 38 issued in 1949 clearly explainted that

scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit and not to keep
outstandingstudentsinschooltobolsteritsprestige.Thedefendants
understandingofthepurposeoftheirscholarshipgrant,i.e.,abusiness
schemedesignedtoincreasethebusinesspotentialoftheireducational
institution is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good
morals,goodcustoms,generallyacceptedprinciplesofmoralitywhich
have received some kind of social and practical confirmation.
Therefore, the decision of the lower court is hereby reversed
sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87 with
interestthereon,aswellasthecosts.
MicianovsBrimo
Facts:
AwillwasexecutedbythedeceasedJosephBrimo,aTurkishnational,
with respect to the partition of the estate left by him. Andre Brimo,
brother of the deceased opposed the petition based on the fact that
the partition was not in accordance with the national laws of the
deceasedasstatedinArticle16oftheCivilCode.

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Issue:
Whatlawswillgovernintheabovecase?Philippinelawsorthenational
lawsofthepersonwhosesuccessionisinconsideration?
Held:
TheTurkishLaws,whichisthenationallawofthedeceasedwillapply
pursuantto
Article16oftheNewCivilCodeofthePhilippines.
PilapilvsIbay~Somera
Facts:
OnSeptember7,1979,ImeldaManalaysayPilapil,aFilipinocitizenand
Erick Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany.
The couple lived together in Malate, Manila and had a daughter,
IsabellaPilapilGeiling.Afteraboutthreeandahalfyearsofmarriage,
Geiling initiated a divorce against Pilapil in Germany. On the other
hand,PilapilfiledforlegalseparationbeforethetrialcourtofManila.
OnJanuary15,1986,divorcewasgrantedbytheFederalGovernment
ofGermany.CustodyofthechildwasgrantedtoPilapil.Five(5)months
after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints
foradulteryagainstPilapilallegingthat,whiletheyweremarried,Pilapil
had an affair with a certain William Lhia and Jesus Chua. Pilapil
petitioned for a temporary restraining order on the ground that the
court is without jurisdiction to try and decide to charge of adultery
since the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his country prior
tohisfilingthecriminalcomplaint.

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Issue:
(1)DoesGeilinghavethelocusstandi,orthestatusorlegalcapacityto
filea
complaintofadulteryagainstPilapilafterhavingobtainedthedivorce
decreefrom
Germany?
(2) Does the Philippine court have jurisdiction over the criminal
complaint
againstthepetitioner?
Held:
UnderArticle344oftheRevisedPenalCode,thecrimeofadultery,as
wellasfourothercrimesagainstchastity,cannotbeprosecutedexcept
uponasworewrittencomplaintfiledbytheoffendedspouse.Nowthe
law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse, and nobody else. In other words, only the
offended spouse and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the
status,capacityorlegalrepresentationtodosoatthetimeofthefiling
of the criminal action. In the case at bar, the fact that private
respondentobtainedavaliddivorceinhiscountry,Germany,whichis
recognizedinthePhilippinesinviewofthenationalityprincipleinour
civil law on the matter of status of persons; private respondent is no
longer the husband of the petitioner hence, had no legal standing to
commencetheadulterycase.
Thereforecriminalcomplaintagainstpetitionerisdismissedforlackof
jurisdiction.
RoehrvsRodriguez

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Facts:
Roehr, German, married Rodriguez, Filipina in Germany. They had

children, Carolynne and Alexandra. Sometime in 1996, Rodriguez filed
an annulment case before the trial court of Makati. Roehr filed a
motionforreconsiderationbutwasagaindeniedbythesamecourt.In
1997,RoehrfiledapetitionforcertiorariwiththeCourtofAppealsbut
it was denied by the Court of Appeals and the cased was to the trial
court. Meanwhile, Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from Germany
dissolving the marriage and granting the custody of their children to
him. In 1999, Roehr filed a motion to dismiss the annulment case on
the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter as a decree of divorce had already been promulgated. In the
sameyear,thetrialcourtgrantedthemotiontodismiss.Rodriguezfiled
for partial reconsideration for the purposes of determining the issues
on the custody of children and the distribution of the properties
betweenthepetitionerandtherespondent.Therespondentjudgeset
aside her order for the purpose of tackling the issues of property
relations,supportandcustodyoftheirchildren.
Issue:
Did the respondent judge gravely abuse her discretion in issuing an

ordermodifyingthepriororder?
Held:
A judge can order partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet
attained finality. The legal effects of the marriage between a Filipino
and a foreigner performed abroad and subsequently a decree of
divorce obtained from the same, for example, the custody, care and
support if the children must still be determined by our courts.

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Therefore, the respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue

regarding the custody of the two children born of the union between
Roehr&Rodriguez.Theorderofthetrialcourtisherebyaffirmedwith
modification.
GarciavsRecio
FACTS:
RederickRecio,aFilipino,wasmarriedtoEdithaSamsonanAustralian
citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce
dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On
June26,1992,respondentbecameanAustraliancitizen.Subsequently,
respondententeredintomarriagewithpetitioneraFilipinaonJanuary
12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separatelywithoutpriorjudicialdissolutionoftheirmarriage.OnMarch
3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriageonthegroundofbigamy.Respondedcontendedthathisprior
marriagehadbeenvalidlydissolvedbyadecreeofdivorceobtainedin
Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial
courtrenderedthedecisiondeclaringthemarriagebetweenpetitioner
and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence,
thispetition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso

factocapacitatedhimtoremarry.
HELD:
The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence.

Basedontherecords,thecourtcannotconcludethatrespondentwho
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was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to

marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioners prayer to
declarehermarriagenullandvoidonthegroundofbigamy.Afterallit
may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to
marrypetitionerasresultofthedivorcedecree.TheSClaiddownthe
followingbasiclegalprinciples;amarriagebetweentwoFilipinocannot
be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of
Articles15and17oftheCivilCode.
NikkoHotelvsReyes
Facts:
RespondentReyeswashavingcoffeeatthelobbyofHotelNikkowhen
he was spotted and invited by a friend who was also invited for a
birthday party in the Hotel. At the birthday party after a couple of
hours, petitioner Lim, as the Hotels Executive Secretary approached
respondent and reminded him to just finish eating his food and leave
the premises because he was not invited. A commotion ensued;
afterwards,therespondentwasescortedbypolicemen.
Issue:
DidpetitionerLimactabusivelyinaskingrespondentReyestoleavethe
partywherehewasnotinvited,therebybecomingliableunderArticles
19and21oftheCivilCode?
Held:
Theparty,inthecaseatbar,isaformalone,inaposh,fivestarhotel,
forinvitation only.Therespondent,whoisuninvited,wasspottedby
theverypersonwhogeneratedtheguestlist.Ms.Lim,mindfulofthe
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celebrants instruction in keeping the party intimate would naturally

wanttogetridofthegatecrasherinalessconspicuousmannerinorder
not to call attention of the other guests. Failure to do so will surely
reflectnegativelyonMs.Lim.RespondentfailedtoprovewhywillMs.
Lim risk ruining the formal and intimate affair. During the cross
examination, there is an unlikely situation that the petitioner would
shoutatrespondentinaveryclosedistance.TheCourtruledthatthe
petitionerstwenty(20)yearsofexperienceinabusinesswhereinbeing
polite and discreet is credible. Petitioner did not abuse her right in
askingrespondenttoleavethepartyandthereforenotliabletopayfor
damages.Thepetitionisgranted.
QuisumbingvsMERALCO
Facts:
Meralcoinspectorsconductedaroutineinspectionofelectricmetersat
Greenmeadows in 1995. Upon reaching the home of the Quisumbing
spouses,theyfoundevidenceoftampering.Basedontheirprocedures,
theydisconnectedthemetertoconductfurthertesting,andtheyfound
thatthemeterwasindeedtamperedwith.Theplaintiffwasrequiredto
payPhp178,875.01,orriskdisconnection.Plaintiffselectricitywascut
off,onlytobereconnectedaftertwohours.Thetrialcourtdecidedin
favor of the plaintiff due to the lack of time given them to refute the
findings. The Court of Appeals reversed this ruling on the basis that
disconnectionwasonlydoneafterdueprocesswasobserved.Plaintiff
wasaskedtopaythebillingdifferential.
Issue:
(1)Wasthedisconnectionofelectricityimplementedwithdisregardfor
goodcustomsandpublicpolicy?
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(2)Didtheplaintiffslossqualifythemfordamages?
Held:
The petition was partly granted. The court found that Meralcos
disconnection was negligently implemented due to the absence of an
officer of the law (specifically, from the Energy Regulatory Board)
duringthedisconnectionprocess,asrequiredbytheirownprocedures.
However, they may still rightfully seek payment for the billing
differential, which the spouses Quisumbing truly owe. On the other
hand,plaintiffspetitionfordamageswasgranted,thecourtawarding
nearlythesameamounttheyweretopayforthedifferential.
BakshvsCA
FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the
assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that she is 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of
good moral character and reputation duly respected in her country;
other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
LozanoApartments,Guilig,DagupanCity,andisanexchangestudent,
beforeAugust20,1987thelattercourtedandproposedtomarryher,
she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they
thereforeagreedtogetmarried.Thepetitionerforcedhertolivewith
him in the Lozano apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a
week before the filing of complaint, petitioners attitude towards her
startedtochange.Hemaltreatedandthreatenedtokillher;asaresult
of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and
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asked her not to live with him anymore and that the petitioner is
already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then
prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the
otherhand,petitionerclaimedthatheneverproposedmarriagetoor
agreed to be married with the private respondent and denied all
allegations against him. After trial on the merits, the lower court
orderedpetitionertopaytheprivaterespondentdamages.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotArticle21oftheCivilCodeappliestothecaseatbar.
HELD:
Theexistingruleisthatabreachofpromisetomarryperseisnotan
actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concepts of torts and quasidelicts in this jurisdiction by
grantingadequatelegalremedyfortheuntoldnumberofmoralwrongs
whichisimpossibleforhumanforesighttospecificallyenumerateand
punish in the statute books. Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which
definesquasidelictsthus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,

there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre
existingcontractualrelationbetweentheparties,iscalleda
quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
InthelightoftheabovelaudablepurposeofArticle21,thecourtheld
thatwhereamanspromisetomarryinfacttheproximatecauseofthe
acceptanceofhislovebyawomanandhisrepresentationtofulfillthat
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
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herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no

intentionofmarryingherandthatthepromisewasonlysubtlescheme
ordeceptivedevicetoenticeorinveiglehertoaccepthimandobtain
herconsenttosexualactcouldjustifytheawardofdamagespursuant
to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but
becauseofthefraudanddeceitbehindit,andthewillfulinjurytoher
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrarytomorals,goodcustoms,orpublicpolicy.
GlobeMackayvsCA
FACTS:
ResititutotobiaswasemployedbyGlobemackaycableandradiocorp
as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations managers. When a fictitious purchase was discovered,
henry, the vice president and general manager of the company
confrontedhimstatingthathewasanumberonesuspect concerning
the matter and ordered him to take one week off, leaving his drawer
open and his office keys. After one week has elapsed, henry went to
himagainandcalledhimacrookandswindlerandorderinghimtotake
a lie detector and other test which the results are negative.
subsequentlyhewassuspendedanddespitethereports,hewassued
for estafa but was dismissed. When he was terminated, heapplied to
retelco and without the request of the company, henry gave a
character evaluation stating that Restituto was dismissed from their
companyduetodishonesty.Thiseventleadsrestitutotofileacasefor
damages against Globe mackay cable and radiocorp alleging the
unlawful, malicious, oppressive and abusive acts of Globe mackay
cableandradiocorp.thelowercourtrenderedthejudgmentinhisfavor
aswellastheca.hencethisappeal.TheGlobemackaycableandradio
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corpsaidtheycantbeheldliablebecausetheyhaveconductedthean
a lawful dismissal while the restituto contended that because of their
abusive manner is dismissing him and inhuman treatment, they are
heldliablefordamages.
ISSUE:
Can Globe mackay cable and radio corp be held liable for damages
resultingtoabuseofright?
HELD:
Itisexpectedfromtheemployertobefirmandtoresolvetouncover
the truth but the treatment they have given to resituto during his
employment was uncalled for. Despite of the evidence held, they
accused restituto guilty without a basis and harass him which are the
standardofhumanconductunderart19ofthecivilcode.Therightof
theemployertodismissanemployeeshouldnotbeconfusedwiththe
matterinwhichtherightisexercisedandtheeffectsflowingformit.If
thedismissalisdoneabusively,thentheemployerisliablefordamages
totheemployee.ItisclearlyindicatedthattheGlobemackaycableand
radio corp failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to
dismiss Resituto, as result, they are held liable for damages under
article21ofthecivilcodewhichrendertheremediesforarticle19.For
the tortuous acts committed by the corporation such as calling him
name which held no basis and the letter sent by them to retelco
allegingresititutowasdismissedduetodishonesty,theyarealsoheld
liableforart2176ofthecivilcode.
UEvsJader
FACTS:
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PetitionerwasenrolledinthedefendantsCollegeofLaw.Hefailedto
taketheregularexaminationinPracticeCourt1forwhichhewasgiven
anincompletegrade.Heenrolledforthesecondsemesterasafourth
yearstudent,andfiledanapplicationfortheremovaloftheincomplete
grade which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty
membersandtheDeanmettodeliberatewhoamongthefourthyear
studentsshouldbeallowedtograduate.Theplaintiffsnameappeared
on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture ceremonies to
whichhetenderedblowoutafterwards.Hethereafterpreparedhimself
forthebarexaminationandtookreviewclasses.However,hewasnot
abletotakethebarexaminationbecausehisacademicrequirementsis
not complete. Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages
allegingthathesufferedmoralshockbesmirchedreputation,wounded
feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar
examinations arising from the latters negligence. He prayed for an
award of moral damages, unrealized income, attorneys fees and cost
ofsuit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages

for misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all
therequirementsforgraduationwhensuchisnotthecase.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the

contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish
sufficientnoticeandinformationtoeachandeverystudentastowhere
he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the
conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among
those who will graduate. The school cannot be said to have acted in
goodfaith.Absenceofgoodfaithmustbesufficientlyestablishedfora
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successfulprosecutionbytheaggrievedpartyinsuitforabuseofright
underArticle19oftheCivilCode.
PevsPe
Facts:
Plaintiffsaretheparents,brothersandsistersofoneLolitaPe.Atthe
timeofherdisappearanceonApril14,1957,Lolitawas24yearsoldand
unmarried. Defendant is a married man and works as agent of the La
PerlaCigarandCiagretteFactory.HeusedtostayinthetownofGasan,
Marinduque, in connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was
stayingwithherparentsinthesametown.Defendantwasanadopted
son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolitas
father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name,
defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a
memberoftheirfamilyname,defendantbecameclosetotheplaintiffs
who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952,
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext; that he
wantedhertoteachhimhowtopraytherosary.Thetwoeventuallyfall
in lovewith eachother and conducted clan, destine trysts not only in
the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a
barrio school. The rumors about their love affair reached the ears of
Lolitas parents sometime in 1955, and since then defendant was
forbiddenfromgoingtotheirhouseandfromseeingLolita.Theplaintiff
evenfileddeportationproceedingsagainstdefendantswhoisaChinese
national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless. Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her
brothersandsistersattheirresidenceat54BEspanaExtension,QC.On
April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her
brothers and sisters checked up her things and found that Lolitas
clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled
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pieceofpaperinsideLolitasaparador.Saidnote,writtenonasmallslip
of paper approximately 4 by 3 in size, was in a handwriting
recognized to be that of defendant. It reads: Honey, suppose I leave
hereonSundaynight,andthats13thofthismonthandwewillhavea
date on the 14th, thats Monday morning at 10 a.m. Reply Love The
disappearanceofLolitawasreportedtothepoliceauthoritiesandthe
NBIbutuptothepresentthereisnonewsortraceofherwhereabouts.
Issue:
Whetherornotthedefendantisliabletopaydamagestotheplaintiff?
Ruling:
Thedecisionappealedfromisreversed.Defendantisherebysentenced
topaytheplaintiffsthesumofP5,000.00asdamagesandP25,000.00
asattorneysfeesand
expensesoflitigation.Costsagainstappellee.Forhehascommittedan
injurytoLolitasfamilyinamannercontrarytomorals,goodcustoms
andpublicpolicyascontemplatedinArticle21ofthenewCivilCode.
TenchavezvsEscao
FACTS:
In February 1948,Tenchavezand Escao secretly married each other

andofcoursewithouttheknowledgeofEscaosparentswhowereof
prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military
chaplain.WhenEscaosparentslearnedofthis,theyinsistedachurch
wedding to be held but Escao withdrew from having a recelebration
because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another
woman.Eventually,theirrelationshipwentsour;2yearslater,Escao
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went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and

she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an
American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further
alleged that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad
and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for
damagesintheamountofP1,000,000.00.Thelowercourtdidnotgrant
thelegalseparationbeingsoughtforandatthesametimeawardeda
P45,000.00worthofcounterclaimbytheEscaos.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotdamagesshouldbeawardedtoeitherpartyinthecase
atbar.
HELD:
Yes.OnthepartofTenchavez:HismarriagewithEscaowasasecret
oneandthefailureofsaidmarriagedidnotresulttopublichumiliation;
thattheyneverlivedtogetherandheevenconsentedtoannullingthe
marriageearlier(becauseEscaofiledforannulmentbeforesheleftfor
the US but the same was dismissed due to her nonappearance in
court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their
daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim
cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escao left
without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a
divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC
awardedP25,000.00onlybywayofmoraldamagesandattorneysfees
to be paid by Escao and not her parents. On the part of Escaos
parents:ItistruethattheP1,000,000.00fordamagessuitbyTenchavez
against the Escaos is unfounded and the same must have wounded
theirfeelingsandcausedthemanxiety,thesamecouldinnowayhave
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them,
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lawsuitshavingbecomeacommonoccurrenceinpresentsociety.What
isimportant,andhasbeencorrectlyestablishedinthedecisionofthe
courtbelow,isthattheywerenotguiltyofanyimproperconductinthe
whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from
P45,000.00toP5,000.00only.
St.LouisRealtyCorp.vs.CA
FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and member of the faculty of
UE Ramon Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover damage for a
wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where St Louis Realty
Corp.misrepresentedhishousewithMr.Arcadio.St.Louispublishedan
adonDecember15,1968withtheheadingwheretheheartis.This
wasrepublishedonJanuary5,1969.Intheadvertisement,thehouse
featured was Dr Aramils house and not Mr. Arcadio with whom the
company asked permission and the intended house to be published.
After Dr Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter to St. Louis
demandinganexplanation1weekaftersuchreceipt.Norectification
or apology was published despite that it was received by Ernesto
Magtoto,theofficerinchargeoftheadvertisement.ThispromptedDr.
Aramilscounseltodemandactual,moralandexemplarydamages.On
March18,1969,StLouispublishedanadnowwithMr.Arcadiosreal
house but nothing on the apology or explanation of the error. Dr
AramilfiledacomplaintfordamagesonMarch29.DuringtheApril15
ad,thenoticeofrectificationwaspublished.
ISSUE:
WhetherSt.LouisisliabletopaydamagestoDr.Aramil.
HELD:
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St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely

circulatedpublication.Furthermore,itnevermadeanywrittenapology
and explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ". The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual
damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees.
When St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed
the judgement for the reason that St. Louis Realty committed an
actionable quasidelict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code
because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house
which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
wasannoyedbythatcontretemps.WHEREFORE,thejudgmentofthe
AppellateCourtisaffirmed.Costsagainstthepetitioner.
SpousesYuvs.PCIB
FACTS:
Petitioners Vicente Yu and Demetria LeeYu mortgaged their title,
interest, and participation over several parcels of land located in
Dagupan City and Quezon City, in favor of the Philippine Commercial
International Bank, respondent and highest bidder, as security for the
paymentofaloan.Aspetitionersfailedtopaytheloanandtheinterest
and penalties due thereon, respondent filed petition for extrajudicial
foreclosureofrealestatemortgageontheDagupanCitypropertieson
July21,1998.CitySheriffissuednoticeofextrajudicialsaleonAugust
3,1998schedulingtheauctionsaleonSeptember10,1998.Certificate
ofSalewasissuedonSeptember14,1998infavorofrespondent,the
highest bidder. The sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds in
Dagupan City on October 1, 1998. After two months before the
expiration of the redemption period, respondent filed an exparte
petition for writ of possession before RTC of Dagupan. Petitioners
complaintonannulmentofcertificateofsaleandmotiontodismissand
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to strike out testimony of Rodante Manuel was denied by said RTC.

MotionforreconsiderationwasthenfiledonFebruary14,2000arguing
that the complaint on annulment of certificate of sale is a prejudicial
issuetothefiledexpartepetitionforwritofpossession,theresolution
of which is determinative of propriety of the issuance of a Writ of
Possession.
ISSUE:
Whether prejudicial question exist in a civil case for annulment of a
certificateofsaleandapetitionfortheissuanceofawritofpossession.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that no prejudicial question can arise from the
existence of a civil case for annulment of a certificate of sale and a
petitionfortheissuanceofawritofpossessioninaspecialproceeding
since the two cases are both civil in nature which can proceed
separatelyandtaketheirowndirectionindependentlyofeachother.A
prejudicialquestionisonethatarisesinacasetheresolutionofwhich
isalogicalantecedentoftheissueinvolvedtherein,andthecognizance
ofwhichpertainstoanothertribunal.Itgenerallycomesintoplayina
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending
and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively
resolvedbeforethecriminalactionmayproceedbecauseissueraisedin
civilactionwouldbedeterminativedejureoftheguiltorinnocenceof
theaccusedinacriminalcase.
Donatovs.Luna
FACTS:
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AninformationforbigamyagainstpetitionerLeoniloDonatowasfiled
onJanuary23,1979withthelowercourtinManila.Thiswasbasedon
the complaint of private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the
petitionersarraignmentonSeptember28,1979,PazfiledwithJuvenile
andDomesticRelationsCourtofManila,acivilactionfordeclarationof
nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26,
1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to
enteringintothemarriagewhichwasDonatossecondsinceshehadno
previous knowledge that Donato was already married to a certain
RosalindaMalupingonJune30,1978.Donatodefensedthathissecond
marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license
and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were
employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the
marriage.Priortothesolemnizationofthesecondmarriage,Pazand
Donatohadlivedtogetherashusbandandwifewithoutthebenefitof
wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed by them on
September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license
was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato
continued to live with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their
homeuponlearningthatDonatoalreadypreviouslymarried.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower
court be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage
pendingbeforethejuvenileanddomesticrelationscourtontheground
thatlatterconstitutesaprejudicialquestion.
HELD:
PetitionerLeoniloDonatocantapplyruleonprejudicialquestionsince
a case for annulment of marriage can only be considered as a
prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was
provedthatpetitionersconsenttosuchmarriageandwasobtainedby
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means of duress violenceand intimidation to show that his act in the

second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy. Accordingly, there being no
prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSEDforlackofmerit.Wemakenopronouncementastocosts.
QuimiguingvsIcao
FACTS:
CarmenQuimiguing,thepetitioner,andFelixIcao,thedefendant,were
neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations.
Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation
andwithoutherconsent.Asaresult,Carmenbecamepregnantdespite
drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped
studying.PlaintiffclaimedforsupportatP120permonth,damagesand
attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in
Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff
movedtoamendthecomplaintthatasaresultoftheintercourse,she
gavebirthtoababygirlbutthecourtruledthatnoamendmentwas
allowablesincetheoriginalcomplaintaverrednocauseofaction.
ISSUE:
Whetherplaintiffhasarighttoclaimdamages.
HELD:
SupremeCourtheldthataconceivechild,althoughasyetunborn,is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes
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favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of

thePhilippines.Theconceivechildmayalsoreceivedonationsandbe
acceptedbythosepersonswhowilllegallyrepresentthemiftheywere
already born as prescribed in Article 742. Lower courts theory on
article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to
children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another
reasonforreversaloftheorderisthatIcaobeingamarriedmanforced
a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear
violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim
compensation for the damage caused. WHEREFORE, the orders under
appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
CostsagainstappelleeFelixIcao.Soordered.
GeluzvsCA
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo, respondent, came to know

Antonio Geluz, the petitioner and physician, through her aunt Paula
Yambot. Nita became pregnant some time in 1950 before she and
Oscar were legally married. As advised by her aunt and to conceal it
fromherparents,shedecidedtohaveitabortedbyGeluz.Shehadher
pregnancy aborted again on October 1953 since she found it
inconvenient as she was employed at COMELEC. After two years, on
February 21, 1955, she again became pregnant and was accompanied
by her sister Purificacion and the latters daughter Lucida at Geluz
clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez Street. Oscar at this time was in the
province of Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial
board.Hedoesnthaveanyideanorgivenhisconsentontheabortion.
26

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ISSUE:
Whetherhusbandofawoman,whovoluntarilyprocuredherabortion,
couldrecoverdamagesfromthephysicianwhocausedthesame.
HELD:
TheSupremeCourtbelievedthattheminimumawardfixedatP3,000
forthedeathofapersondoesnotcovercasesofanunbornfetusthat
isnotendowedwithpersonalitywhichtrialcourtandCourtofAppeals
predicated.BothtrialcourtandCAwasntabletofindanybasisforan
awardofmoraldamagesevidentlybecauseOscarsindifferencetothe
previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates he was unconcerned with
the frustration of his parental affections. Instead of filing an
administrative or criminal case against Geluz, he turned his wifes
indiscretion to personal profit and filed a civil action for damages of
whichnotonlyhebut,includinghiswifewouldbethebeneficiaries.It
showsthathesafterobtainingalargemoneypaymentsincehesued
Geluz for P50,000 damages and P3,000 attorneys fees that serves as
indemnity claim, which under the circumstances was clearly
exaggerated.
DeJesusvSyquia
FACTS:
AntoniaLoanco,alikelyunmarriedgirl20yearsofagewasacashierin
a barber shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente
Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to
have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got acquainted with
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Antonioandhadanamorousrelationship.Asaconsequence,Antonia
gotpregnantandababyboywasbornonJune17,1931.Intheearly
monthsofAntoniaspregnancy,defendantwasaconstantvisitor.On
February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that
the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child.
Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to
Antoniaremindinghertoeatontimeforherandjuniorssake.The
defendantaskhisfriendDr.Talaveratoattendatthebirthandhospital
arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila. After giving birth,
Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street
Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia
showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and
he was married with another woman at this time. It should be noted
that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in
charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
LoancotobegiveninsteadofCesarSyquiaJr.thatwasfirstplanned.
ISSUES:
1.Whetherthenotetothepadreinconnectionwiththeotherletters
written by defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves
acknowledgementofpaternity.
2.WhethertrialcourterredinholdingthatIsmaelLoancohadbeenin
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified
by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said
IsmaelLoanco.
HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of

paternityandtheotherlettersaresufficienttoconnecttheadmission
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with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that the
writing shall be indubitable. The law fixes no period during which a
child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a natural
child;andtheperiodinthiscasewaslongenoughtorevealthefather's
resolution to admit the status. Supreme Court held that they agree
withthetrialcourtinrefusingtoprovidedamagestoAntoniaLoanco
for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no
standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify
the judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael
LoancointheamountofP50pesospermonth.Theylikewisepointed
out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the
orderastotheamountofpension.
Limjucovs.TheEstateofPedroFragante
FACTS:
PedroFragante,aFilipinocitizenatthetimeofhisdeath,appliedfora
certificateofpublicconveniencetoinstallandmaintainaniceplantin
SanJuanRizal.Hisintestateestateisfinanciallycapableofmaintaining
the proposed service. The Public Service Commission issued a
certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased,
authorizing said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial
Administrator,appointedbythepropercourtofcompetentjurisdiction,
to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims that the
grantingofcertificateappliedtotheestateisacontraventionoflaw.
ISSUE:
29

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Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial

judicialpersonality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial

personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person
couldbeconsideredasartificialjuridicalpersonforthepurposeofthe
settlementanddistributionofhisproperties.Itshouldbenotedthat
the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and
fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death.
Oneofthosesurvivingrightsinvolvedthependingapplicationforpublic
conveniencebeforethePublicServiceCommission.SupremeCourtisof
theopinionthatforthepurposesoftheprosecutionofsaidcaseNo.
4572ofthePublicServiceCommissiontoitsfinalconclusion,boththe
personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed
extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as
amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and
decreed.
DumlaovQualityPlastics
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T662 was rendered on February 28, 1962
ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and
DarangtopaysolidarityQualityPlasticsthesumofP3,667.03pluslegal
rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision became final
or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.
Defendantsfailedtopaytheamountbeforethelimitgiven.Oria'sland,
whichwascoveredbyOriginalCertificateofTitleNo.28732andhasan
areaofnineandsixtenthshectares,waslevieduponandsoldbythe
30

PJG
sheriffatpublicauctiononSeptember24,1962whichhehasgivenas
security under the bond. Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or
long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics was not aware on Orias
death.Thesummonsandcopiesofcomplaintwaspersonallyservedon
June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter
acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his codefendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all
testamentary heirs in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic
Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment
against Oria and the execution against his land (T873). Dionisio also
suedinhiscapacityasadministratorofOriastestateestate.
ISSUE:
Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be

annulledonthegroundoflackinjuridicalcapacity.
HELD:
QualityPlasticsuponreceivingthesummonsonT873justlearnedthat
Oria was already dead prior case T662 was filed. The Dumalaos
agreedintheirstipulationthatindeedQualityPlasticswasunawareof
Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co
defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the
judgment against him is a patent nullity. Lower courts judgment
againstOriainT662isvoidforlackofjurisdictionoverhispersonasfar
as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his
juridicalcapacitywhichisthefitnesstobethesubjectoflegalrelations
was lost through death. The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality
Plastics in order to annul the judgment against Oria does not follow
thattheyareentitiledtoclaimattorneysfeesagainstthecorporation.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its
judgmentinCivilCaseNo.T662againstPedroOriaisdeclaredvoidfor
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lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT

No.28732isalsovoid.harmonywiththeconstitution:itissoadjudged
anddecreed.
MoYaLimYaovs.CommissionerofImmigration
Facts:
On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to
enterthePhilippinesasanonimmigrant,foratemporaryvisitor'svisa
to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the
Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y,
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippinesonorbeforetheexpirationofherauthorizedperiodofstay
in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was
allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25
January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplatedactionoftheCommissionerofImmigrationtoconfiscate
her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the
expirationofherauthorizedstay,shebroughtanactionforinjunction
withpreliminaryinjunction.TheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila(Civil
Case49705)deniedtheprayerforpreliminaryinjunction.MoyaLimYao
andLauYuenYeungappealed.
Issue:
WhetherLauYuenYeungipsofactobecameaFilipinocitizenuponher
marriagetoaFilipinocitizen.
Held:
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UnderSection15ofCommonwealthAct473,analienwomanmarrying
a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina
providedsheisnotdisqualifiedtobeacitizenofthePhilippinesunder
Section4ofthesamelaw.Likewise,analienwomanmarriedtoanalien
whoissubsequentlynaturalizedherefollowsthePhilippinecitizenship
of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo
the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to
Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as
Filipino,whodiesduringtheproceedings,isnotrequiredtogothrough
a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino
citizenhereof,itshouldfollowthatthewifeofalivingFilipinocannot
be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is
materialorindispensibleinajudicialoradministrativecase,Whatever
thecorrespondingcourtoradministrativeauthoritydecidesthereinas
tosuchcitizenshipisgenerallynotconsideredasresadjudicata,hence
ithastobethreshedoutagainandagainastheoccasionmaydemand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from
and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto
AguinaldoLim,aFilipinocitizenof25January1962.
RomualdezMarcosvs.COMELEC
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high
school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursuedhercollegedegree,education,inSt.PaulsCollegenowDivine
Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
33

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workwithhercousin,thelatespeakerDanielRomualdezinhisofficein
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
FerdinandMarcoswhenhewasstillaCongressmanofIlocosNorteand
was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registeredasavoter.In1965,whenMarcoswonpresidency,theylived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila.
She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
MetroManiladuring1978.ImeldaRomualdezMarcoswasrunningfor
thepositionofRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyteforthe1995
Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the
FirstDistrictofLeyteandalsoacandidateforthesameposition,fileda
PetitionforCancellationandDisqualification"withtheCommissionon
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence.Shearrivedatthesevenmonthsresidencyduetothefact
that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said
months.
ISSUE:
Whetherpetitionerhassatisfiedthe1yearresidencyrequirementtobe
eligibleinrunningasrepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.
The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of
legalresidenceordomicileintheFirstDistrictofLeytedespiteherown
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declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following

reasons:
1.Aminorfollowsdomicileofherparents.TaclobanbecameImeldas
domicileoforiginbyoperationoflawwhenherfatherbroughtthemto
Leyte;
2.Domicileoforiginisonlylostwhenthereisactualremovalorchange
ofdomicile,abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerresidence
and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of
originshouldbedeemedtocontinue.
3.Awifedoesnotautomaticallygainthehusbandsdomicilebecause
the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
PoliticalLaw.WhenImeldamarriedlatePresidentMarcosin1954,she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domiciliumnecessarium.
4.AssumingthatImeldagainedanewdomicileafterhermarriageand
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
Marcos,heractionsuponreturningtothecountryclearlyindicatedthat
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdaysandotherimportantmilestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
RepresentativesintheFirstDistrictofLeyte,theCOMELEC'squestioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order
35

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the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly

electedRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte.
LimTanhuvs.Ramolete
FACTS:
PrivaterespondentTanPutallegedthatsheisthewidowofTeeHoon
Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has
controllinginterestofGloryCommercialCompanyandaChineseCitizen
untilhisdeath.DefendantAntonioLimTanhuandAlfonsoLeonardoNg
SuawerepartnersinnamebuttheyweremereemployeesofPoChuan
andwerenaturalizedFilipinoCitizens.TanPutfiledcomplaintagainst
spousespetitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech
Chuan and the other spousespetitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including
alsotheirsonEngChongLeonardo,thatthroughfraudandmachination
took actual and active management of the partnership and that she
alleged entitlement to share not only in the capital and profits of the
partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal,
acquiredbythepartnershipwithfundsofthelatterduringitslifetime."
According to the petitioners, Ang Siok Tin is the legitimate wife, still
living, and with whom Tee Hoon had four legitimate children, a twin
born in 1942, and two others born in 1949 and 1965, all presently
residinginHongKong.TeeHoondiedin1966andasaresultofwhich
thepartnershipwasdissolvedandwhatcorrespondedtohimwereall
giventohislegitimatewifeandchildren.
36

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Tan Put prior of her alleged marriage with Tee Hoon on 1949, was
engaged in the drugstore business; that not long after her marriage,
upon the suggestion of the latter sold her drugstore for P125,000.00
which amount she gave to her husband as investment in Glory
Commercial Co. sometime in 1950; that after the investment of the
abovestated amount in the partnership its business flourished and it
embarked in the import business and also engaged in the wholesale
andretailtradeofcementandGIsheetsandunderhugeprofits.
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was
merelythecommonlawwifeofTeeHoon.TanPutandTeeHoonwere
childlessbuttheformerhadafosterchild,AntonioNunez.
ISSUE:
Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can
claimfromthecompanyofthelattersshare.
HELD:
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting
parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set
forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the
primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be
satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who
allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such
marriageunlessproofoflossofthecontractorofanyothersatisfactory
reasonforitsnonproductionisfirstpresentedtothecourt.Inthecase
37

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atbar,thepurportedcertificationissuedbyaMons.JoseM.Recoleto,
Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore,
competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to
unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the
authenticityofthesignatureofsaidcertifier,thejuratallegedlysigned
byasecondassistantprovincialfiscalnotbeingauthorizedbylaw,since
it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides, inasmuch as the
bishopdidnottestify,thesameishearsay.
An agreement with Tee Hoon was shown and signed by Tan Put that
she received P40,000 for her subsistence when they terminated their
relationship of commonlaw marriage and promised not to interfere
with each others affairs since they are incompatible and not in the
position to keep living together permanently. Hence, this document
not only proves that her relation was that of a commonlaw wife but
hadalsosettledpropertyinterestsinthepaymentofP40,000.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted. All
proceedings held in respondent court in its Civil Case No. 12328
subsequent to the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 are hereby
annulled and set aside, particularly the exparte proceedings against
petitionersandthedecisiononDecember20,1974.Respondentcourt
isherebyorderedtoenteranorderextendingtheeffectsofitsorderof
dismissal of the action dated October 21, 1974 to herein petitioners
Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo.
Andrespondentcourtisherebypermanentlyenjoinedfromtakingany
further action in said civil case gave and except as herein indicated.
Costsagainstprivaterespondent.
38

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Republicvs.Dayot
FACTS:
JoseandFelisaDayotweremarriedatthePasayCityHallonNovember
24,1986.Inlieuofamarriagelicense,theyexecutedaswornaffidavit
thattheyhadlivedtogetherforatleast5years.OnAugust1990,Jose
contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa
then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the
other hand, Josefiled a complaint on July1993 for annulment and/or
declarationofnullityofmarriagewherehecontendedthathismarriage
withFelisawasashamandhisconsentwassecuredthroughfraud.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotJosesmarriagewithFelisaisvalidconsideringthatthey
executedaswornaffidavitinlieuofthemarriagelicenserequirement.
HELD:
CAindubitablyestablishedthatJoseandFelisahavenotlivedtogether
for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
39

PJG
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their

marriageonNovember1986.FindingsoffactsoftheCourtofAppeals
arebindingintheSupremeCourt.
Thesolemnizationofamarriagewithoutpriorlicenseisaclearviolation
ofthelawandinvalidatesamarriage.Furthermore,thefalsityofthe
allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and
Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an
exceptiontotherequirementforamarriagelicense,cannotbeamere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely
required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath.
Hence,JoseandFelisasmarriageisvoidabinitio.Thecourtalsoruled
that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. The right to
impugnmarriagedoesnotprescribeandmayberaisedanytime.
Tevs.Te
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering

organizedbytheFilipinoChineseassociationintheircollege.Initially,
hewasattractedtoRowenasclosefriendbut,asthelatteralreadyhad
aboyfriend,theyoungmandecidedtocourtRowena,whichhappened
40

PJG
inJanuary1996.ItwasRowenawhoaskedthattheyelopebutEdward
refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that
month;he,providingtheirtravelmoneyofP80,000andshe,purchasing
theboatticket.
TheydecidedtogobacktoManilainApril1996.Rowenaproceededto
heruncleshouseandEdwardtohisparentshome.Eventuallytheygot
married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from
getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by
Rowena and her uncle. After a month, Edward escaped from the
house,andstayedwithhisparents.Edwardsparentswantedthemto
stayattheirhousebutRowenarefusedanddemandedthattheyhavea
separateabode.InJune1996,shesaidthatitwasbetterforthemto
liveseparatelivesandtheythenpartedways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychologicalincapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of
psychologicalincapacity.
HELD:
Thepartieswhirlwindrelationshiplastedmoreorlesssixmonths.They
metinJanuary1996,elopedinMarch,exchangedmaritalvowsinMay,
and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
41

PJG
testimonyfoundbothpartiespsychologicallyincapacitated.Petitioners
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent
personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and
antisocialpersonalitydisorder
Thereisnorequirementthatthepersontobedeclaredpsychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.Verily,theevidencemustshowalink,medicalorthelike,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychologicaldisorderitself.
Thepresentationofexpertproofpresupposesathoroughandindepth
assessmentofthepartiesbythepsychologistorexpert,foraconclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder,
cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together,
observinglove,respectandfidelityandrenderinghelpandsupport,for
he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others,
and allows others to make most of his important decisions (such as
where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed
everythingdictatedtohimbythepersonsaroundhim.Heisinsecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no
cohesiveselftospeakof,andhasnogoalsandcleardirectioninlife.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality
disordermakesherunabletoassumetheessentialmaritalobligations
on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatmentandcontrolofotherswithoutremorse,andhertendency
42

PJG
to blame others. Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is

impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitionerwithherthreatsofblackmailandofcommittingsuicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable
psychologicalincapacity,theprecipitousmarriagethattheycontracted
onApril23,1996isthus,declarednullandvoid.
WIEGELV.SEMPIODIY
FACTS:
LiliaOliviaWiegelgotmarriedtoKarlHeinzWiegelonJuly,1978atthe
HolyCatholicApostolicChristianChurchinMakati.Karl,uponlearning
thatLiliahadasubsistingmarriage,filedforadeclarationofnullityof
theirmarriage.LiliacontractedherfirstmarriagewithEduardoMaxion
onJune25,1972.Sheclaimsthatthefirstmarriageisnotvalidbecause
they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to
someoneelseatthattime.
ISSUE:
WONLiliasfirstmarriageisvoid?
HELD:
43

PJG
No.Itsvoidable.Petitiondismissed.
RATIO:
1.Presenceofforceonlymakesamarriagevoidable,notvoid.(CCART.
85) It is valid until annulled and since there was no annulment,
marriageisstillvalid.
2.Evenifmarriageisvoid,judicialdeclarationofnullityisstillneeded
especiallyforpurposesofremarriage
TERREV.TERRE
FACTS:
Dorothy Terre first met Jordan Terre when they were 4th year high
school classmates in Cadiz City High School. She was then married to
Merlito Bercenilla. Jordan courted her and this continued when they
moved to Manila to pursue their education. Jordan, then a freshman
lawstudent,toldDorothythathermarriagewithBercenillawasvoidab
initio because they are first cousins. Believing in Jordan and with the
consentofhermotherandexinlaws,shemarriedJordanonJune14,
1977. Jordan wrote single as Dorothys civil status despite latters
protests. Jordan said it didnt matter because marriage was void to
beginwith.Aftertheirmarriage,DorothysupportedJordanbecausehe
was still studying then. They had a son, Jason, whowas born on June
25,1981.Shortlyaftershegavebirth,Jordandisappeared.Shelearned
that he married Vilma Malicdem. Dorothy filed charges for
abandonment of minor, bigamy and grossly immoral conduct. Jordan
wasalreadyamemberoftheBarthen.
44

PJG
Jordan claimed that he was unaware of Dorothys first marriage and

thatshesentheroutofthehousewhenheconfrontedheraboutit.He
contractedthesecondmarriage,believingthathismarriagetoDorothy
wasvoidabinitiobecauseofherpriorsubsistingmarriage.
ISSUE:
WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a
subsequentmarriage?
HELD:
Yes.JordanTerredisbarred.
RATIO:
1.JordanfailedtorebutevidencepresentedbyDorothy.
2.Asalawstudent,heshouldhaveknownthatevenifDorothysfirst
marriage was void ab initio, she still needed a judicial declaration
beforeshecancontractanothermarriage.(GOMEZV.LIPANA;FCART.
40)
3. Jordan has displayed a deeply flawed moral character. Dorothy
supportedhim,hegotherpregnantthenheabandonedher.Hemadea
mockery of the institution of marriage. Thus, not worthy to be a
memberoftheBar.
Valdesvs.RTC
FACTS:
45

PJG
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and

begotten5children.Valdezfiledapetitionin1992foradeclarationof
nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed
underthecustodyoftheirmotherwhiletheother3siblingsarefreeto
choosewhichtheyprefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions
withoutmarriage.Duringthehearingonthemotion,thechildrenfiled
ajointaffidavitexpressingdesiretostaywiththeirfather.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotthepropertyregimeshouldbebasedoncoownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the
causethereof,thepropertyrelationsofthepartiesaregovernedbythe
rules on coownership. Any property acquired during the union is
primafaciepresumedtohavebeenobtainedthroughtheirjointefforts.
Apartywhodidnotparticipateintheacquisitionofthepropertyshall
be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys
effortsconsistedinthecareandmaintenanceofthefamily.
46

PJG
Peoplevs.Aragon
FACTS:
ProcesoRosimacontractedmarriagewithGorrea.Whilehismarriage
withthelattersubsist,hecontractedacanonicalmarriagewithFaicol.
Gorrea is staying in Cebu while Faicol is in Iloilo. He was a traveling
salesmanthus,hecommutedbetweenIloiloandCebu.WhenGorrea
died, he brought Faicol to Cebu where the latter worked as teacher
nurse. She later on suffered injuries in her eyes caused by physical
maltreatment of Rosima and was sent to Iloilo to undergo treatment.
While she was in Iloilo, Rosima contracted a third marriage with
Maglasang.CFICebufoundhimguiltyofbigamy.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotthethirdmarriageisnullandvoid.
HELD:
Theactionwasinstituteduponthecomplaintofthesecondwifewhose
marriagewithRosimawasnotrenewedafterthedeathofthefirstwife
and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last
marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for
contractingmarriagecannotprosper.
Mercadovs.Tan
FACTS:
47

PJG
Dr.VicentMercadowaspreviouslymarriedwithThelmaOlivain1976
before he contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the
latterclaimsshedidnotknow.TanfiledbigamyagainstMercadoand
after a month the latter filed an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage
betweenMercadoandOlivanullandvoid.
ISSUE:
Whether Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration
ofnullityoftheformermarriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary
before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial
declarationisguiltyofbigamy.Thisprincipleapplieseveniftheearlier
unionischaracterizedbystatuteasvoid.
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his
marriagewithOlivarightafterTanfiledbigamycase.Hence,bythen,
the crime had already been consummated. He contracted second
marriage without the judicial declaration of the nullity. The fact that
the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamycharge.
48

PJG
Republicvs.Nolasco
FACTS:
GregorioNolascoisaseaman.HemetJanetParker,aBritish,inbarin
England.Afterthat,JanetstartedlivingwithNolascoinhisshipforsix
months.ItlasteduntilthecontractofNolascoexpiredthenhebrought
her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982.
Due to another contract, Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco
receivedaletterfromhismotherinforminghimthathissonhadbeen
bornbut15daysafter,Janetleft.Nolascowenthomeandcutshorthis
contract to find Janets whereabouts. He did so by securing another
seamanscontractgoingtoLondon.Hewroteseveralletterstothebar
where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in
1988foradeclarationofpresumptivedeathofJanet.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotNolascohadawellfoundedbeliefthathiswife,Janet,
isalreadydead?
HELD:
TheSupremeCourtruledthatNolascoseffortstolocateJanetwerenot
persistenttoshowthathehasawellfoundedbeliefthathiswifewas
alreadydeadbecauseinsteadofseekingassistanceoflocalauthorities
andtheBritishEmbassy,heevensecuredanothercontract.Moreso,
while he was in London, he did not even try to solicit help of the
authoritiestofindhiswife.
LukbanvsRepublic
FACTS:
49

PJG
LourdesLukbanandFranciscoChuidiangotmarriedin1933andaftera
violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then.
Shediligentlylookedforhimaskingtheparentsandfriendsbutnoone
knewhiswhereabouts.Shebelievesthathusbandisalreadydeadsince
he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to
marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be
relievedonanyliabilityunderthelaw.
ISSUE:
Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death
beforeshecanremarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of
presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during
their marriage in 1933. It provides that for the purposes of the civil
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declaredanabsentee.Thedeclarationofabsencemadeinaccordance
withtheprovisionsoftheCivilCodehasforitssolepurposetoenable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estateoftheabsentee.Forthecelebrationofcivilmarriage,however,
thelawonlyrequiresthattheformerspousehasbeenabsentforseven
consecutiveyearsatthetimeofthesecondmarriage,thatthespouse
presentdoesnotknowhisorherformerspousetobeliving,thateach
formerspouseisgenerallyreputedtobedeadandthespousepresent
sobelievesatthetimeofthecelebrationofthemarriage.
Armasvs.Calisterio
FACTS:
50

PJG
Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent,

died intestate in April 1992 leaving several parcel of land estimated
valueofP604,750.00.HewasthesecondhusbandofMariettawhowas
previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter
disappearedwithoutatraceinFebruary1947.11yearslaterfromthe
disappearanceofBounds,MariettaandTeodoricoweremarriedinMay
1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds
presumptivedeath.
AntoniaArmasyCalisterio,survivingsisterofTeodoricofiledapetition
claiming to be the sole surviving heir of the latter and that marriage
betweenMariettaandhisbrotherbeingallegedlybigamousisthereby
null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as
administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and
inheritancebeadjudicatedtoherafteralltheobligationsoftheestate
wouldhavebeensettled.
ISSUE:
Whether Marrieta and Teodoricos marriage was void due to the
absenceofthedeclarationofpresumptivedeath.
HELD:
The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was
solemnized in May 1958 where the law in force at that time was the
Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive
governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
51

PJG
other laws. Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive

death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7
consecutiveyearsofabsenceofthespouseisenoughtoremarrythen
Marrietas marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a
rightcanclaimportionoftheestate.
Republicvs.CAandAlegro
FACTS:
AlanAlegro,thepetitioner,wasmarriedwithLeainJanuary1995.Lea
arrivedhomelateinFebruary1995andAlantoldherthatifsheenjoys
lifeofasingleperson,itwillbebetterforhertogobacktoherparents.
Lealeftafterthatfight.Allancheckedifshewenttoherparentshouse
butwasnotthereandeveninquiredtoherfriends.Hewentbacktothe
parentsinlaws house and learned that Lea had been to their house
but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay
Captain. For sometime, Alan decided to work as parttime taxi driver
and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In June
2001,AlanreportedLeasdisappearancetothelocalpolicestationand
analarmnoticewasissued.HealsoreportedthedisappearanceinNBI
onJuly2001.AlanfiledapetitioninMarch2001forthedeclarationof
presumptivedeathofhiswife.
ISSUE:
WhetherAlanhasawellfoundedbeliefthathiswifeisalreadydead.
HELD:
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a wellfounded
belief,beforehefiledhispetitionwithRTC,thathisspousewasdead.
52

PJG
He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He

even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to
corroborate his testimony. He also failed to make inquiries from his
parentsinlawregardingLeaswhereaboutsbeforefilinghispetitionin
the RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries
fromhisparentsinlawaboutLea'swhereaboutsconsideringthatLea's
father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of
the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only
aftertheOSGfileditsnoticetodismisshispetitioninRTC.
Valdezvs.Republic
FACTS:
AngelitaValdezwasmarriedwithSofioinJanuary1971.Shegavebirth
toababygirlnamedNancy.TheyarguedconstantlybecauseSofiowas
unemployed anddid not bring home anymoney. In March 1972, the
latterlefttheirhouse.AngelitaandherchildwaiteduntilinMay1972,
they decided to go back to her parents home. 3 years have passed
withoutanywordfromSofiountilinOctober1975whenheshowedup
andtheyagreedtoseparateandexecutedadocumenttothateffect.It
was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since.BelievingthatSofiowasalreadydead,petitionermarriedVirgilio
Reyes in June 1985. Virgilios application for naturalization in US was
deniedbecausepetitionersmarriagewithSofiowassubsisting.Hence,
in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of
presumptivedeathofSofio.
ISSUE:
53

PJG
WhetherornotpetitionersmarriagewithVirgilioisvaliddespitelack
ofdeclarationofpresumptivedeathofSofio.
HELD:
ThecourtruledthatnodecreeonthepresumptionofSofiosdeathis
necessarybecauseCivilCodegovernsduring1971andnotFamilyCode
where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus,
petitionerwascapacitatedtomarryVirgilioandtheirmarriageislegal
andvalid.
Anayavs.Palaroan
FACTS:
AuroraAnayaandFernandoPalaroanweremarriedin1953.Palaroan
filed an action for annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the ground
that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and
grantingAurorascounterclaim.Whiletheamountofcounterclaimwas
being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months prior
totheirmarriage,hehadpremaritalrelationshipwithacloserelative
of his. According to her, the nondivulgement to her of such pre
maritalsecretconstitutedfraudinobtainingherconsent.Sheprayed
fortheannulmentofhermarriagewithFernandoonsuchground.
ISSUE:
Whetherornottheconcealmenttoawifebyherhusbandofhispre
maritalrelationshipwithanotherwomanisagroundforannulmentof
marriage.
HELD:
54

PJG
Theconcealmentofahusbandspremaritalrelationshipwithanother
womanwasnotoneofthoseenumeratedthatwouldconstitutefraud
as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last
paragraphprovidingthatnoothermisrepresentationordeceitasto..
chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence,
the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not
warrantanannulmentofmarriage.
Buccatv.MangonondeBuccat
April25,1941
AppealfromadecisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofBaguio.
Facts:
GodofredoBuccatandLuidaMangonondeBuccatmetinMarch1938,
becameengagedinSeptember,andgotmarriedinNov26.OnFeb23,
1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who was 9 months
pregnant,gavebirthtoason.Afterknowingthis,GodofredoleftLuida
and never returned to married life with her. On March 23, 1939, he
filedforanannulmentoftheirmarriageonthegroundsthatwhenhe
agreed to married Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin. The
LowercourtdecidedinfavorofLuida.
Issue:
ShouldtheannulmentforGodofredoBuccatsmarriagebegrantedon
thegroundsthatLuidaconcealedherpregnancybeforethemarriage?
55

PJG
Held:
No.Clearandauthenticproofisneededinordertonullifyamarriage,a
sacred institution in which the State is interested and where society
rests. In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment.ItwasunlikelythatGodofredo,afirstyearlawstudent,did
notsuspectanythingaboutLuidasconditionconsideringthatshewas
in an advanced stage of pregnancy (highly developed physical
manifestation,ie.enlargedstomach)whentheygotmarried.
Aquinovs.Delizo
FACTS:
FernandoAquinofiledacomplaintinSeptember1955onthegroundof
fraudagainstConchitaDelizothatatthedateofhermarriagewiththe
formeronDecember1954,concealedthefactthatshewaspregnantby
anothermanandsometimeinApril1955orabout4monthsaftertheir
marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose
Gocorepresentthestateintheproceedingstopreventcollusion.Only
Aquinotestifiedandtheonlydocumentaryevidencepresentedwasthe
marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor
presentedanyevidence.
CFIRizal dismissed petitioners complaint for annulment of marriage,
which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari to review the
decisions.
ISSUE:
56

PJG
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does

notconstitutesuchfraudaswouldannulamarriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo
wasallegedlytobeonlymorethanfourmonthspregnantatthetimeof
her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say that her pregnancy was
readilyapparentespeciallysinceshewasnaturallyplumporfat.Itis
only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
womans abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus, making the
roundnessoftheabdomenmoregeneralandapparent.Inthefollowing
circumstances,thecourtremandedthecasefornewtrialanddecision
complainedissetaside.
Jimenezvs.Canizares
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his
marriagewithRemediosCanizaresonthegroundthattheorificeofher
genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male
organ for copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and
continuestoexistthatledhimtoleavetheconjugalhometwonights
andonedayafterthemarriage.Thecourtsummonedandgaveacopy
tothewifebutthelatterdidnotfileanyanswer.Thewifewasordered
to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical
certificatewithin10days.Shewasgivenanother5daystocomplyor
57

PJG
else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore

renderingjudgmentinfavorofthepetitioner.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotthemarriagecanbeannulledwithonlythetestimony
ofthehusband.
HELD:
Thewifewhowasclaimedtobeimpotentbyherhusbanddidnotavail
of the opportunity to defend herself and as such, claim cannot be
convincinglybeconcluded.Itisawellknownfactthatwomeninthis
country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly
submit to a physical examination unless compelled by competent
authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self
incriminating.Sheisnotchargedwithanyoffenseandlikewiseisnot
compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotence being an
abnormalconditionshouldnotbepresumed.Thecasewasremanded
totrialcourt.
Sinvs.Sin
FACTS:
Florence,thepetitioner,wasmarriedwithPhilipp,aPortuguesecitizen
inJanuary1987.FlorencefiledinSeptember1994,acomplaintforthe
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In
June1995,trialcourtdismissedFlorencespetitionandthroughoutits
trial, the State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal
58

PJG
JabsonfiledwiththetrialcourtamanifestationdatedNovember1994
stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not
activelyparticipatedtherein.Otherthanhavingappearanceatcertain
hearings,nothingmorewasheardofhim.
ISSUE:
Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the
absenceoftheparticipationoftheStateintheproceedings.
HELD:
Article48oftheFamilyCodestatesthatinallcasesofannulmentor
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecutingattorneyorfiscalassignedtoittoappearonbehalfofthe
statetotakestepstopreventcollusionbetweenthepartiesandtotake
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court
should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
SolicitorGeneraltoappearascounselforthestate.Nodecisionshall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification
brieflystatinghisreasonsforhisagreementoroppositionasthecase
maybe,tothepetition.Therecordsarebereftofanevidencethatthe
State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remandedforpropertrial.
DeOcampovs.Florenciano
FACTS:
JosedeOcampoandSerafinaFlorencianoweremarriedin1938.They
begotseveralchildrenwhoarenotlivingwithplaintiff.InMarch1951,
59

PJG
latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his
trustbymaintainingillicitrelationswithJoseArcalas.Havingfoundout,
hesentthewifetoManilainJune1951tostudybeautyculturewhere
she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife was
goingoutwithseveralothermanotherthanArcalas.In1952,whenthe
wifefinishedherstudies,sheleftplaintiffandsincethentheyhadlived
separately.InJune1955,plaintiffsurprisedhiswifeintheactofhaving
illicitrelationswithNelsonOrzame.Hesignifiedhisintentionoffilinga
petitionforlegalseparationtowhichdefendantmanifestedconformity
provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action.
Accordingly,Ocampofiledapetitionforlegalseparationin1955.
ISSUE:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the
confessionofjudgmentdisallowedbytheFamilyCode.
HELD:
Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed
adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such
confession,isnottheconfessionofjudgmentdisallowedbyArticle48
oftheFamilyCode.Whatisprohibitedisaconfessionofjudgment,a
confession done in court or through a pleading. Where there is
evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement
agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be
granted since it would not be based on the confession but upon the
evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition
should be granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet
prescribed.
60

PJG
LapuzSyvs.Eufemio
FACTS:
Carmen LapuzSy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio

EufemioonAugust1953.TheyweremarriedcivillyonSeptember21,
1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when
her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their
marriage.Petitionerthendiscoveredthatherhusbandcohabitedwith
aChinesewomannamedGoHiokonorabout1949.Sheprayedforthe
issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would
order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
theconjugalpartnershipprofits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
withLapuzSyonthegroundofhispriorandsubsistingmarriagewith
Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent
alreadyscheduledtopresentsurrebuttalevidence,petitionerdiedina
vehicularaccidentonMay1969.Hercounseldulynotifiedthecourtof
herdeath.Eufemiomovedtodismissthepetitionforlegalseparation
on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond
theoneyearperiodprovidedinArticle 102oftheCivilCodeandthat
the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen byher
father,MacarioLapuz.
ISSUE:
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Whetherthedeathoftheplaintiff,beforefinaldecreeinanactionfor
legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action
involvedpropertyrights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff,
even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of
decreeofseparation,theirsourcebeingthedecreeitself;withoutthe
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If
deathsupervenesduringthependencyoftheaction,nodecreecanbe
forthcoming,deathproducingamoreradicalanddefinitiveseparation;
and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remainunborn.
ThepetitionofEufemiofordeclarationofnullityismootandacademic
andtherecouldbenofurtherinterestincontinuingthesameafterher
demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
propertyrightsacquiredbyeitherpartyasaresultofArticle144ofthe
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a
properactionforpartitionbyeithertheappelleeorbytheheirsofthe
appellant.
GandioncovsPenaranda
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against
hereinpetitioner,FroilanGandioncoforlegalseparationontheground
ofconcubinageasacivilcase.Teresitaalsofiledacriminalcomplaintof
concubinageagainstherhusband.Shelikewisefiledanapplicationfor
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the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved

and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend
the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto
suchasthesupportforpendentelite,inviewofthecriminalcasefor
concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for
legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all
proceedingsrelatedtolegalseparationwillhavetobesuspendedand
awaittheconvictionoracquittalofthecriminalcase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending
theresolutionofthecriminalcaseforconcubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were
incorrect. A civil action for legal separation on the ground of
concubinagemayproceedaheadof,orsimultaneouslywith,acriminal
actionforconcubinage,becausesaidcivilactionisnotonetoenforce
the civil liability arising from the offense, even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such
civil action is one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with
thelegalconsequencesthereofincludingthedissolutionoftheconjugal
partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and
disqualifications from inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of
legal separation may be issued upon proof by preponderance of
evidence,wherenocriminalproceedingorconvictionisnecessary.
Furthermore,thesupportpendentelite,asaremedy,canbeavailedof
in an action for legal separation, and granted at the discretion of the
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judge.Ifincase,thepetitionerfindstheamountofsupportpendente
lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or
reducethesame.
Bugayongvs.Ginez
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with
Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at Pangasinan while on furlough leave.
Immediatelyafterthemarriage,theylivedwiththesistersofBugayong
insaidmunicipalitybeforehewentbacktoduty.Thecouplecameto
anagreementthatGinezwouldstaywithhissisterswholatermovedin
Manila.OnoraboutJuly1951,sheleftthedwellingofthesistersin
law and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to
PangasinantoresidewithhermotherandlateronmovedtoDagupan
tostudyinalocalcollege.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco,
(plaintiffs sisterinlaw) and some from anonymous writers, which
were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of
infidelityofhiswife.Headmittedthathiswifeinformedhimbyletter
that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these communications, prompted
himinOctober1951toseektheadviceoftheNavyChaplainwhoasked
himtoconsultwiththenavylegaldepartment.
InAugust1952,BugayongwenttoPangasinanandlookedforhiswife.
Theymetinthehouseofthedefendantsgodmother.Theyproceeded
to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for 1
dayand1nightashusbandandwife.Thenextday,theyslepttogether
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in their own house. He tried to verify with Leonila the truth on the
information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed
upandleftwhichhetookasaconfirmationoftheactsofinfidelity.He
thenfiledacomplaintforlegalseparation.
ISSUE:
Whether there was condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that
mayserveasagroundfordismissaloftheaction.
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a
ground for legal separation. A single voluntary act of marital
intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute
condonation and where the parties live in the same house, it is
presumedthattheyliveontermsofmatrimonialcohabitation.
Furthermore,Art.100oftheCivilCodestatesthatthelegalseparation
maybeclaimedonlybytheinnocentspouse,providedtherehasbeen
nocondonationoforconsenttotheadulteryorconcubinage.
PacetevsCarriaga
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband
Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of
property.SheaverredinhercomplaintthatshewasmarriedtoPacete
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on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete
subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
ConcepcionandthatshelearnedofsuchmarriageonlyonAugust1979.
Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he
evidentlypreferredtocontinuelivingwithClarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an
extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly
granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication,thedefendantsfailedtofileanansweronthedateset
by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the
defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court
received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15,
20,21,and22,1980.Aftertrial,thecourtrenderedadecisioninfavor
oftheplaintiffonMarch17,1980.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for extension of time to file their answer, in
declaringpetitionersindefaultandinrenderingitsdecisiononMarch
17,1980whichdecreedthelegalseparationofPaceteandAlanisand
heldtobenullandvoidthemarriageofPacetetoClarita.
HELD:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be
promulgateduponastipulationoffactsorbyconfessionofjudgment.
Incaseofnonappearanceofthedefendant,thecourtshallorderthe
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between
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parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall

intervenefortheStateinordertotakecarethattheevidenceforthe
plaintiffisnotfabricated.
The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state
attorneysincaseofuncontestedproceedingsforlegalseparation(and
of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriageismorethanamerecontract.
Article103oftheCivilCode,nowArticle58oftheFamilyCode,further
mandatesthatanactionforlegalseparationmustinnocasebetried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
obviouslyinordertoprovidethepartiesacoolingoffperiod.Inthis
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is
furtherorunderscoredbytheinclusionofaprovisioninRule18ofthe
Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for
annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
attorneytoinvestigatewhetherornotacollusionbetweentheparties
exists,andifthereisnocollusion,tointervenefortheStateinorderto
seetoitthattheevidencesubmittedisnotfabricated.
MacadangdangvsCA
FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio
Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for
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twoyearsandhad6children.Theystartedabuyandsellbusinessand
sarisari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune,
their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking,
transportation,riceandcornmillbusiness,abacastripping,realestate
etc. Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in
extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they
separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good.
WhenshereturnedinDavaoin1971,shelearnedoftheillicitaffairsof
herestrangedhusband.Shethendecidedtotaketheinitialaction.In
April1971,sheinstitutedacomplaintforlegalseparation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal
separationhaseffectonthelegalseparation.
HELD:
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no

effect on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the
finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to
appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the
liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor
terminated.
Thelawclearlyspellsouttheeffectofafinaldecreeoflegalseparation
on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and
distributionconformablywiththeeffectsofsuchfinaldecree,thelaw
on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever
remainingpropertieshavebeenallocatedtothedeceasedspouse.
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Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the

finaldecree.Article106oftheCivilCode,nowArticle63oftheFamily
Codeprovidestheeffectsofthedecreeoflegalseparation.Theselegal
effectsipsofactoorautomaticallyfollows,asaninevitableincidentof
the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determiningtheshareofeachspouseintheconjugalassets.
Potencianovs.CA
FACTS:
In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner,
Potenciano,petitionedforhabeascorpuswhichwasdismissedonMay
2000forlackofmeritandgrantedthepetitiontonullifytheCAruling
givingvisitationrightstoErlinda.ThiscasebeforeSCisErlindasmotion
toreconsiderthedecisionmade.AconferencewassetonSeptember
2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical and
medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted.
ErlindasmotiontohavePotencianobemedicallyexaminedbyateam
of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with finality in
March2001.
ISSUE:
Whetheracourtcanvalidlyissueanordercompellingthehusbandto
livetogetherandobservemutuallove,respectandfidelity.
HELD:
ErlindaclaimedthatshewasnotcompellingPotencianotolivewithher
inconsortiumbutclearlyshewantedthelattertolivewithherandis
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therootcauseofherpetition.Whatthelawprovidesisthathusband
andwifeareobligedtolivetogether,observemutuallove,respectand
fidelity. The sanction thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection
betweenhusbandandwifeandnotanylegalmandateorcourtorderto
enforceconsortium.
Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and
Potencianohavingseparatedfrombedandboardsince1972.Empathy
as defined by SC is a shared feeling between husband and wife
experiencednotonlybyhavingspontaneoussexualintimacybutadeep
senseofspiritualcommunion.Maritalunionisatwowayprocess.It
isfortwolovingadultswhoviewtherelationshipwithrespect,sacrifice
andacontinuingcommitmenttotogetherness,consciousofitsvalueas
asublimesocialinstitution.
Goitiavs.CamposRueda
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,
respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at
115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month
before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home.
Itwasallegedthatrespondentdemandedhertoperformunchasteand
lasciviousactsonhisgenitalorgans.Petitionerrefusedtoperformsuch
acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid
cohabitation.SinceGoitiakeptonrefusing,respondentmaltreatedher
by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different
bodyparts.Thetrialcourtruledinfavorofrespondentandstatedthat
Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the
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conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her

separationordivorcefromrespondent.Goitiafiledmotionforreview.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotGoitiacancompelherhusbandtosupportheroutside
theconjugalhome.
HELD:
Theobligationonthepartofthehusbandtosupporthiswifeiscreated
merelyintheactofmarriage.Thelawprovidesthatthehusband,who
isobligedtosupportthewife,mayfulfilltheobligationeitherbypaying
herafixedpensionorbymaintainingherinhisownhomeathisoption.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permitthehusbandtoevadeorterminatehisobligationtosupporthis
wifeifthewifeisdrivenawayfromtheconjugalhomebecauseofhis
wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugalabodebecauseofthelewddesignsandphysicalassaultofthe
husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for
separatemaintenanceevenoutsidetheconjugalhome.
TyvsCA
FACTS:
Privaterespondent,EdgardoReyes,wasmarriedwithAnnaVillanueva
in a civil ceremony in March 1977 in Manila and subsequently had a
churchweddinginAugust1977.Bothweddingsweredeclarednulland
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void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties.
Evenbeforethedecreenullifyingthemarriagewasissued,Reyeswed
OfeliaTyhereinpetitioneronApril1979andhadtheirchurchwedding
inMakationApril1982.ThedecreewasonlyissuedinAugust1980.In
January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage
with petitioner be declared null and void. AC ruled that a judicial
declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must first be
secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.
However, SC found that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be
retroactivelyappliedtothepresentcasefordoingsowouldprejudice
thevestedrightsofthepetitionerandofherchildren.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotdamagesshouldbeawardedtoOfeliaTy.
HELD:
SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be
awardedtothewifewhosoughtdamagesagainstthehusbandforfiling
a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation,socialhumiliationandalienationfromherparents.Aside
fromthefact,thatpetitionerwantshermarriagetoprivaterespondent
heldvalidandsubsisting.Sheislikewisesuingtomaintainherstatusas
legitimate wife. To grant her petition for damages would result to a
situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law
absurd. Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a
maritalobligation.
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Hence, the petition was granted. Marriage between Ty and Reyes is

declaredvalidandsubsistingandtheawardoftheamountofP15,000
isratifiedandmaintainedasmonthlysupporttotheir2childrenforas
longastheyareofminorageorotherwiselegallyentitledthereto.
Ilusoriovs.Bildner
FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive
property valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the
ChairmanoftheBoardandPresidentofBaguioCountryClub.Hewas
married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and
begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin IllusorioBildner (defendant),
Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and
boardin1972.PotencianolivedatMakatieverytimehewasinManila
andatIllusorioPenthouse,BaguioCountryClubwhenhewasinBaguio
City.Ontheotherhand,thepetitionerlivedinAntipoloCity.
In1997,uponPotencianosarrivalfromUS,hestayedwithherwifefor
about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged
that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused
thelattershealthtodeteriorate.InFebruary1998,Erlindafiledwith
RTC petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potencianoduetothelattersadvancedage,frailhealth,pooreyesight
and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate
meetinginBaguio,PotencianodidnotreturntoAntipoloinsteadlived
at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed
withCApetitionforhabeascorpustohavethecustodyofhishusband
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allegingthattherespondentsrefusedherdemandstoseeandvisither
husbandandprohibitedPotencianofromreturningtoAntipolo.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotthepetitionedwritofhabeascorpusshouldbeissued.
HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,orbywhichtherightfulcustodyofapersoniswithheldfrom
the one entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition, the
restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effectivenotmerelynominalormoral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the
writ.Thefactthatthelatterwas86yearsofageandundermedication
doesnotnecessarilyrenderhimmentallyincapacitated.Hestillhasthe
capacitytodiscernhisactions.Withhisfullmentalcapacityhavingthe
rightofchoice,hemaynotbethesubjectofvisitationrightsagainsthis
freechoice.Otherwise,hewillbedeprivedofhisrighttoprivacy.
RomualdezMarcosvs.COMELEC
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high
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school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then
pursuedhercollegedegree,education,inSt.PaulsCollegenowDivine
Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to
workwithhercousin,thelatespeakerDanielRomualdezinhisofficein
the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late President
FerdinandMarcoswhenhewasstillaCongressmanofIlocosNorteand
was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registeredasavoter.In1965,whenMarcoswonpresidency,theylived
in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila.
She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
MetroManiladuring1978.
Imelda RomualdezMarcos was running for the position of

Representative of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections.
CiriloRoyMontejo,theincumbentRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictof
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections
allegingthatpetitionerdidnotmeettheconstitutionalrequirementfor
residency.Thepetitioner,inanhonestmisrepresentation,wroteseven
months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
CandidacyfiledonMarch29,1995andthat"shehasalwaysmaintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven
months residency due to the fact that she became a resident of the
MunicipalityofTolosainsaidmonths.
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ISSUE:
Whetherpetitionerhassatisfiedthe1yearresidencyrequirementtobe
eligibleinrunningasrepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.
The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of
legalresidenceordomicileintheFirstDistrictofLeytedespiteherown
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following
reasons:
1.Aminorfollowsdomicileofherparents.TaclobanbecameImeldas
domicileoforiginbyoperationoflawwhenherfatherbroughtthemto
Leyte;
2.Domicileoforiginisonlylostwhenthereisactualremovalorchange
ofdomicile,abonafideintentionofabandoningtheformerresidence
and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of
originshouldbedeemedtocontinue.
3.Awifedoesnotautomaticallygainthehusbandsdomicilebecause
the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in
PoliticalLaw.WhenImeldamarriedlatePresidentMarcosin1954,she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not
domiciliumnecessarium.
4.AssumingthatImeldagainedanewdomicileafterhermarriageand
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres.
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Marcos,heractionsuponreturningtothecountryclearlyindicatedthat
she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.
To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in
Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept
close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her
birthdaysandotherimportantmilestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
RepresentativesintheFirstDistrictofLeyte,theCOMELEC'squestioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
electedRepresentativeoftheFirstDistrictofLeyte.
AyalaInvestmentsvsCA
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from
petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
RespondentAlfredoChing,EVPofPBM,executedsecurityagreements
on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the
loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC
renderedjudgmentorderingPBMandChingtojointlyandseverallypay
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo,
appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon
respondentspousesofthenoticeofsheriffsaleon3oftheirconjugal
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properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against

petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining
lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auctionsaleofrespondentspousesconjugalproperties.Acertificateof
sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on
July1982.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband
aloneisconsideredforthebenefitoftheconjugalpartnershipandis
itchargeable.
HELD:
TheloanprocuredfromAIDCwasfortheadvancementandbenefitof
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for
thebenefitoftheconjugalpartnershipofgains.PBMhasapersonality
distinctandseparatefromthefamilyofChingdespitethefactthatthey
happenedtobestockholdersofsaidcorporateentity.Clearly,thedebt
wasacorporatedebtandrightofrecoursetoChingassuretyisonlyto
theextentofhiscorporatestockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the
money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husbandactedonlyasasuretyorguarantor,thatcontractcannot,by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
servicesisclearlyforthebenefitoftheprincipaldebtorandnotforthe
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surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contractedwithAIDCinbehalfofPBM.Signingasasuretyiscertainly
not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a
business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable
forthesuretyagreementwhichwasclearlyforthebenefitofPBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a
benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in
favorofChingsemployment(prolongedtenure,appreciationofshares
of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art.
161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It
mustnotbeamerebyproductoraspinoffoftheloanitself.
Agapayvs.Palang
FACTS:
MiguelPalangcontractedmarriagewithCarlinainPangasinanon1949.
HelefttoworkinHawaiiafewmonthsafterthewedding.Theironly
child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident
that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina
andstayedaloneinahouseinPozzorubioPangasinan.
The63yearoldMiguelcontractedasubsequentmarriagewith19year
old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly
purchasedaparcelofagriculturallandlocatedatBinalonanPangasinan.
A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the
otherhand,MiguelandCarlinaexecutedaDeedofDonationasaform
of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal
propertyconsistingof6parcelsoflandtotheirchildHerminia.
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MiguelandErlindascohabitationproducedasonnamedKristopher.In
1979,theywereconvictedofconcubinageuponCarlinascomplaint.2
yearslater,Migueldied.Carlinaandherdaughterinstitutedthiscase
for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot
located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitationwithpetitioner.Thelowercourtdismissedthecomplaint
butCAreversedthedecision.
ISSUE:
Whethertheagriculturallandandthehouseandlotshouldbeawarded
infavorofErlindaAgapay.
HELD:
ThesaleofthericelandonMay17,1973,wasmadeinfavorofMiguel
andErlinda.However,theirmarriageisvoidbecauseofthesubsisting
marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportiontotheirrespectivecontributions.Itisrequiredthattherebe
an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will
benocoownershipandnopresumptionofequalshares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the
businessofbuyandsellandhadasarisaristore.However,shefailed
to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the
subjectedriceland.Whenthelandwasacquired,shewasonlyaround
20yearsoldcomparedtoMiguelwhowasalready64yearsoldanda
pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its
unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share.
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Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the coownership with Miguel
over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA,
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and
Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate
their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicialorderorwithoutjudicialconfermentwhenthereisanexpress
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from
the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and
shouldnotbesoinferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the
falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000
whenshewas22yearsold.ThelawyertestifiedthatMiguelprovided
themoneyforthepurchasepriceanddirectedErlindasnamealonebe
placedasthevendee.
ThetransactionmadebyMigueltoErlindawasproperlyadonationand
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinageatthetimeofthedonation.Moreover,Article87ofthe
Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
togetherashusbandandwifewithoutavalidmarriage,forotherwise,
theconditionofthosewhoincurredguiltwouldturnouttobebetter
thanthoseinlegalunion.
Arcabavs.TabancuraVdaDeBatocael
81

PJG
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the
registeredownersofLotNo.437AlocatedatBalintawakSt.andRizal
AvenueinDipologCity,ZamboangadelNorteinJanuary1956.Zosima
diedin1980henceFranciscoandhismotherinlawexecutedadeedof
extrajudicialpartitionwithwaiverofrights,wherethelatterwaivedher
share consisting of of the property in favor of Francisco. Since
Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his
retirement,heaskedLeticia,hisniece,Leticiascousin,Luzvimindaand
Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of
Franciscoshouseaswellasthestoreinside.
AccordingtoLeticia,FranciscoandCirilawereloverssincetheysleptin
thesameroom.Ontheotherhand,ErlindaTabancura,anotherniece
ofFranciscoclaimedthatthelattertoldherthatCirilawashismistress.
However,Ciriladefensedherselfthatshewasamerehelperwhocould
enter the masters bedroom when Francisco asked her to and that
Francisco was too old for her. She denied having sexual intercourse
withFrancisco.Whentheniecesgotmarried,Cirilawhowasthen34
yearold widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old
widower.Thelatterdidnotpayhimanywagesashousehelperthough
her family was provided with food and lodging. Franciscos health
deteriorated and became bedridden. Tabancura testified that
Franciscosonlysourceofincomewastherentalsfromhislotnearthe
publicstreets.
In January 1991, few months before Francisco died, he executed a
DeedofDonationInterVivoswherehecededaportionofLot437A
composedof150sqm.,togetherwithhishousetoCirilawhoaccepted
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PJG
the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name.
Thiswasmadeinconsiderationofthe10yearoffaithfulservicesofthe
petitioner.AttyLacayanotarizedthedeedandwaslaterregisteredby
Cirilaasitsabsoluteowner.
In Octoer 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila
had a market value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The
decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession
allegedthatCirilawasthecommonlawwifeofFrancisco.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotthedeedofdonationintervivosexecutedbyFrancisco
inArcabasfavorwasvalid.
HELD:
The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law
relationshipwhereindonationisnotvalid.Theconclusionwasbased
on the testimony of Tabancura and certain documents bearing the
signature of Cirila Comille such as application for business permit,
sanitary permit and the death certificate of Francisco. Also, the fact
thatCiriladidnotdemandherwagesisanindicationthatshewasnot
simplyacaregiveremployee.
Cohabitationmeansmorethansexualintercourse,especiallywhenone
ofthepartiesisalreadyoldandmaynolongerbeinterestedinsexat
theveryleast,cohabitationisapublicassumptionofmenandwomen
holdingthemselvesouttothepublicassuch.
Hence,thedeedofdonationbyFranciscoinfavorofCirilaisvoidunder
Art.87oftheFamilyCode.
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PJG
Uyvs.CA
FACTS:
Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose.
Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as
soleadministratoroftheirconjugalpropertyandbeauthorizedtosell
the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his
functions. She further contest that such illness of the husband
necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in
favorofGildacontendingthatsuchdecisionispursuanttoArticle124
of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summaryproceedings.
The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the petition made by her mother was essentially a
petitionforguardianshipofthepersonandpropertiesofhisfather.As
such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on
summary proceedings instead it should follows the ruled governing
specialproceedingsintheRevisedRulesofCourtrequiringprocedural
due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the
merits.HefurtherreiteratedthatChapter2oftheFCcomesunderthe
heading on Separation in Fact Between Husband and Wife
contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind.
Hence,hearguedthatthisshouldnotbeappliedintheircase.
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PJG
During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her
daughterandsoninlaw.UpontheappealbyTeodoro,CAreversedthe
decisionofthelowercourt.
ISSUE:
WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a
cerebrovascular accident rendering him comatose,without motor and
mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugalpropertyanddisposeaparceloflandwithimprovements.
HELD:
SCruledinfavorofTeodoro.Theruleonsummaryproceedingsdoes
notapplytocaseswherethenonconsentingspouseisincapacitatedor
incompetenttogiveconsent.Inthiscase,trialcourtfoundthatsubject
spousewasincompetentwhowasinacomatoseconditionandwitha
diagnosisofbrainsteminfract.Hence,theproperremedyisajudicial
guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court. The law
providesthatwifewhoassumessolepowersofadministrationhasthe
same powers and duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who
desirestosellrealpropertyasadministratoroftheconjugalproperty,
mustobservetheprocedureforthesaleofthewardsestaterequired
of judicial guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under
FC.SCfurtherheldthatsuchincapacityofthetrialcourttoprovidefor
anopportunitytobeheardisnullandvoidonthegroundoflackofdue
process.
DeLaCruzvs.DeLaCruz
85

PJG
Facts:
Estrella de la Cruz, petitioner, was married to Severino de la Cruz,
defendant, at Bacolod City. During their coverture they acquire seven
parcels of land in Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels of land at Silay
Cadastre.Theyarealsoengagedinvariedbusinessventures.
The defendant started living in Manila, although he occasionally
returned to Bacolod City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine
Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in the conjugal home at
Bacolod City. Estrella then filed a petition on the ground of
abandonmentuponthedefendantwhohadnevervisitedtheirconjugal
abode. She also began to suspect the defendant in having an illicit
relation while in Manila to a certain Nenita Hernandez, which she
confirmedupongettingseveralpiecesofevidenceonthedefendants
poloshirtandironsafe.
The defendant denied the allegations of the petitioner and that the
reason he transferred his living quarters to his office in Mandalagan,
Bacolod City was to teach her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and
extremely jealous of every woman. He decided to live apart from his
wife temporarily because at home he could not concentrate on his
work.Thedefendant,withvehemence,deniedthathehasabandoned
hiswifeandfamily,averringthathehasneverfailed,evenforasingle
month, to give them financial support. In point of fact, his wife and
childrencontinuedtodrawallowancesfromhisofficeandhefinanced
theeducationoftheirchildren,twoofwhomwerestudyinginManila.
Issue:
86

PJG
Whetherornotrespondentabandonedhisfamilyandfailedtocomply
withhisobligations.
Held:
The SC have made a searching scrutiny of the record, and it is
consideredviewthatthedefendantisnotguiltyofabandonmentofhis
wife,norofsuchabuseofhispowersofadministrationoftheconjugal
partnership, as to warrant division of the conjugal assets. There must
be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment
must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial
andmoraldesertion.
Therefore,physicalseparationaloneisnotthefullmeaningoftheterm
"abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from
the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the
conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact
that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and
childrennegativesanyintentonhispartnottoreturntotheconjugal
abodeandresumehismaritaldutiesandrights.
PartosaJovsCA
FACTS:
The petitioner, Prima PartosaJo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein
private respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3
womenandfathered15children.Primafiledacomplaint againstthe
husband for judicial separation of conjugal property in addition to an
earlieractionforsupportwhichwasconsolidated.RTCdecisionwasa
definite disposition of the complaint for support but none of that for
thejudicialseparationofconjugalproperty.Joseelevatedthedecision
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PJG
to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial court. The complaint on the

separationofpropertywasdismissedforlackofcauseofactiononthe
ground that separation by agreement was not covered in Art. 178 of
theCivilCode.Primacontestedthattheagreementbetweenherand
Josewasforhertotemporarilylivewithherparentsduringtheinitial
period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They
neveragreedtobeseparatedpermanently.Sheevenreturnedtohim
butthelatterrefusedtoaccepther.
ISSUE:
WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial
separationofconjugalproperty.
HELD:
SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the
necessary modification instead of dismissing the case filed. For
abandonmenttoexist,theremustbeanabsolutecessationofmarital
relations,dutiesandrights,withtheintentionofperpetualseparation.
The fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until
1988, Jose refused to provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the
physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the
private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to
constituteabandonmentasagroundforthejudicialseparationoftheir
conjugalproperty.
Wherefore,thepetitionwasgrantedandinfavorofthepetitionerand
thatthecourtorderedtheconjugalpropertyofthespousesbedivided
betweenthem,shareandsharealike.Thedivisionwillbeimplemented
88

PJG
after the determination of all the properties pertaining to the said

conjugal partnership including those that may have been illegally
registeredinthenameofthepersons.
BAFinanceCorpvs.CA
FACTS:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of
P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own
behalfandasarepresentativeofA&LIndustries.Augustopresentedan
alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who
managed the business and under whose name the said business was
registered,purportedlyauthorizedthehusbandtoprocuretheloanand
signthepromissorynote.2monthspriortheprocurementoftheloan,
Augusto left Lily and their children which in turn abandoned their
conjugal home. When the obligation became due and demandable,
Augustofailedtopaythesame.
Thepetitionerprayedfortheissuanceofawritofattachmentalleging
that said spouses were guilty of fraud consisting of the execution of
Deed of Assignment assigning the rights, titles and interests over a
construction contract executed by and between the spouses and A.
SorianoCorporation.Thewritherebyprayedforwasissuedbythetrial
court and not contented with the order, petitioner filed a motion for
the examination of attachment debtor alleging that the properties
attachedbythesheriffwerenotsufficienttosecurethesatisfactionof
anyjudgmentwhichwaslikewisegrantedbythecourt.
ISSUE:
89

PJG
WONA&LIndustriescanbeheldliablefortheobligationscontractedby
thehusband.
HELD:
A&LIndustriesisasingleproprietorship,whoseregisteredownerisLily
Yulo.Thesaidproprietorshipwasestablishedduringthemarriageand
assetswerealsoacquiredduringthesame.Hence,itispresumedthat
thepropertyformspartoftheconjugalpartnershipofthespousesand
beheldliablefortheobligationscontractedbythehusband.However,
forthepropertytobeliable,theobligationcontractedbythehusband
musthaveredoundedtothebenefitoftheconjugalpartnership.The
obligation was contracted by Augusto for his own benefit because at
the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his
familyandlefttheirconjugalhome.Helikewisemadeitappearthathe
was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure
such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite
showingthatsomeadvantageaccruedtothewelfareofthespouses.
Thus, the Court ruled that petitioner cannot enforce the obligation
contracted by Augusto against his conjugal properties with Lily.
Furthermore,thewritofattachmentcannotbeissuedagainstthesaid
propertiesandthatthepetitionerisorderedtopayLilyactualdamages
amountingtoP660,000.00.
Johnson&JohnsonvsCA
FACTS:
90

PJG
Delilah Vinluan purchased products from petitioner for her retail

business under the name of Vinluan Enterprises incurring an
obligationofP235,880.89forwhichsheissuedsevenchecksofvarying
amountsandduedatesthatbouncedandweredishonoredforhaving
been drawn against insufficient funds. Partial payments were made
afterseveraldemands.Whennofurtherpaymentsweremadetosettle
theobligation,J&Jfiledacomplaintagainstthespousesforcollection
of the principal obligation plus interest with damages. RTC rendered
decisioninfavorofJ&Jandfoundthattherewasnoprivityofcontract
between J&J and defendant husband Alejo Vinluan regarding the
obligations incurred by the wife. Husband was made a coowner of
the enterprise afer the obligation involved in this action has been
incurred.Thecourtthenissuedawritofexecutiondirectingthesheriff
to execute judgment on the properties of the wife. However, the 2
noticesoflevyonexecutioncoverednotonlyherexclusiveparaphernal
properties but also the properties of the conjugal partnership of the
spouses. This led the husband to file a thirdparty claim seeking the
lifting of the levy on the conjugal properties. Trial court denied the
thirdpartyclaimsinceAlejosconsentbecameevidentwhenhedidnot
seek the intervention of the Court to air his objections in his wifes
engaging business coupled by the fact that he made several
representationsforthesettlementofhiswifesaccount.Thus,evenhis
own capital may be liable aside from the conjugal and paraphernal
property. Private respondent elevated the matter to CA, charging the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion for effectively reversing its
ownfinaljudgment.CAupheldprivaterespondent.Hencethispetition
byJ&J.
ISSUE:
91

PJG
WONahusband maybeheldliableforthedebtsincurredbyhiswife
withouthisconsentanddidnotbenefittheconjugalpartnership?
HELD:
SC held that respondent court correctly ruled that the trial court
cannot, in the guise of deciding the thirdparty claim, reverse its final
decision. Only the wife and her paraphernal property can be held
liable.Andsincethepweroftheexecutionofjudgmentextendsonly
to properties belonging to the judgment debtor alone, the conjugal
propertyandthecapitalofthehusbandcannotbeleviedupon.Inany
eventthatDelilahsparaphernalpropertiesareinsufficient,inorderto
bind the conjugal partnership properties, the debts and obligations
contractedbyeitherthehusbandorthewifemustbeforthebenefitof
the conjugal partnership and that the husband must consent to his
wifesengaginginbusiness.Therespondentcourtalreadyfoundthat
thehusbanddidnotgivehisconsentneitherdidtheobligationincurred
bythewiferedoundtothebenefitofthefamily.
SpousesLaperalvsSpousesKatigbak
FACTS:
CFIManiladeclaredthepropertycoveredbyTCTNo.57626asseparate
or paraphernal property of Evelina KalawKatigbak. The spouses
Laperaldisagreewiththisfindingreiteratingthatitsimprovementsand
incomeareconjugalassetsoftheSpousesKatigbak.
When the spouses Katigbak got married, neither of them brought
properties unto the marriage. Ramons occupation rendered him a
monthlyincomeofP200.00.Thepropertyinquestionwasregisteredin
thenameofEvelinaKalawKatigbakmarriedtoRamonKatigbak.The
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PJG
latterdeclaredthathermotherwastheonewhoboughttheproperty
forherandhadplaceditonlyinhernameasthepracticeofhermother
in buying properties and placing them directly in the names of her
children.Thehusbandhavingnointerestwiththepropertyonlysigned
thedocumentforthepurposeofassistinghiswife.
InAugust1950,theLaperalsfiledacaseandwasgrantedbythetrial
court against the Katigbaks in recovery of P14,000 and jewelry
amountingtoP97,500orinlieuthereof,topaysuchamount.Amonth
after the decision was rendered, Evelina filed a complaint against her
husbandforjudicialseparationofpropertyandseparateadministration
whichwasgrantedbythecourtandwassoughtforannulmentbythe
Laperals.
ISSUE:
WONthepropertyinquestionconstitutestheparaphernalpropertyof
Evelina.
HELD:
Allpropertiesacquiredduringthemarriagearepresumedconjugal.It
is however not conclusive but merely rebuttable, unless it be proved
that the property belong exclusively to the husband and wife. In the
caseatbar,thedeedofthelandisunderthenameofthewife.Atthe
time it was purchased, the property was of substantial value and as
admitted, the husband by himself could not have afforded to buy
consideringthesingularsourceofincome.
Hence,thepropertycoveredbyTCT57626isconsideredaparaphernal
propertyofthewife.
93

PJG
Villanuevavs.IAC
FACTS:
ModestoAranas,husbandofVictoria,inheritedalandfromhisfather.
Dorothea and Teodoro, Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed
moneyfromprivaterespondentJesusBernas,mortgagingascollateral
their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described
themselvesastheabsolutecoowners.DorotheaandTeodorofailedto
paytheloanresultingtoextrajudicialforeclosureofmortgagein1977
and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder.
Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in
1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in
equalshareproindiviso.Bernasthenconsolidatedhisownershipover
the lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the
reglementary period, and had the title in the name of Modesto
cancelledandanotherTCTissuedinhisname.
In1978,petitionerConsolacionVillanuevaandRaymundoAranasfiled
a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas,
for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and
theybedeclaredcoownersoftheland.Petitionerallegedthatspouses
ModestoandVictoriain1987and1958executed2separatewills:first
bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and
Teodoro,inequalsharesprodiviso,allofsaidVictoriassharesfromthe
conjugal partnership property; and second Modestos interests in his
conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties
bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the
complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the
disputedproperty.IAClikewiseaffirmedthelowercourtsdecision.
94

PJG
ISSUE:
WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements
thereonmadebyVictoriawhorenderedthelotasconjugalproperty.
HELD:
The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and
Modesto. It was Modestos exclusive property since he inherited it
from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto,
Victoriadidnotinheritsaidlotfromhimandthereforehadnothingof
thelandtobequeathbywillofotherwisetoConsolacion.
Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for
utility or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses
throughadvancementsfromthepartnershiporthroughtheindustryof
either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings
constructedattheexpenseofthepartnershipduringthemarriageon
land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership,
butthevalueofthelandshallbereimbursedtothespousewhoowns
thesame.
TherewasnoproofpresentedbyVillanueva.Suchproofisneededat
the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the
sourceofthefundsusedthereofinordertodeterminethecharacterof
the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one
spouse separately. What is certain is that the land on which the
improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that
where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and
there is no showing of when precisely the propertywas acquired, the
presumption is that is belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not
95

PJG
therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in

character.
Furthermore, Bernas mode of acquisition of ownership over the
property appears in all respect to be regular, untainted by any defect
whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired
indefeasible and clear title to the lot which cannot be defeated or
negated by claims subsequently arising and of which he had no
knowledgeormeansofknowingpriortotheirassertionandventilation.
BPIvs.Posadas
FACTS:
BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze,

appealed to CFI Manila absolving defendant, Collector of Internal
Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in recovering the
inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario
Gelano Vda de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150
representingtheproceedsoftheinsurancepolicyofthedeceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was
actuallyresidingandlivinginGermanywhenAdolphediedinDecember
1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a will in March 1926,
pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir.
The deceased possessed not only real property situated in the
Philippinesbutalsopersonalpropertyconsistingofsharesofstocksin
19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal property is a life
insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of
$10,000bytheSunLifeAssuranceCompanyofCanada,ManilaBranch.
96

PJG
In the insurance policy, the estate of the deceased was named the
beneficiarywithoutanyqualification.Rosarioisthesoleandonlyheir
of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedents estate and
attorneyinfactoftheplaintiff,havingbeendemandedbyPosadasto
pay the inheritance tax, paid under protest. Notwithstanding various
demandsmadebyplaintiff,Posadasrefusedtorefundsuchamount.
ISSUE:
WONtheplaintiffisentitledtotheproceedsoftheinsurance.
HELD:
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a lifeinsurance policy payable to the
insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal
partnership, constitute community property, and belong onehalf to
the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the
premiumswerepaidpartlywithparaphernalandpartlyconjugalfunds,
the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and
conjugalinpart;and(3)theproceedsofalifeinsurancepolicypayable
to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the
testamentaryadministratoroftheformeraspartoftheassetsofsaid
estateunderprobateadministration,aresubjecttotheinheritancetax
according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured
exclusively,anditisimmaterialthattheinsuredwasdomiciledinthese
Islandsoroutside.
Hence,thedefendantwasorderedtoreturntotheplaintiffonehalfof
the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of
the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze,
97

PJG
after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first

premium.
Wongvs.IAC
FACTS:
RomarioHensonmarriedKatrinaonJanuary1964.Theyhad3children
however,evenduringtheearlyyearsoftheirmarriage,thespouseshad
been most of the time living separately. During the marriage or on
about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles
from his father using the money borrowed from an officemate.
SometimeinJune1972,KatrinaenteredanagreementwithAnitaChan
where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at
P321,830.95.Katrinafailedtoreturnthesamewithinthe20dayperiod
thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in
September1972,checkofP55,000whichwasdishonoredduetolackof
funds. The spouses Anita Chan and Ricky Wong filed action for
collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband
Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of
Katrina.TrialcourtruledinfavoroftheWongsthenawritofexecution
wasthereafterissueduponthe4lotsinAngelesCityallinthenameof
RomaricoHensonmarriedtoKatrinaHenson.2ofthelotsweresoldat
public auction to Juanito Santos and the other two with Leonardo
Joson.Amonthbeforesuchredemption,Romaricofiledanactionfor
annulmentofthedecisionincludingthewritandlevyofexecution.
ISSUE:
98

PJG
WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be
satisfiedthroughtheconjugalproperty.
HELD:
Thespouseshadinfactbeenseparatedwhenthewifeenteredintothe
business deal with Anita. The husband had nothing to do with the
businesstransactionsofKatrinanorauthorizedhertoenterintosuch.
The properties in Angeles were acquired during the marriage with
unclear proof where the husband obtained the money to repay the
loan.Hence,itispresumedtobelongintheconjugalpartnershipinthe
absenceofproofthattheyareexclusivepropertyofthehusbandand
even though they had been living separately. A wife may bind the
conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for
supportofthefamily.Thewritofexecutioncannotbeissuedagainst
Romaricoandtheexecutionofjudgmentsextendsonlyoverproperties
belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot
answer for Katrinas obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter
without the consent of her husband nor they did redound to the
benefitofthe family.Therewasalsonoevidencesubmittedthat the
administration of the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by
Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In as much as the
decisionwasvoidonlyinsofarasRomaricoandtheconjugalproperties
concerned, Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina,
personallyandexclusively.
AyalaInvestmentsvsCA
FACTS:
99

PJG
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300,000.00 loan from

petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
RespondentAlfredoChing,EVPofPBM,executedsecurityagreements
on December 1980 and March 1981 making him jointly and severally
answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the
loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The RTC
renderedjudgmentorderingPBMandChingtojointlyandseverallypay
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the
judgment, RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo,
appointed deputy sheriff, caused the issuance and service upon
respondentspousesofthenoticeofsheriffsaleon3oftheirconjugal
properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed injunction against
petitioners on the ground that subject loan did not redound to the
benefit of the said conjugal partnership. CA issued a TRP enjoining
lower court from enforcing its order paving way for the scheduled
auctionsaleofrespondentspousesconjugalproperties.Acertificateof
sale was issued to AIDC, being the only bidder and was registered on
July1982.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the debts and obligations contracted by the husband
aloneisconsideredforthebenefitoftheconjugalpartnershipandis
itchargeable.
HELD:
TheloanprocuredfromAIDCwasfortheadvancementandbenefitof
PBM and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching.
Furthermore, AIDC failed to prove that Ching contracted the debt for
thebenefitoftheconjugalpartnershipofgains.PBMhasapersonality
100

PJG
distinctandseparatefromthefamilyofChingdespitethefactthatthey
happenedtobestockholdersofsaidcorporateentity.Clearly,thedebt
wasacorporatedebtandrightofrecoursetoChingassuretyisonlyto
theextentofhiscorporatestockholdings.
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the

money or services are given to another person or entity, and the
husbandactedonlyasasuretyorguarantor,thatcontractcannot,by
itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of obligations
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or
servicesisclearlyforthebenefitoftheprincipaldebtorandnotforthe
surety or his family. Ching only signed as a surety for the loan
contractedwithAIDCinbehalfofPBM.Signingasasuretyiscertainly
not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is not embarking in a
business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be made liable
forthesuretyagreementwhichwasclearlyforthebenefitofPBM.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a
benefit for the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in
favorofChingsemployment(prolongedtenure,appreciationofshares
of stocks, prestige enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art.
161 of the Civil Code must be one directly resulting from the loan. It
mustnotbeamerebyproductoraspinoffoftheloanitself.
Carlosvs.Abelardo
FACTS:
101

PJG
HonorioCarlosfiledapetitionagainstManuelAbelardo,hissoninlaw
for recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot
located at Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner
issuedacheckworthassuchtoassistthespousesinconductingtheir
married life independently. The seller of the property acknowledged
receiptofthefullpayment.InJuly1991,thepetitionerinquiredfrom
spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the spouses pleaded
that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement.
Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of
making various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner
made a formal demand but the spouses failed to comply with the
obligation. The spouses were separated in fact for more than a year
priorthefilingofthecomplainthencespousesfiledseparateanswers.
Abelardocontendedthattheamountwasneverintendedasaloanbut
his share of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction
firm and that the petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from
his share in the profits. RTC decision was in favor of the petitioner,
however CA reversed and set aside trial courts decision for
insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued worth
$25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became
theconjugaldwellingofthespouses.Thewifeexecutedaninstrument
acknowledgingtheloanbutAbelardodidnotsign.
ISSUE:
WONaloanobtainedtopurchasetheconjugaldwellingcanbecharged
againsttheconjugalpartnership.
HELD:
102

PJG
Yes,asithasredoundedtothebenefitofthefamily.Theydidnotdeny
thatthesameservedastheirconjugalhomethusbenefitingthefamily.
Hence,thespousesarejointlyandseverallyliableinthepaymentofthe
loan.Abelardoscontentionthatitisnotaloanratheraprofitsharein
theconstructionfirmisuntenablesincetherewasnoproofthathewas
partofthestockholdersthatwillentitlehimtotheprofitsandincome
ofthecompany.
Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the
petitionerintheamountof$25,000pluslegalinterestincludingmoral
andexemplarydamagesandattorneysfees.
Mallilinvs.Castillo
FACTS:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both
marriedandwithchildrenbutseparatedfromtheirrespectivespouses
and cohabited in 1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They
established Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation during their
union of which petitioner was the President and Chairman and
respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They likewise acquired
real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondents name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple
separated in 1992. Petitioner then demanded his share from
respondentinthesubjectpropertiesbutthelatterrefusedallegingthat
saidpropertieshadbeenregisteredsolelyinhername.Furthermore,
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PJG
respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and wife
becausetheywerestilllegallymarriedatthetimeofcohabitation.
Petitioner filed complaint for partition of coownership shares while
respondentfiledamotionforsummaryjudgment.Trialcourtdismissed
theformerandgrantedthelatter.
ISSUE:
WON petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties
registered under the name of the respondent considering they both
havesubsistingrelationshipwhentheystartedlivingtogether.
HELD:
The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not
capacitated to marry each other and were living together could not
have owned properties in common. Under Article 148, if the parties
are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them
through their joint contribution, property or industry, shall be owned
bythemincommoninproportiontotheircontributionswhich,inthe
absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence,
there is coownership even though the couples in union are not
capacitatedtomarryeachother.
Furthermore,whenCAdismissedpetitionerscomplaintforpartitionon
grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over
theclaimedpropertieswasdenied.Suchdismissalisunjustifiedsince
both ends may be served by simply excluding from the action for
partition the properties registered in the name of Steelhouse Realty
andEloisaCastillo,notpartiesinthecase.
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PJG
Thecasewasremandedtolowercourtforfurtherproceedings.
Valdesvs.RTC
FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and
begotten5children.Valdezfiledapetitionin1992foradeclarationof
nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of
their mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed
underthecustodyoftheirmotherwhiletheother3siblingsarefreeto
choosewhichtheyprefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding
the procedure for the liquidation of common property in unions
withoutmarriage.Duringthehearingonthemotion,thechildrenfiled
ajointaffidavitexpressingdesiretostaywiththeirfather.
ISSUE:
Whetherornotthepropertyregimeshouldbebasedoncoownership.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the
causethereof,thepropertyrelationsofthepartiesaregovernedbythe
rules on coownership. Any property acquired during the union is
primafaciepresumedtohavebeenobtainedthroughtheirjointefforts.
Apartywhodidnotparticipateintheacquisitionofthepropertyshall
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be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys

effortsconsistedinthecareandmaintenanceofthefamily.
Franciscovs.MasterIronWorksConstructionCorporation
FACTS:
JosefinaCastillowas24yearsoldwhensheandEduardoFranciscogot
married on January 1983. The latter was then employed as Vice
President in a Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of
land where Imus Bank executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Josefina, married to Eduardo. An affidavit of waiver was executed by
EduardowherehedeclaredthatpriortohismarriagewithJosefina,the
latter purchased the land with her own savings and that he waived
whateverclaimshehadovertheproperty.WhenJosefinamortgaged
the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the
deed.In1990,EduardowhowasthenaGeneralManager,boughtbags
ofcementfromdefendantbutfailedtopaythesame.Thelatterfileda
complaint for recovery and trial court rendered judgment against
Eduardo. The court then issued a writ of execution and the sheriif
issued a notice of levy on execution over the alleged property of
Josefinafortherecoveryofthebalanceoftheamountdueunderthe
decisionofthetrialcourt.Petitionerfiledathirdpartyclaimoverthe2
parcelsoflandinwhichsheclaimedasherparaphernalproperty.
106

PJG
ISSUE:
WON the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and

Eduardo.
HELD:
The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the
propertywithherpersonalfundsbeforehercohabitationwithEduardo
andthatshewasthesoleowner.TheDeedofAbsoluteSaleonrecord
showeditwasissuedafterhermarriage.TheircasefallunderArticle
148andsincetheygotmarriedbeforetheFamilyCode,theprovision,
pursuanttoArt256,canbeappliedretroactivelyifitdoesnotprejudice
vestedrights.Petitionerlikewisefailedthatshehadanyvestedright.
Wherethepartiesareinavoidmarriageduetoalegalimpedimentthat
invalidatessuchmarriage,Art148shouldbeapplied.Intheabsenceof
proofthatthewife/husbandhasactuallycontributedmoney,property,
or industry to the properties acquired during such union the
presumptionofcoownershipwillnotarise.
Thepetitionwasdeniedforlackofmerit. ThedecisionofCAthat the
propertywasconjugalwasaffirmed.
107

PJG
DiovDio
Facts:
On14January1998,AlainM.Dio(petitioner)andMa.CaridadL.
Dio(respondent)gotmarried.
On30May2001,petitionerfiledanactionforDeclarationofNullity
ofMarriageagainstrespondent,citingpsychologicalincapacity
underArticle36oftheFamilyCode.
Petitionerallegedthatrespondentfailedinhermaritalobligationto
giveloveandsupporttohim,andhadabandonedherresponsibility
tothefamily,choosinginsteadtogoonshoppingspreesand
gallivantingwithherfriendsthatdepletedthefamilyassets.
Petitionerfurtherallegedthatrespondentwasnotfaithful,and
wouldattimesbecomeviolentandhurthim.
Thetrialcourtruledthatpetitionerwasabletoestablish
respondentspsychologicalincapacity.
Inshort,theirmarriagewasdeclaredvoidabinitiounderArticle36
oftheFamilyCode.
Issue:
Whetherornotthepropertyrelationsofthepartiesshouldfall
under147oftheFamilyCode.
108

PJG
Held:
Yes.Thepropertyrelationsofthepartiesduringtheperiodof
cohabitationisgovernedeitherbyArticle147orArticle148ofthe
FamilyCode.Article147oftheFamilyCodeappliestounionof
partieswhoarelegallycapacitatedandnotbarredbyany
impedimenttocontractmarriage,butwhosemarriageis
nonethelessvoid,suchaspetitionerandrespondentinthecase
beforetheCourt.
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marryeachother,liveexclusivelywitheachotherashusbandand
wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
theirwagesandsalariesshallbeownedbytheminequalshares
andthepropertyacquiredbybothofthemthroughtheirworkor
industryshallbegovernedbytherulesoncoownership.
Intheabsenceofprooftothecontrary,propertiesacquiredwhile
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by
theirjointefforts,workorindustry,andshallbeownedbythemin
equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition
thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and
maintenanceofthefamilyandofthehousehold.
Neitherpartycanencumberordisposebyactsintervivosofhisor
hershareinthepropertyacquiredduringcohabitationandowned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
terminationoftheircohabitation.
109

PJG
In this case, petitioners marriage to respondent was declared void

underArticle36oftheFamilyCodeandnotunderArticle40or45.
Thus,whatgovernstheliquidationofpropertiesownedincommon
by petitioner and respondent are the rules on coownership. In
Valdes, the Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. The rules on co
ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be
liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co
ownership.
Agapayvs.Palang
FACTS:
MiguelPalangcontractedmarriagewithCarlinainPangasinanon1949.
HelefttoworkinHawaiiafewmonthsafterthewedding.Theironly
child Herminia was born in May 1950. The trial court found evident
that as early as 1957, Miguel attempted to Divorce Carlina in Hawaii.
When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to lived with Carlina
andstayedaloneinahouseinPozzorubioPangasinan.
The63yearoldMiguelcontractedasubsequentmarriagewith19year
old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. 2 months earlier, they jointly
purchasedaparcelofagriculturallandlocatedatBinalonanPangasinan.
A house and lot in the same place was likewise purchased. On the
otherhand,MiguelandCarlinaexecutedaDeedofDonationasaform
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PJG
of compromise agreement and agreed to donate their conjugal

propertyconsistingof6parcelsoflandtotheirchildHerminia.
MiguelandErlindascohabitationproducedasonnamedKristopher.In
1979,theywereconvictedofconcubinageuponCarlinascomplaint.2
yearslater,Migueldied.Carlinaandherdaughterinstitutedthiscase
for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against
petitioner. They sought to get back the land and the house and lot
located at Binalonan allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
cohabitationwithpetitioner.Thelowercourtdismissedthecomplaint
butCAreversedthedecision.
ISSUE:
Whethertheagriculturallandandthehouseandlotshouldbeawarded
infavorofErlindaAgapay.
HELD:
ThesaleofthericelandonMay17,1973,wasmadeinfavorofMiguel
andErlinda.However,theirmarriageisvoidbecauseofthesubsisting
marriage with Carlina. Only the properties acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution shall be owned by them in
proportiontotheirrespectivecontributions.Itisrequiredthattherebe
an actual contribution. If actual contribution is not proved, there will
benocoownershipandnopresumptionofequalshares.
Erlinda established in her testimony that she was engaged in the
businessofbuyandsellandhadasarisaristore.However,shefailed
111

PJG
to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to but the
subjectedriceland.Whenthelandwasacquired,shewasonlyaround
20yearsoldcomparedtoMiguelwhowasalready64yearsoldanda
pensioner of the US Government. Considering his youthfulness, its
unrealistic how she could have contributed the P3,750 as her share.
Thus, the court finds no basis to justify the coownership with Miguel
over the same. Hence, the Riceland should, as correctly held by CA,
revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased and
Carlina.
It is immaterial that Miguel and Carlina previously agreed to donate
their conjugal property in favor of Herminia. Separation of property
between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicialorderorwithoutjudicialconfermentwhenthereisanexpress
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment resulted from
the compromise was not specifically for separation of property and
shouldnotbesoinferred.
With respect to the house and lot, Atty Sagun, notary public who
prepared the deed of conveyance for the property revealed the
falshood of Erlindas claim that she bought such property for P20,000
whenshewas22yearsold.ThelawyertestifiedthatMiguelprovided
themoneyforthepurchasepriceanddirectedErlindasnamealonebe
placedasthevendee.
ThetransactionmadebyMigueltoErlindawasproperlyadonationand
which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of the law
because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinageatthetimeofthedonation.Moreover,Article87ofthe
Family Code, expressly provides that the prohibition against donation
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living
togetherashusbandandwifewithoutavalidmarriage,forotherwise,
112

PJG
theconditionofthosewhoincurredguiltwouldturnouttobebetter
thanthoseinlegalunion.
JuanizavsJose
FACTS:
Eugenio Jose, a registered owner and operator of the passenger

jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the
PNRthattookplaceinNovember1969resultedinthe7deathsand5
physicalinjuriesofitspassengers.Thattime,Eugeniowasmarriedto
Socorro but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, defendant
appellant for 16 years as husband and wife. Trial court decision
renderedthemjointlyandseverallyliabletopaydamagestotheheirof
the deceased, Victor Juaniza. A motion was prayed for by Rosalia for
thedecisiontobereconsidered.
ISSUE:
WONEugenioandRosaliaarecoownersofthejeepney.
HELD:
113

PJG
ThecoownershipprovidedinArticle147appliedonlywhentheparties
are not incapacitated to marry. Hence, the jeepney belongs to the
conjugal partnership with the lawful wife. The commonlaw wife not
being the registered owner cannot be held liable for the damages
causedbyitsoperation.Thereisthereforenobasisforherliabilityin
thedamagesarisingfromthedeathofandphysicalinjuriessufferedby
thepassengers.
TumlosvsFernandez
FACTS:
MarioandLourdesFernandezwereplaintiffsinanactionforejectment
filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto Tumlos. In the complaint,
spouses Fernandez alleged that they are the absolute owners of an
apartment building that through their tolerance they allowed the
Tumlostooccupytheapartmentforthelast7yearswithoutpayment
ofanyrent.ItwasagreedthatGuillermawillpay1,600amonthwhile
the other defendants promised to pay 1,000 a month which was not
compliedwith.Demandwasmadeseveraltimesforthedefendantsto
vacate the premises as they are in need of the property for the
constructionofanewbuilding.
DefendantsappealedtoRTCthatMarioandGuillermahadanamorous
relationship and that they acquired the property in question as their
love nest. It was likewise alleged that they lived together in the said
apartment building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that
Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals from the
lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived her as to the
annulmentoftheirmarriage.
ISSUE:
WONGuillermaisacoownerofthesaidapartmentunderArticle148.
114

PJG
HELD:
SCrejectedtheclaimthatGuillermaandMariowerecoownersofthe
subjectproperty.TheclaimwasnotsatisfactorilyprovenbyGuillerma
sincetherewerenootherevidencepresentedtovalidateitexceptfor
the said affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with
Marioandthatsheborehimtwochildrenweretrue,theclaimofco
ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is validly married with
LourdeshenceGuillermaandMarioarenotcapacitatedtomarryeach
other.Thepropertyrelationgoverningtheirsupposedcohabitationis
underArticle148oftheFamilyCode.Actualcontributionisrequiredby
thesaidprovisionincontrasttoArt147whichstatesthateffortsinthe
care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as
contributionstotheacquisitionsofcommonpropertybyonewhohas
nosalary,income,workorindustry.SuchisnotincludedinArt148.If
actual contribution is not proven then there can be no coownership
andnopresumptionofequalshares.
Docenavs.Lapesura
FACTS:
CasianoHombria,privaterespondent,filedacomplaintfortherecovery
ofaparceloflandagainsthislessees,petitionerspouses,Antonioand
AlfredaDocena.Thespousesclaimedownershipofthelandbasedon
theoccupationsincetimeimmemorial.Thepetitionersfiledapetition
forcertiorariandprohibitionwithCAalleginggraveabuseofdiscretion
onthepartofthetrialjudgeinissuingordersandthatofthesheriffin
issuingthewritofdemolition.CAdismissedthepetitionontheground
that the petition was filed beyond the 60day period provided in the
RevisedRulesofCivilProcedureandthatthecertificationofnonforum
shoppingattachedtheretowassignedbyonlyoneofthepetitioners.
ISSUE:
115

PJG
WON it is sufficient that the certification of nonforum shopping was

signedbyonlyoneofthepetitioners.
HELD:
In view of the property involved which is a conjugal property, the
petitionquestioningthewritofdemolitionthereoforiginatedfroman
actionforrecoverybroughtagainstthespousesandisclearlyintended
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the wife as point out
was in the province of Samar whereas the petition was prepared in
Metro Manila, a rigid application of the rules on forum shopping that
would disauthorize a husbands signing the certification in his behalf
andthatofhiswifeistooharsh.
Inthepreviouscourtrulings,certificateofnonforumshoppingshould
be sign by all the petitioners in a case. However, in the case at bar,
suchcertificatesignedbyAntonioDocenaaloneshouldbedeemedto
constitutesubstantialcompliancewiththerules.Thetwopetitionersin
this case are husband and wife and their residence is the subject
propertyallegedtobeaconjugalproperty.UndertheFamilyCode,the
administration of the conjugal property belongs to the husband and
wife jointly. However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance
where the consent of both spouses is required, joint management or
administrationdoesnotrequirethatthehusbandandwifealwaysact
together.Eachspousemayvalidlyexercisefullpowerofmanagement
alone,subjecttotheinterventionofthecourtinpropercases.
Hence,petitionisgrantedandthecaseisremandedtoCAforfurther
proceedings.
MartinezvsMartinez
FACTS:
116

PJG
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de GuzmanMartinez were the

owners of a parcel of land. The former executed a last will and
testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots
bequeathedtoeachofhissonsnamelyRodolfo,Manolo(designatedas
administratoroftheestate),andDanielJr.InOctober1997,DanielSr.
died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his
fatheronSeptember1996whereitappearsthatthelandwassoldto
ManoloandhiswifeLucilaandwasalsoissuedtothem.Rodolfofileda
complaint against his brother Manolo and sisterinlaw Lucila for the
annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses
wroteRodolfodemandinghimtovacatethepropertywhichthelatter
ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the spouses to file a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was
referredtothebarangayforconciliationandsettlementbutnonewas
reached. It was alleged in the position paper of the spouses that
earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same
provedfutile.
ISSUE:
WONspousesMartinezcompliedwiththerequirementsofArt151of
theFamilyCode.
HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
shouldappearfromtheverifiedcomplaintthatearnesteffortstowarda
compromisehavebeenmade,butthesamehavefailed.
LucilaMartinez,therespondentssisterinlawwasoneoftheplaintiffs
inthecaseatbar.Thepetitionerisnotamemberofthesamefamilyas
that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her relationship
withtherespondentisnotoneofthoseenumeratedinArticle150.It
shouldalsobenotedthatthepetitionerswereabletocomplywiththe
117

PJG
requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in their complaint

that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for
unlawful detainer in the katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with
PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable settlement was
arrivedatresultinginthebarangaychairmansissuanceofacertificate
tofileaction.
Hontiverosvs.RTC
FACTS:
PetitionerspousesAugustoandMariaHontiverosfiledacomplaintfor
damagesagainstprivaterespondentsGregorioHontiverosandTeodora
Ayson.Thepetitionersallegedthattheyaretheownersofaparcelof
landinCapizandthattheyweredeprivedofincomefromthelandasa
result of the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private
respondentsdeniedthattheyweremarriedandallegedthatGregorio
was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving
petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the
contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the
property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by
virtueofthewritofpossession.Trialcourtdeniedpetitionersmotion
thatwhileintheamendedcomplaint,theyallegedthatearnestefforts
towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as provided in
Article151.
ISSUE:
WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of
effortsexertedtowardsacompromiseasstatedinArticle151.
HELD:
118

PJG
SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as

defendantandMariaHontiverosaspetitionertakesthecaseoutofthe
scopeofArticle151.Underthisprovision,thephrasemembersofthe
same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children,
ascendants and descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or
halfblood. Religious relationship and relationship by affinity are not
given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as
spousesoftheHontiverosareregardedasstrangerstotheHontiveros
familyforpurposesofArticle151.
ManalovsCA
FACTS:
Troadic Manalo who died on February 1992, was survived by his Pilar
andhis11children.ThedeceasedleftseveralrealpropertiesinManila
andabusinessinTarlac.InNovember1992,hereinrespondents,8of
the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the judicial
settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of
theirbrotherRomeoManaloasadministratorthereof.Hearingwasset
onFebruary11,1993andthehereinpetitionersweregranted10days
withinwhichtofiletheiroppositiontothepetition.
ISSUE:
WONthecaseatbariscoveredunderArticle151whereearnestefforts
towardcompromiseshouldfirstbemadepriorthefilingofthepetition.
HELD:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an
action or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief
were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be controlling. The
careful scrutiny of the petition for the issuance of letters of
119

PJG
administration,settlementanddistributionoftheestatebeliesherein
petitioners claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil
action.TheprovisionofArticle151isapplicableonlytoordinarycivil
actions.Itisclearfromthetermsuitthatitreferstoanactionbyone
personorpersonsagainstanotherorotherinacourtofjusticeinwhich
the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the
redressofaninjuryorenforcementofaright.Itisalsotheintentionof
the Code Commission as revealed in the Report of the Code
Commission to make the provision be applicable only to civil actions.
The petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of estate is a special proceeding and as such a remedy
wherebythepetitionersthereinseektoestablishastatus,aright,ora
particular fact. Hence, it must be emphasized that herein petitioners
are not being sued in such case for any cause of action as in fact no
defendantwaspronouncedtherein.
Albanovs.Gapusan
FACTS:
Redentor Albano filed a complaint against Judge Gapusan seeking
disciplinaryactioninvolvinglattersmalpracticeinhisnotarizationofa
separation agreement between Valentina Andres and Guillermo
Maligta and the extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership.
Likewise, a complaint was filed alleging that said Judge influenced
Judge Crispin of CFIIlocos in deciding two criminal cases. In the
abovementioned separation agreement, it was stipulated that the
spouse guilty of adultery or concubinage shall be barred to file an
actionagainsttheother.Respondentjudgedeniedthathedraftedthe
saidagreementandexplainedthatthespouseshadbeenseparatedfor
a long time when they signed it and the wife had begotten children
with her paramour. He further added that there was a stipulation in
120

PJG
the said agreement that the spouse would live together in case of
reconciliation.
ISSUE:
WONJudgeGapusanshouldbereprimandedbecauseofnotarizingthe
voidagreementbetweenthespouses.
HELD:
Anotaryshouldnotfacilitatethedisintegrationofamarriageandthe
familybyencouragingtheseparationofthespousesandextrajudically
dissolvingtheconjugalpartnership.
There is no question that the stipulation contained in the said
separation agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs.
Thefamilyisabasicsocialinstitutionwhichpublicpolicycherishesand
protects. To preserve the institution of marriage, the law considers
void any contract for personal separation between husband and wife
and every extrajudicial agreement for the dissolution of the
partnership. SC held the action of respondent judge Gapusan as
contrarytolaw.
Modequillovs.Breva
Facts:
OnJanuary29,1988,ajudgmentwasrenderedbytheCourtofAppeals
entitled"FranciscoSalinas,etal.vs.JoseModequillo,etal.
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued by the RTC of Davao City to satisfy the said
121

PJG
judgmentonthegoodsandchattelsofthedefendantsJoseModequillo
andBenitoMalubayatDavaodelSur.Thesheriffleviedonaparcelof
residential land located at Davao del Sur registered in the name of
defendant and a parcel of agricultural land located at Malalag, Davao
delSur.
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by
defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since
1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is exempt
fromexecution,forcedsaleorattachmentunderArticles152and153
of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155
thereof,andthatthejudgmentdebtsoughttobeenforcedagainstthe
familyhomeofdefendantisnotoneofthoseenumeratedunderArticle
155 of the Family Code. An opposition thereto was filed by the
plaintiffs.
Issue:
Whether or not a final judgment in an action for damages may be
satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the
FamilyCode.
Held:
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
houseandlotfromthetimeitisoccupiedasafamilyresidence.There
isnoneedtoconstitutethesamejudiciallyorextrajudiciallyasrequired
in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is,
therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors
shouldtakethenecessaryprecautionsto protecttheirinterestbefore
122

PJG
extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the
home.
Inthepresentcase,theresidentialhouseandlotofpetitionerwasnot
constitutedasafamilyhomewhetherjudiciallyorextrajudiciallyunder
theCivilCode.Itbecameafamilyhomebyoperationoflawonlyunder
Article153oftheFamilyCode.
Manacopvs.CA
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a
residentiallotwithabungalowlocatedinQuezonCity.Thepetitioner
failed to pay the subcontract cost pursuant to a deed of assignment
signedbetweenpetitionerscorporationandprivaterespondentherein
(FFCruz&Co).Thelatterfiledacomplaintfortherecoveryforthesum
ofmoneywithaprayerforpreliminaryattachmentagainsttheformer.
Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon
City owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner.
The latter insists that the attached property is a family home having
been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore
exemptfromattachment.
ISSUE:
WONthesubjectpropertyisindeedexemptedfromattachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by
operationoflawunderArticle153oftheFamilyCode.Suchprovision
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PJG
does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have
beenconstitutedasfamilyhomesatthetimeoftheiroccupationprior
totheeffectivityoftheFamilyCodeandhenceforth,areexemptfrom
executionforthepaymentofobligationsincurredbeforetheeffectivity
oftheFamilyCodeonAugust3,1988.Sincepetitionerincurreddebtin
1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is
thereforenotexemptformattachment.
ThepetitionwasdismissedbySC.
Andalvs.Macaraig
FACTS:
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Duenas, filed a
complaintfortherecoveryoftheownershipandpossessionofaparcel
oflandownedbyEmilianoAndalandMariaDuenas.EduvigisMacaraig,
herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation propter
nuptiasinfavorofEmiliano.Thelatterwassufferingfromtuberculosis
in January 1941. His brother, Felix, then lived with them to work his
house and farm. Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move
and get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the wife
eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Marias father until 1943.
Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where the wife did not attend the
funeral.OnJune17,1943,Mariagavebirthtoaboywhowas,herein
petitioner.
ISSUE:
WONMarianoAndalisalegitimatechildofthedeceased.
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PJG
HELD:
ConsideringthatMarianowasbornonJune17,1943andEmilianodied
on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed to be a legitimate son of
the latter because he was born within 300 days following the
dissolution of the marriage. The fact that the husband was seriously
sickisnotsufficienttoovercomethepresumptionoflegitimacy.This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically
impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the
first 120 days of the 300 days next preceding the birth of the child.
Impossibilityofaccessbyhusbandtowifeincludesabsenceduringthe
initialperiodofconception,impotencewhichispatent,andincurable;
andimprisonmentunlessitcanbeshownthatcohabitationtookplace
through corrupt violation of prison regulations. Marias illicit
intercoursewithamanotherthanthehusbandduringtheinitialperiod
doesnotprecludecohabitationbetweenhusbandandwife.
Hence,MarianoAndalwasconsideredalegitimatesonofthedeceased
makinghimtheowneroftheparcelland.
BenitezBaduavs.CA
FACTS:
SpousesVicenteBenitezandIsabelChipongianwereownersofvarious
properties located in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while his husband
died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a complaint for the
issuanceoflettersofadministrationofVicentesestateinfavorofthe
nephew, herein private respondent. The petitioner, Marissa Benitez
Badua,wasraisedandcaredbythedeceasedspousessincechildhood,
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PJG
thoughnotrelatedtothembyblood,norlegallyadopted.Thelatterto
prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses submitted
documentssuchashercertificateoflivebirthwherethespousesname
were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other
hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable
to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological
child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate
daughterandsoleheirofthespouses.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her
legitimacy.
HELD:
TheCourtdismissedthecaseforlackofmerit.Themereregistrationof
achildinhisorherbirthcertificateasthechildofthesupposedparents
isnotavalidadoption.Itdoesnotconferuponthechildthestatusof
anadoptedchildandherlegalrights.Suchactamountstosimulation
ofthechild'sbirthorfalsificationofhisorherbirthcertificate,whichis
apublicdocument.
It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife
executedaDeedofExtraJudicialSettlementoftheEstateofthelatter.
Inthenotarizeddocument,theystatedthattheywerethesoleheirsof
thedeceasedbecauseshediedwithoutdescendantsandascendants.
Inexecutingsuchdeed,VicenteeffectivelyrepudiatedtheCertificateof
Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the
petitionersfather.
126

PJG
Concepcionvs.CA
FACTS:
GerardoConcepcion,thepetitioner,andMa.TheresaAlmonte,private
respondent, were married in December 1989, and begotten a child
named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on
December1991,apetitiontohavehismarriageannulledontheground
ofbigamysincethewifemarriedacertainMarioGopiaosometimein
December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and
living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an
illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while
Gerardowas granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was
nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative
father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the
surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her
maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers
surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its
ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario.
Hence,thechildwasalegitimatechildofTheresaandMario.
HELD:
Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio,
thelatterneverbecametheformershusbandandneveracquiredany
righttoimpugnthelegitimacyofthechild.Theresascontentionwasto
have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario
butherillegitimatechildwithGerardo.Inthiscase,themotherhasno
righttodisavowachildbecausematernityisneveruncertain.Hence,
she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under
Article167oftheFamilyCode,thechildshallbeconsideredlegitimate
127

PJG
although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
havebeensentencedasanadulteress.Havingthebestinterestofthe
child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the
Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the
surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of
Civil Code on surnames. Gerardocannot then impose his surname to
beusedbythechild,sinceintheeyesofthelaw,thechildisnotrelated
tohiminanyway.
Liyaovs.Liyao
FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented
byhermother(Corazon),filedapetitionorderingJuanitaTanhotiLiyao,
PearlL.Tan,TitaL.TanandLindaLiyaotorecognizeandacknowledge
theformerasacompulsoryheirofthedeceasedandtobeentitledto
all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been
recognizedandacknowledgedassuchchildbythedecedentduringhis
lifetime.Thereweretwosidesofthestory.Corazonmaintainedthat
she and the deceased were legally married but living separately for
morethan10yearsandthattheycohabitedfrom1965untilthedeath
of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the chidren of the
deceasedstatedthathermomandthedeceasedwerelegallymarried
andthatherparentswerenotseparatedlegallyorinfact.
ISSUE:
WONthepetitionercanimpugnhisownlegitimacytobeabletoclaim
fromtheestateofthedeceased.
128

PJG
HELD:
Impugningthelegitimacyofthechildisastrictlypersonalrightofthe
husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was
the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide
whethertoconcealthatinfidelityorexposeitinviewofthemoraland
economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the
legitimacyofthechildcanonlybeimpugnedinadirectactionbrought
forthatpurpose,bytheproperpartiesandwithintheperiodlimitedby
law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and
positive evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father
hadadmittedorrecognizedhispaternity.
EcetavsEceta
FACTS:
RosalinaVdadeEcetawasmarriedtoIsaacEcetain1926.Theyhada
son named Vicente. The husband died in 1967 leaving Rosalina and
Vicente as his compulsory heirs. However, the deceased has an
illegitimatedaughternamedTheresawhosegrandmotherwasRosalina,
thepetitioner.
ISSUE:
WON the admission made by Rosalina that Theresa was her
granddaughterisenoughtoprovethefiliationwiththedeceased.
HELD:
129

PJG
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is

establishedby:
(1)therecordofbirthappearinginthecivilregisterorafinaljudgment;
or
(2)anadmissionoflegitimatefiliationinapublicdocumentoraprivate
handwritteninstrumentandsignedbytheparentconcerned.
Intheabsencethereof,filiationshallbeprovedby:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child;or
(2)anyothermeansallowedbytheRulesofCourtandspeciallaws.
Theduerecognitionofanillegitimatechildinarecordofbirth,awill,a
statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no
furthercourtactionisrequired.Infact,anyauthenticwritingistreated
notjustagroundforcompulsoryrecognition;itisinitselfavoluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.However,whatwastriedbeforethetrialcourtandCAwas
for partition and accounting of damages only. The filiation or
compusolry recognition by Vicente of Theresa was never put in issue.
InfactbothagreedinthetrialcourtspretrialorderthatTheresawas
Rosalinas
granddaughter.
The
deceased
establishing
acknowledgement of his paternity over Theresa nevertheless signed
thedulyauthenticatedbirthcertificateshownbythelatter.Hence,the
Courtgranted1/8shareofthelandtoTheresa.
Constantinovs.Mendez
130

PJG
FACTS:
Michael Constantino, an illegitimate child, as represented by Amelita,
her mother, sought monthly support from Ivan Mendez including
Amelias complaint on damages. The latter and Amelita met in a
restaurantinManilawhereshewasworkingasawaitress.Ivaninvited
himathishotelandthroughpromiseofmarriagesucceededinhaving
sexual intercourse with Amelita, afterwards, he admitted being a
married man. In spite of that, they repeated their sexual contact.
Subsequently,shebecamepregnantandhadtoresignfromwork.
Trial court ruled in favor of Amelita providing actual and moral
damages,acknowledgingMichaelasIvansillegitimatechildandgiving
monthlysupporttothelatterwhichwassetasidebyCA.
ISSUE:
WONtheallegedillegitimatechildisentitledforthemonthlysupport.
HELD:
Amelita Constantino has not proved by clear and convincing evidence
her claim that Ivan Mendez is the father of her son Michael
Constantino.SexualcontactofIvanandAmelitainthefirstorsecond
week of November, 1974 is the crucial point that was not even
establishedondirectexaminationasshemerelytestifiedthatshehad
sexualintercoursewithIvaninthemonthsofSeptember,Octoberand
November,1974.Moreso,Amelitaadmittedthatshewasattractedto
Ivan and their repeated sexual intercourse indicated that passion and
notallegedpromisetomarriagewasthemovingforcetosubmitherself
withIvan.
131

PJG
Bernabevs.Alejo
FACTS:
The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretaryCarolinaAlejoandwasnamedAdrianBernabewhowasborn
on September 18, 1981. After Ernesto Bernabe and Rosalina (legal
wife)died,thesolesurvivingheirleftwasErnestina.Carolina,inbehalf
of his son Adrian, filed a complaint that Adrian be declared an
acknowledgedillegitimatesonofFiscalBernabeandbegivenashareof
hisfathersestate.
Trialcourtsruling:Underthenewlaw,anactionfortherecognitionof
anillegitimatechildmustbebroughtwithinthelifetimeofthealleged
parent to give the latter an opportunity to either affirm or deny the
childsfiliation.
CA ruling: The rights of Adrian are governed underArticle 285 of the
Civil Code which allows an action for recognition to be filed within 4
years after the child has attained the age of majority and that
subsequentenactmentoftheFamilyCodedidnottakeawayhisright.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Adrian Bernabe may be declared an acknowledged
illegitimateson.
HELD:
TheFamilyCodemakesnodistinctiononwhethertheformerwasstilla
minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the
132

PJG
newcodeachancetodisputetheclaim,consideringthatillegitimate
children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimatefamilybeingawareoftheirexistence.
Furthermore, the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of
natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious
children.
Hence,thepetitionwasdeniedandassaileddecisionwasaffirmed.
Jisonvs.CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against
petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as illegitimate child of the
latter.Thecasewasfiled20yearsafterhermothersdeathandwhen
shewasalready39yearsofage.
PetitionerwasmarriedtoLiliaLopezJisonsince1940andsometimein
1945, he impregnated Esperanza Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina
allegedthatsincechildhood,shehadenjoyedthecontinuous,implied
recognitionastheillegitimatechildofpetitionerbyhisactsandthatof
his family. It was likewise alleged that petitioner supported her and
spentforhereducationsuchthatshebecameaCPAandeventuallya
Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11
witnesses.
ISSUE:
WONMoninashouldbedeclaredasillegitimatechildofFranciscoJison.
HELD:
133

PJG
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be

established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidencebywhichlegitimatefiliationisestablished.
To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanentintentionofthesupposedfathertoconsiderthechildashis,
bycontinuousandclearmanifestationsofparentalaffectionandcare,
whichcannotbeattributedtopurecharity.Suchactsmustbeofsucha
nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
theapparentdesiretohaveandtreatthechildassuchinallrelationsin
societyandinlife,notaccidentally,butcontinuously.
Thefollowingfactswasestablishedbasedonthetestimonialevidences
offeredbyMonina:
1.ThatFranciscowasherfatherandshewasconceivedatthetime
whenhermotherwasemployedbytheformer;
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt
actsandconduct.
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putativefatherisnotcompetenceevidenceastotheissueofpaternity.
Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal
certificates and school records render the documents showed as
incompetenttoprovepaternity.Withregardtotheaffidavitsignedby
Moninawhenshewas25yearsofageattestingthatFranciscowasnot
her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not
Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have
134

PJG
gonetosuchgreatlengthsinorderthatMoninadenounceherfiliation.
Moninasevidencehurdlesthehighstandardofproofrequiredforthe
success of an action to establish ones illegitimate filiation in relying
upon the provision on open and continuous possession. Hence,
Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of
evidence.
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if
illegitimate,Moninafiledheractionwellwithintheperiodgrantedher
byapositiveprovisionoflaw.Adenialthenofheractionongroundof
lacheswouldclearlybeinequitableandunjust.Petitionwasdenied.
Condevs.Abaya
Facts:
Casiano Abaya, unmarried, the son of Romualdo Abaya and Sabina
Labadia died on the 1899. PaulaConde, as the mother of the natural
childrenJoseandTeopistaConde,whomshestatesshehadbyCasiano
Abaya moved the settlement of the intestate succession. An
administratorhasbeenappointedforthesaidestate.However,Roman
Abaya brother of Casiano, came forward and opposed said
appointmentandclaimeditforhimselfasbeingthenearestrelativeof
the deceased. The court declares Roman Abaya to be the sole heir of
CasianoAbayaandtobethereforeentitledtotakepossessionofallthe
propertyofsaidestate.PaulaCondefiledapetitionwhereinshestated
that she acknowledged the relationship alleged by Roman Abaya but
that she considered her right was superior to his and moved for a
hearing on the matter. She prayed that she be declared to have
preferentialrightstothepropertyleftbyCasianoAbaya.
135

PJG
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner may enforce an action in the
acknowledgmentofthenaturalchildfromCasianoAbaya.
HELD:
The right of action for legitimacy devolving upon the child is of a
personal character and generally pertains exclusively to him. Only the
childmayexerciseitatanytimeduringhislifetime.Asexception,and
inthreecasesonly,itmaybetransmittedtotheheirsofthechild,to
wit:ifheorshediedduringhisorherminority,orwhileinsane,orafter
action had already been instituted. Inasmuch as the right of action
accruingtothechildtoclaimhisorherlegitimacylastsduringhisorher
whole lifetime, he or she may exercise it either against the presumed
parentsorhisorherheirs.Therightofactionwhichthelawconcedes
tothenaturalchildisnottransmittedtohisascendantsordescendants.
Marquinovs.IAC
EustiquioMarquinoandMariaTerenalMarquino(wife)survivedbyLuz
Marquino, Ana Marquino and Eva Marquino legitimate children
(Petitioners)
Bibiana RomanoPagadora survived by Pedro, Emy, June, Edgar, May,
Mago,ArdenandMarsPagadora(Respondents)
FACTS:
Respondent Bibiana filed action for Judicial Declaration of Filiation,
Annulment of Partition, Support and Damages against Eutiquio.
Bibiana was born on December 1926 allegedly of Eutiquio and in that
time was single. It was alleged that the Marquino family personally
136

PJG
knewhersinceshewashiredasdomestichelperintheirhouseholdat
Dumaguete. She likewise received financial assistance from them
hence, she enjoyed continuous possession of the status of an
acknowledgednaturalchildbydirectandunequivocalactsofthefather
andhisfamily.TheMarquinosdeniedallthese.Respondentwasnot
abletofinishpresentingherevidencesinceshediedonMarch1979but
thesueforcompulsoryrecognitionwasdonewhileEustiquio wasstill
alive.Herheirswereorderedtosubstituteheraspartiesplaintiffs.
Petitioners, legitimate children of Eutiquio, assailed decision of
respondent court in holding that the heirs of Bibiana, allegedly a
naturalchildofEutiquio,cancontinuetheactionalreadyfiledbyherto
compel recognition and the death of the putative parent will not
extinguish such action and can be continued by the heirs substituting
thesaiddeceasedparent.
ISSUES:
1. WON right of action for acknowledgment as a natural child be
transmittedtotheheirsand
2.WONArticle173canbegivenretroactiveeffect.
HELD:
SCruledthatrightofactionfortheacknowledgmentasanaturalchild
canneverbetransmittedbecausethelawdoesnotmakeanymention
of it in any case, not even as an exception. The right is purely a
personal one to the natural child. The death of putative father in an
action for recognition of a natural child cannot be continued by the
heirs of the former since the party in the best position to oppose the
sameistheputativeparenthimself.
137

PJG
SuchprovisionoftheFamilyCodecannotbegivenretroactiveeffectso
astoapplyinthecaseatbarsinceitwillprejudicethevestedrightsof
petitionerstransmittedtothematthetimeofdeathoftheirfather.
IACdecisionwasreversedandsetaside.ComplaintagainstMarquinos
dismissed.
Abadillavs.Tabiliran
FACTS:
Ma. Blyth Abadilla, a Clerk of Court, filed a complaint against Judge
Tabiliran on the grounds of gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and
corruptionunbecomingofajudge.Withrespecttothechargeongross
immorality, she contended that the judge scandalously and publicly
cohabited with Priscilla Baybayan during subsistence of his marriage
withTeresitaBanzuela.TabiliranandPriscillagotmarriedinMay1986.
On the other hand, with respect to the charge on deceitful conduct,
petitionerclaimsthatthejudgecausedhis3illegitimatechildrenwith
Priscilla be registered as legitimate by falsely executing separate
affidavits stating the delayed registration was due to inadvertence,
excusablenegligenceoroversightwheninfact,heknewthesechildren
cannot be legally registered as legitimate. The judge averred that 25
yearshadalreadyelapsedsincethedisappearanceofherwifein1966
whenhemarriedPriscillahencethecohabitationwasneitherbigamous
norimmoral.However,asearlyas1970,basedontherecord,Priscilla
hadbegottenher3children(1970,1971and1975).
ISSUE:
WONthe3childrencanbeconsideredlegitimate.
138

PJG
HELD:
The 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered
legitimate since the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriagebetweenTabiliranandTeresita.Onlynaturalchildrencanbe
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impedimenttomarryeachother,arenatural.
UnderArticle177oftheFamilyCode,onlychildrenconceivedandborn
outsideofwedlockofparentswho,atthetimeoftheconceptionofthe
former,werenotdisqualifiedbyanyimpedimenttomarryeachother
maybelegitimated.Reasonsforthislimitation:
1)Therationaleoflegitimationwouldbedestroyed;
2)Itwouldbeunfairtothelegitimatechildrenintermsofsuccessional
rights;
3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores
change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous
childrenasitwilldestroythesanctityofmarriage;
5)Itwillbeveryscandalous,especiallyiftheparentsmarrymanyyears
afterthebirthofthechild.
TeoticovsDelVal
FACTS:
Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000.
She executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and
139

PJG
acknowledgedbeforeNotaryPublicbyherandthewitnesses.Among
the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who
wasmarriedtothetestatrixsniece,JosefinaMortera.Theusufructof
MariasinterestintheCalvoBuildingwerelefttothesaidspousesand
theownershipthereofwasleftinequalpartstohergrandchildren,the
legitimatechildrenofsaidspouses.Josefinawaslikewiseinstituted,as
sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not
otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the
probateofthewillbutwasopposedbyAnadelValChan,claimingthat
shewasanadoptedchildofFrancisca(deceasedsisterofMaria)andan
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that
said will was not executed as required by law and that Maria as
physicallyandmentallyincapabletoexecutethewillatthetimeofits
executionandwasexecutedunderduress,threat,orinfluenceoffear.
ISSUE:
WONdefendanthasrighttointerveneinthisproceeding.
HELD:
It is a wellsettled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding is that he must have an interest in
theestate,willorinthepropertytobeaffectedbyeitherasexecutor
or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an heir or
onewhohasaclaimagainstitascreditor.Underthetermsofthewill,
defendanthasnorighttointervenebecauseshehasnosuchinterestin
the estate eitheras heir,executor or administrator because it did not
appear therein any provision designating her as heir/ legatee in any
portionoftheestate.Shecouldhaveacquiredsuchrightifshewasa
legalheirofthedeceasedbutsheisnotundertheCIVILCODE.Evenif
140

PJG
her allegations were true, the law does not give her any right to
succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose and Francisca
because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from
succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that
relationshipestablishedbyadoptionislimitedsolelytotheadopterand
adoptedanddoesnotextendtotherelativesoftheadoptingparents
exceptonlyasexpresslyprovidedbylaw.Asaconsequence,sheisan
heiroftheadopterbutnotoftherelativesoftheadopter.
Hence,defendanthasnorighttointerveneeitherastestamentaryoras
legalheirintheprobateproceeding.
InRePetitionforAdoptionofMichelleLimandMichaelJudeLim
FACTS:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with
PrimoLimbutwerechildless.Minorchildren,wereentrustedtothem
byLucia,whoseparentswereunknownasshownbyacertificationof
DSWD.Thespousesregisteredthechildrenmakingitappearsasifthey
were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then
married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000.
Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty
givenunderRA8552toindividualswhosimulatedthebirthofachild.
In 2002, she filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and
Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years old and
already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their
consenttotheadoptionexecutedinanaffidavit.
ISSUE:
141

PJG
WONpetitionerwhohasremarriedcansinglyadopt.
HELD:
Petitionwasdenied.Thetimethepetitionswerefiled,petitionerhad
already remarried. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3
instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses
jointlyadopts,theyshalljointlyexercisedparentalauthority.Theuse
ofthewordshallsignifiesthatjointadoptionofhusbandandwifeis
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly.
TheaffidavitofconsentgivenbyOlariowillnotsufficesincethereare
certainrequirementsthathemustcomplyasanAmericanCitizen.He
must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The
requirementsonresidencyandcertificationofthealiensqualification
to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental
authorityismerelyjustoneoftheeffectsoflegaladoption.Itincludes
caring and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and development of their moral mental and physical character and
wellbeing.
RepublicvsCAandBobiles
FACTS:
ZenaidaCortezaBobilesfiledapetitiontoadoptJasonCondatwhohad
beenlivingwithherfamilysince4monthsold.SalvadorCondat,father
ofthechild,andthesocialworkerassignedwasservedwithcopiesof
theorderfindingthatthepetitionwassufficientinformandsubstance.
Thecopywasalsopostedonthebulletinboardofthecourt.Nobody
142

PJG
appearedtoopposethepetition.Thejudgmentdeclaredthatsurname
ofthechildbechangedtoBobiles.
ISSUE:
WON the petition to adopt Jason should be granted considering only
Zenaidafiledthepetition.
HELD:
ThepetitionforadoptionwasfiledwhenthelawapplicablewasPD603
(Child and Youth Welfare Code), where such petition may be filed
eitherofthespousesorbothofthem.Afterthetrialcourtrenderedits
favorable decision and while the case was pending on appeal in CA,
Family Code took effect where joint adoption of both spouses is
mandatory.
Nonjoinderisnota groundforthedismissalofanactionoraspecial
proceeding. The Family Code will have retrospective application if it
will not prejudice or impair vested rights. When Zenaida filed the
petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under
said law in force at the time and thus vested and must not be
prejudiced. A petition must not be dismissed by reason of failure to
complywithlawnotyetinforceandeffectatthetime.Furthermore,
the affidavit of consent attached by the husband showed that he
actually joined his wife in adopting Jayson. His declarations and
subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court was sufficient to
make him a copetitioner. Future of an innocent child must not be
compromised by arbitrary insistence of rigid adherence to procedural
rulesontheformofthepleadings.
TamargovsCA
143

PJG
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her
death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint
for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he
waslivingthetimeofthetragicincident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
AdelbertoBundoc.SuchpetitionwasgrantedonNovember1982after
thetragicincident.
ISSUE:
WONparentalauthorityconcernedmaybegivenretroactiveeffectso
astomakeadoptingparentstheindispensablepartiesinadamagecase
filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with
thebiologicalparents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and
responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar,
duringtheshootingincident,parentalauthorityoverAdelbertowasstill
lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the
indispensablepartiestothesuitfordamages.Parentsandguardians
areresponsibleforthedamagecausedbythechildundertheirparental
authorityinaccordancewiththecivilcode.
SCdidnotconsiderthatretroactiveeffectmaybegiventothedecree
of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
144

PJG
accruingatthetimewhentheyhadnoactualorphysicalcustodyover
theadoptedchild.Retroactivitymaybeessentialifitpermitsaccrualof
somebenefitoradvantageinfavoroftheadoptedchild.UnderArticle
35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet
begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.
Hence,actualcustodywasthenwiththenaturalparentsofAdelberto.
Petitionforreviewwasherebygranted.
JaviervsLucero
FACTS:
Alfredo Javier Sr. and Salud Arca had begotten a son before they got
married, named Alfredo Jr. After the celebration of marriage, the
father went to US since he was listed as US Navy. The mother and
AlfredoJr.wenttolivewithherparentswhilethehusbandwasinUS.
Whentherelationshipbetweenthespousesbecomestrained,husband
petitionedfordivorcebeforeStateofAlabama.Afterthedecreewas
issued, Alfredo Sr. subsequently married twice (having been divorced
withtheformerbeforecelebrationofsubsequentmarriage).
An action for alimony was filed where respondent Judge ordered the
father to give a monthly allowance of P60 to his wife and son. The
fatherfilednoticeofappealquestioningthestatusofthewife;second,
the fact that his son was over 21 years old making him no longer
entitled to be supported and third, decision is vague and silent in
relation to granting the son entitlement to support even if over 21
years old for purposes of completing his education/ training for some
145

PJG
profession, trade or vocation. Nevertheless, the judge directed the

father to pay the monthly pensions notwithstanding pendency of the
appeal.
ISSUE:
WONAlfredoJr.isentitledforsupport.
HELD:
Alfredo Jr. indeed has reached the age of majority yet under the
provisionofFamilyCode,thesupportmaybegivenbeyondtheageof
majorityinorderenablehimtocompletehiseducation,forsometrade
andprofession.
Iffinancialassistanceistoberenderedonlyatthe terminationofthe
appeal, his education or the completion thereof would be unduly
delayed. This is a good reason for immediate execution. The father
claimed that based on the records, the son is no longer studying.
However,itmighthaveresultedtolackofmeanstosupporthisstudies
considering that the father admits that the son is just a prelaw
graduate.
Goitiavs.CamposRueda
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,
respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at
115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They stayed together for a month
before petitioner returned to her parents home. Goitia filed a
146

PJG
complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home.

Itwasallegedthatrespondentdemandedhertoperformunchasteand
lasciviousactsonhisgenitalorgans.Petitionerrefusedtoperformsuch
acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid
cohabitation.SinceGoitiakeptonrefusing,respondentmaltreatedher
by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different
bodyparts.Thetrialcourtruledinfavorofrespondentandstatedthat
Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the
conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
separationordivorcefromrespondent.Goitiafiledmotionforreview.
ISSUE:
WhetherornotGoitiacancompelherhusbandtosupportheroutside
theconjugalhome.
HELD:
Theobligationonthepartofthehusbandtosupporthiswifeiscreated
merelyintheactofmarriage.Thelawprovidesthatthehusband,who
isobligedtosupportthewife,mayfulfilltheobligationeitherbypaying
herafixedpensionorbymaintainingherinhisownhomeathisoption.
However, this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permitthehusbandtoevadeorterminatehisobligationtosupporthis
wifeifthewifeisdrivenawayfromtheconjugalhomebecauseofhis
wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugalabodebecauseofthelewddesignsandphysicalassaultofthe
husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for
separatemaintenanceevenoutsidetheconjugalhome.
DeAsisvs.CA
147

PJG
FACTS:
Vircel Andres as legal guardian of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, filed an
actionin1988formaintenanceandsupportagainsttheallegedfather
ManuelDeAsiswhofailedtoprovidesupportandmaintenancedespite
repeateddemands.Vircellateronwithdrewthecomplaintin1989for
thereasonthatManueldeniedpaternityofthesaidminoranddueto
suchdenial,itseemsuselesstopursuethesaidaction.Theymutually
agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint with the condition
thatManuelwillnotpursuehiscounterclaim.Howeverin1995,Vircel
filed a similar complaint against the alleged father, this time as the
minors legal guardian/mother. Manuel interposed maxim of res
judicata for the dismissal of the case. He maintained that since the
obligation to give support is based on existence of paternity between
the child and putative parent, lack thereof negates the right to claim
support.
ISSUE:
WONtheminorisbarredfromactionforsupport.
HELD:
The right to give support cannot be renounced nor can it be
transmitted to a third person. The original agreement between the
parties to dismiss the initial complaint was in the nature of a
compromiseregardingfuturesupportwhichisprohibitedbylaw.With
respect to Manuels contention for the lack of filial relationship
betweenhimandthechildandagreementofVircelinnotpursuingthe
originalclaim,theCourtheldthatexistenceoflackthereofofanyfilial
relationshipbetweenpartieswasnotamatterwhichthepartiesmust
148

PJG
decidebutshouldbedecidedbytheCourtitself.Whileitistruethatin
order to claim support, filiation or paternity must be first shown
betweentheparties,butthepresenceorlackthereofmustbejudicially
establishedanddeclarationisvestedintheCourt.Itcannotbeleftto
thewilloragreementoftheparties.Hence,thefirstdismissalcannot
barthefilingofanotheractionaskingforthesamerelief(noforceand
effect). Furthermore, the defense of res judicata claimed by Manuel
was untenable since future support cannot be the subject of any
compromiseorwaiver.
Espirituvs.CA
FACTS:
ReynaldoEspirituandTeresitaMasandingbegantomaintainacommon
law relationship of husband while in US. Teresita works as a nurse
while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation,
toPittsburghforatemporarypost.Theybegotachildin1986named
Rosalind. After a year, they went back to the Philippines for a brief
vacationwhentheyalsogotmarried.Subsequently,theyhadasecond
child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo
pleadedforsecondchancebutinsteadofTeresitagrantingit,sheleft
Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo
brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister.
WhenTeresitareturnedinthePhilippinessometimein1992,hefileda
petitionforawritofhabeascorpusagainstReynaldoandhissisterto
gaincustodyofthechildren.
ISSUE:
WONthecustodyofthe2childrenshouldbeawardedtothemother.
149

PJG
HELD:
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the
latters welfare shall be the paramount concern and that even a child
under7yearsofagemaybeorderedtobeseparatedfromthemother
for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best
custodian for a child under seven years of age is strong but not
conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children
were both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she
preferred to stay must be considered. It is evident in the records
submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She was
found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mothers
infidelity.Furthermore,therewasnothingintherecordstoshowthat
Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
childrenthekindofattentionandcarewhichtheirmotherisnotinthe
positiontoextend.Ontheotherhand,themothersconvictionforthe
crime of bigamy and her illicit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the
daughter.
Hence,petitionwasgranted.Custodyoftheminorswasreinstatedto
theirfather.
Amadoravs.CA
FACTS:
Alfredo Amadora, while in the auditorium of the school, was mortally
hitbyagunbyPablitoDaffonresultingtotheformersdeath.Daffon
wasconvictedofhomicidethroughrecklessimprudence.Thevictims
parents, herein petitioners, filed a civil action for damages against
150

PJG
ColegiodeSanJoseRecoletos,itsrectors,highschoolprincipal,deanof
boys, the physics teacher together with Daffon and 2 other students.
Complaints against the students were dropped. Respondent Court
absolved the defendants completely and reversed CFI Cebus decision
for the following reasons: 1. Since the school was an academic
institution of learning and not a school of arts and trades 2. That
studentswerenotinthecustodyoftheschoolsincethesemesterhas
alreadyended3.Therewasnoclearidentificationofthefatalgun,and
4. In any event, defendants exercised the necessary diligence through
enforcement of the school regulations in maintaining discipline.
Petitioners on othe other hand claimed their son was under school
custody because he went to school to comply with a requirement for
graduation(submissionofPhysicsreports).
ISSUE:
WONCollegiodeSanJoseRecoletosshouldbeheldliable.
HELD:
The time Alfredo was fatally shot, he was in the custody of the
authorities of the school notwithstanding classes had formally ended
whentheincidenthappened.Itwasimmaterialifhewasintheschool
auditorium to finish his physics requirement. What was important is
that he was there for a legitimate purpose. On the other hand, the
rector,highschoolprincipalandthedeanofboyscannotbeheldliable
because none of them was the teacherincharge as defined in the
provision. Each was exercising only a general authority over the
students and not direct control and influence exerted by the teacher
placedinchargeofparticularclasses.
151

PJG
Intheabsenceofateacherincharge,deanofboysshouldprobablybe
held liable considering that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed
gun from a student and later returned to him without taking
disciplinary action or reporting the matter to the higher authorities.
Though it was clear negligence on his part, no proof was shown to
necessarilylinkthisgunwiththeshootingincident.
Collegio San JoseRecoletos cannot directly be held liable under the
provision because only the teacher of the head of school of arts and
trade is made responsible for the damage caused by the student.
Hence, under the facts disclosed, none of the respondents were held
liablefortheinjuryinflictedwithAlfredoresultingtohisdeath.
Ylardevs.Aquino
FACTS:
PrivaterespondentMarianoSorianowastheprincipaloftheGabaldon
Primary School in Pangasinan. Defendant Edgardo Aquino was a
teacher therein. During that time, the school had several concrete
blockswhichwereremnantsoftheoldschoolshopdestroyedinWorld
WarII.Defendantdecidedtohelpcleartheareasohegathered18of
hismalestudentsandorderedthemtodigbesideaonetonconcrete
block in making a hole where the stone can be buried. It was left
unfinishedsothefollowingdayhecalled4ofthe18studentsincluding
the Novelito Ylarde to complete the excavation. Defendant left the
childrentoleveltheloosesoilwhilehewenttoseeBanezforthekeyto
theschoolworkroomwherehecangetsomerope.Itwasallegedthat
beforeleaving,hetoldthechildrennottotouchthestone.Afterhe
left, the children playfully jumped into the pit when suddenly the
concreteblockslidedown.Unfortunately,NovelitoYlardewaspinned
152

PJG
tothewallcausingseriousphysicalinjurieswhichasaconsequenceled
to his death, 3 days thereafter. The parents of the victim, herein
petitioners,filedasuitfordamagesagainstbothAquinoandSoriano.
ISSUE:
WONbothSorianoandAquinocanbeheldliablefordamages.
HELD:
AsheldinAmadoravsCA,itisonlytheteacherandnottheheadofan
academic school who should be answerable for torts committed by
theirstudents.Wheretheschoolisacademicratherthantechnicalor
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the
studentwillattachtotheteacherinchargeofsuchstudent,thisisthe
generalrule.However,incaseaofestablishmentsofartsandtrades,it
is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an
exceptiontothegeneralrule.Inotherwords,teachersingeneralshall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be
answerable. Hence, Soriano as principal cannot be held liable for the
reasonthattheschoolheheadsisanacademicschoolandhedidnot
giveanyinstructionregardingthedigging.
Ateacherwhostandsinlocoparentistohistudentsshouldmakesure
that the children are protected from all harm. The excavation
instructedclearlyexposedthestudentstoriskandshouldnotbeplaced
under the category of Work Education such as school gardening,
plantingtreesetc.Aquinoactedwithfaultandgrossnegligencewhere
insteadofavailinghimselfofadultmanuallaborersheinsteadutilized
his students. Furthermore, the warning given is not sufficient to cast
153

PJG
away all serious danger that the concrete block adjacent to the
excavation would present to the children. He is therefore ordered to
paydamagestothepetitioners.
St.MarysAcademyvs.Carpetanos
FACTS:
Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year
19951996Theyvisitedschoolsfromwhereprospectiveenrolleeswere
studying. Sherwin Carpitanos joined the campaign. Along with the
other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeepwasdrivenbyJamesDanielII,a15yearoldstudentofthesame
school. It was alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner
which resulted for it to turned turtle. Sherwin died due to this
accident.
ISSUE:
WONpetitionershouldbeheldliableforthedamages.
HELD:
CAheldpetitionerliableforthedeathofSherwinunderArticle218and
219oftheFamilyCodewhereitwaspointedthattheywerenegligent
in allowing a minor to drive and not having a teacher accompany the
minorstudentsinthejeep.However,forthemtobeheldliable,theact
oromissiontobeconsiderednegligentmustbetheproximatecauseof
theinjurycausedthus,negligenceneedstohaveacausalconnectionto
the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events,
unbrokenbyanyefficientinterveningcauses.Theparentsofthevictim
154

PJG
failed to show such negligence on the part of the petitioner. The

spousesVillanuevaadmittedthattheimmediatecauseoftheaccident
was not the reckless driving of James but the detachment of the
steeringwheelguideofthejeep.Futhermore,therewasnoevidence
thatpetitionerallowedtheminortodrivethejeepofVillanueva.The
mechanicaldefectwasaneventoverwhichtheschoolhasnocontrol
hence they may not be held liable for the death resulting from such
accident.
Theregisteredownerofanyvehicle,evenifnotusedforpublicservice,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for
injuriescausedwhileitisbeingdrivenontheroad.Itisnottheschool,
buttheregisteredownerofthevehiclewhoshallbe heldresponsible
fordamagesforthedeathofSherwin.Casewasremandedtothetrial
court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding
hereinpetitioner.
TamargovsCA
FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, minor, 10 years of age, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries that resulted in her
death. The petitioners, natural parents of Tamargo, filed a complaint
for damages against the natural parents of Adelberto with whom he
waslivingthetimeofthetragicincident.
In December 1981, the spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
AdelbertoBundoc.SuchpetitionwasgrantedonNovember1982after
thetragicincident.
ISSUE:
155

PJG
WONparentalauthorityconcernedmaybegivenretroactiveeffectso
astomakeadoptingparentstheindispensablepartiesinadamagecase
filed against the adopted child where actual custody was lodged with
thebiologicalparents.
HELD:
Parental liability is a natural or logical consequence of duties and
responsibilities of parents, their parental authority which includes
instructing, controlling and disciplining the child. In the case at bar,
duringtheshootingincident,parentalauthorityoverAdelbertowasstill
lodged with the natural parents. It follows that they are the
indispensablepartiestothesuitfordamages.Parentsandguardians
areresponsibleforthedamagecausedbythechildundertheirparental
authorityinaccordancewiththecivilcode.
SCdidnotconsiderthatretroactiveeffectmaybegiventothedecree
of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents
accruingatthetimewhentheyhadnoactualorphysicalcustodyover
theadoptedchild.Retroactivitymaybeessentialifitpermitsaccrualof
somebenefitoradvantageinfavoroftheadoptedchild.UnderArticle
35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, parental authority is
provisionally vested in the adopting parents during the period of trial
custody however in this case, trial custody period either had not yet
begin nor had been completed at the time of the shooting incident.
Hence,actualcustodywasthenwiththenaturalparentsofAdelberto.
Libivs.IAC
FACTS:
156

PJG
JulieAnnGotiongandWendellLibiwereasweetheartuntiltheformer
broke up with the latter after she found out the Wendell was
irresponsibleandsadistic.Wendellwantedreconciliationbutwasnot
grantedbyJuliesoitpromptedhimtoresorttothreats.Oneday,there
werefounddeadfromasinglegunshotwoundeachcomingfromthe
samegun.TheparentsofJuliehereinprivaterespondentsfiledacivil
case against the parents of Wendell to recover damages. Trial court
dismissedthecomplaintforinsufficiencyofevidencebutwassetaside
byCA.
ISSUE:
WONtheparentsshouldbeheldliableforsuchdamages.
HELD:
The subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor
children imposed under Art 2180 of the Civil Code and Art. 101 of
RevisedPenalCodecoveredobligationsarisingfrombothquasidelicts
and criminal offenses. The court held that the civil liability of the
parents for quasidelict of their minor children is primary and not
subsidiary and that responsibility shall cease when the persons can
provethattheyobserveallthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilyto
prevent damage. However, Wendells mother testified that her
husband owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a
drawerintheirbedroom.Eachofthespouseshadtheirownkey.She
likewiseadmittedthatduringtheincident,thegunwasnolongerinthe
safety deposit box. Wendell could not have gotten hold of the gun
unless the key was left negligently lying around and that he has free
accessofthemothersbagwherethekeywaskept.Thespousesfailed
157

PJG
to observe and exercise the required diligence of a good father to

preventsuchdamage.
Laperalvs.Republic
FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with
Mr.EnriqueR.SantamariaonMarch1939.However,adecreeoflegal
separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she
ceasedtolivewithEnrique.Duringtheirmarriage,shenaturallyuses
EliseaL.Santamaria.Shefiledthispetitiontobepermittedtoresume
inusinghermaidennameEliseaLaperal.ThiswasopposedbytheCity
Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil
Code.Shewasclaimingthatcontinuingtousehermarriednamewould
giverisetoconfusioninherfinancesandtheeventualliquidationofthe
conjugalassets.
ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will
prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with
regardtomarriedwomanlegallyseparatedfromhishusband.
HELD:
Inlegalseparation,themarriedstatusisunaffectedbytheseparation,
therebeingnoseveranceofthevinculum.Thefindingthatpetitioners
continueduseofherhusbandsurnamemaycauseundueconfusionin
herfinanceswaswithoutbasis.Itmustbeconsideredthattheissuance
ofthedecreeoflegalseparationin1958,necessitatethattheconjugal
partnershipbetweenherandEnriquehadautomaticallybeendissolved
158

PJG
and liquidated. Hence, there could be no more occasion for an

eventualliquidationoftheconjugalassets.
Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a
changeofthenameofEliseafortoholdotherwisewouldbetoprovide
foraneasycircumventionofthemandatoryprovisionofArt.372.
Petitionwasdismissed.
Llanetavs.Agrava
FACTS:
AtanaciaLlanetawasmarriedwithSerafinFerrerwhomshehadachild
named Victoriano Ferrer. Serafin died and about four years later
Atanacia had a relationship with another man out of which Teresita
Llaneta, herein petitioner, was born. All of them lived with Serafins
motherinManila.TeresitawasraisedinthehouseholdoftheFerrers
usingthesurnameofFerrerinallherdealingevenherschoolrecords.
ShethenappliedforacopyofherbirthcertificateinSorsogonasitis
required to be presented in connection with a scholarship grant.
Subsequently,shediscoveredthatherregisteredsurnamewasLlaneta
and that she was the illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown
father.SheprayedtohavehernamechangedfromTeresitaLlanetato
Teresita Llaneta Ferrer since not doing so would result in confusion
among persons and entitites she dealt with and would entail endless
andvexatiousexplanationsofthecircumstances.
ISSUE:
WhetherTeresitacanhavehersurnamechangedtoFerrer.
HELD:
159

PJG
TheCourtruledinfavorofTeresitaandgrantedherpetitiontochange
her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. In support to her petition, the
mother of Serafin Ferrer and his two remaining brothers have come
forward in earnest support and were proud to share the surname of
Ferrerwithher.Furthermore,adequatepublicationoftheproceeding
has not elicited slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of
SerafinFerrer.
LukbanvsRepublic
FACTS:
LourdesLukbanandFranciscoChuidiangotmarriedin1933andaftera
violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not been heard of since then.
Shediligentlylookedforhimaskingtheparentsandfriendsbutnoone
knewhiswhereabouts.Shebelievesthathusbandisalreadydeadsince
he was absent for more than 20 years and because she intends to
marry again, she desires to have her civil status put in order to be
relievedonanyliabilityunderthelaw.
ISSUE:
Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death
beforeshecanremarry.
HELD:
The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure declaration of
presumptive death of her husband because Civil Code prevails during
their marriage in 1933. It provides that for the purposes of the civil
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declaredanabsentee.Thedeclarationofabsencemadeinaccordance
160

PJG
withtheprovisionsoftheCivilCodehasforitssolepurposetoenable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the
estateoftheabsentee.Forthecelebrationofcivilmarriage,however,
thelawonlyrequiresthattheformerspousehasbeenabsentforseven
consecutiveyearsatthetimeofthesecondmarriage,thatthespouse
presentdoesnotknowhisorherformerspousetobeliving,thateach
formerspouseisgenerallyreputedtobedeadandthespousepresent
sobelievesatthetimeofthecelebrationofthemarriage.
Republicvs.Cagandahan
FACTS:
Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of
Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral
hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures
had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation.
Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia(CAH),aconditionwherethoseafflictedpossesssecondary
malecharacteristicsbecauseoftoomuchsecretionofmalehormones,
androgen.Accordingtoher,forallinterestsandappearancesaswellas
in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a
petitionatRTCLagunaforCorrectionofEntriesinherBirthCertificate
suchthathergenderorsexbechangedtomaleandherfirstnamebe
changedtoJeff.
ISSUE:
WONcorrectionofentriesinherbirthcertificateshouldbegranted.
HELD:
161

PJG
The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the

variousdegreesofintersexasvariationswhichshouldnotbesubjectto
outrightdenial.SCisoftheviewthatwherethepersonisbiologically
ornaturallyintersexthedeterminingfactorinhisgenderclassification
wouldbewhattheindividual,havingreachedtheageofmajority,with
goodreasonthinksofhis/hersex.Asinthiscase,respondent,thinksof
himselfasamaleandconsideringthathisbodyproduceshighlevelsof
male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for
considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is
fixed.
162

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Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be

Persons Cases Atty. Rivera

lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT

Persons Cases Atty. Rivera