Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 316

P.J.G.

INTRODUCTIONTOCONSTITUTIONALLAW2

THENATUREOFTHECONSTITUTIONANDITSRELATIONWITHTHECOURTS

FRANCISCOVS.HOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES
[415SCRA44;G.R.No.160261;10Nov2003]

Facts:

Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario
Davide.ThejusticiablecontroversypoisedinfrontoftheCourtwastheconstitutionality
ofthesubsequentfilingofasecondcomplainttocontroverttherulesofimpeachment
providedforbylaw.

Issue:

Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar
providedintheConstitutionandwhethertheresolutionthereofisapoliticalquestion
hasresultedinapoliticalcrisis.

Held:
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to
address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces,atthefirstinstance,thatthefearedresorttoextraconstitutionalmethods
of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindfuloftheessentialtruththattheinviolatedoctrineofseparationofpowersamong
thelegislative,executiveorjudicialbranchesofgovernmentbynomeansprescribesfor
absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power
assignedtoitbythesovereignpeople.

P.J.G.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been
carefullycalibratedbytheConstitutiontotempertheofficialactsofeachofthesethree
branchesmustbegiveneffectwithoutdestroyingtheirindispensablecoequality.There
existsnoconstitutionalbasisforthecontentionthattheexerciseofjudicialreviewover
impeachmentproceedings would upset the systemof checks and balances. Verily,the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act
beyondthepowersassignedtoitbytheConstitution.

Whensuingasacitizen,theinterestofthepetitionerassailingtheconstitutionalityofa
statutemustbedirectandpersonal.Hemustbeabletoshow,notonlythatthelawor
any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
sufferstherebyinsomeindefiniteway.Itmustappearthatthepersoncomplaininghas
beenorisabouttobedeniedsomerightorprivilegetowhichheislawfullyentitledor
thatheisabouttobesubjectedtosomeburdensorpenaltiesbyreasonofthestatute
or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public
right,themerefactthatheisacitizensatisfiestherequirementofpersonalinterest.

Inthecaseofataxpayer,heisallowedtosuewherethereisaclaimthatpublicfunds
areillegallydisbursed,orthatpublicmoneyisbeingdeflectedtoanyimproperpurpose,
or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditureofmoneyraisedbytaxationandthathewouldsustainadirectinjuryasa
resultoftheenforcementofthequestionedstatuteorcontract.Itisnotsufficientthat
hehasmerelyageneralinterestcommontoallmembersofthepublic.

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners,
given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditureofpublicfunds.

As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action
which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers
andprivilegesvestedbytheConstitutioninhisoffice.83
2

P.J.G.

TheframersoftheConstitutionalsounderstoodinitiationinitsordinarymeaning.Thus
whenaproposalreachedthefloorproposingthat"Avoteofatleastonethirdofallthe
MembersoftheHouseshallbenecessarytoinitiateimpeachmentproceedings,"this
wasmetbyaproposaltodeletethelineonthegroundthatthevoteoftheHousedoes
notinitiateimpeachmentproceedingbutratherthefilingofacomplaintdoes.

To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives
shallhavetheexclusivepowertoinitiateallcasesofimpeachment,"Thisisamisreading
ofsaidprovisionandiscontrarytotheprincipleofreddendosingulasingulisbyequating
"impeachmentcases"with"impeachmentproceeding."

Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsementoftheimpeachmentcomplainttotheHouseCommitteeonJusticeor,by
thefilingbyatleastonethirdofthemembersoftheHouseofRepresentativeswiththe
SecretaryGeneraloftheHouse,themeaningofSection3(5)ofArticleXIbecomesclear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
maynotbefiledagainstthesameofficialwithinaoneyearperiod.

The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the
merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against
the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed oneyear time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor
indiscriminatelyturnjusticiableissuesoutofdecidedlypoliticalquestions.Becauseitis
not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
greatbranchesofthegovernment.

NooneisabovethelawortheConstitution.Thisisabasicpreceptinanylegalsystem
which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral
authorityandthatofitsagentstosecurerespect forandobediencetoitscommands.
Perhaps,thereisnoothergovernmentbranchorinstrumentalitythatismostzealousin
protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerneditsrealmeaningandramificationsthroughitsapplicationtonumerouscases
especiallyofthehighprofilekindintheannalsofjurisprudence.TheChiefJusticeisnot
abovethelawandneitherisanyothermemberofthisCourt.Butjustbecauseheisthe
ChiefJusticedoesnotimplythathegetstohavelessinlawthananybodyelse.Thelaw
issolicitousofeveryindividual'srightsirrespectiveofhisstationinlife.

P.J.G.

Thus,theRulesofProcedureinImpeachmentProceedingswhichwereapprovedbythe
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
thesecondimpeachmentcomplaintagainstChiefJusticeHilarioG.Davide,Jrisbarred
underparagraph5,section3ofArticleXIoftheConstitution.

MANILAPRINCEHOTELVS.GSIS
[267SCRA408;G.R.No.122156;3Feb1997]

Facts:

ThecontroversyarosewhenrespondentGovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem(GSIS),
pursuanttotheprivatizationprogramofthePhilippineGovernmentunderProclamation
No.50dated 8 December 1986, decided tosell through public bidding 30%to51%of
the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close
biddingheldon18September1995onlytwo(2)biddersparticipated:petitionerManila
PrinceHotelCorporation,aFilipinocorporation,whichofferedtobuy51%oftheMHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITTSheratonasitshoteloperator,whichbidforthesamenumberofsharesatP44.00
pershare,orP2.42morethanthebidofpetitioner.

PendingthedeclarationofRenongBerhadasthewinningbidder/strategicpartnerand
the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tenderedbyRenongBerhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the
tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
respondentGSISandconsummatedwithRenongBerhad,petitionercametothisCourt
onprohibitionandmandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
andsubmitsthattheManilaHotelhasbeenidentifiedwiththeFilipinonationandhas
practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who
believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to
releasethefullpotentialoftheFilipinopeople.Toallintentsandpurposes,ithasbecome
apartofthenationalpatrimony.6Petitioneralsoarguesthatsince51%ofthesharesof
theMHCcarrieswithittheownershipofthebusinessofthehotelwhich isowned by
respondent GSIS, a governmentowned and controlled corporation, the hotel business
4

P.J.G.

ofrespondentGSISbeingapartofthetourismindustryisunquestionablyapartofthe
nationaleconomy.

Issue:

Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the
ConstitutionalprovisionofFilipinoFirstpolicyandisthereforenullandvoid.

Held:

TheManilaHotelor,forthatmatter,51%oftheMHC,isnotjustanycommoditytobe
sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has
playedandcontinues to playasignificant role as an authentic repository oftwentieth
century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the
FilipinoFirstPolicyprovisionofthePhilippineConstitution.AndthisCourt,heedingthe
clarioncalloftheConstitutionandacceptingthedutyofbeingtheelderlywatchmanof
thenation,willcontinuetorespectandprotectthesanctityoftheConstitution.Itwas
thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
CorporationatP44.00pershareandthereaftertoexecutethenecessaryclearancesand
todosuchotheractsanddeedsasmaybenecessaryforpurpose.

PEOPLEVS.POMAR
[46Phil126;G.R.No.L22008;3Nov1924]

Facts:

MacariaFajardowasanemployeeofLaFlordelaIsabela,aTobaccofactory.Shewas
grantedavacationleave,byreasonofherpregnancy,whichcommencedonthe16thof
July1923.AccordingtoFajardo,duringthattime,shewasnotgiventhesalarydueher
inviolationoftheprovisionsofActNo.3071.Fajardofiledacriminalcomplaintbased
on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio
Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the facts in the
complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the aforementioned
provisionsofActNo.3071wasunconstitutional.Section13,ActNo.3071providesthat,
Everyperson,firmorcorporationowningormanagingafactory,shoporplaceoflabor
ofanydescriptionshallbeobligedtogranttoanywomanemployedbyitaslaborerwho
may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after
5

P.J.G.

confinement:Provided,Thattheemployershallnotdischargesuchlaborerwithoutjust
cause,underthepenaltyofbeingrequiredtopaytoherwagesequivalenttothetotalof
two months counting from the day of her discharge. Section 15 of the same Act
provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the
legislatureintheexerciseofitssupposedPolicePowerwiththepurposeofsafeguarding
the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or place of labor of any
description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable support for one
monthbeforeandonemonthaftertheirdelivery.Thetrialcourtrenderedadecisionin
favorofplaintiff,sentencingthedefendanttopaythefineoffiftypesosandincaseof
insolvency,tosuffersubsidiaryimprisonment.Hence,thecasewasraisedtotheCourt
ofAppealswhichaffirmedtheformerdecision.

Issue:

WhetherornotSection13ofActNo.3071isunconstitutional.

Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of
PolicePower.

Held:

TheSupremeCourtdeclaredSection13ofActNo.3071tobeunconstitutionalforbeing
violativeorrestrictiveoftherightofthepeopletofreelyenterintocontractsfortheir
affairs.Ithasbeendecidedseveraltimes,thattherighttocontractaboutone'saffairsis
apartof theliberty oftheindividual, protectedby the "due process of law" clause of
the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditionstheymaydeemadvisable,providedtheyarenotcontrarytolaw,moralsor
publicpolicy

Thepolicepowerofthestateisaverybroadand expandingpower.Thepolicepower
may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the
preservationofthepublicpeace,health,andmorals.Butthatpowercannotgrowfaster
thanthefundamentallawofthestate,nortranscendorviolatetheexpressinhibitionof
the constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount
authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights
securedorguaranteedbythelatter.

LAMBINOVS.COMELEC
6

P.J.G.

[G.R.No.174153;25Oct2006]

Facts:

Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition


to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscitethatwillratifytheirinitiativepetitionunderRA6735.Lambinogroupalleged
thatthepetitionhadthesupportof6Mindividualsfulfillingwhatwasprovidedbyart
17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying
sections 17 of Art 6 and sections 14 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed
changes will shift the present bicameral presidential form of government to
unicameral parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law
governinginitiativepetitionsandinvokedtheSantiagoVs.ComelecrulingthatRA6735
isinadequatetoimplementtheinitiativepetitions.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheLambinoGroupsinitiativepetitioncomplieswithSection2,Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a peoples
initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions to implement
theinitiativeclauseonproposalstoamendtheConstitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due
coursetotheLambinoGroupspetition.

Held:

AccordingtotheSCtheLambinogroupfailedtocomplywiththebasicrequirementsfor
conductingapeoplesinitiative.TheCourtheldthattheCOMELECdidnotgraveabuse
ofdiscretionondismissingtheLambinopetition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
ConstitutiononDirectProposalbythePeople
Thepetitionersfailedtoshowthecourtthattheinitiativesignermustbeinformedat
the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is deceptive and
misleadingwhichrenderstheinitiativevoid.
7

P.J.G.

2. TheInitiativeViolatesSection2,ArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionDisallowingRevision
throughInitiatives
Theframersoftheconstitutionintendedacleardistinctionbetweenamendment
and revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the
constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the
legislativeandtheexecutiveisaradicalchange,thereforeaconstitutesarevision.

3. ARevisitofSantiagov.COMELECisNotNecessary
EvenassumingthatRA6735isvalid,itwillnotchangetheresultbecausethepresent
petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the
constitutionbeforecomplyingwithRA6735

Petitionisdismissed.

SANTIAGOVS.COMELEC
[270SCRA106;G.R.No.127325;19Mar1997]

Facts:

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the
constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He
based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for
the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of
thepetitionandofthenoticeofhearingandthereaftersetthecaseforhearing.Atthe
hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors
oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground
thatonewhichiscognizablebytheCOMELEC.ThepetitionershereinSenatorSantiago,
AlexanderPadilla,andIsabelOngpinfiledthiscivilactionforprohibitionunderRule65
of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several
arguments,suchasthefollowing:(1)Theconstitutionalprovisiononpeoplesinitiative
toamendtheconstitutioncanonlybeimplementedbylawtobepassedbyCongress.
Nosuchlawhasbeenpassed;(2)Thepeoplesinitiativeislimitedtoamendmentstothe
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision,
8

P.J.G.

thereforeitisoutsidethepowerofpeoplesinitiative.TheSupremeCourtgrantedthe
MotionsforIntervention.

Issue:

WhetherornotSec.2,Art.XVIIofthe1987Constitutionisaselfexecutingprovision.

Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendmentstotheConstitutionisvalid,consideringtheabsenceinthelawofspecific
provisionsontheconductofsuchinitiative.

Whethertheliftingoftermlimitsofelectiveofficialswouldconstitutearevisionoran
amendmentoftheConstitution.

Held:

Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing
legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or
granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not provide for its
implementation.

TheportionofCOMELECResolutionNo.2300whichprescribesrulesandregulationson
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an
establishedrulethatwhathasbeendelegated,cannotbedelegated(potestasdelegata
non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the
lattercannotvalidlypromulgaterulesandregulationstoimplementtheexerciseofthe
righttopeoplesinitiative.

Theliftingofthetermlimitswasheldtobethatofarevision,asitwouldaffectother
provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the
constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However,
considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the
petitionisarevisionoramendmenthasbecomeacademic.

GONZALESVS.COMELEC
[21SCRA774;G.R.No.L28196;9Nov1967]

P.J.G.

Facts:

Thecaseisanoriginalactionforprohibition,withpreliminaryinjunction.

The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of
Representativespassedthefollowingresolutions:

1.R.B.H.(ResolutionofBothHouses)No.1,proposingthatSection5,ArticleVI,ofthe
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution,toamaximumof180,tobeapportionedamongtheseveralprovincesas
nearlyasmaybeaccordingtothenumberoftheirrespectiveinhabitants,althougheach
provinceshallhave,atleast,one(1)member;

2.R.B.H.No.2,callingaconventiontoproposeamendmentstosaidConstitution,the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative
district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November,1971;"and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amendedsoastoauthorizeSenatorsandmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesto
becomedelegatestotheaforementionedconstitutionalconvention, withoutforfeiting
theirrespectiveseatsinCongress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June
17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the
ConstitutionproposedintheaforementionedResolutionsNo.1and3besubmitted,for
approvalbythepeople,atthegeneral elections whichshallbeheldonNovember14,
1967.

Issue:

WhetherorNotaResolutionofCongress,actingasaconstituentassembly,violatesthe
Constitution.

Held:

Inasmuchastherearelessthaneight(8)votesinfavorofdeclaringRepublicAct4913
and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid, the petitions in these two (2)
10

P.J.G.

cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss and the writs therein prayed for denied,
withoutspecialpronouncementastocosts.Itissoordered.

Asaconsequence,thetitleofadefactoofficercannot be assailedcollaterally.Itmay
notbecontestedexceptdirectly,byquowarrantoproceedings.Neithermaythevalidity
ofhisactsbequestioneduponthegroundthatheismerelyadefactoofficer.Andthe
reasonsareobvious:(1)itwouldbeanindirectinquiryintothetitletotheoffice;and(2)
theactsofadefactoofficer,ifwithinthecompetenceofhisoffice,arevalid,insofaras
thepublicisconcerned.

"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and
amongtheintegralorconstituentunitsthereof."

ArticleXVoftheConstitutionprovides:

...TheCongressinjointsessionassembled,byavoteofthreefourthsofall
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
contentionforthatpurpose.Suchamendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthis
Constitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescastatanelection
atwhichtheamendmentsaresubmittedtothepeoplefortheirratification.

Fromourviewpoint,theprovisionsofArticleXVoftheConstitutionaresatisfiedsolong
astheelectorateknowsthatR.B.H.No.3permitsCongressmentoretaintheirseatsas
legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of delegates to the
Convention.

SANIDADVS.COMELEC
[78SCRA333;G.R.No.90878;29Jan1990]

Facts:
11

P.J.G.

This is a petition for certiorari assailing the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec


ResolutionNo.2167onthegroundthatitviolatestheconstitutionalguaranteesofthe
freedom of expression and of the press. On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766,
entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA
AUTONOMOUSREGION"wasenactedintolaw.Pursuanttosaidlaw,theCityofBaguio
and the Cordilleras which consist of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao,AbraandKalingaApayao,allcomprisingtheCordilleraAutonomousRegion,shall
takepartinaplebiscitefortheratificationofsaidOrganicActoriginallyscheduledlast
December27,1989whichwas,however,resettoJanuary30,1990byvirtueofComelec
ResolutionNo.2226datedDecember27,1989.TheCommissiononElections,byvirtue
ofthepowervestedbythe1987Constitution,theOmnibusElectionCode(BP881),said
R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated Resolution No. 2167, to
govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
AutonomousRegion.Inapetitiondated November20,1989,hereinpetitioner Pablito
V.Sanidad,whoclaimstobeanewspapercolumnistofthe"OVERVIEW"fortheBAGUIO
MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the
Cordilleras,assailedtheconstitutionalityofSection19ofComelecResolutionNo.2167,
whichprovides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers.


During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the
plebiscite day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or
personalityshallusehiscolumnorradioortelevisiontimetocampaignfor
oragainsttheplebisciteIssue.

Itisallegedbypetitionerthatsaidprovisionisvoidandunconstitutionalbecause
itviolatestheconstitutionalguaranteesofthefreedomofexpressionandofthe
press enshrined in the Constitution. Unlike a regular news reporter or news
correspondent who merely reports the news, petitioner maintains that as a
columnist,hiscolumnobviouslyandnecessarilycontainsandreflectshisopinions,
views and beliefs on any issue or subject about which he writes. Petitioner
likewisemaintainsthatifmediapractitionersweretoexpresstheirviews,beliefs
and opinions on the issue submitted to a plebiscite, it would in fact help in the
government drive and desire to disseminate information, and hear, as well as
ventilate,allsidesoftheissue.

Issue:

12

P.J.G.

WhetherornotSection19ofComelecResolutionNo.2167isunconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is
unconstitutional. It is clear from Art. IXC of the 1987 Constitution that what was
grantedtotheComelecwasthepowertosuperviseandregulatetheuseandenjoyment
offranchises,permitsorothergrantsissuedfortheoperationoftransportationorother
public utilities, media of communication or information to the end that equal
opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates
therefor,forpublicinformationcampaignsandforumsamongcandidatesareensured.
Theevilsoughttobepreventedbythisprovisionisthepossibilitythatafranchiseholder
mayfavororgiveanyundueadvantagetoacandidateintermsofadvertisingspaceor
radio or television time. This is also the reason why a "columnist, commentator,
announcerorpersonality,whoisacandidateforanyelectiveofficeisrequiredtotakea
leaveofabsencefromhisworkduringthecampaignperiod(2ndpar.Section11(b)R.A.
6646).It cannot be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a candidate
would be more exposed to the voters to the prejudice of other candidates unless
requiredtotakealeaveofabsence.

However, neither Article IXC of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A.
6646 can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to
superviseandregulatetheexercisebymediapractitionersthemselvesoftheirrightto
expression during plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of
expression during plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates.Infact,therearenocandidatesinvolvedinaplebiscite.Therefore,Section
19ofComelecResolutionNo.2167hasnostatutorybasis.

PlebisciteIssuearemattersofpublicconcernandimportance.Thepeople'srighttobe
informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better
served by access to an unabridged discussion of the Issue, including the forum. The
peopleaffectedbytheIssuepresentedinaplebisciteshouldnotbeundulyburdenedby
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised. Comelec
spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for expression but they do not
guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are
limitedtoeitherspecificportionsinnewspapersortospecificradioortelevisiontimes.

TheinstantpetitionisGRANTED.Section19ofComelecResolutionNo.2167isdeclared
nullandvoidandunconstitutional.
13

P.J.G.

BONDOCVS.PINEDA
[201SCRA792;G.R.No.97710;26Sep1991]

Facts:

IntheelectionsheldonMay11,1987,MarcianoPinedaoftheLDPandEmigdioBondoc
oftheNPwerecandidatesforthepositionofRepresentativefortheFourthDistrictof
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
RepresentativesElectoralTribunal(HRET),whichiscomposedof9members,3ofwhom
areJusticesoftheSCandtheremaining6aremembersoftheHouseofRepresentatives
(5membersbelong totheLDPand 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, adecision
had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the
LDPvotedwiththeSCJusticesandCongressmanCerillesoftheNPtoproclaimBondoc
thewinnerofthecontest.

OntheeveofthepromulgationoftheBondocdecision,CongressmanCamasura
receivedaletterinforminghimthathewasalreadyexpelledfromtheLDPforallegedly
helpingtoorganizethePartidoPilipinoofEduardoCojuangcoandforallegedlyinviting
LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decidedtowithdrawthenominationandrescindtheelectionofCongressmanCamasura
totheHRET.

Issue:

WhetherornottheHouseofRepresentatives,attherequestofthedominantpolitical
party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgationofadecisionfreelyreachedbythetribunalinanelectioncontestpending
therein

Held:

ThepurposeoftheconstitutionalconventioncreatingtheElectoralCommissionwasto
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislativeoffice,devoidofpartisanconsideration.
14

P.J.G.

Asjudges,themembersofthetribunalmustbenonpartisan.Theymustdischargetheir
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even
independencefromthepoliticalpartytowhichtheybelong.Hence,disloyaltytoparty
and breachof partydisciplineare not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of
the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
consciencevoteinfavorofBondoc,basedstrictlyontheresultoftheexaminationand
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of
the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore,nullandvoid.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
RepresentativesisthatitviolatesCongressmanCamasurasrighttosecurityoftenure.
MembersoftheHRET,assolejudgeofcongressionalelectioncontests,areentitledto
securityoftenurejustasmembersoftheJudiciaryenjoy securityoftenureunderthe
Constitution.Therefore,membershipintheHRETmaynotbeterminatedexceptfora
just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal,formalaffiliationwithanotherpoliticalpartyorremovalforothervalidcause.
A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty,
shortofproofthathehasformallyaffiliatedwithanother

MIRASOLVSCA
[351SCRA44;G.R.No.128448;1Feb2001]

Facts:

The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB)
financed the Mirasols' sugar production venture FROM 19731975 under a crop loan
financing scheme. The Mirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on
Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empoweredPNBtonegotiateandsellthelatter'ssugarandtoapplytheproceedstothe
paymentoftheirobligationstoit.

PresidentMarcosissuedPD579inNovember,1974authorizingPhilippineExchangeCo.,
Inc. (PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for export and authorized PNB to finance
15

P.J.G.

PHILEX'spurchases.ThedecreedirectedthatwhateverprofitPHILEXmightrealizewas
toberemittedtothegovernment.Believingthattheproceedsweremorethanenough
topaytheirobligations,petitionersaskedPNBforanaccountingoftheproceedswhich
itignored.PetitionerscontinuedtoavailofotherloansfromPNBandtomakeunfunded
withdrawals from their accounts with said bank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their
dueanddemandableaccounts.Asaresult,petitioners,conveyedtoPNBrealproperties
by way of dacion en pago still leaving an unpaid amount. PNB proceeded to
extrajudiciallyforeclosethemortgagedproperties.PNBstillhadadeficiencyclaim.

Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account for the proceeds, insisting that said
proceeds, if properly liquidated, could offset their outstanding obligations. PNB
remainedadamantinitsstancethatunderP.D.No.579,therewasnothingtoaccount
since under said law, all earnings from the export sales of sugar pertained to the
NationalGovernment.

On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit for accounting, specific performance, and
damagesagainstPNB.

Issue:

Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional
without notice to the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such
issuefortheresolutionoftheTrialCourt.

WhetherPD579andsubsequentissuancesthereofareunconstitutional.

WhetherornotsaidPDissubjecttojudicialreview.
Held:

ItissettledthatRegionalTrialCourtshavetheauthorityandjurisdictiontoconsiderthe
constitutionalityofastatute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution
veststhepowerofjudicialrevieworthepowertodeclarealaw,treaty,internationalor
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
notonlyinthisCourt,butinallRegionalTrialCourts.

The purpose of the mandatory notice in Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor
Generaltodecidewhetherornothisinterventionintheactionassailingthevalidityofa
law or treaty is necessary. To deny the Solicitor General such notice would be
tantamount to depriving him of his day in court. We must stress that, contrary to
16

P.J.G.

petitioners'stand,themandatorynoticerequirementisnotlimitedtoactionsinvolving
declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself provides that such notice is
requiredin"anyaction"andnotjustactionsinvolvingdeclaratoryrelief.Wherethereis
noambiguityinthewordsusedintherule,thereisnoroomforconstruction.15Inall
actions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty, presidential decree, order, or
proclamation,noticetotheSolicitorGeneralismandatory.

Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are void for
violating the due process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private
property without just compensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its
powerofjudicialreview.

Jurisprudencehaslaiddownthefollowingrequisitesfortheexerciseofthispower:First,
theremustbebeforetheCourtanactualcasecallingfortheexerciseofjudicialreview.
Second,thequestionbeforetheCourtmustberipeforadjudication.Third,theperson
challengingthevalidityoftheactmusthavestandingtochallenge.Fourth,thequestion
of constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the
issueofconstitutionalitymustbetheverylismotaofthecase.

DUMLAOVS.COMELEC
[95SCRA392;G.R.No.L52245;22Jan1980]

Facts:

PetitionerDumlaoquestionstheconstitutionalityofSec.4ofBatasPambansaBlg52as
discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal official
whohasreceivedpaymentsofretirementbenefitsandshallhavebeen65yearsofage
atthecommencementofthetermofofficetowhichheseekstobeelected,shallnotbe
qualifiedtorunforthesameelectivelocalofficefromwhichhehasretired.According
toDumlao,theprovisionamountstoclasslegislation.PetitionersIgotandSalapantanJr.
alsoassailthevalidityofSec.4ofBatasPambansaBlg52,whichstatesthatanyperson
who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to
subversion,insurrection,rebellion,orothersimilarcrimes,shallnotbequalifiedforany
of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein:
providedthatajudgmentofconvictionofthosecrimesshallbeconclusiveevidenceof
suchfactandthefilingofchargesforthecommissionofsuchcrimesbeforeacivilcourt
17

P.J.G.

ormilitarytribunalafterpreliminaryinvestigationshallbeprimafacieevidenceofsuch
fact.

Issue:

Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and
thus,shouldbedeclarednullandvoid

Whetherornottherequisitesofjudicialreviewarecompliedwith

Held:

No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless there is
compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1) There must be an
actual case or controversy; 2) The question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party; 3) The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity;and4)Thedecisionoftheconstitutionalquestionmustbenecessarytothe
determinationofthecaseitself.

Asto(1), Dumlao hasnotbeenadverselyaffectedbytheapplication oftheprovision.


His question is posed merely in the abstract, and without the benefit of a detailed
factual record. As to (2), neither Igot nor Salapantan has been charged with acts of
loyaltytotheState,nordisqualifiedfrombeingcandidatesforlocalelectivepositions.
They have no personal nor substantial interest at stake. Igot and Salapantan have
institutethecaseasataxpayerssuit,buttheinstitutionofataxpayerssuitperseisno
assuranceofjudicialreview.Asto(4),thereisnocauseofactioninthisparticularcase.
Therefore,thenecessityforresolvingtheissueofconstitutionalityisabsent.

In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains


constitutionalandvalid.Theconstitutionalguaranteeofequalprotectionofthelawsis
subjecttorationalclassification.Oneclasscanbetreateddifferentlyfromanotherclass.
In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger
employees.The purposeof the provision is to satisfy the needfor new bloodin the
workplace.InregardstothesecondparagraphofSec.4,itshouldbedeclarednulland
voidforbeingviolativeoftheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocenceguaranteedtoan
accused.

LACSONVS.PEREZ
18

P.J.G.

[357SCRA756;G.R.No.147780;10May2001]

Facts:

PresidentMacapagalArroyodeclaredaStateofRebellion(ProclamationNo.38)onMay
1,2001aswell asGeneral Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and thePNPto suppressthe
rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of
the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction,
mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the issuance of temporary
restrainingorderand/orwritofpreliminaryinjunction.Petitionersassailthedeclaration
of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof.
Petitioners furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information
againstthemwerefiled,woulddesistarraignmentandtrialuntilthisinstantpetitionis
resolved.Theyalsocontendthattheyareallegedlyfacedwithimpendingwarrantless
arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against
them.

Issue:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and
holddepartureordersallegedlyeffectedbythesame.

Held:

President MacapagalArroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,


accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents
have declared that the Justice Department and the police authorities intend to obtain
regularwarrantsofarrestsfromthecourtsforallactscommittedpriortoanduntilMay
1,2001.UnderSection5,Rule113oftheRulesofCourt,authoritiesmayonlyresortto
warrantlessarrestsofpersonssuspectedofrebellioninsuppressingtherebellionifthe
circumstancessowarrant,thusthewarrantlessarrestsare not basedon Proc. No.38.
Petitioners prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an
individualwarrantlesslyarrestedhasadequateremediesinlaw:Rule112oftheRulesof
Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
providingfortheperiodinwhichawarrantlesslyarrestedpersonmustbedeliveredto
the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for such may be
penalizedforthedelayofthesame.Ifthedetentionshouldhavenolegalground,the
arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of
damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the
19

P.J.G.

validityofthesubjectholddepartureorders,norweretheyexpressinganyintentionto
leavethecountryinthenearfuture.Todeclaretheholddepartureordersnullandvoid
abinitiomustbemadeintheproperproceedingsinitiatedforthatpurpose.Petitioners
prayer for relief regarding their alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature
beingthatnocomplaintshavebeenfiledagainstthemforanycrime,furthermore,the
writ of habeas corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint
whichPetitionersarenotsubjectedto.

Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their undertaking


earlieradvertedto,togetherwiththeiragents,representatives,andallpersonsactingin
theirbehalf,areherebyenjoinedfromarrestingPetitionerswithouttherequiredjudicial
warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001
siegeofMalacaang.

SANLAKASVS.EXECUTIVESECRETARY
[421SCRA656;G.R.No.159085;3Feb2004]

Facts:

DuringtheweehoursofJuly27,2003,somethreehundredjuniorofficersandenlisted
men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and
unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they
complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for
thegovernment,demandingtheresignationofthePresident,SecretaryofDefenseand
thePNPChief.TheseactsconstituteaviolationofArticle134oftheRevisedPenalCode,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was
declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the
ProclamationandGeneralOrderswerelifted,andProclamationNo.435,declaringthe
CessationoftheStateofRebellionwasissued.

Intheinterim,however,thefollowingpetitionswerefiled:(1)SANLAKASANDPARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18
ArticleVIIoftheConstitutiondoesnotrequirethedeclarationofastateofrebellionto
call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS
Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamationisacircumventionofthereportrequirementunderthesameSection18,
Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours
20

P.J.G.

from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuancescannotbeconstruedasanexerciseofemergencypowersasCongresshasnot
delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
MacapagalArroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there
was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantlessarrests"forthecrimeofrebellion.

Issue:

WhetherorNotProclamationNo.427andGeneralOrderNo.4areconstitutional?

WhetherorNotthepetitionershavealegalstandingorlocusstanditobringsuit?

Held:

TheCourtrenderedthattheboththeProclamationNo.427andGeneralOrderNo.4are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its CommanderinChief Powers is conferred by
the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionarypowertocalloutthearmedforcesandtodeterminethenecessityforthe
exerciseofsuchpower.WhiletheCourtmayexaminewhetherthepowerwasexercised
withinconstitutionallimitsorinamannerconstitutinggraveabuseofdiscretion,none
of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
Presidentactedwithoutfactualbasis.Theissueofthecircumventionofthereportisof
nomeritastherewasnoindicationthatmilitarytribunalshavereplacedcivilcourtsor
that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of
usurpationofthelegislativepoweroftheCongressisofnomomentsincethePresident,
in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercisingaweddingofherChiefExecutiveandCommanderinChiefpowers.Theseare
purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposedtothedelegatedlegislativepowerscontemplatedbySection23(2),ArticleVI.
Thefearonwarrantlessarrestisunreasonable,sinceanypersonmaybesubjecttothis
whetherthereisrebellionornotasthisisacrimepunishableundertheRevisedPenal
Code,andaslongasavalidwarrantlessarrestispresent.

Legalstandingorlocusstandihasbeendefinedasapersonalandsubstantialinterestin
thecasesuchthatthepartyhassustainedorwillsustaindirectinjuryasaresultofthe
21

P.J.G.

governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assurethatconcreteadversenesswhichsharpensthepresentationofIssueuponwhich
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal
standingtosue.OnlypetitionersRep.Suplicoetal.andSen.Pimentel,asMembersof
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in
PhilippineConstitutionAssociationv.Enriquez, thattheextentthepowersofCongress
areimpaired,soisthepowerofeachmemberthereof,sincehisofficeconfersarightto
participateintheexerciseofthepowersofthatinstitution.

JOYAVS.PCGG
[225SCRA568;G.R.No.96541;24Aug1993]

Facts:

On9August1990,MateoA.T.Caparas,thenChairmanofPCGG,wrotethenPresident
Corazon C. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment
AgreementbetweentheRepublicofthePhilippinesthroughPCGGandChristie,Manson
and Woods International, Inc concerning the scheduled sale on 11 January 1991 of
eightytwo)OldMastersPaintingsandantiquesilverwareseizedfromMalacaangand
the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the illgotten wealth of the
late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August 1990, then President
Aquino,throughformerExecutiveSecretaryCatalinoMacaraig,Jr.,authorizedChairman
CaparastosigntheConsignmentAgreementallowingChristie'sofNewYorktoauction
off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. On 15
August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government of the
RepublicofthePhilippines,signedtheConsignmentAgreementwithChristie'sofNew
York. According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at public
auctiontheeightytwoOldMastersPaintingsthenfoundattheMetropolitanMuseum
ofManilaaswellasthesilverwarecontainedinseventyonecartonsinthecustodyof
the Central Bank of the Philippines, and such other property as may subsequently be
identified by PCGG and accepted by CHRISTIE'S to be subject to the provisions of the
agreement.

On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through then Chairman Eufemio C.


DomingosubmittedtoPresidentAquinotheauditfindingsandobservationsofCOAon
the Consignment Agreement of 15 August 1990 to the effect that: the authority of
22

P.J.G.

former PCGG Chairman Caparas to enter into the Consignment Agreement was of
doubtful legality; the contract was highly disadvantageous to the government; PCGG
hadapoortrackrecordinassetdisposalbyauctionintheU.S.;and,theassetssubject
ofauctionwerehistoricalrelicsandhadculturalsignificance,hence,theirdisposalwas
prohibitedbylaw.

Aftertheoralargumentsofthepartieson9January1991,weissuedimmediatelyour
resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled
saleoftheartworksonthegroundthatpetitionershadnotpresentedaclearlegalright
toarestrainingorderandthatproperpartieshadnotbeenimpleaded.

On 11 January 1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the
proceedsof$13,302,604.86wereturnedovertotheBureauofTreasury.

Issue:

Whetherornotpetitionershavelegalstanding.

WhetherornottheOldMastersPaintingsandantiquesilverwareareembracedinthe
phrase"culturaltreasureofthenation".

Whetherornotthepaintingsandsilverwarearepropertiesofpublicdominiononwhich
can be disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress.

Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other statutory
requirementsfortheexportationandsaleofthesubjectitems.

Whether or not the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the
aboveIssuewarrantresolutionfromthisCourt.

Held:

ThisispremisedonSec.2,Rule3,oftheRulesofCourtwhichprovidesthateveryaction
mustbeprosecutedanddefendedinthenameoftherealpartyininterest,andthatall
personshavinginterestinthesubjectoftheactionandinobtainingthereliefdemanded
shallbejoinedasplaintiffs.TheCourtwillexerciseitspowerofjudicialreviewonlyifthe
caseisbroughtbeforeitbyapartywhohasthelegalstandingtoraisetheconstitutional
orlegalquestion."Legalstanding"meansapersonalandsubstantialinterestinthecase
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
23

P.J.G.

governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an
interestinissueandtobeaffectedbythedecree,asdistinguishedfrommereinterestin
thequestioninvolved,oramereincidentalinterest.Moreover,theinterestoftheparty
plaintiffmustbepersonalandnotonebasedonadesiretovindicatetheconstitutional
rightofsomethirdandrelatedparty.

TherearecertaininstanceshoweverwhenthisCourthasallowedexceptionstotherule
on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the
Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act
authorizingthedisbursementofpublicfunds.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. The
ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the
members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and
appreciatethesepaintingswhentheywereplacedonexhibit.

TheconfiscationofthesepropertiesbytheAquinoadministrationhowevershouldnot
beunderstoodtomeanthattheownershipofthesepaintingshasautomaticallypassed
on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements
ofdueprocessandjustcompensation.Ifthesepropertieswerealreadyacquiredbythe
government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their
subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners
thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are
protectedbystatutesandtheConstitution.Havingfailedtoshowthattheyarethelegal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned,
petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged
unauthorizeddisposition.

Neithercanthispetitionbeallowedasataxpayer'ssuit.Obviously,petitionersarenot
challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they
allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the
paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with
publicmoney.
Anentthesecondrequisiteofactualcontroversy,petitionersarguethatthiscaseshould
beresolvedbythisCourtasanexceptiontotheruleonmootandacademiccases;that
although the sale of the paintings and silver has long been consummated and the
possibilityofretrievingthetreasuretroveisnil,yetthenoveltyandimportanceofthe
24

P.J.G.

Issue raised by the petition deserve this Court's attention. They submit that the
resolutionbytheCourtof the Issue in thiscase will establish future guiding principles
and doctrines on the preservation of the nation's priceless artistic and cultural
possessionsforthebenefitofthepublicasawhole.

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case of
controversyonewhichinvolvesaconflictoflegalrights,anassertionofoppositelegal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or
basedonextralegalorothersimilarconsiderationsnotcognizablebyacourtofjustice.
A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the
casebeforeus.Sincethepurposeofthispetitionforprohibitionistoenjoinrespondent
publicofficialsfromholdingtheauctionsaleoftheartworksonaparticulardate11
January1991whichislongpast,theIssueraisedinthepetitionhavebecomemoot
andacademic.

Theculturalpropertiesofthenationwhichshallbeundertheprotectionofthestateare
classified as the "important cultural properties" and the "national cultural treasures."
On the other hand, a "national cultural treasures" is a unique object found locally,
possessingoutstandinghistorical,cultural,artisticand/orscientificvaluewhichishighly
significant and important to this country and nation. This Court takes note of the
certification issued by the Director of the Museum that the Italian paintings and
silverware subject of this petition do not constitute protected cultural properties and
arenotamongthoselistedintheCulturalPropertiesRegisteroftheNationalMuseum.

WHEREFORE,forlackofmerit,thepetitionforprohibitionandmandamusisDISMISSED.

OPOSAVS.FACTORAN,JR.
[224SCRA792;G.R.No.101083;30Jul1993]

Facts:

Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI),adomestic,nonstockandnonprofitcorporationorganizedforthepurposeof,
inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment
andnaturalresources.TheoriginaldefendantwastheHonorableFulgencioS.Factoran,
Jr.,thenSecretaryoftheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources(DENR).His
25

P.J.G.

substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was
institutedasataxpayers'classsuitandallegesthattheplaintiffs"areallcitizensofthe
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoymentofthenaturalresourcetreasurethatisthecountry'svirgintropicalforests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the
preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
themallbeforetheCourt."

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him and, the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properlypertainstothelegislativeorexecutivebranchesofGovernment.Intheir12July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a
clearandunmistakablecauseofaction,themotionisdilatoryandtheactionpresentsa
justiciablequestionasitinvolvesthedefendant'sabuseofdiscretion.

On18July1991,respondentJudgeissuedanordergrantingtheaforementionedmotion
to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint
statesnocauseofactionagainsthimandthatitraisesapoliticalquestionsustained,the
respondentJudgefurtherruledthatthegrantingofthereliefprayedforwouldresultin
theimpairmentofcontractswhichisprohibitedbythefundamentallawoftheland.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
RevisedRulesofCourtandaskthisCourttorescindandsetasidethedismissalorderon
the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action.Again,theparentsoftheplaintiffsminorsnotonlyrepresenttheirchildren,but
havealsojoinedthelatterinthiscase.

Petitionerscontendthatthecomplaintclearlyandunmistakablystatesacauseofaction
asitcontainssufficientallegationsconcerningtheirrighttoasoundenvironmentbased
on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive
Order(E.O.)No.192creatingtheDENR,Section3ofPresidentialDecree(P.D.)No.1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizingtherightofthepeopletoabalancedandhealthfulecology,theconceptof
generationalgenocideinCriminalLawandtheconceptofman'sinalienablerighttoself
preservationandselfperpetuationembodiedinnaturallaw.Petitionerslikewiserelyon
therespondent'scorrelativeobligationperSection4ofE.O.No.192,tosafeguardthe
people'srighttoahealthfulenvironment.

26

P.J.G.

ItisfurtherclaimedthattheissueoftherespondentSecretary'sallegedgraveabuseof
discretioningrantingTimberLicenseAgreements(TLAs)tocovermoreareasforlogging
thanwhatisavailableinvolvesajudicialquestion.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment


clause,petitionersmaintainthatthesamedoesnotapplyinthiscasebecauseTLAsare
not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by
thesaid clause,it is well settled thatthey may still be revoked by the State whenthe
publicinterestsorequires.

Issue:

Whetherornotthepetitionershavelocusstandi.

Whetherornotthepetitonisinaformofaclasssuit.

WhetherornottheTLAscanbeoutrightlycancelled.

Whetherornotthepetitionshouldbedismissed.

Held:

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains
effective for a certain period of time usually for twentyfive (25) years. During its
effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or
other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the
requirementsofdueprocess.

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. The plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to
ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incidenttotheformer.
27

P.J.G.

Petitionersminorsassertthattheyrepresenttheirgenerationaswellasgenerationsyet
unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Everygenerationhasaresponsibilitytothenexttopreservethatrhythmand
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. The minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generationstocome.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution.

WhiletherighttoabalancedandhealthfulecologyistobefoundundertheDeclaration
ofPrinciplesandStatePoliciesandnotundertheBillofRights,itdoesnotfollowthatit
islessimportantthananyofthecivilandpoliticalrightsenumeratedinthelatter.Sucha
rightbelongstoadifferentcategoryofrightsaltogetherforitconcernsnothinglessthan
selfpreservationandselfperpetuationaptlyandfittinglystressedbythepetitioners
the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitutionfortheyareassumedtoexistfromtheinceptionofhumankind.Iftheyare
nowexplicitlymentionedinthefundamentalcharter,itisbecauseofthewellfounded
fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far
when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaininglife.

Conformablywiththeenunciatedrighttoabalancedandhealthfulecologyandtheright
to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, then
President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of
whichexpresslymandatesthattheDepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
28

P.J.G.

resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in
reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensingandregulationofallnaturalresourcesasmaybeprovidedforbylawinorder
to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statementofpolicy:

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same
Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it
makesparticularreferenceto thefactoftheagency's being subjecttolawandhigher
authority.

Itmay,however,berecalledthatevenbeforetheratificationofthe1987Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the
presentandfuturegenerations.On6June1977,P.D.No.1151andP.D.No.1152were
issued.Thus,therightofthepetitionerstoabalancedandhealthfulecologyisasclear
astheDENR'sdutyunderitsmandateandbyvirtueofitspowersandfunctionsunder
E.O.No.192andtheAdministrativeCodeof1987toprotectandadvancethesaidright.

Adenialorviolationofthatrightbytheotherwhohasthecorrelativedutyorobligation
torespectorprotectthesamegivesrisetoacauseofaction.Petitionersmaintainthat
the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereofrequiresthatnofurtherTLAsshouldberenewedorgranted.

Itissettledinthisjurisdictionthatinamotiontodismissbasedonthegroundthatthe
complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question submitted to the court for
resolutioninvolvesthesufficiencyofthefactsallegedinthecomplaintitself.Noother
mattershouldbeconsidered;furthermore,thetruthoffalsityofthesaidallegationsis
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy
formulationordeterminationbytheexecutiveorlegislativebranchesofGovernmentis
notsquarelyputinissue.Whatisprincipallyinvolvedistheenforcementofarightvisa
vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable
obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executiveandlegislativeactionsfromjudicialinquiryorreview.

29

P.J.G.

Inthesecondplace,evenifitistobeassumedthatthesamearecontracts,theinstant
casedoesnotinvolvealaworevenanexecutiveissuancedeclaringthecancellationor
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the nonimpairment clause cannot as
yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violationofthenonimpairmentclause.Thisisbecausebyitsverynatureandpurpose,
suchaslawcouldhaveonlybeenpassedintheexerciseofthepolicepowerofthestate
for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology,promotingtheirhealthandenhancingthegeneralwelfare.

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause
could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from
receiving,accepting,processing,renewingorapprovingnewtimberlicensesfor,savein
cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances.
Moreover,withrespecttorenewal,theholderisnotentitledtoitasamatterofright.

Petitionishereby GRANTED,andthechallenged Orderof respondentJudgeof18July


1991dismissingCivilCaseNo.90777isherebysetaside.Thepetitionersmaytherefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questionedtimberlicenseagreements.

AGANJR.VS.PIATCO
[402SCRA612;G.R.No.155001;5May2003]

Facts:

Sometimein1993,sixbusinessleaders,exploredthepossibilityofinvestinginthenew
NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted
proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and
amongtheproposalPeoplesAirCargo(Paircargo)waschosen.AEDCprotestedalleging
thatpreferencewasgiventoPaircargo,butstilltheprojectwasawardedtoPaircargo.
Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The
DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement in 1997 to franchise and
operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in the matters of
pertainingtothedefinitionoftheobligationsgiventotheconcessionaire,development
offacilitiesandproceeds,feesandcharges,andtheterminationofcontract.SinceMIAA
is charged with the maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a
30

P.J.G.

contract with several service providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition
claiming that they would lose their job, and the service providers joined them, filed a
motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the MIAA filed a petition
assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen filed similar petitions.
Pres.ArroyodeclaredinherspeechthatshewillnothonorPIATCOcontractswhichthe
Exec.Branch'slegalofficeconcludednullandvoid.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthe1997concessionagreementisvoid,togetherwithitsamendments
forbeingcontrarytotheconstitution.

Held:

The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The
amendmentshavetheeffectofchangingitintoandentirelydifferentagreementfrom
the contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms and conditions which
provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and
financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms were available.
The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements thereto are set
asideforbeingnullandvoid.

Thepetitionershavelocalstandi.Theyareprejudicedbytheconcessionagreementas
theirlivelihoodistobetakenawayfromthem.

UMALIVS.GUINGONA
[305SCRA533;G.R.No.131124;21Mar1999]

Facts:

Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of
InternalRevenuebyPresFidelV.Ramos.HeassignedhiminManila,November29,1993
toMarch15,1994andMakati,March16,1994toAugust4,1994.OnAugust1,1994,
PresidentRamosreceivedaconfidentialmemorandumagainstthepetitionerforalleged
violations of internal revenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency as
Regional Director, more particularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance. upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former President
authorizedtheissuanceofanOrderforthepreventivesuspensionofthepetitionerand
31

P.J.G.

immediatelyreferredtheComplaintagainstthelattertothePresidentialCommissionon
AntiGraft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of
the charges against him. And was directed him to send in his answer, copies of his
StatementofAssets,andLiabilitiesforthepastthreeyears(3),andPersonalDataSheet.
InitialhearingwassetonAugust25,1994,at2:00p.m.,atthePCAGCOffice.OnAugust
23,thepetitionerfiledhisrequiredanswer.Afterevaluatingtheevidenceonrecord,the
PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima facie evidence to
supportsix(6)ofthetwelve(12)chargesagainstpetitioner.OnOctober6,1994,acting
uponthe recommendation ofthe PCAGC, then President Ramos issued Administrative
OrderNo.152dismissingpetitionerfromtheservice,withforfeitureofretirementand
allbenefitsunderthelaw.

Issue:

WhetherorNotAONo.152violatedpetitioner'sRighttoSecurityofTenure.

WhetherorNotPetitionerwasdenieddueprocessoflaw

WhetherorNotthePCAGCisavalidlyConstitutedgovernmentagencyandwhetherthe
petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for
reconsiderationofthetrialcourtsdecision.

Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against the
petitionerisstillbasisforthepetitioner'sdismissalwithforfeitureofbenefitsasruledin
AONo.152

Held:

Petitionermaintainsthatasacareerexecutiveserviceofficer,hecanonlyberemoved
forcauseandundertheAdministrativeCodeof1987,6lossofconfidenceisnotoneof
thelegalcausesorgroundsforremoval.Consequently,hisdismissalfromofficeonthe
groundoflossconfidenceviolatedhisrighttosecurityoftenure,petitionertheorized.
After a careful study, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals
ruledcorrectlyonthefirstthreeIssue.Tobesure,petitionerwasnotdeniedtherightto
due process before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer and
other pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internal revenue laws and
regulations, and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It is thus
decisivelyclearthathisprotestationofnonobservanceofdueprocessisdevoidofany
factualorlegalbasis.Neithercanitbesaidthattherewasaviolationofwhatpetitioner
32

P.J.G.

asserts as his security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of


BureauofInternalRevenue,heisCESOeligibleentitledtosecurityoftenure.However,
petitioner'sclaimofCESOeligibilityisanemicofevidentiarysupport.Itwasincumbent
upon him to prove that he is a CESO eligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce
sufficient evidence on the matter. His failure to do so is fatal. As regards the issue of
constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too late to
raiseforthefirsttimeatsuchlatestageoftheproceedings.Astolastissue,Itisworthy
to note that in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the
petitionerwastakenpriortotheinstitutionofthecriminalcase.Thechargesincludedin
AdministrativeOrderNo.152werebasedontheresultsofinvestigationconductedby
thePCAGCandnotonthecriminalchargesbeforetheOmbudsman.Insum,thepetition
isdismissableonthegroundthattheIssuepositedbythepetitionerdonotconstitutea
valid legal basis for overturning the finding and conclusion arrived at by the Court of
Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent facts and circumstances
aforementioned,theCourt,intheexerciseofitsequitypowers,hasdecidedtoconsider
thedismissalofthechargesagainstpetitionerbeforetheOmbudsman,thesuccinctand
unmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
thathisofficeisnolongerinterestedinpursuingthecase,andthepositiontakenbythe
Solicitor General, that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as
effectiveandsubstantivesuperveningeventsthatcannotbeoverlooked.

INRECUNANAN
[94Phil534;Resolution;18Mar1954]

Facts:

CongresspassedRepublicActNumber972,commonlyknownastheBarFlunkersAct
of1953.Inaccordancewiththesaidlaw,theSupremeCourtthenpassedandadmitted
tothebarthosecandidateswhohadobtainedanaverageof72percentbyraisingitto
75percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admissiontothebarinvokingitsprovisions,whileothermotionsfortherevisionoftheir
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
groundforadmission.Therearealsootherswhohavesoughtsimplythereconsideration
of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to
33

P.J.G.

individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespectiveofwhetherornottheyhadinvokedRepublicActNo.972.

Issue:

WhetherorNotRANo.972isconstitutionalandvalid.

Held:

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarmentandreinstatementofattorneysatlawinthepracticeoftheprofessionand
theirsupervisionhavebeenindisputablyajudicialfunctionandresponsibility.Wehave
said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
professionisconcededlyjudicial.

Onthismatter,thereiscertainlyacleardistinctionbetweenthefunctionsofthejudicial
andlegislativedepartmentsofthegovernment.

Itisobvious,therefore,thattheultimatepowertograntlicenseforthepracticeoflaw
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum
conditionsforthelicense.

RepublicActNumber972isheldtobeunconstitutional.

REPUBLICACT6735,INITIATIVEANDREFERENDUMACT

R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendmentstotheConstitution.TheActisaconsolidationofHouseBillNo.21505and
SenateBillNo.17.TheformerwaspreparedbythecommitteeonSuffrageandElectoral
ReformsofRepresentativesonthebasisoftwoHouseBillsreferredtoit,viz.,(a)House
BillNo.497,whichdealtwiththeinitiativeandreferendummentionedinSections1and
32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the
34

P.J.G.

subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under
Section3ofArticleXVIIoftheConstitution.SenateBillNo.17solely,dealtwithinitiative
and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505intoadraftbill,whichwassubsequentlyapprovedon8June1989bytheSenate
andbytheHouseofRepresentatives.ThisapprovedbillisnowR.A.No.6735.

35

P.J.G.

THEFUNDAMENTALPOWERSOF
THESTATE

THEPOLICEPOWER

AGUSTINVS.EDU
[88SCRA195;G.R.No.L49112;2Feb1979]

Facts:

PresidentMarcosissuedtheLetterofInstructionNo.229whichstatesthatallowners,
usersor driversshall haveatall times onepair of early warning devise (EWD) in their
carsacquirefromanysourcedependingontheownerschoice.TheLetterofInstruction
wasassailedbypetitionerLeovilloAgustintohaveviolatedtheconstitutionguarantee
of due process against Hon Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon. Juan Ponce
Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon. Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister of Public Highways.
Becauseofsuchcontentions,theImplementingRulesandRegulationwasorderedtobe
suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not necessary
becausevehiclesalreadyhavehazardlights(blinkinglights)thatcanbeuseasawarning
device. Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the delegation of
police power because it is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for the
motorists and those dealers of EWD will become instant millionaires because of such
law.

Issue:

WhetherornotPetitionerscontentionspossessmerit.

Held:

Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may
interferewithpersonallibertyorpropertytoensureandpromotethesafety,healthand
prosperity of the State. Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public
safety and it is indeed a rare occurrence that such contention was alleged in a
instruction with such noble purpose. Petitioner also failed to present the factual
foundationthatisnecessarytoinvalidatethesaidletterofinstruction.Incaseswhere
36

P.J.G.

thereisabsenceinthefactualfoundation,itshouldbepresumedthatconstitutionality
shallprevail.Pres.Marcosontheotherhandpossessesvitalstatisticsthatwilljustifythe
need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vienna
ConventionsonRoadSignsandSignals,ourcountrymustabidewiththestandardsgiven
as stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the
ViennaConventionalsorequirestheuseofEWD.Vehicleownersarenotobligedtobuy
an EDW. They can personally create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the
specificationsprovidedbylaw.PetitionersallegationagainstthemanufacturersofEDW
beingmillionairesisdeemedtobeanunfoundedspeculation.Wherefore,thepetitionis
dismissed. The restraining order regarding the implementation of the Reflector Law is
liftedmakingthesaidlawimmediatelyexecutory.

ICHONGVS.HERNANDEZ
[101Phil1117;G.R.No.L7995;31May1957]

Facts:

RepublicAct1180orcommonlyknownasAnActtoRegulatetheRetailBusinesswas
passed.Thesaidlawprovidesforaprohibitionagainstforeignersaswellascorporations
ownedbyforeignersfromengagingfromretailtradeinourcountry.Thiswasprotested
bythepetitionerinthiscase.Accordingtohim,thesaidlawviolatestheinternational
andtreaty ofthePhilippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, theTreatyof
AmitybetweenthePhilippinesandChinawasviolatedaccordingtohim.

Issue:

WhetherorNotRepublicAct1180isavalidexerciseofpolicepower.

Held:

According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then
providedthatpolicepowercannotbebargainedawaythroughthemediumofatreaty
oracontract.TheCourtalsoprovidedthatRA1180wasenactedtoremedyarealand
actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or
37

P.J.G.

amendmentbyasubsequentlawandthesamemaynevercurtainorrestrictthescope
ofthepolicepowerofthestate.

LUTZVS.ARANETA
[98Phil148;G.R.No.L7859;22Dec1955]

Facts:

Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme
Ledesma,seekstorecoverfromJ.AntonioAraneta,theCollectorofInternalRevenue,
thesum ofmoneypaid bythe estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar AdjustmentAct.
UnderSection3ofsaidAct,taxesareleviedontheownersorpersonsincontrolofthe
lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the
collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar industry
exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of public concern hence
making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of First
Instancedismissedhispetition,thusthisappealbeforetheSupremeCourt.

Issue:

Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act
567)isunconstitutional.

Held:

ThetaxleviedundertheSugarAdjustmentActisconstitutional.ThetaxundersaidActis
levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilizationofthethreatenedsugarindustry.Sincesugarproductionisoneofthegreat
industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore
redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public
concernandisthereforeconstitutional. Itfollowsthatthe Legislaturemaydetermine
within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its
promotion.Ifobjectivesandmethodsarealikeconstitutionallyvalid,noreasonisseen
why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxationmaybemadewiththeimplementofthestatespolicepower.Inaddition,itis
38

P.J.G.

only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it.
Therefore,thetaxleviedundertheSugarAdjustmentActisheldtobeconstitutional.

TIOVS.VIDEOGRAMREGULATORYBOARD
[151SCRA208;G.R.No.L75697;18Jun1987]

Facts:

The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely


affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board"withbroadpowerstoregulateandsupervisethevideogramindustry.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the
NationalInternalRevenueCodeprovidedthat:

"SEC.134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed


videotapecassette,readyforplayback,regardlessoflength,anannualtax
offivepesos;Provided,Thatlocallymanufacturedorimportedblankvideo
tapesshallbesubjecttosalestax."

"Section10.Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.


Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall
collectataxofthirtypercent(30%)ofthepurchasepriceorrentalrate,as
the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram
containingareproductionofanymotionpictureoraudiovisualprogram.

Fiftypercent(50%)oftheproceedsofthetaxcollectedshallaccruetothe
province,andtheotherfiftypercent(50%)shallaccruetothemunicipality
wherethetaxiscollected;PROVIDED,ThatinMetropolitanManila,thetax
shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
ManilaCommission.

The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any
technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
moviehousesandtheaters.Suchunregulatedcirculationhavecausedasharpdeclinein
theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the
39

P.J.G.

collectionofsales,contractor'sspecific,amusementandothertaxes,therebyresulting
insubstantiallossesestimatedatP450Millionannuallyingovernmentrevenues.

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from
rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been
subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in
taxeseachyear.

Theunregulatedactivitiesofvideogramestablishmentshavealsoaffectedtheviability
ofthemovieindustry.

Issue:

WhetherornottaximposedbytheDECREEisavalidexerciseofpolicepower.

WhetherornortheDECREEisconstitutional.

Held:

Taxationhasbeenmadetheimplementofthestate'spolicepower.Thelevyofthe30%
taxisforapublicpurpose.Itwasimposedprimarilytoanswertheneedforregulating
thevideoindustry,particularlybecauseoftherampantfilmpiracy,theflagrantviolation
of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And
while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax
remainsavalidimposition.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing


Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying
objectiveoftheDECREEistoprotectthemoribundmovieindustry,thereisnoquestion
that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition
posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
broughtaboutbytheavailabilityofunclassifiedandunreviewedvideotapescontaining
pornographicfilmsandfilmswithbrutallyviolentsequences;andlossesingovernment
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the
activitiesofvideoestablishmentsarevirtuallyuntaxedsincemerepaymentofMayor's
permitandmunicipallicensefeesarerequiredtoengageinbusiness."

WHEREFORE,theinstantPetitionisherebydismissed.Nocosts.

40

P.J.G.

ASSO.OFSMALLLANDOWNERSVS.SEC.OFDAR
[175SCRA343;G.R.NO.L78742;14JUL1989]

Facts:

Severalpetitionsaretherootofthecase:

a. ApetitionallegingtheconstitutionalityofPDNo.27,EO228and229andRA
6657.Subjectsofthepetitionarea9hectareand5hectareRicelandworked
by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified
farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino
usurpedthelegislaturespower.
b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros
Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the
creationofAgrarianReformFundwithinitialfundofP50Billion.
c. ApetitionbyownersoflandwhichwasplacedbytheDARunderthecoverage
ofOperationLandTransfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and
cornlandsnotexceedingsevenhectares.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheaforementionedEOs,PD,andRAwereconstitutional.

Held:

The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power


andeminentdomain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorizedunderSec.6oftheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1987Constitution.Therefore
itisavalidexerciseofPolicePowerandEminentDomain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes
necessarytodepriveownersofwhateverlandstheymayowninexcessofthemaximum
areaallowed,thereisdefinitelyatakingunderthepowerofeminentdomainforwhich
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitationoftheuseoftheland.Whatisrequiredisthesurrenderofthetitleandthe
41

P.J.G.

physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favourofthefarmer.

Astatutemaybesustainedunderthepolicepoweronlyifthereisconcurrenceofthe
lawfulsubjectandthemethod.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be
determinedisthemethodemployedtoachieveit.

LOZANOVS.MARTINEZ
[146SCRA323;G.R.No.L63419;18Dec1986]

Facts:

A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was
made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional.
Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the
Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for
theaccusedtoelevatetotheSupremeCourttheordersdenyingtheirmotionstoquash.
However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower
court'sdenialofamotiontoquash.

Issue:

WhetherornotBP22isconstitutionalasitisaproperexerciseofpolicepowerofthe
State.

Held:

TheenactmentofBP22avalidexerciseofthepolicepowerandisnotrepugnanttothe
constitutionalinhibitionagainstimprisonmentfordebt.

TheoffensepunishedbyBP22istheactofmakingandissuingaworthlesscheckora
checkthatisdishonoreduponitspresentationforpayment.Itisnotthenonpayment
ofanobligationwhichthelawpunishes.Thelawisnotintendedordesignedtocoercea
debtortopayhisdebt.

42

P.J.G.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be
consideredbysocietyasinherentlywrong,hence,notmaluminsebutbecauseofthe
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as
malumprohibitum.Thestatecandothisintheexerciseofitspolicepower.

KWONGSINGVS.CITYOFMANILA
[41Phil103;G.R.No.15972;11Oct1920]

Facts:

Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and
the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also
questionedthevalidityofenforcingOrdinanceNo.532bythecityofManila.Ordinance
No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showingthekindandnumberofarticlesdeliveredbylaundriesanddyeingandcleaning
establishments.Thepermanentinjunctionwasdeniedbythetrialcourt.Theappellants
claimisthatOrdinanceNo.532savorsofclasslegislation;puttinginmindthattheyare
Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances;
and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest
thattheenforcementofthelegislationisanactbeyondthescopeoftheirpolicepower.
Inviewoftheforegoing,thisisanappealwiththeSupremeCourt.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheenforcementofOrdinanceno,532isanactbeyondthescopeof
policepower

WhetherorNottheenforcementofthesameisaclasslegislationthatinfringes
propertyrights.

Held:

Reasonablerestraintsofalawfulbusinessforsuchpurposesarepermissibleunderthe
police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is
basedonSection2444,paragraphs(l)and(ee)oftheAdministrativeCode,asamended
43

P.J.G.

byActNo.2744,authorizesthemunicipalboardofthecityofManila,withtheapproval
ofthemayorofthecity:

(l)Toregulateandfixtheamountofthelicensefeesforthefollowing:xxxx
xxxxxlaundriesxxxx.

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitationandsafety,thefurtheranceoftheprosperity,andthepromotion
of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general
welfareofthecityanditsinhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes
betweenlaundrymenandtheirpatronsandtoprotectcustomersoflaundrieswhoare
notabletodecipherChinesecharactersfrombeingdefrauded.(Consideringthatinthe
year1920s,peopleofManilaaremorefamiliarwithSpanishandmaybeEnglish.)

Inwhethertheordinanceisclasslegislation,thecourtheldthattheordinanceinvades
no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police
regulation,anattemptisnotmadetoviolatepersonalpropertyrights.Theordinanceis
neitherdiscriminatorynorunreasonableinitsoperation.Itappliestoallpubliclaundries
withoutdistinction,whethertheybelongtoAmericans,Filipinos,Chinese,oranyother
nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction,
mustcomplywiththeordinance.Theobviousobjectionfortheimplementationofthe
ordinanceisbasedinsec2444(ee)oftheAdministrativeCode.Although,anadditional
burdenwillbeimposedonthebusinessandoccupationaffectedbytheordinancesuch
asthatoftheappellantbylearningevenafewwordsinSpanishorEnglish,butmostly
Arabicnumbersinordertoproperlyissueareceipt,itseemsthatthesameburdensare
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to
restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the
ordinance,thisisnotsufficientgroundforfailingtoupholdthepowerofthelegislative
body.Theveryfoundationofthepolicepoweristhecontrolofprivateinterestsforthe
publicwelfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminaryinjunctionisdenied,withcostsagainsttheappellants.

44

P.J.G.

TABLARINVS.GUTIERREZ
[152SCRA730;G.R.No.78164;31July1987]

Facts:

The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from
enforcingSection5(a)and(f)ofRepublicActNo.2382,asamended,andMECSOrder
No.52,seriesof1985,dated23August1985andfromrequiringthetakingandpassing
of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceedingwithacceptingapplicationsfortakingtheNMATandfromadministeringthe
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denied said
petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously
scheduled.

Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the
"MedicalActof1959"definesitsbasicobjectivesinthefollowingmanner:

"SECTION1.Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the
standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination
forregistrationofphysicians;and(c)thesupervision,controlandregulation
ofthepracticeofmedicineinthePhilippines."

Thestatute,amongotherthings,createdaBoardofMedicalEducation.Itsfunctionsas
specifiedinSection5ofthestatuteincludethefollowing:

"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a


recognizedcollegeofmedicine;
xxx
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical
school and keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect
from said applicants the amount of twentyfive pesos each which shall
accruetotheoperatingfundoftheBoardofMedicalEducation;

Section7prescribescertainminimumrequirementsforapplicantstomedicalschools:

45

P.J.G.

"Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student


whohasnotbeenconvictedbyanycourtofcompetentjurisdictionofany
offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a record of
completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of
eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical
Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professorsinthecollegeofliberalarts;and(d)birthcertificate.Nothingin
this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from
establishing,inadditiontothepreceding,otherentrancerequirementsthat
maybedeemedadmissible.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports and dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
NationalMedicalAdmissionTest(NMAT)asanadditionalrequirementforissuanceofa
certificateofeligibilityforadmissionintomedicalschoolsofthePhilippines,beginning
withtheschoolyear19861987.ThisOrdergoesontostatethat:"2.
The NMAT,
an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the
quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful
applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the
BoardofMedicalEducationafterconsultationwiththeAssociationofPhilippineMedical
Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission
requirementsaspresentlycalledfor underexistingrules,shallserveasabasisforthe
issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical
colleges.

Issue:

WhetherornotSection5(a)and(f)ofRepublicActNo.2382,asamended,andMECS
OrderNo.52,s.1985areconstitutional.

Held:

46

P.J.G.

Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constituteanunconstitutionalimposition.

Thepolicepower,itiscommonplacelearning,isthepervasiveandnonwaivablepower
and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and
needs in a word, the public order of the general community. An important
componentofthatpublicorderisthehealthandphysicalsafetyandwellbeingofthe
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of
governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only issue that needs some
considerationiswhetherthereissomereasonablerelationbetweentheprescribingof
passingtheNMATasaconditionforadmissiontomedicalschoolontheonehand,and
thesecuringofthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralcommunity,ontheotherhand.This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable
methodofprotectingthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools,byupgradingthequalityofthoseadmittedtothestudentbodyofthemedical
schools. Thatupgradingissought by selectivity in the process ofadmission,selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the
required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice.
The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our
professionalschoolsingeneral,andmedicalschoolsinparticular,inthecurrentstageof
our social and economic development, are widely known. We believe that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achievingitsstatedobjectiveof"upgradingtheselectionofapplicantsinto[our]medical
schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country. We are
entitledtoholdthattheNMATisreasonablyrelatedtothesecuringoftheultimateend
oflegislationandregulationinthisarea.Thatend,itisusefultorecall,istheprotection
ofthepublicfromthepotentiallydeadlyeffectsofincompetenceandignoranceinthose
whowouldundertaketotreatourbodiesandmindsfordiseaseortrauma.

WHEREFORE,thePetitionforCertiorariisDISMISSEDandtheOrderoftherespondent
trialcourt denyingthe petitionfor a writof preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs
againstpetitioners.

47

P.J.G.

CITYGOVERNMENTOFQUEZONCITYVS.ERICTA
[122SCRA759;G.R.No.L34915;24Jun1983]

Facts:

Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The


Establishment, Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or
Burial Ground Within The Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The
ViolationThereof"provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park
cemeteryshallbesetasideforcharityburialofdeceasedpersonswhoare
paupersandhavebeenresidentsofQuezonCityforatleast5yearspriorto
their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for
operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the
application.

Forseveralyears,theaforequotedsectionoftheOrdinancewasnotenforcedbutseven
yearsaftertheenactmentoftheordinance,theQuezonCityCouncilpassedaresolution
torequesttheCityEngineer,QuezonCity,tostopanyfurthersellingand/ortransaction
ofmemorialpark lotsinQuezon City where the owners thereof have failedtodonate
therequired6%spaceintendedforpaupersburial.

The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing
thatSection9oftheordinancewouldbeenforced.

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief,


prohibitionandmandamuswithpreliminaryinjunctionseekingtoannulSection9ofthe
Ordinance in question. Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised
AdministrativeCode.

Issue:

Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police


power.

48

P.J.G.

Held:

Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power.
Section 9 cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
license fee, and regulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be
establishedorpracticedintheCity.

Billofrightsstatesthat'nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,libertyorpropertywithout
dueprocessoflaw'(Art.Ill,Section1subparagraph1,Constitution).Ontheotherhand,
therearethreeinherentpowersofgovernmentbywhichthestateinterfereswiththe
propertyrights,namely.(1)policepower,(2)eminentdomain,(3)taxation.

ThepolicepowerofQuezonCityisdefinedinsubsection00,Sec.12,Rep.Act537that
readsasfollows:

Tomakesuchfurtherordinanceandregulationsnotrepugnanttolawas
maybenecessarytocarryintoeffectanddischargethepowersandduties
conferred by this act and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, , and for the protection of property
therein;andenforceobediencetheretowithsuchlawfulfinesorpenalties
astheCityCouncilmayprescribeundertheprovisionsofsubsection(jj)of
thissection.

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate
doesnotincludethepowertoconfiscate.Theordinanceinquestionnotonlyconfiscates
butalsoprohibitstheoperationofamemorialparkcemetery,becauseunderSection13
of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a
privatecemeteryshallberevokedorcancelled.Theconfiscatoryclauseandthepenal
provisionineffectdeteronefromoperatingamemorialparkcemetery.

Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually
exertedinordertomerelyregulatetheuseandenjoymentofpropertyoftheowner.If
heisdeprivedofhispropertyoutright,itisnottakenforpublicusebutrathertodestroy
inordertopromotethegeneralwelfare.

49

P.J.G.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon
Cityisnotamerepoliceregulationbutanoutrightconfiscation.Itdeprivesapersonof
hisprivatepropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,nay,evenwithoutcompensation.

MMDAVs.BelAirVillage
[328SCRA836;G.R.No.135962;27Mar2000]

Facts:

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a


GovernmentAgencytaskedwiththedeliveryofbasicservicesinMetroManila.BelAir
Village Association (BAVA), respondent herein, received a letter of request from the
petitionertoopenNeptuneStreetofBelAirVillagefortheuseofthepublic.Thesaid
opening of Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons
and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to MMDA law or
Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was appraised that the
perimeterwallseparatingthesubdivisionandKalayaanAvenuewouldbedemolished.

Therespondent,tostoptheopeningofthesaidstreetanddemolitionofthewall,fileda
preliminaryinjunctionandatemporaryrestrainingorder.Respondentclaimedthatthe
MMDA had no authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the
Respondent.Petitionerappealedthedecisionofthelowercourtsandclaimedthatithas
theauthoritytoopenNeptuneStreettopublictrafficbecauseitisanagentoftheState
thatcanpracticepolicepowerinthedeliveryofbasicservicesinMetroManila.

Issue:

Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuanttoitsregulatoryandpolicepowers.

Held:

The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power.
PolicepowerisprimarilylodgedintheNationalLegislature.However,policepowermay
bedelegatedtogovernmentunits.Petitionerhereinisadevelopmentauthorityandnot
a political government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
becauseitcannotbedelegatedtothem.Itisnotalegislativeunitofthegovernment.
50

P.J.G.

Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact ordinances, approve
resolutionsandappropriatefundsforthegeneralwelfareoftheinhabitantsofManila.
ThereisnosyllableinthesaidactthatgrantsMMDApolicepower.

It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with
various national government agencies, peoples organizations, nongovernmental
organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic
servicesinthevastmetropolitanarea.

TATELVS.MUNICIPALITYOFVIRAC
[207SCRA157;G.R.No.40243;11Mar1992]

Facts:

PetitionerCelestinoTatelownsawarehouseinbarrioSta.Elena,MunicipalityofVirac.
Complaintswerereceivedbythemunicipalityconcerningthedisturbancecausedbythe
operationoftheabacabailingmachineinsidepetitionerswarehouse.Acommitteewas
then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the
matterthatanaccidentalfirewithinthewarehouseofthepetitionercreatedadanger
to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was
then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance
within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent
municipalofficials,petitionerswarehousewasconstructedinviolationofOrdinanceNo.
13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses
either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200
metersfromsaidblockofhousestoavoidlossoflivesandpropertiesbyaccidentalfire.
Ontheotherhand,petitionercontendsthatOrdinanceNo.13isunconstitutional.

Issue:

WhetherornotpetitionerswarehouseisanuisancewithinthemeaningArticle694of
theCivilCode

Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutionalandvoid.

Held:
51

P.J.G.

The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the
provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was
passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid
becauseitmeetsthecriteriaforavalidmunicipalordinance:1)mustnotcontravenethe
Constitutionoranystatute,2)mustnotbeunfairoroppressive,3)mustnotbepartial
ordiscriminatory,4)mustnotprohibitbutmayregulatetrade,5)mustbegeneraland
consistentwithpublicpolicy,and6)mustnotbeunreasonable.Thepurposeofthesaid
ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the
primordialobligationofgovernment.Thelowercourtdidnoterrinitsdecision.

52

P.J.G.

THEPOWEROFEMINENTDOMAIN

REPUBLICVS.TAGLE
[299SCRA549;G.R.No.129079;2Dec1998]

Facts:

PrivaterespondentHelenaZ.Benitezistheregisteredowneroftwo(2)parcelsofland
locatedinBarangaySalawag,Dasmarias,Cavitecontaininganareaof483,331square
metersmoreorless.

The Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development


Center(PHRDC),negotiatedwiththeJapaneseInternationalCooperationAgency(JICA)
SurveyTeamonthetechnicalitiesoftheestablishmentoftheASEANHumanResources
Development Project in the Philippines. Among the five (5) main programs of the
proposed project was Program III (Construction Manpower Development) which
involvedtheestablishmentofaConstructionManpowerDevelopmentCenter(CMDC).
PHRDCandprivaterespondentHelenaZ.Benitez,signedaMemorandumofAgreement
which provides, among others, that Benitez undertakes to lease within the period of
twenty (20) years and/or sell a portion of that property (which is no less than ten
hectares) in favor of PHRDC which likewise agrees to lease within a period of twenty
(20)yearsand/orbuysaidpropertysite.

The Philippine Womens University (PWU) and Benitez granted a permit to PHRDC to
occupyandusethelandinquestionandtoundertakelanddevelopment,electricaland
road network installations and other related works necessary to attain its objectives.
Pursuantthereto,theCMDCtookpossessionofthepropertyanderectedbuildingsand
otherrelatedfacilitiesnecessaryforitsoperations.Adepositmadebytheplaintiffwith
thePhilippineNationalBank(PNB)intheamountofP708,490.00whichisequivalentto
theassessedvalueofthepropertysubjectmatterhereofbasedondefendants1990tax
declaration,wasmade.

Inviewoftheagreementonthesaleofthelandinquestion,PHRDCpreparedaDeedof
Absolute Sale with Benitez, as vendor, and PHRDC and CMDC, as vendees, duly
represented by then Undersecretary Gloria M. Arroyo, for the signature of Benitez.
Benitezinherowncapacitydidnotsignthedeedofabsolutesale.
Failingtoacquirethepropertyinvolvedthroughnegotiatedsale,petitioner,throughthe
Department of Trade and Industry, to which CMDC is attached, instituted a complaint
53

P.J.G.

forEminentDomain,pursuanttotheprovisionsofExecutiveOrderNo.1035,datedJune
25,1985.

A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession was granted by the court but quashed it
subsequently.

Issue:

Whether or Not the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground
thattheexpropriatinggovernmentagencyisalreadyoccupyingthepropertysoughtto
beexpropriated.

Held:

No.UnderSection7ofEO1035,when thegovernmentoritsauthorizedagent makes


therequireddeposit,thetrialcourthasaministerialdutytoissueawritofpossession.
Theexpropriationofrealpropertydoesnotincludemerephysicalentryoroccupationof
land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be
compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of
rightsthatconstituteownership.

Intheinstantcase,itismanifestthatthepetitioner,inpursuitofanobjectivebeneficial
topublicinterest,seekstorealizethesamethroughitspowerofeminentdomain.In
exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but
also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its
merephysicalentryandoccupationofthepropertyfallshortofthetakingoftitle,which
includesalltherightsthatmaybeexercisedbyanowneroverthesubjectproperty.

CITYOFMANILAVS.CHINESECOMMUNITY
[40Phil349;No.14355;31Oct1919]

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a portion
private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal Avenue. Plaintiff claims
54

P.J.G.

that it is necessary that such public improvement be made in the said portion of the
privatecemeteryandthatthesaidlandsarewithintheirjurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary because
other routes were available. They further claimed that the expropriation of the
cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to them and to all those persons
owingandinterestedinthegravesandmonumentsthatwouldhavetobedestroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on the
particularstripofland inquestion. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have the rightto
exercisethepowerofeminentdomainandthatthecourtshavenorighttoinquireand
determinethenecessityoftheexpropriation.Thus,thesamefiledanappeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the necessity of the
expropriation.

Held:

Thecourtshavethepowerofrestrictingtheexerciseofeminentdomaintotheactual
reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The
moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessityforconferringtheauthorityuponamunicipalcorporationtoexercisetheright
ofeminentdomainisadmittedlywithinthepowerofthelegislature.Butwhetherornot
themunicipalcorporationorentityisexercisingtherightinaparticularcaseunderthe
conditionsimposedbythegeneralauthority,isaquestionthatthecourtshavetheright
toinquireto.

REPUBLICVS.PLDT
[26SCRA320;G.R.No.L18841;27Jan1969]

Facts:

The plaintiff Republic of the Philippines is a political entity exercising government


powers through one of its branches, the Bureau of Telecommunication. Herein
defendant, PLDT is a public service corporation holding a franchise to install operates
55

P.J.G.

and maintains a telephone system. After its creation, the BOT set up its own
governmenttelephonesystembyutilizingitsownappropriationsandotherequipment
andbyrentingtrunklinesofthePLDTtoenablethegovtofficestocallprivately.BOT
enteredintoanagreementwiththeRCAcommunicationsforjointoverseastelephone
service whereby BOT would convey overseas calls received by RCA to local residents.
PLDTcomplainedtotheBOTthatitwasaviolationoftheconditionoftheiragreement
sincetheBOThadusedtrunklinesonlyfortheuseofgovernmentofficesbutevento
serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT.
Subsequently,theplaintiffcommencedsuitagainstPLDTaskingthecourtjudgmentbe
renderedorderingthePLDTtoexecuteacontractwiththeplaintiff,throughtheBOTfor
theuseofthefacilitiesofPLDT'stelephonesystemthroughoutthecountryundersuch
conditions as the court may consider reasonable. The CFI rendered judgment stating
thatitcouldnotcompelPLDTtoenterintosuchagreement.Hencethispetition.

Issue:

WhetherorNotPLDTmaybecompelledtoenterintosuchagreement.

Held:

Yes, the state, may, in the interest of national welfare transfer utilities to public
ownershipuponpaymentofjustcompensation,thereisnoreasonwhythestatemanot
require a public utility to render services in the general interest provided just
compensationispaid.

PEOPLEVS.FAJARDO
[104Phil443;G.R.No.L12172;29Aug1958]

Facts:

Themunicipalcouncilofbaao,camarinessurstatingamongothersthatconstructionof
abuilding,whichwilldestroytheviewoftheplaza,shallnotbeallowedandtherefore
bedestroyedattheexpenseoftheowner,enactedanordinance.Hereinappellantfiled
a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a
building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's
name, located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a
creek.Therequestwasdenied,forthereasonamongothersthattheproposedbuilding
56

P.J.G.

would destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. Defendants reiterated their
request for a building permit, but again the mayor turned down the request.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a
permit,becausetheyneededaplaceofresidenceverybadly,theirformerhousehaving
been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.
Thereafter, defendants were charged in violation of the ordinance and subsequently
convicted.Hencethisappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheordinanceisavalidexerciseofpolicepower.

Held:

No. It is not a valid exercise of police power. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use
theirownproperty;hence,itoverstepstheboundsofpolicepower,andamountstoa
takingofappellantspropertywithoutjustcompensation.Wedonotoverlookthatthe
moderntendencyistoregardthebeautificationofneighborhoodsasconducivetothe
comfortandhappinessofresidents.

As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants' land,
regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in question,
because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from the highway. The
appellantswould,ineffect,beconstrainedtolettheirlandremainidleandunusedfor
the obvious purpose for which it is best suited, being urban in character. To legally
achieve that result, the municipality must give appellants just compensation and an
opportunitytobeheard.

CITYOFBAGUIOV.NAWASA
[106Phil;G.R.No.L12032;31Aug1959]

Facts:

Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public


corporation, created under Act.1383. It contends that the said act does not include
within its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming that it does, is
unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of
57

P.J.G.

said water works without just compensation and due process of law. The defendant
filedamotiontodismissionthegroundthatitisnotaproperexerciseofpolicepower
andeminentdomain.Thecourtdeniedthemotionandorderedthedefendantstofile
an answer. The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private
property and cannot be expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383
provides for the exchange of the NAWASA assets for the value of the water works
system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just compensation. Defendants
motionforreconsiderationwasdeniedhencethisappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthereisavalidexerciseofpolicepowerofeminentdomain.

Held:

R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not
confiscate, destroy or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It
merely directs that all water works belonging to cities, municipalities and municipal
districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA. The purpose is placing
them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting their
efficientmanagement,butinsodoingdoesnotconfiscatethembecauseitdirectsthat
theybepaidwithequalvalueoftheassetsofNAWASA.

The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public
propertyheldintrustbyamunicipalcorporationforthebenefitofthepublic.Butitisa
property of a municipal corporation, water works cannot be taken away except for
publicuseanduponpaymentofjustcompensation.Judgmentaffirmed.

NATIONALPOWERCORP.VS.GUTIERREZ
[193SCRA1;G.R.No.60077;18Jan1991]

Facts:

PetitionerfiledanactiontoacquirearightofwayoverthelandofRespondentsforthe
constructionoftransmissionlines.Petitionerwasadjudgedtopaythefullmarketvalue
oflandtraversedbythetransmissionlines.Petitionerarguedthatitwasonlyaskingfor
arightofway.

58

P.J.G.

Issue:

Whether or Not the acquisition of the right of way constitutes "taking" and such the
casewillbeentitledjustcompensation.

Held:

The acquisition of the right of way constitutes taking. It perpetually deprives


Respondents of their proprietary rights. No plant higher than three meters is allowed
below the transmission lines. Because of high tension current conveyed through the
transmission lines, danger to life and limbs cannot be discounted. The owner of the
propertyisentitledtojustcompensation.

REPUBLICVS.CASTELVI
[58SCRA336;G.R.No.L20620;15Aug1974]

Facts:

In1947,therepublic,throughtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines(AFP),enteredintoa
lease agreement with Castelvi on a yeartoyear basis. When Castelvi gave notice to
terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused. She then instituted an ejectment
proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriationproceedingsforthelandinquestion.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthecompensationshouldbedeterminedasof1947or1959.

Held:

TheSupremeCourtruledthatthetakingshouldnotbereckonedasof1947,andthat
justcompensationshouldnotbedeterminedonthebasisofthevalueoftheproperty
asofthatyear.

Therequisitesfortakingare:1)theexpropriatormustenteraprivateproperty,2)the
entrymustbeformorethanamomentaryperiod,3)itmustbeunderwarrantorcolor
ofauthorities, 4)thepropertymustbe devoted for public use or otherwise informally
appropriatedorinjuriouslyaffected,and5)theutilizationofthepropertyforpublicuse
59

P.J.G.

mustbesuchawayastoousttheowneranddeprivehimofbeneficialenjoymentofthe
property. Under Sec. 4 Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, just compensation is to be
determinedasofthedateofthefilingofthecomplaint.TheSupremeCourthasruled
that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is
undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the Castelvi property, by
authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The taking of the Castelvi property for the
purposesofdeterminingthejustcompensationtobepaidmust,therefore,bereckoned
asofJune26,1959whenthecomplaintforeminentdomainwasfiled.Thereisnobasis
to the contention of the Republic that a lease on a yeartoyear basis can give rise to
permanent right to occupy since by express provision a lease made for a determinate
time, as was the lease of Castelvi land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed,
without need of a demand (Art. 1669, New Civil Code). The Supreme Court, however,
did not apply Art. 1250 of the New Civil Code for the adjustment of the peso rate in
times of extraordinary inflation or deflation because in eminent domain cases the
obligationtopayarisesfromlawindependentofcontract.

EPZAVS.DULAY
[148SCRA305;G.R.No.L59603;29Apr1987]

Facts:

ThefourparcelsoflandwhicharethesubjectofthiscaseiswheretheMactanExport
ProcessingZoneAuthorityinCebu(EPZA)istobeconstructed.PrivaterespondentSan
Antonio Development Corporation (San Antonio, for brevity), in which these lands are
registeredunder,claimedthatthelandswereexpropriatedtothegovernmentwithout
them reaching the agreement as to the compensation. Respondent Judge Dulay then
issued an order for the appointment of the commissioners to determine the just
compensation. It was later found out that the payment of the government to San
AntoniowouldbeP15persquaremeter,whichwasobjectedtobythelattercontending
thatunderPD1533,thebasisofjustcompensationshallbefairandaccordingtothefair
market value declared by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, or by
the assessor, whichever is lower. Such objection and the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration were denied and hearing was set for the reception of the
commissioners report. EPZA then filed this petition for certiorari and mandamus
enjoiningtherespondentfromfurtherhearingthecase.
60

P.J.G.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheexclusiveandmandatorymodeofdeterminingjustcompensationin
PD1533isunconstitutional.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that the mode of determination of just compensation in PD
1533isunconstitutional.

Themethodofascertainingjustcompensationconstitutesimpermissibleencroachment
tojudicialprerogatives.Ittendstorenderthecourtsinutileinamatterinwhichunder
theConstitutionisreservedtoitforfinancialdetermination.Thevaluationinthedecree
may only serve as guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation,butitmaynotsubstitutethecourtsownjudgmentastowhatamount
should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount. The determination of just
compensation is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may
maketheinitialdeterminationbutwhenapartyclaimsaviolationoftheguaranteein
the Bill of Rights that the private party may not be taken for public use without just
compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own
determination shall prevail over the courts findings. Much less can the courts be
precludedfromlookingintothejustnessofthedecreedcompensation.

AMIGABLEVS.CUENCA
[43SCRA360;G.R.No.L26400;29Feb.1972]

Facts:

VictoriaAmigableistheregisteredownerofaparticularlot.AtthebackofherTransfer
Certificate of Title (1924), there was no annotation in favor of the government of any
right or interest in the property. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the
government used a portion of the lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
Avenues. On 1958, Amigables counsel wrote the President of the Philippines,
requesting payment of the portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor
General in his 9th Endorsement. Petitioner then filed in the court a quo a complaint
against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
CommissionerofPublicHighwaysfortherecoveryofownershipandpossessionofthe
61

P.J.G.

lot.Accordingtothedefendants,theactionwasprematurebecauseitwasnotfiledfirst
at the Office of the Auditor General. According to them, the right of action for the
recoveryofanyamounthadalreadyprescribed,thattheGovernmenthadnotgivenits
consenttobesued,andthatplaintiffhadnocauseofactionagainstthedefendants.

Issue:

Whether or Not, under the facts of the case, appellant may properly sue the
government.

Held:

In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the
governmenttakesawaypropertyfromaprivatelandownerforpublicusewithoutgoing
throughthelegalprocessofexpropriationornegotiatedsale,theaggrievedpartymay
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit without its consent. In the case at bar, since no
annotationinfavorofthegovernmentappearsatthebackofthecertificateoftitleand
plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the
government,thensheremainstheownerofthelot.Shecouldthenbringanactionto
recoverpossessionofthelandanytime,becausepossessionisoneoftheattributesof
ownership.However,sincesuchactionisnotfeasibleatthistimesincethelothasbeen
used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due
compensationpriceorvalueofthelotatthetimeofthetaking.

PHILIPPINEPRESSINSTITUTEVS.COMELEC
[244SCRA272;G.R.No.119694;22May1995]

Facts:

RespondentComelecpromulgatedResolutionNo.2772directingnewspaperstoprovide
free Comelec space of not less than onehalf page for the common use of political
partiesandcandidates.TheComelecspaceshallbeallocatedbytheCommission,freeof
charge,amongallcandidatestoenablethemtomakeknowntheirqualifications,their
standonpublicIssueandtheirplatformsofgovernment.TheComelecspaceshallalso
beusedbytheCommissionfordisseminationofvitalelectioninformation.
62

P.J.G.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a nonprofit organization of newspaper


and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No.
2772unconstitutionalandvoidonthegroundthatitviolatestheprohibitionimposedby
theConstitutionuponthegovernmentagainstthetakingofprivatepropertyforpublic
use without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of print
media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial
andcredibleelection.

Issue:

WhetherornotComelecResolutionNo.2772isunconstitutional.

Held:

TheSupremeCourtdeclaredtheResolutionasunconstitutional.Itheldthattocompel
print media companies to donate Comelec space amounts to taking of private
personalpropertywithoutpaymentofthejustcompensationrequiredinexpropriation
cases. Moreover, the element of necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell
advertising space. The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the
constitution,butnotwithoutpaymentofjustcompensation.AlsoResolutionNo.2772
does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take private
propertyofnewspaperormagazinepublishers.

REYESVS.NATIONALHOUSINGAUTHORITY
[395SCRA494;GRNO.147511;20JAN2003]

Facts:

RespondentNationalHousingAuthority(NHA)filedcomplaintsfortheexpropriationof
sugarcane lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the
63

P.J.G.

expropriation was the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project to


accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the
paymentofjustcompensation.TheSupremeCourtaffirmedthejudgmentofthelower
court.

Afewyearslater,petitionerscontendedthatrespondentNHAviolatedthestatedpublic
purpose for the expansion of the Dasmarias Resettlement Project when it failed to
relocate the squatters from the Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular
inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that most of the expropriated
propertiesremainunoccupied.Petitionerslikewisequestionthepublicnatureoftheuse
by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost
housing units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the
expropriation proceedings. Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its
rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation judgment and the expropriated
propertiesshouldnowbereturnedtohereinpetitioners.

Issue:

Whetherornotthejudgmentofexpropriationwasforfeitedinthelightofthefailureof
respondent NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a
totallydifferentpurpose.

Held:

The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners
cannotinsistonarestrictiveviewoftheeminentdomainprovisionoftheConstitution
by contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated
publicuse.Itisnowsettleddoctrinethattheconceptofpublicuseisnolongerlimited
to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be synonymous
with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."
Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirementofpublicuse."

Inaddition,theexpropriationofprivatelandforslumclearanceandurbandevelopment
isforapublicpurposeevenifthedevelopedareaislatersoldtoprivatehomeowners,
commercials firms, entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
Moreover,theConstitutionitselfallowstheStatetoundertake,forthecommongood
andincooperationwiththeprivatesector,acontinuingprogramofurbanlandreform
64

P.J.G.

and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The
expropriation of private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the
marginalizedsectorisinfurtheranceofsocialjustice.

MUNICIPALITYOFPARAAQUEVS.VMREALTYCORPORATION
[292SCRA676;G.R.NO.127820;20JUL1998]

Facts:

Petitionersoughttoexerciseitspowerofeminentdomainbasedonaresolutionbythe
municipalcouncil.Petitionercitesapreviouscasewhereinaresolutiongaveauthority
to exercise eminent domain. Petitioner also relies on the Implementing Rules, which
provides that a resolution authorizes a Local Government Unit to exercise eminent
domain.

Issue:

Whether or Not an LGU can exercise its power of eminent domain pursuant to a
resolutionbyitslawmakingbody.

Held:

UnderSection19,ofthepresentLocalGovernmentCode(RA7160),itisstatedasthe
first requisite that LGUs can exercise its power of eminent domain if there is an
ordinance enacted by its legislative body enabling the municipal chief executive. A
resolutionisnotanordinance,theformerisonlyanopinionofalawmakingbody,the
latter is a law. The case cited by Petitioner involves BP 337, which was the previous
LocalGovernmentCode,whichisobviouslynolongerineffect.RA7160prevailsover
the Implementing Rules, the former being the law itself and the latter only an
administrativerulewhichcannotamendtheformer.

ASLPVS.SEC.OFAGRARIANREFORM
[175SCRA343;G.R.NO.78742;14JUL1989]
65

P.J.G.

Facts:

Severalpetitionsaretherootofthecase:

e. ApetitionallegingtheconstitutionalityofPDNo.27,EO228and229andRA
6657.Subjectsofthepetitionarea9hectareand5hectareRicelandworked
by four tenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228 as qualified
farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President Aquino
usurpedthelegislaturespower.
f. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros
Occidental against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the
creationofAgrarianReformFundwithinitialfundofP50Billion.
g. ApetitionbyownersoflandwhichwasplacedbytheDARunderthecoverage
ofOperationLandTransfer.
h. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and
cornlandsnotexceedingsevenhectares.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheaforementionedEOs,PD,andRAwereconstitutional.

Held:

The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power


andeminentdomain.

The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was
authorizedunderSec.6oftheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1987Constitution.Therefore
itisavalidexerciseofPolicePowerandEminentDomain.

RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes
necessarytodepriveownersofwhateverlandstheymayowninexcessofthemaximum
areaallowed,thereisdefinitelyatakingunderthepowerofeminentdomainforwhich
payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitationoftheuseoftheland.Whatisrequiredisthesurrenderofthetitleandthe
physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in
favourofthefarmer.

66

P.J.G.

Astatutemaybesustainedunderthepolicepoweronlyifthereisconcurrenceofthe
lawfulsubjectandthemethod.

Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be
determinedisthemethodemployedtoachieveit.

ESLABANVS.ONORIO
[360SCRA230;G.R.NO.146062;28JUN2001]

Facts:

ClaritaVda.DeOnorioistheownerofthelandinBarangayM.Roxas,Sto.Nino,South
Cotabato. Such land is the subject for the construction of an irrigation canal of the
NationalIrrigationAdministration(NIA).Mr.SantiagoEslabanJr.istheprojectmanager
of NIA. The parties agreed to the construction of the canal provided that the
government will pay for the area that has been taken. A rightofway agreement was
enteredintobythepartiesinwhichrespondentwaspaidtheamountofP4,180.00as
right of way damages. Subsequently, respondent executed an Affidavit of Waiver of
RightsandFeeswhichwaivesherrightsforthedamagetothecropsduetoconstruction
oftherightofway.Afterwhich,respondentdemandsthatpetitionerpayP111,299.55
fortakingherpropertybutthepetitionerrefused.Petitionerstatesthatthegovernment
hadnotconsentedtobesuedandthattherespondentisnotentitledforcompensation
byvirtueofthehomesteadpatentunderCAno.141.TheRTCheldthattheNIAshould
pay respondent the amount of P107, 517.60 as just compensation for the 24,660 sq
metersthathavebeenusedfortheconstructionofthecanal.TheCourtofAppealsalso
affirmedthedecisionoftheRTC.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheCAerredinaffirmingthedecisionoftheRTC.

Held:

The CA is correct in affirmingthe decision of the RTC but modifications shall be made
regarding the value of the just compensation. The following are the points to be
consideredinarrivinginthisdecision.

67

P.J.G.

First,Rule7par5oftheRuleofCivilProcedure providesthatthecertification against


forum shopping should only be executed by the plaintiff or the principal. The petition
forreviewwasfiledbyMr.Eslabanjr.whiletheverificationorcertificationweresigned
by Mr. Cesar Gonzales, an administrator of the agency. Neither of the two has the
authoritytosignsuchcertificatefortheyarenottheplaintifforprincipal.Suchcaseisa
sufficientgroundfordismissingthispetition.

Second, PD NO. 1529 provides that the owner is required to recognize in favor of the
governmenttheeasementofapublichighway,way,privatewayestablishedbylaw,or
anygovernmentcanalwherethecertificateoftitledoesnotstatethattheboundaries
thereof have been predetermined. In the case at bar, the irrigation canal was
constructedonOct1981afterthepropertyhadbeenregisteredinMayof1976.Inthis
case,priorexpropriationproceedingsmustbefiledandjustcompensationshallbepaid
totheownerbeforethelandcouldbetakenforpublicuse.

Third, In this case, just compensation is defined as not only the correct amount to be
paidbutthereasonabletimefortheGovernmenttopaytheowner.TheCAerredinthis
pointbystatingthatthemarketvalue(justcompensation)ofthelandisdeterminedin
thefilingofthecomplaintin1991.Thedeterminationofsuchvalueshouldbefromthe
timeofitstakingbytheNIAin1981.

Lastly, the petitioner cannot argue that the Affidavit of waiver of rights and fees
executedbytherespondentpertainstothepaymentofthevalueofthelandtherefore
exemptingNIAtopaythevalueofthelandtaken.Suchwaiverpertainsonlytothecrops
and improvements that were damage due to the construction of the rightofway not
thevalueoftheland.

Wherefore,decisionofCAaffirmedwithmodificationregardingthejustcompensation
intheamountofP16,047.61perhectare.

KNECHTVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[290SCRA223;G.R.NO.108015,20MAY1998]

Facts:

Theinstantcaseisanunendingsequeltoseveralsuitscommencedalmosttwentyyears
agoinvolvingaparceloflandlocatedatthecornerofthesouthendofEDSAandF.B.
Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her
68

P.J.G.

son, Rene Knecht. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses, leased out the
sevenandoccupied oneofthem as their residence. In 1979, the government filed for
theexpropriationofKnechtsproperty.Thegovernmentwantedtousethelandforthe
completionoftheManilaFloodControlandDrainageProjectandtheextensionofthe
EDSAtowardsRoxasBoulevard.In1982,theCityTreasurerofPasaydiscoveredthatthe
Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a
consequenceofthisdeficiency,theCityTreasurersoldthepropertyatpublicauctionfor
the same amount of their deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondent
SpousesAnastacioandFelisaBabiera(theBabieras)andrespondentSpousesAlejandro
andFlorSangalang(theSangalangs).Subsequently,SangalangandBabierasoldtheland
to respondent Salem Investment Corporation. On February 17, 1983, the Batasang
Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing the national government to expropriate
certainpropertiesinPasayCityfortheEDSAExtension.ThepropertyoftheKnechtswas
part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. The government gave out just
compensation for the lands expropriated under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included and
received partial payment. Seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished
andthegovernmenttookpossessionoftheportionoflandonwhichthehousesstood.
Since the Knechts refused to vacate their one remaining house, Salem filed a case
againstthemforunlawfuldetainer.As defense,theKnechtsclaimed ownershipofthe
landandbuilding.TheMunicipalTrial CourthoweverorderedtheKnechts'ejectment
thustheirresidencewasdemolished.

TheKnechtscontinuouslyclaimedownershipofthepropertyandallegethattheymust
begivenjustcompensation.

Issue:

WhetherornotKnechtsarethelawfulownersofthelandatsubject.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Knechts were not the owners anymore of the said
land.TheKnechts'righttothelandhadbeenforeclosedaftertheyfailedtoredeemit
one year after the sale at public auction. Since the petitions questioning the order of
dismissalwerelikewisedismissedbytheCourtofAppealsandthisCourt,theorderof
dismissal became final and res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land.
Petitionerscontendedthattheydidnotreceivenoticeoftheirtaxdelinquency.Neither
didtheyreceivenoticeoftheauctionsale.However,thisquestionhasbeenpreviously
raisedinthecaseswhichhavebeenalreadysetaside.Thecourtisnotatrieroffacts.
69

P.J.G.

Resjudicatahasalreadysetit.TheKnechtsthereforearenotthelawfulownersofthe
land and are not any longer accountable for just compensation given by the
government.

Note:Resjudicataisagroundfordismissalofanaction.Itisarulethatprecludesparties
fromrelitigatingIssueactuallylitigatedanddeterminedbyapriorandfinaljudgment.It
pervadeseverywellregulatedsystemofjurisprudence,andisbasedupontwogrounds
embodied in various maxims of the common law one, public policy and necessity,
thatthereshouldbealimittolitigation;andanother,theindividualshouldnotbevexed
twiceforthesamecause.Whenarightoffacthasbeenjudiciallytriedanddetermined
byacourtofcompetentjurisdiction,oranopportunityforsuchtrialhasbeengiven,the
judgmentofthecourt,solongasitremainsunreversed,shouldbeconclusiveuponthe
parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. To follow a contrary doctrine
would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and
preferthegratificationofthelitigious disposition ofthe parties tothepreservationof
thepublictranquility.

Resjudicataapplieswhen:(1)theformerjudgmentororderisfinal;(2)thejudgmentor
order is one on the merits; (3) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (4) there is between the first and second actions,
identityofparties,ofsubjectmatterandofcauseofaction.

REPUBLICVS.KER
[383SCRA584;G.R.NO.136171,2JULY2002]

Facts:

PetitionerfiledbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofDavaoCityapetitionforexpropriation
ofportionsoftwoparcelsoflandownedbyrespondent.Petitionerneededtheparcels
oflandforthewideningoftheroadcomponentofJ.P.LaurelBuhanginInterchangein
Davao City. The Regional trial court rendered decision of a fair just compensation for
defendant Ker Corporation. However, it was challenged by Petitioner Republic of the
Philippines,representedbytheDepartmentofPublicWorksandHighwaysallegingthat
just compensation for site must be reduced. Petitioner alleged that when the petition
for expropriation was filed, the tax declaration of the property indicated its assessed
valueatalowerprice.

Issue:
70

P.J.G.

Whether or not respondent Ker Company was given a decision for fair just
compensation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the valuation for the lot Sites are excessive and
unreasonable. Just compensation cannot be measured by the assessed value of the
propertyasstatedinthetaxdeclarationandscheduleofmarketvalues.Forthepurpose
ofappraisal,thefairmarketvalueofthepropertyistakenintoaccountandsuchvalue
referstothehighestpriceintermsofmoneywhichapropertywillbringifexposedfor
saleinthepublicmarket.

Incomputingjustcompensationforexpropriationproceedings,itisthevalueoftheland
atthetimeofthetakingoratthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaintnotatthetimeof
therenditionofjudgmentwhichshouldbetakenintoconsideration.4Section4,Rule67
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that just compensation is to be
determinedasofthedateofthetakingorthefilingofthecomplaintwhichevercame
first.Onthismatter,theappellatecourtiscorrectindisregardingpetitioner'sclaim.

MANOSCAVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[252SCRA412;G.R.NO.106440,29JAN.1996]

Facts:

The National Historical Institute declared the parcel of land owned by Petitioners as a
national historical landmark, because it was the site of the birth of Felix Manalo, the
founderofIglesianiCristo.TheRepublicofthePhilippinesfiledanactiontoappropriate
theland.Petitionersarguedthattheexpropriationwasnotforapublicpurpose.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthetakingorexerciseofeminentdomainmaybegranted.

Held:

Publicuseshouldnotberestrictedtothetraditionaluses.Thetakingisforapublicuse
becauseofthecontributionofFelixManalotothecultureandhistoryofthePhilippines.
71

P.J.G.

72

P.J.G.

THEPOWEROFTAXATION

PASCUALVS.SEC.OFPUBLICWORKS
[110PHIL331;G.R.NO.L10405;29DEC1960]

Facts:

Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief
with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Act appropriating funds for public works,
providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvementofPasigfeeder road terminals, were nothing butprojected and planned
subdivision roads within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the
respondent, Jose Zulueta, a member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent
offeredtodonatethesaidfeederroadstothemunicipalityofPasigandtheofferwas
acceptedbythecouncil,subjecttoaconditionthatthedonorwouldsubmitplanofthe
roads and an agreement to change the names of two of the street. However, the
donation was not executed, which prompted Zuleta to write a letter to the district
engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The district engineer, on the other
hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder roads in question were
privatepropertyatthetime ofpassageandapprovalofRA920,theappropriation for
theconstructionwasillegalandtherefore,voidabinitio.Petitioner,prayedforRA920
be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared
unconstitutional.Lowercourtdismissedthecaseanddissolvedthewritofpreliminary
injunction.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthedeedofdonationandtheappropriationoffundsstipulatedinRA
920areconstitutional.

Held:

The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenueforanythingbutpublicpurpose.Thetaxingpowermustbeexercisedforpublic
purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public
purposesandnotfortheadvantageofprivateindividuals.

73

P.J.G.

In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon
whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by
congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the
appropriationsoughtaprivatepurposeandhence,nullandvoid.Thedonationdidnot
curethenullityoftheappropriation;thereforeajudicialnullificationofasaiddonation
neednotprecedethedeclarationofunconstitutionalityofthesaidappropriation.

Thedecisionappealedfromisreversed.

PUNSALANVS.MUNICIPALBOARDOFMANILA
[95PHIL46;NO.L4817;26MAY1954]

Facts:

Petitioners,whoareprofessionalsinthecity,assailOrdinanceNo.3398togetherwith
the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila). The
ordinanceimposesamunicipaloccupationtaxonpersonsexercisingvariousprofessions
inthecityandpenalizesnonpaymentofthesame.Thelawauthorizingsaidordinance
empowers the Municipal Board of the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on
persons engaged in various professions. Petitioners, having already paid their
occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax
under protest as imposed by Ordinance No. 3398. The lower court declared the
ordinanceinvalidandaffirmedthevalidityofthelawauthorizingit.

Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it constitute class legislation, and
authorizewhatamountstodoubletaxation.

Held:

TheLegislaturemay,initsdiscretion,selectwhatoccupationsshallbetaxed,andinits
discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for taxation, and leave others
untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities or municipalities should be
empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from that imposed by the National
Government.Thatmatteriswithinthedomainofpoliticaldepartments.Theargument
74

P.J.G.

againstdoubletaxationmaynotbeinvokedifonetaxisimposedbythestateandthe
other is imposed by the city. It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently
terribleintherequirementthattaxesbeexactedwithrespecttothesameoccupation
byboththestateandthepoliticalsubdivisionsthereof.Judgmentofthelowercourtis
reversedwithregardstotheordinanceandaffirmedastothelawauthorizingit.

OSMEAVS.ORBOS
[220SCRA703;G.R.NO.99886;31MAR1993]

Facts:

On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the
General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was
designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported
petroleumproductsresultingfromexchangerateadjustmentsandfromincreasesinthe
worldmarketpricesofcrudeoil.

Subsequently,theOPSFwasreclassifiedintoa"trustliabilityaccount,"invirtueofE.O.
1024,andorderedreleasedfromtheNationalTreasurytotheMinistryofEnergy.

Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on
February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for
possiblecostunderrecoveryincurredasaresultofthereductionofdomesticpricesof
petroleumproducts,theamountofthe underrecovery beingleftfor determinationby
theMinistryofFinance.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3),ArticleVIoftheConstitution,readingasfollows:

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be
treated as a special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the
purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned,thebalance,ifany,shallbetransferredtothegeneralfundsof
theGovernment.

Thepetitionerarguesthat"themoniescollectedpursuantto..P.D.1956,asamended,
mustbetreatedasa'SPECIALFUND,'notasa'trustaccount'ora'trustfund,'andthat
"if a special tax is collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom
75

P.J.G.

shall 'be treated as a special fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not
channeledtoanothergovernmentobjective."Petitionerfurtherpointsoutthatsince"a
'special fund' consists of monies collected through the taxing power of a State, such
amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objectiveforwhichitwascreated."

Healsocontendsthatthe"delegationoflegislativeauthority"totheERBviolates28(2).
ArticleVIoftheConstitution,viz.:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose,tariffrates,importandexportquotas,tonnageandwharfagedues,
and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
developmentprogramoftheGovernment;

and,inasmuchasthedelegationrelatestotheexerciseofthepower oftaxation,"the
limits, limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only
specify how to tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a
specificlimitonhowmuchtotax."12

Issue:

WhetherorNottheinvalidityofthe"TRUSTACCOUNT"inthebooksofaccountofthe
Ministry of Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8,
paragraph1,ofP.D.No.1956,asamended,"saidcreationofatrustfundbeingcontrary
toSection29(3),ArticleVIoftheConstitution.

Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as


amended by Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of
legislativepowertotheEnergyRegulatoryBoard.

Held:

TheOPSFisa"TrustAccount"whichwasestablished"forthepurposeofminimizingthe
frequentpricechangesbroughtaboutbyexchangerateadjustmentand/orchangesin
world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No.
76

P.J.G.

1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust
Accountmaybefundedfromanyofthefollowingsources:

a)Anyincreaseinthetaxcollectionfromadvaloremtaxorcustomsdutyimposed
on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange
rateadjustment,asmaybedeterminedbytheMinisterofFinanceinconsultation
withtheBoardofEnergy;

b)Anyincreaseinthetaxcollectionasaresultoftheliftingoftaxexemptionsof
government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in
consultationwiththeBoardofEnergy;

c)Anyadditionalamounttobeimposedonpetroleumproductstoaugmentthe
resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the
Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or companies engaged in the
businessofimporting,manufacturingand/ormarketingpetroleumproducts;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil
companiesintheimportationofcrudeoilandpetroleumproductsislessthanthe
peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the
BoardofEnergy.

Hence, itseemsclearthatwhilethefundscollectedmaybereferredtoastaxes,they
areexactedintheexerciseofthepolicepoweroftheState.Moreover,thattheOPSFis
aspecialfundisplainfromthespecialtreatmentgiven itbyE.O.137.Itissegregated
fromthegeneralfund;andwhileitisplacedinwhatthelawreferstoasa"trustliability
account,"thefundnonethelessremainssubjecttothescrutinyandreviewoftheCOA.
TheCourtissatisfiedthatthesemeasurescomplywiththeconstitutionaldescriptionof
a"specialfund."Indeed,thepracticeisnotwithoutprecedent.

With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that
the provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on
petroleum products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be
exercised.Inadditiontothegeneralpolicyofthelawtoprotectthelocalconsumerby
stabilizingandsubsidizingdomesticpumprates,8(c)ofP.D.1956expresslyauthorizes
theERBtoimposeadditionalamountstoaugmenttheresourcesoftheFund.

Whatpetitionerwouldwishisthefixingofsomedefinite,quantitativerestriction,or"a
specific limit on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the
77

P.J.G.

petitioner on the premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as
alreadydiscussed,thisisnotthecase.Whatishereinvolvedisnotsomuchthepower
of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the ERB to impose
additionalamountscouldbeconstruedtorefertothepoweroftaxation,itcannotbe
overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with
expediencyincarryingouttheobjectivesofthelawwhichareembracedbythepolice
poweroftheState.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the
determination of the price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting
needtoeitheraugmentorexhausttheFund,donotconvenientlypermitthesettingof
fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the petitioner. To do so would
rendertheERBunabletorespondeffectivelysoastomitigateoravoidtheundesirable
consequencesofsuchfluidity.Assuch,thestandardasitisexpressedsufficestoguide
the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the
circumstancesunderwhichitistobeexercised.

LLADOCVS.COMMISSIONEROFINTERNALREVENUE
[14SCRA292;NO.L19201;16JUN1965]

Facts:

Sometimein1957,M.B.EstateInc.,ofBacolodCity,donated10,000.00pesosincashto
Fr.CrispinRuiz,theparishpriestofVictorias,NegrosOccidental,andpredecessorofFr.
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic church in the locality. The donated
amountwasspentforsuchpurpose.

OnMarch3,1958,thedonorM.B.Estatefiledthedonor'sgifttaxreturn.Underdateof
April29,1960.CommissionerofInternalRevenueissuedanassessmentforthedonee's
gifttaxagainsttheCatholicParishofVictoriasofwhichpetitionerwastheparishpriest.

Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr. Lladoc was not the
Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of Victorias did not have
juridicalpersonalityastheconstitutionalexemptionforreligiouspurposeisvalid.

Held:

78

P.J.G.

Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI of the
Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes assessed on such
properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise taxes The imposition of
the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is not a violation of the
Constitution.Agifttaxisnotapropertybywayofgiftintervivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in the
imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for religious
purpose.

CASSANOVASVS.HORD
[8Phil125;No.3473;22Mar1907]

Facts:

The Spanish Govt. by virtue of a royal decree granted the plaintiff certain mines. The
plaintiffisnowtheownerofthosemines.TheCollectorofInternalRevenueimposedtax
on the properties, contending that they were valid perfected mine concessions and it
falls within the provisions of sec.134 of Act No. 1189 known as Internal Revenue Act.
Theplaintiffpaidunderprotest.HebroughtanactionagainstthedefendantCollectorof
InternalRevenuetorecoverthesumofPhp.9,600paidbyhimastaxes.Judgmentwas
renderedinfavorofthedefendant,sotheplaintiffappealed.

Issue:

WhetherorNotSec.164isvoidorvalid.

Held:

ThedeedconstitutedacontractbetweentheSpanishGovernmentandtheplaintiff.The
obligationofwhichcontractwasimpairedbytheenactmentofsec.134oftheInternal
Revenue Law infringing sec. 5 of the Act of Congress which provides that no law
79

P.J.G.

impairingtheobligationofcontractsshallbeenacted.Sec.134oftheInternalRevenue
Law of 1904 is void because it impairs the obligation of contracts contained in the
concessionsofminemadebytheSpanishGovernment.Judgmentreversed.

80

P.J.G.

THEBILL
OFRIGHTS

81

P.J.G.

DUEPROCESSOFLAW

Art3,Sec.1.
Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdue
processoflaw

ERMITAMALATEHOTELANDMOTELOPERATORSASSO.VS.MAYOROFMANILA
[20SCRA849;G.R.NO.L24693;31JULY1967]

Facts:

Petitioners ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the
second petitioner, filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against
the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such
charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
andtogivethenecessaryordersfortheexecutionandenforcementofsuchordinances.
Itwasallegedthatthepetitionernonstockcorporationisdedicatedtothepromotion
and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels and motels,
characterizedaslegitimatebusinessesdulylicensedbybothnationalandcityauthorities
andregularlypayingtaxes.ItwasallegedthatonJune13,1963,theMunicipalBoardof
theCityofManilaenactedOrdinanceNo.4760,approvedonJune14,1963bythethen
acting City Mayor, ViceMayor Herminio Astorga. After which the alleged grievances
against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond thepowers ofthe Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofaras it
regulatemotels,onthegroundthatintherevisedcharteroftheCityofManilaorinany
otherlaw,noreferenceismadetomotels.italsobeingprovidedthatthepremisesand
facilitiesofsuchhotels,motelsandlodginghouseswouldbeopenforinspectioneither
bytheCityMayor,ortheChiefofPolice,ortheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives.The
lowercourtonJuly6,1963issuedawritofpreliminaryinjunctionorderingrespondent
MayortorefrainfromenforcingsaidOrdinanceNo.4760fromandafterJuly8,1963.

Issue:

WhetherorNotOrdinanceNo.4760oftheCityofManilaisunconstitutional,therefore,
nullandvoid.

Held:
82

P.J.G.

Adecentregardforconstitutionaldoctrinesofafundamentalcharacteroughttohave
admonishedthelowercourtagainstsuchasweepingcondemnationofthechallenged
ordinance.Itsdecisioncannotbeallowedtostand,consistentlywithwhathasbeenthe
accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive
aspects.

Primarilywhatcallsforareversalofsuchadecisionistheabsenceofanyevidenceto
offsetthepresumptionofvaliditythatattachestoachallengedstatuteorordinance.As
was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validityxxx.Theactionoftheelectedrepresentativesofthepeoplecannotbelightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances
which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by
enacting theordinance,hasineffect given notice that theregulations are essentialto
thewellbeingofthepeoplexxx.TheJudiciaryshouldnotlightlysetasidelegislative
actionwhenthereisnotaclearinvasionofpersonalorpropertyrightsundertheguise
ofpoliceregulation.

Itadmitsofnodoubtthereforethattherebeingapresumptionofvalidity,thenecessity
forevidencetorebutitisunavoidable,unlessthestatuteorordinanceisvoidonitsface
whichisnotthecasehere.Theprinciplehasbeennowherebetterexpressedthaninthe
leadingcaseofO'Gorman& Youngv. HartfordFireInsuranceCo.wheretheAmerican
Supreme Court through JusticeBrandeistersely and succinctly summed upthe matter
thus: The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the
policepower.Weareaskedtodeclareitvoidonthegroundthatthespecificmethodof
regulationprescribedisunreasonableandhencedeprivestheplaintiffofdueprocessof
law.Asunderlyingquestionsoffactmayconditiontheconstitutionalityoflegislationof
thischaracter,theresumptionofconstitutionalitymustprevailintheabsenceofsome
factualfoundationofrecordforoverthrowingthestatute."Nosuchfactualfoundation
beinglaidinthepresentcase,thelowercourtdecidingthematteronthepleadingsand
the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment
againsttheordinancesetaside.

VILLEGASVS.HIUCHIONG
[86SCRA270;NO.L29646;10NOV1978]

Facts:

83

P.J.G.

ThecontrovertedOrdinanceno.6537waspassedbytheMunicipalBoardofManilaon
February 22,1968 andsignedby Mayor Villegas. It is an ordinance making it unlawful
for any person not a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of
employmentortobe engagedinanykindoftradebusinessoroccupationwithinthe
city of Manila without securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and
forotherpurposes.

HiuChiongTsaiPaoHo,whowasemployedinManilafiledapetitionprayingforthewrit
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of said
ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or Not Ordinance no.6537 violates the due process and equal protection
clausesofthe
Constitution.

Held:

It is a revenue measure. The city ordinance which imposes a fee of 50.00 pesos to
enablealiensgenerallytobeemployedinthecityofManilaisnotonlyforthepurpose
ofregulation.

While it is true that the first part which requires the alien to secure an employment
permitfrom
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in
processing and approval or disapproval of application is regulatory in character, the
secondpartwhichrequiresthepayment ofasumof50.00pesosisnotaregulatory
butarevenuemeasure.

Ordinance no. 6537 is void and unconstitutional. This is tantamount to denial of the
basichumanrightofthepeopleinthePhilippinestoengagedinameansoflivelihood.
Whileitistruethat the Philippinesas astate is not obliged to admit aliens within it's
territory,onceanalienisadmittedhecannotbedeprivedoflifewithoutdueprocessof
law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. Also it does not lay down any
standardtoguidetheCity
Mayorintheissuanceordenialofanalienemployment
permitfee.

NAMILVS.COMELEC
84

P.J.G.

[414SCRA553;G.R.NO.150540;28OCT2003]

Facts:

On May 20, 2001, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat
proclaimed the petitioners as winning candidates for their Sangguniang Bayan. The
following day, herein private respondents were proclaimed winners as well. Private
respondents claimed that they should be recognized as the winners, and not the
petitioners. Upon receipt of such letter, the Commissionerincharge for Region XII
askedtheLawDepartment,theRegionalElectionRegistrarandtheProvincialElections
Supervisor to submit their reports on the matter. All of them found the second
proclamation valid. Hence, the COMELEC issued a Resolution ordering the immediate
installation of the private respondents as the newly elected members of the
SangguniangBayan, even though petitioners herein have already taken their oath and
haveassumedoffice.PetitionerscontendthatsuchResolutionisnullandvoidbecause
they were not accorded due notice and hearing, hence constituting a violation of the
dueprocessprinciple.

Issue:

Whether or Not due the COMELEC has the power to suspend a proclamation or the
effectsthereofwithoutnoticeandhearing.

Held:

No. The COMELEC is without power to partially or totally annul a proclamation or


suspendtheeffectsofaproclamationwithoutnoticeandhearing.Theproclamationon
May 20, 2001 enjoys the presumption of regularity and validity since no contest or
protest was even filed assailing the same. The petitioners cannot be removed from
officewithoutdueprocessoflaw.Dueprocessinquasijudicialproceedingsbeforethe
COMELECrequiresduenoticeandhearing.Furthermore,theproclamationofawinning
candidatecannotbeannulledifhehasnotbeennotifiedofanymotiontosetasidehis
proclamation.Hence,asruledinFariasvs.COMELEC,Reyesvs.COMELECandGallardo
vs.COMELEC,theCOMELECiswithoutpowertopartiallyortotallyannulaproclamation
orsuspendtheeffectsofaproclamationwithoutnoticeandhearing.
ICHONGVS.HERNANDEZ
[101PHIL1155;L7995;31MAY1957]

Facts:
85

P.J.G.

RepublicAct1180orcommonlyknownasAnActtoRegulatetheRetailBusinesswas
passed.Thesaidlawprovidesforaprohibitionagainstforeignersaswellascorporations
ownedbyforeignersfromengagingfromretailtradeinourcountry.Thiswasprotested
bythepetitionerinthiscase.Accordingtohim,thesaidlawviolatestheinternational
andtreaty ofthe Philippinestherefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, theTreatyof
AmitybetweenthePhilippinesandChinawasviolatedaccordingtohim.

Issue:

WhetherorNotRepublicAct1180isavalidexerciseofpolicepower.

Held:

According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then
providedthatpolicepowercannotbebargainedawaythroughthemediumofatreaty
oracontract.TheCourtalsoprovidedthatRA1180wasenactedtoremedyarealand
actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or
amendmentbyasubsequentlawandthesamemaynevercurtainorrestrictthescope
ofthepolicepowerofthestate.

PHIL.PHOSPHATEFERTILIZERCORP.VS.TORRES
[231SCRA335;G.R.NO.98050;17MAR1994]

Facts:

Philphos MovementforProgress, Inc. (PMPI for brevity), filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment a petition for certification election among the supervisory
employees of petitioner, alleging that as a supervisory union duly registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment it was seeking to represent the supervisory
employees of Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation. MediatorArbiter Rodolfo S.
Milado issued an order directing the holding of a certification election among the
supervisoryemployeesofpetitioner,excludingtherefromthesuperintendentsandthe
professional and technical employees. However, the PMPI filed an amended petition
with the MediatorArbiter wherein it sought to represent not only the supervisory
employeesofpetitionerbutalsoitsprofessional/technicalandconfidentialemployees.
The parties therein agreed to submit their respective position papers and to consider
86

P.J.G.

the amended petition submitted for decision on the basis thereof and related
documents.MediatorArbiterMiladoissuedanordergrantingthepetitionanddirecting
theholdingofacertificationelectionamongthe"supervisory,professional(engineers,
analysts, mechanics, accountants, nurses, midwives, etc.), technical, and confidential
employees. PHILPHOS appealed the order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment
whorenderedadecisionthrough Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma dismissing the
appeal. PHILPHOS moved for reconsideration but the same was denied; hence, the
instant petition alleging denial of due process on the part of the DOLE to which the
mediatorarbiterwasunder.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherewasdenialofdueprocess.

Held:

Therewasnodenialofdueprocess.Theessenceofdueprocessissimplyanopportunity
tobeheardor,asappliedtoadministrativeproceedings,anopportunitytoexplainone's
sideoranopportunitytoseekareconsiderationoftheactionorrulingcomplainedof
petitionerPHILPHOSagreedtofileitspositionpaperwiththeMediatorArbiterandto
considerthecasesubmittedfordecisiononthebasisofthepositionpapersfiledbythe
parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process, as
petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side. Moreover,
petitionercouldhave,ifitsodesired,insistedonahearingtoconfrontandexaminethe
witnessesoftheotherparty.Butitdidnot;insteaditoptedtosubmititspositionpaper
with the MediatorArbiter. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its
argumentsinitsappealtotheSecretaryofLabor.

RUBIVS.PROVINCIALBOARDOFMINDORO
[39PHIL660;G.R.NO.14078;7MAR1919]

Facts:

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
ProvinceofMindoro.

TheprovincialboardofMindoroadoptedresolutionNo.25whichstatesthatprovincial
governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are
87

P.J.G.

foundisauthorized,whensuchacourseisdeemednecessaryintheinterestoflawand
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied
publiclandstobeselectedbyhimandapprovedbytheprovincialboard.Itisresolved
thatundersection2077oftheAdministrativeCode,800hectaresofpubliclandinthe
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservationprovidingthatsaidhomesteadapplicationsarepreviouslyrecommendedby
theprovincialgovernor.

Thereafter,theprovincialgovernorofMindoroissuedexecutiveorderNo.2,whichsays
thattheprovincialgovernorhasselectedasiteinthesitioofTigbaoonNaujanLakefor
thepermanentsettlementofMangyanesinMindoro.Inthatcase,pursuanttoSection
2145oftheRevisedAdministrativeCode,alltheMangyansinthetownshipsofNaujan
and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of
DulanganandRubi'splaceinCalapan,wereorderedtotakeuptheirhabitationonthe
siteofTigbao,NaujanLake.Also,thatanyMangyanwhoshallrefusetocomplywiththis
ordershalluponconvictionbeimprisonednotexceedinsixtydays,inaccordancewith
section2759oftherevisedAdministrativeCode.

SaidresolutionoftheprovincialboardofMindorowereclaimedasnecessarymeasures
for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forestsinwhichtheyroam,andtointroducecivilizedcustomsamongthem.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
withinthereservationofTigbaoandareliabletobepunished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincialofficialsofthatprovince.Rubiandhiscompanionsaresaidtobeheldonthe
reservationestablishedatTigbao,Mindoro,againsttheirwill,andoneDabalosissaidto
beheldunderthecustody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having
runawayformthereservation.

Issue:

WhetherorNotSection2145oftheAdministrativeCodedepriveapersonofhisliberty
withoutdueprocessoflaw.

WhetherorNotSection2145oftheAdministrativeCodeof1917isconstitutional.

88

P.J.G.

Held:

TheCourtheldthatsection2145oftheAdministrativeCodedoesnotdepriveaperson
ofhislibertywithoutdueprocessoflawanddoesnotdenytohimtheequalprotection
ofthelaws,andthatconfinementinreservationsinaccordancewithsaidsectiondoes
notconstituteslaveryandinvoluntaryservitude.TheCourtisfurtheroftheopinionthat
section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
AdministrativeCodeof1917isconstitutional.

ThepreambleoftheresolutionoftheprovincialboardofMindorowhichsetapartthe
Tigbaoreservation,itwillberead,assignedasreasonsforttheaction,thefollowing:(1)
ThefailureofformerattemptsfortheadvancementofthenonChristianpeopleofthe
province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to
obligethemtoliveinapermanentsettlement.TheSolicitorGeneraladdsthefollowing;
(3)TheprotectionoftheManguianes;(4)theprotectionofthepublicforestsinwhich
theyroam;(5)thenecessityofintroducingcivilizedcustomsamongtheManguianes.

Consideredpurelyasanexerciseofthepolicepower,thecourtscannotfairlysaythat
theLegislaturehasexceededitsrightfulauthority.Itis,indeed,anunusualexerciseof
that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold
thatthelibertyofthecitizenisundulyinterferedwithoutwhenthedegreeofcivilization
of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
generalgoodofthePhilippines.Norcanonesaythatdueprocessoflawhasnotbeen
followed.

None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To
constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not
alwaysnecessary.Insomeinstances,evenahearingandnoticearenotrequisitearule
whichisespeciallytruewheremuchmustbelefttothediscretionoftheadministrative
officersinapplyingalawtoparticularcases.

The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that
they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the
GovernmentofthePhilippineIslandsisshapedwithaviewtobenefittheFilipinopeople
as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be
confinedforatime,aswehavesaid,fortheirowngoodandthegoodofthecountry.

89

P.J.G.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.


Habeascorpuscan,therefore,notissue.

KWONGSINGVS.CITYOFMANILA
[41PHIL103;G.R.NO.15972;11OCT1920]

Facts:

Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and
the same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also
questionedthevalidityofenforcingOrdinanceNo.532bythecityofManila.Ordinance
No. 532 requires that the receipt be in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showingthekindandnumberofarticlesdeliveredbylaundriesanddyeingandcleaning
establishments.Thepermanentinjunctionwasdeniedbythetrialcourt.Theappellants
claimisthatOrdinanceNo.532savorsofclasslegislation;puttinginmindthattheyare
Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances;
and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest
thattheenforcementofthelegislationisanactbeyondthescopeoftheirpolicepower.
Inviewoftheforegoing,thisisanappealwiththeSupremeCourt.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheenforcementofOrdinanceno,532isanactbeyondthescopeof
policepower

Whetherornottheenforcementofthesameisaclasslegislationthatinfringesproperty
rights.

Held:

Reasonablerestraintsofalawfulbusinessforsuchpurposesarepermissibleunderthe
police power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is
basedonSection2444,paragraphs(l)and(ee)oftheAdministrativeCode,asamended
byActNo.2744,authorizesthemunicipalboardofthecityofManila,withtheapproval
ofthemayorofthecity:

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx
xxxxxlaundriesxxxx.
90

P.J.G.

(ee)Toenactallordinancesitmaydeemnecessaryandproperforthesanitation
andsafety,thefurtheranceoftheprosperity,andthepromotionofthemorality,
peace,goodorder,comfort,convenience,andgeneralwelfareofthecityandits
inhabitants.

The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes
betweenlaundrymenandtheirpatronsandtoprotectcustomersoflaundrieswhoare
notabletodecipherChinesecharactersfrombeingdefrauded.(Consideringthatinthe
year1920s,peopleofManilaaremorefamiliarwithSpanishandmaybeEnglish.)

Inwhethertheordinanceisclasslegislation,thecourtheldthattheordinanceinvades
no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police
regulation,anattemptisnotmadetoviolatepersonalpropertyrights.Theordinanceis
neitherdiscriminatorynorunreasonableinitsoperation.Itappliestoallpubliclaundries
withoutdistinction,whethertheybelongtoAmericans,Filipinos,Chinese,oranyother
nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of them without distinction,
mustcomplywiththeordinance.Theobviousobjectionfortheimplementationofthe
ordinanceisbasedinsec2444(ee)oftheAdministrativeCode.Although,anadditional
burdenwillbeimposedonthebusinessandoccupationaffectedbytheordinancesuch
asthatoftheappellantbylearningevenafewwordsinSpanishorEnglish,butmostly
Arabicnumbersinordertoproperlyissueareceipt,itseemsthatthesameburdensare
cast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of person or property are subjected to
restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the
ordinance,thisisnotsufficientgroundforfailingtoupholdthepowerofthelegislative
body.Theveryfoundationofthepolicepoweristhecontrolofprivateinterestsforthe
publicwelfare.

Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a
preliminaryinjunctionisdenied,withcostsagainsttheappellants.

YUCONGENGVS.TRINIDAD
[47PHIL385;G.R.NO.20479;6FEB1925]

Facts:

Thepetitioner,YuCongEng,waschargedbyinformationinthecourtoffirstinstanceof
Manila,withaviolationofAct2972,whichprovidesthat(Section1)itshallbeunlawful
foranyperson,company,orpartnershiporcorporationengagedincommerce,industry
91

P.J.G.

or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance
withexistinglaw,tokeepitsaccountbooksinanylanguageotherthanEnglish,Spanish
oranylocaldialect.Hewasarrested,hisbookswereseized,andthetrialwasaboutto
proceed,whenheandtheotherpetitioner,CoLiam,ontheirownbehalf,andonbehalf
ofalltheotherChinesemerchantsinthePhilippines,filedthepetitionagainstthefiscal,
orprosecutingattorneyofManila,andthecollectorofinternalrevenueengagedinthe
prosecution,andagainstthejudgepresiding.

Issue:

WhetherorNotAct2972isunconstitutional.

Held:

Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its
taxpayerstokeepproperrecordsoftheirbusinesstransactionsinEnglishorSpanishor
Filipinodialectbywhichanadequatemeasureofwhatisduefromtheminmeetingthe
cost of government can be had. But we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the
policepowerofthePhilippineLegislature,becauseitwouldbeoppressiveandarbitrary,
to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a set of books in the Chinese
language,andintheChinesecharacters,andthuspreventthemfromkeepingadvisedof
thestatusoftheirbusinessanddirectingitsconduct.

ANIAGVS.COMELEC
[237SCRA194;G.R.NO.104961;7OCT1994]

Facts:

In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2323, Gun Ban, promulgating rules and regulations on bearing,
carryingandtransportingoffirearmorotherdeadlyweaponsonsecuritypersonnelor
bodyguards,onbearingarmsbymembersofsecurityagenciesorpoliceorganizations,
and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period.
COMELECalsoissuedResolutionNo.2327providingforthesummarydisqualificationof
candidatesengagedingunrunning,usingandtransportingoffirearms,organizingspecial
strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. Pursuant to the Gun Ban, Mr.
SerrapioTaccad,SergeantatArmsoftheHouseofRepresentatives,wrotepetitionerfor
92

P.J.G.

thereturnofthetwofirearmsissuedtohimbytheHouseofRepresentatives.Petitioner
theninstructedhisdriver,Arellano,topickupthefirearmsfrompetitionershouseand
returnthemtoCongress.ThePNPsetupacheckpoint.WhenthecardrivenbyArellano
approachedthecheckpoint,thePNPsearchedthecarandfoundthefirearms.Arellano
was apprehended and detained. He then explained the order of petitioner. Petitioner
alsoexplainedthatArellanowasonlycomplyingwiththefirearmsban,andthathewas
not a security officer or a bodyguard. Later, COMELEC issued Resolution No.920829
directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code, and for petitioner to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective position. Petitioner then questions the
constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that gunrunning, using or
transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution
are not within the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, according to
petitioner,ResolutionNo.2327isunconstitutional.Theissueonthedisqualificationof
petitionerfromrunningintheelectionswasrenderedmootwhenhelosthisbidfora
seatinCongressintheelections.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionercanbevalidlyprosecutedforinstructinghisdrivertoreturn
thefirearmsissuedtohimonthebasisoftheevidencegatheredfromthewarrantless
searchofhiscar

Held:

A valid search must be authorized by a search warrant issued by an appropriate


authority.However,awarrantlesssearchisnotviolativeoftheConstitutionforaslong
asthevehicleisneithersearchednoritsoccupantssubjectedtoabodysearch,andthe
inspectionofthevehicleismerelylimitedtoavisualsearch.Inthecaseatbar,theguns
were not tucked in Arellanos waist nor placed within his reach, as they were neatly
packed in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Given these
circumstances,thePNPcouldnothavethoroughlysearchedthecarlawfullyaswellas
the package without violating the constitutional injunction. Absent any justifying
circumstance specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the
search could not have been valid. Consequently, the firearms obtained from the
warrantlesssearchcannotbeadmitted for any purpose in any proceeding. Itwas also
93

P.J.G.

showninthefactsthatthePNPhadnotinformedthepublicofthepurposeofsettingup
thecheckpoint.PetitionerwasalsonotamongthosechargedbythePNPwithviolation
oftheOmnibusElectionCode.HewasnotinformedbytheCityProsecutorthathewasa
respondentinthepreliminaryinvestigation.Suchconstitutedaviolationofhisrightto
due process. Hence, it cannot be contended that petitioner was fully given the
opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not informed that he was
himselfarespondentinthecase.Thus,thewarrantlesssearchconductedbythePNPis
declaredillegalandthefirearmsseizedduringthesearchcannotbeusedasevidencein
anyproceedingagainstthepetitioner.Resolution No.920829is unconstitutional,and
therefore,setaside.

JAVIERVS.COMELEC
[144SCRA194;G.R.NOS.L6837981;22SEPT1986]

Facts:

ThepetitionerandtheprivaterespondentwerecandidatesinAntiquefortheBatasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular
support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest
between the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were
ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Owing to what he
claimedwereattemptstorailroadtheprivaterespondent'sproclamation,thepetitioner
wenttotheCommissiononElectionstoquestionthecanvassoftheelectionreturns.His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the
SecondDivisionofthesaidbody.ThepetitionerthereuponcametothisCourt,arguing
that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the
Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the
strengthofhisproclamation,theprivaterespondenttookhisoathasamemberofthe
BatasangPambansa.

Issue:

94

P.J.G.

Whether or Not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to


promulgateitsdecisionofJuly23,1984,proclaimingtheprivaterespondentthewinner
intheelection.

Held:

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appeartobeimpartialasanaddedassurancetothepartiesthathisdecisionwillbejust.
Thelitigantsareentitledtonolessthanthat.Theyshouldbesurethatwhentheirrights
are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the
judge,otherwisetheywillnotgotohimatall.Theymustbelieveinhissenseoffairness,
otherwisetheywillnotseekhisjudgment.Withoutsuchconfidence,therewouldbeno
pointininvokinghisactionforthejusticetheyexpect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
JusticeFrankfurtercallstherudimentsoffairplay.Fairplaycansforequaljustice.There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the
otherpartyandwithajudgmentalreadymadeandwaitingonlytobeformalizedafter
the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial)proceedingsarenotorchestratedplaysinwhichthepartiesaresupposed
tomakethemotionsandreachthedenouementaccordingtoapreparedscript.Thereis
nowritertoforeordaintheending.Thejudgewillreachhisconclusionsonlyafterallthe
evidenceisinandalltheargumentsarefiled,onthebasisoftheestablishedfactsand
thepertinentlaw.

YNOTVS.IAC
[148SCRA659;G.R.NO.74457;20MAR1987]

Facts:

ExecutiveOrderNo.626Aprohibitedthetransportationofcarabaosandcarabeeffrom
one province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of
Executive Order No 626A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626A. The
governmentarguedthatExecutiveOrderNo.626Awasissuedintheexerciseofpolice
powertoconservethecarabaosthatwerestillfitforfarmworkorbreeding.
95

P.J.G.

Issue:

WhetherorNotEONo.626AisaviolationofSubstantiveDueProcess.

Held:

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not


reasonablynecessaryforthepurposeofthelawandisundulyoppressive.Itisdifficult
to see how prohibiting the transfer of carabaos from one province to another can
prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining the carabaos in one province will not
preventtheirslaughterthere.Prohibitingthetransferofcarabeef,aftertheslaughterof
thecarabaos,willnotpreventtheslaughtereither.

PHILCOMSATVS.ALCUAZ
[180SCRA218;G.R.NO.84818;18DEC1989]

Facts:

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving telecommunications.


Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced by order of herein
respondentJoseAlcuazCommissioneroftheNationalTelecommunicationsCommission.
Therateswereorderedtobereducedbyfifteenpercent(15%)duetoExecutiveOrder
No. 546 which granted the NTC the power to fix rates. Said order was issued without
priornoticeandhearing.

Issue:

WhetherorNotE.O.546isunconstitutional.

Held:

Yes. Respondents admitted that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as
exercised by administrative bodies is quasijudicial rather than quasilegislative. But
respondents contention that notice and hearing are not required since the assailed
order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and temporary in nature is
erroneous.Section16(c)ofthePublicServiceAct,providingfortheproceedingsofthe
Commission, upon notice and hearing, dictates that a Commission has power to fix
96

P.J.G.

rates,uponpropernoticeandhearing,and,ifnotsubjecttotheexceptions,limitations
orsavingprovisions.

Itisthusclearthatwithregardtoratefixing,respondenthasnoauthoritytomakesuch
order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or
permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summaryinvestigation,oruponthecommission'sownmotionasinthepresentcase.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents is hereby
SETASIDE.

EASTERNBROADCASTINGCORP(DYRE)V.DANSJR.
[137SCRA628;L59329;19JUL1985]

Facts:

ApetitionwasfiledtoreopentheRadioStationDYRE.DYREwassummarilyclosedon
grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to
sedition.Petitioner,DYREcontendsthattheyweredenieddueprocess.Therewasno
hearing to establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the
radiostationviolatesfreedomofexpression.Beforethecourtcouldevenpromulgatea
decisionupontheIssueraised,Petitioner,throughitspresidentMr.ReneEspina,fileda
motiontowithdrawthepetition.Therightsofthestationweresoldtoanewowner,
Manuel Pastrana; who is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case
becomingmootandacademic,(becausetherearenolongerinterestedparties,thusthe
dismissal of the case) the Supreme Court still finds that there is need to pass a
RESOLUTION for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals in
mattersasthiscase.

Issue:

WhetherornotdueprocesswasexercisedinthecaseofDYRE.

WhetherornottheclosureofDYREisaviolationoftheConstitutionalRightofFreedom
ofExpression.

Held:

97

P.J.G.

The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The
absenceofahearingisaviolationofConstitutionalRights.Theprimaryrequirementsin
administrativeproceedingsarelaiddowninthecaseofAngTibayv.CourtofIndustrial
Relation(69Phil.635).TheAngTibayDoctrineshouldbefollowedbeforeanybroadcast
stationmaybeclosed.TheAngTibayDoctrineprovidesthefollowingrequirements:

(1)
Therighttohearing,includestherighttopresentonescaseandsubmit
evidencepresented.
(2)
Thetribunalmustconsidertheevidencepresented
(3)
Thedecisionmusthavesomethingtosupportitself.
(4)
Evidencemust besubstantial (reasonableevidencethatisadequateto
supportconclusion)
(5)
Decisionmustbebasedontheevidencepresentedathearing
(6)
Thetribunalbodymustactonitsownindependentconsiderationoflaw
andfactsandnotsimplyacceptsubordinatesviews
(7)
Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can
knowthevariousissuedinvolvedandreasonsfordecisionsrendered.

The court stresses that while there is no controlling and precise definition of Due
Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in
orderthatdeprivationoflife,libertyandpropertyisvalid.

The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of
freedomofspeechandexpression.Thecourtstressesthatallformsofmedia,whether
printorbroadcastareentitledtothisconstitutionalright.Althoughthegovernmentstill
has the right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. The test for the limitation of freedom of expression is the clear and
presentdangerrule.Ifinthecircumstancesthatthemediaisusedinsuchnatureasto
createthisdangerthatwillbringinsuchevils,thenthelawhastherighttopreventit.
However,Radioandtelevisionmaynotbeusedtoorganizearebellionorsignalastart
of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the
vitality of a representative democracy. The people continues to have the right to be
informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to have the pervasive
influencetothepeoplebeingthemostaccessibleformofmedia.Therefore,broadcast
stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by the due
processandfreedomofexpressionclausesoftheConstitution.

ANGTIBAYVS.COURTOFINDUSTRIALRELATIONS(CIR)
98

P.J.G.

[69PHIL635;G.R.NO.46496;27FEB1940]

Facts:

TherewasagreementbetweenAngTibayandtheNationalLaborUnion,Inc(NLU).The
NLUallegedthatthesupposedlackofleathermaterialclaimedbyToribioTeodorowas
but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from
work.Andthisavermentisdesiredto beprovedbythepetitionerwiththerecordsof
theBureauofCustomsandBooksofAccountsofnativedealersinleather.ThatNational
Worker'sBrotherhoodUnionofAngTibayisacompanyoremployeruniondominated
by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided
thecaseandelevatedittotheSupremeCourt,butamotionfornewtrialwasraisedby
theNLU.ButtheAngTibayfiledamotionforopposingthesaidmotion.

Issue:

WhetherorNot,themotionfornewtrialismeritorioustobegranted.

Held:

To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a
special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is
theCommonwealthActNo.103).Itismoreanadministrativeboardthanapartofthe
integratedjudicialsystemofthenation.Itisnotintendedtobeamerereceptiveorgan
of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only
whenitsjurisdictionisinvokedanddecidingonlycasesthatarepresentedtoitbythe
partieslitigant,thefunctionoftheCIR,aswillappearfromperusalofitsorganiclawis
more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial
functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functionsarefarmorecomprehensiveandextensive.Ithasjurisdictionovertheentire
Philippines,toconsider,investigate,decide,andsettleanyquestion,mattercontroversy
or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers,
andlandlordsandtenantsorfarmlaborers,andregulatestherelationsbetweenthem,
subjectto,andinaccordancewith,theprovisionsofCA103.

AslaiddowninthecaseofGosecov.CIR,theSChadtheoccasiontopointoutthatthe
CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and
substantialmeritsofthecase,withoutregardtotechnicalitiesorlegalformsandshall
99

P.J.G.

notbeboundbyanytechnicalrulesoflegalevidencebutmayinformitsmindinsuch
mannerasitmaydeemjustandequitable.

Thefact,however,thattheCIRmaybesaidtobefreefromrigidityofcertainprocedural
requirements does not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely
ignoreordisregardthefundamentalandessentialrequirementsofdueprocessintrials
and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which
mustberespectedeveninproceedingsofthischaracter:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause
andsubmitevidenceinsupportthereof;
(2) Thetribunalmustconsidertheevidencepresented;
(3) Thedecisionmusthavesomethingtosupportitself;
(4) Theevidencemustbesubstantial;
(5) Thedecisionmustbebasedontheevidencepresentedatthehearing;
oratleastcontainedintherecordanddisclosedtothepartiesaffected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own
independentconsiderationofthelawandfactsofthecontroversy,and
notsimplyaccepttheviewsofasubordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its
decisioninsuchmannerthatthepartiestotheproceedingcanknowthe
variousIssueinvolved,andthereasonforthedecisionrendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the
partiesadverselyaffectedbytheresult.Accordingly,themotionforanewtrialshould
be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remandedtotheCIR,withinstructionthatitreopenthecasereceiveallsuchevidence
as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set
forth.Soordered.

ATENEODEMANILAUNIVERSITYVS.HON.JUDGEIGNACIOCAPULONG
[222SCRA644;G.R.99327;27MAY1993]

Facts:

100

P.J.G.

Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious
physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
BienvenidoMarquezwasalsohospitalizedattheCapitolMedicalCenterforacuterenal
failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint AdministrationFaculty
Student Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report
within72hoursonthecircumstancessurroundingthedeathofLennieVilla.Saidnotice
also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty
four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on
preventive suspension. The Joint AdministrationFacultyStudent Investigating
Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of
several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of
Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were
thenrequiredtofiletheirwrittenanswerstotheformalcharge.PetitionerDeancreated
aDisciplinaryBoardtohearthechargesagainstrespondentstudents.TheBoardfound
respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on
Disciplinewhichprohibitsparticipationinhazingactivities.However,inviewofthelack
ofunanimityamongthemembersoftheBoardonthepenaltyofdismissal,theBoard
left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr.
Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent
students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was
granted.ATROwasalsoissuedenjoiningpetitionersfromdismissingtherespondents.A
dayaftertheexpirationofthetemporaryrestrainingorder,DeandelCastillocreateda
SpecialBoardtoinvestigatethechargesofhazingagainstrespondentstudentsAbasand
Mendoza.Thiswasrequestedtobestrickenoutbytherespondentsandarguedthatthe
creationoftheSpecialBoardwastotallyunrelatedtotheoriginalpetitionwhichalleged
lackofdueprocess.Thiswasgrantedandreinstatementofthestudentswasordered.

Issue:

Wastheredenialofdueprocessagainsttherespondentstudents.

Held:

Therewasnodenialofdueprocess,moreparticularlyproceduraldueprocess.Deanof
the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their
written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the
101

P.J.G.

accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin
elementsofnoticeandhearing.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant
petitionunderRule65consideringthattheyfailedtofileamotionforreconsideration
firstbeforethetrialcourt,therebybypassingthelatterandtheCourtofAppeals.Itis
acceptedlegaldoctrinethatanexceptiontothedoctrineofexhaustionofremediesis
whenthecaseinvolvesaquestionoflaw,asinthiscase,wheretheissueiswhetheror
not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissalfromPetitionerUniversity.

Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in


academicinstitutions,suchaspetitioneruniversityherein,thus:

(1) thestudentsmustbeinformedinwritingofthenatureandcauseofany
accusationagainstthem;
(2) thattheyshallhavetherighttoanswerthechargesagainstthemwith
theassistanceofcounsel,ifdesired:
(3) theyshallbeinformedoftheevidenceagainstthem
(4) theyshallhavetherighttoadduceevidenceintheirownbehalf;and
(5) theevidencemustbedulyconsideredbytheinvestigatingcommitteeor
officialdesignatedbytheschoolauthoritiestohearanddecidethecase.

USGOVERNMENTVS.JUDGEPURUNGAN
[389SCRA623;G.R.NO.148571,24SEPT2002]

Facts:

The United States of America, pursuant to the existing RPUS extradition treaty,
requestedtheextraditionofMarkB.Jimenez.Uponreceiptoftherequest,thesecretary
offoreignaffairs(SFA)transmittedthemtothesecretaryofjustice(SOJ)forappropriate
action.Insuchevent,theRTCheldthatJimenezshellbedeprivedoftherighttonotice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Thereafter the US
government,throughDOJ,filedPetitionforExtraditionandJimenezsimmediatearrest,
to avoid flight. Before the RTC could render its decision, Jimenez filed an "Urgent
Manifestation/ExParte Motion," praying that his application for an arrest warrant be
setforhearing,whichwasgranted.Duringwhich,thelowercourtissueditsquestioned
102

P.J.G.

July3,2001Order,directingtheissuanceofawarrantforhisarrestandfixingbailforhis
temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After Jimenez had surrendered his
passportandpostedtherequiredcashbond,hewasgrantedprovisionallibertyviathe
challengedOrderdatedJuly4,2001.Thus,PetitionpraysfortheliftingofthebailOrder,
thecancellationofthebond,andthetakingofJimenezintolegalcustody.

Issue:

WhetherornotJimenezisentitledtonoticeandhearingbeforeawarrantforhisarrest
canbeissued.

Whether or not he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedingsarepending.

Held:

Bynature,extraditionproceedingsarenotequivalenttoacriminalcaseinwhichguiltor
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition case is not one in which the
constitutionalrightsoftheaccusedare necessarilyavailable.Havingonceescapedthe
jurisdictionoftherequestingstate,thereasonableprimafaciepresumptionisthatthe
person would escape again if given the opportunity. Hence, if the judge is convinced
that a prima facie case exists, he immediately Issue a warrant for the arrest of the
potential extraditee and summons him or her to answer and to appear at scheduled
hearingsonthepetition.Potentialextraditeesareentitledtotherightstodueprocess
andtofundamentalfairness.Dueprocessdoesnotalwayscallforaprioropportunityto
beheard.Asubsequentopportunityissufficientduetotheflightriskinvolved.Indeed,
available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be
heardandtoenjoyfundamentalfairnessthatiscompatiblewiththesummarynatureof
extradition.

After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the
applicantshaveahistoryofabsconding,theyhavetheburdenofshowingthat(a)there
is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special,
humanitarianorcompellingcircumstances. In extradition cases, bail isnota matter of
right;itissubjecttojudicialdiscretioninthecontextofthepeculiarfactsofeachcase.

103

P.J.G.

Art3,Sec.1.

EQUALPROTECTION

norshallanypersonbedeniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws.

PEOPLEVS.CAYAT
[68PHIL12;G.R.NO.45987;5MAY1939]

Facts:

Law prohibits any member of a nonChristian tribe to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any kind. The law, Act No. 1639,
exempts only the socalled native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes
havebeenaccustomedtotake.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthelawdeniesequalprotectiontooneprosecutedandsentencedfor
violationofsaidlaw.

Held:

No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of which is that the
classificationunderthelawmustrestonrealorsubstantialdistinctions.

The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of the non
ChristianandthemembersoftheChristiantribesisnotbaseduponaccidentofbirthor
parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term nonChristian
tribesreferstoageographicalareaandmoredirectlytonativesofthePhilippinesofa
lowgradecivilizationusuallylivingintribalrelationshipapartfromsettledcommunities.
ThedistinctionisreasonablefortheActwasintendedtomeetthepeculiarconditions
existinginthenonChristiantribes

The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to insure peace
andorderinandamongthenonChristiantribeshasoftenresultedinlawlessnessand
crimetherebyhamperingtheeffortsofthegovernmenttoraisetheirstandardsoflife
andcivilization.Thislawisnotlimitedinitsapplicationtoconditionsexistingatthetime
104

P.J.G.

oftheenactment.Itisintendedtoapplyforalltimesaslongasthoseconditionsexists.
TheActappliesequallytoallmembersoftheclass.Thatitmaybeunfairinitsoperation
againstacertainnumberofnonChristiansbyreasonoftheirdegreeofcultureisnotan
argument against the equality of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of the
classificationthusestablished.

PASEIVS.DRILON
[163SCRA386;L81958;30JUN1988]

Facts:

Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the


recruitmentofFilipinoworkers,maleandfemaleofoverseasemployment.Itchallenges
the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines
Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and
Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females.TheOrderdoesnotapplytoallFilipinoworkersbutonlytodomestichelpers
and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also
beinganinvalidexerciseofthelawmakingpower.Further,PASEIinvokesSec3ofArt13
of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decisionmaking
processesaffectingtheirrightsandbenefitsasmaybeprovidedbylaw.Thereafterthe
Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the
respondenthaveliftedthedeploymentbaninsomestateswherethereexistsbilateral
agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguardstoensurethewelfareandprotectionoftheFilipinoworkers.

Issue:

WhetherornottherehasbeenavalidclassificationinthechallengedDepartmentOrder
No.1.

Held:

105

P.J.G.

SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino
femaledomesticsworkingabroadwereinaclassbythemselves,becauseofthespecial
risktowhichtheirclasswasexposed.ThereisnoquestionthatOrderNo.1appliesonly
to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
betweensexes.Itiswellsettledhatequalitybeforethelawundertheconstitutiondoes
not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classification,providedthat:

1. Suchclassificationrestsonsubstantialdistinctions
2. Thattheyaregermanetothepurposeofthelaw
3. Theyarenotconfinedtoexistingconditions
4. Theyapplyequallytoalmembersofthesameclass

Inthecaseatbar,theclassificationsmade,restonsubstantialdistinctions.

Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the
deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to
travelissubjectsamongotherthings,totherequirementsofpublicsafetyasmaybe
providedbylaw.Deploymentbanoffemaledomestichelperisavalidexerciseofpolice
power.Policepowerasbeendefinedasthestateauthoritytoenactlegislationthatmay
interferewithpersonallibertyorpropertyinordertopromotegeneralwelfare.Neither
is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid
exerciseoflegislativepowerasthelaborcodevesttheDOLEwithrulemakingpowers.

DUMLAOVS.COMELEC
[95SCRA392;L52245;22JAN1980]

Facts:

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as


discriminatoryandcontrarytotheequalprotectionanddueprocessguaranteesofthe
Constitution.

Section 4 provided that any retired municipal or provincial city official that already
receivedretirementbenefitsandis65yearsofageshallnotbequalifiedtorunforthe
samelocalelectiveofficefromwhichhehasretired.

Issue:
106

P.J.G.

Whether or Not Sec. 4 of BP.52 is unconstitutional being contrary to the equal


protectionanddueprocessrights.

Held:

No. The guarantee of equal protection is subject to rational classification based on


reasonable and real differentiations. In the present case, employees 65 years of age
have been classified differently from younger employees. The former are subject to
compulsoryretirementwhilethelatterarenot.

Retirementisnotareasonabledisqualificationforelectivelocalofficialsbecausethere
canberetireeswhoareevenyoungeranda65yearoldretireecouldbeasgoodasa65
year old official who is not a retiree. But there is reason to disqualify a 65 year old
electiveofficialwhoistryingtorunforofficebecausethereistheneedfornewblood
toassumerelevance.Whenanofficialhasretiredhehasalreadydeclaredhimselftired
andunavailableforthesamegovernmentwork.

WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby


declaredvalid.

TELECOMMUNICATIONSANDBROADCASTATTORNEYSOFTHEPHILS.VS.COMELEC
[289SCRA337;G.R.NO.132922;21APR1998]

Facts:

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.


(TELEBAP)isanorganizationoflawyersofradioandtelevisionbroadcastingcompanies.
Itwasdeclaredtobewithoutlegalstandingtosueinthiscaseas,amongotherreasons,
itwasnotabletoshowthatitwastosufferfromactualorthreatenedinjuryasaresult
of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite
standingtobringtheconstitutionalchallenge.Petitioneroperatesradioandtelevision
broadcaststationsinthePhilippinesaffectedbytheenforcementofSection92,B.P.No.
881.

PetitionerschallengethevalidityofSection92,B.P.No.881whichprovides:
ComelecTimeTheCommissionshallprocureradioandtelevisiontimeto
be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and
107

P.J.G.

impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio
and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcastingandtelevisionstationsareherebyamendedsoastoprovide
radioortelevisiontime,freeofcharge,duringtheperiodofcampaign.

PetitionercontendsthatwhileSection90ofthesamelawrequiresCOMELECtoprocure
print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air
time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92
singlesoutradioandtelevisionstationstoprovidefreeairtime.

Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial
electionandthatitstandstosufferevenmoreshoulditberequiredtodosoagainthis
year. Petitionersclaimthattheprimary sourceof revenueoftheradioandtelevision
stationsisthesaleofairtimetoadvertisersandtorequirethesestationstoprovidefree
air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in
1992itlostP22,498,560.00inprovidingfreeairtimeforonehoureachdayand,inthis
yearselections,itstandstolostP58,980,850.00inviewofCOMELECsrequirementthat
itprovideatleast30minutesofprimetimedailyforsuch.

Issue:

Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companiestheequalprotectionofthelaws.

Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
processoflawandwithoutjustcompensation.

Held:

Petitionersargumentiswithoutmerit.Allbroadcasting,whetherradioorbytelevision
stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as
therearemoreindividualswhowanttobroadcastthattherearefrequenciestoassign.
Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own
the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images.Theyaremerelygiventhetemporaryprivilegetousethem.Thus,suchexercise
of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
someformofpublicservice.Ingrantingtheprivilegetooperatebroadcaststationsand
108

P.J.G.

supervisingradioandtelevisionstations,thestatespendsconsiderablepublicfundsin
licensingandsupervisingthem.

The argumentthatthe subjectlaw singles out radio and television stations to provide
free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit.
Regulationofthebroadcastindustryrequiresspendingofpublicfundswhichitdoesnot
dointhecaseofprintmedia.Torequirethebroadcastindustrytoprovidefreeairtime
forCOMELECisafairexchangeforwhattheindustrygets.

Asradioandtelevisionbroadcaststationsdonotowntheairwaves,noprivateproperty
istakenbytherequirementthattheyprovideairtimetotheCOMELEC.

LACSONVS.EXECUTIVESECRETARY
[301SCRA298;G.R.NO.128096;20JAN1999]

Facts:

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized


crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the AntiBank
Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG
werepetitionersandpetitionerintervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal
Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and
not a shootout between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said
incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a
review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for
multiplemurderagainsttwentysixrespondentsincludinghereinpetitioner,chargedas
principal, and herein petitionerintervenors, charged as accessories. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the
Sandiganbayan,wherepetitionerwaschargedonlyasanaccessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
assertingthatundertheamendedinformations,thecasesfallwithinthejurisdictionof
theRegionalTrialCourtpursuanttoSection2ofR.A.7975.Theycontendthatthesaid
law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the
109

P.J.G.

principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP
officialswithrankofChiefSuperintendentorhigher.Thus,theydidnotqualifyunder
saidrequisites.However,pendingresolutionoftheirmotions,R.A.8249wasapproved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from
thephraseprincipalaccusedinSection2ofR.A.7975.

PetitionerquestionstheconstitutionalityofSection4ofR.A.8249,includingSection7
whichprovidesthatthesaidlawshallapplytoallcasespendinginanycourtoverwhich
trialhasnotbegunasoftheapprovalhereof.

Issue:

Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due
processandtheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitutionastheprovisionsseemedto
havebeenintroducedfortheSandiganbayantocontinuetoacquirejurisdictionoverthe
KuratongBalelengcase.

Whetherornotsaidstatutemaybeconsideredasanexpostfactostatute.

WhetherornotthemultiplemurderoftheallegedmembersoftheKuratongBaleleng
wascommittedinrelationtotheofficeoftheaccusedPNPofficerswhichisessentialto
the determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial
Courtsjurisdiction.

Held:

PetitionerandintervenorsposturethatSections4and7ofR.A.8249violatetheirright
to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence
and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every
classificationmadebythelawispresumedreasonableandthepartywhochallengesthe
law must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of
whicharepresentinthiscase.

ParagraphaofSection4providesthatitshallapplytoallcasesinvolvingcertainpublic
officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any
court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly
110

P.J.G.

directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only
covercaseswhichareintheSandiganbayanbutalsoinanycourt.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides
retroactiveeffectofpenallaws.R.A.8249isnotapenallaw.Itisasubstantivelawon
jurisdictionwhichisnotpenalincharacter.PenallawsarethoseactsoftheLegislature
which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that
define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can
properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A.
8249cannotbechallengedasunconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in
relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate
relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended
information,therewasnospecificallegationoffactsthattheshootingofthevictimby
thesaidprincipalaccusedwasintimatelyrelatedtothedischargeoftheirofficialduties
as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said
accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their
custody.Thestringentrequirementthatthechargesetforthwithsuchparticularityas
will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committedinrelationtohisofficewasnotestablished.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of
murderwasintimatelyconnectedwiththedischargeofofficialfunctionsoftheaccused
PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and,
therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not
theSandiganbayan.

INT'L.SCHOOLALLIANCEVS.QUISUMBING
[333SCRA13;G.R.NO.128845;1JUN2000]

Facts:

111

P.J.G.

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the localhires of private
respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the localhires
arepaidmorethantheircolleaguesinotherschoolsis,ofcourse,besidethepoint.The
pointisthatemployeesshouldbegivenequalpayforworkofequalvalue.

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to
Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for
dependentsofforeigndiplomaticpersonnelandothertemporaryresidents.Toenable
theSchooltocontinuecarryingoutitseducationalprogramandimproveitsstandardof
instruction,Section2(c)ofthesamedecreeauthorizestheSchoolto
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or
abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from
otherwiseapplicablelawsandregulationsattendingtheiremployment,exceptlawsthat
havebeenorwillbeenactedfortheprotectionofemployees.
Accordingly,theSchoolhiresbothforeignandlocalteachersasmembersofitsfaculty,
classifyingthesameintotwo:(1)foreignhiresand(2)localhires.

TheSchoolgrantsforeignhirescertainbenefitsnotaccordedlocalhires.Theseinclude
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance.
Foreignhiresarealsopaidasalaryratetwentyfivepercent(25%)morethanlocalhires.
TheSchooljustifiesthedifferenceontwo"significanteconomicdisadvantages"foreign
hireshavetoendure,namely:(a)the"dislocationfactor"and(b)limitedtenure.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthegrantsprovidedbytheschooltoforeignhiresandnottolocalhires
discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.

Held:

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long


honoredlegaltruismof"equalpayforequalwork."Personswhoworkwithsubstantially
equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be
paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.

TheSchoolcontendsthatpetitionerhasnotadducedevidencethatlocalhiresperform
workequaltothatofforeignhires.TheCourtfindsthisargumentalittlecavalier.Ifan
employeraccordsemployeesthesamepositionandrank,thepresumptionisthatthese
112

P.J.G.

employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that
employeetoexplainwhyhereceiveslessorwhytheothersreceivemore.Thatwould
beaddinginsulttoinjury.Theemployerhasdiscriminatedagainstthatemployee;itis
fortheemployertoexplainwhytheemployeeistreatedunfairly.

WhilewerecognizetheneedoftheSchooltoattractforeignhires,salariesshouldnot
be used as an enticement to the prejudice of localhires. The localhires perform the
sameservicesasforeignhiresandtheyoughttobepaidthesamesalariesasthelatter.
Forthesamereason,the"dislocationfactor"andtheforeignhires'limitedtenurealso
cannotserveasvalidbasesforthedistinctioninsalaryrates.

TheConstitutionenjoinstheStateto"protecttherightsofworkersandpromotetheir
welfare,""toaffordlaborfullprotection."TheState,therefore,hastherightanddutyto
regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely
contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargainingagreementsincluded,mustyieldtothecommongood.Shouldsuchcontracts
containstipulationsthatarecontrarytopublicpolicy,courtswillnothesitatetostrike
downthesestipulations.

Inthiscase,wefindthepointofhireclassificationemployedbyrespondent Schoolto
justifythedistinctioninthesalaryratesofforeignhiresandlocalhirestobeaninvalid
classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
foreignhiresandlocalhires.

Wherefore,thepetitionisgivenduecourse.Thepetitionisherebygrantedinpart.The
orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19,
1997, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondentschoolofaccordingforeignhireshighersalariesthanlocalhires.

ORMOCSUGARCOMPANYVS.TREASUREROFORMOCCITY
[22SCRA603;L23794;17FEB1968]

Facts:

OnJanuary29,1964,theMunicipalBoardofOrmocCitypassedOrdinanceNo.4,Series
of1964,imposing"onanyandallproductionsofcentrifugalsugarmilledattheOrmoc
SugarCompany,Inc.,inOrmocCityamunicipaltaxequivalenttoonepercentum(1%)
113

P.J.G.

perexportsaletotheUnitedStatesofAmericaandotherforeigncountries."Payments
for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on March 20,
1964forP7,087.50andonApril20,1964forP5,000,oratotalofP12,087.50.

OnJune1,1964,OrmocSugarCompany,Inc.filedbeforetheCourtofFirstInstanceof
Leyte,withserviceofacopyupontheSolicitorGeneral,acomplaint againsttheCityof
Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore
stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
(Sec.1[1],Art.III,Constitution)andtheruleofuniformityoftaxation(Sec.22[1]),Art.
VI,Constitution).

Answering,thedefendantsassertedthatthetaxordinancewaswithindefendantcity's
power to enact under the Local Autonomy Act and that the same did not violate the
aforecited constitutional limitations. After pretrial and submission of the case on
memoranda, the Court of First Instance, on August 6, 1964, rendered a decision that
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared the taxing power of
defendant chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to include all other
formsoftaxes,licensesorfeesnotexcludedinitscharter.

Issue:

Whether or Not the ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protectionclauseunderSec.1[1],Art.III,Constitution.

Whether or not it was violative of the rule of uniformity of taxation under the Bill of
Rights,Sec.22[1],Art.VI,Constitution.

Held:

TheConstitutioninthebillofrightsprovides:"...norshallanypersonbedeniedthe
equalprotectionofthelaws."(Sec.1[1],Art.III)InFelwavs.Salas, Weruledthatthe
equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is
reasonablewhere(1)itisbasedonsubstantialdistinctionswhichmakerealdifferences;
(2)thesearegermanetothepurposeofthelaw;(3)theclassificationappliesnotonlyto
present conditions but also to future conditions which are substantially identical to
thoseofthepresent;(4)theclassificationappliesonlytothosewhobelongtothesame
class.

114

P.J.G.

Aperusaloftherequisitesinstantlyshowsthatthequestionedordinancedoesnotmeet
them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar
Company,Inc.andnoneother.Atthetimeofthetaxingordinance'senactment,Ormoc
SugarCompany,Inc.,itistrue,wastheonlysugarcentralinthecityofOrmoc.Still,the
classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future conditions as
well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequentlyestablishedsugarcentral,ofthesameclassasplaintiff,forthecoverageof
thetax.Asitisnow,eveniflaterasimilarcompanyissetup,itcannotbesubjecttothe
taxbecausetheordinanceexpresslypointsonlytoOrmocCitySugarCompany,Inc.as
theentitytobeleviedupon.

Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were
not arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). 6 At the time of
collection,theordinanceprovidedasufficientbasistoprecludearbitrariness,thesame
beingthenpresumedconstitutionaluntildeclaredotherwise.

Wherefore,thedecisionappealedfromisherebyreversed,thechallengedordinanceis
declared unconstitutional and the defendantsappellees are hereby ordered to refund
theP12,087.50plaintiffappellantpaidunderprotest.Nocosts.Soordered.
PHILIPPINEJUDGESASSO.VS.PRADO
[227SCRA703;G.R.NO.105371;11NOV1993]

Facts:

ThePhilippinePostalCorporationissuedcircularNo.9228toimplementSection35of
RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and
LandRegistrationCommissionandwithcertainothergovernmentoffices.Itisalleged
that RA 7354 is discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from
judiciary, it retains the same for the President & VicePresident of the Philippines,
Senator & members of the House of Representatives, COMELEC, National Census &
Statistics Office and the general public. The respondents counter that there is no
discriminationbecausethelawisbasedonavalidclassificationinaccordancewiththe
equalprotectionclause.

Issue:

WhetherorNotSection35ofRA7354isconstitutional.

Held:
115

P.J.G.

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every
unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Section 1 of the
Constitution to provide for amore specific guarantee against any form of undue
favoritismorhostilityfromthegovernment.Arbitrarinessingeneralmaybechallenged
onthebasisofthedueprocessclause.Butiftheparticularactassailedpartakesofan
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal
protectionclause.Equal protectionsimplyrequiresthatallpersonsor thingssimilarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed.Whattheclauserequiresisequalityamongequalsasdeterminedaccordingto
avalidclassification.Section35ofRA7354isdeclaredunconstitutional.CircularNo.92
28issetasideinsofar

116

P.J.G.

SEARCHESANDSEIZURES

Art3,Sec.2.
Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,papers,
andeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatevernatureandforany
purposeshallbeinviolable,andnosearchwarrantorwarrantofarrestshallissueexcept
uponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudgeafterexaminationunder
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.

Art3,Sec.3.
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolableexceptuponlawfulorderofthecourt,orwhenpublicsafetyororderrequires
otherwiseasprescribedbylaw.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissibleforanypurposeinanyproceeding.

PEOPLEVS.MARTI
[193SCRA57;G.R.NO.81561;18JAN1991]

Facts:

Accusedappellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in


Zurich. Initially, the accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be
examined. However, he refused. Before delivering said packages to the Bureau of
Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress opened said boxes
forfinalinspection.Fromthatinspection,includedinthestandardoperatingprocedure
andoutofcuriosity,hetookseveralgramsofitscontents.

HebroughtaletterandthesaidsampletotheNationalBureauofInvestigation.When
theNBIwasinformedthattherestoftheshipmentwasstillinhisoffice,threeagents
went back with him. In their presence, the husband totally opened the packages.
Afterwards,theNBItookcustodyofsaidpackages.Thecontents,afterexaminationby
forensicchemists,werefoundtobemarijuanafloweringtops.

The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the
agents for questioning. Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the
DangerousDrugsAct.

117

P.J.G.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheitemsadmittedinthesearchedillegallysearchedandseized.

WhetherorNotcustodialinvestigationproperlyapplied.

WhetherorNotthetrialcourtnotgivecredencetotheexplanationoftheappellanton
howsaidpackagescametohispossession.

Held:

No. The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excludedwasprimarilydiscoveredandobtainedbyaprivateperson,actinginaprivate
capacityandwithouttheinterventionandparticipationofStateauthorities.Underthe
circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against
unreasonablesearchesandseizurehasbeenviolated.Statedotherwise,mayanactofa
private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
againsttheState.Intheabsenceofgovernmentalinterference,thelibertiesguaranteed
by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the
proprietoroftheforwardingagency,whomadesearch/inspectionofthepackages.Said
inspectionwasreasonableandastandardoperatingprocedureonthepartofMr.Reyes
asaprecautionarymeasurebeforedeliveryofpackagestotheBureauofCustomsorthe
Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the
reasonablesearcheffectedbyReyesintoawarrantlesssearchandseizureproscribedby
the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.Havingobservedthatwhichisopen,wherenotrespasshasbeencommittedin
aidthereof,isnotsearch.
No. The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his
constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties
(See.5(m),Rule131)andtheirtestimoniesshouldbegivenfullfaithandcredence,there
beingnoevidencetothecontrary.
No.Appellantsignedthecontractastheownerandshipperthereofgivingmoreweight
tothepresumptionthatthingswhichapersonpossesses,orexercisesactsofownership
over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore
estoppedtoclaimotherwise.

WATEROUSDRUGVS.NLRC
118

P.J.G.

[280SCRA735;G.R.NO.113271;16OCT1997]

Facts:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation on 15


August1988.On31July1989,Catolicoreceivedamemorandum fromWATEROUSVice
PresidentGeneral Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to dispense medicine to
employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a prohibited
practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her
not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing
Department,asthiswouldimpairthecompany'scontrolofpurchasesand,besidesshe
wasnotauthorizedtodealdirectlywiththesuppliers.

Asregardsthefirstmemorandum,Catolicodidnotdenyherresponsibilitybutexplained
thatheractwas"duetonegligence,"sincefellowemployeeIreneSoliven"obtainedthe
medicines inbad faithandthrough misrepresentation when she claimed thatshewas
givenachargeslipbytheAdmittingDept."Catolicothenaskedthecompanytolookinto
thefraudulentactivitiesofSoliven.

In a memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E.


Bautro warned Catolico against the "rush delivery of medicines without the proper
documents."On29January1990,WATEROUSControlClerkEugenioValdezinformedCo
thathenoticedanirregularityinvolvingCatolicoandYungShinPharmaceuticals,Inc.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain,
within twentyfour hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for
additionaltimetogiveherexplanation,andshewasgranteda48hourextensionfrom1
to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6
February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to
protecttheinterestsofthecompany.

Inaletterdated2February1990,CatolicorequestedaccesstothefilecontainingSales
InvoiceNo.266forhertobeabletomakeasatisfactoryexplanation.Insaidlettershe
protested Saldaa's invasion of her privacy when Saldaa opened an envelope
addressedtoCatolico.

Inaletter toCodated10February1990,Catolico,throughhercounsel,explainedthat
thecheckshereceivedfromYSPwasaChristmasgiftandnota"refundofoverprice."
Shealsoaverredthatthepreventivesuspensionwasillmotivated,asitsprangfroman
earlierincidentbetweenherandCo'ssecretary,IreneSoliven.
119

P.J.G.

On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum


notifyingCatolicoofhertermination.On5May1990,CatolicofiledbeforetheOfficeof
the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal
suspension.Inhisdecisionof10May1993,LaborArbiterAlexArcadioLopezfoundno
proof of unfair labor practice against petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of
Catolicobecausepetitionersfailedto"provewhatallegedascomplainant'sdishonesty,"
and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowedreinstatement.

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside
because the Labor Arbiter erred in finding that Catolico was denied due process and
thattherewasnojustcausetoterminateherservices.
Initsdecisionof30September1993,theNLRCaffirmedthefindingsoftheLaborArbiter
on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's
dismissalfromheremployment.Itfoundthatpetitioner'sevidenceconsistedonlyofthe
check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her coemployee saw
whenthelatteropenedtheenvelope.But,itdeclaredthatthecheckwasinadmissiblein
evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution. It
concluded:

With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered


inadmissible,byvirtueoftheconstitutionalrightinvokedbycomplainants,
respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be
usedasalegalbasisforcomplainant'sdismissal.

The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive
portion of the appealed decision by deleting the award for illegal suspension as the
same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the awards in the
amountofP35,401.86.

Issue:

Whether or Not the dismissal of the private respondent is in violation of the


Constitution,undertheBillofRights.

Held:
120

P.J.G.

As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving
"commissions"fromYSP,orprobablyfromothersuppliers,andthatthecheckissuedto
heron9November1989wasnotthefirstorthelast.TheyalsomaintainedthatCatolico
occupiedaconfidentialpositionandthatCatolico'sreceiptofYSP'scheck,aggravatedby
her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And
contrary to the findings of NLRC, Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her
sideofthecontroversy.

InherComment,Catolicoassertsthatpetitioners'evidenceistoo"flimsy"tojustifyher
dismissal.Thecheckinissuewasgiventoher,andshehadnodutytoturnitovertoher
employer.Companyrulesdonotprohibitanemployeefromacceptinggiftsfromclients,
and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for
overpriced medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the
constitutionalprovisionontherighttoprivacyandcommunication;hence,ascorrectly
heldbytheNLRC,itwasinadmissibleinevidence.

Catolicowasdenieddueprocess.Proceduraldueprocessrequiresthatanemployeebe
apprised of the charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge,
allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself, and assisted by a
representative if the employee so desires. Ample opportunity connotes every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to enable him to prepare
adequatelyforhisdefense,includinglegalrepresentation.Inthecaseatbar,although
Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the
serviceinthememorandumof5March1990issuedbyherSupervisorafterreceiptof
herletterandthatofhercounsel.Nohearingwaseverconductedaftertheissueswere
joinedthroughsaidletters.

Catolicowasalsounjustlydismissed.Itissettledthattheburdenisontheemployerto
provejustandvalidcausefordismissinganemployee,anditsfailuretodischargethat
burdenwouldresultinafindingthatthedismissalisunjustified.Itclearlyappearsthen
that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Catolico's dismissal then
wasobviouslygroundedonmeresuspicion,whichinnocasecanjustifyanemployee's
dismissal. Suspicion is notamong thevalid causes provided by theLaborCode forthe
terminationofemployment;andeventhedismissalofanemployeeforlossoftrustand
confidence must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employer's arbitrariness,
whims, caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial
employee,towhichclassofemployeestheterm"trustandconfidence"isrestricted.
121

P.J.G.

AsregardstheconstitutionalviolationuponwhichtheNLRCanchoreditsdecision,that
the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
perpetratedbyprivateindividuals.Itisnottrue,ascounselforCatolicoclaims,thatthe
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel
admits,suchaninvasiongivesrisetobothcriminalandcivilliabilities.

Finally,sinceithasbeendeterminedbytheLaborArbiterthatCatolico'sreinstatement
wouldnotbetothebestinterestoftheparties,hecorrectlyawardedseparationpayto
Catolico.Separationpayinlieuofreinstatementiscomputedatonemonth'ssalaryfor
every year of service. In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the
separation pay at onehalf month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not
oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the award of separation pay as
fixedbytheLaborArbiter.

WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisherebyDISMISSEDandthechallengeddecisionand
resolutionoftheNationalLaborRelationsCommissiondated30September1993and2
December1993,respectively,inNLRCNCRCANo.00516093areAFFIRMED,exceptas
toitsreasonfor upholding theLabor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidenceagainst
private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights of privacy of communication and against unreasonable searches
andseizureswhichisherebysetaside.

STONEHILLVS.DIOKNO
[20SCRA383;L19550;19JUN1967]

Facts:

Uponapplicationoftheofficersofthegovernmentnamedonthemargin1hereinafter
referredtoasRespondentsProsecutorsseveraljudges2hereinafterreferredtoas
RespondentsJudgesissued,ondifferentdates,3atotalof42searchwarrantsagainst
petitionersherein4and/orthecorporationsofwhichtheywereofficers,5directedtothe
any peace officer, to search the persons abovenamed and/or the premises of their
offices,warehousesand/orresidences,andtoseizeandtakepossessionofthefollowing
personalpropertytowit:
Booksofaccounts,financialrecords,vouchers,correspondence,receipts,ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or
papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balancesheetsandprofitandlossstatementsandBobbins(cigarettewrappers).
122

P.J.G.

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws,TariffandCustomsLaws,InternalRevenue(Code)andtheRevisedPenalCode."

Petitionerscontentionsare:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be
seized;
(2) cashmoney,notmentionedinthewarrants,wereactuallyseized;
(3) thewarrantswereissuedtofishevidenceagainsttheaforementionedpetitionersin
deportationcasesfiledagainstthem;
(4) thesearchesandseizuresweremadeinanillegalmanner;and
(5) thedocuments,papersandcashmoneyseizedwerenotdeliveredtothecourtsthat
issuedthewarrants,tobedisposedofinaccordancewithlaw

Respondentsprosecutorscontentions
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance
withlaw;
(2) thatthedefectsofsaidwarrants,ifany,werecuredbypetitioners'consent;and
(3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners,regardlessofthe allegedillegalityof theaforementionedsearchesand
seizures.

Thedocuments,papers,andthingsseizedundertheallegedauthorityofthewarrantsin
questionmaybesplitintotwo(2)majorgroups,namely:(a)thosefoundandseizedin
theofficesoftheaforementionedcorporations,and(b)thosefound andseizedinthe
residencesofpetitionersherein.

Issue:

Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporationsareobtainedlegally.

Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are
obtainedlegally.

Held:

123

P.J.G.

Thepetitionershavenocauseofactiontoassailthelegalityofthecontestedwarrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personalityofhereinpetitioners,regardlessoftheamountofsharesofstockorofthe
interestofeachoftheminsaidcorporations,andwhatevertheofficestheyholdtherein
maybe.Indeed,itiswellsettledthatthelegalityofaseizurecanbecontestedonlyby
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawfulsearchandseizureispurelypersonalandcannotbeavailedofbythirdparties.

Withrespecttothedocuments,papersandthingsseizedintheresidencesofpetitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein
RespondentsProsecutorsfromusingtheminevidenceagainstpetitionersherein.
Twopointsmustbestressedinconnectionwiththisconstitutionalmandate,namely:(1)
thatnowarrantshallissuebutuponprobablecause,tobedeterminedbythejudgein
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly
describethethingstobeseized.

Noneoftheserequirementshasbeencompliedwithinthecontestedwarrants.Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offensehadbeenallegedinsaidapplications.Theavermentsthereofwithrespecttothe
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
whoissuedthewarrants to havefoundtheexistenceof probablecause, forthesame
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is
soughthasperformedparticularacts,orcommittedspecificomissions,violatingagiven
provisionofourcriminallaws.Asamatteroffact,theapplicationsinvolvedinthiscase
do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal
heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as
alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provisionofsaidlawsor
__________________________

Hon.JoseW.Diokno,inhiscapacityasSecretaryofJustice,JoseLukban,inhiscapacity
as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D.
Cenzon,EfrenI. PlanaandManuel Villareal,Jr.andAssistantFiscalManeses G. Reyes,
CityofManila.
124

P.J.G.

Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman
Cansino, JudgeoftheMunicipal(nowCity)Court ofManila,Hon.Hermogenes Caluag,
JudgeoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,QuezonCityBranch,Hon.EulogioMencias,
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez,
JudgeoftheMunicipal(nowCity)CourtofQuezonCity.
3
CoveringtheperiodfromMarch3toMarch9,1962.
4
HarryS.Stonehill,RobertP.Brooks,JohnJ.BrooksandKarlBeck.
5
U.S.TobaccoCorporation,AtlasCementCorporation,AtlasDevelopmentCorporation,
Far East Publishing Corporation (Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business
Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil
Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass
Corporation, Industrial and Business Management Corporation, United Housing
Corporation, The Philippine TobaccoFlueCuring and Redrying Corporation, Republic
RealEstateCorporationandMerconselCorporation.

BURGOS,SR.V.CHIEFOFSTAFF,AFP
[133SCRA800;G.R.NO.64261;26DEC1984]

Facts:

Petitioners assail the validity of 2 search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by


respondentJudgeCruzPanoofthethenCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,underwhichthe
premisesknownas No.19,Road3,Project6,Quezon City,and784 UnitsC& D,RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers,documents,booksandotherwrittenliteratureallegedtobe inthe possession
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publishereditor of the "We Forum"
newspaper,wereseized.Asaconsequenceofthesearchandseizure,thesepremises
werepadlockedandsealed,withthefurtherresultthattheprintingandpublicationof
saidnewspaperswerediscontinued.Respondentscontendthatpetitionersshouldhave
filed amotion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them beforeimpugning
the validity of the same before this Court. Respondents also assail the petition on
groundoflaches(Failureornegligenceforanunreasonableandunexplainedlengthof
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier.Itisnegligenceoromissiontoassertarightwithinareasonabletime,warranting
apresumptionthatthepartyentitledtoassertiteitherhasabandoneditordeclinedto
125

P.J.G.

assertit).Respondentsfurtherstatethatsincepetitionerhadalreadyusedasevidence
someofthedocumentsseizedinapriorcriminalcase,heisstoppedfromchallenging
thevalidityofthesearchwarrants.

Petitionerssubmitthefollowingreasonstonullifythequestionedwarrants:
1. RespondentJudgefailedtoconductanexaminationunderoathoraffirmationof
theapplicantandhiswitnesses,asmandatedbytheabovequotedconstitutional
provisionaswellasSec.4,Rule126oftheRulesofCourt.
2. The search warrants pinpointed only one address which would be the former
abovementionedaddress.
3. Articles belonging to his copetitioners were also seized although the warrants
wereonlydirectedagainstJoseBurgos,Jr.
4. Realpropertieswereseized.
5. Theapplicationalongwithajointaffidavit,uponwhichthewarrantswereissued,
from the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group could not have provided
sufficientbasisforthefindingofaprobablecauseuponwhichawarrantmaybe
validlyissuedinaccordancewithSection3,ArticleIVofthe1973Constitution.

Respondentsjustifythecontinuedsealingoftheprintingmachinesonthegroundthat
they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as
amended, which authorizes sequestration of the property of any person engaged in
subversiveactivitiesagainstthegovernmentinaccordancewithimplementingrulesand
regulationsasmaybeissuedbytheSecretaryofNationalDefense.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthe2searchwarrantswerevalidlyissuedandexecuted.

Held:

In regard to the quashal of warrants that petitioners should have initially filed to the
lowercourt,thisCourttakescognizanceofthispetitioninviewoftheseriousnessand
urgencyoftheconstitutionalIssueraised,nottomentionthepublicinterestgenerated
bythesearchofthe"We Forum" offices which was televised in Channel 7 and widely
publicizedinallmetropolitandailies.Theexistenceofthisspecialcircumstancejustifies
this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. With the contention
pertaining to laches, the petitioners gave an explanation evidencing that they have
exhaustedotherextrajudicialeffortstoremedythesituation,negatingthepresumption
thattheyhaveabandonedtheirrighttothepossessionoftheseizedproperty.
126

P.J.G.

Ontheenumeratedreasons:
1. This objection may properly be considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselvesconcededduringthehearingonAugust9,1983,thatanexamination
had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to
searchtwodistinctpremises.Itwouldbequiteabsurdandillogicalforrespondent
judgetohaveissuedtwowarrantsintendedforoneandthesameplace.
3. Section2,Rule126,oftheRulesofCourt,doesnotrequirethatthepropertyto
be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
directed.Itmayormaynotbeownedbyhim.
4. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which
the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question,
while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to
seizureunderasearchwarrant.
5. Thebroadstatementsintheapplicationandjointaffidavitaremereconclusions
oflawanddoesnotsatisfytherequirementsofprobablecause.Deficientofsuch
particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegationcannotserveasbasisfortheissuanceofasearchwarrantanditwasa
grave error for respondent judge to have done so. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance,this Court ruled that "theoath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
thepurposethereofistoconvincethecommittingmagistrate,nottheindividual
makingtheaffidavitandseekingtheissuanceofthewarrant,oftheexistenceof
probable cause." Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. The description of the articles sought to be seized under the
searchwarrantsinquestionaretoogeneral.

With regard to the respondents invoking PD 885, there is an absence of any


implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National Defense.
Furthermore, President Marcos himself denies the request of military authorities to
sequesterthepropertyseizedfrompetitioners.Theclosureofthepremisessubjected
to search and seizure is contrary to the freedom of the press as guaranteed in our
fundamentallaw.Thesearchwarrantsaredeclarednullandvoid.

127

P.J.G.

TAMBASENVS.PEOPLE
[246SCRA184;G.R.NO.89103;14JUL1995]

Facts:

In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant alleging that he
receivedinformationthatPetitionerhadinhispossessionathishouseM16Armalite
rifles,handgrenades,.45Cal.pistols,dynamitesticksandsubversivedocuments,which
wereusedorintendedtobeusedforillegalpurposes.Theapplicationwasgranted.

InSeptember,apoliceteam,searchedthehouseofpetitionerandseized2envelopes
containingP14000,handsetwithantennae,transceiverwithantennae,regulatorsupply,
academy notebook and assorted papers and handset battery pack. In October,
petitioner moved that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized
articlesbereturnedtohim.InDecember,MTCC,initsorder,directedLt.Col.Torresto
return the money seized to petitioner ruling that any seizure should be limited to the
specifieditemscoveredthereby.SolGenpetitionedwiththeRTCfortheannulmentof
the order of MTCC citing that pending the determination of legality of seizure of the
articles,theyshouldremainincustogialegis.RTCgrantedthepetition.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the search
warrantwaslegal.

Held:

Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should
particularlydescribethethingstobeseized.Thepoliceactsbeyondtheparametersof
theirauthorityiftheyseizearticlesnotdescribedinthesearchwarrants.Theevident
purposeandintentoftherequirementisto limitthethings tobeseized,to leavethe
officersofthelawwithnodiscretion;thatunreasonablesearchandseizuremaynotbe
madeandthatabusesmaynotbecommitted.

Petitiongranted.PeopleofthePhilippinesisorderedtoreturnthemoneyseized.

PLACERVS.JUDGEVILLANUEVA
[126SCRA463;G.R.NOS.L6034962;29DEC1983]
128

P.J.G.

Facts:

Petitioners filed informations in the city court and they certified that Preliminary
Investigation and Examination had been conducted and that prima facie cases have
beenfound.Uponreceiptofsaidinformations,respondentjudgesetthehearingofthe
criminal cases to determine propriety of issuance of warrants of arrest. After the
hearing, respondent issued an order requiring petitioners to submit to the court
affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the
informationstoaidhimintheexerciseofhispowerofjudicialreviewofthefindingsof
probable cause by petitioners. Petitioners petitioned for certiorari and mandamus to
compel respondent to issue warrants of arrest. They contended that the fiscals
certificationintheinformationsoftheexistenceofprobablecauseconstitutessufficient
justificationforthejudgetoissuewarrantsofarrest.

Issue:

Whether or Not respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing warrants of
arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentaryevidencepresentedduringthepreliminaryinvestigation.

Held:

Judgemayrelyuponthefiscalscertificationfortheexistenceofprobablecauseandon
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But, such certification does not bind the
judgetocomeoutwiththewarrant.Theissuanceofawarrantisnotamereministerial
function;itcallsfortheexerciseofjudicialdiscretiononthepartofissuingmagistrate.
Under Section 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the judge must satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant of arrest. If on the face of the
information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
certificationandrequiresubmissionoftheaffidavitsofwitnessestoaidhiminarriving
attheconclusionastoexistenceofprobablecause.

Petitiondismissed.

SOLIVENVS.MAKASIAR
[167SCRA393;G.R.NO.82585;14NOV1988]

129

P.J.G.

Facts:

In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not
petitionersweredenieddueprocesswheninformationsforlibelwerefiledagainstthem
althoughthefindingoftheexistenceofaprimafaciecasewasstillunderreviewbythe
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a
warrantforhisarrestwithoutpersonallyexaminingthecomplainantandthewitnesses,
if any, to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue
moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners'
motionforreconsiderationandupheld theresolutionoftheUndersecretaryof Justice
sustaining the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of
Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary,
affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these
developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative
remediesavailableunderthelawhaslostfactualsupport.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionersweredenieddueprocesswheninformationsforlibelwere
filed againstthemalthoughthe finding of the existence of aprima faciecase was still
underreviewbytheSecretaryofJusticeand,subsequently,bythePresident.

WhetherorNottheconstitutionalrightsofBeltranwereviolatedwhenrespondentRTC
judgeissuedawarrantforhisarrestwithoutpersonallyexaminingthecomplainantand
thewitnesses,ifany,todetermineprobablecause

Held:

WithrespecttopetitionerBeltran,theallegationofdenialofdueprocessoflawinthe
preliminaryinvestigationisnegatedbythefactthatinsteadofsubmittinghiscounter
affidavits,hefileda"MotiontoDeclareProceedingsClosed,"ineffectwaivinghisright
torefutethecomplaintbyfilingcounteraffidavits.Dueprocessoflawdoesnotrequire
that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counteraffidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondentbegiventheopportunitytosubmitcounteraffidavitsifheissominded.

130

P.J.G.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:

Art.III,Sec.2.Therightofthepeopletobesecureintheirpersons,houses,
papersandeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizuresofwhatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrantofarrestshallissueexceptuponprobablecausetobedetermined
personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the
complainantandthewitnesseshemayproduce,andparticularlydescribing
theplacetobesearchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.

Theadditionoftheword"personally"aftertheword"determined"andthedeletionof
thegrantofauthoritybythe1973Constitutiontoissuewarrantsto"otherresponsible
officersasmaybeauthorizedbylaw,"hasapparentlyconvincedpetitionerBeltranthat
theConstitutionnowrequiresthejudgetopersonallyexaminethecomplainantandhis
witnessesinhisdeterminationofprobablecausefortheissuanceofwarrantsofarrest.
Thisisnotanaccurateinterpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuingjudgetosatisfyhimselfoftheexistenceofprobablecause.Insatisfyinghimself
oftheexistenceofprobablecausefortheissuanceofawarrantofarrest,thejudgeis
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
establisheddoctrineandprocedure,heshall:(1)personallyevaluatethereportandthe
supportingdocumentssubmittedbythefiscalregardingtheexistenceofprobablecause
and,onthebasisthereof,issueawarrantofarrest;or(2)ifonthebasisthereofhefinds
no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existenceofprobablecause.

Soundpolicydictatesthisprocedure,otherwisejudgeswouldbeundulyladenwiththe
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been
shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with
regardtotheissuanceofthewarrantsofarrest,afindingofgraveabuseofdiscretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to
establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their
131

P.J.G.

discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and


prohibitionprayedforcannotissue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of


jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petitionsinG.R.Nos.82585,82827and83979.TheOrdertomaintainthestatusquo
containedintheResolutionoftheCourtenbancdatedApril7,1988andreiteratedin
theResolutiondatedApril26,1988isLIFTED.

SALAZARVS.ACHACOSO
[183SCRA145;G.R.NO.81510;14MAR1990]

Facts:

Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged
petitioner with illegal recruitment. Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent
petitioner a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint
againsthim.Onthesameday,afterknowingthatpetitionerhadnolicensetooperatea
recruitmentagency,publicrespondentAdministratorTomasAchacosoissuedaClosure
and Seizure Order No. 1205 to petitioner. It stated that there will a seizure of the
documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that petitioner has (1) No valid
license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to recruit and
deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts
prohibitedunderArticle34oftheNewLaborCodeinrelationtoArticle38ofthesame
code.AteamwasthentaskedtoimplementthesaidOrder.Thegroup,accompaniedby
mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to petitioners residence. They served
theordertoacertainMrs.ForaSalazar,wholetthemin.Theteamconfiscatedassorted
costumes. Petitioner filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized
properties,becauseshewasnotgivenpriornoticeandhearing.ThesaidOrderviolated
due process. She also alleged that it violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and the
propertieswereconfiscatedagainstherwillandweredonewithunreasonableforceand
intimidation.

Issue:

132

P.J.G.

Whether orNotthe PhilippineOverseas Employment Administration (or theSecretary


ofLabor)canvalidlyissuewarrantsofsearchandseizure(orarrest)underArticle38of
theLaborCode

Held:

Under the new Constitution, . . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
exceptuponprobablecausetobedeterminedpersonallybythejudgeafterexamination
underoathor affirmationof the complainant and thewitnesses he may produce, and
particularlydescribingtheplacetobesearchedandthepersonsorthingstobeseized.
Mayorsandprosecutingofficerscannotissuewarrantsofseizureorarrest.TheClosure
andSeizureOrderwasbasedonArticle38oftheLaborCode.TheSupremeCourtheld,
WereiteratethattheSecretaryofLabor,notbeingajudge,maynolongerissuesearch
orarrestwarrants.Hence,theauthoritiesmustgothroughthejudicialprocess.Tothat
extent,wedeclareArticle38,paragraph(c),oftheLaborCode,unconstitutionalandof
no force and effect The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for
deportationis,obviously,exceptional.It(thepowertoorderarrests)cannotbemadeto
extendtoothercases,liketheoneatbar.UndertheConstitution,itisthesoledomain
ofthecourts.Furthermore,thesearchandseizureorderwasinthenatureofageneral
warrant. The court held that the warrant is null and void, because it must identify
specificallythethingstobeseized.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
returnallmaterialsseizedasaresultoftheimplementationofSearchandSeizureOrder
No.1205.

MORANOVS.VIVO
[20SCRA562;G.R.L22196;30JUN1967]

Facts:

Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen born in Fukien, China arrived in the Philippines on
November1961tovisithercousin,SamuelLeeMalaps.SheleftChinaandherchildren
byafirstmarriage:FuTseHawandFuYanKaibothminors,inthecareofneighborsin
Fukien,China.ChanSauwaharrivedinthePhilippineswithFuYanFun,herminorson
133

P.J.G.

alsobythefirstmarriage.ChanSauWahandherminorsonFuYanFunwerepermitted
onlyintothePhilippinesunderatemporaryvisitor'svisafortwomonthsandafterthey
posted a cash bond of 4,000 pesos. On January 1962, Chan Sau Wah married Esteban
Morano, a nativeborn Filipino citizen. Born to this union on September 1962 was
EstebanMorano,Jr.ToprolongtheirstayinthePhilippines,ChanSauWahandFuYan
Funobtainedseveralextensions.ThelastextensionexpiredonSeptember10,1962.Ina
letterdatedAugust31,1962,theCommissionerofImmigrationorderedChanSauWah
andherson,FuYanFun,toleavethecountryonorbeforeSeptember10,1962witha
warningthatuponfailuresotodo,hewillissueawarrantfortheirarrestandwillcause
theconfiscationoftheirbond.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheissuanceofthewarrantofarrestisunconstitutional.

Held:

ChanSauWahenteredthePhilippinesonatouristtemporaryvisitor'svisa.Sheisanon
immigrant.UnderSection13justquoted,shemaythereforebeadmittedifshewerea
qualified and desirable alien and subject to the provisions of the last paragraph of
Section9.Therefore,first,shemustdepartvoluntarilytosomeforeigncountry;second,
she must procure from the appropriate consul the proper visa; and third, she must
thereafterundergoexaminationbytheofficialsoftheBureauofImmigrationattheport
ofentryfordeterminationofheradmissibilityinaccordancewiththerequirementsof
the immigration Act. This Court in a number of cases has ruled, and consistently too,
that an alien admitted as a temporary visitor cannot change his or her status without
first departing from the country and complying with the requirements of Section 9 of
theImmigrationAct.Thegravamenofpetitioners'argumentisthatChanSauWahhas,
since her entry, married in Manila a nativeborn Filipino, Esteban Morano. It will not
particularly help analysis for petitioners to appeal to family solidarity in an effort to
thwartherdeportation.ChanSauWah,seeminglyisnotonewhohasahighregardfor
suchsolidarity.Proof:Shelefttwoofherchildrenbythefirstmarriage,bothminors,in
the care of neighbors in Fukien, China.Then, the wording of the statute heretofore
advertedtoisaforbiddingobstaclewhichwillpreventthisCourtfromwritingintothe
lawanadditionalprovisionthatmarriageofatemporaryalienvisitortoaFilipinowould
ipsofactomakeherapermanentresidentinhiscountry.Thisisafieldclosedtojudicial
action. No breadth of discretion is allowed. We cannot insulate her from the State's
power of deportation. it would be an easy matter for an alien woman to enter the
Philippines as a temporary visitor, go through a mock marriage, but actually live with
134

P.J.G.

anothermanashusbandandwife,andtherebyskirttheprovisionsofourimmigration
law. Also, a woman of undesirable character may enter this country, ply a pernicious
trade,marryaFilipino,andagainthrowoverboardSections9and13oftheAct.Sucha
flankingmovement,weareconfident,isimpermissible.Recentlyweconfirmedtherule
that an alien wife of a Filipino may not stay permanently without first departing from
thePhilippines.Reason:Discourageentryunderfalsepretenses.

HARVEYV.DEFENSORSANTIAGO
[162SCRA840;G.R.NO.82544;28JUN1988]

Facts:

ThisisapetitionforHabeasCorpus.Petitionersarethefollowing:Americannationals
AndrewHarvey,52andJonhSherman72.DutchCitizenAdriaanVanDenElshout,58.
All reside at Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago
issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehendedpetitionersattheirresidences.TheOperationReportreadthatAndrew
Harveywasfoundtogetherwithtwoyoungboys.RichardShermanwasfoundwithtwo
nakedboysinsidehisroom.WhileVanDenElshoutintheafterMissionReportread
that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed
beingliveinforsometimenow.

Seizedduringthepetitionersapprehensionwererollsofphotonegativesandphotosof
suspectedchildprostitutesshowninscandalousposesaswellasboysandgirlsengaged
insex.Postersandotherliteratureadvertisingthechildprostituteswerealsofound.

Petitionerswereamongthe22suspectedalienpedophiles.Theywereapprehended17
February1988afterclosesurveillancefor3monthoftheCIDinPagsanjan,Laguna.17
of the arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation. One released for lack of evidence,
anotherchargednotforpedophilebutworkingwithNOVISA,the3petitionerschoseto
face deportation proceedings. On 4 March1988, deportation proceedings were
instituted against aliens for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised
AdministrativeCode.

Warrants ofArrestwereissued7March1988againstpetitionersfor violationofSec37,


45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the
Board of Special Inquiry III commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed
11March1988butwasnotgrantedbytheCommissionerofImmigration.4April1988
135

P.J.G.

PetitionersfiledapetitionforWritofHabeasCorpus.Thecourtheardthecaseonoral
argumenton20April1988.

Issue:

Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detain petitioners
pendingdeterminationofexistenceofprobablecause.

WhetherorNottherewasunreasonablesearchesandseizuresbyCIDagents.

WhetherorNotthewritofHabeasCorpusmaybegrantedtopetitioners.

Held:

WhilepedophiliaisnotacrimeundertheRevisedPenalCode,itviolatesthedeclared
policyofthestatetopromoteandprotectthephysical,moral,spiritualandsocialwell
being of the youth. The arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause
determined after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable cause
justifiedthearrestandseizureofarticleslinkedtotheoffense.Thearticleswereseized
as an incident to a lawful arrest; therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule
126,Section12ofRulesonCriminalProcedure).

Therulethatsearchandseizuresmustbesupportedbyavalidwarrantofarrestisnot
anabsoluterule.Thereareatleastthreeexceptionstothisrule.1.)Searchisincidental
to the arrest. 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view. In
viewoftheforegoing,thesearchdonewasincidentaltothearrest.

The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any irregularity
attendingtheirarrestandestopsthemfromquestioningitsvalidity.Furthermore,the
deportation charges and the hearing presently conducted by the Board of Special
Inquirymadetheirdetentionlegal.Itisafundamentalrulethathabeascorpuswillnot
begrantedwhenconfinementisorhasbecomelegal,althoughsuchconfinementwas
illegalatthebeginning.

The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of Immigration are in


accordancewithSec37(a)ofthePhilippineImmigrationActof1940inrelationtosec69
136

P.J.G.

oftheRevisedAdministrativecode.Section37(a)providesthataliensshallbearrested
anddeporteduponwarrantoftheCommissionerofImmigrationandDeportationafter
a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of a ground for
deportationagainstthem.Deportationproceedingsareadministrativeincharacterand
neverconstruedasapunishmentbutapreventivemeasure.Therefore,itneednotbe
conductedstrictlyinaccordancewithordinaryCourtproceedings.Whatisessentialis
that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
deported.Afairhearingmustalsobeconductedwithassistanceofacounselifdesired.

Lastly,thepowertodeportaliensisanactoftheStateanddoneundertheauthorityof
the sovereign power. It a police measure against the undesirable aliens whose
continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and
tranquilityofthepeople.

SALESVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[369SCRA293G.R.NO.143802;16NOV2001]

Facts:

Thepetitioner,theincumbentmayorofPagudpudIlocosNorte,shottheformermayor
andhispoliticalrivalAtty.Benemerito.Aftertheshooting,hesurrenderedhimselfand
hencethepoliceinspectorandwifeofthevictimfiledacriminalcomplaintformurder
against him. The judge after conducting the preliminary examination (p.e. for brevity)
found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Also after conducting the
preliminaryinvestigation(p.i.forbrevity),heissuedaresolutionforwardingthecaseto
theprosecutorforappropriateaction.Petitionerreceivedasubpoenadirectinghimto
filehiscounteraffidavit,affidavitofwitnessesandothersupportingdocuments.Hedid
it the following day. While proceedings are ongoing, he filed a petition for habeas
corpuswiththeC.Aallegingthat:thewarrantwasnullandvoidbecausethejudgewho
issued it was a relative by affinity of the private respondent and the p.e. and the p.i.
were illegal and irregular as the judge doesnt have jurisdiction on the case. The C.A.
grantedthepetitionholdingthatthejudgewasarelativebyaffinityby3rddegreetothe
privaterespondentandthep.i.heconductedhas2stages,thep.e.andthep.i.proper.
Theproceedingnowconsistsonlyofonestage.Heconductedtherequisiteinvestigation
prior to the issuance of warrant of arrest. Moreover he did not complete it. He only
examinedthewitnessofthecomplainant.Buttheprosecutioninsteadofconductingp.i.
ofhisownforwardedtherecordstotheOmbudsman(OMBforbrevity)forthelatterto
137

P.J.G.

conductthesame.TheOMBdirectedthepetitionertosubmithiscounteraffidavit,but
he did not comply with it finding the same superfluous. The graft investigator
recommendedthefilingofinformationformurderwhichtheOMBapproved.Petitioner
receivedacopyoftheresolutionbutpreventedseekingreconsiderationthereofhefiled
amotiontodeferissuanceofwarrantofarrestpendingthedeterminationofprobable
cause.TheSandiganbayandeniedthemotion.Thisisnowapetitionforreviewonthe
decisionoftheSandiganbayan,

Issue:

Whether or Not the OMB followed the procedure in conducting preliminary


investigation.

Whether or Not petitioner was afforded an opportunity to be heard and to submit


controvertingevidence.

Held:

The proper procedure in the conduct of preliminary investigation was not followed
because of the following reasons. Firstly, the preliminary investigation was conducted
by 3 different investigators, none of whom completed the preliminary investigation
Therewasnotonecontinuousproceedingbutrather,casesofpassingthebuck,thelast
one being the OMB throwing the buck to the Sandiganbayan. Secondly, the charge of
murderisanonbailableoffense.Thegravityoftheoffensealoneshouldhavemeriteda
deeperandmorethoroughpreliminaryinvestigation.TheOMBdidnothingofthesort
butwallowedtheresolutionofthegraftinvestigator.Hedidaworsejobthanthejudge,
byactuallyadoptingtheresolutionofthegraftinvestigatorwithoutdoinganythingand
threw everything to the Sandiganbayan for evaluation. Thirdly, a person under
preliminary investigation by the OMB is entitled to a motion for reconsideration, as
maintained by the Rules of Procedure by the OMB. The filing of the motion for
reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper. The denial
thereofistantamounttothedenialoftherightitselftoapreliminaryinvestigation.This
fact alone renders preliminary investigation conducted in this case incomplete. And
lastly, it was patent error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied purely on the OMBs
certificationofprobablecausegiventheprevailingfactsofthecasemuchmoresointhe
faceofthelattersflawedreportandonesidefactualfindings.

ThecourtcannotaccepttheSandiganbayansassertionofhavingfoundprobablecause
onitsown,consideringtheOMBsdefectivereportandfindings,whichmerelyrekiedon
138

P.J.G.

thetestimoniesofthewitnessesfortheprosecutionanddisregardedtheevidencefor
thedefense.

Judgment is rendered setting aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan, ordering the
SandiganbayantoquashthewarrantofarrestandremandingtheOMBforcompletion
ofthepreliminaryinvestigation.

SILVAVS.PRESIDINGJUDGE
[203SCRA140;G.R.No.81756;21Oct1991]

Facts:

Sgt. Villamor, chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in Dumaguete City filed an


"application for search warrant" and "Deposition of witness" against petitioner
NicomedesSilvaandMartinSilva.JudgeNickarterOntal,thenthepresidingjudgeofRTC
of Dumaguete issued Search Warrant No.1 pursuant to the said applications for
violationofRA6425DangerousDrugsACTof1972.Suchwarrantstatesthatthereisa
probable cause to believe that Mr. Tama Silva has the possession and control of
marijuana dried leaves, cigarette and joint. The warrant authorizes Sgt. Villamor to
makeanimmediatesearchatanytimeoftheroomofMr.TamaSilvaattheresidenceof
his father Comedes Silva and to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartons and
containerstolookforsaidillegaldrugs.Inthecourseofthesearch,theofficersseized
money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of P1,231.40. Petitioner filed a
motiontoquashSearchWarrantNo.1onthegroundthat1)itwasissuedonthesole
basisofmimeographed2)thejudgefailedtopersonallyexaminethecomplainantand
witnessbysearchingquestionsandanswers.

Issue:

WhetherorNotSearchWarrantNo.1isinvalid.WONtheofficersabusedtheirauthority
inseizingthemoneyofAntonietaSilva.

Held:

SearchWarrantNo.1isinvalidduetothefailureofthejudgetoexaminethewitnessin
theformofsearchingquestionsandanswers.Thequestionsaskedwereleadingasthey
are answerable by mere yes or no. Such questions are not sufficiently searching to
establishprobablecause.Thequestionswerealreadymimeographedandallthewitness
139

P.J.G.

hadtodowasfillintheiranswersontheblanksprovided.JudgeOntalisguiltyofgrave
abuseofdiscretionwhenherejectedthemotionofAntonietaSilvaseekingthereturnof
hermoney.

Theofficerswhoimplementedthesearchwarrantclearlyabusedtheirauthoritywhen
they seized the money of Antonieta Silva. The warrant did not indicate the seizure of
moneybutonlyformarijuanaleaves,cigarettes..etc.SearchWarrantNo.1isdeclared
nullandvoid.

***Sec4Rule126RulesofCourt
Examination of the complainant, record the judge before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath the complainant and any witness he may produce the facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with their
affidavits.

VEROYVS.LAYAGUE
[210SCRA97;G.R.No.95630;18Jun1992]

Facts:

PetitionersarehusbandandwifewhoownedandformerlyresidedatNo.13IsidroSt.,
Skyline Village. Catalunan Grande, Davao City. When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was
promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social Security System
sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K8th St., East Kamias,
QuezonCity,wheretheyarepresentlyresiding.Thecareandupkeepoftheirresidence
inDavaoCitywaslefttotwo(2)houseboys,JimmyFaviaandEricBurgos,whohadtheir
assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would occasionally send
moneytoEdnaSoguilonforthesalaryofthesaidhouseboysandotherexpensesforthe
upkeepoftheirhouse.WhiletheVeroyshadthekeystotheinteriorofthehouse,only
thekeytothekitchen,wherethecircuitbreakerswerelocated,wasentrustedtoEdna
Soguilontogiveheraccessincaseofanemergency.Hence,since1988,thekeytothe
master'sbedroomaswellasthekeystothechildren'sroomswereretainedbyherein
PetitionerssothatneitherEdnaSoguilonnorthecaretakerscouldenterthehouse.

Police Officers had an information that the petitioners residence was being used as a
safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to enter the yard with the help of the
caretakersbut did not enterthe house since the owner was not present and they did
140

P.J.G.

not have a search warrant. Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted by telephone in her
QuezonCityresidencebyCapt.ObrerotoaskpermissiontosearchthehouseinDavao
City as it was reportedly being used as a hideout and recruitment center of rebel
soldiers.PetitionerMa.LuisaVeroyrespondedthatsheisflyingtoDavaoCitytowitness
thesearchbutrelentedifthesearchwouldnotbeconductedinthepresenceofMajor
ErnestoMacasaet,anofficerofthePC/INP,DavaoCityandalongtimefamilyfriendof
theVeroys.

The following day, Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet met at the house of herein
petitionersinSkylineVillagetoconductthesearchpursuanttotheauthoritygrantedby
petitionerMa.LuisaVeroy.Thecaretakersfacilitatedtheirentryintotheyard,andusing
the key entrusted to Edna Soguilon, they were able to gain entrance into the kitchen.
However,alocksmithbythenameofGeorgeBadianghadtobeemployedtoopenthe
padlockofthedoor leadingtothechildren's room. Capt. Obrero and Major Macasaet
thenenteredthechildren'sroomandconductedthesearch.Capt.Obrerorecovereda
.45cal.handgunwithamagazinecontainingseven(7)livebulletsinablackclutchbag
insideanunlockeddrawer.Three(3)halffulljutesackscontainingprintedmaterialsof
RAMSFPwerealsofoundinthechildren'sroom.Asearchofthechildren'srecreation
andstudyarearevealedabigtravellingbagcontainingassortedpoloshirts,men'sbrief,
two(2)piecespolobarongandshortsleevestripedgraypolo.sweatshirt,two(2)pairs
men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand,
containingabookentitled"IslamicRevolutionFuturePathoftheNation",aroadmapof
the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious
pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom. Sgt. Leo Justalero was instructed by
Capt.Obrerotomakeaninventoryandreceiptofthearticlesseized,inthehouse.

ThecasewasreferredforpreliminaryinvestigationtoQuezonCityAssistantProsecutor
RodolfoPonferradawhowasdesignatedActingProvincialProsecutorforDavaoCity.In
a resolution dated August 6, 1990, Fiscal Ponferrada recommended the filing of an
information against herein petitioners for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866
(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). No bail
wasrecommended.

Issue:

WhetherorNotPresidentialDecreeNo.1866,oratleastthethirdparagraphofSection
1thereof,isunconstitutionalforbeingviolativeofthedueprocessandequalprotection
clausesoftheConstitution.

141

P.J.G.

Held:

TheissueofconstitutionalityofPresidentialDecreeNo.1866hasbeenlaidtorestinthe
caseofMisolasv.Panga,G.R.No.83341,January30,1990(181SCRA648),wherethis
CourtheldthatthedeclarationofunconstitutionalityofthethirdparagraphofSection1
ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1866iswantinginlegalbasissinceitisneitherabillof
attaindernordoesitprovideapossibilityofadoublejeopardy.

Petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No.
1866 is bereft of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the
words and phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. its meaning and the
intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and
wherethereisnoambiguityinthewords,thereisnoroomforconstruction.Petitioners
contendthatSection1ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1866iscouchedingeneralorvague
terms. The terms "deal in", "acquire", "dispose" or "possess" are capable of various
interpretations such that there is no definiteness as to whether or not the definition
includes "constructive possession" or how the concept of constructive possession
should be applied. Petitioners were not found in actual possession of the firearm and
ammunitions. They were in Quezon City while the prohibited articles were found in
DavaoCity.YettheywerebeingchargedunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1866uponthe
solecircumstancethatthehousewhereintheitemswerefoundbelongstothem.

Petitioners question the admissibility in evidence of the articles seized in violation of


theirconstitutionalrightagainstunreasonablesearchandseizure.Petitionersaverthat
while they concede that Capt. Obrero had permission from Ma. Luisa Veroy to break
openthedooroftheirresidence,itwasmerelyforthepurposeofascertainingthereat
the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any
authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items taken
were,therefore,productsofanillegalsearch,violativeoftheirconstitutionalrightsAs
such,theyareinadmissibleinevidenceagainstthem.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures (Article III,
Section2ofthe1987Constitution).However,therulethatsearchesandseizuresmust
be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute one. Among the recognized
exceptions thereto are: (1) a search incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving
142

P.J.G.

vehicle;and(3)seizureofevidenceinplainview(Peoplev.LoHoWing,G.R.No.88017,
January21,1991[193SCRA122]).

Noneoftheseexceptionspertainstothecaseatbar.Thereasonforsearchingthehouse
ofhereinpetitionersisthatitwasreportedlybeingusedasahideoutandrecruitment
center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter the compound, he did
notenterthehousebecausehedidnothaveasearchwarrantandtheownerswerenot
present.Thisshowsthathehimselfrecognizedtheneedforasearchwarrant,hence,he
didnotpersistinenteringthehousebutrathercontactedtheVeroystoseekpermission
to enter the same. Permission was indeed granted by Ma. Luisa Veroy to enter the
housebutonlytoascertainthepresenceofrebelsoldiers.Underthecircumstancesitis
undeniablethatthepoliceofficershadampletimetoprocureasearchwarrantbutdid
not.

Undeniably,theoffenseofillegalpossessionoffirearmsismalumprohibitumbutitdoes
notfollowthatthesubjectthereofisnecessarilyillegalperse.Motiveisimmaterialin
mala prohibita but the subjects of this kind of offense may not be summarily seized
simplybecausetheyareprohibited.Asearchwarrantisstillnecessary.Hence,therule
having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle. They
cannotbeusedasevidenceagainstthepetitionersinthecriminalactionagainstthem
forillegalpossessionoffirearms.(Roanv.Gonzales,145SCRA689690[1986]).Besides,
assumingthattherewasindeedasearchwarrant,stillinmalaprohibita,whilethereis
noneedofcriminalintent,theremustbeknowledgethatthesameexisted.Withoutthe
knowledgeorvoluntarinessthereisnocrime.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition as granted and the criminal case against the
petitionersforillegalpossessionoffirearmsisDISMISSED.

PEOPLEVS.DELROSARIO
[234SCRA246;G.R.NO.109633;20JUL1994]

Facts:

143

P.J.G.

Accused was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal possession of firearms
andillegalpossessionandsaleofdrugs,particularlymethamphetamineorshabu.After
the issuance of the search warrant, which authorized the search and seizure of an
undetermined quantity of methamphetamine and its paraphernalias, an entrapment
was planned that led to the arrest of del Rosario and to the seizure of the shabu, its
paraphernaliasandofa.22caliberpistolwith3liveammunition.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheseizureofthefirearmswasproper.

Held:

No. Sec 2 art. III of the constitution specifically provides that a search warrant must
particularlydescribethethingstobeseized.Inhereincase,theonlyobjectstobeseized
that the warrant determined was the methamphetamine and the paraphernalias
therein.Theseizureofthefirearmswasunconstitutional.

Whereforethedecisionisreversedandtheaccusedisacquitted.

PEOPLEVS.GESMUNDO
[219SCRA743;G.R.NO.89373;19MAR1993]

Facts:

According to the prosecution, in the morning of Nov. 17, 1986, PO Jose Luciano gave
money and instructed his civilian informer to buy marijuana from the accused at the
Cocoland Hotel. He actually saw the accused selling marijuana to his civilian informer
andthatsamedayLucianoappliedforasearchwarrant.

About 2pm that day, a police raiding team armed with a search warrant went to the
Brgycaptainforthemtobeaccompaniedinservingthesaidwarrantattheresidenceof
the accused. The police was allowed to enter the house upon the strength of the
warrant shown to the accused. The accused begged the police not to search and to
leave the house. The police still searched the house and was led to the kitchen. She
pointedametalbasinontopofatableasthehidingplaceofdiedmarijuanaflowering
topscontainedinaplasticbagmarkedISETANN.Thepolicealsorecoveredfromanative
uwaycabinetdriedmarijuanafloweringtopswrappedin3piecesofkomikspaper.
144

P.J.G.

According to the accused, when the police arrived at her house, she saw Sgt. Yte and
PFCJoseLuciano.SheinvitedSgt.YtetoenterherhousewhileLucianowasleftinthe
jeepthatwasparkednearthehouse.Whileinsidethe houseYteshowedtheaccused
something he claimed as a search warrant, when someone coming from the kitchen
utteredetonaTheyproceededtothekitchenandsawLucianoholdingaplasticbag
with four other companions. They confronted the accused and insisted that the bags
belongedtoher.Accuseddenied theaccusationandtoldthemthatshedoesntknow
anythingaboutit.Shewasmadetosignaprepareddocument.Shewasbroughttothe
policestationandwasdetained.

Thecourtrendersjudgmentfindingtheaccusedguilty.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheevidencewasproperlyobtainedbythepolice.

Held:

In the investigation report prepared by Luciano stated that during the search they
discoveredaholeatthebackyardofthehouseofthesuspect,there wasabigbiscuit
can inside the hole and on top of the cover a flower pot was placed wherein the
marijuanawaskept.However,therewasnomentionofanymarijuanaobtainedfroma
flower pot in any of their testimonies. There were inconsistencies insofar the
prosecution is concerned, as to what was recovered and where, the trial court
concludedthattheseinconsistenciesaretrivial.Theremustsufficientevidencethatthe
marijuana was actually surrendered by the accused. As held in PP vs. Remorosa,
Irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnessescastdoubtontheguiltofappellantandhisculpabilitytothecrimecharged.

Theclaimthatthemarijuanawasplantedwasstrengthenasthepoliceviolatedsec7,
rule126 rulesof thecourtprovides no search of a house, room or any other premise
shallbemadeexceptinthepresenceofthelawfuloccupantthereoforanymemberof
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of
sufficientageanddiscretionresidinginthesamelocality.Thisrequirementismandatory
toensure regularity in theexecution of the search warrant. Violation of said ruleisin
factpunishableunderArticle130oftheRevisedPenalCode.

145

P.J.G.

Thedocument(PAGPAPATUNAY)wasinadmissibletothecourtastheaccusedwasnot
informedofherrightnottosignthedocumentneitherwassheinformedthatshehas
the right to the assistance of a counsel and the fact that it may be used as evidence
againsther.Itwasnotprovedthatthemarijuanabelongedtoher.Notonlydoesthelaw
require the presence of witnesses when the search is conducted, but it also imposes
uponthepersonmakingthesearchthedutytoissueadetailedreceiptfortheproperty
seized.Heislikewiserequiredtodeliverthepropertyseizedtothejudgewhoissuedthe
warrant,togetherwithatrueandaccurateinventorythereofdulyverifiedunderoath.
Again, these duties are mandatory and are required to preclude substitution of the
itemsseizedbyinterestedparties.

Theguiltoftheaccusedwashasnotbeenestablished.Judgmentisreversed.

UMILVS.RAMOS
[187SCRA311;G.R.NO.81567;3OCT1991]

Facts:

On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital,
RooseveltAvenue,QuezonCity,toverifyaconfidentialinformationwhichwasreceived
by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the
said hospital with a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was
amongthefive(5)male"sparrows"whomurderedtwo(2)Capcommobilepatrolsthe
day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump
along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was
listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twentytwo (22) years old of
Block10,Lot4,SouthCityHomes,Bian,Lagunahoweveritwasdisclosedlaterthatthe
truenameofthewoundedmanwasRolandoDural.Inviewofthisverification,Rolando
Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security
reasons.Whileconfinedthereat,hewaspositivelyidentifiedbytheeyewitnessesasthe
onewhomurderedthe2CAPCOMmobilepatrols.

Issue:

WhetherorNotRolandowaslawfullyarrested.
146

P.J.G.

Held:

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is
justifiedasitcanbesaidthathewascommittingasoffensewhenarrested.Thecrimes
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offensescommittedinfurtherancethereforeinconnectiontherewithconstitutedirect
assaultsagainstthestateandareinthenatureofcontinuingcrimes.

PEOPLEVS.SUCRO
[195SCRA388;G.R.No.93239;18Mar1991]

Facts:

Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of


Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2
meters away from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and
exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt.
Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later
identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the
area.WhilethepoliceofficerswereattheYouthHostelinMaagamaSt.Fulgenciotold
Lt.Seraspitointercept.MacabantewasinterceptedatMabiniandMaagamacrossingin
front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of
marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in
frontofthechapel.

The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and
Veterans.Recoveredwere19sticksand4teabagsofmarijuanafromacartinsidethe
chapelandanotherteabagfromMacabante.

Issue:

WhetherorNotarrestwithoutwarrantislawful.

WhetherorNotevidencefromsucharrestisadmissible.

Held:
147

P.J.G.

Searchandseizuressupportedbyavalidwarrantofarrestisnotanabsoluterule.Rule
126,Sec12ofRulesofCriminalProcedureprovidesthatapersonlawfullyarrestedmay
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the
commissionofanoffense,withoutasearchwarrant.(Peoplev.Castiller)Thefailureof
the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance.
However,warantlesssearchandseizuresarelegalaslongasPROBABLECAUSEexisted.
Thepoliceofficershavepersonalknowledgeoftheactualcommissionofthecrimefrom
the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones
conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of
theirduties.

PEOPLEV.RODRIGUEZA
[205SCRA791;G.R.No.95902;4Feb1992]

Facts:

NARCOMagentsstagedabuybustoperation,aftergaininginformationthattherewas
an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents
were given money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said
location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him
and a certain object wrapped in a plastic later identified as marijuana was given in
exchangeforP200.Theagentwentbacktoheadquartersandmadeareport,basedon
which,ateamwassubsequentlyorganizedandaraidwasconductedinthehouseofthe
father of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate
driedmarijuanaleavesandaplasticsyringeamongothers.Therewasnoauthorization
by any search warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The
lowercourt,consideringtheevidencesobtainedandtestimoniesfromtheprosecution,
found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced him to
reclusionperpetua.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthelowercourtwascorrectinitsjudgment.

148

P.J.G.

Held:

The NARCOM agents procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the
qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught redhanded in the act of
sellingmarijuanatoapersonposingasabuyer,sincetheoperationwasconductedafter
theactualexchange.Saidraidalsoviolatedaccusedrightagainstunreasonablesearch
andseizure,asthesituationdidnotfallinthecircumstanceswhereinasearchmaybe
validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a
lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents
couldnothavejustifiedtheiractbyinvokingtheurgencyandnecessityofthesituation
becausethetestimoniesoftheprosecutionwitnessesrevealthattheplacehadalready
beenputundersurveillanceforquitesometime.Haditbeentheirintentiontoconduct
the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search
warrantduringthattime.TheCourtfurthernotestheconfusionandambiguityinthe
identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug
paraphernaliapresentedasevidenceagainstappellant:

CICTaduran,whoactedastheposeurbuyer,testifiedthatappellantsoldhim100grams
of dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible
explanationhasbeenadvancedtherefor,whatweresubmittedtoandexaminedbythe
PCCLandthereafterutilizedasevidenceagainsttheappellantwerethefollowingitems:

One(1)redandwhitecoloredplasticbagcontainingthefollowing:

Exh. "A"Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops


containedinsideatransparentplasticbag.
Exh."B"Fifty(50)gramsofsuspecteddriedmarijuanaleavesandseeds
containedinsideawhitecoloredplasticlabelled"Robertson".
Exh. "C" Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried
marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams then further
wrapped
withapieceofaluminumfoil.
Exh."D"Five(5)smalltransparentplasticbagseachcontainingsuspected
driedmarijuanafruitingtopshavingatotalweightofseventeengrams.
Exh."E"Oneplasticsyringe.

Evidently,theseprohibitedarticleswereamongthoseconfiscatedduringthesocalled
followupraidinthehouseofRodriguezasfather.Theunansweredquestionthenarises
149

P.J.G.

as to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's
conviction.InPeoplevs.Rubio,thisCourthadtheoccasiontorulethattheplasticbag
and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the
crime.Assuch,theexistencethereofmustbeprovedwithcertaintyandconclusiveness.
Failuretodosowouldbefataltothecauseoftheprosecution.Convictionisreversed
andsetasideandaccusedisacquitted.

PEOPLEVS.SYCHUA
[396SCRA657;G.R.No.13606667;4Feb2003]

Facts:

AccusedappellantBinadSyChuawaschargedwithviolationofSection16,ArticleIIIof
R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and
IllegalPossessionofDrugsintwoseparateInformations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that
accusedappellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in
Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group
positionedthemselvesacrossMcArthurHighwaynearBaliHaiRestaurant,frontingthe
hotel.Theothergroupactedastheirbackup.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accusedappellant which just


arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accusedappellant alighted
from the carcarrying asealed ZestO juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly
accostedhimandintroducedthemselvesaspoliceofficers.Asaccusedappellantpulled
out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded
fromhisrightbackpocket.Forthwith,SPO2Nuludsubjectedhimtoabodysearchwhich
yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back pocket.
WhenSPO2NunagpeekedintothecontentsoftheZestObox,hesawthatitcontained
a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small transparent plastic
bag,theZestOjuicebox,thetwenty(20)piecesof.22caliberfirearmbulletsandthe
carusedbyaccusedappellant.SPO2Nuludandtheotherpoliceoperativeswhoarrived
at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
HeadquartersinCampPepito,AngelesCity.
150

P.J.G.

Accusedappellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a


differentversionoftheincident.

Accusedappellantallegedthathewasdrivingthecarofhiswifetofollowherandhis
son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur
Highway.HestoppedinfrontofasmallstorenearThunderInnHoteltobuycigarettes
andcandies.Whileatthestore,henoticedamanapproachesandexaminestheinside
of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled
out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on
identified himself asapoliceman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took
outhiswalletandinstructedhimtoopenhiscar.Herefused,sothepolicemantookhis
carkeysandproceededtosearchhiscar.Atthistime,thepoliceofficerscompanions
arrivedatthesceneintwocars.PO2Nulud,whojustarrivedatthescene,pulledhim
awayfromhiscarinanearbybank,whiletheotherssearchedhiscar.

Thereafter,hewasbroughttoapolicestationandwasheldinsideabathroomforabout
fifteenminutesuntilCol.Guttierezarrived,whoorderedhismentocallthemedia.In
the presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accusedappellant was
madetoholdtheboxwhilepictureswerebeingtaken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet
convictedhimforIllegalPossessionof1,955.815gramsofshabu.Hence,thisappealto
theCourt.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthearrestofaccusedappellantwaslawful;and(2)WONthesearchof
his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on him were
conductedinalawfulandvalidmanner.

Held:

Thelowercourtbelievedthatsincethepolicereceivedinformationthattheaccusedwill
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The
policeofficerhadtoactquicklyandtherewasnomoretimetosecureasearchwarrant.
Thesearchisvalidbeingakintoastopandfrisk.

Thetrialcourtconfusedtheconceptsofastopandfriskandofasearchincidentalto
151

P.J.G.

alawfularrest.Thesetwotypesofwarrantlesssearchesdifferintermsoftherequisite
quantumofproofbeforetheymaybevalidlyeffectedandintheirallowablescope.

Inasearchincidentaltoalawfularrest,astheprecedentarrestdeterminesthevalidity
oftheincidentalsearch,thelegalityofthearrestisquestioned,e.g.,whetheranarrest
wasmerelyusedasapretextforconductingasearch.Inthisinstance,thelawrequires
thattherefirstbearrestbeforeasearchcanbemadetheprocesscannotbereversed.
Accordingly,forthisexceptiontoapply,twoelementsmustconcur:(1)thepersontobe
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presenceorwithintheviewofthearrestingofficer.

Wefindthetwoaforementionedelementslackinginthecaseatbar.Accusedappellant
did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accusedappellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime. Reliable information alone, absent any overt act
indicativeofafeloniousenterpriseinthepresenceandwithintheviewofthearresting
officers,isnotsufficienttoconstituteprobablecausethatwouldjustifyaninflagrante
delictoarrest.

With regard to the concept of stopand frisk: mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validateastopandfrisk.Agenuinereasonmustexist,inlightofthepoliceofficers
experienceandsurroundingconditions,towarrantthebeliefthatthepersondetained
hasweaponsconcealedabouthim.Finally,astopandfriskservesatwofoldinterest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
interestofsafetyandselfpreservationwhichpermitthepoliceofficertotakestepsto
assurehimselfthatthepersonwithwhomhedealsisnotarmedwithadeadlyweapon
thatcouldunexpectedlyandfatallybeusedagainstthepoliceofficer.

Astopandfriskwasdefinedastheactofapoliceofficertostopacitizenonthestreet,
interrogatehim,andpathimforweapon(s)orcontraband.Itshouldalsobeemphasized
that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The
foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused
appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items
found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial
inquiry into accusedappellants business in the vicinity or the contents of the ZestO
juiceboxhewascarrying.Theapprehendingpoliceofficersonlyintroducedthemselves
whentheyalreadyhadcustodyofaccusedappellant.
152

P.J.G.

Inthecaseatbar,neithertheinflagrantedelictonorthestopandfriskprinciplesis
applicabletojustifythewarrantlessarrestandconsequentsearchandseizuremadeby
thepoliceoperativesonaccusedappellant.

Wherefore,accusedappellantBinadSyChuaisherebyAcquitted.

GOVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[206SCRA138;G.R.NO.101837;11FEB1992]

Facts:

Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a oneway street, almost had a
collisionwithanothervehicle.Petitionerthereaftergotoutofhiscar,shotthedriverof
theothervehicle,anddroveoff.Aneyewitnessoftheincidentwasabletotakedown
petitioners plate number and reported the same to the police, who subsequently
ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner presented
himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him.
Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the
prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without
preliminaryinvestigation.Prosecutorreasonsthatthepetitionerhaswaivedhisrightto
preliminaryinvestigationasbailhasbeenpostedandthatsuchsituation,thatpetitioner
hasbeenarrestedwithoutawarrantlawfully,fallsunderSection5,Rule113andSection
7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and
procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his
petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a
preliminaryinvestigation.

Issue:

WhetherorNotwarrantlessarrestofpetitionerwaslawful.

WhetherorNotpetitionereffectivelywaivedhisrighttopreliminaryinvestigation.

Held:

PetitionerandprosecutorerrinrelyingonUmilv.Ramos,whereintheCourtupheldthe
warrantlessarrestasvalideffected1to14daysfromactualcommissionoftheoffenses,
153

P.J.G.

which however constituted continuing crimes, i.e. subversion, membership in an


outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5,
Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there during the
incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding
petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not
apply.

Petitioner wasnotarrestedat all, as when he walked in the police station,he neither


expressed surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime.
When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have
been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a substantive error,
petitionerisentitledtopreliminaryinvestigation,necessarilyinacriminalcharge,where
thesameisrequiredappearthereat.Petitiongranted,prosecutorisorderedtoconduct
preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from
preliminaryinvestigation,petitionerisorderedreleaseduponpostingabailbond.

CALLANTAVS.VILLANUEVA
[77SCRA377;G.R.NOS.24646&L24674;20JUN1977]

Facts:

TwocomplaintsforgraveoraldefamationwerefiledagainstFaustinaCallanta.TheCity
JudgeofDagupanCity,FelipeVillanueva,deniedthemotionstoquashthecomplaints.
Thus,petitionerCallantabroughtthesuitsforcertiorariintheSupremeCourt.Petitioner
questionsthevalidityoftheissuanceof warrantofarrestbyrespondent,arguingthat
the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary investigation. According to
petitionerscounsel,therewasjurisdictionalinfirmity.Aftertheissuanceofthewarrants
ofarrestandthebailfixedatP600,petitionerpostedthebailbond,thusobtainingher
provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judges
investigation,andagreedwiththecomplaintsfiled.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionerscontentionsaretobegivenmerit.

Held:

154

P.J.G.

BasedonmanyprecedentcasesoftheSupremeCourt,wheretheaccusedhasfiledbail
andwaivedthepreliminaryinvestigationproper,hehaswaivedwhateverdefect,ifany,
in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of
arrest. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also
erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation.
According tothe Charterof the City of Dagupan, the City Court of Dagupan Citymay
also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of
punishment,andmayrelease,orcommitandbindoveranypersonchargedwithsuch
offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. Petition for certiorari is
denied.RestrainingorderissuedbytheCourtisliftedandsetaside.

POSADASVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[188SCRA288;G.R.NO.89139;2AUG1990]

Facts:

Members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned
withtheIntelligenceTaskForce,Pat.UrsicioUngabandPat.UmbraUmparconducted
surveillancealongMagallanesStreet,DavaoCity.WhileinthevicinityofRizalMemorial
Collegestheyspottedpetitionercarryinga"buri"bagandtheynoticedhimtobeacting
suspiciously.Theyapproachedthepetitionerandidentifiedthemselvesasmembersof
the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was unsuccessful.
Theythencheckedthe"buri"bagofthepetitionerwheretheyfoundone(1)caliber.38
Smith&WessonrevolverwithSerialNo.770196,two(2)roundsofliveammunitionfor
a .38 caliber gun, a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22
calibergun.Theybroughtthepetitionertothepolicestationforfurtherinvestigation.In
the course of the same, the petitioner was asked to show the necessary license or
authoritytopossessfirearmsandammunitionsfoundinhispossessionbuthefailedto
doso.HewasthentakentotheDavaoMetrodiscomofficeandtheprohibitedarticles
recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial
CourtofDavaoCity.

155

P.J.G.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthewarantlesssearchisvalid.

Held:

Injustifyingthewarrantlesssearchoftheburibagthencarriedbythepetitioner,argues
thatunderSection12,Rule136oftheRulesofCourtapersonlawfullyarrestedmaybe
searched for dangerous weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an
offensewithoutasearchwarrant.Itisfurtherallegedthatthearrestwithoutawarrant
ofthepetitionerwaslawfulunderthecircumstances.

inthecaseatbar,thereisnoquestionthat,indeed,itisreasonableconsideringthatit
was effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the
petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a
probablecausethathewasconcealingsomethingillegalinthebaganditwastheright
anddutyofthepoliceofficerstoinspectthesame.

Itistoomuchindeedtorequirethepoliceofficerstosearchthebaginthepossessionof
thepetitioneronlyaftertheyshallhaveobtainedasearchwarrantforthepurpose.Such
anexercisemayprovetobeuseless,futileandmuchtoolate.

Clearly,thesearchinthecaseatbarcanbesustainedundertheexceptionsheretofore
discussed,andhence, theconstitutional guaranteeagainst unreasonable searches and
seizureshasnotbeenviolated.

PEOPLEV.MENGOTE
[210SCRA174;G.R.NO.87059;22JUN1992]

Facts:

TheWesternPoliceDistrictreceivedatelephonecallfromaninformerthattherewere
threesuspiciouslookingpersonsatthecornerofJuanLunaandNorthBayBoulevardin
Tondo,Manila.Asurveillanceteamofplainclothesmenwasforthwithdispatchedtothe
place.Thepatrolmensawtwomenlookingfromsidetoside,oneofwhomholdinghis
abdomen. They approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen,
156

P.J.G.

whereupon the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surroundedthem.Thesuspectswerethensearched.Oneofthemtheaccusedappellant
wasfoundwitha.38caliberwithliveammunitionsinit,whilehiscompanionhadafan
knife. The weapons were taken from them and they were turned over to the police
headquartersforinvestigation.AninformationwasfiledbeforetheRTCconvictingthe
accused of illegal possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was
among the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver.Forhispart,Mengotemadenoefforttoprovethatheownedthefirearmor
thathewaslicensedtopossessitbutinstead,heclaimedthattheweaponwasplanted
on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for violation of P.D.1866 and was
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and therefore
thefruitofapoisonoustree.

Issue:

Whetherornotthewarrantlesssearchandarrestwasillegal.

Held:

An evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure inadmissible in any


proceedingforanypurposeasprovidedbyArt.IIIsec32oftheConstitution.Rule113
sec.5oftheRulesofCourt,providesarrestwithoutwarrantlawfulwhen:(a)theperson
to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense, (b) when the offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the
person to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
servingfinaljudgmentortemporarilyconfinedwhilehiscaseispending,orhasescaped
whilebeingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the
arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side to side and
holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparentlynooffensethathasjustbeencommittedorwasbeingactuallycommittedor
at least being attempt by Mengote in their presence. Moreover a person may not be
stoppedandfriskedinabroaddaylightoronabusystreetonunexplainedsuspicion.

Judgmentisreversedandsetaside.Accusedappellantisacquitted.

157

P.J.G.

PEOPLEVS.TANGLIBEN
[184SCRA220;G.R.No.L63630;6Apr1990]

Facts:

Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were conducting surveillance at the San
Fernando Victory Liner Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel
Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously. They confronted him,
inspectedhisbag,andtheretheyfoundmarijuanaleaves.Theaccusedwasthentaken
tothePoliceHeadquartersforfurtherinvestigations.TheTCfoundTanglibenguilty of
violatingsec.4art.2oftheRA6425ortheDangerousDrugsActof1972.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherewasanunlawfulsearchduetolackofsearchwarrant.

Held;

No.Rule113sec.5providestheapeaceofficeroraprivatepersonmayw/oawarrant
arrest a person when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
committing,orisattemptingtocommitanoffense.

In the present case, the accused was found to have been committing possession of
marijuana and can be therefore searched lawfully even without a search warrant.
Another reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the arresting police
officers.Itwasfoundoutthataninformerpointedtotheaccusedtellingthepolicemen
thattheaccusedwascarryingmarijuana.Thepoliceofficershadtoactquicklyandthere
wasnotenoughtimetosecureasearchwarrant.

PEOPLEVS.MALMSTEDT
[198SCRA401;G.R.No.91107;19Jun1991]

Facts:

In an information filed against the accused appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged
beforetheRTCofLaTrinidad,Benguet,forviolationofSection4,Art.IIofRepublicAct
6425,asamended,otherwiseknownastheDangerousDrugsActof1972,asamended.
158

P.J.G.

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third
timeinDecember1988asatourist.Hehadvisitedthecountrysometimein1982and
1985.

Intheeveningof7May1989,accused leftforBaguio City. Upon his arrivalthereatin


themorningofthefollowingday,hetookabustoSagadaandstayedinthatplacefor
two (2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to
NangonoganbusstopinSagada.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen
Vasco,theCommandingOfficeroftheFirstRegionalCommand(NARCOM)stationedat
Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14,
Acop,Tublay,MountainProvince,forthepurposeofcheckingallvehiclescomingfrom
theCordilleraRegion.Theordertoestablishacheckpointinthesaidareawasprompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the Commanding
OfficerofNARCOM,thatsamemorningthataCaucasiancomingfromSagadahadinhis
possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
coordination with Tublay PoliceStation, set up a checkpoint at the designated areaat
about10:00o'clockinthemorningandinspectedallvehiclescomingfromtheCordillera
Region.

Thetwo(2)NARCOMofficersstartedtheirinspectionfromthefrontgoingtowardsthe
rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the
rearthereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the
bulgeonaccused'swaisttobeagun,theofficeraskedforaccused'spassportandother
identificationpapers.Whenaccusedfailedtocomply,theofficerrequiredhimtobring
outwhateveritwasthatwasbulgingonhiswaist.Thebulgingobjectturnedouttobea
pouchbagandwhenaccusedopenedthesamebag,asordered,theofficernoticedfour
(4)suspiciouslookingobjectswrappedinbrownpackingtape,promptingtheofficerto
openoneofthewrappedobjects.Thewrappedobjectsturnedouttocontainhashish,a
derivativeofmarijuana.

Thereafter,accusedwasinvitedoutsidethebusforquestioning.Butbeforehealighted
fromthebus,accusedstoppedtogettwo(2)travellingbagsfromtheluggagecarrier.
Uponsteppingoutofthebus,theofficersgotthebagsandopenedthem.Ateddybear
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were
159

P.J.G.

bulgesinsidethesamewhichdidnotfeellikefoamstuffing.Itwasonlyaftertheofficers
hadopenedthebagsthataccusedfinallypresentedhispassport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers
opened the teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative
samplesweretakenfromthehashishfoundamongthepersonaleffectsofaccusedand
thesamewerebroughttothePCCrimeLaboratoryforchemicalanalysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a
prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed
againstaccusedforviolationoftheDangerousDrugsAct.
ACCUSEDSDEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he
raisedtheissueofillegalsearchofhispersonaleffects.Healsoclaimedthatthehashish
was planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling
bagswerenotownedbyhim,butweremerelyentrustedtohimbyanAustraliancouple
whomhemetinSagada.HefurtherclaimedthattheAustraliancoupleintendedtotake
thesamebuswithhimbutbecausetherewerenomoreseatsavailableinsaidbus,they
decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that
theywouldmeeteachotherattheDangwaStation.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond
reasonabledoubt.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime
charged, accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it
was made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discoveredduringtheillegalsearcharenotadmissibleasevidenceagainsthim.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthecontentionoftheaccusedisvalid,andthereforetheRTCrulingbe
reversed.

Held:

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses,papersandeffectsagainstunreasonablesearchesandseizures.However,where
160

P.J.G.

the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search
warrant.Alawfularrestwithoutawarrantmaybemadebyapeaceofficeroraprivate
personunderthefollowingcircumstances.

Sec.5Arrestwithoutwarrant;whenlawful.Apeaceofficeroraprivate
personmay,withoutawarrant,arrestaperson:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is


actuallycommitting,orisattemptingtocommitanoffense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personalknowledgeoffactsindicatingthatthepersontobearrested
hascommittedit;and
(c) Whenthepersontobearrestedisaprisonerwhohasescapedfrom
apenalestablishmentorplacewhereheisservingfinaljudgmentor
temporarilyconfinedwhilehiscaseispending,orhasescapedwhile
beingtransferredfromoneconfinementtoanother.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A
crime was actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto.Thus,thesearchmadeuponhispersonaleffectsfallssquarelyunderparagraph
(1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a
lawfularrest.WhileitistruethattheNARCOMofficerswerenotarmedwithasearch
warrant when the search was made over the personal effects of accused, however,
under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officerstobelievethataccusedwasthenandtherecommittingacrime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable,discreetandprudentmantobelievethatanoffensehasbeencommitted,
andthattheobjectssoughtinconnectionwiththeoffenseareintheplacesoughttobe
searched.Warrantlesssearchofthepersonaleffectsofanaccusedhasbeendeclaredby
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuanaemanatedfromaplasticbagownedbytheaccused, 10orwheretheaccused
wasactingsuspiciously,11andattemptedtoflee.

Theappealedjudgmentofconvictionbythetrialcourtisherebyaffirmed.Costsagainst
theaccusedappellant.

PEOPLEVS.AMMINUDIN
161

P.J.G.

[163SCRA402;G.R.L74869;6Jul1988]

Facts:

Idel Aminnudin, accusedappellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarkingfromtheM/VWilcon9atabout8:30intheevening,inIloiloCity.ThePC
officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers
simplyaccostedhim,inspectedhisbagandfindingwhatlookedlikedmarijuanaleaves
took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles
wereconfiscatedfromhimandlatertakentotheNBIlaboratoryforexamination.Itwas
foundtocontainthreekilosofwhatwerelateranalyzedasmarijuanaleavesbyanNBI
forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who
hadalsobeenarrestedwithhimthatsameeveningandlikewiseinvestigated.Bothwere
arraignedandpleadednotguilty.Subsequently,thefiscalfiledamotiontodismissthe
chargeagainstAlionthebasisofaswornstatementofthearrestingofficersabsolving
heraftera'thoroughinvestigation."Themotionwasgranted,andtrialproceededonly
against the accusedappellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense,
Aminnudindisclaimedthemarijuana,averringthatallhehadinhisbagwashisclothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a
searchwarrant.AtthePCheadquarters,hewasmanhandledtoforcehimtoadmithe
was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the
chestandarmsevenasheparriedtheblowswhilehewasstillhandcuffed.Heinsisted
he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling
watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying
that heonlyhastwowatchesduring thattimeandthat hedid not sufficientlyproved
theinjuriesallegedlysustained.

Issue:

Whetherornotsearchofdefendantsbagislegal.

Held:

Thesearchwasillegal.Defendantwasnotcaughtinflagrantedelicto,whichcouldallow
warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a
crime.Norwasheabouttodosoorhadjustdoneso.Toallappearances,hewaslike
any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said
162

P.J.G.

marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against the defendant, and
furthermoreheisacquittedofthecrimeascharged.

PEOPLEVS.SAYCON
[236SCRA325;G.R.NO.110995;5SEPT1994]

Facts:

On or about 8 July 1992, at about 6:00 in the morning, the Coastguard personnel
received information from NARCOM agent Ruben Laddaran that a suspected "shabu"
courierbythenameofAlvaroSayconwason boardtheMVDoaVirginia,whichwas
arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the
Coastguard chief officer CPO Tolin, instructed them to intercept the suspect. A
combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel consisting of
CPOTolin,acertainMiagme,andSeniorPoliceOfficersRubenLaddaranandWinifredo
Noble of NARCOM posted themselves at the gate of Pier 1. The MV Doa Virginia
docked at 6:00 a.m. that same morning at Pier 1 in Dumaguete City. Alvaro Saycon
alightedfromtheboatcarryingablackbagandwentthroughthecheckpointmanned
bythePhilippineCoastguardwherehewasidentifiedbypoliceofficerWinifredoNoble
ofNARCOM.SayconwastheninvitedtotheCoastguardHeadquartersatthePierarea.
Hewillinglywentwiththem.Attheheadquarters,thecoastguardaskedSaycontoopen
his bag, and the latter willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong
wallet.Inside thatmaongwallet, there was a Marlboropack containing the suspected
"shabu".WhenpoliceofficerWinifredoNobleaskedSayconwhethertheMarlboropack
containingthesuspected"shabu"washis,Sayconmerelybowedhishead.ThenSaycon,
his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking.
When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of
arrest. The PNP's Forensic Analyst declared in court that she had conducted an
examinationofthespecimensandfoundoutthatthespecimensweighed4.2gramsin
total,consistedofmethamphetaminehydrochloride,morewidelyknownas"shabu."

Issue:

WhetherorNotthewarrantlesssearchwasvalid.
163

P.J.G.

Held:

The warrantless search was valid, as the accused was a passenger of a motor vehicle.
There was probable cause to believe that the accused was carrying prohibited drugs.
Three weeks earlier, agents of the Narcotics Command bought methamine
hydrochloridefromhim.AnagentoftheNarcoticsCommandreportedthattheaccused
would be arriving on board the vessel and carrying methamphetamine hydrochloride
withhim.Drugcouriersdonotgoabouttheirtradewithsomeexternalsignindicating
that they are transporting prohibited drugs. This must be taken into account in
determiningprobablecause.

PEOPLEVS.MUSA
[217SCRA597;G.,R.NO.96177;27JAN1993]

Facts:

A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling
marijuanainSuterville,ZamboangaCity.Sgt.AniwasorderedbyNARCOMleaderT/Sgt.
Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided
Ani to Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one
newspaperwrappeddriedmarijuanaforP10.00.

Thenextday,abuybustwasplanned.Aniwastoraisehisrighthandifhesuccessfully
buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the house, the NARCOM team
positionedthemselvesabout90to100metersaway.Fromhisposition,Belargacould
see what was going on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted.
AnisaidhewantedmoremarijuanaandgaveMusatheP20.00markedmoney.Musa
went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing
driedmarijuana.Aniopenedandinspectedit.Heraisedhisrighthandasasignaltothe
other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house.
BelargafriskedMusainthelivingroombutdidnotfindthemarkedmoney(gaveitto
hiswifewhoslippedaway).T/Sgt.BelargaandSgt.Legowenttothekitchenandfound
a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen. They
164

P.J.G.

asked Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and
founddriedmarijuanaleavesinside.Musawasthenplacedunderarrest.

Issue:

Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is
unreasonable,hence,inadmissibleasevidence.

Held:

Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as
evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful
arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundingsunderhisimmediatecontrol.Objectsintheplainviewofanofficerwho
hastherighttobeinthepositiontohavethatviewaresubjecttoseizureandmaybe
presentedasevidence.Theplainviewdoctrineisusuallyappliedwhereapoliceofficer
isnotsearchingforevidenceagainsttheaccused,butnonethelessinadvertentlycomes
across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminatingnatureoftheobjectisnotapparentfromtheplainviewoftheobject.

Inthecaseatbar,theplasticbagwasnotintheplainviewofthepolice.Theyarrested
theaccusedinthelivingroomandmovedintothekitcheninsearchforotherevidences
where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag
wasnotimmediatelyapparentfromtheplainviewofsaidobject.

Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and
cannotbepresentedinevidencepursuanttoArticleIIISection3(2)oftheConstitution.

PITAVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[178SCRA362;G.R.NO.80806;5OCT1989]

Facts:

OnDecember1and3,1983,pursuinganAntiSmutCampaigninitiatedbytheMayorof
theCityofManila, RamonD.Bagatsing, elements of the Special AntiNarcotics Group,
AuxilliaryServicesBureau,WesternPoliceDistrict,INPoftheMetropolitanPoliceForce
of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials
believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized
165

P.J.G.

materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines
publishedandcoeditedbyplaintiffLeoPita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunctionagainstMayorBagatsingandNarciscoCabrera,assuperintendentofWestern
PoliceDistrictoftheCityofManila,seekingtoenjoinsaiddefendantsandtheiragents
fromconfiscatingplaintiffsmagazinesorfrompreventingthesaleorcirculationthereof
claimingthatthemagazineisadecent, artisticandeducationalmagazinewhichis not
perseobscene,andthatthepublicationisprotectedbytheConstitutionalguarantees
offreedomofspeechandofthepress.PlaintiffalsofiledanUrgentMotionforissuance
ofatemporaryrestrainingorderagainstindiscriminateseizure,confiscationandburning
ofplaintiff's"PinoyPlayboy"Magazines,pendinghearingonthepetitionforpreliminary
injunction.TheCourtgrantedthetemporaryrestrainingorder.Thecasewassetfortrial
uponthelapseoftheTRO.RTCruledthattheseizurewasvalid.Thiswasaffirmedbythe
CA.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheseizurewasillegal.

Held:

TheCourtruledthatthegovernmentauthoritieshavenotshowntherequiredproofto
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature. First of all, they were not
possessedofalawfulcourtorder:(1)findingthesaidmaterialstobepornography,and
(2)authorizingthemtocarryoutasearchandseizure,bywayofasearchwarrant.The
courtprovidesthefollowingguidelinestobeobserved:

1. Theauthoritiesmustapplyfortheissuanceofasearchwarrantfromajudge,ifin
theiropinionanobscenityseizureisinorder;
2. Theauthoritiesmustconvincethecourtthatthematerialssoughttobeseizedare
obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrantStateinterferenceandaction;

166

P.J.G.

3. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The
question is to be resolved on a casetocase basis and on the judges sound
discretion;
4. If in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it shall issue the search
warrantprayedfor;
5. ThepropersuitisthenbroughtinthecourtunderArticle201oftheRPC(Obscene
publications).
6. Anyconvictionissubjecttoappeal.Theappellatecourtmayassesswhetheror
notthepropertiesseizedareindeedobscene.

GUANZONVS.DEVILLA
[181SCRA623;G.R.80508;30JAN1990]

Facts:

The41petitionersallegedthatthe"saturationdrive"or"aerialtargetzoning"thatwere
conductedintheirplace(TondoManila)wereunconstitutional.Theyallegedthatthere
isnospecifictargethousetobesearchandthatthereisnosearchwarrantorwarrantof
arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without
nameplatesoridentificationcards.Theresidentswererudelyrousefromtheirsleepby
bangingonthewallsandwindowsoftheirhouses.Theresidentswereatthepoint of
highpowered guns and herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to their
briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks. The residents complained that
they'rehomeswereransacked,tossingtheirbelongingsanddestroyingtheirvaluables.
Someoftheirmoneyandvaluableshaddisappearedaftertheoperation.Theresidents
alsoreportedincidentsofmaulings,spotbeatingsandmaltreatment.Thosewhowere
detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
informations. The respondents said that such accusations were all lies. Respondents
contends that the Constitution grants to government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target
zoning were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by the
communitieswerethesaiddriveswereconducted.Theysaidthattheyhaveintelligently
andcarefullyplannedmonthsaheadfortheactualoperationandthatlocalandforeign
mediajoinedtheoperationtowitnessandrecordsuchevent.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthesaturationdrivecommittedconsistedofviolationofhumanrights.
167

P.J.G.

Held:

Itisnotthepoliceactionpersewhichshouldbeprohibitedratheritistheprocedure
used or the methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based on the facts
stated by the parties, it appears to have been no impediment to securing search
warrants orwarrantsofarrestbeforeanyhousesweresearchedorindividualsroused
fromsleepwerearrested.Thereisnoshowingthattheobjectivessoughttobeattained
bythe"aerialzoning"couldnotbeachievedevenasthrightsofthesquattersandlow
income families are fully protected. However, the remedy should not be brought by a
tazpaersuitwherenotonevictimcomplaintsandnotoneviolatorisproperlycharged.
In the circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring soldier or policeman
whomthecourtcanorderprosecuted.Intheabsenceofclearfactsnopermanentrelief
canbegiven.

Inthemeantimewherethereisshowingthatsomeabuseswerecommitted,thecourt
temporaryrestrainttheallegedviolationswhichareshockingtothesenses.Petitionis
remandedtotheRTCofManila.

PEOPLEVS.ARUTA
[288SCRA626;G.R.NO.120515;13APR1998]

Facts:

OnDec.13,1988,P/Lt.AbellowastippedoffbyhisinformantthatacertainAlingRosa
will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a
team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming
from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team
approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked
alingRosaaboutthecontentsofherbag,thelatterhandeditouttothepolice.They
founddriedmarijuanaleavespackedinaplasticbagmarkedcashkatutak.

Insteadofpresentingitsevidence,thedefensefiledademurrertoevidenceallegingthe
illegalityofthesearchandseizureoftheitems.Inhertestimony,theaccusedclaimed
that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg.
Whileabouttocrosstheroadanoldwomanaskedherforhelpincarryingashoulder
bag,whenshewaslateronarrestedbythepolice.Shehasnoknowledgeoftheidentity
168

P.J.G.

oftheoldwoman and the woman wasnowhere to be found. Also,no search warrant


waspresented.

Thetrialcourtconvictedtheaccusedinviolationofthedangerousdrugsof1972

Issue:

WhetherorNotthepolicecorrectlysearchedandseizedthedrugsfromtheaccused.

Held:

Thefollowingcasesarespecificallyprovidedorallowedbylaw:

1. Warrantlesssearchincidentaltoalawfularrestrecognized underSection12,
Rule126oftheRulesofCourt8andbyprevailingjurisprudence
2. Seizureofevidencein"plainview,"theelementsofwhichare:(a)apriorvalid
intrusionbasedonthevalidwarrantlessarrestinwhichthepolicearelegally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertentlydiscoveredbythepolicewhohadtherighttobewheretheyare;
(c)theevidencemustbeimmediatelyapparent,and(d)"plainview"justified
mereseizureofevidencewithoutfurthersearch;
3. Searchofamovingvehicle.Highlyregulatedbythegovernment,thevehicle's
inherentmobilityreducesexpectationofprivacyespeciallywhenitstransitin
public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to
probablecausethattheoccupantcommittedacriminalactivity;
4. Consentedwarrantlesssearch;
5. Customssearch;
6. StopandFrisk;
7. ExigentandEmergencyCircumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless
searchandseizurecanbelawfullyconducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the
streetandwasnotactingsuspiciouslyfortheNarcomagentstoconcludethatshewas
committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the
accusedsbag,therewasnoprobablecauseandtheaccusedwasnotlawfullyarrested.

169

P.J.G.

Thepolicehadmorethan24hourstoprocureasearchwarrantandtheydidnotdoso.
Theseizedmarijuanawasillegalandinadmissibleevidence.

RULE113,RULESOFCOURT

Section5.Arrestwithoutwarrant;whenlawful. Apeaceofficeroraprivateperson
may,withoutawarrant,arrestaperson:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing,orisattemptingtocommitanoffense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believebasedonpersonalknowledgeoffactsorcircumstancesthattheperson
tobearrestedhascommittedit;and
(c) Whenthepersontobearrestedisaprisonerwhohasescapedfromapenal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
fromoneconfinementtoanother.

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceededagainstinaccordancewithsection7ofRule112.

RULE126,RULESOFCOURT

Section2.Courtwhereapplicationforsearchwarrantshallbefiled.Anapplicationfor
searchwarrantshallbefiledwiththefollowing:

a)Anycourtwithinwhoseterritorialjurisdictionacrimewascommitted.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial
regionwherethecrimewascommittediftheplaceofthecommissionofthecrimeis
known,oranycourtwithinthejudicialregionwherethewarrantshallbeenforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be
madeinthecourtwherethecriminalactionispending.

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
170

P.J.G.

authority,maybreakopenanyouterorinnerdoororwindowofahouseoranypartof
a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfullyaidinghimwhenunlawfullydetainedtherein.

Section12.Deliveryofpropertyandinventorythereoftocourt;returnandproceedings
thereon.

(a) Theofficermustforthwithdeliverthepropertyseizedtothejudgewhoissuedthe
warrant,togetherwithatrueinventorythereofdulyverifiedunderoath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
ascertainifthereturnhasbeenmade,andifnone,shallsummonthepersonto
whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was
made.Ifthereturnhasbeenmade,thejudgeshallascertainwhethersection11
ofthisRulehasbeencomplainedwithandshallrequirethatthepropertyseized
bedeliveredtohim.Thejudgeshallseetoitthatsubsection(a)hereofhasbeen
compliedwith.
(c) Thereturnonthesearchwarrantshallbefiledandkeptbythecustodianofthe
logbookonsearchwarrantswhoshallenterthereinthedateofthereturn,the
result,andotheractionsofthejudge.

Aviolationofthissectionshallconstitutecontemptofcourt.

171

P.J.G.

LIBERTYOFABODEANDOFTRAVEL

Art3,Sec.6.
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribedby lawshall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither
shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety,orpublichealth,asmaybeprovidedbylaw.

CAUNCAVS.SALAZAR
[82PHIL851;NO.L2690;1JAN1949]

Facts:

ThisisanactionforhabeascorpusbroughtbyBartolomeCauncainbehalfofhiscousin
Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by
Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to
Estelitabytheemploymentagency,forhertoworkasamaid.However,Estelitawanted
to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency.
Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency
wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense
fromtheprovinceshouldbepaidbyEstelitabeforeshecouldbeallowedtoleave.

Issue:

Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
withoutreturningtheadvancepaymentitgave?

Held:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective


employee ormaid,hasabsolutely no power tocurtail her freedom of movement. The
factthatnophysicalforcehasbeenexertedtokeepherinthehouseoftherespondent
doesnotmakelessrealthedeprivationofherpersonalfreedomofmovement,freedom
to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom
may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneousbeliefintheexistenceofanimaginarypowerofanimpostortocauseharmif
172

P.J.G.

not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychologicalspellistoplaceapersonatthemercyofanother,thevictimisentitledto
theprotectionofcourtsofjusticeasmuchastheindividualwhoisillegallydeprivedof
libertybyduressorphysicalcoercion.

MANOTOCVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[142SCRA149;G.R.NO.L62100;30MAY1986]

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the
trialcourtsamotionentitled,"motionforpermission toleavethecountry,"statingas
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due
hearing,bothtrialjudgesdeniedthesame.Petitionerthusfiledapetitionforcertiorari
and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated
March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communicationrequest of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave
to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security
Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition.

Petitionercontendsthathavingbeenadmittedtobailasamatterofright,neitherthe
courtswhichgrantedhimbailnortheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionwhichhasno
jurisdictionoverhislibertycouldpreventhimfromexercisinghisconstitutionalrightto
travel.

Issue:

WhetherorNothisconstitutionalrighttotravelhasbeenviolated.

173

P.J.G.

Held:

AcourthasthepowertoprohibitapersonadmittedtobailfromleavingthePhilippines.
Thisisanecessaryconsequenceofthenatureandfunctionofabailbond.Thecondition
imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requireshispresenceoperatesasavalidrestrictiononhisrighttotravel.Indeed,ifthe
accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts. Petitioner has not shown the necessity for his
travel abroad. There is no indication that the business transactions cannot be
undertakenbyanyotherpersoninhisbehalf.

MARCOSVS.MANGLAPUS
[177SCRA668;G.R.NO.88211;15SEPT1989]

Facts:

Thiscaseinvolvesapetitionofmandamusandprohibitionaskingthecourttoorderthe
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former
Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is
guaranteedbytheBillofRights,specificallySections1and6.TheycontendedthatPres.
AquinoiswithoutpowertoimpairthelibertyofabodeoftheMarcosesbecauseonlya
courtmaydosowithinthelimitsprescribedbylaw.NorthePresidentimpairtheirright
totravelbecausenolawhasauthorizedhertodoso.

Theyfurtherassertthatunderinternationallaw,theirrighttoreturntothePhilippines
is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.

Issue:

Whetherornot,intheexerciseofthepowersgrantedbytheconstitution,thePresident
(Aquino)mayprohibittheMarcosesfromreturningtothePhilippines.

Held:

174

P.J.G.

"Itmustbeemphasizedthattheindividualrightinvolvedisnottherighttotravelfrom
thePhilippinestoothercountriesorwithinthePhilippines.Thesearewhattherightto
travelwouldnormally connote.Essentially, the right involved in this case atbar is the
right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent
fromalthoughrelatedtotherighttotravel.Thus,theUniversalDeclarationofHuman
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to
freedomofmovementandabodewithintheterritoryofastate,therighttoleavethe
country,andtherighttoenterone'scountryasseparateanddistinctrights.Whatthe
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the
bordersofeachstate".Ontheotherhand,theCovenantguaranteestherighttoliberty
ofmovementandfreedomtochoosehisresidenceandtherighttobefreetoleaveany
country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
nationalsecurity,publicorder,publichealthormoralsortheseparaterightsofothers.
However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones
countryinthesamecontextasthosepertainingtothelibertyofabodeandtherightto
travel.

TheBillofrightstreatsonlythelibertyofabodeandtherighttotravel,butitisawell
considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principleofInternationalLawandunderourConstitutionaspartofthelawoftheland.

ThecourtheldthatPresidentdidnotactarbitrarilyorwithgraveabuseofdiscretionin
determiningthatthereturnoftheFormerPres.Marcosandhisfamilyposesaserious
threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achievedduringthepastfewyearsaftertheMarcosregime.

ThereturnoftheMarcosesposesaseriousthreatandthereforeprohibitingtheirreturn
tothePhilippines,theinstantpetitionisherebyDISMISSED.

SILVERIOVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[195SCRA760;G.R.94284;8APR1991]

Facts:

175

P.J.G.

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act.
Respondentfiledtocancelthepassportofthepetitionerandtoissueaholddeparture
order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioners passport, based on the finding
that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the
accusedhasleftthecountrywithouttheknowledgeandthepermissionofthecourt.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherighttotravelmaybeimpairedbyorderofthecourt.

Held:

Thebailbondpostedbypetitionerhasbeencancelledandwarrantofarresthasbeen
issuedbyreasonthathefailedtoappearathisarraignments.Thereisavalidrestriction
on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available
whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return
(ConstitutionalLaw,Cruz,IsaganiA.,1987Edition,p.138).Soitisalsothat"Anaccused
releasedonbailmayberearrestedwithoutthenecessityofawarrantifheattemptsto
depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is
pending(ibid.,Sec.20[2nd
par.]).

ArticleIII,Section6ofthe1987Constitutionshouldbeinterpretedtomeanthatwhile
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executiveofficersoradministrativeauthoritiesarenotarmedwitharbitrarydiscretion
to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
publicsafety,orpublichealth"and"asmaybeprovidedbylaw,"alimitivephrasewhich
did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First
Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a
reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when
there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel
upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing
Center,No.53622,25April1980,97SCRA121).

HoldinganaccusedinacriminalcasewithinthereachoftheCourtsbypreventinghis
departurefromthePhilippinesmustbeconsideredasavalidrestrictiononhisrightto
travelsothathemaybedealtwithinaccordancewithlaw.Theoffendedpartyinany
criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that
176

P.J.G.

criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes

DEFENSORSANTIAGOVS.VASQUEZ
[217SCRA633;G.R.NOS.9928990;27JAN1993]

Facts:

AninformationwasfiledagainstpetitionerwiththeSandiganbayanforviolationofthe
AntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct.Theorderofarrestwasissuedwithbailforrelease
fixedatPhp.15,000soshefiledamotionforacceptanceofcashbailbond.Onthesame
daytheSandiganbayanissuedaresolutionauthorizingthepetitionertopostcashbond
which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but
petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed
provisionalreleaseonrecognizance.TheSandiganbayandeferredit.TheSandiganbayan
issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she
made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the
instant motion she submitted before the S.C. she argues that her right to travel is
impaired.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthepetitionersrighttotravelisimpaired.

Held:

Thepetitionerdoesnotdenyandasamatteroffactevenmadeapublicstatement,that
sheheeveryintensionofleavingthecountrytopursuehigherstudiesabroad.Thecourt
upholdsthecourseofactionoftheSandiganbayanintakingjudicialnoticeofsuchfact
ofpetitionerspaltogoabroadandinthereafterissuingasuaspontetheholddeparture
order is but an exercise of respondent courts inherent power to preserve and to
maintaineffectivenessofitsjurisdictionoverthecaseandthepersonoftheaccused.

Also,thepetitionerassumedobligations,whenshepostedbailbond.Sheholdsherself
amenable at all times to the orders and process of eth court. She may legally be
prohibitedfromleavingthecountryduringthependencyofthecase.(Manotocv.C.A.)
177

P.J.G.

MARCOSVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[247SCRA127;G.R.NO.11513234;9AUG1995]

Facts:

Thisisapetitionforcertioraritosetasideasarbitraryandingraveabuseofdiscretion
resolutionsoftheSandiganbayan'sFirstDivisiondenyingpetitioner'smotionforleaveto
travelabroadformedicaltreatment.

The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. After
convictionshefileda"MotionforLeavetoTravelAbroad"toseekdiagnostictestsand
treatmentbypractitionersoforientalmedicineinChinaallegedlybecauseof"aserious
and life threatening medical condition" requiring facilities not available in the
Philippines that was denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent ExParte Motion for
Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and treatment in China. This was
supported by several medical reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto
Anastacio.

AgainanotherMotiontoleavewasfiledbyMrs.MarcostoUSandEuropefortreatment
ofseveralHeartdiseasesallegingthatthetestswerenotavailablehere.

Thepresidingjustice,Garchitorena,contactedDr.GregorioB.Patacsil,OfficerinCharge
ofthePhilippineHeartCenter,andlaterwrotehimaletter,askingfor"expertopinion
oncoronarymedicine".Thecourtstillfoundnomerittoallowthepetitionersmotionto
leaveanddeniedallofthemotions.

Petitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationanda"MotiontoAdmitClinicalSummary
andtoResolveMotionforReconsideration."Attachedwasarecentmedicalreportand
letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be guarantor for the return of
petitioner and those of twenty four members of the House of Representatives
requesting the court to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the
Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement of the VP and the
Cabinetmemberssoastoinfluencetheresolutions,decisionsorordersoranyjudicial
actionofrespondentcourt.

Issue:
178

P.J.G.

WhetherorNottheSandiganbayanerredindisallowingtheMotionforLeavetoTravel
Abroad because it (1) disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a
third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical
findings(3)saidthattherewasnonecessitytogetmedicaltreatmentabroad.

Held:

No.Thecontentionofthepetitionerthatwasinvalidtocontactathirdpartyaskingthe
latter to give an opinion on petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous.
Respondentcourthadtoseekexpertopinionbecausepetitioner'smotionwasbasedon
theadviceofherphysician.Thecourtcouldnotbeexpectedtojustaccepttheopinion
of petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to travel. What would
beobjectionablewouldbeifrespondentcourtobtainedinformationwithoutdisclosing
itssourcetothepartiesanduseditindecidingacaseagainstthem.

Indisregardingthemedicalreports,thepetitionerfailedtoprovethenecessityforatrip
abroad. It should be emphasized that considering the fact that she is facing charges
before the courts in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although the
decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not have an absolute right to
leavethecountryandtheburdenwasonhertoprovethatbecauseofdangertohealth
ifnottoherlifetherewasnecessitytoseekmedicaltreatmentinforeigncountries.

On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo several tests which
summarily states that the required medical treatment was available here in the
Philippinesandthattheexpertiseandfacilitieshereweremorethanadequatetocater
to her medical treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner were not as severe as
thatwasreportedbyDr.Anastacio.

Wherefore,thepetitionerisDismissedwithoutprejudicetothefillingofanothermotion
forleavetotravelabroad,shouldpetitionerstilldesire,basedonherheartcondition.In
suchaneventthedeterminationofhermedicalconditionshouldbemadebyjointpanel
ofmedicalspecialistsrecommendedbyboththeaccusedandtheprosecution.

RUBIVS.PROVINCIALBOARDOFMINDORO
[39PHIL660;NO.14078;7MAR1919]

Facts:
179

P.J.G.

The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein nonChristian


inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code,800hectaresofpubliclandinthesitioofTigbaoonNaujanLakebeselectedasa
site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may
onlysolicithomesteadsonthisreservationprovidingthatsaidhomesteadapplications
arepreviouslyrecommendedbytheprovincialgovernor.

In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the
MangyansinthetownshipsofNaujanandPolaandtheMangyanseastoftheBacoRiver
includingthoseinthedistrictsofDulanganandRubi'splaceinCalapan,wereorderedto
takeuptheirhabitationonthesiteofTigbao,NaujanLake.Also,thatanyMangyanwho
shallrefusetocomplywiththisordershalluponconvictionbeimprisonednotexceedin
sixtydays,inaccordancewithsection2759oftherevisedAdministrativeCode.

SaidresolutionoftheprovincialboardofMindorowereclaimedasnecessarymeasures
for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public
forestsinwhichtheyroam,andtointroducecivilizedcustomsamongthem.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
withinthereservationofTigbaoandareliabletobepunished.

It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincialofficialsofthatprovince.Rubiandhiscompanionsaresaidtobeheldonthe
reservationestablishedatTigbao,Mindoro,againsttheirwill,andoneDabalosissaidto
beheldunderthecustodyof the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapanfor having
runawayformthereservation.

Issue:

WhetherorNotSection2145oftheAdministrativeCodedepriveapersonofhisliberty
pfabode.Thus,WONSection2145oftheAdministrativeCodeof1917isconstitutional.

Held:

TheCourtheldthatsection2145oftheAdministrativeCodedoesnotdepriveaperson
ofhislibertyofabodeanddoesnotdenytohimtheequalprotectionofthelaws,and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute
180

P.J.G.

slaveryandinvoluntaryservitude.TheCourtisfurtheroftheopinionthatsection2145
oftheAdministrativeCodeisalegitimateexertionofthepolicepower.Section2145of
theAdministrativeCodeof1917isconstitutional.
Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non
Christianpeopleoftheprovince;and(2)theonlysuccessfullymethodforeducatingthe
Manguianeswastoobligethemtoliveinapermanentsettlement.TheSolicitorGeneral
adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the
public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
amongtheManguianes.

One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degreeofcivilizationoftheManguianesisconsidered.Theyarerestrainedfortheirown
goodandthegeneralgoodofthePhilippines.

Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the
individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general
wellbeing.Nomancandoexactlyashepleases.

Noneoftherightsofthecitizencanbetakenawayexceptbydueprocessoflaw.

Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty.


Habeascorpuscan,therefore,notissue.

181

P.J.G.

FREEDOMOFRELIGION

Art3,Sec.5.
No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
professionandworship,withoutdiscriminationorpreference,shallforeverbeallowed.
Noreligioustestshallberequiredfortheexerciseofcivilorpoliticalrights.

AGLIPAYVS.RUIZ
[64PHIL201;G.R.NO.45459;13MAR1937]

Facts:

Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of


Postsfromissuingandsellingpostagestampscommemorativeofthe33rdInternational
Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the
Constitutionalprovisionstatingthatnopublicfundsshallbeappropriatedorusedinthe
benefitofanychurch,systemofreligion,etc.Thisprovisionisaresultoftheprincipleof
the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein
thestatewillusethechurch,orviceversa,asaweapontofurthertheirendsandaims.
RespondentcontendsthatsuchissuanceisinaccordancetoActNo.4052,providingfor
the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage
stampsaswouldbeadvantageoustothegovernment.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherewasaviolationofthefreedomtoreligion.

Held:

What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious
toleration.Itishowevernotaninhibitionofprofoundreverenceforreligionandisnota
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it
instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highlyappreciated.ThephraseinActNo.4052advantageoustothegovernmentdoes
notauthorizeviolationoftheConstitution.Theissuanceofthestampswasnotinspired
by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not
182

P.J.G.

sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of
showingaCatholicchaliceasoriginallyplanned,containsamapofthePhilippinesand
thelocationofManila,withthewordsSeatXXXIIIInternationalEucharisticCongress.
ThefocusofthestampswasnottheEucharisticCongressbutthecityofManila,being
the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international
importance.AlthoughsuchissuanceandsalemaybeinseparablylinkedwiththeRoman
Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the
aimorpurposeoftheGovernment.

GARCESVS.ESTENZO
[104SCRA510;G.R.L53487;25MAY1981]

Facts:

TworesolutionsoftheBarangayCouncilofValencia,OrmocCitywerepassed:

a. ResolutionNo.5Revivingthetraditionalsocioreligiouscelebrationeveryfifth
of April. This provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer
and the construction of a waiting shed. Funds for the said projects will be
obtainedthroughthesellingofticketsandcashdonations.
b. ResolutionNo.6Thechairmanorhermanomayorofthefiestawouldbethe
caretakeroftheimageofSanVicenteFerrerandthattheimagewouldremain
inhisresidenceforoneyearanduntiltheelectionofhissuccessor.Theimage
wouldbemadeavailabletotheCatholicChurchduringthecelebrationofthe
saintsfeastday.

These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were
implemented.TheimagewastemporarilyplacedinthealtaroftheCatholicChurchof
thebarangay.However,afteramass,FatherSergioMarilaoOsmearefusedtoreturn
the image to the barangay council, as it was the churchs property since church funds
wereusedinitsacquisition.

Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin
caseagainstthepriestfortherecoveryoftheimage.ResolutionNo.12appointedBrgy.
Captain Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the
constitutionality of the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of
theAglipayanChurch,contendsthatSec.8ArticleIV1andSec18(2)ArticleVIII)2ofthe
constitutionwasviolated.
183

P.J.G.

Issue:

WhetherorNotanyfreedomofreligionclauseintheConstitutionviolated.

Held:

No.AssaidbytheCourtthiscaseisapettyquarreloverthecustodyoftheimage.The
imagewaspurchasedinconnectionwiththecelebrationofthebarriofiestaandnotfor
thepurposeoffavoringanyreligionnorinterferingwithreligiousmattersorbeliefsof
the barrio residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint(such as the acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a
laymans custody so that it could easily be made available to any family desiring to
borrowtheimageinconnectionwithprayersandnovena.Itwasthecouncilsfundsthat
wereusedtobuytheimage,thereforeitistheirproperty.Rightofthedeterminationof
custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to the Church, there is no
violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every government
activitywhichinvolvestheexpenditureofpublicfundsandwhichhassomereligioustint
is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state,
freedomofworshipandbanningtheuseofpublicmoneyorproperty.

AMERICANBIBLESOCIETYVS.CITYOFMANILA
[101PHIL386;G.R.NO.9637;30APR1957]

Facts:

NewYorksEducationLawrequireslocalpublicschoolauthoritiestolendtextbooksfree
ofchargetoallstudentsingrade7to12,includingthoseinprivateschools.TheBoard
of Education contended that said statute was invalid and violative of the State and
Federal Constitutions. An order barring the Commissioner of Education (Allen) from
removing appellants members from office for failure to comply with the requirement
andanorderpreventingtheuseofstatefundsforthepurchaseoftextbookstobelent
toparochialschoolsweresoughtfor.Thetrialcourtheldthestatute unconstitutional.
The Appellate Division reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint since the
appellant have no standing. The New York Court of Appeals, ruled that the appellants
havestandingbutthelawisnotunconstitutional.

Issue:

184

P.J.G.

WhetherorNotthesaidordinancesareconstitutionalandvalid(contention:itrestrains
thefreeexerciseandenjoymentofthereligiousprofessionandworshipofappellant).

Held:

Section1,subsection(7)ofArticleIIIoftheConstitution,providesthat:

(7)Nolawshallbemaderespectinganestablishmentofreligion,orprohibitingthe
freeexercisethereof,andthefreeexerciseandenjoymentofreligiousprofession
and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religiontestshallberequiredfortheexerciseofcivilorpoliticalrights.

The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and


enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to
disseminatereligiousinformation.

Itmaybetruethatinthecaseatbarthepriceaskedforthebiblesandotherreligious
pamphletswasinsomeinstancesalittlebithigherthantheactualcostofthesamebut
this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling
said"merchandise"forprofit.Forthisreason.TheCourtbelievethattheprovisionsof
CityofManilaOrdinanceNo.2529,asamended,cannotbeappliedtoappellant,forin
doingsoitwouldimpairitsfreeexerciseandenjoymentofitsreligiousprofessionand
worshipaswellasitsrightsofdisseminationofreligiousbeliefs.

WithrespecttoOrdinanceNo.3000,asamended,theCourtdonotfindthatitimposes
any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the
exerciseofreligiouspractices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered


unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the
plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not
applicable,sodefendantispowerlesstolicenseortaxthebusinessofplaintiffSociety.
WHEREFORE,defendantshallreturntoplaintiffthesumofP5,891.45undulycollected
fromit.

GERMANVS.BARANGAN
[135SCRA514;G.R.NO.68828;27MAR1985]

185

P.J.G.

Facts:

Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which
adjoinedMalacaang.Respondentbarredthemforsecurityreasons.Petitionersfileda
petitionformandamus.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherewasaviolationoftheconstitutionalfreedom.

Held:

Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to
conductanantigovernmentdemonstrationsincetheyworeyellowTshirts,raisedtheir
clenchedfistsandshoutedantigovernmentslogans.Whileeverycitizenhastherightto
religiousfreedom,theexercisemustbedoneingoodfaith.Besides,therestrictionwas
reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his family,
government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with
Malacanang.Therestrictionwasalsointendedtosecuretheexecutiveofficeswithinthe
Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority
opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the
freedomofreligionistheexistenceofagraveandimminent,ofaseriouseviltopublic
safety,publicmorals,publichealthoranyotherlegitimatepublicinterestthattheState
hasarighttoprevent.Theburdentoshowtheexistenceofgraveandimminentdanger
liesontheofficialswhowouldrestrainpetitioners.Respondentswereinfullcontroland
hadthecapabilitytostopanyuntowardmove.Therewasnoclearandpresentdanger
ofanyseriouseviltopublicsafetyorthesecurityofMalacanang.

EBRALINAGVS.DIVISIONSUPERINTENDENTOFCEBU
[219SCRA256;G.R.NO.95770;1MAR1993]

Facts:

Two special civil actions for certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition were filed and
consolidatedforraisingsameissue.Petitionersallegethatthepublicrespondentsacted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.
Respondentsorderedexpulsionof68HSand GS studentsofBantayan,Pinamungajan,
Caracar, Taburan and Asturias in Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these
186

P.J.G.

students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
Panatang Makabayan required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnesses believing
thatbydoingtheseisreligiousworship/devotionakintoidolatryagainsttheirteachings.
They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection
against official control and religious freedom. The respondents relied on the
precedenceofGeronaetalv.Secretaryof Education. Gerona doctrine provides that
weareasystemofseparationofthechurchandstateandtheflagisdevoidofreligious
significance and it doesnt involve any religious ceremony. The freedom of religious
beliefguaranteedbytheConstitutiondoesnotmeanexceptionfromnondiscriminatory
laws like the saluting of flag and singing national anthem. This exemption disrupts
school discipline and demoralizes the teachings of civic consciousness and duties of
citizenship.

Issue:

WhetherorNotreligiousfreedomhasbeenviolated.

Held:

Religiousfreedomisafundamentalrightofhighestpriority.The2foldaspectofrightto
religiousworshipis:1.)Freedomtobelievewhichisanabsoluteactwithintherealmof
thought.2.)Freedomtoactononesbeliefregulatedandtranslatedtoexternalacts.
Theonlylimitationtoreligiousfreedomistheexistenceofgraveandpresentdangerto
public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The
expulsionofthepetitionersfromtheschoolisnotjustified.

The 30 yr old previous GERONA decision of expelling and dismissing students and
teachers who refuse to obey RA1265 is violates exercise of freedom of speech and
religious profession and worship. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from
observingtheflagceremonybutthisrightdoesnotgivethemtherighttodisruptsuch
ceremonies.Inthecaseatbar,theStudentsexpelledwereonlystandingquietlyduring
ceremonies.Byobservingtheceremoniesquietly,itdoesntpresentanydangersoevil
andimminenttojustifytheirexpulsion.Whatthepetitionersrequestisexemptionfrom
flagceremoniesandnotexclusionfrompublicschools.Theexpulsionofthestudentsby
reasonoftheirreligiousbeliefsisalsoaviolationofacitizensrighttofreeeducation.
The nonobservance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of
patriotismandcivicconsciousness.Loveforcountryandadmirationfornationalheroes,
civicconsciousnessandformofgovernmentarepartoftheschoolcurricula.Therefore,
expulsionduetoreligiousbeliefsisunjustified.
187

P.J.G.

PetitionforCertiorariandProhibitionisGRANTED.ExpulsionisANNULLED.

FONACIERVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[96PHIL417;G.R.L5917;28JAN1955]

Facts:

CasewasfiledbyIglesiaFilipinaIndependiente(IFI),representedbyitssupremebishop
Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his
administration of all the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground
thatheceasedtobethesupremebishopofIFI.IsabeloDelosReyesJr.hadbeenelected
astheSupremeBishop.

Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as Supreme Bishop and his legal
successor was Juan Jamias. He claims that the there was an accounting of his
administration and was turned over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes
and Bayaca have abandoned their faith and formally joined the Prostestant Episcopal
ChurchofAmerica.

CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate
SupremeBishopofIFIandorderedFonaciertorenderanaccountingofhisadmistration
CAaffirmedthedecisionoftheCFI

Issue:

Whetherornotthepetitionershouldstillberegardedasthelegitimatesupremebishop
ofIFI.

Held:

Supreme Court affirmedCAs decision. The legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFIis Isabelo
DelosReyes,Jr.TheSupremeCourtaffirmsthevalidityoftheelectionofBishopDelos
ReyesastheSupremeBishopbasedontheirinternallaws

Tofinallydisposeofthepropertyissue,theCourt,citingWatsonv.Jones,368declared
that the rule in property controversies within religious congregations strictly
independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association (such as the Philippine
188

P.J.G.

IndependentChurch)isthattherulesforresolvingsuchcontroversiesshouldbethose
of any voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the majority rule then the
majorityshouldprevail;ifitadoptsadherencetodulyconstitutedauthoritieswithinthe
congregation,thenthatshouldbefollowed.

PAMILVS.TELECOM
[86SCRA413;G.R.34854;20NOV1978]

Facts:

Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected as Municipal Mayor in Alburquerque, Bohol.


Petitioner, also an aspirant for said office, then filed a suit for quo warranto for
GonzagasdisqualificationbasedontheAdministrativeCodeprovision:Innocaseshall
there be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
service,personsreceivingsalariesorcompensationfromprovincialornationalfunds,or
contractorsforpublicworksofthemunicipality."TherespondentJudge,insustaiingFr.
Gonzagas right to the office, ruled that the provision had already been impliedly
repealedbytheElectionCodeof1971.Petitionerontheotherhandarguesthatthere
wasnoimpliedrepeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotFr.Gonzagaiseligibleforthepositionofmunicipalmayor,accordingto
law.

Whether or Not the prohibition regarding elected or appointed ecclesiastics is


constitutional.

Held:

Thecourtwasdivided.Fivevotedthattheprohibitionwasnotunconstitutional.Seven
others voted that the provision was impliedly repealed. However, the minority vote
overruledtheseven.Accordingtothedissentingseven,therearethreereasonsforthe
said provision to be inoperative. First, the 1935 Constitution stated, No religious test
shallberequiredfortheexerciseofcivilorpoliticalrights.Second,saidsection2175is
supersededbytheConstitution.Third,section2175hasbeenrepealedbySec.23ofthe
Election Code (1971): Appointive public office holders and active members of the
189

P.J.G.

Armed Forces are no longer disqualified from running for an elective office.
Ecclesiasticswerenolongerincludedintheenumerationofpersonsineligibleunderthe
saidElectionCode.Ontheotherhand,thecontrollingfiveargued:Section2175ofthe
AdministrativeCodedealswithamatterdifferentfromthatofsection23oftheElection
Code.Also,section2175oftheAdministrativeCodedidnotviolatetherighttofreedom
ofreligionbecauseitdidnotgiveanyrequirementforareligioustest.

Theviewofthedissentingsevenfailedtoobtainavoteofeightmembers,soitwasnot
controlling.TheprovisionoftheAdministrativeCoderemainedoperative.

ESTRADAVS.ESCRITOR
[492SCRA1;AMNOP021651;22JUN2006]

Facts:

Escritorisacourtinterpretersince1999intheRTCofLasPinasCity.Shehasbeenliving
withQuilapio,amanwhoisnotherhusband,formorethantwentyfiveyearsandhada
son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the
judiciarywhileQuilapioisstilllegallymarriedtoanotherwoman.

Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.


According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
thereinforitwillappearasifthecourtallowssuchact.

Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe


JehovahsWitnessesandtheWatchTowerandtheBibleTraceSociety.Theyallegedly
haveaDeclarationofPledgingFaithfulnessundertheapprovaloftheircongregation.
Suchadeclarationiseffectivewhenlegalimpedimentsrenderitimpossibleforacouple
tolegalizetheirunion.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheStatecouldpenalizerespondentforsuchconjugalarrangement.

Held:

190

P.J.G.

No.TheStatecouldnotpenalizerespondentforsheisexercisingherrighttofreedomof
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the
fundamentalrightsinourConstitution.AsJeffersonputit,itisthemostinalienableand
sacred of human rights. The States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcingtheconcubinageorbigamychargesagainstrespondentorherpartner.Thus
the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition.

Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality
shouldbekeptinmind.ThejurisdictionoftheCourtextendsonlytopublicandsecular
morality.

The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approachthatgivesroomforaccommodationofreligiousexercisesasrequiredbythe
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
furtherdemonstratethatthestatehasusedtheleastintrusivemeanspossiblesothat
thefreeexerciseisnotinfringedanymorethannecessarytoachievethelegitimategoal
ofthestate.Thustheconjugalarrangementcannotbe penalizedforitconstitutes an
exemptiontothelawbasedonherrighttofreedomofreligion.

ISLAMICDA'WAHCOUNCILOFTHEPHILIPPINESVS.EXECUTIVESECRETARY
[405SCRA497;GR153888;9JUL2003]

Facts:

Petitioner Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. (IDCP) is a corporation that
operates under Department of Social Welfare and Development, a nongovernmental
organizationthatextendsvoluntaryservicestotheFilipinopeople,especiallytoMuslim
communities.ItclaimstobeafederationofnationalIslamicorganizationsandanactive
member of international organizations such as the Regional Islamic Da'wah Council of
SoutheastAsiaandthePacific(RISEAP)andTheWorldAssemblyofMuslimYouth.The
RISEAPaccreditedpetitionertoissuehalalcertificationsinthePhilippines.Thus,among
the functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on
halalfoodandissuehalalcertificationstoqualifiedproductsandmanufacturers.
191

P.J.G.

Petitionerallegesthat,theactualneedtocertifyfoodproductsashalalandalsodueto
halal food producers' request, petitioner formulated in 1995 internal rules and
procedures based on the Qur'an and the Sunnah for the analysis of food, inspection
thereofandissuanceofhalalcertifications.Inthatsameyear,petitionerbegantoissue,
for a fee, certifications to qualified products and food manufacturers. Petitioner even
adoptedforuseonitshalalcertificatesadistinctsignorlogoregisteredinthePhilippine
PatentOffice.

On 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the
Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating respondent OMA to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue
halalcertificatesandperformotherrelatedregulatoryactivities.

Issue:

WhetherorNotEOviolatestheconstitutionalprovisionontheseparationofChurchand
State.

Held:

It is unconstitutional for the government to formulate policies and guidelines on the


halalcertificationschemebecausesaidschemeisafunctiononlyreligiousorganizations,
entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims. According to
petitioner,afoodproductbecomeshalalonlyaftertheperformanceofIslamicreligious
ritual and prayer. Thus, only practicing Muslims are qualified to slaughter animals for
food. A government agency like herein respondent OMA cannot therefore perform a
religious function like certifying qualified food products as halal. Without doubt,
classifyingafoodproductashalalisareligiousfunctionbecausethestandardsusedare
drawn from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to
classify food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizationslikehereinpetitionertointerpretforFilipinoMuslimswhatfoodproducts
are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal
certifications,theStatehasineffectforcedMuslimstoacceptitsowninterpretationof
theQur'anandSunnahonhalalfood.

In the case at bar, we find no compelling justification for the government to deprive
Muslimorganizations,likehereinpetitioner,oftheirreligiousrighttoclassifyaproduct
as halal, even on the premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively
192

P.J.G.

protected by assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The
protectionandpromotionofthemuslimFilipinos'righttohealtharealreadyprovided
for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies charged with ensuring
that food products released in the market are fit for human consumption, properly
labeledandsafe.UnlikeEO46,theselawsdonotencroachonthereligiousfreedomof
Muslims.

193

P.J.G.

FREEDOMOFEXPRESSION

Art3,Sec.4.
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression,orofthepress,ortherightofthepeoplepeaceablytoassembleandpetition
thegovernmentforredressofgrievances.

Art3,Sec.7.
Therightofthepeopletoinformationonmattersofpublicconcern
shallberecognized.Accesstoofficialrecords,andtodocuments,andpaperspertaining
toofficialacts,transactions,ordecisions,aswellastogovernmentresearchdataused
asbasisforpolicydevelopment,shallbeaffordedthecitizen,subjecttosuchlimitations
asmaybeprovidedbylaw.

Art3,Sec.8.
Therightofthepeople,includingthoseemployedinthepublicand
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to
lawshallnotbeabridged.

Art 3, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs
andaspirations.

NEARVS.MINNESOTA
[283US697]

Facts:

A complaint alleged that the defendants, on September 24, 1927, and on eight
subsequentdatesinOctoberandNovember,1927,publishedandcirculatededitionsof
The Saturday Press(published in Minneapolis) which were 'largely devoted to
malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles'(based on Session Laws of Minnesota).
The articles charged, in substance, provides that a Jewish gangster was in control of
gambling,bootlegging,andracketeeringinMinneapolis,andthatlawenforcingofficers
andagencieswerenotenergeticallyperformingtheirduties.Mostofthechargeswere
directed against the chief of police; he was charged with gross neglect of duty, illicit
relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft. The county attorney was
charged with knowing the existing conditions and with failure to take adequate
measurestoremedythem.Themayorwasaccusedofinefficiencyanddereliction.One
member of the grand jury was stated to be in sympathy with the gangsters. A special
grand jury and a special prosecutor were demanded to deal with the situation in
194

P.J.G.

general,and,inparticular,toinvestigateanattempttoassassinateoneGuilford,oneof
theoriginaldefendants,who,itappearsfromthe articles,wasshot bygangstersafter
the first issue of the periodical had been published. Now defendants challenged the
Minnesota statute which provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance, of a
malicious, scandalous and defamatory news paper, magazine or other periodical. The
DistrictCourtruledagainstdefendants.Hencetheappeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the proceeding authorized by the statute herein constitutes an


infringementofthefreedomofthepress.

Held:

Yes. The insistence that the statute is designed to prevent the circulation of scandal
whichtendstodisturbthepublicpeaceandtoprovokeassaultsandthecommissionof
crimeisunavailing.

The reason for the enactment, as the state court has said, is that prosecutions to
enforce penal statutes for libel do not result in 'efficient repression or suppression of
the evils of scandal.' In the present instance, the proof was that nine editions of the
newspaperorperiodicalinquestionwerepublishedonsuccessivedates,andthatthey
werechieflydevotedtochargesagainstpublicofficersandinrelationtotheprevalence
and protection of crime. In such a case, these officers are not left to their ordinary
remedy in a suit for libel, or the authorities to a prosecution for criminal libel. The
statutenotonlyoperatestosuppresstheoffendingnewspaperorperiodical,buttoput
thepublisherunderaneffectivecensorship.

Everyfreemanhasanundoubtedrighttolaywhatsentimentshepleasesbeforethe
public;toforbidthis,istodestroythefreedomofthepress;butifhepublisheswhatis
improper,mischievousorillegal,hemusttaketheconsequenceofhisowntemerity.

The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, but he who used it was to be
responsible in case of its abuse.' Public officers, whose character and conduct remain
opentodebateandfreediscussioninthepress,findtheirremediesforfalseaccusations
inactionsunderlibellawsprovidingforredressandpunishment,andnotinproceedings
torestrainthepublicationofnewspapersandperiodicals.

195

P.J.G.

Characterizing the publication as a business, and the business as a nuisance, does not
permit an invasion of the constitutional immunity against restraint. Nor can it be said
that the constitutional freedom from previous restraint is lost because charges are
madeofderelictionswhichconstitutecrimes.

Thepreliminaryfreedom,byvirtueoftheveryreasonforitsexistence,doesnot
depend,asthiscourthassaid,onproofoftruth.

GROSJEANVS.AMERICANPRESSCO.
[297US233]

Facts:

The nine publishers(corporations) who brought the suit publish thirteen newspapers
and these thirteen publications are the only ones within the state of Louisiana having
eachacirculationofmorethan20,000copiesperweek.ThesuitassailedActNo.231of
theLouisianaLegislature,astheirfreedomofthepresswasabridgedincontraventionto
thedueprocessclause.

Issue:

WhetherorNotAct23unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes.Freedomofspeechandofthepressarerightsofthesamefundamentalcharacter,
safeguarded by the due process of law clause. The word 'liberty' contained in that
amendmentembracesnotonlytherightofapersontobefreefromphysicalrestraint,
but the right to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties as well.
TheActoperatesasarestraintinadoublesense.First,itseffectistocurtailtheamount
of revenue realized from advertising; and, second, its direct tendency is to restrict
circulation. This is plain enough when we consider that, if it were increased to a high
degree, as it could be if valid it well might result in destroying both advertising and
circulation.

JudgeCooleyhaslaiddownthetesttobeapplied:Theevilstobepreventedwerenot
the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of
which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems
196

P.J.G.

absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as
citizens.

The tax here involved is bad not because it takes money from the pockets of the
appellees. It is bad because, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the
guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in
virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands as one of the great
interpretersbetweenthegovernmentandthepeople.

Theforminwhichthetaxisimposedisinitselfsuspicious.Itisnotmeasuredorlimited
bythevolumeofadvertisements.Itismeasuredalonebytheextentofthecirculationof
the publication in which the advertisements are carried, with the plain purpose of
penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of
newspapers.

NEWYORKTIMESVS.UNITEDSTATES
[403US713]

Facts:

ThecourtgrantedcertiorariinthecasesinwhichtheUnitedStatesseekstoenjointhe
New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified
studyentitled"HistoryofU.S.DecisionMakingProcessonVietNamPolicy."Saidarticles
reveal the workings of government that led to the Vietnam war. The Government
argues that "the authority of the Executive Department to protect the nation against
publicationofinformationwhosedisclosurewouldendangerthenationalsecuritystems
from two interrelated sources: the constitutional power of the President over the
conduct of foreign affairs and his authority as CommanderinChief. In such case the
ExecutiveBranchseeksjudicialaidinpreventingpublication.Thecourtruledinfavorof
thenewspapercompanieshencetheappeal.

Issue:

Whetherornotthefreedomofthepresswasabridged.

Held:

197

P.J.G.

Yes.TofindthatthePresidenthas"inherentpower"tohaltthepublicationofnewsby
resorttothecourtswouldwipeouttheFirstAmendment(BillofRights)anddestroythe
fundamental liberty and security of the very people the Government hopes to make
"secure."

Nobranchofgovernmentcouldabridgethepeople'srightsgrantedbytheConstitution
includingthefreedomofthepress.ThelanguageoftheFirstAmendmentsupportthe
view that the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without
censorship,injunctions,orpriorrestraints.Thepresswasprotectedsothatitcouldbare
the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press
can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among the
responsibilitiesofafreepressisthedutytopreventanypartofthegovernmentfrom
deceivingthepeopleandsendingthemofftodistantlandstodieofforeignfeversand
foreignshotandshell.

GONZALESVS.COMELEC
[27SCRA835;G.R.L27833;18APR1969]

Facts:

RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of
candidatesandlimitingtheperiodofelectioncampaignorpartisanpoliticalactivitywas
challengedonconstitutionalgrounds.Moreprecisely,thebasiclibertiesoffreespeech
andfreepress,freedomofassemblyandfreedomofassociationareinvokedtonullify
the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent
councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for
ViceMayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967;
petitionerGonzales,ontheotherhand,isaprivateindividual,aregisteredvoterinthe
CityofManilaandapoliticalleaderofhiscopetitioner.Therewasthefurtherallegation
that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are
mattersofpoliticalexpediencyandconveniencewhichonlypoliticalpartiescanregulate
orcurtail by andamongthemselves through selfrestraint or mutual understandingor
agreementandthattheregulationandlimitationofthesepoliticalmattersinvokingthe
policepower,intheabsenceofclearandpresentdangertothestate,wouldrenderthe
constitutionalrightsofpetitionersmeaninglessandwithouteffect.SenatorLorenzoM.
Taadawasaskedtoappearasamicuscuriae,andelucidatedthatActNo.4880could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of
assemblyandofassociation.Hedidjustifyitsenactmenthoweverundertheclearand
198

P.J.G.

present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for
national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning,
excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of
efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil
Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were
requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the
policepowerofthestate.

Issue:

WhetherorNotRA4880unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes.AsheldinCabansagv.Fernandeztherearetwoteststhatmaysupplyanacceptable
criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and
presentdangerruleandthe 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that theevil
consequenceofthecommentorutterancemustbeextremelyseriousandthedegreeof
imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be
guardedagainstisthe'substantiveevil'soughttobeprevented.Ithastheadvantageof
establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It
provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous
tendencyrule"issuchthatIfthewordsutteredcreateadangeroustendencywhichthe
statehas arightto prevent,then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that
somedefiniteorimmediateactsofforce,violence,orunlawfulnessbeadvocated.Itis
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness.Itissufficientifthenaturaltendencyandprobableeffectoftheutterance
betobringaboutthesubstantiveevilwhichthelegislativebodyseekstoprevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices
prohibitedmorepreciselydelineatedtosatisfytheconstitutionalrequirementsastoa
valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada
clearlyexplained,suchprovisions were deemedby the legislative body to be partand
parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present
danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive
partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably
marredelectioncampaignsandpartisanpoliticalactivitiesinthiscountry.
199

P.J.G.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its
citizenstomeetpeaceablyforconsultationinrespecttopublicaffairsandtopetitionfor
redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be
limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantiveevilthatCongresshasarighttoprevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of


interviewsfororagainsttheelectionofanypartyorcandidateforpublicofficeandthe
prohibitionofthepublicationordistributionofcampaignliteratureormaterials,against
the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaignliteratureorpropagandafororagainstanycandidateorpartyisrepugnantto
aconstitutionalcommand.

IGLESIANICRISTOVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[259SCRA529;G.R.NO.119673;26JUL1996]

Facts:

Petitioner has a television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2
everySaturdayandonChannel13everySunday.Theprogrampresentsandpropagates
petitioner'sreligiousbeliefs,doctrinesandpracticesoftentimesincomparativestudies
with other religions. Petitioner submitted to the respondent Board of Review for
Moving Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119,
121 and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public viewing on the
ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law." On November 28, 1992, it appealed to the Office of the
PresidenttheclassificationofitsTVSeriesNo.128whichalloweditthroughaletterof
formerExecutiveSecretaryEdelmiroA.Amante,Sr.,addressedforHenriettaS.Mendez
reversingthedecisionoftherespondentBoard.Accordingtothelettertheepisodeinis
protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression and no
indicationthattheepisodeposesanyclearandpresentdanger.PetitioneralsofiledCivil
Case. Petitioner alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV
programandinxratingthem.ItciteditsTVProgramSeriesNos.115,119,121and128.
IntheirAnswer,respondentBoardinvokeditspowerunderPDNo.19861inrelationto
200

P.J.G.

Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code. The Iglesia ni Cristo insists on the literal
translationofthebibleandsaysthatour(Catholic)venerationoftheVirginMaryisnot
tobecondonedbecausenowhereitisfoundinthebible.Theboardcontendedthatit
outragesCatholicandProtestant'sbeliefs.RTCruledinfavorofpetitioners.CAhowever
reversedithencethispetition.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthe"angiglesianicristo"programisnotconstitutionallyprotectedasa
formofreligiousexerciseandexpression.

Held:

Yes. Any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. It is
the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to
dischargethisburden,itsactofcensorshipwillbestruckdown.Thisistrueinthiscase.
Socalled"attacks"aremerecriticismsofsomeofthedeeplyhelddogmasandtenetsof
other religions. RTCs ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and
interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. attack is different from offend
any race or religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religionsbypetitionerbutthatgivesitnoexcusetointerdictsuchcriticisms,however,
uncleantheymaybe.Underourconstitutionalscheme,itisnotthetaskoftheStateto
favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious
dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers,
especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the
Statefromleaningtowardsanyreligion.Respondentboardcannotcensorthespeechof
petitionerIglesianiCristosimplybecauseitattacksotherreligions,evenifsaidreligion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. The basis of freedom of
religionisfreedomofthoughtanditisbestservedbyencouragingthemarketplaceof
duelingideas.Itisonlywhereitisunavoidablynecessarytopreventanimmediateand
grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of
religiousfreedommay bejustified, and only to the smallest extent necessaryto avoid
the danger. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring
aboutespeciallythegravityandimminenceofthethreatenedharm.Priorrestrainton
speech,includingreligiousspeech,cannotbejustifiedbyhypotheticalfearsbutonlyby
theshowingofasubstantiveandimminentevil.Itisinappropriatetoapplytheclearand
presentdangertesttothecaseatbarbecausetheissueinvolvesthecontentofspeech
and not the time, place or manner of speech. Allegedly, unless the speech is first
allowed,itsimpactcannotbemeasured,andthecausalconnectionbetweenthespeech
201

P.J.G.

andtheevilapprehendedcannotbeestablished.Thedeterminationofthequestionas
towhetherornotsuchvilification,exaggerationorfabricationfallswithinorliesoutside
theboundariesofprotectedspeechorexpressionisajudicialfunctionwhichcannotbe
arrogated by an administrative body such as a Board of Censors." A system of prior
restraint may only be validly administered by judges and not left to administrative
agencies.

ADIONGVS.COMELEC
[207SCRA712;G.R.NO.103956;31MAR1992]

Facts:

COMELECpromulgatedResolutionNo.2347whichprovidesthatdecalsandstickersmay
be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile"
places,publicorprivate.PetitionerBloUmparAdiong,asenatorialcandidateintheMay
11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that
with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a
neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this
prohibition.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheCOMELECsprohibitionunconstitutional.

Held:

Theprohibitionundulyinfringesonthecitizen'sfundamentalrightoffreespeech.The
preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equallyvitalrightofsuffrage.Thesocalledbalancingofinterestsindividualfreedom
ononehandandsubstantialpublicinterestsontheotherismadeevenmoredifficult
inelectioncampaigncasesbecausetheConstitutionalsogivesspecificauthoritytothe
CommissiononElectionstosupervisetheconductoffree,honest,andorderlyelections.
Whenfacedwithborderlinesituationswherefreedomtospeakbyacandidateorparty
andfreedomtoknowonthepartoftheelectorateareinvokedagainstactionsintended
formaintainingcleanandfreeelections,thepolice,localofficialsandCOMELEC,should
leaninfavoroffreedom.Theregulationofelectioncampaignactivitymaynotpassthe
test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its
202

P.J.G.

application,ifitrestrictsone'sexpressionofbeliefinacandidateorone'sopinionofhis
or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory
measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned
objective.

Thepostingofdecalsandstickersinmobileplaceslikecarsandothermovingvehicles
doesnotendangeranysubstantialgovernmentinterest.Thereisnoclearpublicinterest
threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's
rightoffreespeechandexpression.Undertheclearand presentdangerrule notonly
must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be
avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a writing
instrumenttobestilled.Theregulationstrikesatthefreedomofanindividualtoexpress
hispreferenceand,bydisplayingitonhiscar,toconvinceotherstoagreewithhim.A
stickermaybefurnishedbyacandidatebutoncethecarowneragreestohaveitplaced
onhisprivatevehicle,theexpressionbecomesastatementbytheowner,primarilyhis
ownandnotofanybodyelse.Therestrictionastowherethedecalsandstickersshould
bepostedissobroadthatitencompasseseventhecitizen'sprivateproperty,whichin
this case is a privatelyowned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another
cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of
theBillofRightsprovidesthatnopersonshallbedeprivedofhispropertywithoutdue
processoflaw.

Theprohibitiononpostingofdecalsandstickerson"mobile"placeswhetherpublicor
privateexceptintheauthorizedareasdesignatedbytheCOMELECbecomescensorship.

NATIONALPRESSCLUBVS.COMELEC
[201SCRA1;G.R.NO.1026653;5MAR1992]

Facts:

Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are
preventedfromsellingordonatingspaceandtimeforpoliticaladvertisements;two(2)
individualswhoarecandidatesforoffice(onefornationalandtheotherforprovincial
office)inthecomingMay1992elections;andtaxpayersandvoterswhoclaimthattheir
right to be informed of election Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being
curtailed. Itis principallyargued by petitioners that Section 11(b) of Republic ActNo.
66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of
expression.PetitionersmaintainthattheprohibitionimposedbySection11(b)amounts
203

P.J.G.

to censorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with
criminal sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, mediabased
election or political propaganda during the election period of 1992. It is asserted that
theprohibitionisinderogationofmedia'srole,functionanddutytoprovideadequate
channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further,
petitionerscontendthatSection11(b) abridgesthefreedomofspeechofcandidates,
andthatthesuppressionofmediabasedcampaignorpoliticalpropagandaexceptthose
appearingintheComelecspaceofthenewspapersandon Comelectimeofradioand
television broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or
volume of information concerning candidates and Issue in the election thereby
curtailingandlimitingtherightofvoterstoinformationandopinion.

Issue:

WhetherorNotSection11(b)ofRepublicActNo.6646constitutional.

Held:

Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which
enshrinesfreedomofspeech,freedomofexpressionandfreedomofthepresshastobe
takeninconjunctionwithArticleIX(C)(4)whichmaybeseentobeaspecialprovision
applicable during a specific limited period i.e., "during the election period." In our
ownsociety,equalityofopportunitytoprofferoneselfforpublicoffice,withoutregard
to the level of financial resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an
important value. One of the basic state policies given constitutional rank by Article II,
Section26oftheConstitutionistheegalitariandemandthat"theStateshallguarantee
equalaccesstoopportunities forpublicserviceandprohibitpoliticaldynastiesasmay
bedefinedbylaw."Theessentialquestioniswhetherornottheassailedlegislativeor
administrativeprovisionsconstituteapermissibleexerciseofthepowerofsupervision
orregulationoftheoperationsofcommunicationandinformationenterprisesduringan
election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible supervision or
regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b)
has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media
operationsduringelectionperiods.

Section11(b)islimitedinthedurationofitsapplicabilityandenforceability.Byvirtueof
the operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its
applicabilityintimetoelectionperiods.Section11(b)doesnotpurportinanywayto
204

P.J.G.

restrict the reporting by newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news


worthyeventsrelatingtocandidates,theirqualifications,politicalpartiesandprograms
ofgovernment.Moreover,Section11(b)doesnotreachcommentariesandexpressions
of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or editors or commentators or
columnistsinrespectofcandidates,theirqualifications,andprogramsandsoforth,so
longatleastassuchcomments,opinionsandbeliefsarenotinfactadvertisementsfor
particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as
reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not
paidforbycandidatesforpoliticaloffice.Section11(b)asdesignedtocoveronlypaid
politicaladvertisementsofparticularcandidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates
themselvesisnotundulyrepressiveorunreasonable.

USVS.BUSTOS
[37PHIL.731;G.R.L12592;8MAR1918]

Facts:

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,
and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged
communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals
signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and
Masantol,Pampanga,withmalfeasanceinofficeandaskingforhisremoval.Thespecific
chargesagainstthejusticeofthepeaceincludethesolicitationofmoneyfrompersons
who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused
published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous
againsthim.

Issue:

WhetherorNotaccusedisentitledtoconstitutionalprotectionbyvirtueofhisrightto
freespeechandfreepress.

Held:

Yes.Theguarantiesofafreespeechandafreepressincludetherighttocriticizejudicial
conduct.Theadministrationofthelawisamatterofvitalpublicconcern.Whetherthe
205

P.J.G.

law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the
people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public
officer,publicopinionwillbeeffectivelysuppressed.Itisadutywhicheveryoneowes
to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is
furtherthedutyofallwhoknowofanyofficialderelictiononthepartofamagistrateor
the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose
dutyitistoinquireintoandpunishthem.

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican


institutionsandthecomplementofthepartoffreespeech.Assemblymeansarighton
the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs.
Petitionmeansthatanypersonorgroupofpersonscanapply,withoutfearofpenalty,
totheappropriatebranchorofficeofthegovernmentforaredressofgrievances.The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the
charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of
justiceandofpublicaffairs.

Publicpolicy,thewelfareofsociety,andtheorderlyadministrationofgovernmenthave
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has
been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an
interestinthepureandefficientadministrationofjusticeandofpublicaffairs.Theduty
underwhichapartyisprivilegedissufficientifitissocialormoralinitsnatureandthis
person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is
mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace,
they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action.
Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from
officeofapersonthoughttobevenalwerejustifiable.Innowaydidtheyabusethe
privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys
thatpresumption.Aprivilegedcommunicationshouldnotbesubjectedtomicroscopic
examinationtodiscovergroundsofmaliceorfalsity.

PITAVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[178SCRA362;G.R.NO.80806;5OCT1989]

Facts:
206

P.J.G.

OnDecember1and3,1983,pursuinganAntiSmutCampaigninitiatedbytheMayorof
theCity ofManila, RamonD.Bagatsing,elements of the Special AntiNarcotics Group,
AuxilliaryServicesBureau,WesternPoliceDistrict,INPoftheMetropolitanPoliceForce
of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and
peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials
believed to be obscene, pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized
materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student
organizations.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines
publishedandcoeditedbyplaintiffLeoPita.

Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunctionagainstMayorBagatsingandNarciscoCabrera,assuperintendentofWestern
PoliceDistrictoftheCityofManila,seekingtoenjoinsaiddefendantsandtheiragents
fromconfiscatingplaintiffsmagazinesorfrompreventingthesaleorcirculationthereof
claimingthatthemagazineisadecent, artisticandeducationalmagazinewhichis not
perseobscene,andthatthepublicationisprotectedbytheConstitutionalguarantees
offreedomofspeechandofthepress.PlaintiffalsofiledanUrgentMotionforissuance
ofatemporaryrestrainingorderagainstindiscriminateseizure,confiscationandburning
ofplaintiff's"PinoyPlayboy"Magazines,pendinghearingonthepetitionforpreliminary
injunction.TheCourtgrantedthetemporaryrestrainingorder.Thecasewassetfortrial
uponthelapseoftheTRO.RTCruledthattheseizurewasvalid.Thiswasaffirmedbythe
CA.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheseizureviolativeofthefreedomofexpressionofthepetitioner.

Held:

Freedomofthepressisnotwithoutrestraintasthestatehastherighttoprotectsociety
frompornographicliteraturethatisoffensivetopublicmorals,asindeedwehavelaws
punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is
easiersaidthandonetosay,thatifthepictureshereinquestionwereusednotexactly
forart'ssakebutratherfor commercial purposes, the picturesarenotentitled to any
207

P.J.G.

constitutionalprotection.UsingtheKottingerrule:thetestofobscenityis"whetherthe
tendencyofthematterchargedasobscene,istodepraveorcorruptthosewhoseminds
areopentosuchimmoralinfluencesandintowhosehandsapublicationorotherarticle
charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or
indecentmustdependuponthecircumstancesofthecaseandthatthequestionistobe
decidedbythe"judgmentoftheaggregatesenseofthecommunityreachedbyit."The
governmentauthoritiesintheinstantcasehavenotshowntherequiredprooftojustify
abanandtowarrantconfiscationoftheliteratureFirstofall,theywerenotpossessed
of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2)
authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The
courtprovidesthattheauthoritiesmustapplyfortheissuanceofasearchwarrantfrom
ajudge,ifintheiropinionanobscenityseizureisinorderandthat;

1. Theauthoritiesmustconvincethecourtthatthematerialssoughttobeseizedare
obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrantStateinterferenceandaction;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The
question is to be resolved on a casetocase basis and on the judges sound
discretion;

AYERPRODUCTIONSVS.CAPULONG
[160SCRA861;G.R.NO.L82380;29APR1988]

Facts:

Petitioner McElroyanAustralian film maker, and his movie production company, Ayer
Productions, envisioned, sometime in 1987, for commercial viewing and for Philippine
and international release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA. The
proposed motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the
MTRCBasandothergovernmentagenciesconsulted.Ramosalsosignifiedhisapproval
oftheintendedfilmproduction.

Itisdesignedtobeviewedinasixhourminiseriestelevisionplay,presentedina"docu
drama"style,creatingfourfictionalcharactersinterwovenwithrealevents,andutilizing
actual documentary footage as background. David Williamson is Australia's leading
playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American
historianhavedevelopedascript.
208

P.J.G.

Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or
exhibitionofhisname,orpicture,orthatofanymemberofhisfamilyinanycinemaor
televisionproduction,filmorothermediumforadvertisingorcommercialexploitation.
petitionersaccededtothisdemandandthenameofEnrilewasdeletedfromthemovie
script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected motion picture. However, a
complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy. RTC ordered for the
desistanceofthemovieproductionandmakingofanyreferencetoplaintifforhisfamily
andfromcreatinganyfictitiouscharacterinlieuofplaintiffwhichneverthelessisbased
on,orbearssubstantialormarkedresemblancetoEnrile.Hencetheappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotfreedomofexpressionwasviolated.

Held:

Yes. Freedom of speech and of expression includes the freedom to film and produce
motionpicturesandexhibitsuchmotionpicturesintheatersortodiffusethemthrough
television.Furthermorethecircumstancethattheproductionofmotionpicturefilmsis
a commercial activity expected to yield monetary profit, is not a disqualification for
availingoffreedomofspeechandofexpression.

Theprojectedmotionpicturewasasyetuncompletedandhencenotexhibitedtoany
audience. Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the
completed film would precisely look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and
presentdanger"ofanyviolationofanyrighttoprivacy.Subjectmatterisoneofpublic
interestandconcern.Thesubjectthusrelatestoahighlycriticalstageinthehistoryof
thecountry.

At all relevant times, during which the momentous events, clearly of public concern,
that petitioners propose to film were taking place, Enrile was a "public figure:" Such
publicfigureswereheldtohavelost,tosomeextentatleast,theirrighttoprivacy.

The line of equilibrium in the specific context of the instant case between the
constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the right of privacy, may be
209

P.J.G.

markedoutintermsofarequirementthattheproposedmotionpicturemustbefairly
truthfulandhistoricalinitspresentationofevents.

LOPEZVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[34SCRA116;L26549;31JUL1970]

Facts:

In the early part of January, 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila
Chronicle, of which petitioner Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a
newsstoryofasanitaryinspectorassignedtotheBabuyanIslands,FidelCruz,sendinga
distress signal to a passing United States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the
message to Manila. An American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an
emergencysustenance kit containing, among other things, a twoway radio set. He
utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in
terror,duetoaseriesofkillingscommittedsinceChristmasof1955.Losingnotime,the
Philippinesdefenseestablishmentrushedtotheislandaplatoonofscoutrangers.Upon
arriving Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man
named Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this
finding,MajorEncarnacionbrandedasa"hoax,"thereportofrespondent.

This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Gatbonton, devoted a
pictorialarticletoitinitsissueofJanuary15,1956.MentionwasmadethatwhileFidel
Cruzstoryturnedouttobefalseitbroughtattentiontothegovernmentthatpeoplein
thatmostpeopleintheareaaresicksick,onlytwoindividualsabletoreadandwrite,
foodandclothingbeingscarce.

The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz.


Unfortunately,thepicturesthatwerepublishedwerethatofprivaterespondentFidelG.
Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the
photographsofrespondentCruzandthatofFidelCruz,sanitaryinspector,wereonfile
inthelibraryoftheManilaChroniclebutwhenthenewsquizformatwasprepared,the
two photographs were in advertently switched. However a correction was published
immediately.

RespondentsuedpetitionersintheCourtofFirstInstanceofManilafortherecoveryof
damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of his picture.
210

P.J.G.

Defense interposed that they are beating the deadline. The court ruled in his favor.
Hencetheappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionersabusedthefreedomofthepress.

Held:

No.TheSC,quotingQuisumbingv.Lopez,foundforplaintiff,butwithreduceddamages,
sincetheerrorinthiscasecouldhavebeencheckedconsideringthatthiswasaweekly
magazineandnotadaily.Theruling:"thereisnoevidenceintherecordtoprovethat
thepublicationofthenewsitemunderconsiderationwaspromptedbypersonalillwill
orspite,orthattherewasintentiontodoharm,'andthatontheotherhandtherewas
'anhonestandhighsenseofdutytoservethebestinterestsofthepublic,withoutself
seekingmotiveandwithmalicetowardsnone.'Everycitizenofcoursehastherightto
enjoyagoodnameandreputation,butwedonotconsiderthattherespondents,under
the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the
press.Thenewspapersshouldbegivensuchleewayandtoleranceastoenablethemto
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy. In the
preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race with their
deadlines;andconsistentlywithgoodfaithandreasonablecare,theyshouldnotbeheld
toaccount,toapointofsuppression,forhonestmistakesorimperfectioninthechoice
ofwords.

Noinroadsonpressfreedomshouldbeallowedintheguiseofpunitiveactionvisited
onwhatotherwisecouldbecharacterizedaslibelwhetherintheformofprintedwords
oradefamatoryimputationresultingfromthepublicationofrespondent'spicturewith
theoffensivecaptionasinthecaseherecomplainedof.Thisismerelytounderscorethe
primacythatfreedomofthepressenjoys.

PRIMICIASVS.FUGOSO
[80PHIL71;L1800;27JAN1948]

Facts:

Anaction was institutedbythe petitioner for the refusal of the respondenttoissue a


permitto themtoholdapublicmeetinginPlazaMirandaforredressofgrievancesto
211

P.J.G.

thegovernment.Thereason allegedbythe respondent inhis defensefor refusingthe


permitis,"thatthereisareasonablegroundtobelieve,basinguponpreviousutterances
and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains
bitterandhigh,thatsimilarspeecheswillbedeliveredtendingtounderminethefaith
and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government.
Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public
peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession,tendingtodisturbthepeaceorexciteariot;orcollectwithotherpersonsin
a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any congregation
engagedinanylawfulassembly."IncludedhereinisSec.1119,FreeuseofPublicPlace.1

Issue:

WhetherorNotthefreedomofspeechwasviolated.

Held:

Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two
constructions:(1)theMayoroftheCityofManilaisvestedwithunregulateddiscretion
to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade,orprocessioninthestreetsandotherpublicplacesoftheCityofManila;(2)The
rightoftheMayorissubjecttoreasonablediscretiontodetermineorspecifythestreets
orpublicplacestobeusedwiththeviewtopreventconfusionbyoverlapping,tosecure
convenientuseofthestreetsandpublicplacesbyothers,andtoprovideadequateand
proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second
construction.FirstconstructiontantamounttoauthorizingtheMayortoprohibittheuse
of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power
may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
nationalemergency.

The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify
suppressionoffreespeechandassembly.Itisthefunctionofspeechtofreemenfrom
the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonablegroundtofearthatseriousevilwillresultiffreespeechispracticed.There
mustbereasonablegroundtobelievethatthedangerapprehendedisimminent.There
mustbereasonablegroundtobelievethattheeviltobepreventedisaseriousone.The
factthatspeechislikelytoresultinsomeviolenceorindestructionofpropertyisnot
212

P.J.G.

enoughtojustifyitssuppression.Theremustbetheprobabilityofseriousinjurytothe
state.

ZALDIVARVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[170SCRA1;G.R.NO.79690707;1FEB1989]

Facts:

ThecasestemmedfromtheresolutionoftheSupremeCourtstoppingtherespondent
frominvestigatinggraftcasesinvolvingAntiqueGov.EnriqueZaldivar.TheCourtruled
thatsincetheadoptionofthe 1987Constitution,respondentspowers asTanodbayan
have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however
becomestheSpecialProsecutoroftheState,andcanonlyconductaninvestigationand
file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration
was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in
theIssueraisedintheCourt.Thisinclude:(a)Thathehadbeenapproachedtwicebya
leadingmemberofthecourtandhewasaskedto'goslowonZaldivarand'nottobetoo
hardonhim;(b)Thathe"wasapproachedandaskedtorefrainfrominvestigatingthe
COAreportonillegaldisbursementsintheSupremeCourtbecause'itwillembarassthe
Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over
thephonebyaleadingmemberoftheCourtandwasaskedtodismissthecasesagainst
two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SCs order
'"heightensthepeople'sapprehensionoverthejusticesysteminthiscountry,especially
becausethepeoplehavebeenthinkingthatonlythesmallflycangetitwhilebigfishes
goscotfreewaspublicizedinleadingnewspapers.

Now,theCourtResolvedtorequirerespondenttoexplaininwritingwhyheshouldnot
be punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the
media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit
themselvesintheresolutionoftheZaldivarcaseforallegedbiasandprejudiceagainst
him.Alittlelater,heineffectaskedthewholeCourttoinhibititselffrompassingupon
the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
IntegratedBarofthePhilippines,uponthegroundthatrespondentcannotexpectdue
processfromthisCourt,thattheCourthasbecomeincapableofjudginghimimpartially
and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely
suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his
freedomofspeech.Counselforrespondenturgesthatitiserror"forthisCourttoapply
213

P.J.G.

the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in
disciplinaryandcontemptcharges."

Issue:

WhetherorNottherewasaviolationofthefreedomofspeech/expression.

Held:

There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of
"visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised
Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: "any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administrationofjustice."

Undereitherthe"clearandpresentdanger"testorthe"balancingofinteresttest,"the
CourtheldthatthestatementsmadebyrespondentGonzalezareofsuchanatureand
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissiblelimitsoffreespeech.WhatishereatstakeistheauthorityoftheSupreme
Courttoconfrontandpreventa"substantiveevil"consistingnotonlyoftheobstruction
ofafreeandfairhearingofaparticularcasebutalsotheavoidanceofthebroaderevil
of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the
standardsofprofessionalconductrequiredfrommembersofthebarandofficersofthe
courts,whichhassomeimplicationstothesociety.
REYESVS.BAGATSING
[125SCRA553;L65366;9NOV1983]

Facts:

PetitionersoughtapermitfromtheCityofManilatoholdapeacefulmarchandrallyon
October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta to the
gates of the United States Embassy. Once there, and in an open space of public
property,ashortprogramwouldbeheld.Themarchwouldbeattendedbythelocaland
foreignparticipantsofsuchconference.Thatwouldbefollowedbythehandingoverof
a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the AntiBases
Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be
taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally. However the request was denied.
Reference was made to persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of
214

P.J.G.

subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations


where a large number of people is expected to attend. Respondent suggested that a
permitmaybeissuedifitistobeheldattheRizalColiseumoranyotherenclosedarea
wherethesafetyoftheparticipantsthemselvesandthegeneralpublicmaybeensured.
Anoralargumentwasheardandthemandatoryinjunctionwasgrantedontheground
that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino
dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any
foreignmissionorchanceryandforotherpurposes.HencetheCourtresolves.

Issue:

Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble
violated.

Held:

Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implicationthattherighttofreespeechhaslikewisebeendisregarded.Itissettledlaw
thatastopublicplaces,especiallysoastoparksandstreets,thereisfreedomofaccess.
Noristheirusedependentonwhoistheapplicantforthepermit,whetheranindividual
oragroup.Therecanbenolegalobjection,absenttheexistenceofaclearandpresent
dangerofasubstantiveevil,onthechoiceofLunetaastheplacewherethepeacerally
would start. Time immemorial Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly,
communicatingthoughtsbetweencitizens,anddiscussingpublicquestions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities,rights,andlibertiesofcitizens.

Withregardtotheordinance,therewasnoshowingthattherewasviolationandevenif
itcouldbeshownthatsuchaconditionissatisfiedit does notfollowthatrespondent
couldlegallyactthewayhedid.Thevalidityofhisdenialofthepermitsoughtcouldstill
bechallenged.

Asummaryoftheapplicationforpermitforrally:Theapplicantsforapermittoholdan
assemblyshouldinformthelicensingauthorityofthedate,thepublicplacewhereand
thetimewhenitwilltakeplace.Ifitwereaprivateplace,onlytheconsentoftheowner
orthe oneentitled to itslegalpossession is required. Such application shouldbe filed
well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there
215

P.J.G.

maybevalidobjectionstothegrantofthepermitortoitsgrantbutatanotherpublic
place.Itisanindispensableconditiontosuchrefusalormodificationthattheclearand
present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to
applicantsforthedenial.

BAYANVS.EXECUTIVESECRETARYERMITA
[488SCRA226;G.R.NO.169838;25APR2006]

Facts:

RalliesofSeptember20,October4,5and6,2005isatissue.BAYANsrallywasviolently
dispersed. 26 petitioners were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass
actiontheywaspreemptedandviolentlydispersedbythepolice.KMUassertsthatthe
right to peacefulassembly,are affected by Batas Pambansa No. 880 and thepolicy of
Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR) being followed to implement it. KMU, et al.,
claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally KMU cosponsored was to be conducted at the
Mendiola bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto Streets and
forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further
allegethatonOctober6,2005,amultisectoralrallywhichKMUalsocosponsoredwas
scheduled to proceed along Espaa Avenue in front of the UST and going towards
Mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and prevented
them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on
oneofthem.Threeotherrallyistswerearrested.

AllpetitionersassailBatasPambansaNo.880ThePublicAssemblyActof1985,someof
themintotoandothersonlySections4,5,6,12,13(a),and14(a),aswellasthepolicyof
CPR.Theyseektostopviolentdispersalsofralliesunderthenopermit,norallypolicy
andtheCPRpolicyannouncedonSept.21,2005.

Petitioners Bayan, et al., contend that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treatiesofwhichthePhilippinesisasignatory.

TheyarguethatB.P.No.880requiresapermitbeforeonecanstageapublicassembly
regardlessofthepresenceorabsenceofaclearandpresentdanger.Italsocurtailsthe
choiceofvenueandisthusrepugnanttothefreedomofexpressionclauseasthetime
and place of a public assembly form part of the message for which the expression is
sought.

216

P.J.G.

PetitionersJessdelPrado,etal.,inturn,arguethatB.P.No.880isunconstitutionalasit
isacurtailmentoftherighttopeacefullyassembleandpetitionforredressofgrievances
because it puts a condition for the valid exercise of that right. It also characterizes
public assemblies without a permit as illegal and penalizes them and allows their
dispersal. Thus, its provisions are not mere regulations but are actually prohibitions.
RegardingtheCPRpolicy,itisvoidforbeinganultraviresactthataltersthestandardof
maximumtolerancesetforthinB.P.No.880,asidefrombeingvoidforbeingvagueand
forlackofpublication.

KMU, et al., argue that the Constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly and
thereforeB.P.No.880cannotputthepriorrequirementofsecuringapermit.Andeven
assuming that the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are
unreasonable: First, allowing the Mayor to deny the permit on clear and convincing
evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive. Second, the fiveday
requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public
assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.As to the CPR policy,
they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before the
rallyistscanperformtheiract,andthatnolaw,ordinanceorexecutiveordersupports
thepolicy.Furthermore,itcontravenesthemaximumtolerancepolicyofB.P.No.880
andviolatestheConstitutionasitcausesachillingeffectontheexercisebythepeople
oftherighttopeaceablyassemble.

Respondentsarguedthatpetitionershavenostanding.BP880entailstrafficrerouting
to prevent grave public inconvenience and serious or undue interference in the free
flow of commerce and trade. It is contentneutral regulation of the time, place and
manner of holding public assemblies. According to Atienza RA. 7160 gives the Mayor
powertodenyapermitindependentlyofB.P.No.880.andthatthepermitisfortheuse
of a public place and not for the exercise of rights; and that B.P. No. 880 is not a
contentbasedregulationbecauseitcoversallrallies.

Issue:

WhetherorNotBP880andtheCPRPolicyunconstitutional.

Held:

Noquestionasto standing. Their right as citizens to engagein peaceful assembly and


exercisetherightofpetition,asguaranteedbytheConstitution,isdirectlyaffectedby
B.P.No.880.B.P.880isnotanabsolutebanofpublicassembliesbutarestrictionthat
217

P.J.G.

simplyregulatesthetime,placeandmanneroftheassemblies.Itreferstoallkindsof
public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does
not make it contentbased because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Maximum
tolerance1 is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the
content of the expressions in the rally. There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the
contentofthespeechisnotrelevanttotheregulation.

Thesocalledcalibratedpreemptiveresponsepolicyhasnoplaceinourlegalfirmament
andmustbestruckdownasadarknessthatshroudsfreedom.Itmerelyconfusesour
peopleandisusedbysomepoliceagentstojustifyabuses.Insofarasitwouldpurport
todifferfromorbeinlieuofmaximumtolerance,thiswasdeclarednullandvoid.

TheSecretaryoftheInteriorandLocalGovernments,areDIRECTEDtotakeallnecessary
stepsfortheimmediatecompliancewithSection15ofBatasPambansaNo.880through
theestablishmentordesignationofatleastonesuitablefreedomparkorplazainevery
city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision,subjecttothegivingofadvancenotices,nopriorpermitshallberequiredto
exercisetherighttopeaceablyassembleandpetitioninthepublicparksorplazasofa
cityormunicipalitythathasnotyetcompliedwithSection15ofthelaw.

FERNANDOVS.ESTORNINOS
[G.R.NO159751;6DEC2006]

Facts:

Actingonreportsofsaleanddistributionofpornographicmaterials,officersofthePNP
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in the National Capital Region conducted
police surveillance on the store Gaudencio E. Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair) in
Quiapo. A Search Warrant for violation of Article 201 of RPC against petitioner and a
certainWarrenTingchuyandtheseizureofthefollowingitems:

a.
CopiesofNewRaveMagazineswithnudeobscenepictures;
b.
CopiesofIOUPenthouseMagazinewithnudeobscenepictures;
c.
CopiesofHustlerInternationalMagazinewithnudeobscenepictures;and
d.
CopiesofVHStapescontainingpornographicshows.

218

P.J.G.

The police searched the premises and confiscated twentyfive VHS tapes(among of
whichisKahitsaPangarapLangwithMyraManibogasactresswhoisnaked)andten
different magazines(Dalaga, Penthouse, Swank, Erotic, Rave, Playhouse, Gallery, QUI),
whichtheydeemedpornographic.Petitionerswerechargedandconvicted.CAaffirmed
thedecisionhencethisappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheCAerredinaffirmingRTCsdecision.

Held:

No.AsobscenityisanunprotectedspeechwhichtheStatehastherighttoregulate,the
Stateinpursuingitsmandatetoprotectthepublicfromobscene,immoralandindecent
materialsmustjustifytheregulationorlimitation.(KottingerRuleApplied).

MALABANANVS.RAMENTO
[129SCRA359;G.R.NO.62270;21MAY1984]

Facts:

PetitionerswereofficersoftheSupremeStudentCouncilofrespondentUniversity.They
soughtandweregrantedbytheschoolauthoritiesapermittoholdameetingfrom8:00
A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students,theyheldageneralassemblyattheVeterinaryMedicineandAnimalScience
basketballcourt(VMAS),theplaceindicatedinsuchpermit,notinthebasketballcourt
as therein stated but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering they manifested in
vehement and vigorous language their opposition to the proposed merger of the
Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of Agriculture. The same day, they
marchedtowardtheLifeScienceBuildingandcontinuedtheir rally.It wasoutsidethe
areacoveredbytheirpermit.Eventheyrallied beyondthe periodallowed.Theywere
asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for holding an
illegalassembly.ThenonSeptember9,1982,theywereinformedthattheywereunder
preventivesuspensionfortheirfailuretoexplaintheholdingofanillegalassembly.The
validitythereofwaschallengedbypetitionersbothbeforetheCourtofFirstInstanceof
Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture, and
Sports. Respondent Ramentofound petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly
which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the
219

P.J.G.

disturbance of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one
academicyear.Hencethispetition.

Issue:

Whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in the disciplinary action and the penalty
imposed,therewasaninfringementoftherighttopeaceableassemblyanditscognate
rightoffreespeech.

Held:

Yes.Studentleadersarelikelytobeassertiveanddogmatic.Theywouldbeineffectiveif
during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the academe. But
with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime, no clear
and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the
taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantialdisorderorinvasionoftherightsofothers."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed students of
educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their
welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or
subsequent punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a
substantiveevilthatthestate,hasarighttopresent.Asacorollary,theutmostleeway
and scope is accorded the content of the placards displayed or utterances made. The
peaceablecharacterofanassemblycouldbelost,however,byanadvocacyofdisorder
underthenameofdissent,whatevergrievancesthatmaybeairedbeingsusceptibleto
correctionthroughthewaysofthelaw.Iftheassemblyistobeheldinschoolpremises,
permitmustbesoughtfromitsschoolauthorities,whoaredevoidofthepowertodeny
such request arbitrarily or unreasonably. In granting such permit, there may be
conditions as to the time and place of the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppageofworkofthenonacademicpersonnel.Evenif,however,therebeviolations
ofitsterms,thepenaltyincurredshouldnotbedisproportionatetotheoffense.

NONVS.DAMES
[185SCRA523;G.R.NO.89317;20MAY1990]

Facts:

220

P.J.G.

Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines


Norte,werenotallowedtoreenrollbytheschoolfortheacademicyear19881989for
leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding
semester.Thesubjectoftheprotestsisnot,however,madeclearinthepleadings.

Petitionersfiledapetitioninthecourtseekingtheirreadmissionorreenrollmenttothe
school,butthetrialcourtdismissedthepetition.Theynowpetitionthecourttoreverse
its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that
petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for reenrollment with respondent
collegewhentheyadopted,signed,anduseditsenrollmentformforthefirstsemester
ofschoolyear198889,whichstatesthat:TheMabiniCollegereservestherighttodeny
admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to
requirewithdrawal ofstudentswhose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose
activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college.
Students,therefore,arerequiredtobehaveinaccordwiththeMabiniCollegecodeof
conductanddiscipline.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthestudentsrighttofreedomofspeechandassemblyinfringed.

Held:

Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the
Constitutionissimilarlyavailabletostudentsiswellsettledinourjurisdiction.However
there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional
Rightswithintheschoolpresupposesthatconductbythestudent,inclassoroutofit,
whichforanyreasonwhetheritstemsfromtime,place,ortypeofbehaviorshouldnot
materiallydisruptclassworkormustnotinvolvesubstantialdisorderorinvasionofthe
rightsofothers.

INRE:TULFO
[A.M.NO.90415450;17APR1990]

Facts:

InOct.13,1989,TulfowroteanarticleinhiscolumninPDI'OnTarget'statingthatthe
SupremeCourtrenderedanidioticdecisioninlegalizingcheckpoints,andagainonOct.
221

P.J.G.

16, 1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo
justices of the Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he
shouldnotbepunishedforcontempt.Tulfosaidthathewasjustreactingemotionally
because he had been a victim of harassment in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant
illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just quoted from other attorneys, and since the
case had been decided and terminated, there was not contempts. Lastly, the article
doesnotposeanyclearandpresentdangertotheSupremecourt.

Issue:

WhetherorNotTulfoisincontempt.

Held:

Yes.AtthetimeTulfowrotethearticle,thecheckpointscasehadnotyetbeendecided
upon,andtheSupremeCourtwasstillactingonanMRfiledfromtheCA.Thepowerto
punishisinherentasitisessentialforselfpreservation.Contemptofcourtisdefianceof
theauthority,justiceanddignityofthecourts.Itbringsdisreputetothecourt.Thereare
two kinds of publications which can be punished for contempt:

a. thosewhoseobjectistoaffectthedecisioninapendingcase.
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit. Tulfo's article constituted
both.

Itshouldhavebeenokaytocriticizeifrespectfullanguagewasused,butifitsobjectis
only to degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing
constructivecanbegainedfromthem.Beingemotionalisnoexcuseforbeinginsulting.
Quotingisnotanexcusealso,becauseattheendofhisarticle,Tulfosaid,"Soyoubobo
justices, watch out!" Also, he said he was not sorry for having written the articles.

Tulfoisfoundincontemptofcourtandisgravelycensured.

PBMEMPLOYEESVS.PBM
[51SCRA189;G.R.NO.L31195;5JUN1993]

Facts:

222

P.J.G.

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a


legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine
Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are
officersandmembersofthepetitionerUnion.PetitionersclaimthatonMarch1,1969,
they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the
planneddemonstrationandstatedthatthedemonstrationorrallycannotbecancelled
becauseithasalreadybeenagreeduponinthemeeting.Pagcuexplainedfurtherthat
the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no
quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Companypersonnelmanager,informedPBMEOthatthedemonstrationisaninalienable
right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstrationforthatmattershouldnotundulyprejudicethenormaloperationofthe
Company.WorkerswhowithoutpreviousleaveofabsenceapprovedbytheCompany,
particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such
failureisaviolationoftheexistingCBAand,therefore,wouldbeamountingtoanillegal
strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded
withthedemonstrationdespitethepleasoftherespondentCompanythatthefirstshift
workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the
workersinthesecondandthirdshiftsshouldbeutilizedforthedemonstrationfrom6
A.M.to2P.M.onMarch4,1969,filedachargeagainstpetitionersandotheremployees
who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace
Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held
guiltyinbyCIRforbargaininginbadfaith,hencethisappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthepetitionersrighttofreedomofspeechandtopeaceableassemble
violated.

Held:

Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent


criterion,namelyexistenceofagraveandimmediatedangerofasubstantiveevilwhich
theStatehastherighttoprevent.Thisisnotpresentinthecase.Itwastotheinterest
hereinprivaterespondentfirmtorallytothedefenseof,andtakeupthecudgelsfor,its
employees,sothattheycanreporttoworkfreefromharassment,vexationorperiland
asconsequenceperformmoreefficientlytheirrespectivetasksenhanceitsproductivity
223

P.J.G.

as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expressionwellastheirrightofassemblyandofpetitionagainstallegedpersecutionof
local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absenceofitsemployeesfrom6o'clockinthemorningto2o'clockintheafternoon,isa
plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed
theywerebythepeaceofficersofthemunicipality.Asaboveintimated,theconditionin
whichtheemployeesfoundthemselvesvisavisthelocalpoliceofPasig,wasamatter
that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families.
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the
human being broken in morale and brutalized in spiritcan never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over
propertyrightshasbeensustained.Toregardthedemonstrationagainstpoliceofficers,
notagainsttheemployer,asevidenceofbadfaithincollectivebargainingandhencea
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collectivebargainingagreement,is"apotentmeansofinhibitingspeech"andtherefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of
freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by onethird, then by that much
the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants,themorepersonscanbeapprisedofthepurposeoftherally. Moreover,
theabsenceofonethirdoftheirmemberswillberegardedasasubstantialindicationof
disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
policepersecution.

224

P.J.G.

THEIMPAIRMENTCLAUSE

Art3,Sec.10.Nolawimpairingtheobligationofcontractsshallbepassed.

RUTTERVS.ESTEBAN
[93PHIL68;NO.L3708;18MAY1953]

Facts:

OnAugust20,1941RuttersoldtoEstebantwoparcelsoflandsituatedintheManilafor
P9,600 of which P4,800 were paid outright, and the balance was made payable as
follows:P2,400onorbeforeAugust7,1942,andP2,400onorbeforeAugust27,1943,
withinterestattherateof7percentperannum.Tosecurethepaymentofsaidbalance
ofP4,800,afirstmortgagehasbeenconstitutedinfavoroftheplaintiff.Estebanfailed
topaythetwoinstallmentsasagreedupon,aswellastheinterestthathadaccruedand
so Rutter instituted an action to recover the balance due, the interest due and the
attorney's fees. The complaint also contains a prayer for sale of the properties
mortgaged in accordance with law. Esteban claims that this is a prewar obligation
contractedandthatheisawarsufferer,havingfiledhisclaimwiththePhilippineWar
Damage Commission for the losses he had suffered as a consequence of the last war;
andthatundersection2ofRA342(moratoriumlaw),paymentofhisobligationcannot
beenforceduntilafterthelapseofeightyears.Thecomplaintwasdismissed.Amotion
forreconwasmadewhichassailstheconstitutionalityofRA342.

Issue:

WhetherorNotRA342unconstitutionalonnonimpairmentclausegrounds.

Held:

Yes.Themoratoriumispostponementoffulfillmentofobligationsdecreedbythestate
through the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of
police power. The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its
continuinganddominantprotectivepowernotwithstandinginterferencewithcontracts.
The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally, or
directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate end and
themeasurestakenarereasonableandappropriatetothatend.
225

P.J.G.

However based on the Presidents general SONA and consistent with what the Court
believes to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness,
declaredthatthecontinuedoperationandenforcementofRA342atthepresenttimeis
unreasonableandoppressive,andshouldnotbeprolongedshouldbedeclarednulland
void and without effect. This holds true as regards Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32,
with greater force and reason considering that said Orders contain no limitation
whatsoever in point of time as regards the suspension of the enforcement and
effectivityofmonetaryobligations.

ORTIGASVS.FEATIBANK
[94SCRA533;NO.L24670;14DEC1979]

Facts:

Plaintiff is engaged in real estate business, developing and selling lots to the public,
particularly the Highway Hills Subdivision along EDSA. On March 4, 1952, plaintiff, as
vendor,andAugustoPadillaand NatividadAngeles,asvendees,enteredintoseparate
agreementsofsaleoninstallmentsovertwoparcelsoflandoftheSubdivision.OnJuly
19,1962,thesaidvendeestransferredtheirrightsandinterestsovertheaforesaidlots
infavorofoneEmmaChavez.Uponcompletionofpaymentofthepurchaseprice,the
plaintiff executed the corresponding deeds of sale in favor of Emma Chavez. Both the
agreements(ofsaleoninstallment)andthedeedsofsalecontainedthestipulationsor
restrictionsthat:

1. Theparceloflandshallbeusedexclusivelyforresidentialpurposes,andsheshall
notbeentitledtotakeorremovesoil,stonesorgravelfromitoranyotherlots
belongingtotheSeller.
2. All buildings and other improvements (except the fence) which may be
constructedatanytimeinsaidlotmustbe,(a)ofstrongmaterialsandproperly
painted,(b)providedwithmodernsanitaryinstallationsconnectedeithertothe
publicsewerortoanapprovedseptictank,and(c)shallnotbeatadistanceof
lessthantwo(2)metersfromitsboundarylines.

Eventually said lots were bought by defendant. Lot 5 directly from Chavez and Lot 6
from Republic Flour Mills by deed of exchange, with same restrictions. Plaintiff claims
226

P.J.G.

that restriction is for the beautification of the subdivision. Defendant claimed of the
commercializationofwesternpartofEDSA.Defendantbeganconstructingacommercial
bank building. Plaintiff demand to stop it, which forced him to file a case, which was
later dismissed, upholding police power. Motion for recon was denied, hence the
appeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotnonimpairmentclauseviolated.

Held:

No.Resolutionisavalidexerciseofpolicepower.EDSA,amaintrafficarterywhichruns
throughseveralcitiesandmunicipalitiesintheMetroManilaarea,supportsanendless
streamoftrafficandtheresultingactivity,noiseandpollutionarehardlyconduciveto
the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route. Health, safety, peace, good
order and general welfare of the people in the locality are justifications for this. It
should be stressed, that while nonimpairment of contracts is constitutionally
guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate
exerciseofpolicepower.

LOZANOVS.MARTINEZ
[146SCRA323;NO.L63419;18DEC1986]

Facts:

A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was
made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional.
Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the
Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for
theaccusedtoelevatetotheSupremeCourttheordersdenyingtheirmotionstoquash.
However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower
court'sdenialofamotiontoquash.

Issue:

227

P.J.G.

WhetherorNotBP22impairsfreedomofcontract.WhetherornotBP22transgresses
theconstitutionalinhibitionagainstimprisonmentfordebt.

Held:

The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into


"lawful"contracts.Contractswhichcontravenepublicpolicyarenotlawful.Checkscan
not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this
modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of
the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the
state.

TheoffensepunishedbyBP22istheactofmakingandissuingaworthlesscheckora
checkthatisdishonoreduponitspresentationforpayment.Itisnotthenonpayment
ofanobligationwhichthelawpunishes.Thelawisnotintendedordesignedtocoercea
debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions,themakingofworthlesschecksandputtingthemincirculation.

228

P.J.G.

EXPOSTFACTOLAWS

Art3,Sec.22.Noexpostfactolaworbillofattaindershallbeenacted.

PEOPLEVS.FERRER
[48SCRA382;NOS.L3261314;27DEC1972]

Facts:

Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the
AntiSubversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of
subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
CommunistPartyofthePhilippines(CPP)aggravatedbycircumstancesofcontemptand
insulttopublicofficers,subversionbyabandandaidofarmedmentoaffordimpunity.
2.)NiloTayagand5others,forbeingmembers/leadersoftheNPA,inciting,instigating
people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating
CircumstancesofAidorArmedMen,Craft,andFraud.Thetrialcourtisofopinionthat
1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by
pronouncingtheguiltoftheCPPwithoutanyformsofsafeguardofajudicialtrial.3.)It
createdapresumptionoforganizationalguiltbybeingmembersoftheCPPregardless
ofvoluntariness.

TheAntiSubversiveActof1957wasapproved 20June1957. Itisanacttooutlawthe


CPPandsimilarassociationspenalizingmembershiptherein,andforotherpurposes.It
defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized
conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by
deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and
present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation
with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that
dueinvestigationbyadesignatedprosecutorbytheSecretaryofJusticebemadeprior
to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence.Section7providesfor2witnessesinopencourtforactspenalizedbyprision
mayortodeath.Section8allowstherenunciationofmembershiptotheCCPthrough
writingunderoath.Section9declarestheconstitutionalityofthestatuteanditsvalid
exerciseunderfreedomifthought,assemblyandassociation.

229

P.J.G.

Issue:

WhetherornotRA1700isabillofattainder/expostfactolaw.

WhetherorNotRA1700violatesfreedomofexpression.

Held:

ThecourtholdstheVALIDITYOftheAntiSubversionActof1957.

Abillofattainderissolelyalegislativeact.Itpunisheswithoutthebenefitofthetrial.It
is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In
orderforastatutebemeasuredasabillofattainder,thefollowingrequisitesmustbe
present:1.)Thestatutespecifiespersons,groups.2.)thestatuteisappliedretroactively
andreachpastconduct.(Abillofattainderrelativelyisalsoanexpostfactolaw.)

Inthecaseatbar,thestatutesimplydeclarestheCPPasanorganizedconspiracyforthe
overthrowoftheGovernmentforpurposesofexampleofSECTION4oftheAct.TheAct
appliesnotonlytotheCPPbutalsotootherorganizationshavingthesamepurposeand
their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person.
Membershiptothisorganizations,tobeUNLAWFUL,itmustbeshownthatmembership
wasacquiredwiththeintenttofurtherthegoalsoftheorganizationbyovertacts.This
is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the
required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished.
Membershiprendersaidandencouragementtotheorganization.Membershipmakes
himselfpartytoitsunlawfulacts.

Furthermore,thestatuteisPROSPECTIVEinnature.Section4prohibitsactscommitted
after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the
passingofthisActisgivenanopportunitytoescapeliabilitybyrenouncingmembership
inaccordancewithSection8.Thestatuteappliestheprincipleofmutatismutandisor
thatthenecessarychangeshavingbeenmade.

ThedeclarationofthattheCPPisanorganizedconspiracytooverthrowthePhilippine
Governmentshouldnotbethebasisofguilt.ThisdeclarationisonlyabasisofSection4
oftheAct.TheEXISTENCEOFSUBSTANTIVEEVILjustifiesthelimitationtotheexercise
ofFreedomofExpressionandAssociationinthismatter.Beforetheenactmentofthe
statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were
done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and
230

P.J.G.

association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak


consideringNATIONALSECURITYandPRESERVATIONofDEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In
addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements
mustalsobeestablished:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the


organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the
PhilippinesandestablishadominationofaFOREIGNPOWER.Membershipis
willfullyandknowinglydonebyovertacts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose.
Membershipiswillfullyandknowinglydonebyovertacts.

ThecourtdidnotmakeanyjudgmentonthecrimesoftheaccusedundertheAct.The
SupremeCourtsetasidetheresolutionoftheTRIALCOURT.

BAYOTVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[128SCRA383;NO.L61776TONO.L61861;23MAR1984]

Facts:

Bayotisoneoftheseveralpersonswhowasaccusedinmorethan100countsofestafa
thru falsification of Public documents before the Sandiganbayan. The said charges
started fromhisallegedinvolvement asa government auditor of the commission on
audit assigned to the Ministry of education and culture, with some other employees
fromthesaidministry.ThebureauoftreasuryandtheteacherscampinBaguioCityfor
the preparation and encashment of fictitious TCAA checks for the nomexistent
obligations of the teachers camp resulting in damage to the government of several
millions. The 1st 32 cases were filed on july 25, 1987, while Bayot ran for municipal
mayor of Amadeo Cavite and was elected on January 1980. but on May 1980
Sandiganbayan promulgated adecision convicting theaccused togetherwithhis other
coaccusedinallbutoneofthethirtytwocasesfiledagainstthem.

231

P.J.G.

OnMach16,1982BatasPambansaBlg195waspassedamendingRA3019.

Issue:

WhetherorNotitwouldbeviolativeoftheconstitutionalguaranteeagainstanexpost
factolaw.

Held:

The court finds no merit in the petitioners contention that RA 3019 as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg 195, which includes the crime of estafa through falsification of
Public Documents as among crimes subjecting the public officer charged therewith
with suspension from public office pending action in court, is a penal provision which
violatestheconstitutionalprohibitionagainsttheenactmentofexpostfactolaw.Accdg
to the RPC suspension from employment and public office during trial shall not be
considered as a penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not a result of a judicial
proceeding. In fact, if acquitted the official who is suspended shall be entitled to
reinstatement and the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension.Anddoesnotviolatetheconstitutionalprovisionagainstexpostfactolaw.

The claim of the petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is currently


occupying a position diffren tfrom that under which he is charged is untenable. The
amendatoryprovisionclearlystatesthatanyincumbentpublicofficeragainstwhomany
criminalprosecutionunderavalidinformationunderRA3019foranyoffenseinvolving
frauduponthegovernmentorpublicfundsorpropertyorwhateverstageofexecution
andmodeofparticipationshallbesuspendedfromoffice.Theuseofthewordoffice
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding and not only the
particularofficeunderwhichhewascharged.

PEOPLEVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[211SCRA241;G.R.NO.101724;3JUL1992]

Facts:

Two letter complaints were filed with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio on October
28,1986and December9,1986,apoliticalleader ofGovernorValentinaPlaza,wifeof
232

P.J.G.

Congressman Democrito Plaza of Agusan del Sur, shortly after private respondent had
replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial Governor of Agusan del Sur on March 1986 The
complaint questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the
provincial attorney in 1976 of a free patent title for a lot in the Rosario public land
subdivisioninSanFrancisco,AgusandelSur.HemisrepresentedtoaLandsInspectorof
theBureauofLandsthatthelandssubjecthereinaredisposablelands,therebyinducing
saidinspectortorecommendapprovalofhisapplicationforfreepatent.OnAugust10,
1989aninformationforviolationofRA3019AntiGraftandCorruptPracticesActwas
thenfiledintheSandiganbayanafteranexpartepreliminaryinvestigation.Amotionto
quash the information was filed by the private respondent contending among others
that he is charged for an offence which has prescribed. Said motion was granted. The
crime was committed on January 21, 1976, period of prescription was 10 years,
thereforeithasprescribedin1986.Nowthemotiontoquashwasbeingassailed.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthemotiontoquashvalidlygranted.

Held:

Yes.RA3019,beingaspeciallawthecomputationoftheperiodfortheprescriptionof
thecrimeisgovernedbySec.29ofActNo.3326,whichbeginstorunfromthedayof
thecommissionofthecrimeandnotthediscoveryofit.Additionally,BP195whichwas
approvedonMarch16,1982,amendingSec.11ofRA3019byincreasingtentofifteen
yearsoftheperiodfortheprescriptionorextinguishmentofaviolationofRA3019may
notbegivenretroactiveapplicationtothecrimewhichwascommittedbyParedes,asit
isprejudicialtotheaccused.ToapplyBP195toParedeswouldmakeitanexpostfacto
law1foritwouldalterhissituationtohisdisadvantagebymakinghimcriminallyliable
for a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was
committed.

233

P.J.G.

NONIMPRISONMENTFORDEBT

Art3,Sec.20.Nopersonshallbeimprisonedfordebtornonpaymentofapolltax.

SERAFINVS.LINDAYAG
[67SCRA166;ADM.MATTER.NO.297MJ;30SEPT1975]

Facts:

Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then
municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was
filedagainsther.Complainantadmittedcomplaint.Nowcomplainantfiledacaseagainst
respondentJudgefornotdismissingthecaseandissuingawarrantofarrestasitfallson
thecategoryofasimpleindebtedness,sinceelementsofestafaarenotpresent.Further
shecontendedthatnopersonshouldbeimprisonedfornonpaymentofaloanofasum
of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here
committedgrossignoranceoflaw.Evenifcomplainantdesistedcasewaspursued.)

Issue:

Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the
imprisonmentofplaintifffornonpaymentofdebt?

Held:

Yes.Sinceplaintiffdidnotcommitanyoffenseas,hisdebtisconsideredasimpleloan
grantedbyherfriendstoher.Thereisnocollateralorsecuritybecausecomplainantwas
anoldfriendofthespouseswholentthemoneyandthatwhentheywroteheraletter
of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise,
theycouldgethervaluablethingsatherhome.UndertheConstitutionsheisprotected.
Judgethereforeinadmittingsucha"criminalcomplaint"thatwasplainlycivilinaspects
fromtheveryfaceofthecomplaintand the "evidence" presented,andissuingon the
same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties
properly.

234

P.J.G.

LOZANOVS.MARTINEZ
[146SCRA323;NO.L63419;18DEC1986]

Facts:

A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was
made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional.
Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the
Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for
theaccusedtoelevatetotheSupremeCourttheordersdenyingtheirmotionstoquash.
However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower
court'sdenialofamotiontoquash.

Issue:

WhetherornotBP22isconstitutionalasitisaproperexerciseofpolicepowerofthe
State.

Held:

TheenactmentofBP22avalidexerciseofthepolicepowerandisnotrepugnanttothe
constitutionalinhibitionagainstimprisonmentfordebt.

TheoffensepunishedbyBP22istheactofmakingandissuingaworthlesscheckora
checkthatisdishonoreduponitspresentationforpayment.Itisnotthenonpayment
ofanobligationwhichthelawpunishes.Thelawisnotintendedordesignedtocoercea
debtortopayhisdebt.

The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be
consideredbysocietyasinherentlywrong,hence,notmaluminsebutbecauseofthe
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as
malumprohibitum.Thestatecandothisintheexerciseofitspolicepower.

235

P.J.G.

INVOLUNTARYSERVITUDE

Art3,Sec.18.(2)No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a


punishmentforacrimewhereofthepartyshallhavebeendulyconvicted.

CAUNCAVS.SALAZAR
[82PHIL851;NO.L2690;1JAN1949]

Facts:

ThisisanactionforhabeascorpusbroughtbyBartolomeCauncainbehalfofhiscousin
Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by
Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to
Estelitabytheemploymentagency,forhertoworkasamaid.However,Estelitawanted
to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency.
Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency
wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense
fromtheprovinceshouldbepaidbyEstelitabeforeshecouldbeallowedtoleave.

Issue:

Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid
withoutreturningtheadvancepaymentitgave?

Held:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective


employee ormaid,hasabsolutely no power to curtail herfreedom of movement. The
factthatnophysicalforcehasbeenexertedtokeepherinthehouseoftherespondent
doesnotmakelessrealthedeprivationofherpersonalfreedomofmovement,freedom
to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose ones residence. Freedom
may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to
erroneousbeliefintheexistenceofanimaginarypowerofanimpostortocauseharmif
not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental
faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
psychologicalspellistoplaceapersonatthemercyofanother,thevictimisentitledto
236

P.J.G.

theprotectionofcourtsofjusticeasmuchastheindividualwhoisillegallydeprivedof
libertybyduressorphysicalcoercion.

237

P.J.G.

THEWRITOFHABEASCORPUS

Art3,Sec.15.Theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusshallnotbesuspendedexcept
incasesofinvasionorrebellionwhenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.

LANSANGVS.GARCIA
[42SCRA448;L33964;11Dec1971]

Facts:

In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
PhilippineswasholdingapublicmeetingatPlazaMiranda,Manila,forthepresentation
of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand
grenadeswerethrownattheplatformwheresaidcandidatesandotherpersonswere.
Eightpersonswerekilledandmanymoreinjured.Proclamation889wasissuedbythe
Presidentsuspendingprivilegeofwritofhabeascorpusstatingthatthereisaconspiracy
ofrebellionandinsurrectioninordertoforciblyseizepoliticalpower.Petitionsforwrit
ofhabeascorpuswerefiledbypersons(13)whohavebeenarrestedwithoutawarrant.

Itwasstatedthatoneofthesafeguardsoftheproclamationwasthatitistobeapplied
to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889A was issued as an
amendment, inserting the word actually staging. Proc. 889B was also issued lifting
the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3 subprovinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889C
was issued restoring the suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao).
Proc.889Dfurtherliftedthesuspensionin7provincesand4cities.Only18provinces
andsubprovincesand2citieswhose privilegewassuspended.Petitionersmaintained
thatProclamationNo.889didnotdeclaretheexistenceofactual"invasioninsurrection
orrebellionorimminentdangerthereof,howeveritbecamemootandacademicsinceit
was amended. Petitioners further contend that public safety did not require the
issuanceofproclamationsstating:(a)thatthereisnorebellion;(b)that,priortoandat
thetimeofthesuspensionoftheprivilege,theGovernmentwasfunctioningnormally,
as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident, confirmatory of an alleged July
August Plan, has actually taken place after August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's
allegedapprehension,becauseofsaidplan,isnonexistentandunjustified;and(e)that
the Communist forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public
safetytosuchextentastorequirethesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeas
corpus.
238

P.J.G.

A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived at a


consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence of the factual
basesfortheproclamations.NowtheCourtresolvesafterconclusivedecisionreached
bymajority.

Issue:

Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension(oftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus)belongstothePresidentand
hisdecisionisfinalandconclusiveuponthecourtsanduponallotherpersons.

Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeascorpusdecreedinProclamationNo.889A.

Held:

ThePresidenthasauthorityhoweveritissubjecttojudicialreview.Twoconditionsmust
concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ (a)
theremustbe"invasion,insurrection,orrebellion"or"imminentdangerthereof,"and
(b)"publicsafety"mustrequirethesuspensionoftheprivilege.Presidenthasthree(3)
courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writofhabeascorpus;and(c)toplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial
law.Hehad,already,calledoutthearmedforces,provedinadequate.Ofthetwoother
alternatives,thesuspensionoftheprivilegeistheleastharsh.

Petitioners contention that CPPNPA has no ability, is negatived by the killing of 5


mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there were fourteen (14)
meaningfulbombingincidentsintheGreaterManilaAreain1970.CPPhasmanagedto
infiltrateorestablishandcontrolninemajorlabororganizations;hasexploitedthe(11)
major student or youth organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively
advancingtheCPP.

239

P.J.G.

RIGHTSOFTHEACCUSED

Art3,Sec.12.(1)Anypersonunderinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffenseshall
havetherighttobeinformed of his right to remain silent and to have competentand
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
servicesofcounsel,hemustbeprovidedwithone.Theserightscannotbewaivedexcept
inwritingandinthepresenceofcounsel.
(2) Notorture,force,violence,threat,intimidation,oranyothermeanswhichvitiate
thefreewillshallbeusedagainsthim.Secretdetentionplaces,solitary,incommunicado,
orothersimilarformsofdetentionareprohibited.
(3) AnyconfessionoradmissionobtainedinviolationofthisorSection17hereofshall
beinadmissibleinevidenceagainsthim.
(4) Thelawshallprovideforpenalandcivilsanctionsforviolationsofthissectionas
wellascompensationtoandrehabilitationofvictimsoftortureorsimilarpractices,and
theirfamilies.

Art3,Sec.14.(1)Nopersonshallbeheldtoanswerforacriminaloffensewithoutdue
processoflaw.
(2)Inallcriminalprosecutions,theaccusedshallbepresumedinnocentuntilthecontrary
isproved,andshallenjoytherighttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel,tobeinformedof
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and
publictrial,tomeetthewitnessesfacetoface,andtohavecompulsoryprocesstosecure
theattendanceofwitnessesandtheproductionofevidenceinhisbehalf.However,after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
thathehasbeendulynotifiedandhisfailuretoappearisunjustifiable.

Art 3, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasijudicial bodies and adequate legal
assistanceshallnotbedeniedtoanypersonbyreasonofpoverty.

Art 3, Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
beforealljudicial,quasijudicial,oradministrativebodies.

Art3,Sec.17.Nopersonshallbecompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself.

Art3,Sec.19.(1)Excessivefinesshallnotbeimposed,norcruel,degradingorinhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
240

P.J.G.

reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penaltyalreadyimposedshallbereducedtoreclusionperpetua.
(2) Theemploymentofphysical,psychological,ordegradingpunishmentagainstany
prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under
subhumanconditionsshallbedealtwithbylaw.

Art 3, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.Ifan actis punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
eithershallconstituteabartoanotherprosecutionforthesameact.

GAMBOAVS.CRUZ
[162SCRA642;L56291;27JUN1988]

Facts:

Petitionerwasarrestedforvagrancywithoutawarrant.Duringalineupof5detainees
includingpetitioner,hewasidentifiedbyacomplainanttobeacompanioninarobbery,
thereafterhewascharged.Petitionerfiled a Motion to Acquit on the ground thatthe
conduct of the lineup, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his
constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion.
Hearingwasset,hencethepetition.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionersrighttocounselanddueprocessviolated.

Held:

No.Thepolicelineupwasnotpartofthecustodialinquest,hence,petitionerwasnot
yetentitled,atsuchstage,tocounsel.Hehadnotbeenheldyettoanswerforacriminal
offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit
admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or
innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by
counsel,unlesshewaivestheright,butthewaivershallbemadeinwritingandinthe
presenceofcounsel.

Ontherighttodueprocess,petitionerwasnot,inanyway,deprivedofthissubstantive
andconstitutionalright,ashewasdulyrepresentedbyacounsel.Hewasaccordedall
theopportunitiestobeheardandtopresentevidencetosubstantiatehisdefense;only
241

P.J.G.

thathechosenotto,andinsteadoptedtofileaMotiontoAcquitaftertheprosecution
hadresteditscase.Whatdueprocessabhorsistheabsolutelackofopportunitytobe
heard.

PEOPLEVS.JUDGEAYSON
[175SCRA216;G.R.NO.85215;7JUL1989]

Facts:

FelipeRamoswasaticketfreightclerkofthePhilippineAirlines,assignedatitsBaguio
City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane
tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline,
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees'Association(PALEA)towhichRamospertained.AletterwassentbyRamos
statinghiswillingnesstosettletheamountofP76,000.ThefindingsoftheAuditteam
weregiventohim,andherefutedthathemisusedproceedsofticketsalsostatingthat
hewaspreventedfromsettlingsaidamounts.Heprofferedacompromisehoweverthis
didnotensue.TwomonthsafteracrimeofestafawaschargedagainstRamos.Ramos
pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission
andstatement,towhichdefendantsarguedthattheconfessionwastakenwithoutthe
accusedbeingrepresentedbyalawyer.RespondentJudgedidnotadmitthosestating
thataccusedwasnotremindedofhisconstitutionalrightstoremainsilentandtohave
counsel.Amotionforreconsiderationfiled bytheprosecutorswasdenied.Hencethis
appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the
admissionandstatementofaccused.

Held:

No.Section20ofthe1987constitutionprovidesthattherightagainstselfincrimination
(onlytowitnessesotherthanaccused,unlesswhatisaskedisrelatingtoadifferent
crimechargednotpresentincaseatbar).

242

P.J.G.

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsionofsubpoena,inanycivil,criminal,oradministrativeproceeding.Therightis
notto"becompelledtobeawitnessagainsthimself.Itprescribesan"optionofrefusal
to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to
thewitness.Itcannotbeclaimedatanyothertime.Itdoesnotgiveawitnesstheright
todisregardasubpoena,todeclinetoappearbeforethecourtatthetimeappointed,or
torefusetotestifyaltogether.Itisarightthatawitnessknowsorshouldknow.Hemust
claimitandcouldbewaived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accusedinclude:

1) heshallhavetherighttoremainsilentandtocounsel,andtobeinformedofsuch
right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
freewillshallbeusedagainsthim.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

Theindividualmayknowinglyandintelligentlywaivetheserightsandagreetoanswer
ormakeastatement.Butunlessanduntilsuchrightsandwaiversaredemonstratedby
the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
usedagainsthim.

PEOPLEVS.MAQUEDA
[242SCRA565;G.R.NO.112983;22MAR1994]

Facts:

British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba,
BenguetwhilehisFilipinowife,TeresitaMendozawasbadlybatteredwithleadpipeson
theoccasionofarobbery.TwohouseholdhelpersofthevictimsidentifiedSalvamante
(aformerhouseboyofthevictims)andMaquedaastherobbers.MikeTabayanandhis
friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that
samemorning,whenthetwoaccusedaskedthemfordirections.

243

P.J.G.

MaquedawasthenarrestedinGuinyangan,Quezon.HewastakentoCalauag,Quezon
where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the
crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights
beforehesignedsuchdocument.AfterwardshewasbroughttotheBenguetProvincial
Jail.Whilehewasunderdetention,MaquedafiledaMotiontoGrantBail.Hestated
thereinthat"heiswillingandvolunteeringtobeaStatewitnessintheaboveentitled
case,itappearingthatheistheleastguiltyamongtheaccusedinthiscase."

MaquedaalsoadmittedhisinvolvementinthecommissionoftherobberytoProsecutor
ZarateandtoSalvosa.

Issue:

Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is
admissibleasevidence.

Held:

No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain
silentandhisrighttocounsel.Second,hecannotbecompelledtobeawitnessagainst
himself.Atthetimeoftheconfession,theaccusedwasalreadyfacingchargesincourt.
Henolongerhadtherighttoremainsilentandtocounselbuthehadtherighttorefuse
tobeawitnessandnottohaveanyprejudicewhatsoeverresulttohimbysuchrefusal.
Andyet,despitehisknowingfullywellthatacasehadalreadybeenfiledincourt,hestill
confessedwhenhedidnothavetodoso.

Thecontentionofthetrialcourtthattheaccusedisnotentitledtosuchrightsanymore
becausetheinformationhasbeenfiledandawarrantofarresthasbeenissuedalready,
is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informedthereofunderSection12(1)oftheBillofRightsarenotconfinedtothatperiod
priortothefilingofacriminalcomplaintorinformationbutareavailableatthatstage
whenapersonis"underinvestigationforthecommissionofanoffense."

PursuanttoSection12(3)oftheBillofRightstherefore,suchextrajudicialadmissionis
inadmissibleasevidence.

AstotheadmissionsmadebyMaquedatoProsecutorZarateandRayDeanSalvosa,the
trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their
244

P.J.G.

conversationbutnottoprovethetruthoftheadmissionbecausesuchtestimonywas
objectedtoashearsay.MaquedavoluntarilyandfreelymadethemtoProsecutorZarate
not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be
utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a
privatepersonthereforeadmissible.

Note:adistinctionbetweenaconfessionandadmissionhasbeenmadebytheSC:
Admissionofaparty.Theact,declarationoromissionofpartyastoarelevantfact
maybegiveninevidenceagainsthim.

Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense


charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence
againsthim.

PEOPLEVS.BANDULA
[232SCRA566;G.R.NO.89223;27MAY1994]

Facts:

SixarmedmenbargedintothecompoundofPoloCoconutPlantationinTanjay,Negros
Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard, including accused. Salva
andPastrano,securityguardswerehogtiedandaccusedproceededtotheAtty.Garay,
counselofplantation.Theyransackedtheplaceandtookwiththemmoneyandother
valuables. Atty. Garay was killed. Accusedappellant is charged with robbery with
homicide along with 3 others who were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
Appellantwasconvicted.

Now, appellant argues that the extrajudicial confessions he and accused Dionanao
executed suffer from constitutional infirmities, hence, inadmissible in evidence
considering that they were extracted under duress and intimidation, and were merely
countersigned later by the municipal attorney who, by the nature of his position, was
notentirelyanindependentcounselnorcounseloftheirchoice.Consequently,without
the extrajudicial confessions, the prosecution is left without sufficient evidence to
convicthimofthecrimecharged.

Issue:

245

P.J.G.

WhetherorNotextrajudicialconfessionsofappellantisadmissibleasevidenceagainst
him.

Held:

No. When accusedappellant Bandula and accused Dionanao were investigated


immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If at all, counsel came in
onlyadayafterthecustodialinvestigationwithrespecttoaccusedDionanao,andtwo
weeks later with respect to appellant Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted
bothaccusedwasAtty.RubenZerna,theMunicipalAttorneyofTanjay.Ontopofthis,
therearetelltalesignsthatviolencewasusedagainsttheaccused.Certainly,theseare
blatantviolationsoftheConstitutionwhichmandatesin
Sec.12,Art.III.Irregularitiespresentinclude:

1. Theinvestigatorsdidnotinformtheaccusedoftheirrighttoremainsilentandto
have competent and independent counsel, preferably of their own choice, even
beforeattemptingtoelicitstatementsthatwouldincriminatethem.
2. Investigators continuously disregard the repeated requests of the accused for
medicalassistance.ReasonforAccusedSedigos"blackeye"whicheven
Pat.Baldejeraadmittedisnotestablished,aswellasBandulasfracturedrib.
3. Counselmustbeindependent.Hecannotbeaspecialcounsel, publicorprivate
prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedlyadversetotheaccused.

PEOPLEVS.LUCERO
[244SCRA425;G.R.NO.97936;29MAY1995]

Facts:

Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and
JohnDoewerechargedwiththecrimeofrobberywithhomicide.

Theprosecution:

Accusedappellant(alightedfromagrayreddishcar),armedwithhandgun,blockedthe
wayofthesaidcomplainantwhowasonboardaMercedesBenzpassingalongRoad14,
MindanaoAvenue,Pagasa,QC,robandcarryawaycashmoney;onegoldnecklacewith
cross pendant, 7 karat; one gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold
246

P.J.G.

ring, domino style; one solid gold bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR.
DEMETRIOZ.MADRID.AccusedshotLORENZOBERNALESyALERIA,adriverofthesaid
offended party, thus inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which resulted to the
instantaneousdeathofALERIA.

OnlytheaccusedEchavezbrothersandAlejandroLucerowereapprehended.

When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta
conferredwithLucero.HeapprisedLuceroofhisconstitutionalrights.Heobservedno
reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero
understoodhisadvice.

When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to
attendthewakeofhisfriend.Thenextmorning,LucerowasaccompaniedbyCISagents
to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty.
Peralta.ItwasalreadysignedbyLucero.

Thethreeaccuseddeniedcomplicityinthecrimecharged.

AppellantLucero'sdefenseisalibi.HetestifiedthathewasathishouseinCaloocanCity.

He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was
walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and
pushedhimintoajeep.Hewasblindfoldedthewholenightanddidnotknowwherehe
wastaken.Thementurnedouttobepoliceofficers.
Thenextday,helearnedhewasinCampCrame.Heclaimedthathewastortured.He
wasnotinformedoftheoffenseforwhichhewasbeinginvestigated.Neitherdidthey
revealtheidentityofthecomplainant.

LucerodeniedknowingDr.Madrid,theEchavezbrothersandtheotheraccusedinthis
case.HesaidheonlymetDr.MadridattheCISOfficeduringthepolicelineup.Hewas
made to lineup four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth
time.

Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied
engagingtheservicesofAtty,Peralta.HelikewiseconfirmedthatAtty.Peraltawasnot
presentduringhisactualcustodialinterrogation.

247

P.J.G.

Aftertrial,thecourtaquoacquittedtheEchavezbrothersforinsufficientevidence.The
trial court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct
participationofRobberywithHomicideandsentencedtosufferanimprisonmentterm
ofRECLUSIONPERPETUA.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthelowercourterredinconvictingaccusedappellant.

Held:

Appellant'sconvictioncannotbebasedonhisextrajudicialconfession.

Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime
shouldbeprovidedwithcounsel.TheCourthaveconstitutionalizedtherighttocounsel
because of hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them
inadmissible.

The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant.
Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his
impressionwasthatappellantunderstoodhim.Moreso,itwasduringhisabsencethat
appellantgaveanuncounselledconfession.

Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but
effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant
receivednoeffectivecounselingfromAtty.Peralta.

Whereof,DecisionconvictingappellantAlejandroLuceroyCortelisherebyreversed.

PEOPLEVS.AGUSTIN
[240SCRA541;G.R.NO.110290;25JAN1995]

Facts:

Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna
Theresa;hisdaughter,Dominic;andDanny,afamilyfriend, wereontheirwayaboard
their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were
248

P.J.G.

cruisingalongMalvarStreetandnearingtheBaptistchurch,amancameoutfromthe
right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the
Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The
Brasiliaswervedand hitafence. The gunman immediately returnedtotheparkedcar
whichthenspedaway.AllthoseinthecarwerehitandDr.BayquenandAnnaTheresa
diedonthespot.DominicwasbaletogetoutoftheBrasiliatoruntotheAlabanzastore
where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and her mother brought her father and
Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home and was then brought to the Hospital for
treatment.

AccusedQuiao,anallegedformermilitaryagentwhohadbeenpickedupbythepolice
authorities,confessedduring the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo
Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who
engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and a
certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by Atty.
Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as
transcribedwiththeswornstatementofQuiaowassigned,withtheassistanceofAtty.
Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was
apprehended,andwasinvestigatedandwasaffordedtheprivilegeslikethatofQuijano.
Agustinsdefenseinterposethathewasforcedtoadmitinvolvementatgunpointinthe
KennonRoad.Hefurtherdeclaredthatalthoughhewasgivenalawyer,Cajucom(alaw
partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver
Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and
Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The promise that he would be
dischargedasawitnessdidnotpushthroughsinceQuijanoescaped.HowevertheRTC
convictedhim,sinceconspiracywasestablished.Hencetheappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotaccusedappellantsextrajudicialstatementsadmissibleasevidence.

Held:

No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an


acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or
implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly
includes admissions, not just confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant,
contained intwentytwopagesappear to be signed by him and Atty. Cajucom butfor
reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes which consists of
249

P.J.G.

twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or
decipherthestenographicnotesitcannotbeexpectedthatappellant,whoisafarmer
andwhoreachedonlythefourthgrade,toreadordecipheritscontents.Theappellant,
thereforewasdeprivedofhisrightsunderSection12(1),ArticleIIIoftheConstitution.
Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The appellant was not
explicitlytoldofhisrighttohaveacompetentandindependentcounselofhischoice,
specificallyaskedifhehadinmindanysuchcounseland,ifso,whetherhecouldafford
tohirehisservices,and,ifhecouldnot,whetherhewouldagreetobeassistedbyone
tobeprovidedforhim.Hewasnotcategoricallyinformedthathecouldwaivehisrights
to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the
presenceofhiscounsel.Hehad,infact,waivedhisrighttoremainsilentbyagreeingto
be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no
other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the
appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through
suggestivelanguage,immediatelyinformedhimthatAtty.Cajucomwasreadytoassist
him. Moreso said counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private
prosecutor.

PEOPLEVS.BOLANOS
[211SCRA262;G.R.NO.101808;3JUL1992]

Facts:

Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat.
Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the
previousnight,oneofwhomtheaccusedwhohadadrinkingspreewiththedeceased.
When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the
chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with
Magtibay,otheraccusedonthepolicevehicleandbroughtthemtothepolicestation.
While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased. RTC convicted him
hencetheappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotaccusedappellantdeprivedofhisconstitutionalrighttocounsel.

Held:

250

P.J.G.

Yes.Beingalreadyundercustodialinvestigationwhileonboardthepolicepatroljeepon
the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III,
Section12ofthe1987Constitution,moreparticularlypar.1andpar.3.

PEOPLEVS.MACAM
[238SCRA306;G.R.NOS.9101112;24NOV1994]

Facts:

Prosecutionsversion:

On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque
and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam)
locatedat43FermaRoadQC.Uponthearrivaloftheaccused,Benitoinvitedtheformer
tohavelunch.BenitoaskedhismaidSalvacionEnreratocallthecompanionsofEduardo
who were waiting in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque
entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had
takentheirlunch,EduardoMacamgrabbedtheclutchbagofBenitoMacamandpulled
out his uncles gun then declared a holdup. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam),
children, maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs.
After a while Leticia was brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was
stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo and Salvacion was also stabbed but
survived.ThetotalvalueoftheitemstakenwasP536,700.00.

Defensesversion:

Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benitos
houseforafeeofP50.00.Insteadofpayinghim,hewasgivenacallingcardbyEduardo
Macam so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the
accusedinsidethehousetohavelunch.Thereafterhewashedthedishesandsweptthe
floor.WhenEugenioCawilanpulledagunandannouncedtheholdup,hewasaskedto
gathersomethingsandwhichheabidedoutoffear.Whileputtingthesaidthinsinside
thecarofBenito(victim)heheardtheaccusedsayingkailanganpatayinangmgataong
yandahilkilalaakongmgayan.Uponhearingsuchphraseheescapedandwenthome
usinghistricycle.HealsotestifiedthathisbrotherErnestoRoquehasjustarrivedfrom
the province and in no way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day,
together with his brother, they went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the
251

P.J.G.

fatherofEduardoMacam)forhimtogethispayment(50.00).Heandhisbrotherwas
suddenlyapprehendedbythesecurityguardsandbroughttothepoliceheadquartersin
Q.C.Theywerealsoforcedtoadmitcertainthings.

Afterwhich,hetogetherwithalltheaccused,inhandcuffsandborecontusionsontheir
facescausedbyblowsinflictedintheirfacesduringinvestigation,wasbroughttotheQC
General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to lineup for identification.
EugenioCawilanwasalsochargedwithAntifencingLawbutwasacquittedinthesaid
case.

Issue:

Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid.
WONtheevidencefromthelineupisadmissible.

Held:

Itisappropriatetoextendthecounselguaranteetocriticalstagesofprosecutioneven
before trial. A police lineup is considered a critical stage of the proceedings. Any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police lineup is inadmissible.
HOWEVER,theprosecutiondidnotpresentevidenceregardingappellantsidentification
atthelineup.Thewitnessesidentifiedtheaccusedagaininopencourt.Also,accused
didnotobjecttotheincourtidentificationasbeingtaintedbyillegallineup.

Thearrestoftheappellantswaswithoutawarrant.HOWEVER,theyareestoppedfrom
questioningthelegalityofsucharrestbecausetheyhavenotmovedtoquashthesaid
information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
trialcourtbyenteringapleaofnotguiltyandparticipatingintrial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining
outsidethehouseservedasalookedout.

Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque and Ernesto Roque is
guiltyofthecrimeofrobberywithhomicideascoconspiratorsoftheotheraccusedto
sufferreclusionperpetua.

Thingstaken:2toygun,airgunriffle,CO2refiller,TV,betamaxtapes,betamaxrewinder,
Samsoniteattachecase,typewriter,chessboard,TOYOTACrownCarPlateNo.CAS997,
assortedjewelry..22gunandmoney.
252

P.J.G.

PEOPLEVS.DY
[158SCRA111;G.R.74517;23FEB1988]

Facts:

Pat. Padilla reported along with Benny Dy, with caliber .38 as suspect to the shooting
incidentat"Benny'sBar,"atSitioAngol,ManocManocMalay,Aklan(Boracay)situated
ontheIslandwhichcausedthedeathofChristianLangelPhilippe,tourist,24yearsold
and a Swiss nationale. He was charged with the Murder With the Use of Unlicensed
firearms.Appellantallegesthathecarriedthevictimtotheshoretobebroughttothe
hospitaltosavethelatter,andwhofacilitatedthesurrendertoPat.Padillaagunwhich
his helper found the following morning while cleaning the bar. Accused posted bail
whichwasgranted.Theaccuseddeniedhavingmadeanyoralconfessionallegingthat
hewenttoPat.Padillanottoreporttheincidentbuttostatethataboyhelperinthe
barhadfoundagunonthesandfloorwhilecleaningandthatPat.Padillapickedupthe
gun from the bar at his request. The Accused argues that even if he did make such a
confession,thesamewouldbeinadmissibleinevidence.HewasfoundguiltyintheRTC.
Hencetheappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthelowercourtcorrectinsayingthattheconstitutionalprocedureon
custodialinterrogationisnotapplicableintheinstantcase.

Held:

YES.Appellant'sassertionthatthegunhehadsurrenderedwasmerelyfoundbyaboy
helperwhilecleaningthebardeservesnocredencefor,ifitwereso,itwouldhavebeen
absurdforhimtohaveplacedhimselfunderpolicecustodyintheearlymorningafter
theincident.SwornComplaintfor"MurderwithUseofUnlicensedFirearm"signedby
theChiefofPolicealsoatteststoAppellant'soralconfession.ThatComplaintformspart
of therecordofthe proceedings before theMunicipalCircuit Trial CourtofBuruanga,
Aklan, and is prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Appellant's voluntary
surrenderimpliesnoviolationas"nowarrantofarrestisissuedfortheapprehensionof
theaccusedforthereasonthatheisalreadyunderpolicecustody beforethefilingof
the complaint." What was told by the Accused to Pat, Padilla was a spontaneous
statement not elicited through questioning, but given in ordinary manner. No written
253

P.J.G.

confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial


investigation.

NAVALLOVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[234SCRA177;G.R.NO.97214;18JUL1994]

Facts:

AccusedwastheCollectingandDisbursingOfficeroftheNumanciaNationalVocational
School, which school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties
includedthecollectionoftuitionfees,preparationofvouchersforsalariesofteachers
and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National
Treasury.Aninformationformalversationofpublicfundswasfiled.Awarrantofarrest
was issued, but accusedpetitioner could not be found. on 10 December 1978,
PresidentialDecreeNo.1606tookeffectcreatingtheSandiganbayanandconferringon
itoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionovercrimescommittedbypublicofficersembraced
in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally
arrested.Hewasreleasedonprovisionallibertyupontheapprovalofhispropertybail
bond.WhenarraignedbytheRTCon18July1985,hepleadednotguilty.Uponmotion
of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. QuionesMarcos opined that since Navallo
hadalreadybeenarraignedbeforethecasewastransferredtotheSandiganbayan,the
RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the
Office of the Ombudsman which held otherwise. The information was then docketed
with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan.ThewarrantwasreturnedwithacertificationbytheRTCClerkofCourt
thattheaccusedhadpostedabailbond.Navallofiledamotiontoquash,contending(1)
that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the
accused and (2) that since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the
attempttoprosecutehimbeforetheSandiganbayanwouldconstitutedoublejeopardy.
Howeverthiswasdeniedandtrialensuedandhewasfoundguilty.

Issue:

Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial
investigationsinfavoroftheaccusedviolated.

254

P.J.G.

Held:

No.Doublejeopardyrequirestheexistenceofthefollowingrequisites:

(1) Thepreviouscomplaintorinformationorotherformalchargeissufficientinform
andsubstancetosustainaconviction;
(2) Thecourthasjurisdictiontotrythecase;
(3) Theaccusedhasbeenarraignedandhaspleadedtothecharge;and
(4) Theaccusedisconvictedoracquittedorthecaseisdismissedwithouthisexpress
consent.

The RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused
whichbythenhadalreadybeenconferredontheSandiganbayan.Moreover,neitherdid
thecasethereterminatewithconvictionoracquittalnorwasitdismissed.

No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal audit


examinationisnotundercustodialinvestigation.Anauditexaminerhimselfcanhardly
be deemed to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any
case, the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report
prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor)
appearstobebeliedbyhisowntestimony.

PEOPLEVS.ALICANDO
[251SCRA293;G.R.NO.117487;2DEC1995]

Facts:

AppellantwaschargedwiththecrimeofrapewithhomicideofKhazieMaePenecilla,a
minor,fouryearsofage,chokingherwithhisrighthand.Theincidenthappenedafter
appellantdrankliquor.Aneighbor,LeopoldoSantiagofoundthevictimsbodyandthe
parents and police were informed. Appellant was living in his uncle's house some five
arm's length from Penecilla's house. Appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3
Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the
basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow up interrogations, the police
cametoknowandrecoveredfromappellant'shouse,KhazieMae'sgreenslippers,apair
of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained Tshirt all of which were
presentedasevidencefortheprosecution.HewasarraignedwiththeassistanceofAtty.
255

P.J.G.

RogelioAntiquieraofthePAO.Appellantpleadedguilty.TheRTCconvictedhim.Hence
anautomaticreviewfortheimpositionofdeathpenalty.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthedeathpenaltyproper.

Held:

No.TherecordsdonotrevealthattheInformationagainsttheappellantwasreadinthe
language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in
theEnglishlanguage.ItisunknownwhethertheappellantknowstheEnglishlanguage.
Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any
showingthattheInformationcouchedinEnglishwastranslatedtotheappellantinhis
owndialectbeforehispleaofguilt.TheRTCviolatedsection1(a)ofRule116,therule
implementingtheconstitutionalrightoftheappellanttobeinformedofthenatureand
causeoftheaccusationagainsthim.Italsodeniedappellanthisconstitutionalrightto
due process of law. It is urged that we must presume that the arraignment of the
appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at stake, we cannot lean on this
rebuttablepresumption.Therecouldbenopresumption.Thecourtmustbesure.

Thetrialcourtviolatedsection3ofRule116whenitacceptedthepleaofguiltofthe
appellant. Said section requires that the court shall conduct a searching inquiry the
voluntarinessandfullcomprehensionoftheconsequencesofhis plea and requirethe
prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may
also present evidence in his behalf. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had
physicalmarksofmaltreatment.Itdidnotasktheappellantwhenhewasarrested,who
arrestedhim,howandwherehewasinterrogated,whetherhewasmedicallyexamined
beforeandafterhisinterrogation,etc.Itlimiteditseffortstryingtodiscoverlatebody
marksofmaltreatmentasifinvoluntarinessiscausedbyphysicalabusealone.

Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These consists of a
pillowwithbloodstainsinitscenter14andtheTshirt15oftheaccusedcoloredwhite
with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical evidence are evidence of the highest
order. They strongly corroborate the testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was
raped.TheseareinadmissibleevidencefortheyweregatheredbyPO3DaniloTanofthe
IloiloCityPNPasaresultofcustodialinterrogationwhereappellantverballyconfessed
tothecrimewithoutthebenefitofcounsel.

256

P.J.G.

PEOPLEVS.DEGUZMAN
[224SCRA93;G.R.NOS.9832124;30JUN1993]

Facts:

AlltheaccusedwerechargedbeforetheRegionalTrialCourtofCebuwiththreecounts
of murder and one count of frustrated murder in four Informations. The victim Jose
Bantug was found with gunshots in the head, body, and skull. The other three
informations charged them with the murder of Francisco Carteciano y Sorilla and
Antonio S. Carteciano, and the frustrated murder of Lorna V. Carteciano. The other 8
accused were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, while Victor Nuez was
foundguilty.Thefactsshownbyevidenceare:Onemorning,MajorAntonioCarteciano
wasdrivinghisprivatejeepCampGeneralArcadioMaxilominLahug,CebuCitywhere
hewasstationedasmedicalofficerofthePC/INPProvincialCommand.Inthefrontseat
with him is his wife Lorna, and at the backseat are his mother in law, son, brother
Francisco, neighbor Bantug, and Bantugs son. Near the intersection, gunshots were
heardfromtheleftsideofthestreet.MajorCartecianotookhis.45calpistolandfired.
However, gunshots were fired in succession, and Major Carteciano, his brother
Francisco, Jose Bantug, and his wife Lorna were hit. When the jeep stopped, several
gunmenapproachedthem.NuezdemandedLornatogiveNuezherhusbandspistol.
Lorna asked to take her valuables instead. Then, Nuez shot Major Cartecianos head
point blank. Then the gunmen hijacked another jeep and took off. Lorna, her mother
JuanitaRicaplaza,andhersonReiserCartecianopositivelyidentifiedtheaccused.Lorna
identifiedNuezas theonewhoshot herhusband.Nuez claimedthathisarrestwas
illegal and that he was deprived of his right to counsel when he was subjected to a
paraffintestwithouttheassistanceofcounsel.

Issue:

WhetherornottheaccusedNuezsconstitutionalrightwasviolated

Held:

No. Nuez pleaded not guilty at the arraignment. Therefore, he is estopped from
questioningthevalidityofhisarrest.Furthermore,theillegalarrestofanaccusedisnot
sufficientcauseforsettingasideavalidjudgmentrendereduponasufficientcomplaint
after trial free from error. The witnesses also positively identified the accused, so he
257

P.J.G.

cannot question the credibility of the witnesses. Regarding his right to counsel, the
Supreme Court held that the right to counsel attaches only upon the start of an
investigation, that is, when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
informationand/orconfessionsoradmissionsfromtheaccused.Atsuchpointorstage,
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the
personundergoinginterrogation.Inthecaseatbar,whenaccusedwassubjectedtoa
paraffin test, he was not then under custodial investigation. Accusedappellant also
arguedthatsincehiscoaccusedwereacquitted,thentheiracquittalnegatesconspiracy
amongthem,andheshouldnotbeconvictedwiththechargesfiled.However,theCourt
held that conspiracy was still proven by the evidence, and the other coaccused were
acquittedonlybecausetherewasreasonabledoubt.Therefore,accusedappellantisstill
convictedofthefourchargesagainsthim.

We,therefore,findthattheconvictionofaccusedappellantforthecrimeschargedhas
been established beyond reasonable doubt and the penalty imposed is in accordance
withlaw.However,thecivilindemnityimposedbythetrialcourtshouldbeincreasedto
P50,000inconformitywithourrecentrulingsonthematter.

WHEREFORE,exceptforthemodificationthatthecivilindemnitytobepaidbyaccused
appellantVictorNuez,Jr.totheheirsofeachvictimwhodiedisherebyincreasedto
P50,000, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs
againstaccusedappellant

PEOPLEVS.JUDGEDONATO
[198SCRA130;G.R.NO.79269;5JUN1991]

Facts:

PrivaterespondentandhiscoaccusedwerechargedofrebelliononOctober2,1986for
actscommittedbeforeandafterFebruary1986.PrivaterespondentfiledwithaMotion
toQuashallegingthat:(a)thefactsallegeddonotconstituteanoffense;(b)theCourt
hasnojurisdictionovertheoffensecharged;(c)theCourthasnojurisdictionoverthe
personsofthedefendants;and(d)thecriminalactionorliabilityhasbeenextinguished.
Thiswasdenied.May9,1987Respondentfiledapetitionforbail,whichwasopposed
that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital
offenseunderPD1996,942and1834amendingART.135ofRPC.On5June1987the
PresidentissuedExecutiveOrderNo.187repealing,amongothers,P.D.Nos.1996,942
258

P.J.G.

and1834andrestoringtofullforceandeffectArticle135oftheRevisedPenalCodeas
it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which
wasfixedatP30,000.00andimposedaconditionthatheshallreporttothecourtonce
every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a
supplementalmotionforreconsiderationindirectlyaskingthecourttodenybailtoand
toallowittopresentevidenceinsupportthereofconsideringthe"inevitableprobability
thattheaccusedwillnotcomplywiththismainconditionofhisbail.Itwascontended
that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee
fromdetentionwhenarrested;(ChairmanofCPPNPA)
2. Hewasnotarrestedathisresidenceashehadnoknownaddress;
3. Hewasusingthefalsename"ManuelMercadoCastro"atthetimeofhisarrest
andpresentedaDriver'sLicensetosubstantiatehisfalseidentity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner
whoseidentityandaddresswerealsofoundtobefalse;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00wasofferedandpaidforhisarrest.

Thishoweverwasdenied.Hencetheappeal.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheprivaterespondenthastherighttobail.

Held:

Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a
capitaloffense,thereforeprosecutionhasnorighttopresentevidence.Itisonlywhenit
isacapitaloffensethattherightbecomesdiscretionary.Howeveritwaswrongforthe
Judgetochangetheamountofbailfrom30Kto50Kwithouthearingtheprosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion
perpetuatothecrimeofrebellion,isnotapplicabletotheaccusedasitisnotfavorable
tohim.

259

P.J.G.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus).
Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co
detaineesJosefinaCruzandJoseMiloConcepcionwillbereleasedimmediately,witha
conditionthattheywillsubmitthemselvesinthejurisdictionofthecourt.Saidpetition
forHCwasdismissed.Bailisthesecuritygivenforthereleaseofapersonincustodyof
thelaw.Ergo,therewasawaiver.Weherebyrulethattherighttobailisanotherofthe
constitutionalrightswhichcanbewaived.Itisarightwhichispersonaltotheaccused
andwhosewaiverwouldnotbecontrarytolaw,publicorder,publicpolicy,morals,or
goodcustoms,orprejudicialtoathirdpersonwitharightrecognizedbylaw.

CARPIOVS.MAGLALANG
[196SCRA41;G.R.NO.78162;19APR1991]

Facts:

OnJanuary8,1987,informationforthemurderofMayorJosePayumoofDinalupihan
Bataanwas filed againstEscao and ten other unindentified persons bythe provincial
fiscalintheRTCofBataanatBalanga.Fourdayslater,theActingExecutiveJudgeofsaid
courtissuedanorderofarrestagainstEscaorecommendingnobailforhisprovisional
liberty. Pat. Cesar Diego who acted on the warrant returned to the court with a
certificationissuedbyNBIagentGonzales,statingthereinthataccusedwasstillunder
investigation.

ThroughcounselRolandoT.Cainoy,Escaofiledincourtanurgentexpartemotionfor
his commitment at the provincial jail of Bataan on the ground that he wanted to be
wherehisfamilyandcounselcouldhaveeasyaccesstohim.Heallegedthereinthathis
detention at the NBI headquarters in Manila was irregular and in defiance of the
warrantofarrestissuedbythecourt.Thiswasgranted.

A motion forreconsideration was filed by Director Carpio stating that the NBI needed
physical custody of Escao for the identification of the other accused in the case who
were still the objects of a manhunt by NBI agents; that in view of the finding of NBI
agents that the other accused and suspects in the case were subversive elements or
members of the New People's Army, it was for the best interest of Escao that he be
detainedattheNBIlockupcellwheresecuritymeasureswereadequate;andthatthe
NBIwouldproducethepersonofEscaobeforethecourtwheneverrequiredandevery
timethattherewouldbeahearingonthecase.Howeveranothermotionwasexecuted
byEscaostatingthathenowwantstobedetainedintheNBI,allegingthathedidnot
260

P.J.G.

authorize his counsel to execute the first motion. Also, Escao's counsel Rolando T.
Cainoy filed an application for bail stating that Escao was arrested by NBI agents on
December7,1986withoutawarranthavingbeenpresentedtohimandthatsincethen
he had been detained in the lockup cell of the NBI; that said agents, also without a
warrant,searchedhishousewhenhewasarrested;thathewassubjectedtoinhuman
torture and forced to admit participation in the killing of Mayor Payumo and to
implicate other persons, and that during the custodial investigation, he was not
representedbycounsel.Inopposingsaidapplication,thepublicprosecutoraverredthat
theaccusedwaschargedwithacapitaloffenseforwhichnobailmaybeavailedof,that
the reasons advanced in said application would be overcome by strong and sufficient
evidence; and that during the custodial investigation, he was represented by counsel.
ThecourtgrantedtheapplicationforbailfixingthesameatP30,000,havingfoundno
sufficient evidence against accused. Director Carpio was ordered to justify his actions
andsoasnottobeconsideredincontempt.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheordergrantingrighttobailwasproper.

Held:

No.The ordergranting bail had been rendered moot not onlyby the fact that hehad
been released from NBI custody, but also because Escao jumped bail and did not
appear on the date set for his arraignment. Notwithstanding, the Court resolved the
issue of the legality of the order granting bail to Escao. Although the right to bail is
principallyforthebenefitoftheaccused,inthejudicialdeterminationoftheavailability
of said right, the prosecution should be afforded procedural due process. Thus, in the
summaryproceedingonamotionprayingforadmissiontobail,theprosecutionshould
begiventheopportunitytopresentevidenceand,thereafter,thecourtshouldspellout
atleastaresumeoftheevidenceonwhichitsordergrantingordenyingbailisbased.
Otherwise,theorderisdefectiveandvoidable.InthecaseatbartheRTCerredinnot
summarizing the factual basis of its order granting bail, the court merely stated the
number of prosecution witnesses but not their respective testimonies, and concluded
that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not "sufficiently strong" to deny
bailtoEscao.

Thefacts,however,thatMayorPayumowaskilledonAugust20,1986whenthe1973
Constitutionallowingthedeathpenaltywasstillinforceandthattheapplicationforbail
was made on March 5, 1987 during the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution which
261

P.J.G.

abolished the death penalty, should not have gotten in the way of resolving the
applicationforbailinaccordancewiththeConstitutionandproceduralrules.Section13,
ArticleIIIoftheConstitutionexplicitlyprovidesthat"(a)llpersons,exceptthosecharged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall
beforeconviction,bebailablebysufficientsureties,orbereleasedonrecognizanceas
may be provided by law." As the phrase "capital offenses" has been replaced by the
phrase "offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, 25 crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence of guilt is
strong,aretheexceptionstotherulethattherighttobailshouldbemadeavailableto
all accused. As the court itself acknowledged in its order of April 2, 1987 that "capital
punishment"inSection4,Rule114hasbeenamendedtoreclusionperpetua,thecourt
should have proceeded accordingly: i.e., resolved the application for bail pursuant to
Section13,ArticleIIIoftheConstitution.Itdidnothavetoinvoketheabolitionofthe
deathpenaltyandthelackoflegislativeenactmentrestoringitinjustifyingthegrantof
bail.Allithadtodowastodeterminewhetherevidenceofguiltisstronginthelightof
theprovisionofSection13,ArticleIII.

TheRTChasthediscretionintheconsiderationofthestrengthoftheevidenceathand.
However,intheexerciseofsaiddiscretion,thecourtiscontrolledbythefollowing:first,
the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules
which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice
thataredeemedtobepartofthelawsoftheland.27Thelowercourtnotonlyfailedto
properly apply the pertinent provisions of the Constitution and the Rules but it also
disregarded equity and justice by its failure to take into account the factual milieu
surroundingthedetentionofEscao

PEOPLEVS.FORTES
[223SCRA619;G.R.NO.90643;25JUN1993]

Facts:

Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog, Province of Sorsogon,


accompanied his 13year old daughter, Merelyn, to the police station of the said
municipality to report a rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following
this, the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was granted for
accusedsprovisionalrelease.TheMCTCfoundhimguilty.AnappealtoRTCwasfiled,
therequestforthefixingofbondwasdenied.Nowaccusedassailsdenialofbailonthe
groundthatthesameamountedtoanunduedenialofhisconstitutionalrighttobail.
262

P.J.G.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheaccusedsrighttobailviolated.

Held:

No.ItisclearfromSection13,ArticleIIIofthe1987ConstitutionandSection3,Rule114
oftheRevisedRulesofCourt,asamended,thatbeforeconvictionbailiseitheramatter
ofrightorofdiscretion.Itisamatterofrightwhentheoffensechargedispunishableby
any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. If the
offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of
discretion.Itshallbedenied ifthe evidence ofguilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But once it is
determinedthattheevidenceofguiltisnotstrong,bailalsobecomesamatterofright.
Ifanaccusedwhoischargedwithacrimepunishablebyreclusionperpetuaisconvicted
bythetrialcourtandsentencedtosuffersuchapenalty,bailisneitheramatterofright
onthepartoftheaccusednorofdiscretiononthepartofthecourt.

COMMENDADORVS.DEVILLA
[200SCRA80;G.R.NO.93177;2AUG1991]

Facts:

ThepetitionersinG.R.Nos.93177and96948whoareofficersoftheAFPweredirected
to appear in person before the PreTrial Investigating Officers for the alleged
participationthefailedcouponDecember1to9,1989.Petitionersnowclaimthatthere
wasnopretrialinvestigationofthechargesasmandatedbyArticleofWar71.Amotion
fordismissalwasdenied.Now,theirmotionforreconsideration.Allegingdenialofdue
process.

InG.R.No.95020,LtcJacintoLigotappliedforbailonJune5,1990,buttheapplication
wasdeniedbyGCMNo.14.HefiledwiththeRTCapetitionforcertiorariandmandamus
with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM
thengrantedtheprovisionalliberty.Howeverhewasnotreleasedimmediately.TheRTC
nowdeclaredthatevenmilitarymenfacingcourtmartialproceedingscanavailtheright
tobail.

263

P.J.G.

TheprivaterespondentsinG.R.No.97454filedwithSCapetitionforhabeascorpuson
thegroundthattheywerebeingdetainedinCampCramewithoutcharges.Thepetition
wasreferredtoRTC.Findingafterhearingthatnoformalchargeshadbeenfiledagainst
the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court ordered their
release.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherewasadenialofdueprocess.

Whetherornottherewasaviolationoftheaccusedrighttobail.

Held:

NOdenialofdueprocess.Petitionersweregivenseveralopportunitiestopresenttheir
side at the pretrial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990,
andthenagainafterthedenialoftheirmotionofFebruary21,1990,whentheywere
given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counteraffidavits. On that date, they filed
instead a verbalmotionforreconsideration which they wereagain asked to submit in
writing. They had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit
counteraffidavits on the date specified shall be deemed a waiver of their right to
submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to preemptory challenge.
(RighttochallengevalidityofmembersofG/SCM)

ItisarguedthatsincetheprivaterespondentsareofficersoftheArmedForcesaccused
of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order
theirreleaseandotherwiseinterferewiththecourtmartialproceedings.Thisiswithout
merit.*TheRegionalTrialCourthasconcurrentjurisdictionwiththeCourtofAppeals
and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against
inferiorcourtsandotherbodiesandonpetitionsforhabeascorpusandquowarranto.

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been
recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule
embodiedintheBillofRights.Therighttoaspeedytrialisgivenmoreemphasisinthe
militarywheretherighttobaildoesnotexist.

Onthecontentionthattheyhadnotbeenchargedaftermorethanoneyearfromtheir
arrest,therewassubstantialcompliancewiththerequirementsofdueprocessandthe
right to a speedy trial. The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete
264

P.J.G.

the precharge investigation only after one year because hundreds of officers and
thousandsofenlistedmenwereinvolvedinthefailedcoup.

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No.
96948,thepetitionisgranted,andtherespondentsaredirectedtoallowthepetitioners
toexercisetherightofperemptorychallengeunderarticle18ofthearticlesofwar.In
G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted, and the orders of the
respondentcourts forthereleaseoftheprivaterespondentsareherebyreversedand
setaside.Nocosts.

MANOTOCVS.COURTOFAPPEALS
[142SCRA149;G.R.NO.L62100;30MAY1986]

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa. He posted bail. Petitioner filed before each of the
trialcourtsamotionentitled,"motionforpermission toleavethecountry,"statingas
ground therefor his desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business
transactions and opportunities." The prosecution opposed said motion and after due
hearing,bothtrialjudgesdeniedthesame.Petitionerthusfiledapetitionforcertiorari
and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals seeking to annul the orders dated
March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as the
communicationrequest of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave
to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ
commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security
Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure. The Court of Appeals denied the
petition.
Petitionercontendsthathavingbeenadmittedtobailasamatterofright,neitherthe
courtswhichgrantedhimbailnortheSecuritiesandExchangeCommissionwhichhasno
jurisdictionoverhislibertycouldpreventhimfromexercisinghisconstitutionalrightto
travel.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherighttobailamatterofright.

Held:

265

P.J.G.

Therighttobailisamatterofrightifthechargeisnotacapitaloffenseorpunishableby
reclusionperpetuatodeath.

AcourthasthepowertoprohibitapersonadmittedtobailfromleavingthePhilippines.
Thisisanecessaryconsequenceofthenatureandfunctionofabailbond.

Theconditionimposeduponpetitionertomakehimselfavailableatalltimeswhenever
thecourtrequireshispresenceoperatesasavalidrestrictiononhisrighttotravel.

Indeed,iftheaccusedwereallowedtoleavethePhilippineswithoutsufficientreason,
hemaybeplacedbeyondthereachofthecourts.

Petitionerhasnotshownthenecessityforhistravelabroad.Thereisnoindicationthat
thebusinesstransactionscannotbeundertakenbyanyotherpersoninhisbehalf.

CALLANTAVS.VILLANUEVA
[77SCRA377;G.R.NOS.24646&L24674;20JUN1977]

Facts:

TwocomplaintsforgraveoraldefamationwerefiledagainstFaustinaCallanta.TheCity
JudgeofDagupanCity,FelipeVillanueva,deniedthemotionstoquashthecomplaints.
Thus,petitionerCallantabroughtthesuitsforcertiorariintheSupremeCourt.Petitioner
questionsthevalidityoftheissuanceof warrantofarrestbyrespondent,arguingthat
the City Fiscal should have conducted the preliminary investigation. According to
petitionerscounsel,therewasjurisdictionalinfirmity.Aftertheissuanceofthewarrants
ofarrestandthebailfixedatP600,petitionerpostedthebailbond,thusobtainingher
provisional liberty. The City Fiscal in this case did not disagree with the judges
investigation,andagreedwiththecomplaintsfiled.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionerscontentionsaretobegivenmerit.

Held:

BasedonmanyprecedentcasesoftheSupremeCourt,wheretheaccusedhasfiledbail
andwaivedthepreliminaryinvestigationproper,hehaswaivedwhateverdefect,ifany,
266

P.J.G.

in the preliminary examination conducted prior to the issuance of the warrant of


arrest. In the case at bar, it is futile for the petitioner to question the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, because she posted the bail bond. Petitioner also
erred in arguing that only the City Fiscal can conduct a preliminary investigation.
According to the Charterofthe City of Dagupan, theCity Court of Dagupan Citymay
also conduct preliminary investigation for any offense, without regard to the limits of
punishment,andmayrelease,orcommitandbindoveranypersonchargedwithsuch
offense to secure his appearance before the proper court. Petition for certiorari is
denied.RestrainingorderissuedbytheCourtisliftedandsetaside.

TATADVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[159SCRA70;G.R.NOS.L7233539;21MAR1988]

Facts:

Thecomplainant,AntoniodelosReyes,originallyfiledwhathetermed"areport"with
theLegalPanelofthePresidentialSecurityCommand(PSC)onOctober1974,containing
charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public
Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the
PSCuntiltheendof1979whenitbecamewidelyknownthatSecretary(thenMinister)
Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On
December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal
complaintfiledwiththeTanodbayan.TheTanodbayanactedonthecomplaintonApril
1,1980whichwasaroundtwomonthsafterpetitionerTatad'sresignationwasaccepted
byPres.MarcosbyreferringthecomplainttotheCIS,PresidentialSecurityCommand,
for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the
Tanodbayan,recommendingthefilingofchargesforgraftandcorruptpracticesagainst
former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and
counteraffidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan.
However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the
Tanodbayan.FivecriminalinformationswerefiledwiththeSandiganbayanonJune12,
1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for
giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brotherinlaw, unwarranted
benefits,advantageorpreferenceinthedischargeofhisofficialfunctions;(2)Violation
of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar,
President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the
releaseofacheckofP588,000.00tosaidcorporationforprintingservicesrenderedfor
theConstitutionalConventionReferendumin1973;(3)ViolationofSection7onthree
267

P.J.G.

(3)countsforhis failure tofilehis Statement of Assets and Liabilities for thecalendar


years1973,1976and1978.Amotiontoquashtheinformationwasmadeallegingthat
the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
dispositionofthecasesfiledagainsthim.Itwasdeniedhencetheappeal.

Issue:

Whetherornotpetitionerwasdeprivedofhisrightsasanaccused.

Held:

YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated.
Firstly,thecomplaintcametolife,asitwere,onlyafterpetitionerTatadhadafallingout
withPresidentMarcos.Secondly,departingfromestablishedproceduresprescribedby
law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and
counteraffidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding
investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a tenday period for the
prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its
termination.Whileweagreewiththerespondentcourtthatthisperiodfixedbylawis
merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored
completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be
deemedreasonableorjustifiableinthelightofthecircumstanceobtaininginthecaseat
bar.

GALMANVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[144SCRA43;G.R.NO.72670;12SEP1986]

Facts:

Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his
planethathadjustlandedattheManilaInternationalAirport.Hisbrainwassmashedby
a bullet fired pointblank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino
(whoseidentitywasthensupposedtobeunknownandwasrevealedonlydayslateras
268

P.J.G.

RolandoGalman)wasacommunisthiredgunman,andthatthemilitaryescortsgunned
himdowninturn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large
masses of people who joined in the tenday period of national mourning yearning for
thetruth,justiceandfreedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
versionstating that "theevidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have
shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report
found all the twentysix private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case
involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would
excludenineteenofthem.

ThenPres.MarcosstatedthatevidenceshowsthatGalmanwasthekiller.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decisioninthetwocriminalcasesbeforeit,theCourtresolvedbyninetotwovotes11
toissuetherestrainingorderprayedfor.TheCourtalsograntedpetitionersafiveday
periodtofileareplytorespondents'separatecommentsandrespondentTanodbayana
threedayperiodtosubmitacopyofhis84pagememorandumfortheprosecution.

Buttendayslater,theCourtbythesameninetotwovoteratioinreverse,resolvedto
dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayanfromrenderingitsdecision.ThesameCourtmajoritydeniedpetitioners'
motion for a new 5day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandumfortheprosecution(whichapparentlywasnotservedonthem).

Thus,petitionersfiledamotionforreconsideration,allegingthatthedismissaldidnot
indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full
hearingonthemeritsthatthepeopleareentitledtodueprocess.

However,respondentSandiganbayanissueditsdecisionacquittingalltheaccusedofthe
crimecharged,declaringtheminnocentandtotallyabsolvingthemofanycivilliability.
Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant
case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied
petitioners'motionforreconsiderationforlackofmerit.
269

P.J.G.

Hence,petitionersfiledtheirmotiontoadmittheirsecondmotionforreconsideration
alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resultinginmiscarriageofjusticeandgrossviolationoftheconstitutionalrightsofthe
petitionersandthesovereignpeopleofthePhilippinestodueprocessoflaw.

Issue:

Whetherornotpetitionerwasdeprivedofhisrightsasanaccused.

Whetherornottherewasaviolationofthedoublejeopardyclause.

Held:

Petitioners'secondmotionforreconsiderationisgrantedandorderingaretrialofthe
saidcaseswhichshouldbeconductedwithdeliberatedispatchandwithcarefulregard
fortherequirementsofdueprocess.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former
Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the AquinoGalman murder case.
Malacaangwanteddismissaltotheextentthatapreparedresolutionwassenttothe
Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the
former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran,
(First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro
werewiththePresident.Theconfereesweretoldtotakethebackdooringoingtothe
roomwherethemeeting was held, presumably toescapenotice bythe visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moromoro na lamang
kayo;'andthatontheirwayoutoftheroomPres.Marcosexpressedhisthankstothe
groupanduttered'Iknowhowtoreciprocate'.

TheCourtthensaidthatthethenPresident(codenamedOlympus)hadstagemanaged
inandfromMalacaangPalace"ascriptedandpredeterminedmannerofhandlingand
disposingoftheAquinoGalmanmurdercase;"andthat"theprosecutionintheAquino
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
270

P.J.G.

compulsionofsomepressure which provedto be beyondtheircapacitytoresist.Also


predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twentysix
respondentsaccusedofallcriminalandcivilliability.Pres.Marcoscameupwithapublic
statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military
escorts,butbyacommunisthiredgun.Itwas,therefore,notasourceofwonderthat
President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a
procedurewouldbeabetterarrangementbecause,iftheaccusedarechargedincourt
and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear
whenPresidentMarcosisnolongerinoffice.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J.
Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in
power.TheassignmentofthecasetoPresidingJusticePamaran;noevidenceatallthat
the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of
proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The
partialityofSandiganbayanbetrayedbyitsdecision:ThatPresidentMarcoshadwanted
all of the twentysix accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its
decision,theSandiganbayanoverdiditselfinfavoringthepresidentialdirective.Itsbias
andpartialityinfavoroftheaccusedwasclearlyobvious.Theevidencepresentedbythe
prosecutionwastotallyignoredanddisregarded.

TherecordshowsthatthethenPresidentmisusedtheoverwhelmingresourcesofthe
governmentandhisauthoritarianpowerstocorruptandmakeamockeryofthejudicial
processintheAquinoGalmanmurdercases."Thisistheevilofonemanruleatitsvery
worst."OurPenalCodepenalizes"anyexecutiveofficerwhoshalladdressanyorderor
suggestiontoanyjudicialauthoritywithrespecttoanycaseorbusinesscomingwithin
theexclusivejurisdictionofthecourtsofjustice."

Impartialcourtistheveryessenceofdueprocessoflaw.Thiscriminalcollusionastothe
handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completelydisqualifiedrespondentSandiganbayanandvoidedabinitioitsverdict.The
courtswouldhavenoreasontoexistiftheywereallowedtobeusedasmeretoolsof
271

P.J.G.

injustice,deceptionandduplicitytosubvertandsuppressthetruth.Moreso,inthecase
atbarwherethepeopleandtheworldareentitledtoknowthetruth,andtheintegrity
ofourjudicialsystemisatstake.

Therewasnodoublejeopardy.Courts'Resolutionofacquittalwasavoidjudgmentfor
havingbeenissuedwithoutjurisdiction.Nodoublejeopardyattaches,therefore.Avoid
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
bindsnorbarsanyone.Allactsandallclaimsflowingoutofitarevoid.

MotiontoDisqualify/Inhibitshouldhavebeenresolvedahead.Inthiscase,petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the
TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken
cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total
absolutionofalltheaccusedpendingthefinalactionofthisCourt.Alloftheactsofthe
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdictionwhichsubstantivelyprejudicedthepetitioner.

Withthedeclarationofnullityoftheproceedings,thecasesmustnowbetriedbefore
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face
trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutorwithalldueprocess.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our
system of government,is tofill the public posts. Justices and judgesmust everrealize
thattheyhavenoconstituency,servenomajoritynorminoritybutserveonlythepublic
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitutionandtheirownconscienceandhonor.

PEOPLEVS.DRAMAYO
[42SCRA60;G.R.L21325;29OCT1971]

Facts:

DramayobroughtuptheideaofkillingEstelitoNogalizasothathecouldnottestifyin
the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to
ambushEstelito,whowasreturningfromSapao.Theothersweretostationthemselves
272

P.J.G.

nearby. Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the
appeal

Issue:

Whetherornottheaccusedscriminalliabilityprovedbeyondreasonabledoubt.

Held:
Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of innocence. So it
must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants.
Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is
incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
evencalleduponthentoofferevidenceontheirbehalf.Theirfreedomisforfeitonlyif
therequisitequantumofproofnecessaryforconvictionbeinexistence.Theirguiltbe
shown beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty. "By
reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such
investigation,toletthemind resteasy uponthe certainty ofguilt.Absolutecertainof
guiltisnotdemandedbythelawtoconvictofanycarnalchargebutmoralcertaintyis
required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof regular to
constitutetheoffense."

Thejudgmentofconvictionshouldnothaveoccasionedanysurpriseonthepartofthe
two appellants,asfromthe evidence deserving ofthefullest credence,their guilt had
beenmorethanamplydemonstrated.Thepresumptionofinnocencecouldnotcometo
theirrescueasitwasmorethansufficientlyovercomebytheproofthatwasofferedby
the prosecution. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It must be
stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases
where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the
element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties,
responsiblefortheoffenseguiltyofthecrimecharged,amoralcertaintyhavingarisen
astotheircapability.

DUMLAOVS.COMELEC
[95SCRA392;L52245;22JAN1980]

Facts:

273

P.J.G.

PetitionerDumlaoquestionstheconstitutionalityofSec.4ofBatasPambansaBlg52as
discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the
Constitution.Sec.4providesthatanyretiredelectiveprovicialormunicipalofficialwho
hasreceivedpaymentsofretirementbenefitsandshallhavebeen65yearsofageatthe
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualifiedtorunforthesameelectivelocalofficefromwhichhehasretired.According
toDumlao,theprovisionamountstoclasslegislation.PetitionersIgotandSalapantanJr.
alsoassailthevalidityofSec.4ofBatasPambansaBlg52,whichstatesthatanyperson
who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to
subversion,insurrection,rebellion,orothersimilarcrimes,shallnotbequalifiedforany
of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein:
providedthatajudgmentofconvictionofthosecrimesshallbeconclusiveevidenceof
suchfactandthefilingofchargesforthecommissionofsuchcrimesbeforeacivilcourt
ormilitarytribunalafterpreliminaryinvestigationshallbeprimafacieevidenceofsuch
fact.

Issue:

Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and
thus,shouldbedeclarednullandvoid

Held:

In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains


constitutionalandvalid.Theconstitutionalguaranteeofequalprotectionofthelawsis
subjecttorationalclassification.Oneclasscanbetreateddifferentlyfromanotherclass.
In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger
employees.The purposeof the provision is to satisfy the need for new bloodin the
workplace.InregardstothesecondparagraphofSec.4,itshouldbedeclarednulland
voidforbeingviolativeoftheconstitutionalpresumptionofinnocenceguaranteedtoan
accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
righttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel(ArticleIV,section19,1973Constitution).An
accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidateisdisqualifiedfromrunningforpublicofficeonthegroundalonethatcharges
havebeenfiledagainsthimbeforeacivilormilitarytribunal.Itcondemnsbeforeoneis
fullyheard.Inultimateeffect,exceptastothedegreeofproof,nodistinctionismade
between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have
274

P.J.G.

beenfiledforsuchacts,asbothofthemwouldbeineligibletorunforpublicoffice.A
persondisqualifiedtorunforpublicofficeonthegroundthatchargeshavebeenfiled
againsthimisvirtuallyplacedinthesamecategoryasapersonalreadyconvictedofa
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspensionoftherighttoholdofficeduringthetermofthesentence(Art.44,Revised
PenalCode).

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore,mayberebutted,yet.thereis"clearandpresentdanger"thatbecauseofthe
proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Additionally,itisbestthatevidenceproandconofactsofdisloyaltybeairedbeforethe
Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly
possibleconflictoffindingsbetweentwogovernmentbodies,totheextremedetriment
ofapersoncharged,willtherebybeavoided.Furthermore,alegislative/administrative
determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that
objectionableportionismandated.Itisseparable fromthefirstportionofthesecond
paragraphofsection4ofBatasPambansaBig.52whichcanstandbyitself.

Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby


declaredvalidandthatportionofthesecondparagraphofsection4ofBatasPambansa
Bilang 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumptionofinnocenceguaranteedtoanaccused.

PEOPLEVS.ALCANTARA
[240SCRA122;G.R.NO.91283;17JAN1995]

Facts:

On July 19, 1988, Venancio Patricio, accompanied by Larry Salvador, drove a ten
wheelertruckaCocaColaplantinAntipolotoloadcasesofsoftdrinks.Theywereabout
toleavetheplantat10:00pmwhenseveralmenapproachedthemtohitchforaride.
Ascertaining that Salvador knew appellant, Venancio accommodated appellant's
request.Appellanthadfourcompanions.AtOrtigasAve.,oneofthempokedagunat
Venancioandgrabbedthesteeringwheel.Atthe NorthDiversionRoad,Venancioand
275

P.J.G.

Salvador(helper) were brought down from the vehicle and tied to the fence of the
expressway,thereaftertheywerestabbedandleftbleedingtodeath.Venanciosurvived
but Salvador did not.Appellant was arrested in the vicinity of Otis Street in Pandacan,
Manila.Afewdayslater,hewasturnedovertotheConstabularyHighwayPatrolGroup.
Sgt.AlbertoAwananbroughttheappellanttotheMCUhospitalandwaspresentedto
Venancioforidentification.AppellantwasbroughttotheHeadquartersatCampCrame
whereheconfessed.

AppelantsDefense:Denialandalibi.Hesaidthathewasjustapplyingtobeadriverand
stayedthereevenifhewastoldthatnoworkwasavailable,toconfirmwiththetruck
drivers. While he was applying for CONCEPCION TRUCKING located across Otis street
fromtheCocacolaplant.Hewasarrested.Hedeniedanyknowledgeofthe"hit"onthe
Cocacoladeliverytruck.Heremainedinthecustodyofthepolicefortwodaysandtwo
nights. On the third day of his detention, he was turned over to the Constabulary
HighwayPatrolGroup.AppellantwasthebroughttotheMCUhospital.Hewasmadeto
confrontVenanciowhomhesawforthefirsttime.CHPGSgt.AwananaskedVenancio
twice if appellant was among those who hijacked the truck he was driving. On both
times, Venancio did not respond. Undaunted, Sgt. Awanan, called to a photographer
present,forcedappellanttostandaboutafootfromVenancio,andtoldthelattertojust
pointatthesuspect."Bastaituromolang,"Sgt.Awanandirected.Venancioobeyed,and
pictures of him pointing to the suspect were taken. From the hospital, appellant was
brought to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group headquarters at Camp Crame.
Withoutbeingapprisedofhisrightsnorprovidedwithcounsel,hewasinterrogatedand
urgedtoconfesshisguilt.Hebalked.Atteno'clockthatnight,hoursafterquestioning
began,appellant'sinterrogatorsstartedboxinghimandkickinghim.Hewasalsohiton
the back with a chair, and electrocuted. Still, he refused to admit to the crime. In the
midst of his ordeal, appellant heard someone say, "Tubigan na iyan." He was then
blindfoldedandbroughttoanotherroomwherehewasmadetoliedown.Waterwas
slowlyandcontinuouslypouredonhisface,overhismouth.Appellantcouldnolonger
bearthepaincausedbythewatertreatment.Finally,heconfessedtobeingoneofthe
hijackers. He was led to another room, where he was handcuffed and left until the
following day. Later, he was made to sign prepared statements containing his full
confession.

Alcantara was arraigned under an information charging him and four others (at large)
withthecrimeofrobberywithHomicideandFrustratedHomicide.

The trial court convicted the accused despite the following inconsistency between
Venanciosaffidavitandtestimony:
276

P.J.G.

Affidavit

Testimony
1.mentioned5assailants

onlyAlcantarawasidentified
2.stabbingwasprecededbya

only3assailantshada
3.conferencebyallassailants

conference
4.claimedtohaveallowedassailants

failedtoidentifyAlcantara
5.tohitcharidebecauseAlcantara

atthehospitalandinopen
6.wasfamiliartothem

court(pointedtoanotherperson)

Issue:

Whetherornottherightsoftheaccusedwasviolated.

Held:

YES. The peoples evidence failed to meet the quantum required to overcome the
presumption.ThesecondidentificationwhichcorrectlypointedtoaccusedbyVenancio
shouldnotbecredited.Thereisnoreasonforhimtoerrastheyknoweachotherfor3
years.ItwasalsoincorrecttogivetoomuchweighttoPoliceSgt.Awananstestimonyas
tothepreviousidentificationatthehospital.ThetestimonyofSgt.Awananwasnot
corroboratedbyVenancio.

Theidentificationprocedurewasirregular.Dueprocessdemandsthattheidentification
procedure of criminal suspects must be free from impermissible suggestions as the
influence of improper suggestion probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice
than any other single factor. Conviction must be based on the strength of the
prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. There was blatant violation of the
constitutionalrightsofappellantasanaccused.Appellantbelongstotheeconomically
deprived in our society. He is nearly illiterate(third grade education). Our Constitution
andourlawsstrictlyordaintheirprotectionfollowingtheMagsaysaydesideratumthat
thosewhohavelessinlifeshouldhavemoreinlaw.

CORPUZVS.REPUBLIC
[194SCRA73;G.R.NO.74259;14FEB1991]

Facts:
277

P.J.G.

Generoso Corpuz is the Supervising Accounting Clerk in the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Nueva Viscaya. He was designated Acting Supervising Cashier in the said
office.Inthiscapacity,hereceivedcollections,disbursedfundsandmadebankdeposits
andwithdrawalspertainingtogovernmentaccounts.OnApril13,1981hisdesignation
as Acting Supervising Cashier was terminated and a transfer of accountabilities was
effectedbetweenhimandhissuccessor.TheCertificateofturnoverrevealedashortage
ofP72,823.00.HewasabletopayonlyP10,159.50.Afterafinaldemandletterforthe
total of P50,596.07 which was not met, a case of malversation was filed against him.
Corpuzdidnotdenysuchfactsbutheinsiststhattheshortagewasmalversedbyother
persons. He alleged that Paymaster Diosdado Pineda through 1 of 4 separate checks
(PNB) issued and encashed such checks while he was of leave. Also, Acting Deputy
Provincial Treasurer Bernardo Aluning made to post the amount on his cashbook
althoughhehadnotreceivedthesaidamount.HewasconvictedinSandiganbayan.

Issue:

WhetherorNotCorpuzisguiltyofmalversation.

Held:

Itisasubtlewayofcamouflagingtheembezzlementofthemoneyequivalentwhen1of
the 4 checks issued and encashed in the same day was entered in the accuseds cash
book 3 months after such encashments. Also, Corpuz claim that he was absent when
PaymasterDiosdadoPinedathrough1of4separatechecks(PNB)issuedandencashed
suchchecks,wasnotproven.

PostAuditisnotapreliminaryrequirementtofilingamalversationcase.Thefailureof
thepublicofficertohavedulyforthcominganypublicfundswithwhichheischargeable,
upondemandbyanauthorizedofficershallbeaprimafacieevidencethathehasput
suchmissingfundstopersonaluse.

Theequipoiserule(balancingtest)whichisthepresumptionofinnocenceisapplicable
only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balance, in which case the scale of
justiceshouldbetiltinfavoroftheaccused.Thereisnosuchbalanceinthecaseatbar.
The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the
petitioner with his claims. The presumed innocence must yield to the positive finding
thatheisguiltyofmalversation.

278

P.J.G.

Wherefore his petition is denied. He is guilty as principal of Malversation of Public


Funds.

PEOPLEVS.HOLGADO
[85PHIL752;G.R.L2809;22MAR1950]

Facts:

Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slightillegaldetentionbecauseaccordingtotheinformation,beingaprivateperson,he
did"feloniouslyandwithoutjustifiablemotive,kidnapanddetainoneArtemiaFabreag
in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia
Fabreagofherpersonalliberty.Hepleadedguilty(withoutacounsel)andsaidthathe
was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the
latter.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherewasanyirregularityintheproceedingsinthetrialcourt.

Held:

Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he
mustbeinformedbythecourtthatitishisrighttohaveattorneybeingarraigned.,and
mustbeaskedifhedesirestheaidofattorney,theCourtmustassignattorneydeoficio
to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was
violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall
enjoytherighttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel."Incriminalcasestherecanbeno
fairhearingunlesstheaccusedbegiventheopportunitytobeheardbycounsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused.
TherecorddoesnotshowwhetherthesupposedinstructionsofMr.Ocampowasreal
andwhetherithadreferencetothecommissionoftheoffenseortothemakingofthe
pleaguilty.Noinvestigationwasopenedbythecourtonthismatterinthepresenceof
theaccusedandthereisnownowayofdeterminingwhetherthesupposedinstruction
is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the
court became satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr.
279

P.J.G.

Ocampoandfoundthatthesamehadnothingtodowiththiscase.Suchattitudeofthe
court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not
sufficient toovercomeaqualified plea oftheaccused.But aboveall, thecourtshould
have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the
qualifiedpleagivenbyhimandtheseriousnessoftheoffensefoundtobecapitalbythe
court.

PEOPLEVS.MAGSI
[124SCRA64;G.R.NO.L32888;12AUG1983]

Facts:

Soon after appellant was apprehended on August 20, 1970, his arraignment was
scheduled before the Criminal Circuit Court of San Fernando, La Union. The case was
actuallysetandrescheduledforsix(6)times,firstofwhichwasonAugust1,1970.On
thatdate,despiteappointmentbythecourtofAtty.MarioRiveraasdeofficiocounsel
fortheaccused,hearingwasresettoSeptember8,1970onmotionofAtty.Rivera,who
waspromptedtoaskforitbecauseofaccuseddesiretoberepresentedbyadeparte
counsel.Priortothenexthearing,Atty.Riveramovedtowithdrawasdeofficiocounsel
anditwasfavorablyactedonbythecourtonSeptember7,1970.Atthesecondhearing
on September 8, 1970, for failure of the de officio and de parte counsels to appear,
despiteasecondcallofthecase,thehearingwasresetforthenextdayandthecourt
appointed Atty. Dominador Cariaso de officio counsel for the accused. On the third
hearing date, neither the de parte nor the de officio counsel was in Court, so Atty.
Rivera was reappointed that day as de officio counsel for arraignment purposes only.
TheaccuseddelRosarioenteredapleaofguiltybutqualifieditwiththeallegationthat
he committed the crime out of fear of his coaccused Eloy Magsi and the other
coaccused.Appellantwasfoundguiltyofmurderandmadetosufferthedeathpenalty.

Issue:

Whetherornottherewasaviolationoftherightsoftheaccused.

Held:

YES. The desire to speed up the disposition of cases should not be effected at the
sacrificeofthebasicrightsoftheaccused.CitingPeoplevs.Domingo(55SCRA243244):
thetrialcourtsshouldexercisesolicitouscarebeforesentencingtheaccusedonaplea
280

P.J.G.

ofguiltyespeciallyincapitaloffensesbyfirstinsuringthattheaccusedfullyunderstands
thegravityoftheoffense,theseverityoftheconsequencesattachedtheretoaswellas
themeaningandsignificanceofhispleaofguilty;andthattheprudentandproperthing
todoincapitalcasesistotaketestimony,toassurethecourtthattheaccusedhasnot
misunderstoodthenatureandeffectofhispleaofguilty.Mereproformaappointment
of de officio counsel, who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused,
resetting of hearing by the court for alleged reception of evidence when in fact none
wasconducted,perfunctoryqueriesaddressedtotheaccusedwhetherheunderstands
thechargesandthegravityofthepenalty,arenotsufficientcompliance.

SORIANOVS.SANDIGANBAYAN
[131SCRA184;G.R.NO.L65952;31JUL1984]

Facts:

Tanwasaccusedofqualifiedtheft.Thepetitioner,whowasanAsst.Fiscal,wasassigned
to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from
Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an
entrapment.TanwasgivenaPhp.2000,markedbill,andhehadsuppliedtheotherhalf.
TheentrapmentsucceededandaninformationwasfiledwiththeSandiganbayan.After
trial,theSandiganbayanrenderedadecisionfindingthepetitionerguiltyasaprincipalin
violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for
reconsiderationwasdeniedbytheSandiganbayan,hencethisinstantpetition.

Issue:

Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as


contractortransactionwithinthepurviewof.RA.3019.

Held:

R.A.3019Sec.3.CorruptpracticesofpublicofficersInadditiontoactsoromissionsof
publicofficersalreadypenalizedbyexistinglaws,thefollowingshallconstitutecorrupt
practicesofanypublicofficerandareherebydeclaredtobeunlawful:xxxb.Directlyor
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage or benefit, for
himselforforotherperson,inconnectionwithanycontractortransactionbetweenthe
281

P.J.G.

Govt. and any other party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
interveneunderthelaw.

ThepetitionerstatedthatthefactsmakeoutacaseofdirectbriberyunderArt.210of
theRPCandnotaviolationofR.A.3019sec.3(b).Theoffenseofdirectbriberyisnotthe
offensechargedandisnotincludedintheoffensechargedwhichisviolationofR.A.3019
sec.3(b).

Therespondentclaimedthat,transactionasusedhereof,isnotlimitedtocommercialor
businesstransaction,butincludesallkindsoftransactionwhethercommercial,civil,or
administrativeinnature.

Thecourt agreeswiththe petitioner. It is obvious that the investigation conducted by


thepetitionerwasneitheracontractnortransaction.Atransactionlikeacontractisone
whichinvolvessomeconsiderationasincredittransactions.Andthiselementisabsent
intheinvestigationconductedbythepetitioner.

Judgmentmodified.PetitionerisguiltyofdirectbriberyunderArt.210oftheRPC.

BORJAVS.MENDOZA
[77SCRA422;G.R.NO.L45667;20JUN1977]

Facts:

Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not
arraigned.Thatnotwithstanding,respondentJudgeSeniningproceededwiththetrialin
absentiaandrenderedadecisionfindingpetitionerguiltyofthecrimecharged.Thecase
was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge
Mendoza.Itwasallegedthatthefailuretoarraignhimisaviolationofhisconstitutional
rights. It was also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring
him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The
Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled because there was
noarraignment.

Issue:

282

P.J.G.

Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not
arraigned.

Held:

Yes.Proceduraldueprocessrequiresthattheaccusedbearraignedsothathemaybe
informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be
convictedonlyonashowingthathisguiltisshownbeyondreasonabledoubtwithfull
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that
requiresanarraignment.ItisrequiredintheRulesthatanaccused,forthefirsttime,is
grantedtheopportunitytoknowtheprecisechargethatconfrontshim.Itisimperative
thatheisthusmadefullyawareofpossiblelossoffreedom,evenofhislife,depending
on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he must be fully
informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being
arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also,
respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an
arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and
counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with
petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The
absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of
dueprocesstoensureafairandimpartialtrial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge
RomuloR.SeniningdatedDecember28,1973,findingtheaccusedguiltyofthecrimeof
slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent
JudgeRafaelT.MendozadatedNovember16,1976,affirmingtheaforesaiddecisionof
JudgeSenining,isnullifiedandsetaside.ThecaseisremandedtotheCityCourtofCebu
for the prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and
observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of
petitioner.

CONDEVS.RIVERA
[45PHIL650;G.R.NO.21741;25JAN1924]

Facts:

283

P.J.G.

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has
appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different
occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the
SupremeCourtforprotection,andnow,afterthepassageofmorethanoneyearfrom
the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite
resolutionofhertroublesasshewaswhenoriginallycharged.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionerhasbeendeniedherrighttoaspeedyandimpartialtrial.

Held:

Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutionstheaccusedshallenjoytherighttohaveaspeedytrial.AureliaConde,like
allotheraccusedpersons,hasarighttoaspeedytrialinorderthatifinnocentshemay
go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the
legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
periodoftime,asinthisinstanceformorethanayear,theaccusedisentitledtorelief
by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be
restrainedofhisliberty,byhabeascorpustoobtainhisfreedom.

PEOPLEVS.TAMPAL
[244SCRA202;G.R.NO.102485;22MAY1995]

Facts:

Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel Padumon, Pablito Suco,
Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were charged of robbery with homicide and multiple
serious physical injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon. Wilfredo
Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only private respondents, Luis Tampal,
DomingoPadumon,ArsenioPadumon, andSamuelPadumonwerearrested,whilethe
othersremainedatlarge.

The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
WilfredoGuanteromovedforpostponementduetohisfailuretocontactthematerial
284

P.J.G.

witnesses.Thecasewasresetwithoutanyobjectionfromthedefensecounsel.Thecase
wascalledonSeptember20,1991buttheprosecutorwasnotpresent.Therespondent
judge considered the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the
criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was because such date was a Muslim
holidayandtheofficeoftheProvincialprosecutorwasclosedonthatday.Themotion
wasdeniedbyrespondentjudge.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthepostponementisaviolationoftherightoftheaccusedtoaspeedy
dispositionoftheircases.

WhetherorNotthedismissalservesasabartoreinstatementofthecase.

Held:

Indeterminingtherightofanaccusedtospeedydispositionoftheircase,courtsshould
do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduledhearingsofthecase.Whatareviolativeoftherightoftheaccusedtospeedy
trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial for an unreasonable length of
time.Inthefactsabove,therewasnoshowingthattherewasanunjustdelaycausedby
theprosecution,hence,therespondentjudgeshouldhavegiventheprosecutionafair
opportunitytoprosecuteitscase.

The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double jeopardy. In several
casesitwasheldthatdismissalonthegroundsoffailuretoprosecuteisequivalenttoan
acquittalthatwouldbaranotherprosecutionforthesameoffense,butinthiscase,this
does not apply, considering that the rights of the accused to a speedy trial was not
violated by the State. Therefore, the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is
remandedtothecourtoforiginforfurtherproceedings.

REPUBLICACTNO.8493THESPEEDYTRIALACT

The arraignment of an accused shall be held within 30 days from filing of the
information, or from the date the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or
court in which the charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. Thereafter, where a
pleaofnotguiltyisentered,theaccusedshallhaveatleast15daystopreparefortrial.
285

P.J.G.

Trialshallcommencewithin30daysfromarraignmentasfixedbythecourt.Innocase
shalltheentiretrialperiodexceed180daysfromthe1stdayoftrial,exceptasotherwise
authorizedbytheChiefJusticeoftheSupremeCourt.

RE:REQUESTFORLIVETVOFTRIALOFJOSEPHESTRADA
[360SCRA248;A.M.NO01403SC;29JUN2001]

Facts:

TheKapisananngmgaBrodkasterngPilipinas(KBP)sentaletterrequestingtheCourtto
allowlivemediacoverageoftheanticipatedtrialoftheplunderandothercriminalcases
filedagainstformerPresidentJosephE.EstradabeforetheSandiganbayaninorder"to
assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in
our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by
SenatorRenatoCayetanoandAttorneyRicardoRomulo.

Issue:

WhetherorNotlivemediacoverageofthetrialoftheplunderandothercriminalcases
filedagainstformerPresidentJosephE.Estradashouldbepermittedbythecourt.

Held:

Theproprietyofgrantingordenyingtheinstantpetitioninvolvetheweighingoutofthe
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information,
on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its
proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one
another,jurisprudencetellsusthattherightoftheaccusedmustbepreferredtowin.

Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is
proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of
publics attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside
forceorinfluencebutonlybeevidenceandargumentgiveninopencourt,wherefitting
dignityandcalmambianceisdemanded.

Anaccusedhasarighttoapublictrialbutitisarightthatbelongstohim,morethan
anyoneelse,wherehislifeorlibertycanbeheldcriticallyinbalance.Apublictrialaims
toensurethatheisfairlydealtwithandwouldnotbeunjustlycondemnedandthathis
286

P.J.G.

rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymouswithpublicizedtrial,itonlyimpliesthatthecourtdoorsmustbeopento
those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum
andobservethetrialprocess.

Thecourtsrecognizetheconstitutionallyembodiedfreedomofthepressandtheright
to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most
accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public.
Nevertheless,withinthecourthouse,theoverridingconsiderationisstilltheparamount
rightoftheaccusedtodueprocesswhichmustneverbeallowedtosufferdiminutionin
itsconstitutionalproportions.

PEOPLEVS.SALAS
[143SCRA163;G.R.NO.L66469;29JUL1986]

Facts:

Atabout6:00o'clockinthemorningofMarch6,1992,a60yearoldwoman,identified
asVirginiaTalenswasfoundlyingdeadinacanalatBo.SanNicolas,Mexico,Pampanga;
shewaslastseenaliveatabout3:00o'clockearlymorningofMarch6,1992byOrlando
Pangan andRichard Panganwho werewith her going home coming from the wakeof
oneLeonardoFlores;bothOrlandoandRichardPangantestifiedthataccusedwaswith
themingoinghomeatabout3:00o'clockinthemorningofMarch6,1992;Orlandoand
RichardPanganreachedfirsttheirhouseandleftthetwoonthewayandthatwasthe
lasttimeVirginiawasseenalive;justafewminutesafterreachinghishouseandwhile
insidehishouse,OrlandoPanganheardashout;anotherwoman,oneSerafiaGutierrez,
testifiedthatshelikewisewasawakenedbyashoutatabout3:00inthemorning;Dr.
Agudawhoautopsiedthevictimfoundhematomaontheheadandchest,anabrasion
ontheleftchinandstabwoundonthe neckwhichstabwound,thedoctorclaims,was
the cause of death of the victim; Police Investigator Gonzales who immediately
respondeduponreport,recoveredatthesceneapin,thevictim'swristwatch,earring,a
ring and P135.00 money; he likewise found on March 9, 1992 when he continued his
investigationbloodstainonthefrontdoorofthehouseoftheaccusedwhichbloodstain
when submitted for examination was found to be of human blood; one Resultay was
withVirginiaTalensatabout5:00afternoonofMarch5,1992ingoingtothewake,who
claimsthatVirginiahadmoneyonapurseaswhiletheywereonthewayVirginiabeton
ajuetengshesawVirginiagotmoneyfromherpurseaP500.00billbutasshehadno
change she instead took P8.00 from her other pocket; one Ramil Talens, a son of the
287

P.J.G.

victimcorroboratedtheclaimofResultaythatVirginiahadwithheratthattimemoney
worthP2,000.00asinthemorningofMarch5,1992hegavehermotherforsafekeeping
thesumofP1,500.00whichheclaimshismotherplacedinherpurseandclaimsfurther
thatatthewake,heaskedandwasgivenP50.00byhismotherashealsoparticipatedin
thegamblingthereat,however,thepurseofVirginiacontainingaboutP2,000.00wasno
longer to be found when she was found dead; Orlando Pangan saw the accused
gambledinthewake;Virginialikewisegambledatthewake;accusedhadbeenworking
forthreedaysbeforeMarch6atSta.Ana,PampangaanduptoMarch5,1992,butthe
followingday,hedidnotanymorereportforworkatSta.Ana,Pampanga,wasnolonger
tobefoundandwaslastseenatabout3:00morningtogetherwithVirginiaTalenson
theirwayhomecomingfromthewake;theparentsof[the]accusedwereinformedby
Investigator Gonzales that their son was the suspect and adviced them to surrender
him,butsinceMarch6,1992whenaccusedleftMexico,Pampanga,hereturnedonlyon
September 19, 1992 at Arayat, Pampanga, not at Mexico, Pampanga where he was
ultimatelyapprehendedbytheMexicoPoliceonSeptember22,1992afterchancingon
aradiomessagebythepoliceofArayattotheirProvincialcommanderthatavehicular
incidentoccurredatArayat,PampangawhereoneElmerSalaswasthevictimandwas
hospitalized at the district hospital at Arayat, Pampanga where he used the name of
RommelSalasandnotElmerSalas.ThetrialcourtrenderedconvictingSalasforRobbery
withHomicide

Issue:

WhetherorNotthereisevidencesufficienttosustainaconvictionoftheappellantof
thecrimeofRobberywithHomicide.

WhetherorNottheappellantscrimehomicideorrobberywithhomicide.

Held:

There was no eyewitness or direct evidence; either to the robbery or to the homicide
andnoneofthethingsallegedlystolenwereeverrecovered.However,directevidence
isnottheonlymatrixfromwhichthetrialcourtmaydrawitsfindingsandconclusionof
culpability. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct
testimonywouldresultinsettingfelonsfree.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the


circumstancesmustbeconsistentwitheachother,consistentwiththetheorythatthe
accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the
288

P.J.G.

hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis
excepting that ofguilt. Allthe circumstances established must constitute anunbroken
chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the
accused,totheexclusionofallotherpersons,astheauthorofthecrime.Thefactsand
circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his
innocence can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be
deemedtosurpassevendirectevidenceinitseffectonthecourt.

The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992.
Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his
residence since childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co
worker and barrio mate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant's house to fetch him for
workataround6:30to7:00a.m.ofMarch6,1992.Appellantalsoabandonedhisjobas
a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving
behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date. Police
investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant's house, on his
clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed. Despite efforts of the
policetofindappellantastheprincipalsuspect,afactknowntoappellant'sfamilyand
neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the authorities. Appellant was
apprehended only a full six months after the date of the crime, following his
confinementinahospitalinArayat,PampangabecausehewassideswipedbyaVictory
LinerbusinArayat.Whenhospitalized,appellantusedthealiasRommelSalas,instead
of his true name Elmer Salas. These circumstances denote flight, which when
unexplained,hasalwaysbeenconsideredbythecourtsasindicativeofguilt.

Bothappellantandvictimgambledatthewaketheyattended.Thevictimwas,infact,
enjoyingawinningstreakwhenherson,RamilTalens,cametofetchherbutwhichhe
failed to do because his mother was winning, and she refused to leave. The purse of
Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab
wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the
missingpursetoherclothes.

Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of


nonculpability to merit credibility. Denial is negative and selfserving and cannot be
given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who
positivelytestifiedthatappellantwasatthelocuscriminisandwasthelastpersonseen
withthevictimalive.

289

P.J.G.

The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal
witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to
buttresstheconclusionthatnosuchimpropermotiveexistsandthatthetestimonyof
saidwitnessesdeservefullfaithandcredit.

Theessenceofvoluntarysurrenderisspontaneityandtheintentoftheaccusedtogive
himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he
acknowledgeshisguiltorhewantstosavetheStatethetroubleofhavingtoeffecthis
arrest.Spontaneityandintenttogiveone'sselfupareabsentwheretheaccusedwent
intohidingforsixmonthsaftertheincidentandhadtoresorttoanaliaswhenhewas
involvedinanaccidentbeinginvestigatedbythepoliceauthorities.

Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is


incidentaltotherobberywhichisthemainpurposeofthecriminal.InchargingRobbery
with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to
another;(c)thetakingischaracterizedwithanimuslucrandi;and(d)ontheoccasionof
the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic
sense,wascommitted."Althoughtherewasnowitnessastotheactualrobbingofthe
victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold
earringsvaluedatP750.00.Thesewereneverrecovered.

While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she
waskilled,wemayconcludefromfourcircumstancesthattherobberyoccasionedher
killing:(1)Bothappellantandvictimgambledatthewake.(2)Theappellantknewthat
victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim's
pursecontaininghermoneyandearringsweremissingfromherbodywhenfound.

Thedecisionoftheregionaltrialcourtisaffirmed.Costsagainstappellant.Soordered.

PEOPLEVS.MAGPALAO
[197SCRA79;G.R.NO.92415;14MAY1991]

Facts:

Eleven (11) people rode in a Ford Fiera going to Baguio. Namely they are: Felizardo
Galvez, Jimmy Jetwani, Simeon Calama, Rene Salonga, Eduardo Lopez, Adolfo
290

P.J.G.

Quiambao, Aliman Baraakal, Anwar Hadji Edris, Gumanak Ompa and defendant
appelantsinthiscase,OmarMagpalaoandRexMagumnang.

After an hour of driving, the car stopped so that one of the passengers could urinate.
While the car was stopped the Baraakal, Edris, Ompa, Magpalao and Magumnang
pointedgunsandknivesattheotherpassengersanddivestedthemoftheirproperties.

OnoftherobbersthenorderedGalveztodrivethecartowardstheprecipice(bangin).
When the car was near the precipice, Galvez then stepped to the brakes. The other
passengers jumped out of the car and went to different directions to escape. Galvez
however,wasleftinsidethecarandwasstabbedbyoneoftherobbers.Therobbers
thenescaped.Quiambao,whoownedthecarhelpedGalveztogettoahospital.Galvez
died in the hospital. The robbers were then apprehended with the exception of Edris
whoremainatlarge.MangumnanghoweverescapedwhilebeingindetentionandBara
akal died inside the jail. Since Mangumnang was not arrested, the trial in absentia
continuedastohim.Ompa,Magpalao,andMagumnangwereallheldguiltyasprincipal
bydirectparticipationofthecrimeofRobberywithHomicide.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthelowercourterredinfailingtoapplytheConstitutionalmandateon
thepresumptionofinnocenceandproofbeyondreasonabledoubtwhenitallowedthe
trialinabsentiatopushthroughonthepartofdefendantappellantMagumnang.

Held:

TheCourtaffirmedthedecisionofthelowercourt.Thereasonisthatthelowercourt
has jurisdiction over Magumnang the moment the latter was in custody. Jurisdiction
onceacquiredisnotlostupontheinstanceofpartiesbutuntilthecaseisterminated.
Sincealltherequisitesoftrialinabsentiaarecomplete,thecourthasjurisdictionover
Magumnang.

In addition, Magumnang was presumed innocent during his trial in absentia. The
prosecutionhadstrongevidenceagainsthimasproofbeyondreasonabledoubtthathe
is a principal by direct participation in the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Thus, the
Constitutionalmandatewasnotviolated.

PEOPLEVS.ACABAL
291

P.J.G.

[226SCRA694;G.R.NO.103604,23SEP1993]

Facts:

Theaccusatoryportionintheinformationformurder.Factsareasfollows:

"Thatsometimeintheeveningofthe28thofJanuary,1980,atNagbinlod,Municipality
ofSta.Catalina,ProvinceofNegrosOriental,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionof
this Honorable Court, the accused, including several 'John Does', conspiring and
confederating with one another, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident
premeditationandbeingthenarmedwithbolosand'pinuti',didthenandtherewillfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on the person of
oneRizalinaApatanSilvanowhilethelatterwasabouttoleaveherhouseandinflicting
upon her injuries, to wit: 'right leg amputated below the knee; left leg hacked behind
the knee; abdomen hacked with viscerae evacerated,' and did then and there set the
houseon fire while the aforementioned Rizalina Apatan Silvano was inside saidhouse
tryingtoescapetherefrom,andallowinghertobeburnedinsidesaidhousewhichwas
burnedtotheground,therebycausinguponsaidRizalinaApatanSilvanoherdeathand
burningherbeyondrecognition.

But on 16 May 1987, a fire gutted the building where Branch 37 was located and the
recordsofthesetwocaseswereburned.Therecordsweresubsequentlyreconstituted
uponpetitionoftheprosecutingfiscal.Thetestimoniesofthewitnesseswereretaken,
however, before it could commence, accused Engracio Valeriano jumped bail and the
warrantforhisarrestissuedon16November1987wasreturnedunservedbecausehe
couldnotbefound.Analiaswarrantforhisarrestwasissuedon26June1989,buthe
remainsatlargeuptothepresent.

AfterthecompletionoftheretakingofthetestimoniesofthewitnessesinBranch37,
CriminalCasesNos.4584and4585werereraffledtoBranch33ofthetrialcourt,then
presidedoverbyJudgePacificoS.Bulado.

Thedecisionofthetrialcourt,perJudgePacificoS.Bulado,dated31October1991but
promulgatedon20December1991,containednospecificdispositiveportion.Itsrulings
arefoundinthelasttwoparagraphswhichreadasfollows:

"Theelementsofmurderinthiscase,CriminalCaseNo.4585forthekillingofRizalina
ApatanSilvano having been proved by the prosecution beyond doubt, the accused
JUANITO RISMUNDO, MACARIO ACABAL and ABUNDIO NAHID, considering the
292

P.J.G.

attendantqualifyingaggravatingcircumstancesofnighttime,useoffirebyburningthe
house of victim Rizalina ApatanSilvano in order to forcibly drive her out of her house
andhackhertodeath,theabuseofsuperiorstrength,thepenaltyimpossable[sic]here
willbeinitsmaximumdegree,thatisreclusionperpetuatakingintoaccountArticle248
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty now for murder is Reclusion Temporal to
ReclusionPerpetua,andforalltheaccusedtoindemnifytheheirsofthevictimthesum
of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos since this case occurred [sic] in 1980. For the
wounding of the victim Wilson A. Silvano, this Court believes that simple frustrated
homicideonlyiscommittedbytheaccusedEngracioValerianoonly.

ButsincethepersonwhoactuallyinflictedtheinjuriesofvictimWilsonSilvano,accused
EngracioValerianoonlyisnowheretobefound,hence,notbroughttothebarofjustice,
hebeingafugitiveoratlarge,nopenaltycouldbeimposedonhimsinceheisbeyond
the jurisdiction of this court to reach. All the other two (2) accused, JUANITO
RISMUNDOandABUNDIO NAHID are hereby ordered and declared absolved fromany
criminalresponsibilityfromfrustratedhomicide.

Thebailbondputupbythethreeaccused,namely:JuanitoRismundo,MacarioAcabal
andAbundioNahidareherebyorderedcancelledandletawarrantofarrestbeissued
fortheirimmediateconfinement."

Issue:

WhetherornotthejudgmentcompliedwiththeRulesofCourt.

Whetherornotthecancellationofthebailbondsoftheaccusedisvalid.

Whetherornottheaccusedmaybetriedinabsentia.

Whetherornottheaccusedisguiltyofthecrimeoffrustratedmurder.

Held:

WefindthatthedecisionsubstantiallycomplieswiththeRulesofCourtonjudgmentsas
itdidsentencetheaccusedappellantstoreclusionperpetua.Ajudgmentofconviction
shallstate(a)thelegalqualificationoftheoffenseconstitutedbytheactscommittedby
theaccused,andtheaggravatingormitigatingcircumstancesattendingthecommission,
ifthereareany;(b)theparticipationoftheaccusedinthecommissionoftheoffense,
whether as principal, accomplice or accessory after the fact; (c) the penalty imposed
293

P.J.G.

upontheaccused;and(d)thecivilliabilityordamagescausedbythewrongfulacttobe
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the
enforcementofthecivilliabilitybyaseparateactionhasbeenreservedorwaived.

Itisobviousthattheyclearlyunderstoodthattheywerefoundguiltybeyondreasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and were sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetuainCriminalCaseNo.4585.Wereitotherwise,theywouldnothavedeclaredin
opencourttheirintentiontoappealimmediatelyafterthepromulgationofthedecision
andwouldnothavesubsequentlyfiledtheirwrittennoticeofappeal.

Accusedappellants contend that the trial court did not impose any sentence and so
cannot cancel anymore their bail bonds and direct their arrest and immediate
commitmentbecauseitalreadylostjurisdictionovertheirpersonswhentheyperfected
theirappeal.

The decision did impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Since the order cancelling
their bail bonds and directing their arrest is contained in the decision itself, it is
apparentthattheirabovementionedcontentionishighlyillogical.Atthetimetheorder
in question was made, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the persons of the
accusedappellants.

The trial court further erred in holding that no penalty could be imposed on accused
Engracio Valeriano in Criminal Case No. 4584 because he "is nowhere to be found,
hence, not brought to the bar of justice, he being a fugitive or at large." The court
ignoredthefactthatEngraciojumpedbailafterhehadbeenarraigned,justbeforethe
retaking of evidence commenced. Paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the
Constitutionpermitstrialinabsentiaaftertheaccusedhasbeenarraignedprovidedhe
has been duly notified of the trial and his failure to appear thereat is unjustified. One
who jumps bail can never offer a justifiable reason for his nonappearance during the
trial.

Accordingly,afterthetrial inabsentia, the court can render judgment in thecaseand


promulgation may be made by simply recording the judgment in the criminal docket
withacopythereofserveduponhiscounsel,providedthatthenoticerequiringhimto
bepresentatthepromulgationisservedthroughhisbondsmenorwardenandcounsel.

In conclusion, because of reasonable doubt as to their guilt, the accusedappellants


must be acquitted. Every accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;
that presumption is solemnly guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The contrary requires
294

P.J.G.

proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
anunprejudicedmind.Shortofthis,itisnotonlytherightoftheaccusedtobefreed;it
iseventheconstitutionaldutyofthecourttoacquithim.

USVS.TANTENG
[23PHIL145;G.R.NO.7081;7SEP1912]

Facts:

The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a sevenyearold girl. Tan Teng was
gamblingnearthehouseofthevictimanditwasallegedthatheenteredherhomeand
threwthevictimonthe floorand place hisprivatepartsoverhers.Severaldayslater,
Pacomiowassuffering fromadisease called gonorrhea. Pacomio toldhersister about
whathadhappenedandreportedittothepolice.

TanTengwascalledtoappearinapolicelineupandthevictimidentifiedhim.Hewas
thenstrippedofhisclothingandwasexaminedbyapoliceman.Hewasfoundtohave
the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance
emittingfromthebodyofthedefendantandturneditover totheBureauofScience.
Theresultsshowedthatthedefendantwassufferingfromgonorrhea.

Thelowercourtheldthattheresultsshowthatthediseasethatthevictimhadacquired
came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of
carnalknowledgebythelatter.Thedefendantallegedthatthesaidevidenceshouldbe
inadmissiblebecauseitwastakeninviolationofhisrightagainstselfincrimination.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthephysicalexaminationconductedwasaviolationofthedefendants
rightsagainstselfincrimination.

Held:

Thecourtheldthatthetakingofasubstancefromhisbodywasnotaviolationofthe
said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any
questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was
examinedbycompetentmedicalauthority.

295

P.J.G.

The prohibition of selfincrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of


physicalormoralcompulsiontoextortcommunicationsfromhim,andnotanexclusion
of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the
offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as
evidenceagainsthim.

VILLAFLORVS.SUMMERS
[41PHIL62;G.R.NO.16444;8SEP1920]

Facts:

PetitionerVillaflorwaschargedwiththecrimeofadultery.Thetrialjudgeorderedthe
petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was
pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein
petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such
examinationwasaviolationofherconstitutionalrightsagainstselfincrimination.

Issue:

Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners


constitutionalrightsagainstselfincrimination.

Held:

No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional
guaranty,thatnopersonshallbecompelledinanycriminalcasetobeawitnessagainst
himself,islimitedtoaprohibitionagainstcompulsorytestimonialselfincrimination.The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is
permissible.

BELTRANVS.SAMSON
[53PHIL570;G.R.NO.32025;23SEPT1929]

Facts:

Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his
handwritingasorderedbytherespondentJudge.Thepetitionerinthiscasecontended
296

P.J.G.

thatsuchorderwouldbeaviolationofhisconstitutionalrightagainstselfincrimination
becausesuchexaminationwouldgivetheprosecutionevidenceagainsthim,whichthe
latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make
himfurnishevidenceagainsthimself.

Issue:

Whetherornotthewritingfromthefiscal'sdictationbythepetitionerforthepurpose
of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the
scopeandmeaningoftheconstitutionalprovisionunderexamination.

Held:

The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain
absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his
handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is
something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purelymechanicalact,becauseitrequirestheapplicationofintelligenceandattention;
andinthecaseatbarwritingmeansthatthepetitionerhereinistofurnishameansto
determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal
clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to
that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the
purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is
compelledtoproduceadocument,andonewhoiscompelledtofurnishaspecimenof
his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against
himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a
specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished.Consideringthecircumstancethatthepetitionerisamunicipaltreasurer,it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his
handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens
withoutresortingtothemeanscomplainedherein,thatisnoreasonfortramplingupon
a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminalsmaysucceedinevadingthehandofjustice,butsuchcasesareaccidentaland
do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists
fortheprotectionofinnocentpersons.

PASCUALVS.BME
297

P.J.G.

[28SCRA345;G.R.NO.25018;26MAY1969]

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of
MedicalExaminers.Itwasallegedthereinthatattheinitialhearingofanadministrative
case forallegedimmorality,counselforcomplainantsannouncedthathewouldpresent
as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of
record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a
witnessagainsthimself.Petitionerthenallegedthattocompelhimtotakethewitness
stand,theBoardofExaminerswasguilty,attheveryleast,ofgraveabuseofdiscretion
forfailuretorespecttheconstitutionalrightagainstselfincrimination.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call
petitionertothewitnessstandandinterrogatehim,therightagainstselfincrimination
being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a
witness.Theylikewiseallegedthattherightagainstselfincriminationcannotbeavailed
ofinanadministrativehearing.

Petitionerwassustainedbythelowercourtinhispleathathecouldnotbecompelled
tobethefirstwitnessofthecomplainants,hebeingthepartyproceededagainstinan
administrativechargeformalpractice.Hence,thisappealbyrespondentBoard.

Issue:

Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants


violatestheSelfIncriminationClause.

Held:

TheSupremeCourtheldthatinanadministrativehearingagainstamedicalpractitioner
for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently
with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the
witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance
withthewellsettledprinciplethat"theaccusedinacriminalcasemayrefuse,notonly
to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner
would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of
property buttherevocationofhislicenseasamedicalpractitioner. Theconstitutional
guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to
298

P.J.G.

remainsilentandhissilencecannotbeusedasapresumptionofhisguilt."Itistheright
of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witnessstandwithundiluted,unfetteredexerciseofhisownfreegenuinewill."

Thereasonforthisconstitutionalguarantee,alongwithotherrightsgrantedanaccused,
standsforabeliefthatwhilecrimeshouldnotgounpunishedandthatthetruthmustbe
revealed,suchdesirableobjectivesshouldnotbeaccomplishedaccordingtomeansor
methodsoffensivetothehighsenseofrespectaccordedthehumanpersonality.More
andmoreinlinewiththedemocraticcreed,thedeferenceaccordedanindividualeven
those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional
foundationunderlyingtheprivilegeistherespectagovernment...mustaccordtothe
dignityandintegrityofitscitizens.

PEOPLEVS.BALISACAN
[17SCRA1119;G.R.NO.L26376;31AUG1966]

Facts:

Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being
arraigned,heenteredintoapleaofguilty.Indoingso,hewasassistedycounsel.Athis
counseldeofficio,hewasallowedtopresentevidenceandconsequentlytestifiedthat
he stabbed the deceased in selfdefense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered
himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the
accused,hewasacquitted.Thus,theprosecutionappealed.

Issue:

WhetherorNottheappealplacedtheaccusedindoublejeopardy.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential
requisitetodoublejeopardy.Theaccusedhadfirstenteredapleaofguiltybuthowever
testified that he acted in complete selfdefense. Said testimony had the effect of
vacatinghispleaofguiltyandthecourtaquoshouldhaverequiredhimtopleadanew
charge,oratleastdirectthatanewpleaofnotguiltybeenteredforhim.Thiswasnot
done.Therefore,therehasbeennostandingofpleaduringthejudgmentofacquittal,so
therecanbenodoublejeopardywithrespecttotheappealherein.
299

P.J.G.

PEOPLEVS.OBSANIA
[23SCRA1249;G.R.L24447;29JUN1968]

Facts:

The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of
Balungao,Pangasinan.Hepleadednotguilty.Hiscounselmovedforthedismissalofthe
chargeforfailuretoallegevividdesignsintheinfo.Saidmotionwasgranted.Fromthis
orderofdismissalthe prosecutionappealed.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthepresentappealplacestheaccusedinDoubleJeopardy.

Held:

In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must
haveobtainedintheoriginalprosecution,a)validcomplaint,b)competentcourt,c)the
defendant had pleaded to thecharge, d) defendant was acquittedor convicted or the
caseagainsthimwasdismissedorotherwiseterminatedwithouthisexpressconsent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the
defendant'smotiontodismiss.ThedoctrineofdoublejeopardyasenunciatedinP.vs.
Salico
appliestowitwhen thecaseisdismissedwiththeexpressconsentofthe
defendant,thedismissalwillnotbeabartoanotherprosecutionforthesameoffense
becausehisactionin having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against
him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express
consentoftheaccusedbutevenupontheurgingofhiscounseltherecanbenodouble
jeopardyunderSect.9Rule113,iftheindictmentagainsthimisrevivedbythefiscal.

PAULINVS.GIMENEZ
300

P.J.G.

[217SCRA386;G.R.NO.103323;21JAN1993]

Facts:

RespondentandBrgyCapt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when


they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such,
Mabuyofollowedthevehicleuntilthelatterenteredthegateofanestablishment.He
inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later
that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him.
Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to
preventthepetitionersescape.Uponthearrivalofthepolice,petitionersputtheirguns
downandwereimmediatelyapprehended.

Acomplaintgravethreatswasfiledagainstthepetitioners(CriminalCaseNo.5204).It
wasdismissedbythecourtactingonthemotionofthepetitioners.MabuyofiledaMOR
thusthedismissalwasreversed.Thereafter,petitionersfiledforcertiorari,prohibition,
damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB9207).
Petitionisdismissedforlackofmeritandforbeingaprohibitedpleadingandorderedto
proceedwiththetrialofthecase.Hence,thisinstantpetition.

Issue:

WhetherorNotthedismissalof5204wasajudgmentofacquittal.

Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by
dismissingCEB9207.

Held:

For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express
consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the
express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against
double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the
petitioners.Doublejeopardythusdidnotattach.

Furthermore,suchdismissalisnotconsideredasanacquittal.Thelatterisalwaysbased
on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While
theformer,inthecaseatbar,terminatedtheproceedingsbecausenofindingwasmade
astotheguiltorinnocenceofthepetitioners.
301

P.J.G.

Thelowercourtdidnotviolatetherulewhenitsetasidetheorderofdismissalforthe
receptionoffurtherevidence bytheprosecutionbecauseit merelycorrecteditserror
whenitprematurelyterminatedanddismissedthecasewithoutgivingtheprosecution
therighttocompletethepresentationofitsevidence.Theruleonsummaryprocedure
wascorrectlyapplied.

PEOPLEVS.COURTOFSILAY
[74SCRA248;G.R.NO.L43790;9DEC1976]

Facts:

ThatsometimeonJanuary4,1974,accusedPacificoSensio,RomeoMillanandWilfredo
JochicowhowerethenscalersattheHawaiianPhilippineCompany,weighedcanecars
No.1743,1686and1022loadedwithsugarcaneswhichwereplacedintarjetas(weight
report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was padding of the
weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to be false
making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were
chargedwithFalsificationbyprivateindividualsanduseoffalsifieddocument.After
the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge against
themonthegroundthattheevidencespresentedwerenotsufficienttoestablishtheir
guiltbeyondreasonabledoubt.Actingonthemotion,respondentcourtissueditsorder
dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code
defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be
dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the
caseatbarwasdismissedbecauseaccordingtothem,itwasdonewiththeconsentof
theaccusedthereforewaivingthere defense of double jeopardy. The accusedon the
other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the
prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the
prosecutionfromprosecutingtheaccusedforitwillbeunjustandunconstitutionalfor
theaccusedduetodoublejeopardyrulethustheappealoftheplaintiff.

Issue:

Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused Sensio,
MillanandJochicoindoublejeopardy

302

P.J.G.

Held:

Yestherevivalofthecasewillputtheaccusedindoublejeopardyfortheveryreason
thatthecasehasbeendismissedearlierduetolackofmerits.Itistruethatthecriminal
case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this was a
motionfiledaftertheprosecutionhadresteditscase,callingfortheevidencebeyond
reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would be
tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was
statedon therequirementsof a valid defense of doublejeopardy it says: That there
should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a
competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was
previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express
consentoftheaccusedinwhichwereallpresentinthecaseatbar.Therewasindeeda
valid,legitimatecomplaintandconcernagainsttheaccusedSensio,MillanandJochico
which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also
mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was
proventhatthecaseusedagainsttheaccusedwerenotsufficienttoprovethemguilty
beyondreasonabledoubtthereforedismissingthecasewhichtranslatestoacquittal.It
explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is
jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to
insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably
prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites
given,itwasthefirstonthatisverymuchapplicabletoourcaseatbarwheretherewas
dismissalofthecaseduetoinsufficiencyofevidencewhichwillbartheapprovalofthe
petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the
accusedwhichthelawdespises.

PEOPLEVS.RELOVA
[149SCRA292;G.R.NO.L45129;6MAR1987]

FACTS:Inthispetitionforcertiorariandmandamus,PeopleofthePhilippinesseeksto
setasidetheordersofRespondentJudgeHon.Relovaquashinganinformationfortheft
filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the
petitionersmotionforreconsideration..OnFeb.11975,Batangaspolicetogetherwith
personnelofBatangasElectricLightSystem,equippedwithasearchwarrantissuedbya
cityjudgeofBatangastosearchandexaminethepremisesoftheOpulenciaCarpenaIce
Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have
beeninstalledwithoutauthorityfromthecitygovernmentandarchitecturallyconcealed
303

P.J.G.

inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or
decreasethereadingsofelectriccurrentconsumptionintheplantselectricmeter.The
case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine
months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act
beingalightfelonyandprescribedtherighttofileincourt.OnNov24,1975,another
case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a
violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with
resultingdamageandprejudicetoCityofBatangasintheamountofP41,062.16.Before
arraignment,Opulenciafiledamotiontoquashonthegroundofdoublejeopardy.The
Assistantfiscalsclaimisthatitisnotdoublejeopardybecausethefirstoffensecharged
against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the
approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by
anordinance,whereinthecasewasdismissed,asopposedtothesecondoffensewhich
istheftofelectricitywhichispunishablebytheRevisedPenalCodemakingitadifferent
crimechargedagainstthe1stcomplaintagainstMr.Opulencia.

Issue:

Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to
the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the
groundoftheftofelectricitypunishablebyastatuteagainsttheRevisedPenalCode.

Held:

Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense
becauseastediously explainedin the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two
instancesorkindsofdoublejeopardy.ThefirstwouldbethatNopersonshallbetwice
putinjeopardyofpunishmentforthesameoffenseandthesecondsentencestatesthat
Ifanactispunishablebyalaworanordinance,theconvictionoracquittalshallbarto
anotherprosecutionforthesameact.Inthecaseatbar,itwasveryevidentthatthe
charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double
jeopardywhereinitcontemplatesdoublejeopardyofpunishmentforthesameact.It
furtherexplainsthateveniftheoffenseschargedarenotthesame,owingthatthefirst
charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation
againsttherevisedpenalcode,thefactthatthetwochargessprungfromoneandthe
same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The
factthatMr.Opulenciawasacquittedonthefirstoffenseshouldbarthe2ndcomplaint
304

P.J.G.

against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against
Mr.Opulencia.

ESMENAVS.POGOY
[102SCRA861;G.R.NO.L54110;20FEB1981]

Facts:

PetitionersEsmeaandAlbawerechargedwithgravecoercionintheCourtofCebuCity
forallegedlyforcingFr.ThomasTibudantowithdrawasumofmoneyworthP5000from
the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During
arraignment,petitionerspleadedNotGuilty. Notrialcameinafter thearraignment
due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy
issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it
received atelegram stating thatthe complainant was sick. Theaccused invoked their
righttospeedytrial.Respondentjudgedismissedthecasebecausethetrialwasalready
dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not have a medical certificate
attachedtoitinorderforthecourttorecognizethecomplainantsreasontobevalidin
order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to
revivethecaseandattachedthemedicalcertificateofthepriestprovingthefactthat
thepriestwasindeedsickofinfluenza.OnOct.24,1979,accusedEsmeaandAlbafiled
amotiontodismissthecaseonthegroundofdoublejeopardy.

Issue:

WhetherorNottherevivalofgravecoercioncase,whichwasdismissedearlierdueto
complainantsfailuretoappearatthetrial,wouldplacetheaccusedindoublejeopardy

Held:

Yes,revivalofthecasewillputtheaccusedindoublejeopardyfortheveryreasonthat
the case hasbeendismissedalreadywithout theconsent of the accused which would
haveaneffectofanacquittalonthecasefiled.Thedismissalwasduetocomplainants
incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and
complainanthimselfwhichwouldbarfurtherprosecutionofthedefendantforthesame
offense.Fordoublejeopardytoexistthesethreerequisitesshouldbepresent,thatone,
thereisavalidcomplaintorinformationfiledsecond,thatitisdonebeforeacourtof
competentjurisdictionandthird,thattheaccusedhasbeenarraignedandhaspleaded
305

P.J.G.

tothecomplaintorinformation.Inthecaseatbar,allthreeconditionswerepresent,as
thecasefiledwasgravecoercion,filedinacourtofcompetentjurisdictionastowhere
the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the
complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the
acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case
withouthisexpressconsentconstitutesresjudicataandisabartoanotherprosecution
fortheoffensecharged.Inthecase,itwasevidentlyshownthattheaccusedinvoked
their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination
whichwouldmeanthatrespondentshadnoexpressedconsenttothedismissalofthe
case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the
competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy
trial whichwill beequivalent to acquittal of the respondentswhich wouldbe a bar to
furtherprosecution.

PEOPLEVS.DELATORRE
[380SCRA586;G.R.NOS.13795358;11MAR2002]

Facts:

WilfredodelaTorre,appellee,hasthreechildrenfromacommonlawrelationship,the
eldestofwhichisMaryRose.WhenMaryRosewas7yearsold,hermotherleftthem
togetherwithheryoungestbrothersosheandherotherbrotherwerelefttothecareof
herfather.

Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January
1997,asuddenchangeinMaryRosesbehaviorbehaviorwasnoticed.Shewastwelve
years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her
panty.Whenconfrontedbyherheadteacher,MaryRoseadmittedthatshewasabused
repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being
imputedtohimbyherdaughter.

The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of actsof lasciviousness and four counts of
murder. However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on
appellee.Itmaintainedthattherewerecircumstancesthatmitigatedthegravityofthe
offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the
commissionoftheacts,thatafterthemotherofMaryRoselefttheconjugalhome,for
more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a
familyandMaryRosewasnevermolestedbyherfather.
306

P.J.G.

TheprosecutionseekstomodifytheRTCDecisionbyimposingthesupremepenaltyof
deathoftheaccused.Itarguesthatithasproventhatthevictimisthedaughterofthe
accused,andthatshe was beloweighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a
consequence,thetrialcourtshouldhavebeenimposedthepenaltyofdeathpursuant
toSection11ofR.A.7659..

Issue:

Whether or Not the Court erred in penalizing the appellee with reclusion perpetua in
eachofthefourindictmentsofrape,insteadofimposingthesupremepenaltyofdeath
asmandatedbyR.A.7659.

Held:

Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may
appealfromajudgmentorfinalorderunlesstheaccusedwillbeputindoublejeopardy.
InPeoplevs.Leones,itdeclaredthat:

while it is true that this Court is the Court of last resort, there are
allegationsoferrorcommittedbyalowercourtwhichweoughtnottolook
intotoupholdtherightoftheaccused.Suchisthecaseinanappealbythe
prosecutionseekingtoincreasethepenaltyimposedupontheaccusedfor
thisrunsafouloftherightoftheaccusedagainstdoublejeopardyWhen
theaccusedafterconvictionbythetrialcourtdidnotappealhisdecision,
an appeal by the government seeking to increase the penalty imposed by
thetrialcourtplacestheaccusedindoublejeopardyandshouldtherefore
bedismissed.

The ban on double jeopardy primarily prevents the State from using its criminal
processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of
cases with accumulated trials. It also serves as a deterrent from successively retrying
thedefendant inthehope of securinga conviction. And finally, it prevents theState,
followingconviction,fromretryingthedefendantagaininthehopeofsecuringagreater
penalty.

Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the appeal of the prosecution
cannotprosper.

307

P.J.G.

308

P.J.G.

CITIZENSHIP

309

P.J.G.

CITIZENSHIP

Art.4

Sec.1.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

ThefollowingarecitizensofthePhilippines:
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;
ThosewhosefathersormothersarecitizensofthePhilippines;
ThosebornbeforeJanuary17,1973,of Filipino mothers,whoelectPhilippine
citizenshipuponreachingtheageofmajority;and
Thosewhoarenaturalizedinaccordancewithlaw.

Sec.2.
NaturalborncitizensarethosewhoarecitizensofthePhilippinesfrombirth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.
ThosewhoelectPhilippinecitizenshipinaccordancewithparagraph(3),Section1hereof
shallbedeemednaturalborncitizens.

Sec.3.
Philippinecitizenshipmaybelostorreacquiredinthemannerprovidedby
law.

Sec.4.
Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship,
unlessbytheiractoromissiontheyaredeemed,underthelaw,tohaverenouncedit.

Sec.5.
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be
dealtwithbylaw.

FRIVALDOVS.COMELEC
[174SCRA245;G.R.NO.87193;23JUN1989]

Facts:

PetitionerJuanG.FrivaldowasproclaimedgovernorelectoftheprovinceofSorsogon
onJanuary22,1988,andassumedofficeinduetime.OnOctober27,1988,theLeague
ofMunicipalities,SorsogonChapter,representedbyitsPresident,Estuye,whowasalso
suinginhispersonalcapacity,filedwiththeCOMELECapetitionfortheannulmentof
Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen,
havingbeennaturalizedintheUnitedStatesonJanuary20,1983.Inhisanswerdated
310

P.J.G.

May22,1988,FrivaldoadmittedthathewasnaturalizedintheUnitedStatesasalleged
but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenshiponlytoprotecthimselfagainstPresidentMarcos.Hisnaturalization,hesaid,
was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine
citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not
qualifiedtorunforandbeelectedgovernor.Theyalsoarguedthattheirpetitioninthe
Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the
OmnibusElectionCode.TheultimatepurposewastopreventFrivaldofromcontinuing
as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his
alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the
contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated
himselfafterhisnaturalizationasanAmericancitizen.Asanalien,hewasdisqualified
from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the
electorateofSorsogoncouldnotamendtheConstitution,theLocalGovernmentCode,
and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument
that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the
LeagueandEstuyewereseekingwasnotonlytheannulmentoftheproclamationand
election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of
Frivaldo'sincumbencyasgovernorofSorsogononthegroundthathewasnotaFilipino.

Issue:

WhetherorNotpetitionerJuanG.FrivaldowasacitizenofthePhilippinesatthetimeof
hiselectiononJanuary18,1988,asprovincialgovernorofSorsogon.

Held:

The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution
thatallpublicofficialsandemployeesowetheStateandtheConstitution"allegianceat
alltimes"andthespecificrequirementinSection42oftheLocalGovernmentCodethat
acandidateforlocalelectiveofficemustbeinteraliaacitizenofthePhilippinesanda
qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus
Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a
citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
ArticleV,Section1,oftheConstitution.
311

P.J.G.

InthecertificateofcandidacyhefiledonNovember19,1987,Frivaldodescribedhimself
asa"naturalborn"citizenofthePhilippines,omittingmentionofanysubsequentloss
ofsuchstatus.Theevidenceshows,however,thathewasnaturalizedasacitizenofthe
United States in 1983 per the following certification from the United States District
Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P.
CortezofthePhilippineConsulateGeneralinSanFrancisco,California,U.S.A.

TheCourtseesnoreasonnottobelievethatthepetitionerwasoneoftheenemiesof
theMarcosdictatorship.Evenso,itcannotagreethatasaconsequencethereofhewas
coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his
naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally
unacceptableandmustberejectedoutright.

ThisCourtwillnotpermittheanomalyofapersonsittingasprovincialgovernorinthis
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was
electedbythepeopleofSorsogondoesnotexcusethispatentviolationofthesalutary
rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility,especiallyiftheymistakenlybelieved,asinthiscase,thatthecandidatewas
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of
citizenship.IfapersonseekstoserveintheRepublicofthePhilippines,hemustowehis
total loyaltytothis countryonly, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity toany
otherstate.

Itistrueasthepetitionerpointsoutthatthestatusofthenaturalborncitizenisfavored
by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be
treasuredlikeapearlofgreatprice.Butonceitissurrenderedandrenounced,thegiftis
gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and
limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to
welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning
renegademustshow,byanexpressandunequivocalact,therenewalofhisloyaltyand
love.

PetitionDismissed.PetitionerJUANG.FRIVALDOisherebydeclarednotacitizenofthe
Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon.Accordingly,heisorderedtovacatehisofficeandsurrenderthesametothe
312

P.J.G.

duly elected ViceGovernor of the said province once this decision becomes final and
executory.

MERCADOVS.MANZANO
[307SCRA630;G.R.NO.135083;26MAY1999]

Facts:

Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates
for the position of ViceMayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private
respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended
duetothepetitionofErnestoMamarilregardingthecitizenshipofprivaterespondent.
MamarilallegedthattheprivaterespondentisnotacitizenofthePhilippinesbutofthe
United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent
for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that
personswhopossessdualcitizenshiparedisqualifiedfromrunninganypublicposition.
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until
afterelection.Petitionersoughttointerveneinthecasefordisqualification.COMELEC
reversedthedecisionanddeclaredprivaterespondentqualifiedtorunfortheposition.
Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the
COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the
vicemayorofMakati.

Issue:

WhetherorNotprivaterespondentisqualifiedtoholdofficeasViceMayor.

Held:

Dualcitizenshipisdifferentfromdualallegiance.Theformerariseswhen,asaresultof
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneouslyconsideredanationalbythesaidstates.Forinstance,suchasituation
may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the
principleofjussanguinisisborninastatewhichfollowsthedoctrineofjussoli.Private
respondentisconsideredasadualcitizenbecauseheisbornofFilipinoparentsbutwas
borninSanFrancisco,USA.Suchaperson,ipsofactoandwithoutanyvoluntaryacton
hispart,isconcurrentlyconsideredacitizenofbothstates.Consideringthecitizenship
313

P.J.G.

clause(Art.IV)ofourConstitution,itispossibleforthefollowingclassesofcitizensof
the Philippines to posses dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or
mothersinforeigncountrieswhichfollowtheprincipleofjussoli;(2)Thoseborninthe
PhilippinesofFilipinomothersandalienfathersifbythelawsoftheirfatherscountry
suchchildrenarecitizensofthatcountry;(3)Thosewhomarryaliensifbythelawsof
thelatterscountrytheformerareconsideredcitizens, unlessbytheiractoromission
they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the
other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegianceistheresultofanindividualsvolition.

Byfilingacertificateofcandidacywhenheranforhispresentpost,privaterespondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectivelyremovinganydisqualificationhemighthaveasadualcitizen.

By declaringin his certificate ofcandidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; thathe isnot a


permanentresidentorimmigrantofanothercountry;thathewilldefendandsupport
theConstitutionofthePhilippinesand beartruefaithandallegiancetheretoandthat
hedoessowithoutmentalreservation,privaterespondenthas,asfarasthelawsofthis
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private
respondentsoathofallegiancetothePhilippine,whenconsideredwiththefactthathe
hasspenthisyouthandadulthood,receivedhiseducation,practicedhisprofessionas
anartist,andtakenpartinpastelectionsinthiscountry,leavesnodoubtofhiselection
ofPhilippinecitizenship.

TECSONVS.COMELEC
[424SCRA277;G.R.No.161434;3Mar2004]

Facts:

VictorinoX.Fornier,petitionerinitiatedapetitionbeforetheCOMELECtodisqualifyFPJ
andtodenyduecourseortocancelhiscertificateofcandidacyuponthethesisthatFPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
naturalborn Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe,
was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting,
314

P.J.G.

petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmittedhisFilipinocitizenshiptoFPJ,thelatterbeinganillegitimatechildofanalien
mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two
assertions first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed,AllanF.Poe,marriedBessieKellyonlyayearafterthebirthofrespondent.

Issue:

WhetherorNotFPJisanaturalbornFilipinocitizen.

Held:

ItisnecessarytotakeonthematterofwhetherornotrespondentFPJisanaturalborn
citizen,which,inturn,dependedonwhetherornotthefatherofrespondent,AllanF.
Poe,wouldhavehimselfbeenaFilipinocitizenand,intheaffirmative,whetherornot
the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo
Poucouldonlybedrawnfromthepresumptionthathavingdiedin1954at84yearsold,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
deathin1954,intheabsenceofanyotherevidence,couldhavewellbeenhisplaceof
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en
masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
firstlight,conferscitizenshiptoallpersonswhosefathersareFilipinocitizensregardless
ofwhethersuchchildrenarelegitimateorillegitimate.

ButwhilethetotalityoftheevidencemaynotestablishconclusivelythatrespondentFPJ
is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would
preponderateinhisfavorenoughtoholdthathecannotbeheldguiltyofhavingmadea
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relationtoSection74,oftheOmnibusElectionCode.

BENGZONVS.HRET
315

P.J.G.

[357SCRA545;G.R.No.142840;7May2001]

Facts:

RespondentTeodoroCruzwasanaturalborncitizenofthePhilippines.Hewasbornin
SanClemente,Tarlac,onApril27,1960,ofFilipinoparents.Thefundamentallawthen
applicablewasthe1935Constitution.OnNovember5,1985,however,respondentCruz
enlistedintheUnitedStatesMarineCorpsandwithouttheconsentoftheRepublicof
thePhilippines,tookanoathofallegiancetotheUnitedStates.AsaConsequence,he
losthisFilipinocitizenshipforunderCommonwealthActNo.63,section1(4),aFilipino
citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting
commissioninthearmedforcesofaforeigncountry.HewasnaturalizedinUSin1990.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the
RepresentativeoftheSecondDistrictofPangasinanintheMay11,1998elections.He
wonoverpetitionerAntonioBengsonIII,whowasthenrunningforreelection.

Issue:

WhetherorNotrespondentCruz isanatural borncitizenofthePhilippinesinviewof


the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representativeunlessheisanaturalborncitizen.

Held:

Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the


lengthyprocessofnaturalization,repatriationsimplyconsistsofthetakingofanoathof
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil
Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means
thatanaturalizedFilipinowholosthiscitizenshipwillberestoredtohispriorstatusasa
naturalizedFilipinocitizen.Ontheotherhand,ifhewasoriginallyanaturalborncitizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
naturalbornFilipino.

316