Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 188767

July 24, 2013

SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND FLORIDA GADITANO, Petitioners,

vs.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For review on certiorari are the Decision dated 11 March 2008 and Resolution dated 16 July
2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88431 which reversed the Resolutions issued
by the Secretary of Justice, suspending the preliminary investigation of I.S. No. 01-4205 on the
ground of prejudicial question.
Petitioner Spouses Argovan Gaditano (Argovan) and Florida Gadiano (Florida), who were
engaged in the business of buying and selling beer and softdrinks products, purchased beer
products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in the amount of P285, 504.00 on 7 April 2000.
Petitioners paid through a check signed by Florida and drawn against Argovans Asia Trust
Bank Current Account. When said check was presented for payment on 13 April 2000, the
check was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite three (3) written
demands,1 petitioner failed to make good of the check. This prompted SMC to file a criminal
case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa against petitioners, docketed as I.S.
No. 01-4205 with the Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon City on 14 March 2001.
In their Counter-Affidavit, petitioners maintained that their checking account was funded under
an automatic transfer arrangement, whereby funds from their joint savings account with
AsiaTrust Bank were automatically transferred to their checking account with said bank
whenever a check they issued was presented for payment. Petitioners narrated that sometime
in 1999, Fatima Padua (Fatima) borrowed P30,000.00 from Florida. On 28 February 2000,
Fatima delivered Allied Bank Check No. 82813 dated 18 February 2000 payable to Florida in
the amount of P378,000.00. Said check was crossed and issued by AOWA Electronics. Florida
pointed out that the amount of the check was in excess of the loan but she was assured by
Fatima that the check was in order and the proceeds would be used for the payroll of AOWA
Electronics. Thus, Florida deposited said check to her joint AsiaTrust Savings Account which
she maintained with her husband, Argovan. The check was cleared on 6 March 2000 and
petitioners joint savings account was subsequently credited with the sum of P378,000.00.
Florida initially paid P83,000.00 to Fatima. She then withdrew P295,000.00 from her joint
savings account and turned over the amount to Fatima. Fatima in turn paid her loan to Florida.
Petitioners claimed that on 7 April 2000, the date when they issued the check to SMC, their joint
savings account had a balance of P330,353.17.2 As of 13 April 2000, petitioners balance even
amounted to P412,513.17.3

On 13 April 2000, Gregorio Guevarra (Guevarra), the Bank Manager of AsiaTrust Bank, advised
Florida that the Allied Bank Check No. 82813 for P378,000.00, the same check handed to her
by Fatima, was not cleared due to a material alteration in the name of the payee. Guevarra
explained further that the check was allegedly drawn payable to LG Collins Electronics, and not
to her, contrary to Fatimas representation. AsiaTrust Bank then garnished the P378,000.00
from the joint savings account of petitioners without any court order. Consequently, the check
issued by petitioners to SMC was dishonored having been drawn against insufficient funds.
On 23 October 2000, petitioners filed an action for specific performance and damages against
AsiaTrust Bank, Guevarra, SMC and Fatima, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42386.
Petitioners alleged that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully garnished and debited their
bank accounts; that their obligation to SMC had been extinguished by payment; and that Fatima
issued a forged check.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the
prosecution of the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa.
On 29 January 2002, the Office of the Prosecutor recommended that the criminal proceedings
be suspended pending resolution of Civil Case No. Q-00-42386. SMC thereafter filed a motion
for reconsideration before the Office of the Prosecutor but it was denied for lack of merit on 19
September 2002.
SMC filed with the Department of Justice (DOJ) a petition for review challenging the Resolutions
of the Office of the Prosecutor. In a Resolution dated 3 June 2004, the DOJ dismissed the
petition. SMC filed a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary denied in a
Resolution dated 15 December 2004.
Undaunted, SMC went up to the Court of Appeals by filling a petition for certiorari, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 88431. On 11 March 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting
the petition as follows:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the
Department of Justice dated June 3, 2004 and December 15, 2004 are SET ASIDE. In view
thereof, let the suspension of the preliminary investigation of the case docketed as I.S. No. 014205 with the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City be LIFTED. Accordingly, the continuation
of the preliminary investigation until completed is ordered and if probable cause exists, let the
corresponding information against the respondents be filed. 4
The Court of Appeals drew a distinction between the civil case which is an action for specific
performance and damages involving petitioners joint savings account, and the criminal case
which is an action for estafa/violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 involving Argovans current
account. The Court of Appeals belied the claim of petitioners about an automatic fund transfer
arrangement from petitioners joint savings account to Argovans current account.
By petition for review, petitioners assail the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the following
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND EXCEEDED
THE BOUNDS OF ITS JURISDICTION IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO RESPONDENTS
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED

JUNE 3, 2004 AND DECEMBER 15, 2004 OF THE DOJ, THERE BEING NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION BELOW BECAUSE TWO DIFFERENT BANK ACCOUNTS
ARE INVOLVED IN THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES.
IV. THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING PETITIONERS TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE PREJUDICIAL QUESTION DURING THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION.5
The issues raised by petitioners are divided into the procedural issue of whether certiorari is the
correct mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals and the substantive issue of whether a
prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings.
On the procedural issue, petitioners contend that SMCs resort to certiorari under Rule 65 was
an improper remedy because the DOJs act of sustaining the investigating prosecutors
resolution to suspend the criminal proceedings due to a valid prejudicial question was an error
in judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioners further assert that nevertheless, an error of
judgment is not correctible by certiorari when SMC had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
which was to file an appeal to the Office of the President.
The procedure taken up by petitioner was correct.
The Court of Appeals is clothed with jurisdiction to review the resolution issued by the Secretary
of the DOJ through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court albeit solely on
the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction.6
In Alcaraz v. Gonzalez,7 we stressed that the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is
subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who exercises the power of control and supervision
over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of
such prosecutor. Thus, while the Court of Appeals may review the resolution of the Justice
Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely
on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting
to excess of lack of jurisdiction.8
Also, in Tan v. Matsuura,9 we held that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the
DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review
with respect to the DOJs findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is
committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of
probable cause is ignored, the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case via a petition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 10
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion when it affirmed the
prosecutors suspension of the criminal investigation due to the existence of an alleged
prejudicial question.
We expound.

Petitioners insist that the Court of Appeals erroneously ruled against the existence of a
prejudicial question by separately treating their joint savings account and Argovans current
account, and concluding therefrom that the civil and criminal cases could proceed independently
of each other.
It is argued that the appellate court overlooked the fact that petitioners had an automatic
transfer arrangement with AsiaTrust Bank, such that funds from the savings account were
automatically transferred to their checking account whenever a check they issued was
presented for payment.
Petitioners maintain that since the checking account was funded by the monies deposited in the
savings account, what mattered was the sufficiency of the funds in the savings account. Hence,
petitioners separate action against AsiaTrust Bank for unlawfully garnishing their savings
account, which eventually resulted in the dishonor of their check to SMC, poses a prejudicial
question in the instant criminal proceedings.
Moreover, petitioners argue that they were not required to fully and exhaustively present
evidence to prove their claims. The presentation of their passbook, which confirmed numerous
withdrawals made on the savings account and indicated as "FT" or "Fund Transfer," proved the
existence of fund transfer from their savings account to the checking account.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.11
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure states the two elements necessary
for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied).
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately related to the
issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided that the other
element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no
necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case
does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. 12
The issue in the criminal case is whether the petitioner is guilty of estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether AsiaTrust Bank had lawfully garnished
the P378,000.00 from petitioners savings account.

The subject of the civil case is the garnishment by AsiaTrust Bank of petitioners savings
account.1wphi1 Based on petitioners account, they deposited the check given to them by
Fatima in their savings account. The amount of said check was initially credited to petitioners
savings account but the Fatima check was later on dishonored because there was an alleged
alteration in the name of the payee. As a result, the bank debited the amount of the check from
petitioners savings account. Now, petitioners seek to persuade us that had it not been for the
unlawful garnishment, the funds in their savings account would have been sufficient to cover a
check they issued in favor of SMC.
The material facts surrounding the civil case bear no relation to the criminal investigation being
conducted by the prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil case involves the dishonor of
another check. SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged materially altered check leading to
its dishonor and the eventual garnishment of petitioners savings account. The source of the
funds of petitioners savings account is no longer SMCs concern. The matter is between
petitioners and Asia Trust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in the preliminary investigation is
whether petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the payment of beer products.
The gravamen of the offense punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. 13
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the mere act of issuing a worthless check. The law did not
look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which it was made,
drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. 14 The thrust of the law is to
prohibit the making of worthless checks and putting them into circulation. 15
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia Trust Bank liable for the unlawful
garnishment of petitioners savings account, petitioners cannot be automatically adjudged free
from criminal liability for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, because the mere issuance of
worthless checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself
the offense.16
Furthermore, three notices of dishonor were sent to petitioners, who then, should have
immediately funded the check. When they did not, their liabilities under the bouncing checks law
attached. Such liability cannot be affected by the alleged prejudicial question because their
failure to fund the check upon notice of dishonour is itself the offense.
In the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, deceit and
damage are additional and essential elements of the offense. It is the fraud or deceit employed
by the accused in issuing a worthless check that is penalized.17 A prima facie presumption of
deceit arises when a check is dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. 18 Records show that
a notice of dishonor as well as demands for payment, were sent to petitioners. The presumption
of deceit applies, and petitioners must overcome this presumption through substantial evidence.
These issues may only be threshed out in a criminal investigation which must proceed
independently of the civil case.
Based on the foregoing, we rule that the resolution or the issue raised in the civil action is not
determinative or the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal investigation against them.
There is no necessity that the civil case be determined firrst before taking up the criminal
complaints.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 11
March 2008 and its Resolution dated 16 July 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 88431, are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159823

February 18, 2013

TEODORO A. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
ETTORE ROSSI, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension
of the criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing
Checks Law (Batas Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued
in connection with the sale.
Antecedents
On October 31, 1997, petitioner Teodoro A. Reyes (Reyes) and Advanced Foundation
Construction Systems Corporation (Advanced Foundation), represented by its Executive Project
Director, respondent Ettore Rossi (Rossi), executed a deed of conditional sale involving the
purchase by Reyes of equipment consisting of a Warman Dredging Pump HY 300A worth
P10,000,000.00. The parties agreed therein that Reyes would pay the sum of P3,000,000.00 as
downpayment, and the balance of P7,000,000.00 through four post-dated checks. Reyes
complied, but in January 1998, he requested the restructuring of his obligation under the deed
of conditional sale by replacing the four post-dated checks with nine post-dated checks that
would include interest at the rate of P25,000.00/month accruing on the unpaid portion of the
obligation on April 30, 1998, June 30, 1998, July 31, 1998, September 30, 1998 and October
31, 1998.1
Advanced Foundation assented to Reyes request, and returned the four checks. In turn, Reyes
issued and delivered the following nine postdated checks in the aggregate sum of
P7,125,000.00 drawn against the United Coconut Planters Bank, 2 to wit:

Check No.

Date

Amount

72807

April 30, 1998

P 25,000.00

79125

May 1, 1998

1,000,000.00

72802

May 30, 1998

2,000,000.00

72808

June 30, 1998

25,000.00

72809

July 31, 1998

25,000.00

72801

August 31, 1998

72810

September 30, 1998

25,000.00

72811

October 31, 1998

25,000.00

72903

November 30, 1998

2,000,000.00

2,000,000.00

Rossi deposited three of the post-dated checks (i.e., No. 72807, No. 79125 and No. 72808) on
their maturity dates in Advanced Foundations bank account at the PCI Bank in Makati. Two of
the checks were denied payment ostensibly upon Reyes instructions to stop their payment,
while the third (i.e., No. 72802) was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. 3
Rossi likewise deposited two more checks (i.e., No. 72809 and No. 72801) in Advanced
Foundations account at the PCI Bank in Makati, but the checks were returned with the notation
Account Closed stamped on them. He did not anymore deposit the three remaining checks on
the assumption that they would be similarly dishonored. 4
In the meanwhile, on July 29, 1998, Reyes commenced an action for rescission of contract and
damages in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City (RTC). His complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q98-35109 and entitled Teodoro A. Reyes v. Advanced Foundation Construction
Systems Corporation, sought judgment declaring the deed of conditional sale "rescinded and of
no further force and effect," and ordering Advanced Foundation to return the P3,000,000.00
downpayment with legal interest from June 4, 1998 until fully paid; and to pay to him attorneys
fees, and various kinds and amounts of damages.5
On September 8, 1998, Rossi charged Reyes with five counts of estafa and five counts of
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for the
dishonor of Checks No. 72807, No. 72808, No. 72801, No. 72809 and No. 79125. Another
criminal charge for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was lodged against Reyes in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for the dishonor of Check No. 72802. 6
On September 29, 1998, Reyes submitted his counter-affidavit in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati,7 claiming that the checks had not been issued for any valuable
consideration; that he had discovered from the start of using the dredging pump involved in the
conditional sale that the Caterpillar diesel engine powering the pump had been rated at only 560
horsepower instead of the 1200 horsepower Advanced Foundation had represented to him; that
welding works on the pump had neatly concealed several cracks; that on May 6, 1998 he had
written to Advanced Foundation complaining about the misrepresentations on the specifications
of the pump and demanding documentary proof of Advanced Foundations ownership of the

pump; that he had caused the order to stop the payment of three checks (i.e., No. 72806, No.
72807 and No. 79125); that Advanced Foundation had replied to his letter on May 8, 1998 by
saying that the pump had been sold to him on an as is, where is basis; that he had then sent
another letter to Advanced Foundation on May 18, 1998 to reiterate his complaints and the
request for proper documentation of ownership; that he had subsequently discovered other
hidden defects, prompting him to write another letter; and that instead of attending to his
complaints and request, Advanced Foundations lawyers had threatened him with legal action.
At the same time, Reyes assailed the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati
over the criminal charges against him on the ground that he had issued the checks in Quezon
City; as well as argued that the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati should suspend the
proceedings because of the pendency in the RTC of the civil action for rescission of contract
that posed a prejudicial question as to the criminal proceedings. 8
On November 20, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor handling the preliminary investigation
recommended the dismissal of the charges of estafa and the suspension of the proceedings
relating to the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 based on a prejudicial question. 9
On January 5, 1999, the City Prosecutor of Makati approved the recommendation of the
handling Assistant City Prosecutor, 10 stating:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for Estafa is respectfully recommended to
be dismissed, as upon approval, it is hereby dismissed.
Further, it is respectfully recommended that the proceedings in the charge for Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against the respondent be suspended until the prejudicial question raised
in Civil Case Q-98-35109 for Rescission of Contract and Damages which is now pending with
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 224, has been duly resolved.
Rossi appealed the resolution of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice, but the
Secretary of Justice, by resolution of July 24, 2001, denied Rossis petition for review.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2002, Rossi challenged the
resolutions of the Secretary of Justice by petition for certiorari in the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the petition for certiorari, Rossi insisted that the Secretary of Justice had committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the suspension of
the criminal proceedings by the City Prosecutor of Makati on account of the existence of a
prejudicial question, and in sustaining the dismissal of the complaints for estafa.
On May 30, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 11 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the assailed resolution is hereby MODIFIED and the
instant petition is GRANTED in so far as the issue of the existence of prejudicial question is
concerned. Accordingly, the order suspending the preliminary investigation in I.S. No. 98-4002429 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the dismissal of the complaint for estafa is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Issues
Hence, this appeal by Reyes.
Reyes asserts that the CA erred in ruling that there was no prejudicial question that warranted
the suspension of the criminal proceedings against him; that the petition suffered fatal defects
that merited its immediate dismissal; that the CA was wrong in relying on the pronouncements
in Balgos, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan 12 and Umali v. Intermediate Appellate Court 13 because the
factual backgrounds thereat were not similar to that obtaining here; and that the Secretary of
Justice did not commit any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In his comment,14 Rossi counters that the petition for review should be outrightly dismissed
because of its fatal defect; that the CA did not err in ruling that the action for rescission of
contract did not pose a prejudicial question that would suspend the criminal proceedings.
Reyes submitted a reply,15 declaring that the defect in the affidavit of service attached to his
petition for review had been due to oversight; that he had substantially complied with the rules;
that there existed a prejudicial question that could affect the extent of his liability in light of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000; and that the CA erred in finding that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion.
To be resolved is whether or not the civil action for rescission of the contract of sale raised a
prejudicial question that required the suspension of the criminal prosecution for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
Ruling
The petition for review is without merit.
A prejudicial question generally comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the former an issue that must first be determined
before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.16 The rationale for the suspension on the ground of a prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisions.17
Two elements that must concur in order for a civil case to be considered a prejudicial question
are expressly stated in Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or
not the criminal action may proceed.
In Sabandal v. Tongco,18 the concept of prejudicial question is explained in this wise:

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil, the following requisites must be
present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try
said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related to the
issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided the other
element or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that the civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence
of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity "that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case," therefore,
the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.
Contending that the rescission of the contract of sale constitutes a prejudicial question, Reyes
posits that the resolution of the civil action will be determinative of whether or not he was
criminally liable for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. He states that if the contract
would be rescinded, his obligation to pay under the conditional deed of sale would be
extinguished, and such outcome would necessarily result in the dismissal of the criminal
proceedings for the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The action for the rescission of the deed of sale on the ground that Advanced Foundation did
not comply with its obligation actually seeks one of the alternative remedies available to a
contracting party under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfilment and the rescission of the obligation, with
the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfilment, if the latter should become impossible.
The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing
of a period.
This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the
thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.
Article 1191 of the Civil Code recognizes an implied or tacit resolutory condition in reciprocal
obligations. The condition is imposed by law, and applies even if there is no corresponding
agreement thereon between the parties. The explanation for this is that in reciprocal obligations
a party incurs in delay once the other party has performed his part of the contract; hence, the
party who has performed or is ready and willing to perform may rescind the obligation if the
other does not perform, or is not ready and willing to perform. 19

It is true that the rescission of a contract results in the extinguishment of the obligatory relation
as if it was never created, the extinguishment having a retroactive effect. The rescission is
equivalent to invalidating and unmaking the juridical tie, leaving things in their status before the
celebration of the contract.20 However, until the contract is rescinded, the juridical tie and the
concomitant obligations subsist.
To properly appreciate if there is a prejudicial question to warrant the suspension of the criminal
actions, reference is made to the elements of the crimes charged. The violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 requires the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) the making,
drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the
maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the
subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or
dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
stop payment.21 The issue in the criminal actions upon the violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
is, therefore, whether or not Reyes issued the dishonoured checks knowing them to be without
funds upon presentment. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for rescission is
whether or not the breach in the fulfilment of Advanced Foundations obligation warranted the
rescission of the conditional sale. If, after trial on the merits in the civil action, Advanced
Foundation would be found to have committed material breach as to warrant the rescission of
the contract, such result would not necessarily mean that Reyes would be absolved of the
criminal responsibility for issuing the dishonored checks because, as the aforementioned
elements show, he already committed the violations upon the dishonor of the checks that he
had issued at a time when the conditional sale was still fully binding upon the parties. His
obligation to fund the checks or to make arrangements for them with the drawee bank should
not be tied up to the future event of extinguishment of the obligation under the contract of sale
through rescission. Indeed, under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere issuance of a worthless
check was already the offense in itself. Under such circumstances, the criminal proceedings for
the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 could proceed despite the pendency of the civil action
for rescission of the conditional sale.
Accordingly, we agree with the holding of the CA that the civil action for the rescission of
contract was not determinative of the guilt or innocence of Reyes. We consider the exposition
by the CA of its reasons to be appropriate enough, to wit:
xxxx
We find merit in the petition.
A careful perusal of the complaint for rescission of contract and damages reveals that the
causes of action advanced by respondent Reyes are the alleged misrepresentation committed
by the petitioner and AFCSC and their alleged failure to comply with his demand for proofs of
ownership. On one hand, he posits that his consent to the contract was vitiated by the
fraudulent act of the company in misrepresenting the condition and quality of the dredging
pump. Alternatively, he claims that the company committed a breach of contract which is a
ground for the rescission thereof. Either way, he in effect admits the validity and the binding
effect of the deed pending any adjudication which nullifies the same.
Indeed, under the Jaw on contracts, vitiated consent does not make a contract unenforceable
but merely voidable, the remedy of which would be to annul the contract since voidable

contracts produce legal effects until they are annulled. On the other hand, rescission of
contracts in case of breach pursuant to Article 1191 of the Civil Code of the Philippines also
presupposes a valid contract unless rescinded or annulled.
As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the
jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected
with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal
action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action
is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case.
In this light, it is clear that the pendency of the civil case does not bar the continuation of the
proceedings in the preliminary investigation on the ground that it poses a prejudicial question.
Considering that the contracts are deemed to be valid until rescinded, the consideration and
obligatory effect thereof are also deemed to have been validly made, thus demandable.
Consequently, there was no failure of consideration at the time when the subject checks were
dishonored. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review; AFFIRMS the decision the Court of
Appeals promulgated on May 30, 2003; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166836

September 4, 2013

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC., PETITIONER,

vs.
SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ, ALBERT C. AGUIRRE, TEODORO B. ARCENAS, JR., MAXY

S. ABAD, JAMES G. BARBERS, STEPHEN N. SARINO, ENRIQUE N. ZALAMEA, JR.,

MARIANO M. MARTIN, ORLANDO O. SAMSON, CATHERINE R. AGUIRRE, AND ANTONIO
V. AGCAOILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of
residential subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel
the seller to deliver the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly
considered a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 9571 on the ground of a prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a
logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.
Antecedents
Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel Properties), a domestic corporation engaged
in the real estate business, purchased in 1992, 1993 and April 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF
Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized
rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),2 130
residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Paraaque, containing a total area of
44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The transactions were
embodied in three separate deeds of sale. 3 The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first
and second deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel Properties, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the
41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565 square meters purchased under the third deed of
sale, executed in April 1993 and for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of
P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to San Miguel Properties.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land
purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its
rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver
by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May 17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. 4
BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands. Thus, on August 15, 2000, San
Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City
(OCP Las Pias) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of
titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957
(I.S. No. 00-2256).5
At the same time, San Miguel Properties sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB (HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183),6 praying to compel BF Homes to release the
20 TCTs in its favor.
In their joint counter-affidavit submitted in I.S. No. 00-2256,7 respondent directors and officers of
BF Homes refuted San Miguel Properties assertions by contending that: (a) San Miguel
Properties claim was not legally demandable because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority
to sell the 130 lots in 1992 and 1993 due to his having been replaced as BF Homes
rehabilitation receiver by the SEC on May 17, 1989; (b) the deeds of sale conveying the lots
were irregular for being undated and unnotarized; (c) the claim should have been brought to the

SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases, it was essential to
suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable the receiver to effectively
exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial interference that could unduly hinder the
rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the lots involved were under custodia legis in view of
the pending receivership proceedings, necessarily stripping the OCP Las Pias of the
jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
On October 10, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the OCP
Las Pias,8 citing the pendency of BF Homes receivership case in the SEC. In its
comment/opposition, BF Homes opposed the motion to suspend. In the meantime, however, the
SEC terminated BF Homes receivership on September 12, 2000, prompting San Miguel
Properties to file on October 27, 2000 a reply to BF Homes comment/opposition coupled with a
motion to withdraw the sought suspension of proceedings due to the intervening termination of
the receivership.9
On October 23, 2000, the OCP Las Pias rendered its resolution, 10 dismissing San Miguel
Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground that no
action could be filed by or against a receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed
him; that the implementation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 exclusively
pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; that there existed a prejudicial question
necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the
distressed BF Homes was first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and that no
prior resort to administrative jurisdiction had been made; that there appeared to be no probable
cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
On February 20, 2001, the OCP Las Pias denied San Miguel Properties motion for
reconsideration filed on November 28, 2000, holding that BF Homes directors and officers
could not be held liable for the non-delivery of the TCTs under Presidential Decree No. 957
without a definite ruling on the legality of Atty. Orendains actions; and that the criminal liability
would attach only after BF Homes did not comply with a directive of the HLURB directing it to
deliver the titles.11
San Miguel Properties appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pias to the Department of
Justice (DOJ), but the DOJ Secretary denied the appeal on October 15, 2001, holding:
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling
of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City. Established jurisprudence supports the position taken
by the City Prosecutor concerned.
There is no dispute that aside from the instant complaint for violation of PD 957, there is still
pending with the Housing and Land Use Resulatory Board (HLURB, for short) a complaint for
specific performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire into, and rule on, the validity of
the sales transactions involving the lots in question and entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in
behalf of BF Homes.
As early as in the case of Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, the Supreme Court had
ruled that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate business and
practices under PD 957. This is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Union Bank of the
Philippines versus HLURB, G.R. [No.] 953364, June 29, 1992 and C.T. Torres Enterprises vs.
Hilionada, 191 SCRA 286.

The said ruling simply means that unless and until the HLURB rules on the validity of the
transactions involving the lands in question with specific reference to the capacity of Atty.
Orendain to bind BF Homes in the said transactions, there is as yet no basis to charge
criminally respondents for non-delivery of the subject land titles. In other words, complainant
cannot invoke the penal provision of PD 957 until such time that the HLURB shall have ruled
and decided on the validity of the transactions involving the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)
The DOJ eventually denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration. 13
Ruling of the CA
Undaunted, San Miguel Properties elevated the DOJs resolutions to the CA on certiorari and
mandamus (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008), contending that respondent DOJ Secretary had acted
with grave abuse in denying their appeal and in refusing to charge the directors and officers of
BF Homes with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. San Miguel Properties submitted
the issue of whether or not HLURB Case No. REM-082400-11183 presented a prejudicial
question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of Presidential Decree
No. 957.
In its assailed decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 73008,14 the CA
dismissed San Miguel Properties petition, holding and ruling as follows:
From the foregoing, the conclusion that may be drawn is that the rule on prejudicial question
generally applies to civil and criminal actions only.
However, an exception to this rule is provided in Quiambao vs. Osorio cited by the respondents.
In this case, an issue in an administrative case was considered a prejudicial question to the
resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the suspension of the latter until after
termination of the administrative proceedings.
Quiambao vs. Osorio is not the only instance when the Supreme Court relaxed the application
of the rule on prejudicial question.
In Tamin vs. CA involving two (2) civil actions, the Highest Court similarly applied the rule on
prejudicial question when it directed petitioner therein to put up a bond for just compensation
should the demolition of private respondents building proved to be illegal as a result of a
pending cadastral suit in another tribunal.
City of Pasig vs. COMELEC is yet another exception where a civil action involving a boundary
dispute was considered a prejudicial question which must be resolved prior to an administrative
proceeding for the holding of a plebiscite on the affected areas.
In fact, in Vidad vs. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, it was ruled that in the interest of good
order, courts can suspend action in one case pending determination of another case closely
interrelated or interlinked with it.

It thus appears that public respondent did not act with grave abuse of discretion x x x when he
applied the rule on prejudicial question to the instant proceedings considering that the issue on
the validity of the sale transactions x x x by x x x Orendain in behalf of BF Homes, Inc., is
closely intertwined with the purported criminal culpability of private respondents, as
officers/directors of BF Homes, Inc., arising from their failure to deliver the titles of the parcels of
land included in the questioned conveyance.
All told, to sustain the petitioners theory that the result of the HLURB proceedings is not
determinative of the criminal liability of private respondents under PD 957 would be to espouse
an absurdity. If we were to assume that the HLURB finds BFHI under no obligation to delve the
subject titles, it would be highly irregular and contrary to the ends of justice to pursue a criminal
case against private respondents for the non-delivery of certificates of title which they are not
under any legal obligation to turn over in the first place. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On a final note, absent grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutorial arm of the
government as represented by herein public respondent, courts will not interfere with the
discretion of a public prosecutor in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before him. A
public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal
information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt
nor prima facie case has been established by the complaining party.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus is hereby
DENIED. The Resolutions dated 15 October 2001 and 12 July 2002 of the Department of
Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 15
The CA denied San Miguel Properties motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2005. 16
Issues
Aggrieved, San Miguel Properties is now on appeal, raising the following for consideration and
resolution, to wit:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE, SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS
WHEN IT DISMISSED PETITIONERS CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS PETITION TO
ORDER AND DIRECT RESPONDENT SECRETARY TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR
VIOLATION OF SECTION 25, PD. 957 IN THAT:
THE OBLIGATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO DELIVER TO PETITIONER THE
TITLES TO 20 FULLY-PAID LOTS IS MANDATED BY SECTION 25, PD 957. IN FACT, THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAD DULY CONFIRMED THE SAME PER ITS DECISION
DATED 27 JANUARY 2005 IN O.P. CASE NO. 03-E-203, ENTITLED "SMPI V. BF HOMES,
INC.".
A FORTIORI, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILURE AND/OR REFUSAL TO DELIVER TO
PETITIONER THE SUBJECT TITLES CONSTITUTES CRIMINAL OFFENSE PER SECTIONS
25 AND 39, PD 957 FOR WHICH IT IS THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF RESPONDENT
SECRETARY TO INDICT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEREFOR.

IN ANY EVENT, THE HLURB CASE DOES NOT PRESENT A "PREJUDICIAL QUESTION" TO
THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASE SINCE THE FORMER INVOLVES AN ISSUE SEPARATE
AND DISTINCT FROM THE ISSUE INVOLVED IN THE LATTER. CONSEQUENTLY, THE
HLURB CASE HAS NO CORRELATION, TIE NOR LINKAGE TO THE PRESENT CRIMINAL
CASE WHICH CAN PROCEED INDEPENDENTLY THEREOF.
IN FACT, THE CRIMINAL CULPABILITY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS EMANATE FROM
THEIR MALA PROHIBITA NON-DELIVERY OF THE TITLES TO TWENTY (20) FULLY-PAID
PARCELS OF LAND TO PETITIONER, AND NOT FROM THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE HLURBS RULING IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE.
NONETHELESS, BY DECREEING THAT PETITIONERS CRIMINAL COMPLAINT IS
PREMATURE, BOTH THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RESPONDENT SECRETARY HAD
IMPLIEDLY ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR THE CRIME CHARGED. 17
It is relevant at this juncture to mention the outcome of the action for specific performance and
damages that San Miguel Properties instituted in the HLURB simultaneously with its filing of the
complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. On January 25, 2002, the HLURB Arbiter
ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue
of Atty. Orendains authority to enter into the transactions in BF Homes behalf, because the
final resolution by the SEC was a logical antecedent to the determination of the issue involved in
the complaint before the HLURB. Upon appeal, the HLURB Board of Commissioners (HLURB
Board), citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, affirmed the HLURB Arbiters decision, holding
that although no prejudicial question could arise, strictly speaking, if one case was civil and the
other administrative, it nonetheless opted to suspend its action on the cases pending the final
outcome of the administrative proceeding in the interest of good order. 18
Not content with the outcome, San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President
(OP), arguing that the HLURB erred in suspending the proceedings. On January 27, 2004, the
OP reversed the HLURB Boards ruling, holding thusly:
The basic complaint in this case is one for specific performance under Section 25 of the
Presidential Decree (PD) 957 "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective."
As early as August 1987, the Supreme Court already recognized the authority of the HLURB, as
successor agency of the National Housing Authority (NHA), to regulate, pursuant to PD 957, in
relation to PD 1344, the real estate trade, with exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases "involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligation filed by buyers of
subdivision lots against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman," the HLURB, in
the exercise of its adjudicatory powers and functions, "must interpret and apply contracts,
determine the rights of the parties under these contracts and award[s] damages whenever
appropriate."
Given its clear statutory mandate, the HLURBs decision to await for some forum to decide if
ever one is forthcoming the issue on the authority of Orendain to dispose of subject lots before
it peremptorily resolves the basic complaint is unwarranted, the issues thereon having been
joined and the respective position papers and the evidence of the parties having been
submitted. To us, it behooved the HLURB to adjudicate, with the usual dispatch, the right and
obligation of the parties in line with its own appreciation of the obtaining facts and applicable

law. To borrow from Mabubha Textile Mills Corporation vs. Ongpin, it does not have to rely on
the finding of others to discharge this adjudicatory functions. 19
After its motion for reconsideration was denied, BF Homes appealed to the CA (C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 83631), raising as issues: (a) whether or not the HLURB had the jurisdiction to decide with
finality the question of Atty. Orendains authority to enter into the transaction with San Miguel
Properties in BF Homes behalf, and rule on the rights and obligations of the parties to the
contract; and (b) whether or not the HLURB properly suspended the proceedings until the SEC
resolved with finality the matter regarding such authority of Atty. Orendain.
The CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 83631,20 decreeing that the HLURB, not
the SEC, had jurisdiction over San Miguel Properties complaint. It affirmed the OPs decision
and ordered the remand of the case to the HLURB for further proceedings on the ground that
the case involved matters within the HLURBs competence and expertise pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, viz:
[T]he High Court has consistently ruled that the NHA or the HLURB has jurisdiction over
complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those
aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory
obligations.
Hence, the HLURB should take jurisdiction over respondents complaint because it pertains to
matters within the HLURBs competence and expertise. The proceedings before the HLURB
should not be suspended.
While We sustain the Office of the President, the case must be remanded to the HLURB. This is
in recognition of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The fairest and most equitable course to
take under the circumstances is to remand the case to the HLURB for the proper presentation of
evidence.21
Did the Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of San
Miguel Properties criminal complaint for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957 for lack of
probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question?
The question boils down to whether the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the
delivery of the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for
the violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial
question.
Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
1.
Action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises
a prejudicial question BF Homes posture that the administrative case for specific performance
in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined before the criminal
case for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 could be resolved is correct.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to
try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but is so intimately connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.22 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid
conflicting decisions.23 The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section
7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to
San Miguel Properties submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of
because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specif ic
performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the
proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of Section 25 24 of Presidential
Decree No. 957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action
civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction
over the action was exclusive and original. 25
The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial
question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific
performance case were so related with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the
violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former
would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the nature
of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact performance of a contract
in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the precise terms agreed upon by a
party bound to fulfill it.26 Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there
must first be a breach of the contract.27 The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the Civil
Code, which reads:
Article 1191. The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the
obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.
The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with
the payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen
fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or rescission with
damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the remedy of rescission in reciprocal
obligations within the context of Article 1124 of the former Civil Code which used the term
resolution. The remedy of resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a partys
breach of the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured party to
rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates alternative remedies for the
injured party who is granted the option to pursue, as principal actions, either the rescission or
the specific performance of the obligation, with payment of damages in either case. 28

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision
lots and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations
and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic requirements and amenities, as well
as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,29 such as failure to deliver
titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances. Presidential Decree No. 957
authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and license of the real estate
subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers in certain instances, as well as
provides the procedure to be observed in such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and
other penalties in case of violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would
determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally entitled to demand the delivery of
the remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes
directors and officers were criminally liable for withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the
former must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel
Properties to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have
the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having been terminated
by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Section 25 of Presidential
Decree No. 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Worthy to note at this juncture is that a prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the
guilt or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply test the
sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the
criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essential elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the
information, considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of evidence
on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the allegations in the
information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the
criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.30
2.
Doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable
That the action for specific performance was an administrative case pending in the HLURB,
instead of in a court of law, was of no consequence at all. As earlier mentioned, the action for
specific performance, although civil in nature, could be brought only in the HLURB. This
situation conforms to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There has been of late a proliferation of
administrative agencies, mostly regulatory in function. It is in favor of these agencies that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is frequently invoked, not to defeat the resort to the judicial
adjudication of controversies but to rely on the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of
such agencies in their resolution. The Court has observed that one thrust of the proliferation is
that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights under contracts are no
longer a uniquely judicial function exercisable only by the regular courts. 31
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been increasingly called into play on matters demanding
the special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time
within the jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise,

specialized skills, and knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it

involves technical matters or intricate questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an
appropriate administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts although
the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The application of the doctrine does not
call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its suspension until after the matters
within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and determined. 32
To accord with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot and will not determine a
controversy involving a question within the competence of an administrative tribunal, the
controversy having been so placed within the special competence of the administrative tribunal
under a regulatory scheme. In that instance, the judicial process is suspended pending referral
to the administrative body for its view on the matter in dispute. Consequently, if the courts
cannot resolve a question that is within the legal competence of an administrative body prior to
the resolution of that question by the latter, especially where the question demands the exercise
of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of
the administrative agency to ascertain technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered,
suspension or dismissal of the action is proper. 33
3.
Other submissions of petitioner are unwarranted
It is not tenable for San Miguel Properties to argue that the character of a violation of Section 25
of Presidential Decree No. 957 as malum prohibitum, by which criminal liability attached to BF
Homes directors and officers by the mere failure to deliver the TCTs, already rendered the
suspension unsustainable.34 The mere fact that an act or omission was malum prohibitum did
not do away with the initiative inherent in every court to avoid an absurd result by means of
rendering a reasonable interpretation and application of the procedural law. Indeed, the
procedural law must always be given a reasonable construction to preclude absurdity in its
application.35 Hence, a literal application of the principle governing prejudicial questions is to be
eschewed if such application would produce unjust and absurd results or unreasonable
consequences.
San Miguel Properties further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial
question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because respondents had not
themselves initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal action.1wphi1 It
contends that the defense of a prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could
only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case.
The submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is
allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law
makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish. 36
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 24, 2004 by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO. 73008; and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183805

July 3, 2013

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI, PETITIONER,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the
reversal of the Decision1 dated February 1, 2008 and Resolution 2 dated July 24, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City in an Information which reads:
On or about December 8, 1999, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without
said marriage having been legally dissolved or annulled, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously contract a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo, to the damage and prejudice
of the latter.
Contrary to law.3
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending
civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed
by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would
exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
Consequently, the arraignment and pre-trial were reset by the RTC of Pasig City, in view of the
filing of the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by petitioner.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a
subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from
the beginning.

Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the
dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared void by the RTC.
In an Order4 dated July 7, 2006, the RTC of Pasig City granted petitioners Manifestation and
Motion to Dismiss, to wit:
The motion is anchored on the allegation that this case should be dismissed as a decision dated
December 1, 2004 had already been rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 in Civil Case No. 01-6043 (entitled: "Karla Medina-Capili versus James Walter P.
Capili and Shirley G. Tismo," a case for declaration of nullity of marriage) nullifying the second
marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo and said decision is already
final.
In the opposition filed by the private prosecutor to the motion, it was stated, among others, that
the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this abovecaptioned case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
WHEREFORE, after a judicious evaluation of the issue and arguments of the parties, this Court
is of the humble opinion that there is merit on the Motion to dismiss filed by the accused as it
appears that the second marriage between James Walter P. Capili and Shirley G. Tismo had
already been nullified by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72 of Antipolo City which has
declared "the voidness, non-existent or incipient invalidity" of the said second marriage. As
such, this Court submits that there is no more bigamy to speak of.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed an appeal before the CA.
Thus, in a Decision5 dated February 1, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the RTCs decision.
The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated 07 July 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 152 in Crim. Case No. 128370 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case
is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said decision, but the same was
denied in a Resolution[7] dated July 24, 2008.
Accordingly, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that:
THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DISREGARD
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE PRONOUNCED BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AND TO REVERSE THE ORDER DATED JULY 7, 2006 OF THE TRIAL
COURT (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, BRANCH 152) ISSUED IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 128370 GRANTING THE MOTION TO DISMISS THE CASE OF

BIGAMY AGAINST PETITIONER, INASMUCH AS THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID

ORDER IS BASED ON THE FINDINGS AND/OR FACTS OF THE CASE IN THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY, BRANCH 72, IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 AND THE CONCLUDING AND DISPOSITIVE PORTION IN
THE SAID DECISION WHICH STATES THAT, AFTER PERUSAL OF THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD AND THE TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES X X X, THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT
SHIRLEY G. TISMO, IS HEREBY NULL AND VOID.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI
AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO CITY,
BRANCH 72 IN ITS DECISION IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043, IS ON THE GROUND
THAT IT IS BIGAMOUS IN NATURE, DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH
FINDINGS OR FACTS ON WHICH IT IS BASED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 14 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND IN CONCLUDING THAT THE SAID
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL
OF THE BIGAMY CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, WHICH RULING IS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF THE SAID DECISION AND
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE.
THE CASE OF TENEBRO V. COURT OF APPEALS SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. IT IS AN
EXCEPTION TO EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE INVOLVING DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE AND IS APPLICABLE ONLY TO THE SET OF FACTS IN
THE SAID CASE, AND THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE IS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HENCE, THERE IS NO LEGAL
BASIS FOR ABANDONING EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AS WHERE IN THE
INSTANT CASE THE GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS
VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 3 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 4 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE USE BY
RESPONDENT SHIRLEY G. TISMO OF THE SURNAME "CAPILI" IS ILLEGAL
INASMUCH AS THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO
CITY, BRANCH 72 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-6043 DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI AND SHIRLEY G. TISMO HAD
LONG BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE AS OF THE DATE OF THE SAID
DECISION ON DECEMBER 1, 2004 AND DULY RECORDED IN THE RECORDS OF
ENTRIES IN THE CORRESPONDING BOOK IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF PASIG CITY AND THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE. 8
In essence, the issue is whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second
marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy.
We rule in the negative.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes the crime of bigamy as follows:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are: (1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity. 9
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when
the Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted on December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for being
bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so
long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People,10 the Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for bigamy ruling that the
crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the subsequent marriage without the
previous one having been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had
no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage
be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. 11
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling in the aforementioned case and ruled that
what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held that the parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so

declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is
that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. 12
Finally, it is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law.13 It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the
time he contracted the second marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal
charge for bigamy against him.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 1,
2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30444 are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264

October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated
that: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a
determination as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm
the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set
aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for

unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the constitution." 1 (as

originally underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque." 2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus:
petitioner is a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the
House of Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction
of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently
stated, was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May
2013. Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a
precedent oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed
of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14
May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x
x As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis
of her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable
fact we here repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was
WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to
reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's
certificate of candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of
petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her
proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even any
attempt to remove it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation
may be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En
Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court."

Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a
restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the
barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner
did not move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from
being proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of
candidacy has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was
a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from the
Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse
to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more
imperative. She would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a
restraining order, which would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on
irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was
not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her
proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a
proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on
14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18
in the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND
EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme
Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from
promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule
18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a
division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance
upon the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date
of its promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she
in fact received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13. 4 On that date, she had
absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove the
restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two
days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the
Rule stating that her proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme
Court is even indicative of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation
as the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over
the issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she
directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her
procured proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by Division and

then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision. In
other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial
actions thereon, past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the
congressional seat that she sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons
that lead to the impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of
the House of Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with
knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which
has exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written
constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a
Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the
rightful winner in the election for such membership. 5 Indeed, the action for cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the
COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided
by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC
to do to decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC
regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The
decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained when no
restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days
from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone
become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the
decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably
needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation
with the Supreme Court decision as basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action
for a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules
and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard
summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC
Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission
may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear
the case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section
3 that when the proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may, after due notice, be required to submit their position
paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary
evidence; x x x and that this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the
hearing and reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the
Division to any of its officials x x x.

b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner because of passion or hostility. 6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of
the COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme
Court's authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that defines the way
petitioner's submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the
disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and
admitted in evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay
and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends
that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules
of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission.
In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted
by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given
every opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's
petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner
had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of
the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be
given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral

argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of

procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the
COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office
the law requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine
Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid
requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof
regarding her American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case.
She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or
naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated
February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American
passport which she continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his
allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless
and until she can establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual
Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold
any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's
COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a
holder of a US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of
proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with
the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted
that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American
citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said
motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.
Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve
the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to
petitioner's explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then
it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it

to address the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated
only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.1wphi1
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her
oath of office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is
already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the
records evidence on matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of
allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not present it
at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed
lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as
Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a
natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot
be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met
as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration. Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered
as the oath of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s
citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the
HRET insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned.
The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due
course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be
legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of
the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action
before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of
jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision,
there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that
sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER,
who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and
unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification
of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such,
proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just
stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary,
proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made
clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of
Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the

HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed
winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of
petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the
crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of
Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be
attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25
June 2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional
duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the way
for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can
very well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of
Representatives.8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was
contained in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was
internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts approval to have the explanation
published as it is now appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well
be in order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of
the parties, but continues until the case is terminated. 9 When petitioner filed her Petition for
Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when
it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the
petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly
has legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition,
negative and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel
petitioner against trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests.
Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of
the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is
affirmed. Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 172060

September 13, 2010

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action
for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223
(RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392
(Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the
RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted
that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him
before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 3 holding that the pendency of the
case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if the
validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City ruled:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the
[Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order, 5 the RTC Quezon City
denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22
August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender
commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform
all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had already been
committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the charge of frustrated
parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case
Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure 6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action.
In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled
to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information.
The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February
2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7 February 2005.8
Respondents petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was filed on

5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal
case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the
criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal
action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. 10 A prejudicial
question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, 12
which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse." 13 The relationship between
the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder14 or homicide.15
However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue
in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is
not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.16 At the time of the
commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent
dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have
no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged
crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a

second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal liability

for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court declared in
that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No.
04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.