Jasmine Solorzano-Maya

Philosophy
Ortega, Gary
7 September 2015
A Question of Matter and Soul
The question of mind and body and their relationship with one another has
always puzzled the mind of philosophers. To this day, it is still uncertain what the mind
and body are, and whether they work together as one unit, or individual pieces and how
that may affect a person as a whole. Throughout the article, The Mind-Body Problem,
Jerry A. Fodor discusses the multiple theories, including subcategory theories, and their
flaws in explaining the phenomena, which is the mind and body. Primarily, the flaws
which Fodor perceives to exist rely on whether the mind is of the physical or spiritual
realm and how that affects its interaction with its surroundings. The mind and body are
essential to the human experience and how they perceive the world through personal
thoughts, actions and senses. Being able to understand how and why they work, will
help people be able to better function and live a happy life.

Behaviorism questions the minds capabilities to exist and affect through the idea
of the brains mental states. Fodor references both radical behaviorism, a form of
materialist eliminativism, and logical behaviorism, a form of materialist reductionism.
Radical behaviorism, being the belief that a mental state does not exist and that all
thoughts have a neurophysiological explanation or a response to stimuli has brought
about the question of current progress in psychological research. In reference to radical
behaviorism, Fodor does justice to point out that, particularly in the case of human

behavior psychological theories satisfying the methodological tenets of radical

behaviorism have proved largely sterile, as would be expected if the postulated mental
processes are real and causally effective. Here, the existence of mental causation
being considered a physical matter and how that affects its influence is also questioned.
The research advancing in stimuli and responses was not discrediting the theory of
mental causation, however, it seemed closer to the truth for many philosophers than
dualism.

Logical behaviorism emerged soon after in, which a mental state did exist but is a
product of behavioral disposition. This theory allowed room for mental causation, or
thoughts, but with an explanation limited to stimuli response. In other words, the
thought is in reference to the stimuli and the action following, in reference to the
response. However, as Fodor points out, In the realm of the mental, many examples of
event-event causation involve one mental state's causing another, and for this kind of
causation logical behaviorism provides no analysis. While logical behaviorism allows
room for mental causation, it fails to explain additional forms. This theory explains a
mental cause and its interaction with a physical cause, but leaves a physical cause and
its effect to another physical cause unspoken. Cause and effect, references events such
as thoughts to physical actions or physical actions leading to another physical action.
The example Fodor used being a glass broken by the action of being struck. In this
case, the question of the mind and its effects on the surrounding events focuses more
on its interaction with the body and the explanation of stimuli responses.

The central state identity theory, one separate from those previously discussed,
focuses on the idea that mental states are identical to neuropsychological states. In
other words, the idea of the mind can be explained physically, and the idea of it being
referred to as more spiritually is no longer in question. Because this theory states that
the thought is identical to a neuropsychological state, the physical evidence of the
thought would be the neurons being used to create it. Under the central identity theory,
are token physicalism and type physicalism, and within those lye the flaws of the theory.
As Fodor explained, token physicalism does not rule out the logical possibility of
machines and disembodied spirits having mental properties. This means that although
the theory supports thoughts possessing physical evidence, the idea of mentality
existing within something that does not contain human neurons is not impossible. On
the other hand, type physicalism states the opposite, however, the problem with type
physicalism is that there are possible information-processing systems with the same
psychological constitution as human beings but not the same physical organization. In
the case of this theory, type physicalism is more reliant on the software, meaning things
such as beliefs and pain can be identified by the correct program, even if it is not
human. If this were true, then it would be false to say that mental and
neuropsychological states are identical because a machine in the mental state does not
contain neurons. This leads back to the question of the physical state of the mind or the
spiritual state.

Functionalism is also discussed as the concept that a mental state can be

defined by its causal relations to other mental states and is fully compatible with token
physicalism. Because of its combination of materialist alternatives to that of dualsim, it

has grown increasingly popular among non-dualists in modern time. Fodor analyzes
functionalism and states that, an obvious objection to functionalism as a theory of the
mind is that [it] is not limited to mental states and processes. While it is open to the
idea that objects of similar mental states are interdefined and can be realized by many
systems, even of unfamiliar physical states, it does not open the door to objects
pertaining a mental concept such as pain or emotions. The theory of functionalism now
brings about the question of mental concepts and the physical or spiritual existence of
them within the mind.

One of the most agreed upon theories when discussing the mind and bodys
existence is dualism. Unfortunately, dualism was the one theory which Fodor quickly
glossed over despite its popularity. Dualism is the theory that the mind and body coexistent and interact by causally influencing one another. In other words, both the mind
and body are separate individual pieces of a human being that work together to transfer
thoughts into actions. In the beginning of the article, Fodor made note to point out the
flaw in this theory by questioning that, If the mind...has no position in physical
space...how can the nonphysical give rise to the physical without violating the laws of
the conservation of mass, of energy and of momentum? Someone, such as a
materialist, might point out that something which does hold a physical foundation can in
no way affect something that does. The idea of psychologists and their use of applying
experiments in the physical sciences also plays a role in the doubting of dualism. They
question that their experimental methods for physical science cannot be applied to the
mind if dualism states that the mind is not of the physical realm.

Whether the mind is of the physical or spiritual realm, and how that affects its
functionality, is no doubt the salient and recurring issue discussed throughout the article
and is questioned in every theory. Fodors article dissected the different and popular
theories which seek to resolve this mystery and compared everyone of them. However,
without knowing what the definition of a mind truly is and its ability to cause and effect
its surrounding it, one can never truly come to the conclusion of a stable theory.