PARISH PRIEST OF VICTORIA v.

RIGOR
This case is about the efficaciousness or enforceability of a devise of ricelands
located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, with a total area of around forty- four hectares That
devise was made in the will of the late Father Pascual Rigor, a native of Victoria
Tarlac, in favor of his nearest male relative who would study for the priesthood.

The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a trustee of the said lands, appealed
to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order of the
probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative.
Father Rigor, the parish priest of Pulilan, Bulacan, died on August 9, 1935, leaving a
will executed on October 29, 1933 which was probated by the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac in its order of December 5, 1935. Named as devisees in the will were the
testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-Escobar, Belina
Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise to his
cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda.
Conditions:
(1.a) absolutely prohibits the sale of these lands located above objects of this
legacy;
(2d) The legatee mine kin have the right to begin to enjoy and manage this legacy
as you begin to Sacred Theologius the crossover, and ordained a priest until his
death; but legatee loses this right to manage and enjoy this legacy to leave to
continue their studies for ordination to the Priesthood (Priest).
The legatee once Priest and be bound to celebrate each year TWENTY (20) Masses
prayed for the repose of my soul and my deceased parents, and if the current
legatee, would remain excommunicated, ipso facto deprives him this legacy, and
the administration of this happened by the current pastor and his successors of the
Catholic Iglecia Victoria, Tarlac.
And time interval no legatee conditioning according to what is stated above, the
administration passed this legacy by the current pastor and his Catholic successors,
Victoria, Tarlac.
The pastor administrator estate legacy accumulate annually all the products that
may have estate legacy, making or taking of annual products five (5) percent for
administration, and rights of the twenty (20) Masses prayed that The pastor should
celebrate each year, depositing all remaining legacy estate products in a bank, on
behalf of estate legacy.
A project of partition was submitted to the court. Judge Roman A. Cruz in his order
of August 15, 1940, approving the project of partition, directed that after payment

of the obligations of the estate. the administratrix and Judge Cruz did not bother to
analyze the meaning and implications of Father Rigor's bequest to his nearest male
relative who would study for the priesthood. Inasmuch as no nephew of the testator
claimed the devise and as the administratrix and the legal heirs believed that the
parish priest of Victoria had no right to administer the ricelands, the same were not
delivered to that ecclesiastic.
Thirteen years after the approval of the project of partition, the parish priest of
Victoria filed in the pending testate proceeding a petition praying for the
appointment of a new administrator (succeeding the deceased administration
Florencia Rigor), who should deliver to the church the said ricelands, and further
praying that the possessors thereof be ordered to render an accounting of the fruits.
The probate court granted the petition. The intestate heirs of Father Rigor countered
with a petition dated March 25, 1957 praying that the bequest be d inoperative and
that they be adjudged as the persons entitled to the said ricelands. The bequest
inoperative and adjudicated the ricelands to the testator's legal heirs in his order of
June 28, 1957. The parish priest filed two motions for reconsideration.
Judge De Aquino granted the respond motion for reconsideration in his order of
December 10, 1957 on the ground that the testator had a grandnephew named
Edgardo G. Cunanan (the grandson of his first cousin) who was a seminarian in the
San Jose Seminary of the Jesuit Fathers in Quezon City. The administrator was
directed to deliver the ricelands to the parish priest of Victoria as trustee.
The legal heirs appealed to the Court of Appeals. It reversed that order. It held that
Father Rigor had created a testamentary trust for his nearest male relative who
would take the holy orders but that such trust could exist only for twenty years
because to enforce it beyond that period would violate "the rule against
perpetuities. It ruled that since no legatee claimed the ricelands within twenty years
after the testator's death, the same should pass to his legal heirs, citing articles 888
and 912(2) of the old Civil Code and article 870 of the new Civil Code.
The parish priest in this appeal contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not
finding that the testator created a public charitable trust and in not liberally
construing the testamentary provisions so as to render the trust operative and to
prevent intestacy.
As refutation, the legal heirs argue that the Court of Appeals d the bequest
inoperative because no one among the testator's nearest male relatives had studied
for the priesthood and not because the trust was a private charitable trust.
According to the legal heirs, that factual finding is binding on this Court. They point
out that appellant priest's change of theory cannot be countenanced in this appeal.
ISSUE: the primary issue is the determination of the testator's intention which is the
law of the case

RULING:
The will of the testator is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments.
When his intention is clearly and precisely expressed, any interpretation must be in
accord with the plain and literal meaning of his words, except when it may certainly
appear that his intention was different from that literally expressed.
What then did the testator mean by "el intervalo de tiempo que no haya legatario
acondicionado"? The reasonable view is that he was referring to a situation whereby
his nephew living at the time of his death, who would like to become a priest, was
still in grade school or in high school or was not yet in the seminary. In that case,
the parish priest of Victoria would administer the ricelands before the nephew
entered the seminary. But the moment the testator's nephew entered the seminary,
then he would be entitled to enjoy and administer the ricelands and receive the
fruits thereof. In that event, the trusteeship would be terminated.
Following that interpretation of the will the inquiry would be whether at the time
Father Rigor died in 1935 he had a nephew who was studying for the priesthood or
who had manifested his desire to follow the ecclesiastical career. That query is
categorically answered in paragraph 4 of appellant priest's petitions of February 19,
1954 and January 31, 1957. He unequivocally alleged therein that "not male relative
of the late (Father) Pascual Rigor has ever studied for the priesthood" (pp. 25 and
35, Record on Appeal).
Inasmuch as the testator was not survived by any nephew who became a priest, the
unavoidable conclusion is that the bequest in question was ineffectual or
inoperative. Therefore, the administration of the ricelands by the parish priest of
Victoria, as envisaged in the wilt was likewise inoperative.
The appellant in contending that a public charitable trust was constituted by the
testator in is favor assumes that he was a trustee or a substitute devisee That
contention is untenable. A reading of the testamentary provisions regarding the
disputed bequest not support the view that the parish priest of Victoria was a
trustee or a substitute devisee in the event that the testator was not survived by a
nephew who became a priest.
It should be understood that the parish priest of Victoria could become a trustee
only when the testator's nephew living at the time of his death, who desired to
become a priest, had not yet entered the seminary or, having been ordained a
priest, he was excommunicated. Those two contingencies did not arise, and could
not have arisen in this case because no nephew of the testator manifested any
intention to enter the seminary or ever became a priest.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the
old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason
should be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of
substitution and those in which the right of accretion exists" ("el legado ... por
qualquier causa, no tenga efecto se refundira en la masa de la herencia, fuera de
los casos de sustitucion y derecho de acrecer").
This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2),
which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of
all that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the
said ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The
effect is as if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.
The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate,
or that there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the
testator's win is no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect,
there will be intestate succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy
(Macrohon Ong Ham vs. Saavedra, 51 Phil. 267).
POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVIII, Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA,
respondents.
FACTS:
Adoracion C. Campos, in her lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia. She executed a Last Will and Testament
in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., according to the laws thereat,
and that while in temporary sojourn in the Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in
the City of Manila, leaving property both in the Philippines and in the United States
of America. The Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos was
admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court Division of the Court of
Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, County of
Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in favor of Clement J.
McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country on procedure
and allowance of wills. Nenita C. Paguia, daughter or the testator, was appointed
Administratrix of the estate of said decedent.
This was opposed by Adoracions father, Hermogenes Campos, who earlier filed an
Affidavit of Self-adjudication not being aware that Adoracion had left a will. He later
died and was substituted by Polly Cayetano as petitioner in the instant case.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner
Hermogenes Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and
her sisters, only remaining children and forced heirs was denied on September 12,
1983.
Cayetano alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the right of a forced heir to
his legitime can be divested by a decree admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in complete disregard of Law of Succession.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a forced heir is entitled to his legitime in case the testator was a
citizen of another country.
RULING:
No.
Applying Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the law which governs
Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law
of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a
complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it
would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter
to the specific provisions of Philippine Law. It is a settled rule that as regards the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VITO BORROMEO, PATROCINIO
BORROMEO-HERRERA, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO BORROMEO and HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, respondents.
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu City, died on March 13,
1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs but leaving
extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a
petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will and testament left
by the said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all
surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as
executor thereof.
After due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the
deceased was a forgery.

The testate proceedings was converted into an intestate proceedings.

After determining the intestate heirs of the decedent, the court ordered that the
assets of the intestate estate of Vito Borromeo shall be divided into 4/9 and 5/9
groups and distributed in equal and equitable shares among the 9 declared
intestate heirs.
On August 25, 1972, respondent Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as
heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be
declared as one of the heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, alleging that he is an
illegitimate son of the deceased and that in the declaration of heirs made by the
trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled
to receive a legitime like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate
child, he stated that he was entitled to a legitime equal in every case to four-fifths
of the legitime of an acknowledged natural child.
Finding that the motion of Fortunato Borromeo was already barred by the order of
the court dated April 12, 1969 declaring the persons named therein as the legal
heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo, the court dismissed the motion on June 25,
1973.
Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he
submitted to support his motion for reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis
for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver of
Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly signed by Pilar N. Borromeo,
Maria B. Putong, Jose Borromeo, Canuto V. Borromeo, Jr., Salud Borromeo, Patrocinio
Borromeo-Herrera, Marcial Borromeo, Asuncion Borromeo, Federico V. Borromeo,
Consuelo B. Morales, Remedios Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam In the waiver, five of
the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The
motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court,
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato
Borromeo is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; that the waiver
agreement is void as it was executed before the declaration of heirs; that the same
is void having been executed before the distribution of the estate and before the
acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of
subject matter.
On December 24, 1974, after due hearing, the trial court concluding that the five
declared heirs who signed the waiver agreement assigning their hereditary rights to
Fortunato Borromeo had lost the same rights, declared the latter as entitled to 5/9
of the estate of Vito Borromeo.
It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled " waiver of Hereditary
Rights" executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked
on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo,
is without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary

rights before there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend
to transfer. Pursuant to Article 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or
repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one
from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner
and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were
declared heirs, their rights were, therefore, uncertain. This view, according to the
petitioner, is also supported by Article 1057 of the same Code which directs heirs,
devicees, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days
after the court has issued an order for the distribution of the estate.
Respondent Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Article
1043 of the Civil Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir
before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must
first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he
must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He points out that at the time of the
signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver
document were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as well as of their
rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, in order to be valid,
must be preceded by a court declaration that the person making the acceptance or
renunciation is indeed an heir.
RULING:
No.
The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that "the properties
included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third
persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of
the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because
the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the
deceased, by principle established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the
Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of
death. More or less, time may elapse from the moment of the death of the deceased
until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance
in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance with article 989 of
the Civil Code. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of
the corresponding hereditary portion." The heirs, therefore, could waive their
hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only in
1969.
In this case, however, the purported "Waiver of Hereditary Rights" cannot be
considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1)

the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an
intention to relinquish such right. The intention to waive a right or advantage must
be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in
what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative of
an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other
reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible.
The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document
did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights, Thus: (1)
On October 27, 1967. Fortunato, Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo filed a pleading
entitled "Compliance" wherein they submitted a proposal for the amicable
settlement of the case. In that Compliance, they proposed to concede to all the
eight (8) intestate heirs of Vito Borromeo all properties, personal and real, including
all cash and sums of money in the hands of the Special Administrator, as of October
31, 1967, not contested or claimed by them in any action then pending in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu. In turn, the heirs would waive and concede to them all the
14 contested lots. In this document, the respondent recognizes and concedes that
the petitioner, like the other signatories to the waiver document, is an heir of the
deceased Vito Borromeo, entitled to share in the estate. This shows that the "Waiver
of Hereditary Rights" was never meant to be what the respondent now purports it to
be. Had the intent been otherwise, there would not be any reason for Fortunato,
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo to mention the heirs in the offer to settle the case
amicably, and offer to concede to them parts of the estate of the deceased; (2) On
April 21 and 30, 1969, the majority of the declared heirs executed an Agreement on
how the estate they inherited shall be distributed. This Agreement of Partition was
approved by the trial court on August 15, 1969; (3) On June 29, 1968, the petitioner,
among others, signed a document entitled Deed of Assignment" purporting to
transfer and assign in favor of the respondent and Tomas and Amelia Borromeo all
her (Patrocinio B. Herrera's) rights, interests, and participation as an intestate heir in
the estate of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The stated consideration for said
assignment was P100,000.00; (4) On the same date, June 29, 1968, the respondent
Tomas, and Amelia Borromeo (assignees in the aforementioned deed of assignment)
in turn executed a "Deed of Reconveyance" in favor of the heirs-assignors named in
the same deed of assignment. The stated consideration was P50,000.00; (5) A
Cancellation of Deed of Assignment and Deed of Reconveyance was signed by
Tomas Borromeo and Amelia Borromeo on October 15, 1968, while Fortunato
Borromeo signed this document on March 24, 1969.