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CRIMINAL LAW
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general,
territorial
and
prospective
characteristics of criminal law are
principles that define and demarcate the
scope and limitation of the operation of
criminal law. Under these three principles,
the operation or enforceability of criminal
law is limited to wrongful acts committed
on or after its effectivity (prospectivity)
within the territory of the Philippines
(territoriality) by person living and
sojourning therein (generality).
GENERALITY
Generality
principle is akin to territoriality principle
in the sense that the demarcating factor of
both principles is the territory of the
Philippines. Under generality principle,
criminal law is enforceable to person living
or sojourning in the territory of the
Philippines.
Under
the
territoriality
principle, criminal law is applicable only to
criminal act committed within the territory
of the Philippines. But the concept of
generality is different from territoriality.
The applicability of territoriality principle
or generality principle will depend on the
issue raised by the accused in questioning
the jurisdiction of the court. If the accused
attacks the jurisdiction of the court
because of the unique characteristic of his
person (e.g. he is a foreigner, military,
hermit, primitive, ambassador, legislator,
President), the applicable principle is
generality. If the accused attacks the
jurisdiction of the court due to the unique
characteristic of the place where the crime
was committed (e.g. the place of
commission is foreign vessel, embassy or
high sea) etc, the applicable principle is
territoriality.
1. Military officers - The Revised
Penal Code and special criminal laws are
enforceable against military men living or
sojourning in the Philippines. However, CA
408 (Articles of War) which vests
jurisdiction over members of the AFP to
the courts-martial. RA 7055 (AN ACT
STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY
OVER THE MILITARY) did not divest the
military courts of jurisdiction to try cases
involving "service-connected crimes or
offenses" under CA 408 (Example: Mutiny
or sedition, quarrels, frays; disorders,
breaking an arrest or escaping from
confinement, releasing prisoners without
proper authority, wrongful appropriation of
captured property, corresponding with, or
aiding the enemy, spies, dueling, fraud
against the government affecting matters
and equipment). In fact, RA No. 7055
mandates that these service-connected
crimes shall be tried by the court-martial
(Navales v. Abaya,
G.R. No. 162318,
October 25, 2004). CA 408 is a law of
preferential application since it excludes
members of the AFP from the operation of
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In
attempted felony and frustrated felony, the
offender failed to accomplish his criminal
objective by reason of extraneous causes;
if the causes are not extraneous, the
accused will be absolved from criminal
liability.
a. Negative Act - In the attempted
stage of the execution of a felony, the
offender must do a negative act to be
exempt
from
criminal
liability
for
attempted felony; since the offender has
not yet performed all the acts of execution
that would produce the felony as a
consequence, he must spontaneously
desist from further doing criminal acts
that will complete all the acts of execution.
Example: A with intent to kill shot B;
B sustained non-mortal wound. To be
exempt
from
criminal
liability
for
attempted homicide or murder, A must
spontaneously desist from further shooting
B in order not to inflict mortal injury
upon him.
b. Positive Act If the offender
performs all the acts of execution, which
would
produce
the
felony
as
a
consequence, offender is not exempted
from liability for frustrated felony even if
he voluntary desisted from further doing
criminal act. Spontaneous desistance is a
defense in attempted felony but not in
frustrated felony. In the frustrated stage of
the execution of a felony, the offender
must do a positive act to be exempt from
criminal liability; since the offender has
performed all the acts of execution that
would
produce
the
felony
as
a
consequence, he must do something to
prevent, or thwart the production of the
felony. Example: A with intent to kill shot
B; B sustained mortal wound. To be
exempt
from
criminal
liability
for
frustrated felony, it is not enough that A
would desist from further shooting B.
The spontaneous desistance is not a valid
defense since A had already inflicted
mortal wound on B that would cause his
death as a consequence. Thus, A must
save the life of B by treating his wound.
If B did not die because As medical
treatment, the latter will not be held liable
for frustrated felony because the homicide
was not produced due to the will of A.
c. Not absolutory cause If the
felony is consummated, offender cannot
undo what was done. Offender would not
be absolved from criminal liability even if
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No.
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To
appreciate
treachery, two (2) conditions must be
present, namely, (a) the employment of
means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or to retaliate, and (b) the means of
execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted. Treachery is not present because
accused chased victim before the latter was
hacked; hence, it cannot be concluded that
accused employed means of execution
which gives victim no opportunity to
retaliate or escape. Moreover, the location
of the hack wound on the left side of the
face of the victim will also show that a
frontal attack was made (People vs. Duavis,
GR No. 190861, December 07, 2011,
Justice Peralta).
The fatal stabbing of Rosalino by
Ramon was immediately preceded by two
altercations between Ramon and Virgilio,
on one hand, and Rosalino, on the other.
The first altercation occurred right after the
near-collision of the tricycles, while the
other happened shortly after Ramon and
Virgilio
had
blocked
Rosalinos
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EVIDENT PEMIDITATION
For evident premeditation to be
appreciated, the following must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when
the accused determined to commit the
crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the accused clung to his determination; and
(3) sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him
to reflect upon the circumstances of his act
(People vs. Duavis, G.R. No. 190861,
December 7, 2011).Accused told witness
that they were going to kill the doctor.
After less than thirty minutes, the accused
killed the victim, who is a doctor. Evident
premeditation should not be appreciated.
The span of time (less than thirty minutes),
from the time the accused showed their
determination to kill the victim up to the
time they shot the victim, could not have
afforded
them
full
opportunity
for
meditation
and
reflection
on
the
consequences
of
the
crime
they
committed (People vs. Patelan, G.R. No.
182918, June 6, 2011).Unlike evident
premeditation, there is no requirement for
conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient
period of time to elapse to afford full
opportunity
for
meditation
and
reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on
the very moment the plotters agree,
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REPETITION
Differences of recidivism, quasirecidivism,
reiteracion
and
habitual
delinquency:
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body,
that
accused
was
defending
himself. It would have been different if the
wounds inflicted were located in the front
portion of the victim's body. Thus, the first
element of self-defense is not present
(Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 181052,
November 14, 2012, Justice Peralta).
Necessary means - The means
employed by a person claiming self-defense
must be commensurate to the nature and
the extent of the attack sought to be
averted, and must be rationally necessary
to
prevent
or
repel
an
unlawful
aggression. In the present case, four stab
wounds that are the product of direct
thrusting of the bladed weapon are not
necessary to prevent what the accused
claim to be the continuous unlawful
aggression from the victim as the latter was
already without any weapon. In connection
therewith, having established that there
was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim when he was stabbed, accused
cannot avail of the mitigating circumstance
of incomplete self-defense (Belbis, Jr. vs.
People, GR No. 181052, November 14,
2012, Justice Peralta).
Under
doctrine
of
rationale
equivalence, plea of self-defense would
prosper if there is a rational equivalence
between the means of attack by the
unlawful aggressor and the means of
defense by the accused that would
characterize the defense as reasonable. The
doctrine
of
rational
equivalence
presupposes the consideration not only of
the nature and quality of the weapons used
by the defender and the assailantbut of
the totality of circumstances surrounding
the
defense vis--vis, the
unlawful
aggression.
Clearly,
this
continuous
attack by accused despite the fact that
aggressor already was neutralized by the
blow constitutes force beyond what is
reasonably
required
to
repel
the
aggressionand is therefore unjustified
(Espinosa
vs.
People,
G.R.
No.
181071, March 15, 2010).
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME:
"Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a
scientifically
defined
pattern
of
psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative
abuse (Section 3 of RA No. 9262). Each of
the phases of the cycle of violence must be
proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the accused
and her intimate partner and such final
episode produced in the battered persons
mind an actual fear of an imminent harm
from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save
her life. (People vs. Genosa, G.R. No.
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confession
and
privilege
mitigating
circumstance of minority cannot be given
suppletory effect (People vs. Simon, G.R.
No. 93028, July 29, 1994). Moreover,
Section 98 of RA No. 9165 provides that the
provisions of RPC shall not apply to the
provisions of this Act, except in the case of
minor offenders. Since there is no showing
that X is a minor, the circumstance of
confession and minority will not be
appreciated in favor of X.
(b) Applying the second rule of the
ISLAW,
the
maximum
indeterminate
penalty must not exceed 20 years and the
minimum penalty must not be less than 12
years and 1 day. If I am the judge, I will
sentence the accused to suffer 14 years of
imprisonment as minimum penalty to 18
years as maximum penalty.
(c) Since X is a minor, the provisions
of RPC including those on modifying
circumstances are applicable to crime
punishable under RA No. 9165. Hence,
mitigating circumstance of confession and
privilege
mitigating
circumstance
of
minority should be appreciated in favor of X
(People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227,
July 20, 2011, Justice Peralta);
(d) The penalty prescribed for the
crime committed is 12 years and 1 day to
20 years. This is equivalent to reclusion
temporal.
Since
privilege
mitigating
circumstance of minority and mitigating
circumstance of confession are present, the
penalty should be graduated to prision
mayor to be applied in its minimum period.
The maximum penalty under the ISLAW
shall be taken from minimum period of
prision mayor, which has a range from 6
years and 1 day to 8 years, while the
minimum penalty shall be fixed within the
duration of the penalty of prision
correccional, the penalty one degree lower
than that prescribed by law, which has a
ranged from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.
If I am the judge, I will sentence the
accused to suffer 4 years of prision
correccional as minimum penalty to 7 years
of prision mayor as maximum penalty.
THREE-FOLD AND 40 YEARS
LIMITATION RULE
Simultaneous service - When the
culprit has to serve two or more penalties,
he shall serve them simultaneously if the
nature of the penalties will so permit. Thus,
convict could serve simultaneously arresto
mayor and fine, prision correccional and
perpetual absolute disqualification, or
reclusion perpetua and civil interdiction. In
sum, while lingering in prison, convict
could pay fine, return the property
confiscated, be disallowed to cast his vote
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distinctly
or acts
a single
a single
multiple
COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY
RULE - Under the Lawas principle, if
accused fired their guns killing several
victims pursuant to a single impulse, they
shall be held liable for continued crime of
murder. The Lawas principle should only be
applied in a case where (1) there is no
conspiracy (People vs. Hon. Pineda, G.R.
No. L-26222, July 21, 1967) and (2) it is
impossible to ascertain the number of
deaths caused by each accused (People vs.
Tabaco, G.R. No. 100382-100385, March
19, 1997). In conspiracy, each conspirator
is not only liable for deaths attributable to
him but also for deaths caused by others
because in conspiracy the act of one is the
act of all. Thus, the Lawas doctrine should
not be applied if there is conspiracy since
the number of victims actually killed by
each conspirator is not anymore material if
there is conspiracy (People vs. Elarcosa,
G.R. No. 186539, June 29, 2010).
In People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No.
184500. September 11, 2012 - Significantly,
there was no conspiracy in Lawas case.
However, the Lawas doctrine is more of an
exception than the general rule. With the
presence of conspiracy in the case at
bench, appellants had assumed joint
criminal responsibility the act of one is
the act of all. The ascertainment of who
among them actually hit, killed and/or
caused injury to the victims already
becomes
immaterial.
Collective
responsibility
replaced
individual
responsibility.
The
Lawas
doctrine,
premised
on
the
impossibility
of
determining who killed whom, cannot be
applied.
In Lawas, this Court was merely
forced to apply Article 48 of RPC because of
the impossibility of ascertaining the
number of persons killed by each accused.
Since conspiracy was not proven therein,
joint criminal responsibility could not be
attributed to the accused. Each accused
could not be held liable for separate crimes
because of lack of clear evidence showing
the number of persons actually killed by
each of them.
In conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all. It is as though each one
performed the act of each one of the
conspirators. Each one is criminally
responsible for each one of the deaths and
injuries of the several victims. The severalty
of the acts prevents the application of
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05-2067,
31
August
2005; Pace
v.
Leonardo, A.M. No. P-03-1675, 6 August
2003,). A Provincial Adjudicator, who
rendered judgment in DARAB Case in the
performance of a quasi-judicial function,
closely akin to the function of a judge of a
court of law, could not be held liable under
Article 241 of RPC, therefore, considering
that the acts constitutive of usurpation of
judicial function were lacking herein (Reyes
vs. People, G.R. Nos. 177105-06, August
12, 2010). A clerk of court, who is not an
officer of the executive branch, cannot be
held liable for usurpation of judicial
function. However, a clerk of court, who
usurped judicial prerogative of the judge by
issuing the arrest of an accused in a
criminal case, is administratively liable for
grave misconduct (Albior vs. Auguis, A.M.
No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003).
MALVERSATION
The essential elements common to
all acts of malversation under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the
offender be a public officer; (2) That he had
the custody or control of funds or property
by reason of the duties of his office; (3) That
he had the custody or control of funds or
property by reason of the duties of his
office; (4) That those funds or property were
public funds or property for which he was
accountable; and (5) That he appropriated,
took, misappropriated or consented, or
through
abandonment
or
negligence,
permitted another person to take them
(Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
178626, June 13, 2012; Justice Peralta).
Accountable
officer
An
accountable public officer is one who has
custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his
office. The nature of the duties of the
public officer or employee, the fact that as
part of his duties he received public money
for which he is bound to account and failed
to account for it, is the factor which
determines whether or not malversation is
committed by the accused public officer or
employee. Hence, a school principal of a
public high school may be held guilty of
malversation if he or she is entrusted with
public funds and misappropriates the same
(Torres vs. People, GR No. 175074, August
31, 2011, Justice Peralta).
The municipal mayor initiated the
request for obligation of allotments and
certified and approved the disbursement
vouchers.
The
municipal
accountant
obligated the allotments despite lack of
prior
certification
from
the
budget
officer. Municipal treasurer certified to the
availability of funds and released the money
even without the requisite budget officers
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Peralta).
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the
sold
any
No.
FALSIFICATION
Commercial
document
Commercial documents are, in general,
documents or instruments which are used
by merchants or businessmen to promote
or facilitate trade or credit transactions.
Promissory
notes
facilitate
credit
transactions while a check is a means of
payment used in business in lieu of money
for
convenience
in
business
transactions. A cashiers check necessarily
facilitates bank transactions for it allows
the person whose name and signature
appear thereon to encash the check and
withdraw the amount indicated therein
(Tanenggee vs. People, GR No. 179448,
June 26, 2013).
Is intent to cause damage an
element of falsification of public or official
document? No. In falsification of public or
official documents, it is not necessary that
there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person because in
the falsification of a public document, what
is punished is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of the truth as
therein solemnly proclaimed (Regidor, Jr.,
vs. People, G. R. Nos. 166086-92 Feb. 13,
2009).
What is the crime committed if
private document is falsified as a necessary
means to commit or conceal estafa or
malversation?
Under the doctrine of common
element, an element used to complete one
crime cannot be legally re-used to complete
the requisites of a subsequent crime
(Regalado). The common element of estafa
or malversation and falsification is damage
to the victim. Thus, falsification of private
document and estafa cannot co-exist. The
use of damage as an element in falsification
precludes the re-use thereof to complete the
elements of estafa, and vice versa.
Falsification - If the offender
committed falsification of private document
as a means to commit estafa, he is liable for
falsification only. Falsification absorbs
estafa. (See: U.S. vs Chan Tiao, G.R. No.
12609, October 30, 1917).
Estafa or malversation If a person
falsified a private document to conceal
malversation or estafa, the crime is
malversation or estafa only. Falsification of
private document is not committed
because: (a) the use of damage as an
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Sweetheart
theory
The
sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily
admits carnal knowledge, the first element
of rape. This admission makes the
sweetheart theory more difficult to defend,
for it is not only an affirmative defense that
needs
convincing
proof;
after
the
prosecution has successfully established
a prima facie case, the burden of evidence
is shifted to the accused, who has to
adduce evidence that the intercourse was
consensual (People vs. Deligero, GR No.
189280, April 17, 2013).
Sweetheart
defense
will
not
exculpate accused from liability for rape
against mentally retarded person. In the
rape of a woman deprived of reason or
unconscious, the victim has no will. The
absence of will determines the existence of
the rape. Such lack of will may exist not
only when the victim is unconscious or
totally deprived of reason, but also when
she is suffering some mental deficiency
impairing her reason or free will. Carnal
knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect
as to be incapable of legal consent
constitutes rape (People vs. Caoile, GR No.
203041, June 05, 2013).
A child was not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the import of her
actions and in consequence, remained
vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of
adults. Unlike rape, therefore, consent is
immaterial in cases involving sexual absue
under Section 5 of RA 7610. For purposes
of sexual abuse, the sweetheart defense is
unacceptable. A
child
exploited
in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
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Section
provides:
29
of
RA
No.
10591
in
in
of
d
an
or
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that
the person
who
actually
signed the
corporate check shall be held liable for a
violation of BP 22. This provision does not
contain any condition, qualification or
limitation (Mitra Vs. People and Tarcelo,
G.R. No. 191404. July 5, 2010)
NOTICE
OF
DISHONOR
IN
ESTAFA CASE - The essential elements of
the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or
issued in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack
or insufficiency of funds to cover the
check; and (3) damage to the payee
thereof. It is criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check which is made
punishable under the RPC, and not the
non-payment of a debt. The postdating or
issuing of a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds
in the bank or his funds deposited therein
are not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check is a false pretense or a
fraudulent
act.
However
deceit
is
presumed if the drawer of the check fails
to deposit the amount needed to cover his
check within three days from receipt of
notice of dishonor.
a. No notice of dishonor - If there
is no notice of dishonor, the prosecution
can still prove the existence of deceit such
as in a case where the accused knows that
his checking account is closed. The receipt
by the drawer of the notice of dishonor is
not an element of the estafa through
bouncing check.
b. With notice of dishonor - If
there
is
notice
of
dishonor,
the
presumption of deceit can still be rebutted
by: (1) proof that the check is issued in
payment of a pre-existing obligation or (1)
evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa
by postdating a check. Good faith may be
demonstrated, for instance, by a debtors
offer to arrange a payment scheme with
his creditor or making full payment of the
entire amount of the dishonored checks.
However, simply empty promise to pay
complainant the value of the bum checks
issued in order to induce her to part with
her property in favor of accused is not an
evidence of good faith that will rebut the
presumption of deceit. (See: People vs.
Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3,
2004, Corona; Lopez vs. People, G.R. No.
166810, June 26, 2008, De Castro;
NOTICE OF DISHONOR IN BP
BLG. 22 - Notice of dishonor of a check to
the maker in BP Blg. 22 must be in
writing. A mere oral notice to the drawer
or maker of the dishonor of his check is
not enough. If the maker or drawer pays,
or makes arrangements with the drawee
bank for the payment of the amount due
within the five-day period from notice of
the dishonor given to the drawer, it is a
complete defense; the accused may no
longer be indicted for violation of Section
1, B.P. Blg. 22. If he is so indicted, he
may set up the payment of the amount
due as a complete defense. Assuming that
the accused had knowledge that he had
insufficient funds in the drawee bank
when he issued the questioned checks, he
could still have paid the checks or made
arrangements with the drawee bank for
the payment of the said checks if he had
been duly notified of their dishonor. In not
sending a notice or letter of dishonor to the
petitioner as required by law, the
complaint deprived the accused of his right
to avoid prosecution for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 (Sia vs. G.R. No. 149695, April 28,
2004).
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SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT - X in
his capacity as officer of Z corporation
issued a corporate check in favor of A. The
check bounced due to DAIF. Notice of
dishonor was received by X. After three
months, SEC issued order creating the
Management Committee and ordering the
suspension of all pending actions for claims
against Z corporation. (a) Is X liable for
violation of BP Blg. 22?
Answer: Yes. X was formally
notified of the dishonor of the checks.
Yet, it was only more than three
months after, that the SEC issued order
for the suspension of all pending
actions
for
claims
against
Z
corporation. Thus, X was not precluded
from making good the checks during
that three-month gap when he received
the letter and when the SEC issued the
order (Tiong Rosario vs. Co, G.R. No.
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