254 ‘icon Paclads ‘The Kantian reading I have presented takes the transcendental ideality of space for granted, and then accommodates the new relativistic phenomena in space-time, considering them less fundamental than sirical phenomena ‘untenable within the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, Tbelieve that a similar distinction must be does not imply that there can or cannot be ‘other forms of philosophy of space and time that do not depend on space-time physics, Prof. Dr. Ricardo Purlads, Dpto. iso (Complutense de Madea, Ciudad Universita ‘Lelbniz, Oldenburg, snd Spinoza, i the Lightof Lenin's Later 243, sponse to them at the time when he went to visit him; once in Spinoza's company, he seems in some ways to have been drawn, if only briefly, more ‘Strong forces of both stzraction and repulsion were ‘may explain why it was that ~ if the argument correct ~ Oldenburg’s letter described Leibniz as an inoza, and the atte may account for his decision, in ‘De. Noet Malcolm, All Souls College, GB ~ Oxford OX3 4AL, noel nalelm@all-ouls.oxacleLeibniz, Kant, the Transcendental Ideality of Space and Modern Geometry 4. The ideality and subjectivity of space ‘According to Kant's “Transcendental Philosophy”, in which the critique of reason is undertaken in order to determine the nature and senpe of metaphysics, ta oe gi oa gery sc ca aa eas owe 1 Teton Voua-Buon hs cet a azud ia ie dieton GL, Vid Leibniz, Kan, the Transcendental Ieaiyof Space and Modern Geomesy 245 between logic and geometry is based on the distinction inthe a priori domain, of another class of necessary, non-analytic, truly philosophical propositions, such as the principe of causality, and another kind of mathematical proposi- tions, in arithmetic and algebra, which rests, much les clearly, onthe intuition ‘mistaken, and Kant's theory of space uterly untenable, 2. Kant's theory of space 3 anatytic loge i wholly dependent on his conception of concepts apply this model i domains, even when attempting to account for setual individual differences between’ things. According 10 this combinatorial theory of the concept, the ‘theory of judgement, onthe one hand, amount tothe thesis ofthe inclusion of ‘contributions, his theory of inference is undermined by his theoretical insist- 2 Leda o Arauld, Jone 1686; GPM, 6.246 Ricardo Paeses ence on conceiving every proof asthe explicit rendering of implicit identities, ‘which leads him to go far as to affirm that ostensive and apagogical proofs ‘amount (0 one and the same thing? Even were it not to hold totally with respect to contingent truths, in this stile T shall assume, in general terms, the analytic interpretation of Leibniz's Kant's conception of analytic knowledge. According to Leibniz, the necessity and the impossibility of truths of reason always involve the aifirmstion oF nogation of the same conceptual characteristic, and the principle of contradic- aravity of bodies, the necessity that a ba alleged metaphorical character of the inclusion of the predicate in the subject’ ‘captnizdby Biter Homi viva sbowa roe ger cnc". Heat “Leis, Kant, the Transcendental Iealiyof Space and Modera Geometry 247 ‘The logical characterization ofan analytic judgement, both in its material Jhich can be considered indifferently concept or esse ‘According to Kant, analysis is undertaken through logical means, known discursively, ‘obviously necessary char (Cambridge, Ms. 1980, pp. 20-46, 9. Respectively, Kae Krier reinen Ver, A 7/B 10 end 8151/8 190, 10. Kane Criqueof Pare Reason, ars by N- Ker Smith, A 7B 65248 Ricardo Paelads spatial synthesis operates in geometrical definitions,-axioms and proofs, and that is why the principle which resumes the a priori nature of of knowledge is the construction of concepts in Synthetic a prior! geometry is only possible ifthe of space: the subject, bot tis tnowledge is applied to empirical Knowledge, a0 space i the a priori form of human sensibility" 3 the task of transcendental philosophy as providing an expla- nation of how synthetic @ priori judgements are possible, but this question tothe knowledge of nature, and he does so, through his conception of pure intuition asthe form of empirical intuition o, in ideal mathematical space rooted in subjectivity asthe form and condition of empirical space. Hence the transcendental ideality of space, which {is the reason why empirical objects are phenomena and not things in them- in order to determine the field of metaphy jon of mathematics, How sre mathe 1d its physical application possible? How is mathematical physics Tn other words, how can we explain that nature is written with tical types? When examining Kant’s theory of space from the perspec tive ofthe development of geometry, Doh these qvestons shouldbe bome in 12 ‘Afar reviewing Ken's conception of space intuition ‘Mattie Schinn offers «uefa survey ofthe views of import dunkors i the 20% Leibniz, Kant the Transcendental Itty of Space and Modern Geometry 249 3. Modem geometry and relativity theory expressed through ‘the geomony of figures can be solved. The first non-Euclidean ‘consistent systems based on the first four postulates of Euclid ‘lear that non-Euclidean geometries are not logically incomps ylidean geometry. They depend on the establishment of a different metric to Eucla’, given in Pythagoras’ theorem, and the definition of ‘distance by means of certain fun ‘The Cartesian arthmetization ‘res through egebrac equations, epresens the st challenge to Keats theory ‘of spatial synthesis. Although long in existence, Kant did not actually take it braic equations does notin itself seem to invalidate the Kantian synthesis. Fist, this treatment is not sufficient to solve all the problems ofthe geometry ofthe century (nlnly Poincené and Camp), but be doesnot go into the question of whether of geomet. M, Shin: "Kants250 Ricardo Paclada ‘igures, but rather requires some concepts of higher mathematis's, Second, ‘Kant holds tht the widimensionality of space isthe object of e synthetic, a spite of both Cartesian geometry and modem analytic axioms of continuity Unlike Cartesian geometzy, in these all presuppositions of formal, and axiomatic geometry with uninterpreted tems for ‘ety with interpreted terms, Questions about the geometry refer to the later and can only be settled by experies relativity describes the movements of bx ‘four-dimensional non Euclidean geometry that handles geometry and gravita- tion together and has been confirmed. ‘Up until this point, however, a Kantian dean geometry determined by matter. second phenomenalizaton of nature of geometric propositions is very questionable, With the distinction betseen pure and physical geometry, exemplified here by Einstein, bth things fare negated, so thai geometry with content can be interpreted as directly Ske Bedetung der Rlaveeheorte, Beaunsceig~ Wiesbaden 1979, pp. 318-397,252 Ricardo Parlads referring to physical objects and empirically testable, and the fundamental negative curvature. Both these propositions are doubtless wholly « priori, sepmies of thir analytic or syne character “com the Viewpoint of an @ priori conception of all geometry, it cannot be scepted that the ideal propositions refer from the outset to rigid bodies, as Einstein appears to suggest on numerous occasions, regardless of the fact that they are also applied when considering physical space”. Nor ean we accept, for ‘example, arguments agai ibility of infinitely prolonging a straight mad postulate, grounded on the finiteness an a priori conception, the objects and fo and Kant maintained, bu they include of Euclidean geometry, bat also non- Euclidean structures. When two-dimensional, theso structares admit ostensive constructbility in space. Inthree dimensions, the constructive impos- bility seems not to be strict, Dut gradual, although non-E Leite, Kant the Transcendent Ideal of Space and Modem Geometry 253 lear that, in contrast to what Kant believed, the development of geometry has ‘made it possible for us to analytically prove and describe the propositions and structures of different mathematical spaces. However, this does not invalidate ‘our capacity, stressed by Kant, to intuit and demonstrate a priori in Euclidean space. "Nov the next step in Kant’s argument isto anchor space in man’s subjeo- jon, Geometric propositions, which are to the empirical objects because space the subject. This st ‘can certainly give rise to even greater ‘than the harmony between mathematics and nature. But, in my pinion, the crucial point is that this step of the argument is wholly untenable ther the introduction of the notion of a physical feld in the nineteenth century ‘non-Euclidean spatial structures in the twentieth. We do ‘of geometry has to take it into account, ‘the geometry of physical fields. ‘Euclidean space, of which we certainly time the structure of physical space. And this invalidates, in my his theory of space as an a priori form of human sensibility.