Willard Van Orman Quine: Philosophy of

Science

W. V. O. Quine (1908-2000) did not conceive of philosophy as an activity separate from the general
province of empirical science. His interest in science is not best described as a philosophy of
science but as a set of reflections on the nature of science that is pursued with the same empirical
spirit that animates scientific inquiry. Quines philosophy should then be seen as a systematic
attempt to understand science from within the resources of science itself. This project investigates
both the epistemological and ontological dimensions of scientific theorizing. Quines
epistemological concern is to examine our successful acquisition of scientific theories, while his
ontological interests focus on the further logical regimentation of that theory. He thus advocates
what is more famously known as naturalized epistemology, which consists of his attempt to
provide an improved scientific explanation of how we have developed elaborate scientific theories
on the basis of meager sensory input. Quine further argues that the most general features of reality
can be examined through the use of formal logic by clarifying what objects we must acknowledge
as real given our acceptance of an overarching systematic view of the world. In pursuing these
issues, Quine reformulates and thus transforms these philosophical concerns according to those
standards of clarity, empirical adequacy, and utility that he takes as central to the explanatory power
of empirical science. While few philosophers have adopted Quines strict standards or accepted the
details of his respective positions, the general empirical reconfiguration of philosophy and
philosophy of science recommended by his naturalism has been very influential. This article
provides an overview of Quines naturalistic conception of philosophy, and elaborates on its
examination of the epistemological and ontological elements of scientific practice.