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Austan Goolsbee, Steven Levitt, Chad Syverson

Microeconomics
First Edition

Chapter 15
Asymmetric Information

Copyright 2013 by Worth Publishers

Figure 15.1 Moral Hazard in the Insurance Market


Goolsbee, Levitt, Syverson: Microeconomics, First Edition
Copyright 2013 by Worth Publishers

Figure 15.2 The PrincipalAgent Problem as a Sequential Game


Goolsbee, Levitt, Syverson: Microeconomics, First Edition
Copyright 2013 by Worth Publishers

Figure 15.3 Education as a Signal on the Job Market


Goolsbee, Levitt, Syverson: Microeconomics, First Edition
Copyright 2013 by Worth Publishers

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