PARTS

.
OF

C H I E F OF
STAFF,
1

MANUSCRIPT F I L E
r LE

H I

_ -*

...be*&

HEADQUARTERS

E U R O P E A N COMMAkD

I1 wedd PjarUI 8 pUm irr #&s

-v

?him i 8 a
-latopi4 mtrw m
W
m
4

rlrr-------.

e ir ClWB rrof W y L. 4 e d C I
M,o l n ,
om

mk

v o l l ~ e ,subtopics are artsplaaed undor faul.tg chapter headings.

An inoxcusable evidence of duplication is found i n V o l . II.

wherein demobiliaation personnel r t a t i a t i c s &re premnted. A better
arrweloent for t h i s ibra could h+va been derised th8n that presented
by the present page 26 pnd pPb88 36 ta 39 of Volume 11 wherein ths saw
seta of figures are belaborsd t o the confusion of the reader.
Another " p l e of f a u l t y ammgemont occurs in Chapter X I X ,
of w h e t i r thorein prewntsd mepaate and aapliPies
wbrial cnntmined i n Chapter 111 of Val. X and Chupbr I X of Vol. I.

Vol. 11, since much

Possibly the best arrangemnt i n this series is encountered

This presents a very complete s t o r y w i t h a miniruum of
repetition.
i n Vol. III.

4.

A "ation

of c r l t i c l a m would indicate that:

a. Too l i t t l e is told conoerning the effect of the! occupation

upon the Owmans.
b.

Too much emphssia haa bean placed upon t o p i d arrangesent

so that repetition and duplication 8bOund$.

Too nrprsy incidents h8ve been hcluded which do nothing t o

C.
increase the reader's knowledge of h a occupation rorked.

d. The reader i s S d s h d a great maso of idoraation about

how ue strove t o o c c w Oermany and then, f o r the m e t part, is l e f t
t0

b%e68

h-

OCCupatiOrt

worked.

e. Ho e f f o r t was.made, apparently, t o help the reader by the

inclusion of any naps or sketahes. A feu would have helped.

On the credit side i t can be mid t h a t a great maas of infor.ication,

a t present poorly arranged, is presented i n the volumes.

5. It

ie recolPleendsd that:

a.

The iuanucript be filed for reference use.

b.

That ita present clasaification of "Restricted" be inaintained.

c.

That a copy of this review be filed w i t h the umuscript.

Office of th. Commondw'in C h d

SUSJ5CT:

Occupation Forcer in Europa Seri.8

TO

A l l concerned

1.

T h e W a r Department h e directed that the hirtory of

the m i l i t a r y occupation of Germny aad Auatri. i n Vorld War

be recordsd and interpreted as tho events transpire.
The

I1

agency which is r e s p o m i b l e for Preparing t h i s h i r t o r y i r the

Office of the Chief Historian, European Carmrand.

2. T h e Occupatior. Forces in Europe S e r i e r , puklication of

which was begun i n 1947, consists of a s e r i e s o f s t u d i e s ,
monographe, and n a r r a t i v e s of t h e h i s t o r y of the occupation.
k m time to tine, the Occupation Forcer In Europe S e r i e s w i l l
include a sumnary v o l m e giving a n a r r a t i v e h i s t o r y of ths
occupation.
A 1 1 the sbldies o r volumes published in the
S e r i e e for t h e year lC45-46 or a subsequent year rmke up the
orficial history of the occrupation f o r that year.

3. E%ch publication in the Oocupation Force6 i n Europe

S e r i e s is baaed upon a thorough s h d y of the correrpondence ,
direFtives, and other documents r e l a t i n g t o the subject.
It
serves a l e o as a d i g e s t tnd summary o f the p e r t i n e n t paseape
of the r e p o r t s of operations which are made periodically t o
the'CPfice o f the Chief Iiistorian by a l l staff d i v i s i o n s and
.mJor uiita of t h e Suropean C o m n d .
Each publication I n the
Soriee, before being issued, is reviewed by the staff divisions
o r o r d i n a t e command whore r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n d i c a t e a
F r h r y i n t e r e e t In the s u b j e c t matter.

4. A l l persons t o whose a t t e n t i o n t h e r e publications come

are i n v i t e d t o f o r m r d to the Office of the Chief Kistorian,
European Cc"nd, APO 757, tb!r conmento and c r i t i c i s m , In
order to make a v a i l a b l e a l l facte from which a d e f i n i t i v e
h i s t o r y may be prepared in ths War Department.

LUCm8 D. C U Y

General, USA

CoEmanderrin-Chief

- ..__

__

g-43,f
41

31

The F i r s t Y e a r

o f t h e Occupation

e/

/86e2,

Occupation Forces i n Europe Series, 1 9 4 5 - 4 6

O F F I C E OF T
F R A N K F U R T - A @ - MAIN, G E R M A N Y
is47

PART ONE

The Transition

f r o m Combat to

Military Occupation

(8 May

- 17 July 1945)

1945

Chief Historian
Chief Archivist

- 1947

..................
..................

%?onel naold E. I-otter, Inf,mtry

G i l l e tt !Mewold

OCCUPATI OHAI, HISTO3Y SP-CH

Chief a
Colonel David R. lierr, I n f ; Colcnel Wilbur S. Bye, FA:
Aeop, CAC; Lt. Colonel W i l _ l i m S. FccCrea, I d .

Col.onel A.C.M.

Rxemtive
.-__
-Cfftcers
--_--L t . C o l o n e l K d c o l n S. Eekin, FA; Lt. C o l o i e l John E. Ulmer, Inf;

-Chip3 Ristoricel

C o n a m

* doseph a, S t a n , Ph.D.
Lmra Totme, M.A.;

Bditorial S t a f f
b d e l i n e E. Lannelle, 3.5.:

William E. Amis

X i l i t m y Staff

colonel Laslie 3. Ja,coby, Fir; C o l o n e l A r n o l d 9.C. Sender, I n f ;

* Cclonel Charles 3. Iviorrieon, Cev; * L t . :olgr.el George L. ?itre, Inf;
L t . Colonel Tremine K. Field, I n f ; Xadcr George C. Penny, AGD; * KaJor
Leonard L. Lerwill, i n f ; * I h j o r IIarold i?.B r o w , I n f ; 2d Lieutenact
Piartin F . Detele, Jr., I n f ; * Staff Sergesnt B r i z e l l e Gabls, 'IIAC.

C ivilian Staff
* Charles 3. Caxpbell, A.3.;
Linda Bennett; * Arthur B. Burnet, A.B.;
Francis Cheee, X . S . ;
Robert W. Coaklep, N.A.;
* fiargeret L. Davis, A.B.;
Tbms A. Donovan, A.B.;
Sophie R. Dornbusch, M.S.;
Ruth !4cClun=;
Fleehmen; * Marcus :J. Fl.ogd, A.B.; MPrtbe Frey, A J . :
* Prederic X.
* F&r+aretL. Geis, 14.A.; * EernRrd v. %31, M.A.;
Gmzert, Ph.9.;
Kildred V. Heeter, A . 3 . : Kargot IIoffman; Virginia C-. Xritikoe, A.B.;
Porc?yyar ~ewa.nlloweki,>t.A.; !'!dter s. Long,

* 33.izc3eth s. L q y , I-:.-\.;
* Jooephina T. M e l m d y , A.B.;

(Cantab.);
*
Jean
3
.
Mdc01.71,
N.A.
A.P.;
* Dmsille J. Norris,
* Albert Yorrnan, 3.S.S.;
* George F. Kdler, M.A,;
B.S,;
* George J. Olezewdci; S e t t y O'Regm: * John C.E. Smith, B.A.
( Centab )

(") Contributors t o t h i s vol.aac,

CHPIER

I:

CYLiTER

11:

CH.APTEil 111:
CHAFTEE

IV:

CHAPmL

V:

. . . . .. ...

Page

..... 1
The United States Forces on V-E Dw . . . . . . . . 32
The United S t a t e s Forces
Transition . . . .
47
The Assumption of the Occupation .Mission . . . . .
77
The Maturation of t h e Policies and Organization of
the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
The Xaqpower Problem.. . , . . . . . . : . . . 128
The Defeat of Germany

(Iccupi+,icI!

CUAHER

VI:

CHAPTER VII:
WAPTFji

Organization and Fti0nk.g

VIII: Accomplishments of the Occupation

CH@TEt? IX:

..
.... . . . .
.. ..

of the Occupation

T h r e e Examples of United States Occupakion

148

167
18.3
223

European Theater Organization, 17 July 1945, following

89

European Theater Organization, 30 June 1946, following

182

2.

The Bct
The

Of

S
i
.

prOVisiOId.

(b-

Gwtav Jodl, C h i e f of Staff, t o

GO8-

(1)authorized

(;en,

the instrumsnt of surrender.

He arrived at Beima in a United States C-47 airplane on 6 May and

waa taken directly t o Suprems Headquarters.

An U d delegation

including Gmeral Smith, Gen. C s r l Spt&%, Co"der

of the UmS.

Strategic Air Force, laaj. Gem. F'rancis S e v n o f the French Army,

Cen. Iran Sousloparov of the Soviet High Co"i, and a number of

other8 met the German general in the War Roan i n the Indutrial
College of Rsins. The instrument was signed at Om,2. lae;lr,
placing his signature on the paper, General Jadl

t o speak.

ICLP)

After

granted pormirrian

Addressing the group in German, he said:

W i t h this signature the Gsnaaa people and armsd forcer
are, for better or worse, delivered into the hand8 of
the victors. In t h h wqr, which ha8 lasted more than
five years, they have both achieved and suffered RDF.
than perhaps any other people in the mrld. In t h i 8
hour, I can only express the hope that the victor w i l l
treat tham with generodem

None of the Allied officera replied t o General Jodl'e

reraark..

The

surrender ua8 confirmed at Berlin at 0045 burr on 9 May with M a l

Marohal A. 91. Tedder signed for the Supreme ColiaPandsr and General
Zhukm for tha Soviet forces, with Gon, Jean Lattre de Tearim of

France and General S p t s of the U.S.

- 2 -

Str&OgiC

bir Force8 a6

WitlUO688m

3,

'hxt Of t h e kt Of S-w.
The

Qc-nt

which General Jodl signed read as follows:

1. b t h e undersi@ed, a c t i n g by authority of the

Csrman High comoand, hereby mrrencler unconditionally
t o t h e Supreme Commander, Allied Ibtpeditionarg Force,
and Simrrltaneausly t o the Soviet High Command a l l forces
on land, 8ea, and in the & who 8 r e at this date under
G e m control.
2. The German High Command w i l l at once issue ordera
t o all German milit-,
naval, and air authorities and
to all forcea under Gennan c o n t r o l t o cea8e active
operatbna, a t 2301 hours Central Ertropean Tlclpb on 8 UaJ.
and t o remain in t h e p o s i t b n a occupied at t h a t t h o .
100 d d p , vewel, o r aircraft is to be s c u t t l e d , o r aqy
dam,ago done t o their h u l l , machinerg, or equipment.

3.

The Gennan High Conrnend rill at once issue t o the

appropriate ca"ndera, and e n a m tho carrying out of
q f u r t h e r orders i r s w d by the Suprsmr Comander,
Allied Expditionary Force, and by t h e Soviet High C o d .

4. This act of miUtary ourrender 3s without prejudice

t o , and will be wp@raeded by any general instrument of
surrender impowd by, or on behalf of t h e United NatbM
and applicable t o Gemany and t o t h e Geman anmd f o r c e s
ar a whole.

3. In t h e event of t h e Csnnan High C o d or any of

the forces un&r t h e i r control, failing t o act in accordance with this act of surrender, ths Supreme CaPmander,
Allid Expeditionary Pome, and t h e Sovi4t High C o d ,
w i l l take such punitive o r o t h e r action a s t h e y deem
appropriate,

4.

Oeneral Eisenhorerls Actions.

After t h e signing, t h e Germans were brought into t h e

presence of General Eisenhower, Supraw Colrmandrr, who asked them if
they understood t h e tenna and if they were prepared t o carry tham out,

They repUed i n the affirmative.

General Biseahower then went into

-3-

the W a r Ebau and dsliwred a victory Oddrem, b which ho credited

t h e t r i m p h t o t e m o r k among t h r U n i t e d States, Great B r i t a i n , and

nelemextr of almost every oppmsmd country in

Later, he

telephoned to Gen. Cbmr 1. Brdley, compLanding the 12th U.S.

Arq

Croup, who, on hearing that the enemy had surpBndemd, Instructed

h i a field comnmders t o atand fmt

pnd

amid acposhg t h e i r t m p a

t o danger.

5.

Announcamant of t h e Surrender.

The German radio s t a t i o n at Flensburg announced on 7 Kay 1945

the surrender by authority of Wand Admiral Karl Mnits, acting aa
Hitlers aucctwaor. ( 2 ) There had aa yet been no o f f i c i a l s t a t a m n t
from the U e d powers, since 1500 hours on 8 Hay had been set as
the t h e for t h e 8N1DuncemdIlt.

Aeoociated Press correspondent

Edward Kennedy sent a neus dispatch t e l l i n g of t h e surrender beforo

the time f o r the reloa8e, and newspapers carried t h e story before

it was officia3l.y announced by President Tand Prime Minister

Churchill.

It was originally planned t o make siaultaneouo

announcements fram Washington, Iondon, and Yoacow, but Premier

Stalin did not make any amouncSment u n t i l 9 May.

THE COYPIBTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

-4-

Allied a m i o s were storming t h e l a d Nasi stron&olds i n Central

In France, one reinforced division, the 66th Infantry Mvieion,

Europe,

was c0nt-g

the enemy garrison at St, l e s d r e and h r i e n t on a

f r o n t of about 112 miles.

Soms arpall areaa

in northern Tugoolavia,
\

reatem Latvia, Frame, &he Channel Islands, and &long t h e Elbe Rivmr
were still in German hands.

Only i n Ceechoslovskia did f i g h t i n g on

The l i t t l e

any conaidorable s c a l e by United S t a t e s troop8 continue.

f i g h t left in t h e Germans w a s mostly directed at t h e other A l l i e r .

The piecemeal c a p i t u l a t i o n of the Wbhnnrcht that took place dttring

t h e days pretcedfng final surrender awned part of a Miberate plan

of t h e Geman High comeand aad the DClnita Government t o surrender as

many of t h e i r forces as possible t o t h e Wbstem AlJ.ies before

acknomhdging the simultsneoua victory of t h e Red Ar14y.(3)

7.

Continued Resistance t o tha Soviet Porce8.

On 8 May, t h e only a m o u n c ~ from
t
Moscow was

a carsmuniqw

rumarising another dqy of f i g h t i n g between Sovlet and Geman forces.

S t a l h ' s order of that day reported t h a t the "troops of the Fourth

Ukrajnian Command, continuing their offensive after stiff fighting,

today occupied t h e large town and railway junction of Olomouc, an
important bastion in the G e m defense on t h e lbravia River line."

A c d q u e from the German High CNrmand confirmd t h e continuaaco

of f i g h t i n g in aravia and in the north.(f+)

Koniev'a forces after an 8lrday siege.(5)

Breslau fell t o Marahal

Dreadan, t h e l a s t large c i t y

remaidng in Na5i hands, surrendered on 8 ~ay.(6)

- 5 -

I n A u s t r i a , the

Third Ukrainlan Anqv occupied t h e towns of Waidhofen, Lebing, and

St. Michael two days l a t e r .

A week after the o f f i c i a l end of

h o s t i l i t i e s , f a n a t i c a l Germans were s t i l l r e s i s t i n g in Berlin.

SS troops i n c i v i l i a n disguise were s e t t i n g f i r e s and flooding

subway tunnels.

8.

The p r i n c i p a l building destroyed was the c i t y h d . ( 7 )

Cavitulation t o B r i t i s h Forces,

a.

It w a s m r e than sewn hours after h o s t i l i t i e s had

o f f i c i a l l y ended before t h e Channel Islands surrendered and t h e only

part of t h e United Eingdom which had been in Nazi hands was liberated.
There was no adim resistance, but the Germans, who had held the
i s l a n d s since 20 June 1940, remained t h e r e u n t i l t h e b i t t e r end.
'phe

destroyer Bulldoq waited t h r e e days within f i r i n g distance while

negotiations went on.

9 M q , on

Surrender terms were deped at 0700 hours on

t h e q u a r t e l d e c k of t h e Bulldog, Great crowds of sited

i s l a n d e r s ovarrhelmd t h e landing troops rho assured t h e i r l i b e r a t i o n .

The i n h a b i t a n t s were hungry, but so were t h e Germans, r h o had been

c u t off f r o m supplles for numy weeks,(8)

b,

8180 on t h e " i n g

the F i r s t Canadian -,(9)

of 9 May, Dunkerque surrendered t o

four days a f t e r t h e surzender of all

other enemy forces i n t h e area.(10)

C.

The next day, London announced the surrender of two

widely separated German f o r c e s in t h e Courland d i s t r i c t of Latvia

and on t h e Greek I s l e e of Crete and Milos.

On ll May, a n a d l

communique reported the surrender of a l l Cennan garrisons, t o t a l l i n g

- 6 -

20,OOO man, in t h e Dodecaaese Islands in t h e Aegean Sea.(ll)

d.

I n Norway as l a t a as 20 May, armed Germans uere still

requisitioning fresh vegetables and other food, as well as liquor,

clothing, and various types of equipment, fmm t h e populace.(l2)

raid on 10 June a t Lillehamner, German Headquarter6 in Nomay, by

600 B r i t i s h s o l d i e r s resulted i n sei"

of important recorda and

the apprehension of 50 o f f i c e r s , 100 e n l i s t e d men, and 127 Wehrmacht

women.

Defeated Germans had been living in fSntastic style in a

r e s o r t hotel there on d o c k s they had accumulated I n Norray,(l3)

e.

Copenhagen had been formally handed over t o the A l l i e s

on 10 Uv and t u n e d over t o t h e Danes by t h e British on t h e same day,

but a m n t h after V-E D?y t h e Nazis were not opt of Denmark,
S.

Col. Gen.

Liademan, t h e hi@mst-ranking uncaptured Wehrmacht comardnr, raa

d i r e c t i n g t h e final evacuation and & t a W g

German authority i n

the area,

No U e d personnd was allowed t o enter without

permiaaion.

(U)

9.

The Last German Pocket Contained br lb3ted S t a t e s Troow,

For some time t h e r e r a e d a patch of about one thousand

aquare miles of "free" G
e
m t e r r i t o r y between the United States and

Soviet forces, where Gsrman soldiers, under t h e i r compBnder8, r o d

at uill.

This area lay south of ZIlickau and east of Rodeuisch, near

Plauen, and extended t o t h e western limits of t h e Soviet position near

Annaberg and south roughly t o the Csech border.

Both t h e tlnited S t a t e r

and Soviet forces whose front. touched this t e r r i t o r y had order8 not

-7-

t o "invade" it.

Road blocks mere established t o keep refugees w i t h i n

t h e area and t o prevent the German forces from attempting a counterinvasion.

Aside from 80m 5,000 refugees camping gypsy-style d o n g

t h e roads, there were about 16,000 German troops garrisoning in Bmau

towns.

All the troops mere unarmed, t h e i r weapons havimg been turned

over t o the 87th Division, but they still had t h e i r

olsn

o f f i c e r s and

regular m i l i t a r y organizations and were considered as uncaptured troops.

The delay was caused by indecision over t h e boundary between the

Instructions t o t h e a d e s , dated

United S t a t e r and Soviet Zonea.

19 May, established t h e boundary i n this area as a line between

Karlsbad and Chemnite, *hub placing about t w o - t h i r d s of t h e dirputed
d i s t r i c t under t h e control of t h e Ninth U.S.

Army and one-third under

Soviet control pending final changes t o ultimate occupation sones.

It was several days before positions could be taken up, and meantims
t h e remnant of Geman troops

w88

in

s t a t e of desperation and

t s r m r i e i n g t h e t o m s and countryside while foraging for food.(l5)

10.

D i s w s i t i o n of United States Forces Iplswtdiatels after V-E Dq.

a.

The United S t a t e s forces reported l i t t l e en-

opposition.

The principal American concern rqs t h e detention of German troops and

c i v i l i a n s who were fleeing from t h e advancing Soviet forces i n such

numbers t h a t roads were blocked.

land and

8ea

Liaison planes maintained a constant

march t o prevent individual o r organized escape,(l6)

2hs majority of incidents were considered t o be sabotage o r t h e

a c t i v i t i e s of a nascent undergrotmi movement.

- 8 -

(17)

Group was deployed on a 35o-rile f m n t

bo The 12th

.cross Auutria, Czechoslovakia, and Germony.

offensive operations en&d by 1

For the Ninth U.S.

Amy,

m, 8f'ker which date It maintained

a watch on t h e lube Riwr, the decirion ha-

been reached that t h i a

a r q should halt along t h e Une of t h e lfulde and t h e Elbe

Riwr

r a t h e r than meet t h e Soviet forces I n a headlong a d ~ c e . ( 1 8 )

c.

Organized resistance against the Fifteenth U.S. Amy in

t h e area boldering t h e Netherlands, Belgiun, Luxsinburg, ard France

ended on 18 April,(lg)
midnight. of

The Lorient garrison did not c a p i t u l a t e u n t i l

7 May. Enemy

forces i n St. t?a%aireheld out longer,

mpposedly for the purpose of destroying i n s t a l l a t i o n s , but surrendered

unconditionally ge of midnight 8 May.(20)

The French Navy occtapied

the port on 11 May, and reported no apparent dsmolition.(2l)

IIXII Corps wa8 alerted by

The

Fifteenth Army Headquarters on 9 June for

movement t o Crechoslovakia.

A week l a t e r a l l i t s u n i t e had taken up

t h e i r new position. i n that country.(22)

ll. The End of Resistonce in Atutria.

a.

To a s s i e t t h e 15th Arqy Group in I t a l y and Austria, t h e

1 2 t h Amy Group was ordsred on 22

t o prepare t o mve two corps

through t h e Alp8 into Carinthia t o r e l i e v e t h e British,

The f o l l o d n g

day these corps began t h e mocuasnt south, but a f t e r reconnaissance

and a request from t h e B r i t i s h this movement was delayed u n t i l t h e

congested area could be cleared, Yemwhila, t h e s i t u a t i o n improved

and t h e f o r c e s held en alert for " n t

- 9 -

t o Carinthia were reduced

t o one corpr on U, June and were entirely relieved twelve days later.(23)

12.

The Naval Finish:

a.

Kid and t h e & b i n e Surrender,

Under t h e terms of surrender all German warships,

auzUlaries, merchant ships, and other c r a f t a t

886

were ordered t o

report t h e i r positions t o the nearest Allied wireless telegraph

station.

These ships were then t o proceed t o Allied ports and t o

remain t h e r e pending f u r t h e r orders.

Submarines at sea were ordered

t o surface, t o f l y a black flag or pennant, and t o proceed t o such

porta as dlrected.(2l+)

The wMte ensign o r United States colors were

hoisted on all ships and c r a f t found in brman p o r h ( 2 5 )

b.
sane

A l l , forward operating U-boat bases had been located f o r

time on t h e Norwegian west coast, notably at Tmndheim and Bergsn.

These bases were well equipped with workshop f a c i l i t i e s and Stocks of

spare p a r t s and torpedoea t o permit operation of c r a f t for some tima

without fresh supplies.

It was known t h a t t h e crews' morale was high.

A t IEiel, t h e largest U-boat base in German home waters, about one

hundred U-boats were present on 2

Mas,

but by 4 May almost half of

tham had departed for unknom destinations.(26)

c.

1800 hours on 9 May, only six U-boats had reported

t h e i r positions and another five had entered ports.

t o surrender gave up t o a U.S.

The first U-boat

Navy plane off &gland and was escorted

t o Portland harbor by B r i t i s h naval craft.

By 10 May, fourteen had

ansuered the surrender order and two had a c t u a l l y reached British

porte.

The folloOring day, ninety midget submarines complete with

- 10 -

crews and e q u i p n t were located at Iynses, Denmnrlc, and a t Schomen

and Overflakkee on the Netherland coast.(27)

Seven U-boats were

found i n t a c t i n t h e harbor a t Hel@oland.(28)

The i s l a n d of Helgohd

was f

e taken over on U. May by a force of Floyd. Marines, and

t h e garrison and c i v i l i a n s were evacuated.

The town of Selgoland

had been completely destroyed.(29)

d.

The U-boat f l e e t was slowly being rounded up by Allied

vessels and w u n d e d i n porta all over t h e world.

On

Ui. May, a

submarine surrendered o f f Cape May, New Jersey, and t h e next day

another surrendered at Portsmouth, New Hempshire.(30)

On 16 May,

nineteen surfaced U-boats were sighted o f f t h e coast of Noxway and

were ordered t o t h e west coast o f Scotland t o surmnder.

It was

estimated that a t l e a s t fourteen other8 were a t sea and unreprted.(31)

BrifzLsh Admiral Max Horton, compBz?dQr o f t h e western approaches at
Londonderry, North Ireland, s a i d on 17 May t h a t it was possible some

German suhnarines might not y e t have received surrender i n s t r u c t i o n s .

By that t b mre than one hundred submarines had been found at bases,
but of t h e fif'ty t o seventy emmy underwater raiders on missions at
t h e time of surrender only t h i r t y - f o u r had been accounted f o r on
both s i d e s of the Atlantic.(32)

Early in June a l a r g e German submarine

appeared off the Portugese coast and sent up a diJtrese signal.

crew members were i n t e r n e d after they had s c u t t l e d t h e

Its

craft.(33)

One o t h e r arrived at Scapa on t h e morning of 4 June,(34) but G e m

submarines s t i l l prowled t h e B a l t i c Sea like p i r a t e a , refwing t o

-ll-

Soviet planes searched t h e sea f o r the raidera and several

surrender.

battles between &craft and submarines took pLace.(35)

13. The Close of t h e

a.

Campaim

in Ceechoslovakia.

The resistance m t in Ceechoslovakia by United Stater

and Soviet forces wqs coneiderably mre extensive than elsewhem*

It was t h e only region where ah! arrd ground operations c o n t h w d
without a h a l t after announcament of t h e surrender on 8 May,

The

German forces continually opposed o r fled from t h e S o v i e t forcae,

w h i l e the United States forces were alerted agein and again for

actions that never m t e r i a l l e e d .

b.

One Soviet force entered the euburba of Prague frapl

the southeast, another crossed t h e f r o n t i e r f r o m Sww about sixty

miles north of t h e Czech capital, and still another drove south f

~oravska-0stra,(36) On t h e night of 9 May, Harshal S t a l i n issued an

order of the d w proclaiming t h e l i b e r a t i o n of Prague, although the
c i t y had been under a i r a t t a c k from German planes that afternoan.(37)
Confusion was created by t h e German-held Prague radion, which forecast
continwd resistance because, as it said, t h e German Cnwrnment had
not a c t u a l l y capitulated t o t h e Soviet Union as t o t h e other Allies.(38)
C.

The Third U.S.

Axmy was directed t o continue i t a advance

t o an agreed line of contact w i t h t h e Soviet forces in both

Csechodovakia and Austria.(B9)

On 5 May t h e 4th Armored Division,

after attacking i n Coechoalorakia t o t h e northeast, was ordered t o

h a l t i t s advance, and a f t e r that it marked timb u n t i l the uneonditionil

-12-

:',hen t h e 1 6 t h Armored X v i s i o n took Pilsen i n Czecho-

surrender.

slovakia on 6 :
'
a
:,

t h e eastern l i n e mas secured and only routine

consolidation of p o s i t i o r s vias then necessary. (40)

of u n i t s of t h e Third U.S.

Comcznciing generals

Arny were furnished an operational d i r e c t i v e

on 10 flay which provided t n a t units i n Czechoslovakia areas would:(kl)

E s t a b l i s h defended raod blocks a t once on a l l rnain

roads leading i n t o corps areas fro.? t h e southeast,
e a s t , and northeast

Place signs well i n f r o n t of tnese defended road

blocks reading: "In compliance with t h e terms of
surrender, German m i l i t a r y personnel are forbidden
t o pass beyond t h i s line."
Stop t r o o p and h o s p i t a l t r a i n s f r o x corsing inside
our lines by perforxing such minor delllolitions as
a r e necessary.
d.

Germans who refused t o surrender were subjected t o

constantly increasing pressure from t h e Soviet forces.

Final collapse

of C e n p a n r e s i s t a n c e i n Czechoslovakia and t h e surrender of 420,052

hold-out troops "3s mnounced on 14 1,;ay by t h e Soviet :!igh Command.(42)
Occasional gunfire continued i n Prague s t r e e t s f o r some days as
Soviet and Szecn forces routed German s o l d i e r s f r o n cellars and a t t i c s .
I n s p i t e of t h i s danger, Fresident Edouard Benes of kechoslovakia
m d e a dramatic r e t u r n t o tile c i t y on 1 5 :..ay a f t e r s i x years of exile.
e.

The 1 2 t h Army Group on 14 :a;y directed t:iat t h e zdvance

t o t h e south vould c o n t i m e until contact was xade vjith t h e Soviet

forces o r viith t h e 15th

;SimJr

Group.(43)

I n addition, Third .umy was

given full a u t h o r i t y t o put down any resistance.

Consequently, t h e

inovep.ent proceeded as planned, although mobility was h a q e r e d by

13

poor msds and icy conditions.(&)

from t h e 1 2 t h

As late as 18 May, i n s t r u c t i o n s

Group t o t h e Third Amy smphasized that i t s p b s i t i o n s

i n CEechoslvakia held at t h e end of h o s t i l l t i e s should be maintained

with t h e use of all neceasary force t o r e s t r a i n all moement of

German military or c i v i l i a n ele0entr in t h e rest,

Bs Csechslovakia

was not considered enemy t e r r i t o r y , military government was not

invoked in the technical. sense.

m r g e n c y c i v i l affairs detachwnts

were formed and equipped by t h e Third Army from service and combat
troops.

These detachments were deployed t o exercise c o n t r o l of c i v i l

administration pending United S t a b s withdrawal.

were issued

(h5)

Instructions

Suprems Headquarters on 6 July for gradual reduction

of forces i n Czechoslovakia i n pmportion t o the reduction of Soviet

troops i n t h e country.(46)

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE

l4. A s s w t i o n of

HIGH COMMAND AND NATIONAL O ; ) V E E " T

d by t h e D(lnits % m m " n t n

and

N e m t i a t i o n s f o r Surrender.

The collapse of the German forces was p a r a l l e l e d by t h e

d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e German High Copsland and Government.

Intelligence

r e p o r t s indicated t h a t a jockeying for p o s i t i o n had taken place among

t h e various t o p r a k i n g Geman leaders following the reported death

of Hitler in late April or e a r l y May 1945.(47)

-14-

In a broadcast to the

Gernaan nation on 1 May 19k5, Admiral Dclnitz stated that Hitler was
dead and that he had been nominated by Hitler t o succeed him as
Cermanyts Chancellor and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.(48)

During the early days of May, emissaries o f the German High Command
and of the Dclnitz "Government" uere already conferring with Allied

authorities at Supreme Headquarters (Forward}, then located i n Re-,

France.

The German officers who had negotiated the surrender of their

northwestern armies on 5 May 1945 remained w i t h i n the Allied lines to

negotiate a complete German surrender.(lt9)

On 6 May Supreme Headquarters

directed t h e Moscow Military Mission t o in.Zonn the Soviet High Connand

that the proposed unconditional m e n d e r terms had been presented to

Admiral von Riedeburg, the emissary of Admiral DClaitz, on the afternoon

of 5 May 1945.

Mmiral m n Priedeburg transmitted a messsge to

Admiral D(lnite requesting authorization t o sign an act of unconditional

anl s%taneous

surrender or that M n i t c send the C o m d e r i n Chief

o f tb A r q , the Corrmander in Chief of the Navy, and t h e Commander in

Chief of the Air Force t o Supreme Headquarters f o r the signing of

the surrender. (50)

15. EstabUahrnent at Supreme Heedauarters of a Liaison Detachment

f r o m the German Hid Command.
Shortly after the surrender, a Uaison detachment f r o m the
Gelmen

High Command w a s set up at Suprems Headquarters (Forward).

Detailed inatructions for the composition of this detachment were

issued by Supreme Headquarters.

It was

- 15 -

t o consist of fourteen o f f i c e r s

and a number of e n l i s t e d men and t o include a general o f f i c e r i n

charge, two o f f i c e r s each from General Staff, A Branch,

1lQ

Branch,

and Air Staff, one medical o f f i c e r , two signals o f f i c e r s , and two

naval officers.(51)

On 9 May addition of t h e following Garman

o f f i c i a l s nas ordered:

t h e Secretary of S t a t e for the Reichspost-

ministeritan, the ranking radio o f f i c e r of t h e Luftlraffe, and, f r o m

t h e German H i g h Command, t h e ranking signal o f f i c e r with one senior

staff expert on military wireless and cable matters, and t h e ranking

code and cipher officer. ( 5 2 ) Orders were issued by Supreme
Headquarters on 13 May

1945 announcing t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n of t h e

German High C o d Liaison Party at a point six miles outside of

mima, France.(53)
16. E d a b l i b n t at Flensburn of the Allied Control Partx.
I n the meantime, Supreme Headquarters had arranged t o set
up i t s c o n t r o l party at German High Commsnd Headquarters, t h e seat
of the DBnite Government, located at Flensburg, Germany, near t h e
Danish f r o n t i e r .

A cbnhrol party of twenty-five United States and

B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s and fmy-two e n l i s t e d men under the camand of

Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Books, U.S. A r q , was authorised on

U May 19k5.(54)

The Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s were informsd and invited t o send a s h d l a r

party.

The Soviet General Staff informed Supreme Headquarters that

they would send t o Flensburg a control group c o n s i s t i n g of fifteen

officers and additional supporting personnel, t o be under the command

of General Tmov.(55)

The setting up of a control party over German

- 16 -

elements i n southern Germany, A u s t r i a , and C?iechoslovakia was a l s o

contemplated, ( 5 6 )

17. P o s t h o s t i l i t i e s Negotiations between the German Hi& Command

and t h e Allies.
a.

Various negotiations and o t h e r contacts continued t o be

made between the Allied Commands on t h e one hand, and the G e m Ugh

Command Liaison Party a t Reims, France, or t h e G e m High Command at

Flensburg, Germaqy, on t h e other.

For instance, General Jodl, at

Eeims, protested t h a t t h e Soviet forces were continuing bombing

operations against t h e Germans in t h e East Prussian Army Sector,(fl)
On t h e other hand, t h e Chief of the General S t a f f of t h e Soviet Amy,

i n a message t o General Eisenhower, noted that t h e Central and Southern

Groups o f t h e German forces did not cease resistance a t 2301 hours on

8 May 1945 and did not remain in t h e i r places and lay down t h e i r anw
as required by t h e Act

of Capitulation.

A t 1600 hours on 9 May 1945

t h e s e f o r c e s were not c a p i t u l s t i n g , but were r e s i s t i n g t h e Soviet

Anqy and moving westwards.

General Eisenhower directed t h e German

High Cnmmand at Flensburg t o issue orders t o t h e Central and Southern

Groups e f f e c t i n g full and h e d i a t e compliance.(58)
b.

Some confusion arose as t o t h e procedure for correspondence

between Supreme Headquarters and t h e German High Command.

was clarified

T h b matter

in a l e t t e r issued by Supreme Headquarters on 13 May

1945, which s t a t e d that Supretw Headquarters would deal w i t h the

German High Command only through t h e Supreme Headquarters Control

- 17 -

Party at t h e German High Command Headquarters.

The German High

C o d d Liaison Detachment at Supreme Headquarters d s t e d p u r e a8

an advisory body t o t h e Supreme Headquarters staff divisions and

not used as a means o f con"ioation

and Supreme Headquarters.(59)

between the German High Conrnand

Apparently this letter w a s not complied

with immediately and further directions had t o be issued t o the

German High Command through t h e Suprems Headquarters Control Party

at t h e German High Comnand Headquarters.

These new directions noted

t h a t Supreme Headquarters had received many messages from t h e German

High Command Liaison Detachment at Suprems Headquarters and t h a t it
w a s not at a l l c l e a r whether t h e Supreme Headquarters Control Party

at Flensburg had seen these messages.

It uas pointed out t h a t it

w a s easential that the Supreme Headquarters Control Party a t Flensburg

should censor a l l messages issued by the G
e
m High Cormand,

including those t o the Liaison Detachment.

It referred back t o the

Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg, for t h e i r primary

action, a l e t t e r t o the German H i & Command Liaison Detachment f r o m
the German High Command Headquarters a t Flensburg which pmpsed the
s e t t i n g up of a radio network by the High Command so t h a t its orders
could be heard, not only by German military authorities, but a l r o
by German troops.(60)
C.

On

14 May 19L5, after charges were made from abroad

that ill-advised messages had been broadcast over t h e Flensburg radio,

the Supreme Headquarters Control Party a t Flensburg was directed t o
establish control over t h e Flensburg radio s t a t i o n and t o cemor any

- 18 -

messages coming from it.(61)

German radio s t a t i o n s continued t o make

propaganda broadcasts, however, and on 20 May it was again pointed

out that German a u t h o r i t i e s could w e broadcasting facilities only
when t h e U e d d i t a r y a u t h o r l t i e s wished and a f t e r they had
censored t h e proposed broadcasts. (62)

d.

Suprams Headquarters decided t o use Qerman Reichspoat

f a c i l i t i e s t o the fullest possible extent t o supplement t h e i r own

m i l i t a r y signal c o d c a t i o n s network.

An attempt mas made t o secure

t h e return of Reichspost telscomunications personnel t o their proper

places of employment.

The assistance of t h e German High Command in

t h i s matter was a u t h o r i m d on 23 May

1945.(63)

18. Strendhening of A l l i e d Controls in Southern Germany,

Informtion from reconnaissance elements indicated t h a t
t h e r e were southern elements of the Gernan High Command i n t h e vicinity
v

of Berchtesgzden and t h a t there rag a uide d i s p e r s a l and possibly

deliberate conceabmnt of documants,

On 24 ?day it w a s decided t o

reinforce l o c a l control groups i n southern G e v with additional

United S t a t e s and 3 r i t i s h officers.

aadio links between t h e control

groups at Flensburg and those in the south were t o be arranged.(&)

19. The Arrest o f Admiral Danite and His Followers.

a.

In t h e meantime, the question of arresthg Admiral

W n i t a and the members of t h e German High Command and GoverMlsnt

came more and more t o t h e fore.

Admiral D6nit.t himself and most

- 19 -

h e r s of his gomrnment were s l a t e d for arrest by Supreme Headquarters

following a conference between Ambassador Uurphy and t h e E r i t i s h

pol.itical adviser a t Supreme Headquarters. ( 6 5 ) Supreme Headquarters,
however, requested t h a t t h e Soviet Union be contacted before a c t i o n

be taken.

I n t h e meantime, steps were taken t o reduce and e U " t e

the %xcessive functions" of t h e DUnitz Government,(&)

On 18 May

1945 Supreme Headquarters was i n f o m d through General Trusov, the

senior Soviet representative at Flensburg, t h a t t h e Soviet Governmeat
had "nothing against t h e a r r e s t of a l l members of t h e m - c a l l e d
government of Admiral Dt)nitz."( 67)

The German High C

b.

was ordered closed d m e f f e c t i v e

d Liaison Detachment

23 May 1945.

at R e h

The members of this

detachment were t o be disposed of by t h e provost marshal of Oise

Base Section and by G 2 and A-2 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters,(&)

The German High C o d i t s e l f was closed down on

c,

24 bfay 1945. A t loo0 hours on that date, Admiral Dbnitz and his
staff were summoned on board t h e former German luguy liner Patria,
t h e Headquarters of General. Rooks and his Supreme Headquartera Control

Party.

Upon t h e i r arrival they were met by General Rooks and

representative o f f i c e r s of the B r i t i s h and Sori.& forces and placed

under arrest.

A t t h e s a m time, B r i t i s h troops marched i n t o Admiral

W n i t z ' schoolhouse compound at Flensburg and took all i t s occupants

prieoners.

Thus ended the Cerman High Command and Government at

Flensburg, (69)

-20-

20, Disbandmat of t h e German Hi& Command. South.

On 17 June 1945 it was decided t o disband t h e Germ High

Conunand i n southern Germany In much the sama m e r as had been &ne
with t h e Flensburg Covemnwnt in the North.

The Allied Control Party

was t o mve t o t h e W s t e r i a l Collecting Center area near IEassel.(70)

The disbandment of t h e German High Command South completed the

liquidation of all surviving military elements of the German Governmnt.

2l. E s t a b l i s h k Control over German Uhisteries.

Now that the ltgowrnment and all elements of the German

High Command were e l i t e d ,

t h e task of gathering together and

controlling t h e scattered elements of the Gennan ministeries remained.

The Plan GOLDCUP, dram up by Supreme Headquarters during h o s t i l i t i e s

t o e s t a b l i s h contact with t h e Soviet forces a f t e r the defeat of
Germany and to secure control

over a l l Gowen ministeries located

i n t h e area subject t o General Eisenhowers comoand, was implemented

t o some axtent i n t h e middle of lcay 1945.

This plan had provided

f o r t h e set-ting up of several d n i & e r i a l control parties t o 8 e a r ~ h

f o r t h e various G e m ministeries and a Ministerial Control Group

in charge of a l l these parties.(71)

Ministerial control parties had

already been directed t o proceed t o Flensburg on 15 k y 1945.(72)

Effort waa t o be made t o l o c a t e all German miniateries in t h e United

S t a t e s and B r i t i s h areas with t h e ultimate aim of concentrating all
elements of t h e national government i n one center.(73)

The Mbisterial

Control Group, along with the Soviet Mission a t Flensburg, assumed a

-21-

l o c a l cantrol over elements of the Cerman High Command in t h e north.

Questioning of members of t h e former High Comaand revealed that most
of the High Commands documents had been s e n t south.

The setting up

of ministerial control parties in t h e south and of coordinating

agencies between them was reconansnded on 26

1945.(74)

Contrpl of

the German H i g h Command North o f f i c i a l l y passed fmn the Allied

Control Party t o t h e %xiaterial

Control Group on 28 b[ay 1945.

Brigadier Watkins, i n command of the W s t e r i a l Control Group, mas

a l s o responsible

for coordinating a c t i v i t i e s between t h e Allied Control

Party of the German High Command North and the Allied Control Party

of t h e German High Command South.(75)

22.

Establishment of the Elnieterial Collectinn Centerc

The Ministerial Control Group appointed a c d t t e e t o

locate a suitable area where t h e personnel and archives of t h e v a r i o u

German ministries could be assembled. This grouping of German agencies

was t o be known as t h e Ministerial Collecting Center.

It ncjs pinally

decided t o use t h e areas of Eschenstruth, FUrstenhagen, and Lichtenau,

about f i f t e e n m i l e s southeast of Kaasel, in the northern part of

Land HessenW.(76)

Supremo Headquarters agreed on 5 June 1945 t o

reserve this area f o r the W s t e r i a l Collecting Center,(77)

The

objects of t h e Ministerial Collecting Center included safegunrding

of German archives and records f o r t h e Allied Control Counciland

pmoviding a collecting center f o r such members of Cienaan ministerial

staff8 as m i g h t be required f o r interrogation o r as archivists.
-22-

After all t h e required information had been secured, the Allied

Control Council would determine t h e f a t e of the various

ministries. (78)
23.

Movement of t h e bllnisterial Collecting Center from the

Kasael Area t o Berlin.

a.

The establishment of the Hnisterial Collecting Center

near Kassel was a j o i n t U n i t e d States-British undertaking and was

intended as a temporary measure pending t h e establishmdt of a
quadripartite m i n i s t e r i a l collecting center.

Officers i n charge of

t h e Ministerial Collecting Center recomansnded that a conrmittee be

chosen t o make a surve~yt o find a permanent location in Berlin f o r
the records of t h e ministries, following t h e disbandment of t h e
Ministerid. Collecting Center near K a e s d ,

It w a e not considered

desirable t o attempt establishment of a quadripartite collecting

center e i t h e r in Kassel o r in t h e Soviet Zone.(79)

b.

A t the Potsdam Conference it was decided t h a t the f i v e

chief ministries would be moved t o Berlin by 1November 1945 and t h a t

t h e Ministerial Collecting Center near Kassel would be completely
closed out by 1 February 1946.

A conference was held on 15 October

1945 t o determine t h e present and f u t u r e requirements o f the

M i n i s t e r i a l Collecting Center.(80)
stood

It soon appeared that difficulties

in the way of a quadripartite agreement concerning t h e

Ministerial Collecting Center and t h a t an e a r l y ramoval t o Berlin

would be extrendy d i f f i c u l t .

Many American military o f f i c i a l s f e l t ,

- 23 -

however, that t h e f i v e minidries nentioned in t h e Potsdam Agreement

should be removed t o Berlin, even %&ugh they were established in the
United States Sector of Berlin under exclusive United S t a t e s contml.
They could remain in this sector pending quadripartite agreement.
Such ministerial records as were not t o be removed t o Berlin were t o
be placed in a c e n t r a l depository.(81)

Orders .for the removal o f

t h e Y5nisterial Collecting Center fram t h e Kassel Area t o Berlin were

on 5

issued by t h e Office of U i t a r y Governnk3nt f o r Germany (U.S.)

January 1946.(82)

This move i n which a l l documents required by t h e

occupation forces or by any future Cexman governments were transferred,

was completed by 1 February 1946, when t h e 'Msterial Collecting

Center w a s reconstituted a t Berlin-Tempelhof under t h e c
6889th Berlin Documents Centar.(m)

d of t h e

Only f i f t y German c i v i l servants

were moved from Kassel t o Berlin.

THE SEIZURE OF CONTROL

24. Establishment of Control

Over Civil Population,

The last stage in t h e i n i t i a l assumption of control i n Germany

came with t h e putting i n t o force of certain enactments and proclamations
directed toward t h e c i v i l population, which were later r a t i f i e d by t h e
quadripartite authority. (84)

A l l entertainment was forbidden.

were allowed t o keep t h e i r radios, but music was not alluwed.

-24-

Peop$s
Instead,

t h e Allies used this o u t l e t f o r broadcasting world news, instructions,

and public proclamations.

nature w a s put into effect.

Over-all r e g i s t r a t i o n of a temporary
The use of postal and telephone

communications was not permitted.

A curfew was s t r i c t l y enforced

and t r a v e l by any m a n s except on foot o r bicycle was prohibited.

Motor t r a v e l was permitted t o doctors, nurses, and clergymen v i s i t i n g
outlying d i s t r i c t s .

Repair of the badly damaged German railway

system w a s begun immediately, but only f o r military use.

The work

previously carried out by slave labor now f e u t o the Germans

themselves.
25.

The Settinn-hP of M i l i t a r y Law.

The laws of marfare protected t h e property r i g h t s of t h e

vanquished Germans and placed other l i m i t a t i o n s upon t h e powers of the

The laws proclaimed by t h e occupy3ng powers in Germany

conqueror.

dissolved t h e Nazi Party, suspended German$ laws containing Nazi

principles, closed Germ courts, dissolved t h e special Nasi courts,
prohibited various kinds of private and public comnunication, made

Allied military currency legal tender, blocked German foreign exchange

transactions, froze German property abroad, and established control

over all German-Government and N a z i property at home and abroad.(85)

a.

The law dissolving t h e Nazi Party l i s t e d fifty-two

offices, organizations, and i n s t i t u t i o n s , and eight paramilitary

organizations which were prohibited.

A l l funds, property, equipment,

accounts and records were t o be preserved i n t a c t and delivered t o

- 25 -

Military Government.

Officers or persons i n charge were t o be

responsible f o r carrying out t h e s e provisions, and any punishment,

including death, could be i n f l i c t e d for failure t o comply.
b.

"he N a e i laws abrogated included t h e l a w f o r t h e

protection of national symbols, the law against t h e creation of

p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , t h e l a w securing t h e unity of party and state,
and another concernhg insidious a t t a c k s against t h e state and t h e
p a r t y and f o r t h e protection of p a r t y Uniforms.

Others were t h e

l a w , t h e Hitlerjugend law, t h e law f o r protection of

nReich" flag

German blood and honor, t h e "Reich" c i t i z e n s h i p l a w , and decrees of

t h e f"er

concerning t h e legal status of the Nationalsoaialistische

Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei.

Later, other laws were suspended.

a t i o n s were placed on punishent.

Limit-

Only those punishments expressly

provided by law, and no c r u e l or excessive punishments, could be

Detention Prithout a s p e c i f i c charge and punishment without

inflicted.

a lawful trial were prohibited.

C.

The Vollssaerichtshof, t h e Sondernericht, and all courts

and t r i b u n a l s of t h e N a t i o n a b o z i a l i s t i s c h e Deutsche ArbeiteIs-Partei

and of its associated organizations were abolished.

O r d i n a r y and

administrative courts were suspended temporarily, pending t h e i r

denazification.

A l l cases involving

aru; of t h e United Nations or

any of their nationals, cases involving military law o r personnd,

and claims for money against the German Government were removed from
t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of German courts.

In addition, military government

- 26 -

courts could asme j u r i s d i c t i o n of any case, or review any case.

A l l death sentences were t o be reviewed.

d.

A l l telephone, teletype, telegraph, and radio services

and all internal, external, and t r a n s i t mail services were suspended.

A l l items i n t r a n s i t were detained by postal a u t h o r i t i e s .

The only

post-office functions allowed t o remain in operation were savings-bank

and other f i n a n c i a l services.

All employees of t h e communications

systems were t o continue t o report t o t h e i r places of duty and were

t o be responsible f o r t h e preservation, maintenance, and r e p a i r of

A l l p r i v a t e l y owned communications equipment had t o be

facilities.
declared.

The law provided f o r a system of censorship f o r a l l

correspondence, personal papers, and documents c a r r i e d e i t h e r by the

post o r by c i v i l i a n t r a v e l e r s and for all communications by tdbphone,

teletype, telegraph, o r radio, when such services should be restored.

Violations could be punished by death.
e.

The printing, production, publication, distribution, sale,

and commercial lending of a l l newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books,

pamphlets, posters, printed music, and other p r i n t e d material, of
sound recordings and motion p i c t u r e films were prohibited, and all
t h e a t r i c a l and radio a c t i v i t i e s .

The Ministry of Propaganda and t h e

laws of review were abolished, and t h e funds, property, equipment,

accounts, and records of t h e ministry were taken over.

Violations of

this lam also might be punished by death.

f.

Another law provided t h a t Allied military mark notes of

- 27 -

denominations equivalent t o other mark currency were t o be used f o r

a l l transactions, and arq punishment short of death was authorized for

violations.

All money transactiona between Germans and people outside

of Germany were prohibited without s p e c i f i c permission from Military

\

Government.

All persons owning o r controlling foreign asseta, or

owing a q obligations whatever were required t o report it.

A l l foreign

currency, checks, d r a f t s , b i l l s of exchange o r other instruments of

payment were t o be delivemd t o t h e nearest branch of t h e Reichsbank.(86)

The ApDrehension of Nazi Personalities,

26.

The Western

U e s entered Germany with

t h e seizure of control.
targets-the

well-laid plans for

Much thought had gone i n t o t h e selection of

s t r a t e g i c points which, i f seized, would put t h e Allies

i n f u l l control of t h e situation.

Some of t h e t a r g e t s were persons:

the leading personalities of t h e Nazi Party, the G e m n Government,

and t h e armed forces.

The surrender, suicide, or capture of the top

members of t h e Nazi hierarchy was so rapid t h a t three weeks after

V-E Day only a few t o p Nazis were at large.
sure, but was not a c t u a l l y established.

H i t l e r ' s death seemed

His decision t o die in Berlin

r a t h e r than flee t o Berchtesgaden appeared t o have put an end t o t h e

conthgency'of t o p Nazis holding out i n the mountains and building a
"no-surrender" legend for use in reviving nazism among whatever

die-hards might survive defeat.

Joseph Cllbbels, Heinrich Himmler,

and Cen. Admiral Hans w n Friedeburg committed suicide by swallowing

poison.

Her"

GUrjng, Grand Admiral K a r l DUnits, Field 1Jarshal

- 28 -

,411-r

eA

Wilhelm Keitel, iEulius Streicher, Col. Gen. dustzv Jodl, and fonner
labor minister Robert Ley were in custody.
a prisoner in Great Britain.

Rudolph Hesa was s t i l l

A number of high-ranking officers were

captured with t h e i r troops.(@)

27.

Other Targets of Control.

Other t a r g e t s destined for seizure were agencies or

institutions.

These included t h e Nazi Party and all i t s auxiliary

organizations, the c i v i l administration, and the agencies and means

of communication and information.

a.

Organized government had f o r the most part broken down;

as a matter of f a c t , not much government was needed, f o r t h e people

nere too stunned by the sudden collapse t o offer much resistance.
U l i t a r y Government detachments i n each Hreis, together with weekly
meetings and inspections, made it possible t o head off any unauthorized
a c t i v i t y that threatened.

The time was used by Military Government

i n defining i t s own organization and i n making preliminary studies

and evaluations.

obvious.

The necessary changes i n Gerxan government were

Nazi influence had t o be removed, as w e l l as the military

character and the central controls.

Many appointments t o l o c a l

Geman offices, made during combat, had t o be changed.(B)

b.

Other targets were economic o r industrial.

These

included w a r plants, key industries, and concentrations of economic

power and wealth.

The disposition of German industry so as t o make

r e s t i t u t i o n for t h e damage suffered by the victims of German aggression

- 29 -

and t o deprive Germany of t h e paser t o &e

difficult problems,

w a r was one of the moat

Partial. restoration of industry was of course

necessary in order t o effect any kind of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and to prevent

starvation.

W i t h i n a feu days after t h e surrender, the Ford plant

at Cologne was turning out trucks f o r t h e use of Ulitary Govenment

i n transporting displaced persons.

Two b o i l e r p l a n t s zeopened and

a few sanmills were producing lumber f o r essential bridges and houses;

a threadmill was supplying raw materials f o r clothing;

were reopening wherever possible,

and shops

While no f i n a l policy of industry

control had as y e t been established, t h e immediate policy was t o

reopen f a c t o r i e s whose products were of help t o the A r q in i t s task

of maintaining order and i n supplying such imperative c i v i l i a n needs

as food, medicine, disinfectants, soap, fertilizer, power, and

forth.

80

Other legitimate industries were p e d t t e d but not encouraged.

Any lumry enterprise was subject t o labor r e q u i s i t i o n if additional.

personnel was needed f o r essential work.

The climax t o t h e sebura

of control over German industry came on 5 July 1945, when United

S t a t e s o f f i c e r s took over t h e managanent of all p l a n t s and branches
of t h e I.G.

Farbenlndustrie, t h e largest chemical f i r m in t h e world

and Germarry's major pmducer of war materials.(89)

28. Assumtion of Four-Power Authority in Genaanu.

The ultimate s t e p i n t h e seizure of control came with t h e
Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945, announcing the assumption of j o i n t
control i n Germany, by t h e governments of t h e United States,

- 30 -

Great Brit*,

the Provisional Government of France, and the Union

of Soviet Socialist Republics.(gO)

On U, July General Eisenhower

proclaimed that U.S. Forces, European Theater, had been established

under his control and that all m i l i t a v laws and orders issued under

his a u t h o r i t y as Supreme Commander remained in effect.

- 31 -

Chapter I1

THE UNITEll STATES FORCES ON V-E DAY

THE STRUCTURE OF C O W D

29.

Machinery f o r Coordination.
A global conflict necessitating t h e highest degree of

collaboration between t h e Allied forces led t o the establishment of

an organization that w a s capable of both integrated

command.

The U.S.

and Navy;

and separated

Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised control over the

'

the British War Office exercised control over t h e

Britieh military forces; w h i l e the Combined Chiefs of Staff nas

made up of representatives of the two nations and issued instructions
i n the name of both governments t o operational commands.

Expeditionary Force w a s composed o f the U.S.

The Allied

Army, the British A n q ,

and elements of the armies of the liberated countries.

"wo measures

were taken t o effect coordination between Supreme Headquarters and

these countries:

an Allied Contact Section w a s established in Supreme

Headquarters, t o which representatives of t h e Allied governments were

- 32 -

assigned;

and missions were maintained in t h e various countries.

30. Machinery of United S t a t e s Oranization.

Even within t h e United States comnand, organization was on

a complex triple basis, comprised of Supreme Headquarters, Headquarters,

European Theater of Operations, and the C d c a t i o n s Z o n d

working i n a c l o s e l y i n t e r r e l a t e d p a t t e r n of responsibilities.

31. Supreme Headauarters.

a.

The Supreme Comnnrnder. General of t h e Army Dwight D.

Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of a l l United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h

forces i n northwestern Europe, as w e l l as of a l l other n a t i o n a l
elaments forming p a r t of t h e Allied Expeditionary Force, and in t h i s
capacity he received i n s t r u c t i o n s from t h e Combined Chiefs of Staff.

He was a s s i s t e d by a chief of staff, by a general. and s p e c i a l staff,

and by a number of p o l i t i c a l advisers who mere s p e c i a l i s t s on t h e
European countries with which Supreme Headquarters was dealing.

b.

Distribution of Personnel.

Supreme Headquarters included

both United States and B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s , distributed, so far as

possible, in equal numbers in t h e staff division and sections.

The

general practice was f o r t h e chief of a division t o have a deputy

of t h e other nationality.
C.

General and Special Staffs.

Of t h e t w o sections of t h e

general staff, one d e a l t with general operations and t h e other with

air operations.

The naval and air staffs operated under t h e i r respective

- 33 -

comnders.

The s p e c i a l staff included the Adjutant General, t h e

Engineer, Signals, Medical, Psychological Warfare, Public Relations,

Air Defense, and Headquarters Commandant.

d.

Z[a;Ior Commands under the Supreme Headquarters.

The

major coIIDpaLlcfs under the Supreme Headquarters were t h e 6th, lab, and

21st Army Groups, t h e Naval task forces, and t h e t a c t i c a l air forces.

Field forces, with few exceptions, were assigned t o t h e arqy groups,

which were tactical echelons.

On 20 July 1945, t h e 6th

Arw

Group

was disbanded, and i t s forces transferred t o t h e 12th Awy Group.

32.

Functions of t h e United S t a t e s Elements of Supreme

Headquarters.

As well as performing t h e functions a l l o t t e d t o them under

t h e Allled scheme o f organization, t h e United S t a t e s elements on t h e

Suprems Iieadquarters staff were responsible f o r c e r t a i n functions in

connection with United S t a t e s troop matters, generally when these

involved two o r more major commands or were matters of policy.(l)

Utters r e l a t i n g t o personnel and r e l a t i o n s with c i v i l populations
were assigned t o t h e United States element of t h e G-1 Division.

United S t a t e s m i l i t a r y censorship and administration of m i l i t a r y

i n t e l l i g e n c e units were t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e United S t a t e s element

of t h e G-2 Division.

The G3 United States element d e a l t with

inspections o f United S t a t e s troops directed by the Theater Cofinuander,

t r a i n i n g policies, operation reports, signal. communications,

- 34 -

eccperiments with new items, Theater troop basis, organization of units,

and issue of equipment.

Administration and planning of major

subordinate commands, allocation of service troops, supply, transportation, construction, captured enemy materiel, employment of indigenous

labor, and civil. affairs supplies were a l l o t t e d t o t h e United S t a t e s

element of t h e G-4 Division.

33

Channels. of Command

I n 1941,t h e division of authority was, b r i e f l y , on the

following lines:

All Theater duties, except those of decision and

policy a f f e c t i n g more than one principal United S t a t e s command, were

t h e responsibility of t h e Comnding General of t h e Communications
Zone;

i n United S t a t e s matters on which the Theater Commender had

t o take personal action, the appropriate senior o f f i c e r of the United

States element of Supreme Headquarters acted in an advisory capacity
t o t h e Theater Co"ander.(2)

I n A p r i l 19b5 t h e chiefs of t h e general

s t a f f divisions o f Supreme Headquarters were designated acting c h i e f s

of the equivalent divisions of t h e European Theater of Operations.(3)

The r e l a t i o n between these two s t a f f s was indicated by Lt. Gen. W. B.

Smith, Chief of S t a f f , as follows:

It 8eems t o me t h a t t h e guiding principle of operation

i s that General Eisenhower, as American Theater Commander,
is uskg t h e staff of t h e Line of Communications (Communications Zone) t o perform t h e usual functions of a Theater
staff. Consequently, every precaution must be taken t o
insure that this s t a f f i s kept w e l l in t h e general picture.
Short-cuts which might confuse or m i l i t a t e against the
effective use of t h e Line of Collnnunications staff i n its
American administrative functions must be carefully

- 35 -

avoided, and full coordination must be assured. Until

routine method8 of operation are established, this
will require t h e careful attention of a l l concerned,
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n routing belegrams and papers f o r action.

THE EURO"

THEATER OF OPEXIATIONS AM) THE

ORGANIZATION OF ITS HEADGUARTEES

34. Location and Relation t o Other Headquarters.

On V-E Day t h e European Theater of Operations, which was

t h e second component of United States coamand, had i t s headquarters

in Paris. The Commanding General, General Eisenhower, and t h e ChieP

of S t a f f were in ReimS with Supreme Headquarters, ard t h e chiefs of
t h e general and special staff divisions functioned j o i n t l y with t h e
Headquarters of t h e C o d c a t i o n s Zone.

Acting chiefs of t h e

general staff divisions had bean designated at Supreme Headquarterw,(4)

but most of the work was performed by t h e Paris staff.

35. Operational Problems.

The Theater Commander delegated all possible r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s
t o major commands, but reserved t h e determination of policies,
objectives, and p r i o r i t i e s , and t h e issuance of orders affecting mre
than one co"and.(5)

Major commanders were authorized d i r e c t

comunication with British agencies, t h e War Department, or with

each other on technical and routine matters;
were routed through Theater Headquarters.

- 36 -

all other c o " i c a t i o n 8

36. Duality of Theater H e a d a a r t e r s .

Two organizations could, and did, a c t as Theater Headquarters:
one, t h e general staff of Supreme Headquarters, and t h e other, t h e
general staff of the C o d c a t i o n s Zone.

I n an attempt i n 1944 t o

c l a r i f y t h e division of a u t h o r i t y between these two bodies, a s t a f f

study was submitted by t h e
.

G 4 Division of Supreme Headquarters

containing a proposal t o place t h e Commanding General of t h e

Comnunications Zone under the operational c o n t r o l of Supreme Headquart e r s , ( b ) which would have a l l o t t e d a greater measure of supervisory
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o that Headquarters.

No a c t i o n was taken, however,

along these lines u n t i l April 1945, when members of t h e general staff

of Supreme Headquarters were designated a c t i n g c h i e f s of the

oorresponding d i v i s i o n s on t h e s t a f f of Headquarters, European

Theater of Operations.

37.

Elements of Headauarters. Eurouean Theater of Operations,

and their Functions.

a.

Functions of t h e Deputy Theater Commander.

On 15 U y

1945 t h e d u t i e s of t h e Deputy Theater Commander were t r a n s f e r r e d t o

staff sections, and no further deputy was designated u n t i l 15 March

1947. (7)
b.

General and Special Staffs.

The functions of t h e

general staff of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, were

performed j o i n t l y by the general staffs of Suprams Headquarters and

- 37 -

of Comrmmications Zone.

The special staff was made up of the chiefs

of t h e administrative and supply services and was, for the most

part, i d e n t i c a l with t h e special staff of t h e Comunications Zone.

Ekceptions were the Inspector General, the Chief of t h e Artillery
Section, and the Chief of t h e Military Labor Service, who did not
have corresponding duties with t h e Communications Zone, and the
London Munitions Assignment Board, which was considered as a special
staff section of Theater Headquarters rather than a Communications
Zone agency.
C.

b j o r Conmands under the European Theater of Operations.

Major commands under Headquarters, European Theater of Operations,

were also under Supreme Headquarters, but the control of the
first-mentioned headquarters, prior t o the dissolution of combined
command was administrative rather than t a c t i c a l .

As w e l l as the

commands already cited,(8) the following were under the administrative

control of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations:

c3onmunications

Zone, Ground Forces Reinforcement Cormuand, stld the F i r s t Airborne

*,while the

Office of Strategic Sersdces, the Air Transport

Command, and the Arrqy Airways Comunication System were attached.

THE COMMUNICATICNS ZONE AND ITS ORGANIZATION

38.

Functions of the Communications Zone.

The Communications Zone, the t h i r d component of United States

- 38 -

comand, was t h e organization that d e a l t with operations and the

administration of supply units.

It was authorized t o deal directly

on routine supply matters with t h e New Pork Port of Embarkation and

t h e Headquarters of t h e A r q Service Forces,

Har Department.

After

t h e establishment of Theater Headquarters i n Frankfurt, Germany,

Comnunications Zone was t h e major headquarters functioning in the
l i b e r a t e d countries.
General, Gen. John C.H.

In addition t o these functions t h e Commanding

Lee, was t h e Tmater Executive f o r t h e

maintenance of Theater records and f o r carrying out t h e administrative

functions t h a t were c o m n t o t h e whole Theater.(9)

The Theater

chiefs of administration and supply were technical advisers t o t h e

Theater Commander and served on t h e staff of t h e Commanding General

of t h e Communications Zone.

Later, w i t h t h e modifications o f Theater

organization, more d u t i e s were assumed by Headquarters, European

Theater of Operations.

Functions o r i g i n a l l y assigned t o t h e

Commanding General of t h e Comunications Zone included:

recommendations

t o the Theater Commander concerning Comunications Zone boundaries,

and Theater matters of supply, equipment, hospitalization, salvage,

captured en-

equipment, transportation, funds, property, account-

ability, and preparations for t h e p o s t h o s t i l i t i e s period.

He was a l s o

responsible f o r t h e indoctrination of personnel a r r i v i n g in t h e

Theater, for d i r e c t i v e s concerning the services, strength reports,
casualty reports, prisoners of w a r , r e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of o f f i c e r s ,
censorship, military intelligence, graves registration, quarters,

and records a d reports.(lO)

- 39 -

39.

General and Special Staffs.

The general staff of t h e Comunications Zone was composed

of t h e usual f i v e divisions and t h e Office of t h e Purchasing Agent,

who served a l s o on t h e special staff of Theater Headquarters.

The

s t a f f o f f i c e r s of the C d c a t i o n s Zone general staff had functions

i n connection with Theater Headquarters as well.

The special s t a f f

comprised the Judge Advocate, Adjutant General, Chief of Chemical

Warfare, Chief Quartermaster, C h i e f Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer,
Chief of Transportation, Chief Engineer, Chief of Ordnance, Provost

Marshal, Antiaircraft Officer, Chief of Claims, Chief of the Army

&change Service, C h i e f of Information and Education, Historian,

and Chief Chaplain.

40. Major Commands, C o d c a t i o n e Zone.

The major c o b s under t h e Comunications Zone were
Advance Section, Oise Base Section, Seine Base Section, United Kingdom

Base, Continental Advanced Section, Delta Base Section, Channel Base

Section, and Normandy Base Section, t h e last two o f which were fuzed
on 1 July 1945 and redesiepated Chanor Base Section(ll)

"E DlEPUlPLIENT OF FIELD KEXES ON

V-E DAY

W . Order of Battle.
The V-E Day battle line, extending from southeast Germany

- 40 -

through Austria and Czechoslovakia, north up across Germany t o t h e

extreme northwestern t i p of that country, contained a t o t 8 1 of

sixty-one United S t a t e s combat divisions:

forty-two infantry, f o u r

airborne, and f i f t e e n armored.

a,

The Southern Section of the Line.

On t h e right, or

south, of t h e line was t h e 6th Army Group, sometimes r e f e r r e d t o aa

t h e Southern Group of Armies, coIIIpDcLI)(led by Cen. Jacob L. Devers,

This group comprised t h e F i r s t

with headquarters a t Heidelberg.

m and the Seventh U.S.

French A

following major units:(12)

Axmy, which was made up of t h e

t h e 12th Armored Division and t h e 45th,

63d, and 100th Infantry Divisions;

the V I Corps, including t h e 10th

Armored and t h e 44th and 103d I n f a n t r y Divisions;

including t h e 20th Armored and t h e 3d,

t h e XV Corps,

426, axxi 86th Infantry Divisions;

t h e IMI Corps, including t h e l 0 k d Airborne Division? and the 36th

I n f a n t r y Division,

42. The Northern Section of t h e Line.

The opposite end of t h e l i n e was held by t h e X V I I I Corps

(Airborne), composed of t h e 5 t h and 7 t h Armored Divisions, t h e 82d

Airborne Division, and t h e 8 t h Infantry Division.

This corps operated

with t h e B r i t i s h Second Army under t h e i r 2 l s t Army Group.

43.

The Central Section of t h e Line.

Between t h e s e two p u p a all f o r c e s were under Gen. Omar 1.

Bradley, commanding t h e 1 2 t h Army Gmup with headquarters at Wiesbaden,

-w-

The 12th Army Group contained t h e F i r s t , Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth

U.S.

Armies.

The Fifteenth A r q area comprised the %e

provincea;

t h e o t h e r armies i n t h i s group were disposed t a c t i c a l l y over t h e rest

of Germany.
a.

c o d :

The F i r s t

had t h e following major u n i t s under i t a

t h e Vu: Corps, including t h e

t h e 78th Infantry Division;

3d Armored 'and t h e 9th, 69th, and 104th Infantry Divisions;

the

V I I I Corps, including t h e 6 t h Armored and t h e 76th, Qth, and 89th

Inf'antry Divisions.
b.

The Third Amy was composed of t h e foUorring: t h e

4th and 70th Infantry Divisions;

the

III Corps, including t h e U t h

Armored and t h e 99th Infantry Divisions;

9th and 16th *red

t h e V Corps, including the

Divisions and t h e lst, 2d, and 97th Infantry

Divisions; t h e X I I Corps, including t h e 4 t h and l l t h Armored and t h e

5th, 26th, and 90th Infantry Divisions;

t h e XX Corps, including t h e

1 3 t h Armored and t h e 65th,, 71st, and 80th Infantry Divisions.

C.

The Ninth Army comprised t h e following: t h e XI11 Corps,

including t h e 35th, 84th, and 102d Infantry Divisions; t h e XVI Corps,

including t h e 2%h, 75th, 7%h,

and 95th Infantry Divisions;

the

X X Corps, including the 2d and 8 t h Armored and t h e 30th and 83d

Infantry Divisions

d.

The F i f t e e n t h Army was made up of t h e following:

the

66th and 106th Infantry Divisions; t h e BMII Corps, including the 1 7 t h

kirborne Division and t h e 94th Infantry Division;

- 42 -

t h e XXIII Corps,

composed of t h e 28th Infantry Division.

44.

The Reserve.
The F i r s t Allied Airborne Axmy, containing t h e 1 3 t h Airborne

Division, formed t h e Supreme Headquarters, Allied Ekpeditionary Force,

Reserve.

CONFORUTION To THE NATIONAL ZONES OF OCCUPATION

45. S i t u a t i o n on V-E Day.

Tlie question of t h e zonal division of occupied t e r r i t o r y
had been a matter of discussion among t h e Big Three since t h e e a r l y
planning conferences.

Since t h e second Quebec conference t h e United

S t a t e s a u t h o r i t i e s had known t h a t t h e y would have t h e southwestern

zones of Germany and t h a t t h e zones assigned t o t h e occupying powers
would correspond generally t o zones of operation during combat.

The

end of h o s t i l i t i e s , however, found t h e armies of t h e various powers

dispersed over areas not within t h e i r respective contemplated zones.
The United S t a t e s battle l i n e on V-E Day extended from southeast .
Germany and A u s t r i a . , north through Czechoslovakia, and across Germany

t o i t s extreme northwestern t i p .

One of t h e f i r s t problems, therefore,

was t h e early w i t h d r a w a l of troops from the occupation zones of t h e

other powers and t h e i r realignment in t h e i r own zone.

- 43 -

46. Decision on t h e French Zone.

In t h e spring of 1945 t h e major powers agreed that France
should join in t h e occupation, and the Provisional Government of t h e
French Republic on 1 U y 1945 signed t h e Agreeinent on t h e Control
Machinery f o r Germany, which had been prepared by the European

Advisory Commission.

On 13 May Ambassador John U. Winant informed

t h e French of t h e area pmposed f o r their occupation.(l3)

French reaction was favorable,

The

Subsequent agreenent between t h e

United States and French Governments established t h e area as the

Kreise

of Oberwesterwald, Untemesterwald, Unterlahn, and St. bars-

hausen;

t h e Benirke of Preiburg and Konstane;

13aden7Baden, and Rastatt;

the Kreise of Btlhl,

and t h e area of Land 7iUrttemberg comprising

Leonberg, Mblingen, Ntlrtingen, Wppingen, Ulm, anl t h e northeast

portion of Lillnsingen.(U)

The European Addsory Commission expert

subcommittee approved t h e agreement on 5 JuIy,(lS)

and t h e necessary

amendments were drawn up and l a t e r published t o t h e Protocol of

12 September 19&,

which had delineated the zones of occupation in

Germany. (16)

47.

Operations t o Conform with Delineation of French Zone.

A t the end of June t h e War Depart;oent instructed Supreme

Headquarters t o withdraw from t h e area o f the French Zones in Germany

and Austria, and t o make arrangements f o r t h e temporary accommodation
of a token French force i n B r i t i s h o r United States Sectors of Berlin.

The absence of a f i n a l decision on t h e sectors i n Vienna precluded

any action there.(l'/)

Operations began on 5 July with t h e handing

over by t h e Fifteenth Army of t h e relevant Rhine area.(lB)

On 10

July Trier, Koblenz, the Landkreise of Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn,

and St. Goarshausen, t h e Saarland, m d the section of Land Hessen
west o f t h e Rhine River were transferred t o French control,(l9) and
a t t h e same time Tirol-Vorarlberg was placed under French j u r i s d i c t i o n

i n Austria.(20)

Reciprocally, the V I Corps of t h e Seventh Axmy had

relieved the French on 8 July of t h e sector of t h e &der

XWtemberg

and Baden t h a t was designated f o r the United S t a t e s Zone.(;?l)

48. Operations to Conform with Delineation of B r i t i s h Zone.

The first operation connected with t h e t r a n s f e r of t e r r i t o r y

to form the B r i t i s h Zone tool$ t h e form of an evacuation by t h e Ninth

U.S.

Arqy on 7 June.(=)

Three days l a t e r General Eisenhower informed

the Combined Chiefs of Staff of t h e outline plan f o r complete transfer,

which arranged for t h e t r a n s f e r t o the Second B r i t i s h Army, over a
period of three weeks, of t e r r i t o r y held by United S t a t e s forces i n

Hanover and Westphalia, and the assumption of command by the 2 l s t

Arqy Group of its sector of t h e &e

Province by 27 June.(23)

The

completion of operations, however, took longer than had been planned.

Ugdeburg was cleared on 4 July, and t h e next day t h e B r i t i s h took
over control of t h e i r Rhhe area from t h e Fifteenth U.S.

-.(a)

Complete control of t h e i r Zone in Germany passed t o t h e British by

9 July,(25) while the first adjustment between B r i t i s h and United

S t a t e s troops in Austria took place on t h e same day, when t h e l O l s t

- 45 -

Airborne Division handed over t h e i r small area of Steiermark. (26)

Final British-American adjustment in Austria c a w w i t h t h e handing

over t o t h e B r i t i s h on 28 July of t h e s e c t o r in S t e i e m a r k occupied
by t h e l l t h Armored Division.(27)

49, Operations t o

Conform with t h e Delineation of the Soviet Zone,

I n t h e d r i v e during April 1945, t h e T h i r d and Ninth U.S.

Armies had moved eastward through c e n t r a l Germany t o t h e Elbe River
and had penetrated t h e contemplated Soviet Zone.(28)

According t o

t h e plan drawn up f o r the necessary t r a n s f e r , the 12th Amy Gmup

should hand over, beginning 1 July, t h e p a r t of t h e Soviet Zone

Following a m e t i n g between

occupied by United S t a t e s troops,(29)

Marshal Zhukov and Lt. Cen. Lucius D. Clay in Berlin, detailed plans

were concluded f o r t h e occupation by t h e Soviet f o r c e s of t h e Wiamar

%ushionft3 one day and of t h e bfagdeburg bulge in two.(30)

operations were completed in Germany

The

& 4 July,(31) but final

adjustments of t h e areas in Austria were not accomplished u n t i l

19 September. (32)
50.

Other Operations i n Connection with Occur>ation of Zonal Areas.

Certain other operations were c a r r i e d out during t h e period.

On 24 b y , the Bremen Enclave, including t h e ports of Brenen and

Bremerhaven, was occupied by United S t a t e s forces.(33)

On 6 July t h e

first detachment of United States troops mved into Berlin and began
t o take over c o n t r o l of t h e United States Sector there,(34)

- 46 -

Plans

were drawn up f o r t h e &radual reduction, in propartion t o t h e withdrawal

of Soviet troops, of t h e Third U.S.

X.

forces in Czechoslovakia.(35)

Final Extent of t h e United States Zone.

On 17 ;July

I945

Theater Headquarters SMounced that lion&

adjustments had been completed, that all a r e a s assigned t o t h e United

S t a t e s f o r military occupation were held exclusively by United S t a t e s
troops, and t h a t all United S t a t e s forces had withdrawn fmm a r e a s
t o be occupied by other powers.

I n t h e final delineation of zones,

the United S t a t e s was a l l o t t e d t h e following areas i n G e r q :

Land Bavaria, excluding Landkreis Undau;

Bhine River;

Land Hessen e a s t of t h e

Pmvinz Hessen-Nassau as it existed p r i o r t o July 1938,

exclusive of Landkreise Obemestemald, Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn,

and St. Goarshausen;

t h e northern parts of LCLnder Baden and

Wilrttemberg south t o and including Landkreise Ulm, W i n g e n ,

Mblingen, Leonberg, Pforzheim, and Karlsruhe;

Enclave.(36)

and the Bremen

I n Austria, the united States Zone comprised Land

Salzburg and that psrt of Land OberClsterreich lying south of the

Danube

.(37)

- 47 -

Chapter III
THE UNITED STAPFS FORCES IN "SITION

TIE NEN MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE

52.

Change of Mission i n Europe.

a.

With t h e end of hostilities, t h e Allies mved on t o t h e

second stage of t h e i r task, the aims and objectives of which had been
declared by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal
S t a l i n af'ter t h e Crimea Conference, as foUows:(l)

It i s our inflexible purpose t o destroy German m i l i t a r i s m

and nazism and t o ensure that Germany w i l l . never again be
able t o disturb the peace of t h e world. We are determined
t o disarm and disband a l l Germen armed forces; break up
f o r all time the German General Staff t h a t has repeatedly
contrived t h e resurgence of German militarism; remove o r
destroy all German military equipnent; eliminate or
control all German industry t h a t could be used for military
production; bring all war criminals t o justice and
swift punishment and exact reparation i n kind f o r the
destruction wrought by Germans; w i p e out t h e Nazi Party,
Nazi laws, organizatione, and institutions; remy8 all
Nazi and military inPluence from public offices and from
the c u l t u r a l and economic l i f e of t h e German people;
and take in harmony such other masues i n Germany as
may be necessaryto the future peace and safety of the
world.

- 47 -

These missions were primarily t h e concern of hhilitary Government a t

all echeloris, but they inevitablg- affected t h e mission of

a l l the

United S t a t e s forces insofar as the l a t t e r participated with Military

G o v e m n t in t h e accomplishment of t h e new objectives.(2)

The

cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s , too, and t h e occupation of Germany and

Austria brought In t h e i r t r a i n specific new functions for the various

services, which led t o adjustments in comand and comruand channels.(3)

b.

I n general, the missions of the United S t a t e s forces in

Europe following t h e defeat of Germany had been o u t l h e d by t h e War

Departmrrt i n l9&.(4)

It

was

assumed t h a t p a r t i a l demobilization

would be possible and t h a t about 400,000 men mould be needed in t h e

Theater a year after t h e and of h o s t i l i t i e s .

A l l ground forces,

except sone service units in t h e United Kingdom and North Africa,

were t o be concentrated on t h e Continent.

F i r s t priority had been

given t o support of t h e war against Japan, and withdrawal of f o r c e s

was t o be accomplished only by such transportation as remained after

this p r i o r i t y had been met.
w

C.

During t h e period of combined c o m d 12th A r q Group,

in cooperation with 6th Army Group, was made responsible f o r the

occupation of Germany, and t h e United S t a t e s element of the Supreme
Headquarters general staff was responsible for planning for t h e
Theater administration.

Chiefs of services were responsible for

planning within t h e i r own services and maintained considerable d i r e c t

control with t h e general staff divisions of Supranre Headquarters.

-48-

Theater c h i e f s of supply services under Supreme Headquarters and

European Theater of Operations continued as c h i e f s of services

following the termination of combined command.
d.

The occupation of Germany was t h e more important of

t h e two main missions confronting t h e Theater Commander.

Since many

of t h e important decisions regarding the occupation were expected t o

come from t h e Allied Control Authority and from sources other than

military, it was necessary t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y headquarters in Germaq

be oriented with .the United S t a t e s element of the U e d Control
Authority.

The second-main mission confronting t h e Theater Commander

was t h e redeployment of United States forces, and a t t h e close of t h e

war in Germany enormous p r e a s k e was alreadg being f e l t in the d i r e c t i o n
of expediting redeployment, both t o assist t h e war in Japan and t o
r e t u r n other forces t o t h e United States.

The headquarters which was

t o handle redeployment needed close contact with t h e War Department

on supply and shipping and had t o be c l o s e l y t i e d t o t h e personnel

administration of t h e Theater as a whole.

It was e s s e n t i a l for a

single agency t o c o n t r o l t h e line of communications, which would be

throuefi France and Belgium u n t i l f a c i l i t i e s were provided in
Bremerhaven.

- 49 -

R0lEDIATE ADJUSTXENTS IN C O W AND LBPL0-T

53.

Supreme Command in Germang.

The ageearent reached between t h e Allied powers i n November

1944 on t h e control machinerg h Germany

vested t h e supreae authority

i n t h e Control Council, which was composed o f t h e commanders in chief

of t h e four occupying forces.(5)

The Allied Control Authority was

the Allied central governing machinery for Germany, t h e United States

component of *ich

54.

was the

U.S.

Group Control Council (Cermarty).(6)

SuPreine United S t a t e s Command in Europe.

The original plan provided for e a r l y termination o f combined

coxnand and establishment of a separate United States headquarters t o
take over those functions 5.n connection with

United S t a t e s troop8 that

had been performed by Supreme Headquarters.

A &month period uas

allowed for ca-g

out the transfer of command f'unctffons.

Instead

developments after V-E Day caused t h e 3-way transition t o be

accomplished i n leas than one month.(7)

On 28 May 1945 General

Eisenhower announced his decision on t h e separation of Theater

Headquarters and the Headquarters of Communications Zone in a telegram
t o General bkrshall, which ran:(8)
Despite d i f f i c u l t i e s created by separation of t h e
Theater Communications Zone Headquarters we have
decided t o &e no basic change i n organization for
t h e present. Instead, our G-4 Division w i l l be
reinforced with technical experts from each of the
s p e c i a l branches in order t h a t the general staff
may have here the information on which t o base its
i n s t r u c t i o n s t o the Communications Zone Commander.

- 50

The o f f i c i a l designation of t h e new Theater Headquarters as Headquarters, U.S.

Forces, European Theater, was made known on 18 June,(9)

and on 20 June composition of i t s staff and i t s l o c a t i o n at Frankfurt

am Main were announced in a general. order.(lO)

55.

Special Provisions for Cammand in Austria,

Entirely d i f f e r e n t treatment w a s t o be accorded i n Austria,

It appeared e a r l y that there would be aerious disadvantages in making

Austria a subordinate part of t h e European Theater.(ll)

The status

of the United S t a t e s comaander i n Austria would have been below that

of t h e B r i t i s h , French, and Soviet commanders.

A special E 5 section

would have had t o be created t o handle Austrian matters

d i r e c t i o n had been given through t h e

if policy

G 5 Division a t Frankfurt, and

t h e distance involved would have made it d i f f i c u l t t o maintain close

touch,

The plan was, therefore, t o sever dl connections between

t h e two countries as soon as possible.

The resulting arrangement for

Austria was that, while t h e United States forces t h e r e were attached

t o t h e European Theater f o r supply and administration, t h e U n i t e e l

S t a t e s commander i n Austria reported d i r e c t l y t o the J o i n t Chiefs of

Staff on militaxy government and political matters. (12)

56.

Ad$"

of Co"nications

Zone F'unctions,

The b c t i o n s of t h e supply services naturally fell into

two d i v i s i o n s , operations inside

Germany and operations outside G e m .

The l a t t e r category was delegated t o t h e Communications Zone, while

t h e T h e a h r staff was responsible f o r operations within Germany with

t h e exception of Bramerham, where the control of C o d c a t i o n s

Zone was necessary t o Unify t h e shipping program.

Zone had an important new mission:

Communications

responsibility for redeployment,

including t h e withdrawal of units from Germany, t h e i r staging,

reorganization, and reequipment in France, and t h e i r s h i p m a t
overseas.

I n addition t o matters of supply, Comunications Zone

was responsible f o r t h e administration of i t s own forces outside of

Germany.

57.

Ad.iustments in Deployment.
With the announcement on 16 July (13) of t h e termination of

combined command and t h e dissolution o f Supreme Headquarters, Allied

Expeditionary Force, the U.S. A m y in northwestern Europe reverted

t o a normal command relationship w i t h the Joint Chiefs of Staff and

t h e V a r Department.

Theoretically, t h e occupational troop basis of

P l a n ECLIPSE came into effect.

The planning had been directed toward

an "Army Type Occupation Force"--that

is, a force strong enough t o

occupy a conquered country and meet any t a c t i c a l need that might

arise, and a t t h e same time t o furnish security against subversive

actions of a former eneqy and give l o g i s t i c a l support t o the M i l i t a q y
Government of t h e zone.

It was assuned t h a t two f i e l d annies, with

ten divisions organized i n t o t h r e e corps would be required.

Third and Seventh U.S.

. M e s were selected f o r t h e task.

The
Planning

by the 12th A r q Group,(U) l a t e r approved by Supreme Headquarters,(lS)

- 52 -

had provided f o r t h e division o f t h e occupation zone into two m i l i t a r y

d i s t r i c t s , each equipped with an army headquarters.

The United States

Zone was, accordingly, divided i n t o t h e Eastern E l i t a r y D i s t r i c t ,

which comprised the portion of Land Bavaria under United S t a t e s control

and which was occupied by t h e Third

.-,

and the Western Xilitary

D i s t r i c t , which comprised t h e rernainder of t h e United S t a t e s Zone,

and which was occupied by the Seventh Army.

Except f o r disarmament

and disposal of enemy property, d i s t r i c t comuanders were responsible

f o r the primary missions of t h e occupation and also, as far as

possible, f o r service functions within their' d i s t r i c t s .

REOftCZANIZATIGN OF THE LINZS CF COKUJICATION

AND THE SEHVIW OF SUPPLY

58.

Transfer of Communications Zone Functions.

The responsibility f o r all Communications Zone functions

i n Germany had been assmed by t h e armies by 1 July 1945, except i n
special instances where other arrangeiaents had been made.

Depots,

hospitals, pipelines, and prisoner-of-war cages i n t e r r i t o r y destined

ultimately t o become B r i t i s h or French areas continued t o be the

responsibility of Communications 20ne wtil turned over t o t h e Allled
nation concerned. (16)

After t h e establishment of Theater Headquarters

i n Frankfurt, the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the operation of through truck

and rail lines passed from the Communications Zone t o t h e armies.

- 53 -

Operation of reception centers, movemerrt of displaced persons, and

maintenance of redeployment f a c i l i t i e s were assigned t o t h e 12th

The Ninth Arqy supported t h e Units in Berlin u n t i l the

Army Group.

Seventh Arqy (Western 3filitary D i s t r i c t ) was ready t o assume t h i s

task.

Thou& Continental Advance Section continued t o function u n t i l

1 July, i t s functions were transferred t o t h e Seventh Amy, except

f o r supply of the F i r s t French Arq, the operation of t h e Saar coal

mlnes, and prisoner-of-war enclosures. (17) The s e d c e chiefs of
both organizations worked together on t h e reassignment of personnel.
Oise Intermediate Section assumed responsibility f o r t h e supply of
t h e F i r s t French Army, while Fifteenth Army took over t h e functions
in connection with coal production and primone-f-war

59.

enclosures.

Lines of Communication.

The Communications Zone extended and operated lines of

communication into Germany t o t h e intermediate boundaries of t h e armies,
and it operated i n s t a l l a t i o n s necessary t o t h e accomplishment of i t a
mission.(18)

Military motor transportation was c o n t m u e d by army

groups, air forces, and Comunications Zone agencies in Germany as

assigped.

D i s t r i c t commanders supervised t h e allocation of c i v i l i a n

transportation.

Rehabilitation and operation of ports, railroads,

inland water transportation, thmugh transportation, and such depots,

shops, and other i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n Germany as were required formed

t h e responsibility o f C m u n i c a t i o n s Zone.

Oise Intermediate Section

assumed the functions in France formerly the responsibility of the

- 54 -

two sections which moved i n t o Gemany, while Channel, Normandy, and

Delta Base Sections and Seine Section were responsible for other
areas outside of Germaw.

60.

Service Responsibilities

Some apprehension was expressed by the Communications Zone

that t h e

new organization would result in a double system of

requisitions from the Theater on t h e New York P o r t of Embarkation.(19)

Maj. Gen. 3. B. Lord, Chief of S t a f f , held t h a t d e t a i l e d administrative
planning for Germany w a s similar t o t h a t f o r t h e l i b e r a t e d countries,
and he contended t h a t service planning by two general staffs would

result i n confusion.

I n place of t h e proposed plan he recommended:

That t h e authority and responsibility of t h e Comand&g

General of t h e Communications Zone be extended over
t h e whole Theater except that portion occupied by t h e
armies in an operational role, and further excepting
responsibilit;P 5x1 Garmany for those matters pertaining
t o m i l i t a r y occupation t o enforce t h e w i l l of t h e
conqueror upon the country.
That planning be sccomplished by t h e issuance of
over-all planning d i r e c t i v e s by the Theater Commander
( t h a t is, t h e United S t a t e s portion of t h e Supreme
Headquarters staff) on t h e Theater level t o the
Arqy groups and t o t h e Conmanding General of toe
Cornmunications Zone

The position of t h e Supreme Headquarters planning staff w a s outlined

i n a reply t o Major General Inrd: (20)

It is stated that coordination of service planning by

two general staffs would cause confusion. That is,
t o a c e r t a i n axtmt, true, Communications Zone did
exactly t h a t twice in t h e pre-May period-once
with Advance Section and Communications Zone proper
and once with Fomard Echelon and Communications Zone

- 55 -

proper. It did cause some confusion, but not

insuperable d i f f i c u l t i e s . T h i s i s a real objection
but t h e only one. The only a l t e r n a t i v e i s fonnation
of e n t i r e l y separate service planning staffs on
Theater level.

We recommend separate services i n Germany, under

supervision of t h e zone staff d i r e c t , and have already
ordered t h e Chief of Transportation, i n line with
this policy, t o create a s p e c i a l planning staff t o
d e a l with Supreme Headquarters. I f Comuuications
Zone moved t o Germany t o perform these functions,
a new o r g a n b a t i o n similar t o Communications Zone
would have t o be b u i l t up i n France.

The chiefs of services, a c t i n g under t h e supervision of t h e United

S t a t e s element of t h e Supreme Headquarters general staff, prepared
t h e plans f o r t h e functioning of t h e services within Germany which

were incorporated in t h e f i n a l Theater organization plan.

61.

Service Commands.
Troop units assigned t o the MilitarJT Pipelines Service,

Military Railww Service, Motor Transport Service, and t h e Signal

Comunications Service had been d e r t h e control of t h e chiefs of
services and had operated on a Theater-wide basis.
termination of eombined c o " d

After t h e

and t h e almost e n t i r e exclusion of

Comunications Zone from responsibility i n Germany and Austria, t h e

organization of these service commands was modified.(21)

The Military

Railway and Motor Transport Services were redesignated Theater service

commends and placed under t h e direct command of the Theater Chief of
Transportation, while t h e Signal Communications Service was placed
under t h e Theater Chief Signal Officer,(22)

- 56 -

The Military Pipelines

Service, pending i t s liquidation, remained under t h e Communications

The Inland PJaCer Transport Service bec.ame a Theater agency

Zone.

under the Theater C h i e f of Transportation.

The plan for these changes

was submitted by t h e headquarters of the C o m ~ c a t i o n sZone, but

action was initiated by Theater Headquarters.(23)

62.

Additional Service Functions.

Various other services were faced with new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s

after the assumption of t h e occupation mission by t h e United S t a t e s

forces.

Among these were the following:

a.

Wansportation Corps arranged f o r railwey operations i n

Germany, using indigenous raflraod personnel.

Transportation agencies

on t h e operating l e v e l were mahtained i n Berlin.

b.

The Medical Corps was confronted with a serious public

health problem i n Germany.

C.

The Signdl Corps had an additional problem in interzonal

communications i n Germany, f o r which t h e German c i v i l and m i l i t a r y

communications systems were utilized.
d.

The Quartermaster Corps d e a l t with the disposal of enemy

quartemaster equipment and aupervised the supply systems of t h e German

forces p r i o r t o t h e i r disbandment.
e.

lbequipnent of organizations in connection w i t h t h e

redeployment program provided t h e Ordnance Service with a t a s k of

considerable magnitude, w h i l e in Gernrany many pmblems arose i n
connection with the dispoeal of enenty equipment.

- 57 -

f.

The disposal of large q u a n t i t i e s of enemy w a r material

t h a t had been captured-both in t h e l i b e r a t e d countries and i n Germany

was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e Chemical Warfare Service, w h i l e it also

had functions in connection with the equipment of Units scheduled f o r
redeployment t o t h e Pacific.

g.

Redeployment laid a heavy burden a l s o on t h e Corps of

Engineers, which was responsible for t h e construction of staging areas

and f o r t h e i r winterization.

I n Germany t h e Corps had a heavy program

to accomplish, including t h e destruction of enemy f o r t i f i c a t i o n s , the

r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of German f a c i l i t i e s f o r military h e a d q a r t e r s and

military communities and t h e construction and r e p a i r of bridges,

highways, buildings, and u t i l i t i e s .
was done

Thile much of t h e actual work

by German labor, supervision was in all instances t h e

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e Corps of Engineers.

THE BEGINNINGS OF REDUCTION

63. Inactivation of A m y Groups and t h e Reassi!.ent

of ATmies.

The reduction of organizations in the Theater began immediately,

and by July t h e army group formations had been eliminated.

As e a r l y

as May, the Seventh A r q was absorbed i n t o t h e 12th Amy ctroup,(24)

and t h e w i t h d r a w a l of the First French iullg. t o t h e Bench Zone(25)

permitted t h e complete i n a c t i v a t i o n of t h e 6 t h Arrrcy Group on 20 July.(26)

- 58 -

On 26 July 1 2 t h Army Group became nonoperational,(a) with t h e

t r a n s f e r t o U.S.

Forces, European Theater, of t h e Third, Seventh,

Ninth, and F i f t e e n t h Armies.

The p e r s m e l of Headquarters, Special

Troops, 12th Army Group, was assigned t o Headquarters Command,

U.S.

Forces, European Theater, on 1 August 1945.(28)

64.

Redeploment of Armies.
On

15 Kay t h e First- .4rmy closed i t s WeSmar Headquarters(29)

and was t r a n s f e r r e d from 1 2 t h Axmy Gmup t o Normandy Base Section.(SO)

It was then readied for redeployment t o t h e Pacific, and embarked on

22 May.(31)

The Ninth Army t r a n s f e r r e d its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o t h e

Seventh

on 1 5 June,(32)

area on 7 July.(33)

and s t a r t e d i t s move t o t h e assembly

On 28 July it s a i l e d f o r t h e United States.(34)

THE BEGINNING5 OF #EDEPLOXHENT

65.

Ports and Processinn Areas.

The ports used at this time f o r t h e redeployment of troops

were Le Kame, Marseille, Cherbourg, Antwerp, Qasgow, and Southampton.

Most of t h e units going direct to t h e Pacific were processed through
t h e port of Marseille by Delta Base Section,(35) while those bound
f o r t h e P a c i f i c by way of t h e United S t a t e s w e n t through t h e Normandy

assembly area, which was operated by t h e 89th Division.(36)

- 59'-

66.

Shiaments from Ma.. t o 17

a.

Juls 1945.

Redeployment operations began on 12 May

1945. Before

t h e end of t h e month nearly 90,OOO men had been shipped.(37)

O f these

21,564 were being sent t o t h e P a c i f i c via t h e United States.(38)

remaining

The

61,597 men were casuals, including men e l i g i b l e f o r

discharge, p a t i e n t s , recovered Allied m i l i t a r y personnel, and others. (39)

No d i r e c t shipments t o t h e P a c i f i c were made during t h e month.(f+O)

b.

In June a t o t a l of 313,298 men were redeployed.

Of

t h i s t o t a l , 23,479 men formed d i r e c t shipnents t o t h e Pacific.

shipments t o t a l l e d 124,163 men.

Indirect

Casuals, consisting mostly of rnen

e l i g i b l e f o r discharge and patients, made up another 165,656 of t h e

June shipmsnts.(&L) Major units shipped during June included t h e

111, V, V I I , and X I I I Corps, t h e XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 86th,
95th, 9 7 t h and the 104th Infantry Divisions.
C.

t h e end of June, t h e redeployment program was

progressing s a t i s f a c t o r i l y .

The total. forecast for t h e Mag-June

period called f o r redeployment of 424,025 man.(43)

402,459 men were redeployed.(4k)

O f t h i s quota

The casual quota was not met,

191,760 men being shipped(45) against t h e quota of 193,800,(46) but

t h e quota f o r i n d i r e c t Saap@@nent was exceeded,18'7,220 being
shipped,(47) against a f o r e c a s t of 167,473.(48)

Direct shipments t o

the P a c i f i c fell short of t h e forecast, t h e main reason being the

change i n plans, which called f o r s h i p e n t of a unit's organic
equipment thirty-five days ahead of t h e unit.(49)

-60-

If equipment was

shipped thirty-five days in advance on slow-moving f r e i g h t e r s and

i f a l l space on fast-moving troop ships was used, t h e unit and i t s

equipment could arrive a t approximately t h e same time.

The forecast

figure f o r shipments d i r e c t t o t h e Pacific for bky and June was

o r i g i n a l l y 62,602.(50)

This was reduced i n June t o 2l,000.(51)

Against t h i s l a t t e r quota of 21,OOO t h e r e were 23,479 men shipped

d i r e c t l y t o t h e Pacific. (52)
d.

During July t h e shipping quota f o r that month was

exceeded, but t h e MapJune backlog could mot be made up.

Against a

forecast f o r out-shipment of 385,910,(53) 391,058 were shipped. (54)

Of this number 227,l4l men were i n u n i t s bound f o r t h e Pacific via
t h e United States, 72,238 were in units going d i r e c t t o t h e Pacific,
and 91,679 were in casual units.(55)

July shipments included t h e

VIII Corps, t h e 13th and 20th Armored Divisions, and t h e 2d, 4th,
5th, ah, 2&h, U t h , and 87th Infantry Divisions.(56)

THE MSBW!NT OF THF, 0B.hiAN ARLElI FORCES

67. The hro Aspects of Disbandment.

The disbar&nent o f German armed forces a f t e r 8 May 1945
operated sllloothlg and according t o plan.
operations:

There were two d i s t i n c t

t h e liquidation of a l l command functions of the German

armed forces,(5?) and the gradual release of t h e members of t h e

German armed forces held i n American custaiy.

- 61 -

68.
a.

Status of t h e Disarmed Forces after t h e Surrender,

Except f o r war criminals and security suspects, all members

o f t h e German armed forces captured after cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s

were t r e a t e d as disarmed Geman forces.

After 4 May 1945 captured

Germans i n Germany could be r e c l a s s i f i e d and t h e i r s t a t u s changed

from p r i s m e r s of war t o disarmed Gennans. The United States supplied

and maintained enemy prisoners uf w a r u n t i l they were discharged.

All eneqy prisoners held by the United S t a t e s outside of the occupied

countries were t r e a t e d as prisoners of war u n t i l they were released.
The disbandment of t h e Germ disarmed forces and c e r t a i n paramilitary
organizations was t h e responsibility of amy group and zone commanders.
The planning, organization, and execution of t h e program was assigned
t o army and military d i s t r i c t coaaaanders within t h e i r respective

areas. (58)
b.

Non-Germans were s t a t i s t i c a l l y segregated from Germans

i n national -ups

t o await disposal by t h e i r respective governments.

Soviet nationals were physically segregated and accorded special

treatment under t h e terms of t h e agreement signed with t h e Soviet

Union on 1 2 February 1945.(59)
C.

11,OOO,ooO,

The German armed forces were estimated t o number about

O f these, 7,200,000 were i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of Supreme

Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

Under t h e international

agreement c a l l i n g f o r t h e handling of prisoners of war according t o

t h e zones in which t h e i r haxes were located, the share of the United
S t a t e s forms i n the process of disbandment i s represented by t h e

- 62 -

figure 4,800,000.

By t h e end of May 1945, figures of the Provost

Marshal's Department indicated t h a t there were 1,913,402 prisoners

of war held by t h e United States forces in t h e European Theater,(60)

69. Successive Steps in t h e Disbandment of t h e Enemy Forces.

a.

The first &roup t o be released were t h e members of t h e

Volkssturm, t h a t group of German men who, disqualified from service in

t h e i"Jehrmacht because of age o r other reasons, served t h e army in a~
auxiliary capacity.

After t h e authorization of the Ildisarmed-enemy-

forces" s t a t u s on 4 Lay 1945, members of t h e Volkssturm who had been

prisoners of war o r uho were subsequently captured w h i l e in uniform
were processed as members of disarmed energ forces and then discharged.
Members captured not in uniform were isemitted t o return t o t h e i r

homes without processing; (61)

b,

On 15 hiay 1945, Supreme Headquarters authorized the

discharge of rnen of German nationality who were farmers, coal miners,

transport workers, o r i n other key industries, provided t h a t they
l i v e d i n t h e area Fn which they were imprisoned and provided t h a t they
were not war criminals, security suspects, o r members of the S,S.
Likewise, a l l German women residing i n t h e t e r r i t o r y in which they
were confined were t o be released, w i t h t h e same excepted categories.(62)
C.

Three days l a t e r , Supreme Headquarters authorized the

release of all prisoners of war over f i f t y years of age Nho l i v e d in

the l o c a l i t y i n which they were imprisoned, providing they were not
w a r criminals, security suspects, o r members of the S.S.(63)

- 63 -

d.

On

5 June 1945 nationals of France, BelgLum, t h e

Netherlandg and Luxemburg who were prisoners of war of t h e United

S t a t e s forces, o r in t h e s t a t u s of disarmed German forces not wanted
f o r w a r crimes by a country other than t h e i r own, were released t o
t h e i r respective governments. (64)
e.

General discharge w a s authorized l a t e in June f o r all

Germans except u a r criminals, s e c u r i t y suspects, those in automatic

arrest categories, and those whose homes were in t h e Soviet Zone.

Those living i n t h e Soviet Zone were held u n t i l an agreement on t h e i r

t r a n s f e r was reached with the Soviet authorities.

A t the sane time

it was announced t h a t w a r criminals would be discharged and interned

and t h a t automatic a r r e s t e e s and security suspects could be discharged
if held i n custody f o r interrogation. (65)

f. A l l nationals of the United Nations still held, except

Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, dissident Jugoslavs, and Polish
not claiming Soviet citizenship, Here released t o t h e i r governments

i n July 1945. A t the same tinelall n e u t r a l nationals other than

those with ardent Axis sympathies were released, pmvided they were
not security suspects o r wanted as war criminals by a country other
than t h e i r own.(46)

70. Other Aspects of Disarmament and Disbandment.

I n t h e first m n t h s of t h e occu-pation, t h e United S t a t e s

forces a l s o disarmed and disbanded all paramilitary organiaations,
including t h e Gexman intelligence service, the Gestapo,. t h e p o l i t i c a l

- 64 -

police, the SS, and the SA.

A l l the property of these organizations

was confiscated, t h e i r records and headquarters mere seized, and the

e n t i r e membership o r t h e i r leaders above a certain grade, as prescribed

in the directives in effect, were arrested.

The Geman General Staff

was broken up by the simple expedient of holding as prisoners of war

all of i t s members who were found.

All military academies and

officers' t r a i n i n g schools were located and closed.

THE REPATRIATION OF LIBEFATED FRIS0NU.S OF :'BB

71. Basic Policies f o r Return of United States Prisoners of War.

The X a r Department prescribed t h a t all persons who had been
prisoners should be returned t o t h e United States u n l e s s they elected
t o remain overseas, which very few did.(67)

For purposes of shipping,

they were assigned p r i o r i t y over other casuals except t h e sick and

wounded.

The Prisoner-of-Fiar

Executive Branch of t h e El Division of

Supreme Headquarters had formulated the policy t h a t all prisoners,

upon cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s , should remain i n t h e i r camps to avoid
being classed as displaced persons,

The original plan contemplated

t h a t a gouerment might s t i l l be operating i n Germany a t the time of

the surrender and t h a t assistance might be received from German
authorities i n charge of prisoner-of-war

camps,

','hen t h e surrender

actually occurred, honever, practically all German authority had ceased.

Officers were assigned t o f i e l d forces t o assist i n l i b e r a t i n g

- 65 -

prisoners of war, and a s p e c i a l division was established i n t h e o f f i c e

of t h e Theater Provost hiarshal.
72.

Nwibers of fiecovered Allied Prisoners.

There were 91,252 United S t a t e s and 168,746 B r i t i s h c i t i z e n s

recovered f r o n Germn camps.

Liberated prisoners were moving t o t h e

rear i n a steady flotv by the end of March, and by 30 April l4,174 United
S t a t e s nationals had been recovered from eneay custody and returned
t o t h e Comunications Zone, sone of them having been l i b e r a t e d by t h e
Soviet forces and returned by way of Odessa.

The re-patriation of

United S t a t e s prisoners of war was completed in June.

On 15 March

1945 it was estimated t h a t t h e t o t a l nuinber of Allied nationals held

by t h e Germans was 2,173,764,(68)

Many of these, particularly Poles,

Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, d i d not r e t u r n t o t h e country

of t h e i r origin, but became displaced persons.

73.

Treatment of O t h e r IJationalities,
The regulations issued by Supreme Headquarters provided for

t h e care of all l i b e r a t e d prisoners of war, although t h e obligation

o f t h e United S t a t e s was not t h e s w f o r all n a t i o n a l i t i e s .

Similar

treatment was given t o United S t a t e s and S r i t i s h c i t i z e n s , but f o r

others, r a t i o n s c a l e s and other r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s differed. (69)

Theater

Headquarters issued comprehensive i n s t r u c t i o n s regarding t h e treatment

of recovered prisoners, and camps were operated a t Stenay, Epinal,

Brussels, Likge, R e h , Namur, and Sedan.

- 66 -

Camp Lucky Strike w a s one

staging area f o r returning prisoners and another was Camp Wings,

where many were brought by air.

Both camps were Bstuated near

Le Have.

74.

United States Personnel with the Underwound.

P r i o r t o D-Day t h e underground organization on t h e Continent,

which included more than 35,000 French, Belgian, Netherland, Luxemburg,

Danish, and Czech c i t i z e n s , had a s s i s t e d approximately 3,000 United
S t a t e s f l i e r s t o return t o England.(?O)

After D-Day t h e advancing

armies uncovered a similar number of fliers who had been shot down
but avoided capture.

Theater d i r e c t i v e s provided t h a t those who had

been out of United S t a t e s o r Allied control f o r more than f i v e days

should be sent t o t h e reception center operated by Seine Section in
Paris, where they would be interrogated by military intelligence
authorities

75.

The Standfast Ameement.

e

During t h e e a r l y part of t h e German r e t r e a t few Allied

prisoners were recovered, because t h e Germans moved t h e i r inclosures
f a r t h e r i n t o Germany.

On 21 February 1945 t h e J o i n t Chiefs of S t a f f

proposed through diplomatic channels t h a t t h e Gerraans leave prisoners

of war i n place, with t h e understanding t h a t persons so recovered
would not be returned t o m i l i t a r y service.

The Germans accepted this

proposal, and it was w e e f f e c t i v e on 22 April 1945.(?1)

t h e Third U.S.

On 29 April

Army overran t h e prisoner-of-war camp a t Moosberg and

- 67 -

Liberated 100,OOO prisoners, including 15,568 of United S t a t e s

nationality.

There was a marked increase i n the number returned

during Uy, when the use of

air transportation increased, and by

9 May t h e daily r a t e of processing a t Le k v r e was 30,000 United

S t a t e s and B r i t i s h prisoners.,

THE CARE AN) REPATXIATION OF DISPLACED I?E2WNS

76. Estimate of Numbers of Displaced Peraons.

Gwing t o t h e meager intelligence available, there was a

wide range i n e a r l y estimates of t h e nusber of displaced persons in

Europe.

In June 1944 it was estimated that there were ll,332,700

displaced persons (including refugees) i n France, Belgium, the

Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, and Germany,
whom were dis$aced

persons in foreign countries and

refugees in their own countries.

8,935,400 of
2,397,300

They came from twenty d i f f e r e n t

countries and were the concern of as many governments.(72)

77.

mannina. Procedure. and Personnel.

a.

Planning f o r the handling of displaced persons had been

begun in l a t e 19&3 by Supreme Headquarters, the Allied Governments,

and representatives of the United Nation5 Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration.

The basic plans, amended by l a t e r experience, became

the directives guiding operations.

An agreement reached between the

- 68 -

Soviet Union and t h e Western Powers a t the C r h a Conference provided

f o r t h e exchange of displaced persons and l i b e r a t e d prisoners of war.

b.

Displaced persons uncovered by m i l i t a r y forces were

assembled at c o l l e c t i n g points and directed t o t r a n s i t points or areas>

where they were given food, temporary s h e l t e r , and medical care,

They

were then taken t o assembly centers and cared f o r whLLe awaiting

When uncovered i n rapid military advance, displaced

repatriation.

persons were i n s t r u c t e d t o stand fast u n t i l arrangements mere completed

f o r c o l l e c t i n g them in assembly centers.

As early as condAtions

permitted, United Nations displaced persons were returned t o reception

centers i n t h e i r own countries, where t h e i r governments assumed f u l l
responsibility.
C.

Responsibilities i n connection with displaced persons

were shared by several agencies and categories of personnel:

the

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, at first i n

conjunction with t h e Suprams Commander and later i n sole authority;(73)
t h e Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees;
missions of Supreme Headquarters;(75)

(74) t h e Mrious m i l i t a r y

t h e s t a f f sections of Supreme

Headquarters; (76) t h e Combined Displaced Persons ptecutive of Supreme

Headquarters ( a f t e r its establishment
commanders.(78)

&
l.4
i

July);(77)

and t h e militarg

After April, when t h e problem became mom acute, t h e

armies and army groups organized special displaced persons military

t e a s t o d i r e c t operations and supplement t h e military government

detachments. (79)

- 69 -

78.

Operations.

A limited number of r e p a t r i a t i o n s had been

made p r i o r t o

the entrance of United S t a t e s forces into Germany.

These involved

nationals of France, Belgim, and t h e Netherlands.

The e a r l y stage

of t h e campaign i n Gemany uncovered only a small number of displaced

persons, which was due t o t h e German policy of evacuating t h e i r slave
workers eastward.

United States troops uncovered fewer than 100,OOO

displaced persons i n t h e whole of t h e Rhine Province and t h e S a a r h d

west of t h e Rhine.

By t h e end of February, however, t h e Gerrnans

appeared t o have l o s t all control over foreign workers, and in t h e

small a r e a of t h e Remagen bridgehead alone over 3,500 displaced persons

were found by t h e Allied forces on 7 March.

Hith t h e ensuing major

drives across t h e W e in t h a t month, Allied armies found themselves

confronted with millions of displaced persons.(80)

The flow of

Western Europeans being repatriated from Germmy increased rapidly

until on 15 April Belgians were returning a t t h e rate of 500 daily,

and French were passing through t r a n s i t reception centers en route
f o r t h e i r homes at t h e rate of 2,000 a day.

Early i n &l

these numbers

increased t o a peak of 5,000 Belgians and 20,000 French, a s well as

1,OOO Netherlanders every twenty-four hours.

During April ~ 0 , o O O

Western European displaced persons were r e p a t r i a t e d from 12th Army

Group area, and 30,000 f r o m 6th Axmy Group area, most of them French,
with Belgians making up the next largest group.(81)

By the end of

July, t h e s i t u a t i o n with regard t o displaced persons was as shown

i n t a b l e I.(82)

- 70 -

'

3R

0THE;R RESPONSIBILITIES

79.

AND OBLIGATIONS

Punisfment of War Criminals,

a.

BackRround t o t h e Establishment of J u d i c i a l Machinery.

The apprehension, prosecution, and bringing to j u s t i c e

of U s war criminals was one of t h e war aims of t h e United Nations

which was constantly r e i t e r a t e d before and a f t e r t h e end of h o s t i l i t i e s .

I n t h e immediate p o s t h o s t i l i t i e s period much was accomplished toward

t h e establishment o f t h e final mchinery.

The first i n t e r n a t i o n a l

agency established t o i n v e s t i g a t e war crimes was t h e United Nations

V a r Crimes Commission, which convened f o r t h e first time in London on

20 October 1943.

This commission furnished t h e Theater C o m i i e r

with lists o f suspected war criminals, accused by d i f f e r e n t governments.(&)

b.

M i l i t a r y bswnsibilities.
Supreme Headquarters i n s t r u c t e d a q group commanders

t o apprehend and keep in custody a l l w a r criminals.

Suspects were

not segregated from other prisoners of w a r , but t h e i r cards were marked

t o i d e n t i f y them as such.
hostfiities.

Their trials had t o await t h e end of

Group compnanders were authorized t o appoint c o d s s i o n s

f o r t h e trial of persons charged with "mch violations of t h e laws

of war as threaten o r impair t h e security of United S t a t e s forces."(&)

This power could be delegated down t o division level.

The r e s t r i c t i o n

l i m i t i n g t r i a l by military commanders t o persons i n this category was

removed on 19 June 1945 by command of t h e Combined Chiefs of Staff.(85)

- 71 -

After that time, war criminals could be t r i e d before m i l i t a r y government

commissions or military government courts regaidless of t h e n a t i o n a l i t y
of t h e victim.(86)

The only exceptions were persons wanted by other

governments and the high p o l i t i c a l figures t o be t r i e d before t h e

international tribunal.

All commanders who had general court-martial

j u r i s i d c t i o n were authorized t o appoint military commissions f o r the

t r i a l of war criminals.

Sentences were t o be reviewed and approved

by t h e authority appointing t h e c o d s s i o n .

Death sentences required

confirmation by t h e Theater Commander or his designee.(@)

authority was not revoked u n t i l 26 June

This

1946, one year a f t e r t h e

war.(88)
C.

Interrogation of Former American Prisoners of Mar.

After t h e end of h o s t i l i t i e s , t h e amount of work t o be

completed by the W a r Crimes Branch increased considerably.

important during

and June

Particularly

1945 w a s t h e h d i a t e interrogation of

some 9O,OOO American ex-prisoners of war, who were scheduled f o r

immediate return t o t h e United States.

Special care was taken t o

preserve t h e evidence that had accumulated in concentration camps

and other centers of mass murder.(89)

80. Establishment of Judicial Machinery.

The bringing to justice of a l l w a r criminals and t h e i r
swift punishment was specified at t h e Crimea Conference a s one of t h e
prime objectives of t h e occupation.(W)

On 12 bky 1945 President

Truman appointed Col. Joseph V. Hodgson as U.S.

- 72 -

Conmissioner on the

United Nations W a r Crimes Commission.(91)

This appointment was

followed on 22 May by t h a t of Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson

as U.S.

Counsel f o r War Crimes.(92)

A month l a t e r , t h e Combined

Chiefs of S t a f f authorized Supreme Headquarters t o t r y war criminals,

subject t o certain limitations.(93)
delegated t o U.S.

T h i s authority w a s l a t e r

Forces, European Theater, and formed t h e basis

for the trial of w a r criminals not brought before t h e International

War Crimes W i b u n d a t Nbnberg,

The plan f o r this t r i b u n a l was

drafted a t a meeting of delegates of t h e United States, Great B r i t a i n ,

France, and t h e Soviet Union which convened in London on 26 June 1945.
The draft prepared at t h i s meeting was r a t i f i e d at the Potsdam
Conference.

The first comprehensive d i r e c t i v e on t h e t r y i n g of w a r

criminals was issued by the J o i n t Chiefs of Staff on 8 July

1945.(94)

81. The General Board.

The General Board was established on 17 June l945,(95) t o
prepare a f a c t u a l analysis intended t o present t h e strategy of t h e
campaign as it had been planned and as i t actually had been carried
out and t o f o m u l a t e recommendations pertaining t o such changes i n
t a c t i c a l and administrative doctrines, techniques, organization, and
equipment of the U.S.

Army ground and air forces as were indicated

by the analysis t o be desirable.

The Board was a l s o t o make studies

and reconmendations on special problems referred t o it by Theater

Headquartars.(96)

The Board was assigned as a special u n i t within

t h e headquarters of t h e Fifteenth U.S. Army and shared i t s commanding

- 73 -

officer.

Gen. Jacob L. Devers was president of the General Board,

in addition t o h i s other duties, and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Germ,

deputy president.(97)

On 4 July 1945, General &row succeeded

General Devers as president. ( 9 8 ) k n . George S. Patton,Jr.,

became

president of t h e General Board on l4 October 1945.(99)

82. Disposal of Surplus Property.

I n connection with the disposal of surplus property, the

office of the Central Field Commissioner f o r Europe w a s opened in
Paris on 4 July 1945.(100)

There were in the Theater approximately

long tons of surplus material valued a t '&l0,322,000,000.

1O,f&O,ooO

The A m y had the task of guarding and maintaining these stocks u n t i l

early in 1946, when they were f i r s t disposed of in large quantities.

OT,HE3 EVE3TS OF IXO2TUCE; TO 17 JULY 1945

83.

Genera Eisenhower's V i s i t t o the United States.

Ceremonies honoring General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower

were held i n London on 12 June 1945 and i n Paris on l4 June 1945,

before his return t o t h e United States by air f o r honecoining receptions
on 16 June.

Air Xarshal S i r Arthur W. Tedder became Acting Suprerne

Commander, and Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Acting Theater Conmander.

Gen. Omar .!I

Bradley took over the temporary c o m i d from General Devers

on 17 June and served until General Eisenhower's return t o t h e Theater

on 12 July 1945.

- 74 -

84, P a r t i a l Relaxation of t h e Ban on Fraternization,

During June and July, c e r t a i n relaxations were authorized

in t h e h i t h e r t o complete ban on fraternization.

On 1 2 June General

Eisenhower announced t o a press conference t h a t t h e nonfraternization

policy had been relaxed insofar as it applied t o I'very yo*
wbile on l4 July

1945 a f u r t h e r relaxation

children,tl(lOl)

was permitted, a l l o w i n g

United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h troops t o converse with German a d u l t s i n

s t r e e t s and other public places. (102)

85.

Visitors and Inspectors.

Suprene Headquarters and t h e Joint Chiefs o f S t a f f discouraged

visits t o t h e Theater p r i o r t o t h e end of h o s t i l i t i e s , b u t some were

made i n April and May.

Three Mexican general officers, Lt. Cen.

Eulogio Ortiz, Maj. k n . Jose Beltran and Brig. Gen. Ramon Rodriguez,
arrived i n London 30 April.

1945 on

a t r i p which resulted i n an

apology to t h e S r i t i s h by United S t a t e s o f f i c i a l s when the B r i t i s h

complained they had not been n o t i f i e d t h a t t h e Mexicans were coning,(lO3)
The t o u r included Suprene Headquarters a t R e h , 12th A r q Group
Headqyarters at Bad Iildungen, Third Arqy Headquarters a t Ih'langen,

F i r s t A r q Headquarters a t Pfeimar, Ninth Army Headquarters a t Brunswick,

and i n s t a l l a t i o n s a t Paris.

The three Kexicans departed on 8 May 1945.

One o f t h e first congressional committees t o a r r i v e was t h e s p e c i a l

subconnnittee of t h e Committee of Agriculture of the House of
-Representatives.

T h i s group came t o London in t h e l a t t e r p a r t of

May 1945 seeking information on food production i n Great B r i t a i n and

- 75 -

on t h e Continent.

Congressmen and Congressional committees had been

confined l a r g e l y t o Great Britain, but when a c t i v e operations ended

an increasing number came t o t h e Continent.

Senator W. Dahlquist of

Xinnesota interviewed General Clay in June t o obtain information of

i n t e r e s t t o t h e Blinnesota E d i t o r i a l Association.

I n t h e sane month

a committee which included Gen. W i l l i a m Knudson, C.B.

Chrysler Corporation, J.B.

Thomas of t h e

Uooney of General Motors, R.J.

Fbberg of

t h e Ford Motor Company, Gibson Carey of Yale and Tome, and B.R.

Deupree

of Proctor and Gamble was i n t h e Theater in connection with repair and

rebuilding of motor vehicles.
executives a r r i v e d i n July.

The first group of motion p i c t u r e

They were followed by other representatives

of t h e motion picture industry and by several tours of e d i t o r s and

publishers.

- 76 -

Chapter IV
THE ASSWTION OF THE OCCUFJ~TIONhIISSIXjN

86.

Planning Grows.
The egencies planning for the military government of

Germany included the Zuropean Advisory C d s s i o n ;

the military

section of the 3ritish Control Commission for Germany;

Group Control Council (Germany);

the U.S.

several commissions, agencies,

and divisions in Supreme Headquarters;

and staff officers of the

European Theater of Operations, the Communications Zone, and t h e

army groups.

Some of the plans for t e r r i t o r y t h a t later cane under

Theater staff becvne an element of some importance in shaping the

future o f Army and military government policies under General
Eisenhower, particularly w i t h regard t o the occupation of Austria.
,%igh-level decisions were :,lade by the Combined Chiefs o f Staff and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the Department of State w a s involved

i n ;nany of the negotiations and became increasingly important after

consideration o f peace treaties was started.

- 77 -

87. The European A d d s ~ rConmission.

~
The e s t a b l i s b n t of the European Advisory Commission
followed agreements reached at the Uscow conference in October 1943.
Members of th3.s commission were John C. Winant of the United States,

Sir W i l l i a m Strang of Great Britain, and Ambassador F.T.

the S o v i e t Union.

Gousev of

Among the accomplishents B f the Commission was

the preparation of t h e terms of surrender and the original plans for

t h e governmental machinery f o r Germany.

Training of Personnel and Delepation of Power.

88.

From t h e f i r s t it was recognized t h a t the occupation of

conquered t e r r i t o r y imposed problems requiring specially trained
personnel.

milit&

Specialists were, therefore, recruited and trained f o r

g o v e m n t duties.

These persons were assigned as members

of G 5 staff divisions, military government detachments, and other

related organizations.

During combat operations and f o r some time

thereafter, military government detachments were superksed by the

G5 divisions i n regular command channels. The Supreme CnmmAnder

delegated his powers a s military governor t o the commanding generals

of t h e amy groups, who in turn delegated t h e i r powers t o subordinate

comnanders.

Usually a t a c t i c a l unit, on taking possession of a

tom or area, d i d only what waa absolutely necessary in the way

of restoring l a w and order and providing r e l i e f f o r tha inhabitants.

The t a c t i c a l u n i t soon moved on and transferred i t s military

government responsibilities t o the unit which was assigned area
responsibility i n t h e rear.

- 78 -

$9,

Development of t h e United S t a t e s Element of t h e Allied

Control Authority.

a.

F r o m t h e United S t a t e s point of view, t h e most important

of t h e agencies planning f o r m i l i t a r y government w a s t h e U.S. GxW.!P

Control Council (Geffnaror), which became t h e United States element of

t h e U e d Control Authority,(l)

The mission of t h i s body as conceived

by t h e Joint Chiefs of Staff was brought t o t h e a t t e n t i o n of Supram

Headquarters in August 1944,(2) and a nucleus planning staff w a s

T h i s staff w a s under the d i r e c t i o n of Brig,

formed iediately.(3)

Gen, Cornellus W. Wickershaa, former commandant of t h e School of

M i l i t a r y Government a t Charlottesville, Virginia, who later became
m i l i t a r y adviser t o Ambassador Winant.

b.

Accomplishments of t h e planning staff of t h e U.S.

Gmup

Control Council (Germany) in the first few weeks following its

organization included conferences with B r i t i s h elements of Suprme
Headquarters regarding d i v i s i o n a l problems, reconnaissance on t h e
Continent f o r a l o c a t i o n t o an advanced section, and t h e preparation
of various plans f o r t h e administration of t h e occupation thmugh an
organization b u i l t on divisions dealing with subjects such as finance,
prisoners of w a r and displaced persons, p o l i t i c s , transportation, and
i n t e r n a l affairs.

Ely

5 February 1945 t h e -up

had completed plans

f o r the seizure and c o n t r o l of t h e German Foreign Office, the

Chancellary, t h e Nazi Party headquarters, and t h e transportation system,

Meanwme t h e F i f t e e n t h

Arw was

planning f o r t h e occupation of Berlin,

- 79 -

aml t h e request of the U.S.

Group Control Council (Germaqy) for the

activation of Headquarters Command was submitted t o t h e Fifteenth

Army by Supreme Headquarters on 17 February
C.

1945.(4)

On 5 March 1945 the U,S. Group Control Council (Germany)

was organized as a c o m d with Brig. Cen. Wickersham as commanding

general ( 5)
d.

On 25 h r c h 1945 t h e Headquarters of U.S.

Group Control

Council (Germany) w a s transferred from Bushy Park, Surrey, England,

t o Versailles, France,(b) except f o r a rear echelon, designated the
U.S. Group Control Council (Rear), which operated in England u n t i l

16 May 1945.(7)

Advance Headquarters, mhich had been opened a t

Versailles on 9 February 1945, with Col. L.W.

Jefferson i n charge,

was absorbed by t h e main headquarters.

90.

Division of Responsibility between Group and Theater Staff.

While t h e headquarters was s t i l l in England, much consideration

had been given t o t h e problem of t h e relationship between the U.S.

Group

Control Council (Gemany) and t h e Theater s t a f f , and a meeting was

held on 16 Mwch between representatives of both organioations.(8)

It was decided t h a t more of the responsibility f o r t h e control of

Germany should be given t o the Theater staff, a decision which involved

the revision of approved European Advisory Commission d r a f t directives.

Further d e t a i l s were taken up in a j o i n t s t a f f study carried out by

both bodies.

On 31 Wch 1945 long-range requirements for army, navy,

and a i r disarmament and demobilization were excluded f r o m t h e scope

-80-

of planning, as well as other policies f o r t h e United S t a t e s Zone.

b m t h i s tine it was established t h a t a l l policies with regard t o

Germany were t o be dewoped i n conjunction with the United States

element of Suprem Headquarters, for approval by the Comading

General, European Theater of Operations. (9)

b.

A f u r t h e r c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e relationship of the

Deputy Military Governor and the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany)
t o t h e Theater staff was issued on 29 April 1945.(10)

So f a r as

Germany was concerned, t h e Theater staff was specifically charged

with the execution, implementation, and supervision within t h e United
S t a t e s Zone of United States and Allied Control Authority policies.

When t h e reaponsibilitg for the government of Germany passed t o

Allied c i v i l i a n control, t h e functions of t h e control agenciesthe Deputy Military Governor, t h e U.S.

Group Control Council (Germmy),

and military government elements of s t a f f s i n the United States Zone-

were t o be withdrawn from United States m i l i t a l y command.

THE BWLIN DECLARirTION

IiND

THE INAUGURATION OF QUADRIPARTITE CQTITRDL

91. The Function o f t h e Berlin Declaration.

A t the time of the signing of the surrender, General Eisenhower

emphasized t h a t the surrender was a purely military one, and t h a t

p o l i t i c a l and economic terms t o be imposed upon Germany by t h e p o l i t i c a l
heads of t h e Allied nations would follow.(ll)

- 81 -

The first announcemeat

of what these terma would be c a m scarcely a month later.

A Control

Council consisting of t h e commanders i n chief of t h e armies of t h e

four powers met i n Berlin as representatives of t h e i r countries t o

discuss t h e p o l i c i e s .

Members of t h e Council were General Eisenhower,

Marshal Zhukov, Field Marshal S i r Bernard Montgomry, and Gen, Jean

de Lattre de Tassigny.
Germany were vested.

In these four men t h e governing powers over

Decisions could be reached only by Unanimous

On 5 June 1945 these decisions were

vote of t h e Council b e r a .

merde public in t h e 3 e r l i n Declaration.(U)

92.

The Terms of t h e Declaration.

The Berlin Declaration s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e would be no c e n t r a l

German Govenunant.

The administration of t h e country

i n t h e victorious powers.

W ~ St o

be vested

The governments of t h e four Allied nations

would determine t h e boundaries of Germany, o r any part thereof, and

t h e s t a t u s of Germany, or of

area of German t e r r i t o r y .

of a r t i c l e s s e t f o r t h t h e following requirements:

A series

t h e surrender t d

Allied representatives of a l l persons with Nazi a f f i l i a t i o n s ; t h e

complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany; t h e s t a t i o n i n g

of W e d forces and c i v i l agencies in any o r a l l parts of Germany,

as determined by t h e Allies;

and the imposition of additional

p o l i t i c a l , administrative, economic, financial, military, and any

other requirements a r i s i n g f r o m t h e defeat of Germany, as seen
necessary by Allied representatives.

Any f a i l u r e on t h e part of

t h e German a u t h o r i t i e s o r people t o f u l f i l l t h e i r obligations was

- 82 -

t o be m e t w i t h suitable a c t i o n by t h e Allied representatives.

93. The Entry of United S t a t e s Troops i n t o Berlin.

Lieutenant General Clay, Lieutenant General Weekes, and
Marshal Zhukov at a meeting i n Berlin on 29 June

1945,

planned f o r

t h e w v e into Berlin o f United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h troops t o be

completed between 1 and

4 July.(l3)

Accordingly, t h e preliminary

reconnaissance party of 2,000 men, together with two detachments

of Berlin District Headquarters and Headquarters C o m d troops,

moved into S e r l i n on 1 July.(l4)

On t h e following day a reconnaissance

p a r t y of 3,000, including a number of U S . Group Control Council

(Germany) personnel, inoved in. (15)

chosen f o r both t h e U.S.

Headquarters buildings were

Group Control Council ( C e m y ) and Berlin

District a t t h e Luftgau Building and t h e !#&efunken Radio Engineer

Research Laboratory, and by 7 July they had been occupied.(l6)

94.

Problem of t h e French Sector in Berlin.

A problem arose with regard to t h e French Sector in Berlin

similar t o t h a t which had a r i s e n regarding t h e French Zone of occupation.

When t h e decision was made a t t h e C r h a Conference t o invite t h e
French t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the occupation, t h e area od t h e i r Berlin
Sector was not defined.

In a subsequent meeting of t h e European

Advisory Commission on 1Uarch, t h e B r i t i s h representative had

suggested t h a t Rehickendorf should be part of the French Sector,
while subsequent B r i t i s h proposals named Zehlendorf and S t e g l i t z .

- 83 -

me decision was t o be l e f t t o the commanders in chief, acting

jointly.(l7)

Finally, a t t h e end of July, t h e French accepted t h e

B r i t i s h o f f e r of t h e d i s t r i c t s of Reinickendorf and Wedding t o fonn

t h e i r sector of Greater Berlin. (18)

95.

The United S t a t e s Sector of Berlin.

The United S t a t e s Sector of Berlin comprised the s i x districts

of Zehlendorf, Sch(lneberg, Tempelhof, Hreuzberg, Steglite, and NeuklJlln.

96.

Inauauaation of Quadripartite Control.

With the entry i n t o Berlin of the Western powers, quadripartite

control could be inaugurated.

On t h e municipal l e v e l t h i s was, in

terms of t h e European Advisory Comdssion's decision o f L

!+ November

1944, t o take t h e form of an inter-Allied governing authority, l a t e r

designated t h e Allied Kommdatura Berlin, conposed of t h e commandants
appointed by t h e respective commanders in chief and operating under
t h e general d i r e c t i o n of the Allied Control Authority.(19)

The

Kommandatura functioned a s a council, and ,through t h e OberbUrgermeister

of Berlin,exercised control over a l l municipal affairs.

The comrnandant

of each sector administered law and order i n his sector, i n accordance

with t h e policies o f t h e K o m d a t u r a .
rotated among t h e four commandants.

The position of chairman

In its i n t e r n a l organization, the

Xomuaandatura was divided i n t o all t h e departments of a municipal

government, s t a f f e d by representatives of t h e four occupying powers.
The first meeting of t h e Komuandatura, with Marshal Zhukov presiding,
inaugurated formal quadripartite control on ll July,(20) and was

-84-

followed on 30 July by t h e f i r s t formal meeting of t h e U e d Control

Council, presided over by General Eisenhower. (21)

97. P l a n n i n ~f o r t h e Occupation of Austria.

a.

The assumption of quadripartite control was a slower

process in Austria and was not completed u r i t i l August 1945.

Planning,

however, had s t a r t e d i n 1944, and from t h e beginning, a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n

had been made between t h e s t a t u s of Germany and Auatria.(22)

b.

It was originally decided by the Combined Chiefs of

Staff t h a t t h e Allied planning organizatian i n &gland would coordinate

plans f o r the occupation of Austria witin those f o r Germany, but that

Austria would be initially under t h e Kediterranean Theater because

forces f o r t h e occupation could be provided more quickly from there.(23)

The U.S.

Group Control Council (Austria) was established i n t h e

Uediterranean Theater on 2? January 1945,(24) and the London planning

staff s t a r t e d i t s move t o L t a l y early i n February 19&5.(25)

c.

I n Deceaber l94+ t h e proposal t h a t A u s t r i a be divided

i n t o t h r e e zones was m d e by t h e Soviet representative t o the European

Advisory Commission.

I n Larch 1945 the four-power occupation of

Austria was being considered by t n a t body, but agreenient was not

reached u n t i l e a r l y i n July.

- 85 -

Events e a r l y i n April

d.

1945

forced changes i n t h e plans

Soviet forces crossed t h e Austrian border early i n

f o r Austria,

April and captured Vienna on 13 April.

Meanwhile, t h e weakening

resistance of t h e Wehrmacht i n Germarg indicated t h a t United S t a t e s

forces

toad invade Austria from t h e northwest more easily than fmm

t h e south.

P a r t of General Eisenhowers forces were turned south,

therefore, and penetrated i n t o Austria before t h e Germans could

assemble t h e i r forces i n t h e mountain redoubt of southern Bavaria

and western Austria.

Control was transferred f r o n t h e Mediterranean

t o the European Theater of Operations, except t h a t t h e fonner Theater

was d i r e c t e d t o furnish m i l i t a r y government personnel and the

headquarters s t a f f f o r t h e occupation forces.(26)

98.

Interim Period of Tactical Militam Government

After V-E Day it was necessary t o oontinue t a c t i c a l military

government in Austria f o r a few weeks u n t i l m i l i t a r y gdvernment f i e l d
detachments were in position.

When t h e f i r s t members of t h e rdlitarg

government planning staff arrived a t t h e end of May, they found a

confused situation, due t o t h e t e r r i t o r i a l disposition of unit$.
Troops in Austria comprised a l l or parts of two a r q groups, two
f i e l d armies, f o u r arnly corps, and twelve divisions,
were partly i n Germany and partly in Austria.

of which

Consequthtly, t h e i r

i n s t r u c t i o n s and p o l i c i e s mere not exclusively directed towards

Austria..

During t h e e a r l y period Austria had t o be treated on t h e

sanm? lines as

Germany.(a)
J

- 86 -

99.

Development of an Austrian Comtrrand.

. This s i t u a t i o n was improved, however, i n July.

On 5 July

Group w a s reorganized and redesignated t h e U S , Occupational

15th

Forces Austria.(28)

The Headquarters Company I1 Corps, 11th Armored

Division, L+2d Division, and 65th Division, previously assigned t o

T h i r d Army and 12th Arqy Group, were assigned on

6 July t o t h e new*

formed U S . Occupational Forces Austria,(29) the coinmanding general

of which was Gen, hiark Clark.(30)

100. The Place of Austria i n

the

European Theater Organization.

The w m n d d i r e c t i v e f o r Germany and Austria, which was

adopted by t h e Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 June 1945, provided t h a t
General Eisenhower as Commanding General of t h e European Theater
should delegate t o t h e Commanding General of t h e United States forces

i n Austria such operational control as he considered necessary, and

t h a t two divisions should be assigned t o Austria.(31)

T h i s provision

was elaborated i n t h e Allied Forces Headquarters d o c w n t that

established t h e U.S.

Occupational Forces Austria.

General Clark

was made directly responsible t o t h e Joint Chiefs of Staff on military

government and p o l i t i c a l matters, while remaining under t h e European
Theater

OA

matters of supply and administration. (32) Responsibility

for the l o g i s t i c a l support of forces i n Austria was delegated t o t h e

Third Army, and later t o Continental Base Section.

Thus, the

Austrian coxrunand assumed i t s place within the European Theater,

retaining, however, a considerable measure of independence as regards

-87-

policy, military government, and operation.

101.

The Dissolution of the Allied lkpeditionaxy Force, and

the R e a l i m e n t of Command.
a.

The Supreme Commander relinquished comcand of dll

elements of t h e Allied Expeditionary Force on ll+ July 1945, The

Commanding General of t h e U.S.

Forces, European Theater, assumed

command of t h e 1 2 t h and 6th Amy Groups, United S t a t e s naval elements,

Ninth Air Force, Communications Zone, and the United S t a t e s elements
of the SHAEF Missions t o France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxemburg, and Norway, (33)

b.

The British ;Jar Office assumed control over t h e 21st

Army Group and t h e S r i t i s h elements of the

the Netherlands, and Norway.

SHAEF Missions t o France,

B r i t i s h army elemnts of these missions

reverted t o t h e co"mnd of 21st Army Group, while t h e Royal Air Force

elements reverted t o t h e B r i t i s h A i r W s t r y , which a l s o assumed
c o m n d of t h e Royal Air Force in Norway.

The B r i t i s h War Office

assumed c o w of a l l land forces i n Norway, and t h e British Chiefs

of Staff acted as agents for the Combined C h i e f s of Staff, but no
change was made in t h e command of Norwegian naval and a i r forces
u n t i l they were transferred t o t h e Norwegian Government.

The B r i t i s h

Admiralty assumed control of British naval elements, and t h e French

-88-

High Command took over t h e F i r s t French Army.

The A r q Detachment of

t h e Alps d i d not revert t o French command until 10 July 1945.

C.

For two weeks t h e United S t a t e s element of t h e Supreme

Headquarters staff functioned in t h e dual capacity of o f f i c e r s of

Suprene Headquarters and of U.S.

Forces, European Theater.

It was

a period of adjustment and organization involving t h e disposal of

records and termination of Supreme Headquarters functions

The

discontinuance of Headquarters Command, Supreme Headquarters, was

----- 1945, a

ordered e f f e c t i v e as of 16 July

move which marked t h e end

.
.
-

of t h e j o i n t command of United S t a t e s and B r i t i s h forces,(34) and

t h e final stage in t h e assumption of the occupation mission.

The

constitution, and t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n of units, of t h e United S t a t e s

forces i n t h e European Theater as of 17 July 1945 i s shown in t h e
accompanying chart.

- 89 -

I
'

Chapter V
THE MATURATION OF THE WUCIES AND ORGlrNIZATION OF THE OCCUPATION

102.

Preparations for the Conference.

a.

Toward the end of June 1945, U.S. Headquarters, Berlin

District, and Headquarters F i r s t Airborne A r q y were entrusted with t h e

responsibility of organizing and preparing a s i t e for the proposed
"Big Three" conference.

On 16 June 1945, kj. Cen. Floyd L. Parks,

then commanding Berlin District a d F i r s t Airborne Amy, received

instructions .to proceed t o Berlin t o confer with representatives of
Marshal Zhukov regarding the use of a neutral meeting area f o r t h e

proposed three-power conference which was then scheduled t o begin

about 15 July.(l)
b.

General Parks and his party arrived i n Berlin on 22 June

1945 and were conducted

by t h e i r Soviet hosts t o Babelsberg, a residential

t o m j u s t east o f Potsdam.

A preliminary ground reconnaissance party

arrived i n Babelsberg the next day.

The Soviet forces at f i r s t

- 90 -

permitted the Americans 50 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles

i n Babelsberg;

but by t h e time t h e principal American conferees had

arrived on 15 July, t h e military personnel in the compound had

increased t o 3,238 o f f i c e r s and men.(2)
c.

The t a r g e t date s e t for t h e completion of all work a t

Babelsberg was 13 July, two days before the date scheduled f o r the

arrival of t h e f i r s t conferees.

It wqs estimated that a p p r o x b t e l y

4,800 persons, including am o f f i c i a l party of 500, accompanying

administrative personnel of 300, press representatives numbering
500, and security, air force, and service personnel of

&e

3,500, would

up the American representation a t the conference.(3)

103. Sessions,
The Tripartite Conference popularly known as the Potsdam
Conference, opened on 17 July 1945, when the President of t h e United
States, Harry S. Truman, t h e Chairman of the Council of People's
Commissars of t h e Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republics, J.V.

Stalin,

and t h e Prime E n i s t e r of Great Britain, Yiinston S. Churchill, each

accompanied by the foreign secretary of his government, met i n the
Cecilienhof, a t Babelsherg, near Potsdam.

Clement R. Attlee,soon

t o replace Churchill as B r i t i s h prime minister, was a l s o present

with t h e British delegation.

U t e r the ninth meeting, t h e conference

was interrupted f o r two days and resumed on 28 July, when the r e s u l t s

of the B r i t i s h general election had been declared.

Attlee, as t h e

newly elected Prime lfinister, now replaced Churchill in the Conference,

which continued u n t i l 2 August 1945.

- 91 -

10k.

2ih-Y eement s

Agreement was reached on t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic

p r i n c i p l e s of t h e policy t o be followed by t h e occupying powers with
regard t o Germany.

These p r i n c i p l e s were, on t h e whole, those agreed

upon i n t h e C r h a Conference i n February 1945.

Conference q t Potsdam, they were amplified.

In the Tripartite

I n addition, c e r t a i n

problems of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l character were discussed, such as t h e

future boundaries of Poland and t h e expulsion of German c i v i l i a n s
from newly l i b e r a t e d areas.

a.

P o l i t i c a l Principles.
The agreement provided f o r the general denazification

o f Gersiiy, for t h e removal from o f f i c e of all persons with former

Nazi a f f i l i a t i o n s , and f o r t h e punishment of war criminals.

Efforts

were t o be d i r e c t e d towards a decentraliziitdon of p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e

and a development of local responsibility, t o be accomplished by t h e

r e s t o r a t i o n of l o c a l self-government on democratic p r i n c i p l e s and the

encouragement of a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .

For t h e time being, no c e n t r a l

German Government was t o be established.

b.

Economic Principles.

I n t h e organization of German economy, primary emphasis

was t o be given t o t h e development of a g r i c u l t u r e and peaceful
domestic industries.

All production of war materials was prohibited.

During t h e period of occupation, Germany was t o be t r e a t e d as a

s i n g l e economic unit.

(4)

92

C.

Reparations.
Reparation claims of each of t h e occupying powers w e r e

t o be met by remvcl of property from t h e i r respective zones of

occupation a d by appropriation of German external assets.

The Soviet

Union, i n addition, would receive from t h e western zones, in exchange

f o r an equivalent value of food and other commodities l a t e r t o be
agreed upon, 1.5 percent of such usable capEtal equipment f r o 3 t h e
metallurgical, chemical, and machine manufacturing i n d u s t r i e s as was
not necessary f o r t h e German peace economy;

and another 10 percent

of such i n d s u t r i a l equipment as was unnecessary f o r the Gem=

peace

economy, t o be t r a n s f e r r e d from the western zones without paynent o r

exchange of any kind in return.(5)

d.

General Occupation Policies.

The Conference adopted as general occupation p o l i c y

t h a t the co-mander i n chief of each zone would exercise supreme

authority i n h i s own zone and t h a t t h e four commnders would a c t

jointly in matters a f f e c t i n g Gemany as a whole.(6)

Treatment of

t h e German population was t o be uniform throughout Gem~

as f a r

as possible. (7)
e

I n t e r n a t i o n a l Policy.
Agreement was reached on c e r t a i n rcatters of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

policy.

Although t h e western f r o n t i e r of Poland-the

between Gemiany and Fohd-was

f u t u r e boundary

not yet d e f i n i t e l y determined at the

Conference, it was decided that, pending settlement of t h e f r o n t i e r ,

- 93 -

all former German t e r r i t o r y lying east of t h e Oder River, including

t h a t p a r t of East Prussia not placed under t h e administration of t h e
Soviet Union, should be under t h e administration of Poland and should
not be considered a p a r t of t h e Soviet Zone of occupation i n Germrtny.(8)

It was a l s o agreed t h a t German c i v i l i a n populations residing within t h e

limits of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would be expelled and
sent i n t o occupied Cerrmny.

It was stressed t h a t these transfers

must be effected i n an orderly and humane manner.

The governments

of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and H u n g a r y , which had been expelling t h e

Geman civilian population p r i o r t o t h e meeting a t Potsdam, were
directed t o suspend f u r t h e r expulsions pending a study by the Allied
Control Council, which was t o determine, among other things, t h e
equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of these expelled Germans among the four
occupation zones.

(9)

THE EORGANIZATION OF THE EUI?OPEXJ TIUPTIC3 AND THE SE3.VICE23 FORCES

105.

The Ad.justiaent of Theater k w n i z a t i o n .

The period f r o m 18 July t o 31 December

1945 was one of

considerable reorganization, a t a l l levels, of t h e elements constituting

t h e European Theater.

a.

The arlmy group formation was eliminated by t h e disbandment

of 6th(10) and 12th Army Groups(ll) and t h e redesignation of 2lst

94

&my

Group Headquarters as Headquarters, B r i t i s h A n q of t h e Rhine.(12)

The a r e a occupied by t h e United States, exclusive of t h e Berlin Sector

and t h e Bremen Enclave, was divided i n t o t h e Eastern U i t a r y D i s t r i c t

and t h e Western Military District.(l3)

On t h e major command level, September saw t h e discontinuance

b.

of t h e Assembly Area C o m n d and t h e t r a n s f e r of i t s functions and

personnel t o Oise Intermediate Section.(U)

I n December, United

Kingdom Base was discontinued and i t s functions and _Dersonnel were

transferred t o London Area Office;(lS)

the Bremen Enclave ceased t o

exist with t h e t r a n s f e r t o t h e British of that t e r r i t o r y , except for

the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven;(l6)

and on 29 December, a new

command, Continental Base Section, was formed from Headquarters,

Advanced Section. (17)
A change also occurred j.n*Theater command:

C.

on ll Novamber,

General Eisenhower l e f t t h e Theater and Gen. George S. Patton served

a s temporary Theater Commander u n t i l 26 November, when Gen. Joseph T.
BscNarney arrived and became Theater Commander. (18)
There was a major organizational change i n the Air Forces

d.

on 16 August, when t h e U.S.

redesignated U.S.

air force.(l9)
of the &h,

Strategic and Tactical Air Forces was

Air Forces i n Europe and reorganized i n t o an occupation

The 9th Air Force became t h e basic unit, with units

U t h , and 1 5 t h Air Forces.

The Air Transport Command and

t h e Amy Air Forces C o d c a t i o n s Service were attached t o and

received l o g i s t i c a l support from Theater Service Forces, as directed
by Theater Headquarters.

- 95 -

106.

The Reorganization of Service Forces.

The major organizational change, however, concerned t h e

Service Forces, Pvhich a t t h e beginning of the period functioned under

t h e control o f Headquarters, Communications Zone.
a.

Preliminaries t o t h e Chanae.
The functions of t h e chiefs of services had been defined

i n t h e Theater organization plan of 1 2 June 1945.

They mere t o remain

under a subordinate headquarters, with t h e i r activities somewhat

reduced in scope from w h a t they had been during combat. (20) Several
of t h e elements of t h e Communications Zone staff had been t r a n s f e r r e d
t o t h e new Theater Headquarters when it was established i n Frankfurt

am Main on 1 July

1945, and

t h e plan for t h a t headquarters called f o r

a separation f r o m t h e Communications Zone, with which it had been

c l o s e l y interwoven up t o t h a t time.

Planning for t h e new service

headquarters s t a r t e d i n Jdy, and on 21 July t h e announcement was

made t h a t Theater administrative and supply services would be combined

and t h a t a new headquarters, t o be known as Headquarters, Theater

Service Forces, European Theater, would be activated on 1August 19l+5.(21)
b.

Establishment of Theater Service Forces, European Theater.

The order which c a l l e d f o r t h e r e o r g a n h a t i o n was

published on 21 July 1945,(22) and t h e new Headquarters became operative

on 1 August, with Lt. Can. John C.H. Lee continuing in comnand until

29 December, when his place was taken by Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder.(a)
The newly activated headquarters took over all i n s t a l l a t i o n s and

functions which had pregiously been assigped t o t h e Communications Zone.

It was divided i n t o a main echelon a t Frankfurt and a Rear echelon a t

Paris.

The P a r i s headquahers was t h e normal channel of coxnunication

with Army Service Forces and t h e Zone of t h e I n t e r i o r ports u n t i l 3

December 1945.(&)

Each staff division, however, was directed t o

e s t a b l i s h i t s main headquarters a t Frankfurt as soon as pzacticable,

and after

3 December the p r i n c i p a l functions, except redeployment,

were performed there,

On 1 nugust t h e t o t a l personnel employed by

t h e service forces amounted t o s l i g h t l y more than 2,000,000.(25)

The headquarters included a general and a s p e c i a l s t a f f , t h e Theater
chiefs of services being s p e c i a l staff o f f i c e r s f o r t h e commanding
generals of both t h e Theater and t h e Theater Service Forces.

The

r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e two staffs remained t h e same as under t h e

Comunications Zone. (26)
C.

Reorpanhation of Subordinate Commands of Theater Service

Forces.
With t h e inauguration of Headquarters, Theater Service

Forces, European Theater, c e r t a i n technical commands were established

under t h e cammanding general:(27)

t h e Theater Motor Transport Service,

the Military Railway Service, and t h e Theater Inland Xaterways Transport

Service, all t h r e e being under the technical command of t h e Chief of
Transportation, United States Forces, European Theater;

t h e Military

Pipelines Service, until i t s i n a c t i v a t i o n on 1 October;(28)

and the

American Graves Registration Service, which w a s redesignated American

- 97 -

Graves Registration Command on 1 October 1945 and assigned t o t h e

supervision of t h e Theater Chief Quartermaster. (29)

E S T J I B L ~ S W TOF UNITED STATES LZLITIW WJERNLSNT

107.

Over-Ul Trend.

The trend of organization i n Germany took t h e form of a

gradual evolution from m i l i t a r y t o civil. government.

During combat

operations, m i l i t a r y government w a s secondary t o military operetions,

and although t h e responsibility for military government was assigned

t o t h e Supreme Conwinder, this responsibility was subordinate t o t h a t
of defeating t h e enemy.

Full responsibility remained with t h e d l i t a r g

commander u n t i l t h e military government machinery could be s e t up.

I n t h e period innnediately following t h e end of h o s t i l i t i e s , therefore,

the m i l i t a r y government d e t a c h

t h a t took up t h e i r positions with

tactical. u n i t s had only l o c a l jurisdiction. (30) Their integration

i n t o a military government f o r l a r g e r areas came Later.

108. T e r r i t o r i a l Basis f o r Established Kilitary Government.

That one of the prime r e q u i s i t e s f o r a system of militarg
government was a s e t t l e d t e r r i t o r i a l subdivision of t h e area t o be
governed had been recognized i n the e a r l y directives, which called
f o r t h e establishment of military government on the pattern of existing

German p o l i t i c a l and administrative areas.

- 98 -

The exigencies of bombat,

however, had led t o a changing d i s t r i b u t i o n of area responsibility

among t a c t i c a l units i n which t h e following of l o c a l administrative

boundaries was more o r less a matter of chance.

The f r i c t i o n which

developed f r o m t h e ensuing c o n f l i c t of j u r i s d i c t i o n l e d t o t h e policy

of following German i n t e r n a l boundaries f o r a l l purposes connected
with military government, which became standard practice under s t a t i c
conditions.

The f i r s t major s t e p i n t h e direction of s t a b i l i z a t i o n

came i n September 1945, with t h e division of t h e United S t a t e s Zone

i n t o t h e t h r e e s t a t e s of Grossheasen, Wilrttemberg-Baden,

and Bavaria,

,each with a state government empowered t o enact state l e g i s l a t i o n and

exercise other state governmental powers, subject t o t h e supervision
of M i l i t a r y Government, regional o f f i c e s of which functioned in each

state. (31)

109. Early Chain of Pdilitars Government Command.

Nith t h e s t a b i l i z a t i o n of t h e occupation cane t h e d e f i n i t i o n

of a chain of command f o r m i l i t a r y government, passing from Theater

Headquarters t o t h e commanders of Third and Seventh Armies, a l s o

designated as t h e co-ders

of the Military D i s t r i c t s , and from them

through a f l T e r r i t o r i a l m i l i t a r y government d e t a c h e n t chain of command,"

which r a n parallel t o t h e Gennan c i v i l administrative chain of command.(32)

This was t h e first complete chain of command f o r m i l i t a r y government

and it was notable i n that it was independent of t h e t a c t i c a l chain.

- 99 -

UO.

Developnent and S t a b i l i z a t i o n on t h e Headquarters Level.

A corresponding evolution and f i n a l s t a b i l i z a t i o n occurred

in t h e headquarters organization of m i l i t a r y government.

The original

bodies from which t h e final. organizations of t h e Office of M i l i t a r y

Government developed were t h e E 5 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters
and Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and t h e U.S.

Control Council, (b-)

a.

Group

G-5 Division.
In t h e e a r l y period, E 5 Divisions functioned a t

Supreme Headquarters, European Theater of Operations and Comunications

Zone, t h e last two of which were i n t e r r e l a t e d .
Supreme Headquarters, its

A t t h e dissolution of

E5 Division was consolidated with t h e G-5

Division of t h e European Theater o f Operations and became the '3-5

Division of U.S.

Forces, European Theater.

The r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of

t h i s division were t h e control and supervision of t h e normal functions

of German civil government at all echelons below the national level.

It w a s composed of nine branches:

executive, i n t e r n a l affairs, l e g a l ,

financial, economics, t r a d e and commerce, displaced persons, public

health, and industry.

On 1 October, the G5 Division was redesignated

Office of Military Government

b.

U.S.

(u.s. ZOne).(33)

Group Control Council (Gemany). (34)

On t h e same d a t e , t h e U.S. Group Control Council (Germany)

was redesignated Office of Military Government (U.S.).(35)

- loo -

u1. Division of Functions,

,

These two units composed t h e m i l i t a r y government staff of

The functions of t h e Office of Elilitary

t h e Theater Commander.
Government (U.S.)

were:

t o furnish t h e United S t a t e s element of t h e

U l i e d Control Authority for Germany;

t o develop major m i l i t a r y

government p o l i c i e s for, and t o supervise m i l i t a r y government a c t i v i t i e s

in, t h e United S t a t e s Zone, covering l o c a l gmernnent and c i v i l services,

education and r e l i g i o u s a f f a i r s , public welfare, p o s t a l service, finance,
courts and prisons, displaced persons, economics, industry, newspaper,
radio, and theaters.
(U.S.Zone) were:

The functions of Gffice of E l i t a r y Government

t o supervise within t h e Zone United S t a t e s n i l i t a r y

government policies;

t o supervise United S t a t e s c i v i l affairs i n

l i b e r a t e d countries;

t o supervise r e s t i t u t i o n s , supply, control, coal,

, health,

denazifica-

t i o n , displaced persons and refugees, and e l e c t i o n returns;

t o direct

currency depositories, rail transportation, safety

m i l i t a r y government i n t h e Bremen Enclave through t h e c m m d i n g

general of Bremen Port CoamLand.

112. Eeasures toward a Separation.

Experience brought a more e f f i c i e n t division of functions
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s between t h e m i l i t a r y c o " n d

- 101 -

and t h e m i l i t a r y

government authorities. I n general, t h e tendency was t o c l a s s i f y any

matter r e l a t i n g t o the control of t h e c i v i l population and t h e

p o l i t i c a l , economic, and c u l t u r a l l i f e of Germany as a military
government responsibility, and any matter concerning t h e security of
t h e zone o r requiring a l a r g e personnel f o r guard duty o r administrat i o n as t h e responsibility of the purely military elements of t h e
occupation forces.

Immediately a f t e r t h e redesignation of the G5

Division a s the Office of f i l i t a r y Government (U.S.

Zone), military

goverm.ent a c t i v i t y began t o be further separated from other Theater

functions.

I n October 1945 a memorandum vias issued t o a l l branch

chiefs of t h e Office of k i l i t a r y hvernment

(u.s. zone)

instructing

then t o make a detailed study of the problems v i t h i n t h e i r area o f

responsibility in t h e l i g h t of the folloiiing principles:

The f i e l d

forces of the Army and Theater Yeadquarters would have no d i r e c t

m i l i t a r y goveriment functions, but would be available t o maintain the
security of o w forces and t h e authority of-rnilitary governnent when
required.

The administrative and technical services of t h e

provide t h e following:
and petroleum stocks;

administrative support;

would

rations, clothing;

and pay of United S t a t e s m i l i t a r y and c i v i l i a n

personnel in the military government organization.

In all other

matters, t h e m i l i t a r y government organization would depend u-n

German c i v i l i a n agencies and persannel f o r supplies and services.

Direct cammecation was authorimd between t h e regional offices and

t h e Office of Kilitary Government (U.S. Zone);

control of t h e German

c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s was t o be carried o u t a t the regional level. (36)

- 102 -

113.

Transfer of Information Control Functions.

The Infomation Control Division, which was a staff d i v i s i o n

of Theater Headqut?rters,

was discontinued on 10 Deceaber

191!+5(37)

and i t s functions were reallocated t o m i l i t a r y govermnent offices.

12.4. Responsibility for Displaced Persons.

A t the time of t h e inauguration of the Office of Military
Government (U.S. Zone), r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r formulation of policy on
displaced persons passed t o t h e new organization,

Control and s u p p l ~

of displaced persons, however, was l e f t with t h e t a c t i c a l forces,

and a number of detachments which had been detailed t o this study

continued t o operate under corps and Army control.(38)

POLICIES AND ACCOLPLISHUENTS OF K L I T k B Y TO

"C

115.

Final Establishment of Occupation in Austria.

a.

(?ne o f t h e e a r l i e s t major accomplishments of this period

was t h e final e s t a b l i s h a n t of the occupation i n Austria.(39)

19 August t h e advance headquarters of U.S.

Vienna;

On

Forces Austria moved i n t o

a f t e r a s e r i e s of conferences with Soviet o f f i c i a l s , t h e

commanders i n chief of t h e other t h r e e occupying powers Gen. Kark

Clark, Lt. Cen. S i r Richard YcCreery, and Gen. Zarie-Emile Bethouart,

moved i n t o the c i t y on 23 August.

The Soviet fdrces were under t h e

command of Marshal Ivan S. Koniev.(l+O)

- 103 -

b.

By September 1945 t h e United S t a t e s Sector of Vienna

was established, comprising t h e d i s t r i c t s of Neubau, J o s e f s t a d t ,

A l s e r v d , \ a h r i n g , M b l i n g , and t h e northern p a r t of Hernals
adjoining W&hring.(U)

On 11 September t h e Allied Control Council

met f o r t h e first time.

c.

Two of t h e major achievements of q u a d r i p a r t i t e c o n t r o l

during this period were t h e extension through t h e whole of Austria o f

t h e power of t h e Provisional Governnent under Dr. Karl Renner on 20

October, and t h e preparations f o r , and supervision of, t h e first free
e l e c t i o n s f o r t h e n a t i o n a l and provincial l e g i s l a t u r e s of t h e postwar
period.

This was held on 25 ?!overciber 1945, with approximately 93

percent of t h e r e g i s t e r e d voters p a r t i c i p a t i n g .

Eighty-f ive Volks-

p a r t e i members, 76 Social Denocrats, and 4 Cormmists were e l e c t e d

t o the Nationalrat, or lower House of P a r l i m e n t ;

Volkspartei

m a j o r i t i e s were e l e c t e d t o the provincial l e g i s l a t u r e s in a l l t h e

IAnder except Vienna and U r n t e n (a k i d of the B r i t i s h Zone), where
s o c i a l i s t s formed t h e majority.

Leopold Figl, chairman of t h e Volks-

p a r t e i , was elected chancellor of t h e new government, which was

formally approved on

14 Decenber

by t h e Executive Comrcittee of t h e

Allied Control Council. (4.2)

116.

Denazif i c z t ion.

a.

One of t h e major purposes of t h e occupation of Ger-mny

was t o e r a d i c a t e from German l i f e a l l evidences of nazisui;

t h e f i r s t steps w a s t o a t t a c k t h e Nazi Party i t s e l f .

- 104 -

one of

It was dissolved,

its funds and property were confiscated, its records and headquarters
were seized, and i t s leaders were arrested and interned.

Au. Nazi

schools and newspapers were abolished, and Nazi propaganda was

prohibited.

A l l auxiliary organizations of the Nazi Party, including

t h e youth p u p s , were swept away.

.QU laws and practices based upon

the Nazi philosophy, o r involving discriminations on grounds of race,

color, religion, or p o l i t i c a l opinions, were suspended by the military
commanders and l a t e r repealed by t h e U e d Control Council.

J3y the

end of 1945, approximately U0,oOO Germs had been arrested, of whom

almost 50,000 were in automatic a r r e s t categories.

About 80,OW

enemy c i v i l i a n internees were in the custody of the army.

b.

Denazification of t h e German government and i n s t i t u t i o n s

w a s begun in the e a r l i e s t stages of military government.

In the

reconstitution of t h e c i v i l administration, appointment of Nazis

was avoided with t h e greatest care.

Naturally, some crept i n by

f a l s i f y i n g t h e i r records, but they were thrown out l a t e r .

In the

e a r l y months of the occupation, the efforts of the military government

a u t h o r i t i e s were concentrated upon the denazification of t h e government,

and especially of its e s s e n t i a l services.

Denazification of the

police was announced o f f i c i a l l y a s complete i n December 1945.

Military

Government Law No. 8, which became effective on 26 September 1945,

began the process of denazifying German industry, business, and
institutLons other than the govBrnment,

It excluded members of the

Nazi Party from all employment i n which they would have responsibility

or authority, r e s t r i c t i n g them to the lowest c l e r i c a l positions and

common labor,

All Gems were required t o r e g i s t e r with the

authorities, s t a t i n g the f a c t s as t o t h e i r membershi_:, i n the Nazi

Party, and the trial of all members o f t h e Nazi Party above nominal

participants was contemplated.

117.

Civil Government.

a.

The f i r s t obligation of an occupying power is t o restore

and maintain law and order.

The victorious Allied armies found in

Germany no national government worthy o f the name and hardly any

county and l o c a l governments capable of functioning with any degree

of efficiency.

The whole goverr!! e n t a l structure was so completely

t i e d t o nazism t h a t it crumbled, along with t h e party and military

machines.

In t h e circumstances, t h e conquerers had t o man t h e

e s s e n t i a l services i n order t o get public u t i l i t i e s t o functioning,

t o furnish a police force i n order to f o r e s t a l l an outbreak of crime
and sabotage, and t o s e t up i t s own courts i n order t o t r y offenders
expeditiously.

After these first urgent steps were taken, the

occupying force could begin s e t t i n g up l o c a l and high administrations

and turning back t o the inhabitants a degree of responsibility f o r
t h e i r own government.
b.

No branch of t h e Gerinan government was more thoroughly

nazified than the police and the courts.

In t h e United States Zone,

it was necessary t o tear them down almost completely and build anew.
The Mazi national police, the Gestapo, was broken up completely;
so a l s o was t h e p o l i t i c a l police.

Some elements of t h e criminal and

- 106 -

municipal police and of t h e l o c a l f i r e departments were found t o be

untainted and s u i t a b l e f o r incorporation in the new organizations.
With these as nuclei, new personnel was screened, employed, trained,
and put into service i n t h e new E l i t a r y Government police and f i r e

departments.

By November t h e new police had been so successful i n

winning t h e confidence of a l l concerned t h a t the military commander

had hegun t o i s s u e arms and ammunition t o them.
c.

All German courts were closed and j u s t i c e was

administered exclusively i n m i l i t a r y government courts.

Nazi People's Court was abolished.

The notorious

Personnel was sought t o man new

German courts and in August 1945 German courts gradually began t o

function under a l i t a r y Government supervision.

d.

After provisional goverments had been established

generally a t t h e municipal and county l e v e l s , three LClnder, o r s t a t e s ,

were sonstituted on 19 September 1945, each headed by a minister
All t h e members of t h e Land governments had t o be confirmed.

president.

by t h e appropriate Office of Ldilitary Government.

On 17 October 1945

was inaugurated a consultative council known as the LCtnderrat, composed

of the ministers president of t h e three L h d e r and the G

e
m chief

administrator of t h e Bremen Enclave.

U8.

P o l i t i c a l Promess in Germaq.

a.

Revival o f P o l i t i c a l Parties.
Stimulus was given. to p o l i t i c a l organization and a c t i v i t y

by t h e announcement on 2 August 19b5 of the decision of t h e T r i p a r t i t e

- 107 -

Conference in Berlin t o permit.and encourage thmughout Germany, as

a s t e p toward t h e reconstruction of German l i f e on a democratic and

peaceful basis, all democratic p o l i t i c a l parties with r i g h t s of assembly
and of public discussion.

Up t o t h i s time a l l p o l i t i c a l activity had

been banned i n t h e United S t a t e s Zone.

Although t h e ban continued in

e f f e c t during all of August, i n f o r d and preparatory organizational

work began, with comunists and s o c i a l democrats most active.

On

27 August a revised d i r e c t i v e was promulgated f o r t h e United S t a t e s

Zone, under which m i l i t a r y government o f f i c e r s might accept and
approve applications t o form "democratic p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s t o engage
i n p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s a t Kreis l e ~ e l . ~ ~ ( l + 3 )

b.

Parts Newspaper.

I n Berlin four organized p a r t i e s were already functioning

when United S t a t e s forces occupied t h e United S t a t e s Sector of t h e

city, t h e Soviet military a u t h o r i t i e s having granted them permission

t o organize.

Each party published a newspaper, whose e d i t o r i a l o f f i c e

and p r i n t i n g establishment were in t h e Soviet occupied area, and a l l

papers were subjected t o Soviet censorship.(kk)

The first p a r t y

papers in t h e United S t a t e s Zone appeared on t h e streets of Munich

on 26 January 1946, t h e day before t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n s were held in

Bavaria (45)
C.

Increase of P o l i t i c a l Bctitriby.
P o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y was comparatively great in t h e l a r g e r

c i t i e s during September.

I n t h e SmdUer cities, however, it was

- 108 -

s l i g h t , and in most rural d i s t r i c t s it was nonexistent.

mass demand f o r p o l i t i c a l organization.

There was no

T h a t which occurred was

inspired by a few leaders, most of whom had been active before 1933.(46)
Organized p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y increased during October, although t h e
public, absorbed in t h e business of merely keeping alive and preparing
f o r t h e coming winter, showed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t .

In October, t h e

communists applied f o r authorization t o organize en a Land l e v e l in

Bavaria and there ivas some indication of organization on a national

level.

Communist programs appeared t o be i n close agreement in a l l

On 23 November p o l i t i c a l parties were authorized on a

zones.(47)

Land level,(@) and organization got well under way i n t h e Uniited

S t a t e s Zone in December f o r t h e l o c a l elections scheduled f o r t h e ,

l a s t two Sundays i n January,

119. Labor Unions.

a.

One of the points agreed upon i n the T r i p a r t i t e Conferenci

of Berlin was t h e r i g h t of t h e German people t o form f r e e trade unions.

General Eisenhower said i n his message of 8 August t o t h e Gernan

people:

You w i l l be -permitted t o form l o c a l unions and t o engage

in local political activities.

An i n i t i a l aim of trade unions and

p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s should be t o help i n the measures necessary how

t o prepare f o r t h e coming winter.

b.

By July 1945 i n t e r e s t i n t h e organization o f unions

w a s growing, and a material increase i n labor organization was

expected as a r e s u l t o f t h e decision of t h e T r i p a r t i t e Conference.(49)

- 109 -

Unions a e r e already being formed i n hine of the f i f t e e n Kreise of

northem 1Flllrttemberg.

I n S t u t t g a r t , there had been active labor

organization since t h e f i r s t days of the occupation and t h e leadership w a s of an unusually high type.

In Ntlmberg, f i f t y work councils

had been permitted t o organize on a provisional basis.

Xeetings of

labor groups were held i n 2annheim, where a uell-organized general

trade union was operating.

I n i t i a t i o n f e e s were usually one

Reichsmark and t h e low dues were computed on a s l i d i n g scale based

on earnings.

h s t without exception, the labor organizations were

i n i t i a t e d by pre-1933 leaders.
c r a f t o r industry.

Workers were admitted regardless of

P o l i t i c a l , confessional, and previous trade-union

commitments were deliberately avoided, and a strong d e s i r e t o break

with the past was evident.
C.

Denazification was t h e first objective.(50)

During August a c t i v i t y leading t o t h e forriation of

t r a d e Unions increased throughout the United States Zone, and one

organization operating on an interzonal basis was reported t o be
active i n the B r i t i s h 2nd Soviet Zones.
120.

Reparations and Restitution.

The principle t h a t &many would be required t o restore

t h e property removed by her from occupied countries was announced i n

t h e Allied Declaration of 5 January 3.943 a t London.

The principle

t h a t Geimany would be rec,uired t o deliver reparations i n kind was

agreed t o b~ the Allied Governments in the Yalta Conference.

Potsdam Agreeiaent elaborated uson both of these principles.

- 110 -

The
Until

near the end of 1945, l i t t l e progress was made h

i e i t h e r reparations

o r r e s t i t u t i o n , as detziled international agreements were needed i n

both fields.

3eparatiofis i n kind were mde extensively in one form

even 4uring t h e first - o n t h s of t h e occupation, large numbers of

Cerm prisoners of war being held as elements o f t h e labor force of

Allied countries.

A beginning was w d e in t h e d i s m t l i n g of German

industry f o r reparations deliveries when 156 plants i n the United

S t a t e s Zone were iinrked f o r t h i s r.urpose by t h e Economic Directorate,
and twenty-four of these were allocated as "advance reparations" on
1 October 1945.

By t h e end of Yovember, t h e dismantling of t e n cf

these had been finished o r was i n progress.

Only s r a a l l quantities

of a r t i s t i c and i n d u s t r i a l .naterial were restored t o t h e i r r i g h t f u l

oivners f r o m t h e United S t a t e s Zone i n 1945, as the Allied Powers

had a t t h a t t h e not agreed upon a d e f i n i t i o n of r e s t i t u t i o n .

121.

Economic Problems.

a.
surrender.

The economic l i f e o f Germw was paralyzed a f t e r t h e

The war took a tremendous t o l l in damaged factories, broken

l i n e s of transportation, disruption of t h e systems of distribution,

and depletion and dispersion of the labor force.

Gerrnan economy

probably reached i t s lowest ebb i n June 1945, when i n d u s t r i a l production

was not over 2 percent of existing capacity and the normal food r a t i o n

was o n l y about 900 c a l o r i e s per day.

The prospects of recovery were

poor, since Germany was divided i n t o four zones whose borders were
p r a c t i c a l l y insurinountable economic b a r r i e r s across which almost no

111

t r a d e mas carried on during the first year of t h e occupation.

b.

The Potsdam Agreement sas a milestone i n t h e development

of economic policy f o r Germany i n i t s assertion of t h e principle that

the whole country should be t r e a t e d as an economic unit.

No progress

was made, however, in bringing about t h e economic unity of Germany,

The agencies of t h e United S t a t e s forces of occupation charged with

t h e economic control of Germany were therefore forced t o proceed with

a policy looking t o a limited rehabilitation of t h e United States Zone.

C.

Certain kinds of economic endeavor were stiniiulated as

much as possible:

agriculture, brown coal production, railways,

inland water transport, electric power.

Postal cormunications were

brought back into operation by October.

Where possible, plants

providing essential peacetime i t e m like soap, leather, shoes, and

textiles were allowed t o resume pmduction.

By the end o f 1945,

i n d u s t r i a l production had r i s e n t o about 10 percent of existing

capacity, and t h e normal daily ration had been increased t o 1550
calories.

To maintain t h e l a t t e r , however, i t was necessary t o begin,

in January

1946, the direct importation

of foodstuffs f r o m t h e United

states.
d.

Steps were taken during these early months of t h e

occupation t o prevent Gemany's w a r industry from coming t o l i f e .

A comprehensive survey of industry for t h e purpose of identifying

war plants w a s begun i n May 1945, and no plants capable of being

diverted t o war production were allowed t o reopen.

The demilitarisation

of Gennan industry was begun i n November w i t h t h e destruction of the

first war plant.

- u2 -

122.

The Restoration of Freedom.

The accomplishments of m i l i t a r y government during t h e f i r s t

few months of t h e occupation may best be summed up in ternts of t h e

r i g h t s and l i b e r t i e s of t h e individual Grnan citizen.

A s a consequence

of t h e Allied victory, Germny vias freed from t h e domination of one

of t h e most r u t h l e s s dictatorships of modern tines.

of oppression--the

The instruments

Nazi hierarchy, the m i l i t a r y caste, the intelligence

service, the Gestapo, the p o l i t i c a l police, and t h e concentration

camps--had a l l been swept away.

A11 p o l i t i c a l prisoners had been

s e t free, unless t h e r e was a good reason r e l a t e d t o security f o r holding

them.

The bombardment of Nazi propaganda i n the press and by radio

was silenced;

i n i t s place, t h e Gerians had t h e beginnings o f a

f r e e press and radio.

Religious freedom had been reestablished, and

t h e surviving Jews had been freed from Nazi persecution.

A good

beginning had been made in reopening the schools and in providing

f r e e education without politcical and m i l i t a r i s t i c propaganda.

Limited

public r i g h t s had been granted in t h e freedom t o associate in p o l i t i c a l

p a r t i e s and trade-unions,

and t o hold some kinds of public assemblies,

The Nazi domination of the theater, motion pictures, music, and a r t

had been broken.

To be sure, the Gernan population had been plunged

by war i n t o w a n t f o r the n e c e s s i t i e s of life--food,

shelter.

clothing, and

It cannot be said t h a t t h e German c i t i z e n enjoyed t h e f u l l

r i g M s of a c i t i z e n of a democratic state--but

the g r o u n d w o ~had

been l a i d f o r t h e freedom of the individual and t h e regeneration of

t h e Geman nation.

- 113 -

mLICIES AND ACCOX'LISlBENTS OF THE UNITSD STAT53 FORCSS

123. Destruction of German F o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

a.

During t h e early months of t h e occupation, German military

i n s t a l l a t i o n s such as a i r f i e l d s , ordnance p l a n t s , and weapons

emplacements were i d e n t i f i e d , surveyed, and inventoried.

All l a r g e

ammunition dumps and s t o r a g e depots of t h e Geman armed f o r c e s were

found.

All i n s t a l l a t i o n s that were a hazard t o t h e occupying f o r c e s

or t h e c i v i l population were prompt17 destroyed, placed under guard,

o r marked with warning signs.

The d e s t r u c t i o n of mine f i e l d s ,

underground f a c t o r i e s , and permanent f o r t i f i c a t i o n s was a t a s k t h a t

was t o continue for a l o n g time.

E3y t h e end of 1945, t h e network of

f o r t i f i c a t i o n s and defensive works was almost completely surveyed,

but only about one-quarter demolished.
b.

German defensive works and f o r t i f i c a t i o n s were divided,

f o r t h e purpose of d e s t r u c t i o n , i n t o two groups.

F i r s t p r i o r i t y was

given t o those i n s t a l l a t i o n s which c o n s t i t u t e d an immediate hazard

t o occupation f o r c e s o r which could immediately be u t i l i z e d for war

purposes without a d d i t i o n a l construction o r production.

Second p r i o r i t y

was given t o those i n s t a l l a t i o n s which could not be u t i l i z e d without

a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n for resumption of German war i n d u s t r i e s .
.Qllied Control Authority set t h e t a r g e t d a t e of 6 June 1951 f o r
complete de struc t ion.

The

124.

Surplus Property.

No r e l i a b l e estimates of t h e amount of surplus property

were made before about 1October 1945.

It was then estimated t h a t

t h e r e were in the Theater 1O,l+8O,ooO long tons of surplus material

valued a t ~10,322,000,000.

Although t h e Office of t h e Foreign

Liquidation Comnissioner was established i n Septedoer 1945 and

negotiations were begun f o r t h e s a l e of surplus property i n Europe,
r e l a t i v e l y slow progress was made until 1946 due t o t h e lack of
complete disposal instructions and t h e limited d o l l a r c r e d i t of
prospective buyers.

125.

On V-3 Day t h e United S t a t e s forces had 36,260 pieces of

requisitioned property i n the United Kingdom and t h e l i b e r a t e d

countries.

By November 1945 these real estate holdings had been

reduced t o 28,000.

Real e s t a t e holdings i n t h e occupied areas of

Germany and Austria by t h i s time t o t a l e d 27,000 pieces.

The highest

p r i o r i t i e s for new construction were given i n 194.5 t o t h e redeployment

program and t h e r e p a i r of Bremen and RremeEhaven as t h e p r i n c i p a l

ports of supply f o r t h e occupation forces.
126.

Black Karket Curbs.

On 15 September 1945, General Eisenhower prepared a statement

vihich was read t o all troops, explaining regulations designed t o curb

black marketing.

Troops were ordered not t o s e l l o r exchange a r t i c l e s

issued o r sold t o them by t h e ~lrmy, while Germans were forbidden t o

deal i n these goods.(al)

- 115 -

127. Further Relaxation of Monfraternization Order.

In Austria, a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on f r a t e r n i z a t i o n were removed
on U, August 194.5, except when t h i s involved known Nazis o r was
directed toward marriage.

was allowed.
taking place.

Later, in i'overnber, marriage w i t h Austrians

I n Germany a similar, though slower, developahent was

On 1 October 1945, t h e Allied Control Council l i f t e d

a l l r e s t r i c t i o n s on fraternization, except f o r marriage and b i l l e t i n g .

Control over these two aspects was reserved t o commanders of t h e
United States, British, and French Zones,

The Council's action d i d

not affect t o t h e Soviet forces, since they had not adopted any
regulations governing fraternization.

I n a message t o United S t a t e s

troops, General Zisenhovder stressed t h e s t r i c t prohibition against

marriage w i t h Gerr~lansand b i l l e t i n g of troops with German families.(52)
128.

Administration and Repatriation of Displaced Fersons.

Every possible e f f o r t w a s made t o r e p a t r i a t e United Nations

displaced persons before winter, i n view of the anticipated shortages

of food and f u e l in Germany.

Some categories of displaced persons

presented especially d i f f i c u l t problems:

nonrepatriable persons, and t h e Jews.

these were s t a t e l e s s persons,

By August 1945, it was t h e

policy of t h e United S t a t e s t h a t stateless and nonrepatriable persons,

such as Latvians, Lithuanians, Zstonians, and e x - e n q nationals
persecuted because of race, religion, o r a c t i v i t i e s in favor of the
United Nations, should be granted t h e same assistance as United Nations
displaced persons.

Special centers were established f o r these people,

116

with United Iktions Relief and Rehabilitation Administration teams

Numerous special Jewish asseinbly centers, such as those

i n charge.

a t Zeilsheia, Landsberg, and i'iolf rat shausen, were established.

In

order t o prevent a breakdown of morale, t h e Central Tracing Bureau

made every e f f o r t t o t r a c e members of families who had long been

I n October 1945, special rations were authorized f o r

separated.

persons persecuted under t h e Nazi r e g h e .

E f f o r t s were a l s o made

t o employ nonrepatriable displaced persons, and by the end of 1945

steps had been taken to e f f e c t a complete registration, showing
!'iork projects were being developed, in cooperation

their skills.

with t h e m i l i t a r y authorities, and displaced persons were given first

p r i o r i t y on these projects.

I n Movember and December 1945, transport-

a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s revolving around the lack of f u e l desulted i n a

s t a t i c period of repatriation movements.

Only

40,785 displaced

persons were repatriated i n November, and 578 i n December, leaving

313,,&44 in camps and 161,644 outside t h e camps.

r"

The t o t a l number

of displaced persons repatriated by t h e end of December 1945 was

2,709,127. (63)
129.

The Repatriation of Liberated Prisoners of VJar.

a.

By the end of June 1945, repatriation of 91,252 l i b e r a t e d

American prisoners of war was regarded as complete, although lu,

remained i n hospitals
b.

.(54)

The vast majority of l i b e r a t e d prisoners of war of all

n a t i o n a l i t i e s except Polish and Yugoslavwere repatriated by t h e month

- u7 -

of August 1945. I n t h e early f a l l of 1945, the policy es respects

Poles was t h a t they would be repatriated only i f t h e i r homes were
west of the line fixed i n 1939 as the l i n e of demarcation between the
Soviet and German spheres of control, and i f t h e individual was

willing t o be repatriated.Oi.5)

Yugoslavs were not t o be repatriated

pending a decision by the S t a t e Department.(*)

A law enacted in

Yugoslavia on 23 August 1945 deprived of citizenship a l l members

of t h e Yugoslav Army, l i b e r a t e d from G e m custody and resident
abroad, who did not declare t h e i r readiness to be repatriated before

15 December 1945.
C.

The practice of forming Civilian Guard Companies and

Labor Service Conpanies from ex-prisoners and displaced persons not

desiring repatriation, mostly Polish i n nationality, was i n s t i t u t e d
in t h e 9u1wer of

d.

1945.

The o f f i c i a l end of operations i n t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n of

recovered a l l i e d m i l i t a r y personnel was marked by t h e rescission of

the Theater standing operating procedure on 1October 1945.

130. The Punishment of Xar Criminals.

a.

Establishyent of t h e International Eilitary Tribunal.

P l a n s f o r an inter-Allied w a r crimes t r i b u n a l were

drafted by representatives of the occupying powers a t London in a
conference which began oq 26 June.

The conference drafted a charter

and established t h e International Y i l i t a r y Tribunal, before which

Nazi organizations and mjor criminals whose crimes had no p a r t i c u l a r

- 118 -

Under t h e teras of t h e

geographic location were brought t o justice.

charters, war crimes were defined i n t h r e e categories:

crine against

peace, crimes against humanity, and crimes against international laws

and usages of aar.(S7)
b.

Number of Xar Criminals.

The task ahead was a big one.

The Central Registry of

Yiar Criminals and Security Suspects, o r i g i n a l l y located in Paris,

already had t h e n a e s of approximately 18,000 alleged war criminals

i n its f i l e s .

By t h e end of 1945, 5,000 more names viere under

preparation.

To t r y these, together with a l l t h e menrbers of t h e

organizations found g u i l t y by t h e International i i i l i t a r y &&bund,

presented a problex of trerrendous proportions.

It was estirmted

t h a t t o t r y 100,OOO individuals so t h a t each would appear before a

tribunal conposed of three judges, would take t h e time of

375

judges f o r a period of four months, i f one hour were a l l o t t e d t o

each accused. (58)
c.

Responsibilities

By Theater d i r e c t i v e of 2 0 September 19l+5,(59)

staff

responsibility was placed on t h e Theater Judge Advocate, whose o f f i c e

thus became t h e principal agency f o r t h e investigation and prosecution

of war crimes.

I n addition, t h e Assistant Chief of S t a f f , G2, was

given t h e responsibility f o r t h e apprehension o f t h e persons designated

by t h e Theater Judge Advocate as suspects o r witnesses.

d.

Delegation of Zesponsibility t o German Courts.

In order t o lighten t h e gigantic task of trying all war

- llq -

criminals, a plan was submitted t o t h e iiar Department on

5 December

194.5 wherein it was proposed t h a t special courts be constituted by

73litax-y GovemTent, with t h e Office of Chief o f Comsel c o n t r o l l i n g
t h e flow of cases as a p a r t of i t s authority t o d i r e c t t h e trial of

i'ixis war crininals.($O)

Provided t h e victim was not a Llnited Nations

national, t h e accused was to be t r i e d before a Gerrnan tour% unless

he was a m a o r war c r i r ; - n a l wanted by t h e International t ! i l i t a r y
Tribunal.

This plan was approved on 18 January 1946.($1)

The burden

o f the Theater Comander with respect t o punishment of war criminals

was reduced further by a law of 20 December 1945, issued by t h e

Allied Control Council, according t o which tile .min group of persons
t o be t r i e d before Gernian c r h i n a l courts were those who had colnmitted
cri:.es on r a c i a l , religious, o r p o l i t i c a l grounds.

By t h i s masure

t h e German people were inade t o share som? o f t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r

the punishment o f t h e g u i l t y among them.($2)
e,

Ua-ior !iar Criminals.

The Committee of Chief Prosecutors f o r t h e Investigation

and Prosecution of Xar Criminals prepared a list of major war criminals
which was anlounced on 29 August 1945.

The names on t h e lists were:($3)

Hemann :dlhelm Wring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, dobert Ley,
Alfred aosenberg, Hans Frank, D r . Ernst Kaltenbrunner, D r . 'jjilhelm Frick,

Julius Streiciier, '.iiliieLn Keitel, Dr. :;alter Funk, Earon Constantin von
Neurath, Dr. Hjalaar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von b h l e n und Halbach,

Karl D U n i t e , Saldur von Schiracii, Fritz Sauckel, Llbert Speer, liartin

- 120 -

F r i t z von Papen, Alfred Jodl, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Erich

Bo
,"

mder,

Hans Fritzsche.

These defendents were t r i e d i n the war crimes

t r i a l s a t NtLrnberg which opened on 21 Rovember 1945.

f.

Other Trials.
?ythe end of

1945, considerable progress had been made,

In September the Luneberg t r i a l s had begun, with an indictrnent against

forty-nine war criminals;(6'4)

on 8 October, in Vliesbaden, seven

Gerrmns were placed on t r i a l f o r the mass murder of 500 Polish and

Soviet slave laborers in a mental hospital;(&5)

the Dachau

concentration camp cases were being t r i e d before a military

commission;(&b) and the groundwork f o r other cases, such as the
Elalmedy b s s a c r e and huthausen concentration camp atrocities, was
rapidly being laid.

THE POLIcETYF% OCCUF'ATION

131. Changing Concepts-of the Occupation,

a.

By the f a l l of

1945, it had become clear that the

occupation forces would not have t o cope with a strong resistance

mvement in Germany, as had been feared before the end of hostilities.
G
e
m plans f o r underground a c t i v i t i e s had been i n a formative stage

at the time of the unconditional surrender, and the early apprehension

of key figures of the SS, SD, and Gestapo ha& deprived a potential

resistance of i t s leadership.

In the early months of the occupation,

the most serious threats t o security were offered by disorderly

displaced persons and Gernm youths, some of whom were disposed t o
-121-

There was no

form secret organizations of a subversive character.

further need f o r t h e overwhelming show of force which had been made

i n achieving the victory and during t h e first months of t h e occupation.

b.

Zany of t h e short-term objectives of t h e occupation were

quickly accomplished.

These included measures such as t h e disbandinent

of t h e Gerinan armed forces, t h e destruction of t h e Nazi Party and i t s

a f f i l i a t e d organizations, t h e imprisonment of t h e p o l i t i c a l police, and
t h e breaking-up of t h e German general staff.

To accomplish t h e

long-range objectives of the occupation such as t h e punishment of

w a r criminals, t h e destruction of Germaq's war potential, and t h e

reeducation of t h e German people in t h e ways of democracy, a long
period of occupation had t o be contemplated.
C.

The original plans f o r the occupation called f o r the

stationing i n Gemany of r e l a t i v e l y large f i e l d forces, organized a t

f i r s t i n t o two armies.

This may be characterized a s an army-type

occu-pation, and it depended upon t h e conversion of ordinary combat

u n i t s i n t o occupation forces.

The Xumpean Theater was, however, soon

n o t i f i e d by Nashington that large f i e l d forces of t h e army-type would

not be available f o r t h e control of t h e German people.
arose t h e concept of t h e police-type occupation.

From this f a c t

Its c e n t r a l idea-

t h a t an occupied nation may best be controlled by a r e l a t i v e l y small

but highly mobile and especially t r a i n e d security force-cannot
a t t r i b u t e d t o any individual o r any single agency.

be

Part of t h e

concept came from t h e War Department, w h i l e many aspects of t h e

organization and functions of t h e security force, o r constabulary,

- 122 -

were developed from p r a c t i c a l experience i n the occupation of Germmy.

132. The Constabulary and t h e T a c t i c a l Reserve.

The knowledge that only a r e l a t i v e l y small force would be
available f o r t h e long-term occupation of Germany forced t h e command

of t h e European Theater t o consider t h e mst e f f i c i e n t use of t h e

manpower that would be available.

In t h e f a l l of 1945 thought along

this l i n e began t o c r y s t a l l i z e , and c e r t a i n ideas gained general

acceptance.

Granted tbat a l a r g e portion of t h e s t r e n g t h available

would have t o be used as headquarters and service troops, it was

believed that most e f f i c i e n t use could be made of t h e troops a v a i l a b l e
f o r s e c u r i t y and t h e control of t h e German population by s e t t i n g up

a r e l a t i v e l y small, but highly t r a i n e d and mobile superpolice force,

or constabulary, t o be supported by t h e remainder of t h e troops,

which would be held i n a t a c t i c a l reserve.

It was calculated t h a t

t h e constabulary should have a strength of about 30,OOO and t h a t

t h e t a c t i c a l reserve should consist of t h r e e mobile combat divisions.
The f o m e r , operating by a system of roving p a t r o l s , would provide
f o r t h e general s e c u r i t y of t h e area of Cernal7y occupied by t h e
U.S.

A r q y and would enforce upon t h e c i v i l population t h e e d i c t s of

t h e K i l i t a r y Government.

The latter, held in s t r a t e g i c locations,

would be available t o back up t h e constabulary in any emergency.

The only apparent disadvantage in this plan was that t h e number d

mobile ground dambat forces would be so l i m i t e d as t o prevent any
a c t i o n outside t h e United States-occupied areas, i n case f o r c e s

- 123 -

were needed for s t r a t e g i c support of other Allied forces or for t h e

implementation of national p o l i c y in other p a r t s of Europe.

The

major underlying assumption in t h e adoption of the police-type

occupation was t h a t t h e other United Nations i n Europe would cooperate
i n t h e maintenance of peace by upholding l a w and order in t h e i r areas
of responsibility. (87)

133. The Proposal for a Superpolice Force.

General Eisenhower outlined t h e theory of t h e police-type
occupation t o General Marshall on 8 October 1945 and proposed a
pyramided superpolice system with mobile t a c t i c a l units i n reserve,

as follows:(68)

a llcityll and %ountrytl police composed of Germans

or Austrians, supervised by f i l i t a r y Government, f o r t h e enforcement

of m i l i t a r y government ordinances i n addition t o usual police duties;

a 'Istate'l police composed of specially trained, highly mobile United

S t a t e s u n i t s of t h e mechanized-cavalry-squadron type, which would be
given a s e c u r i t y p a t r o l mission;

an organization of c e n t r a l l y

controlled United S t a t e s counterintelligence agents;

and United

S t a t e s combat formations of regimental s t r e n g t h o r larger, l o c a t e d

in principal communications and admiriistrative centers and capable

of rapid movement t o threatened places.

l3k.

Communication of t h e Plan t o Comroanders.

Late i n October, General Eisenhower co:municqted t h e plan

t o a l l headquarters i n tile Yuropean Theater.

- 124 -

He described t h e pyramided

police system as a U.S.

constabulary working over t h e loc a l c i t y and

country German police.

It would eventually be responsible to the

c i v i l governor of t h e United States Zone, while t h e supporting troops

would be organized under the United S t a t e s military cormand.

30

s t r a t e g i c reserve was t o be retained, b u t each d i s t r i c t was t o inaintain

c e r t a i n troops on an alert basis a s a l o c a l reserve prepared t o
furnish forces f o r emergency use.

The various headquarters were

requested t o submit b3 1 Xovember proposals f o r the t a c t i c a l disposition

of troops based on these principles.(69)

135. The Problem of Activating a Constabulary.

During November the plan was put i n t o operation on an

A small-scale t r i a l group began operations in the

experimental basis.

Eastern Y U t a r y D i s t r i c t about the iCiddle of the month as a supplement

t o hhe normal combat units having occupation duties.

The.lessons

learned were t o be u t i l i z e d in putting the plan i n t o f u l l operation

by 1 July 1946.

By t h a t time t h e winter would be over, the new

harvest viould be reaching t h e people, and t h e basic assumption underlying the plan--that
would be well tested.
coincide w i t h what

t h e German people were r e l a t i v e l y quiescentFurthermore, the s h i f t at t h a t time would

M ~ then
S

accepted as t h e t a r g e t date f o r "civilian-

izing" the Office of f i l i t a r y Government for Germany (U.S.),

as it

was then anticipated t h a t t h e German and Austrian people would be

governing themselves w i t h o n l y minimum coctrol.

It was assumed t h a t

t h e major functions of Thezter troops pertaining t o displaced persons,

125

prisoners of war, and surplus property would be s u b s t a n t i a l l y finished,

as w e l l as t a s k s i n l i b e r a t e d countries.(%O)

The plan contemplated

a constabulary unit t h a t would p a t r o l a f i x e d area and, through high

mobility, be capable of supporting adjacent constabulary units.

A c t i v i t i e s were t o be coordinated with German l o c a l and f r o n t i e r

police through m i l i t a r y government o f f i c e r s at l o c a l l e v e l s and
through normal s t a f f coordination a t Theater level.

The proposed

strength o f t h e constabulary was based on t h e size of t h e area

covered and i t s population.

The estimate f o r t h e mobile combat force

was t h r e e divisions, made up of two arnlored and one motorized

infantry divisions concentrated in regimental or l a r g e r strengths

near t h e c e n t e r s of population and disposed so as t o be able t o
reach all a r e a s of t h e i r operational range.(@)

136.

Optmition t o t h e Plan.
Despite t h e opposition of t h e Provost h s h a l t o t h e

proposed d i v i s i o n i n t h e s e c u r i t y command, (72) recommendations were

submitted t o t h e ?Jar Department on 22 December f o r a separate
constabulary unit. (513)

137. Planninc:, f o r t h e Constabulary Program.

a.

The Third kqy was made responsible f o r t h e organization

of t h e force and was provided with p r e l h d n a r y planning data.

Public Safety Branch, Office of U i t a r y Government (U.S.

The

Zone),

a s s i s t e d i n working out t h e proyam and i n coordinating constabulary

- 126 -

functions with t h e Counter Intelligence Corps, t h e m i l i t a r y police,

t h e German c i v i l police, and other agencies.
b.

The constabulary w a s t o be developed a s an e l i t e force

of t h e highest c a l i b e r United S t a t e s personnel available, and no

over-age o r limited-duty men were t o be used.

troops were a l l t o be r e e n l i s t e d veterans.

was s e t a t ninety days.

If practicable, t h e

Their period of t r a i n i n g

The use *of foreign nationals was considered

f o r some tirue, but it was f i n a l l y decided t h a t it would iveaken such

a c e n t r a l l y controlled system by creating language and t r a i n i n g

d i f f i c u l t i e s . (?I+)
C.

A c e n t r a l Zone Constabulary Headquarters was t o be

established with t h r e e brigade headquarters a t the German Land level.

Each was t o include an a i r reconnaissance squadron and a varying
number of mechanized cavalry regiments, which were t o be modified

by elimination of t h e bulk of the tanks and artillery and substitution

of carbines, tammy guns, jeeps, and motorcycles f o r the heqvier

weapons and transportation.

Twelve group headquarters were t o be

coordinated w i t h Gernlan c i v i l a u t h o r i t i e s a t points agreed on with

Land Offices of I ' i l i t a r y Government.

Finally, forty-eight squadrons

were t o be a l l o t t e d t o t h e groups, d i s t r i b u t e d according t o the

population of t h e area and i t s security needs, and the reserve was
t o be assigned a t group and higher echelons.(85)

- 127 -

Chapter V I

138. Before V-J Dav.

For the last h a l f of July and the f i r s t ten days of August

1945 t h e story of redeployment was t h e uneventful one of an operation

a t l a s t f u l l y organized, with the responsible agencies trying t o
cope with the backlog l e f t from t h e f i r s t two chaotic months.

This

was reduced by 10 A u g u s t t o under 27,000 through shipnent of an

excess of nearly 70,000 men bound f o r t h e Pacific via t h e United States(2).
Direct shipments t o t h e Pacific were 96,000 short.

139. The Changes a t V-J Day.

On 10 August 1945 t h e redeployment machinerj was for the
first time functioning f a i r l y smoothly.

Plans were l a i d for t h e

redeployment t o the Pacific,directly o r indirectly, of 186,000 men

i n August.

Bs clay as 382,000 raen with low p r i o r i t y f o r discharge

were i n course of preparation f o r redeployment.

Procedures were

thought out and published, or about t o be published, which would

cover t h e whole scheme of redeployment from the European Theater down
t o t h e achievement of t h e occupational troop basis by 1 July 1946.
On V-J gay this whole prospect was swept away.

Two cables were

received from t h e War Department which announced t h e imminent defeat

of Japan and t h e procedures t o be adopted as soon as this was

- 128 -

accomplished. (3)

These directions required t h e Allied comanders in

China and t h e P a c i f i c t o report i"ediate1y upon t h e i r requirements

f o r men and material f o r the next s i x t y days in the light of t h e
surrender of Japan.

Direct redeployment t o the P a c i f i c was t o ceas8

almost imeediately.

All e n l i s t e d men with adjusted service r a t i n g

scores of 85 o r above were t o be returned hiediately t o t h e United

States, under a p r i o r i t y second only t o the urgent requirements of
the Pacific Theater.(4)

On

14 August,

t h e ness of t h e surrender of

Japan was received and t h e War Uepartment cabled orders t o put t h e

above instructions into inmediate e f f e c t , ( 5 )

l.40. Promess i n liedeployment Durina August.

Sone u n i t s were so close t o t h e i r sailing date t h a t it was
not f e a s i b l e t o cancel t h e i r departure.

Over 100,000 men i n u n i t s of

low p r i o r i t y f o r discharge were therefore shipped t o t h e United S t a t e s

during August.(6)

The air l i f t known as "Green Projecttt(?) was reduced

s l i g h t l y during t h e ,onth.

Nhere -mssible, units intended f o r t h e

P a c i f i c were sidetracked from t h e pipe-line uhile units containing

mainly candidates f o r discharge passed through first.

Some u n i t s

id,ek,ded f o r t h e P a c i f i c were assigned temporarily t o duties i n t h e

Theater that had been performed by u n i t s then being shipped home f o r
dischzrge. ( 8 ) Subordinate cormrands were entrusted w i t h the task of
s e l e c t i n g units for redeployment, with a view t o nominating units as
f a r as possible in t h e i r correct p r i o r i t y for discharge.

2ajor commands

were informed t h a t candidates f o r discharge should be assigned p r i o r i t y

- 129 -

a s follows:
or mre;

f i r s t , those with adjusted service r a t i n g scores of 85

secondly, those with scores of 75 t o 84;

and, t h i r d l y , those

with scores of 60 t o 74.(9)

la. Estimates and Policies during August.

In t h e middle of August, it was hoped t h a t 250,000 pen
could be moved each month-200,000
i n t h e United States.

for discharge and 50,000 f o r duty

It w a s expected t h a t by the end of t h e year

Theater strength would be reduced t o j u s t over a million men.(lO)

Tne War Department was emphatic i n urging t h e Theater t o get the
candidates f o r discharge out of Europe f i r s t .

The Theater responded

by r a i s i n g t h e e s t h t e for t h e shipment of men for discharge t o

227,000 per month f o r August and September.(U)

I n order t o ' f i l l t h e

quota of 200,000 high score men for September, seven divisions and

81,000 men in smaller Units were a l e r t e d f o r shipment.

The divisions

were authorized t o proceed a t an overstrength of 12 percent.(l2)

16 August the age l i m i t ' f o r discharge was reduced t o 38.

On

Any e n l i s t e d

man regardless of special skills o r assignment, who was above t h a t

age was e n t i t l e d t o return t o t h e United States w i t h ninety days.(13)

The " c r i t i c a l military occupational specialty numbers,

possession of

which might r e s u l t i n the retention of a man otherwise e l i g i b l e f o r

discharge, viere reduced in August t o three.(U)
score was t e n t a t i v e l y fixed a t 45.

The ultimate c r i t i c a l

&n with scores below this were

assigned t o the occupation forces, and men with higher scores t o u n i t s

t h a t might be shipped t o the Pacific.(lT)

- 130 -

Later it was decided t h a t

units f o r t h e s t r a t e g i c reserve, which were regarded as of t h e same

category as units f o r t h e Pacific, should contain only men with scores
below 45. (16)

l42. s h i p p i n g ?lans.
On 20 August

1945, t h e Theater announced t o t h e V!ar Department

i t s proposals f o r revised shipping plans f o r the reminder of the month

and f o r September.

It was then estimated t h a t eleven complete divisions

would be shipped t o make up in large p a r t the quota of 200,000 high

score men e l i g i b l e f o r discharge.

Theater Headquarters a l s o reported

t h a t 70,000 low-score men would be included in t h e shipgents of t h e

near future.(l7)

After a few days the 3'Iar DeLartrnent announced a

great increase i n t h e r a t e a t which the Theater must ship i t s strength

back t o t h e United States.

It directed t h e Tneater t o ship over 400,000

i n September and an average o f 322,OOO i n each of t h e following four

months.(18)

The Theater requested t h a t , in order t o meet t h i s

requirement, it should be allowed t o include more t h m t h e 20 percent

of low-score men then authorized, and t h a t a liquidation force of
300,000 be authorized in addition t o t h e occupation force.(l9)

second request was refused. (20)

This

The Kar Department then announced t h a t

no more troops f o r the P a c i f i c would be required of t h e European Theater.

The e.qhasis was exclusively on rmn f o r discharge.(2l)

The Theater

was especially requested not t o return men with medium p r i o r i t y f o r

discharge t o t h e United States, as it was not practicable t o reassign
these men and there would be no a l t e r n a t i v e but t o discharge them.

- 131 -

T h i s would slow t h e discharge of men with higher p r i o r i t y and have

a bad e f f e c t on morale.(22)

143. Achievement in August.

E$y t h e end of August the change from redeployment for the

Pacific campaign t o return of large numbers t o t h e Vnited States f o r

discharge was complete.

Arrangements had been made t o reduce Theater

strength t o i t s occupational troop basis by the end of January 1946.

Uen with medium p r i o r i t y (between 45 and 70 points) were being held
up u n t i l November.

Fifteen divisions had been a l e r t e d for slxipmnt.

The t o t a l number of men redeployed during August was 278,270.(23)

&!+.

Pro-ess

a.

i n Redeployment durino September.

European Theater Headquarters did not abandon its

recomendation f o r the authorization of a close-out force, and finally

t h e War Department was persuaded t o approve i t . ( = )

The basis for

this force was intended t o be the nedium p r i o r i t y men whom the Var

Department could not reassign.

Lieanwhile an adjustment was wade in

computing adjusted service r a t i n g scores t o include points accumulated

between V-E and V-3 Days.

This had the effect of adding a t l e a s t

eight points t o t h e score of every man in the Theater.(25)

Theater

Headquarters was alarmed early i n September by t h e discovery t h a t t h e

scheduled shipments t o February would bring &ts strength below the

occupational troop basis.

T h i s was partly due t o a miscalculation

by t h e Theater of over 200,000 i n its strength, but shipping forecasts

were a l t e r e d t o c l e a r up what was r e a l i n the threat.(26)

- 132 -

"Green

Project" was greatly reduced in Septerpber, and finally ended on t h e

l a s t day of t h e month.(27)

b.

The plan for t h e occupational troop basis, worked out

i n the Theater before 6 September, was approved ky t h e end of t h e

month by the Xar Department.

It called f o r a Theater strength of

7CY7O
, OO at the end of 1945, including 363,000 occupation troops,
The rest were t h e close-out force and some service units f o r t h e
Mediterranean Theater.

The l s t , 3d, 9th, U d , and 78th I n f a n t r y

Divisions and the 1st and 4 t h Armred Divfsions were thereupon

designated as the occupation forces.

Six divisions were designated

as t h e cloae-out force and two a8 t h e s t r a t e g i c reserve.

The rest

were declared e l i g i b l e f o r discharge. (28)

c.

On 6 September t h e ;Jar Department announced plans for

t h e redeployment of officers.

Except f o r f i e l d grade o f f i c e r s , f o r

whon: t h e c r i t i c a l score was 100, there was not much difference

between t h e o f f i c e r c r i t i c a l score and t h a t for e n l i s t e d men. ( 2 9 )
d.

The shipping s i t u a t i o n was responsible f o r a c e r t a i n

mount of delay i n t h e September sailings.

DocQard s t r i k e s , t h e

r e t u r n of ships of other flags, miscalculation of loading and unlosding

ti-,

and bad weather were various causes of this delay.(30)

Nine

divisions were shipped out of t h e Theater and three, with two corps

headquarters, were inactivated in t h e Theater during September. (31)

Asserribly Area Command was a l s o i n a c t i v i t e d , i t s functions being taken
over by Cise Intermediate Section on 22 September.(32)

- 133 -

By t h e end

of September a t o t a l of 1,451,558 men had been shipped out of the

Theater, and the Theater strength was reduced t o 1,672,569.(33)

145.

October t o December.

a.

.kt t h e beginning of Cctober, e f f o r t s were cade t o c l e a r

up t h e backlog from t h e previous month and t o arrange t h a t a l l those

e l i g i b l e f o r redeployment i n t h a t m n t h be shipped in t h e i r proper
priority.

It was hoped t h a t all rnen with scores of 80 and above

could be shipped home in October, and all those with 70 and above in
November.

As t h e nonth advanced, however, it was seen t h a t t h e same

causes which brought September shippings below t h e i r quota would

prevent t h e l a g being made up in October.

When t h e Queen Elizabeth,

t h e A a u i t d a , and t h e equivalent i n troop space of t h e Queen Mars

had t o be returned t o Great Britain e a r l y in t h e month, a l l hope of
c l e a r i n g t h e men with 80 points and over i n t h a t month was lost.
The target had now t o be moved up t o the middle of November.

Moreover,

major comrmds continued t o report discoveries of high point men o r

units previously not accounted for.

Some relief was gained by t h e

use of warships f o r returning men f o r discharge.(3,!+) The methods

of redeploying t h e air forces had long @en causing dispute.

In this

month Theater Headquarters a t l a s t approved the plan submitted by

Headquarters, U.S.

Air Forces i n Europe, under which w i t s which

n five-point brackets were prepared

adjusted service r a t i n g scores i
by t h e Air Forces and then\ c a l l e d forward by Theater Headquarters i n

due course.

(35)

Seven divisions were redeployed complete in October. ( 3 6 )

- 134 -

Altogether 366,903 person: were shipped home, of whom 313,404 had

scores of

75 o r above o r were o f f i c e r s of above t h e then c r i t i c a l

score. (37)

Theater strength was then 1,317,328,

of whom 163,282

were enlisted men with 80 o r more points and o f f i c e r s with 75 or

more.

The scores of nearly 100,oOO were still unknown.(38)

b.

The m a i n event of t h e month of November was t h e opening

of t h e p o r t of Bremen f o r replacements and t h e arrival of t h e f i r s t

November was also the month i n which t h e

replacements there.(39)

l a r g e s t numbers v e r e sent home, 420,795 being shipped, of whom

400,058 mere for redeployment.(40)

In December t h e Y J a r Department

announced t h a t for t h a t month l e s s shipping would be available t o

t h e European Theater.

All t h e warships and twenty-one o t h e r vessels

were taken from t h e Theater allotment.(l+l.)

d i v i s i o n s l e f t t h e Theater.(@)

During t h e month seven

The rate was slower than in t h e

previous month, partly because another month l i k e Xovember would have

reduced Theater s t r e n g t h below w h a t was required at t h e time, and
p a r t l y because even t h e lowered quota was not met owing t o stormy
weather.

The number shipped during December was 327,272, of whom

303,689 were f o r redeployment.(43)

was 60.

The c r i t i c a l score a t this tihe

Nearly 30,000 e n l i s t e d men of t h e t o t a l had scores of 73

o r above.(&)

By t h e end of 1945 over two and a h a l f million men-

81 percent of t h e Theater strength--had been redeployed t o one or

another destination. (45)

- 135 -

l.46,

Redeployment Plans f o r

1946,

In November t h e Yiar Department asked f o r t h e views of t h e

European Theater on two plans f o r redeployment f o r the first half of

1946. One was t o use

a l l t h e shipping t h a t could be a l l o t t e d t o

bring t h e Theater's strength down t o t h e occupational troop basis as

soon as possible.

The other was t o be more gradual, but s t i l l t o

phase-out troops as quickly as was consistent with the other functions

of t h e Theater.(k6)

Obviously, i f t h e r e was t o be any d i f f e r e n c e

between these, t h e first one vmuld result i n functions other than

The Theater therefore supported t h e

.redeployment being neglected.

second, mentioning i n p a r t i c u l a r that use of a l a r g e p a r t of t h e

occupation force in support of t h e close-out force while it was
being redeployed would draw t o heavily on t h e strenkth of t h e former.
Furthermore, t h i s would happen in February and Larch, when a large
p a r t of t h e occupation force would be withdrawn from operational
d u t i e s t o be t r a i n e d as constabulary units.

It was suggested,

therefore, that as f a r as possible t h e close-out force should redeploy

i t s e l f , one t w e l f t h of it being moved in each of t h e first t h r e e months

of 1946 and one f o u r t h in each of t h e next three.(47)

I n December

t h e strengths of t h e close-out force and t h e occupation force, which

had before been f i x e d a t 344,000 and 363,000, respectively, were
reduced t o 316,000 and 300,000.

T h i s reduced t h e authorized Theater

strength a t t h e end of 1945 from 707,000 t o 616,000.

strengLh on 1 January 1946 was 622,789.(48)

- 136 -

The a c t u a l

The f i n a l shipping

schedule published e a r l y in 1946 showed t h a t t h e close-out force was

t o be shipped out. in s i x approximately equal monthly loads.

It also

showed 15,000 miscellaneous shipnents, and shipments of high point

men f o r vrhox replacements had arrived from t h e United S t a t e s t o t h e
number of 34,500 i n January and approximately 20,000 a month
thereafter. (49)

U+?. The United S t a t e s OccuRied .ireas.

The f i n a l withdrawal of United S t a t e s forces from t h e other
occupied zones and of a l l other Allied forces fron; t h e United S t a t e s
Zone was reported t o be complete on 17 July 1945.(50)

Plans had

been made f o r t h e reduction by three-quarters of t h e United S t a t e s

troop stren&h in Czechoslovakia.(51)

The main United S t a t e s area

o f Germany was divided i n t o two K i l i t a r y Districts, the Nestern

consisting of Yk-ttemberg-Baden and Grosshessen, occupied by t h e
Seventh U.S.

iimy.(52)

Army, and t h e Eastern, Bavaria, by t h e T h i r d U.S.

The United S t a t e s Zone of -4ustria was already established,

and during t h i s six-month period no a l t e r a t i o n took place i n i t s

organization, except f o r t i e move of Zonal Fieadquarters t o Vienna

in October. (53)

- 137 -

U+8* Successive iieductions.

The a l t e r a t i o n s in t h e projected occupational troop b a s i s
t h a t took place in t h e suimer and f d l of 1945 were completely
unrelated t o t h e organization i n t h e Theater at t h e time.

Sone

reductions i n commitments and i n a c t i v a t i o n s of major headquarters,

however, were of significance in d e t e r d n i n g t h e future pattern.
The f i r s t of these was the inactivation of 12th Axmy Group on

1 August.(54)

I n September t h e withdrawal from Czechoslovakia began.

This was not completed u n t i l 10 Decmber.(55)

Early in October,

United S t a t e s troops began t o withdraw from :iomay.(56)

On 1 November

the first s y s t e m t i c action tuxard insuring t h a t the forces rem%%

after t h e close of redeployment would be i n t h e most advantageous

employment possible was taken when t h e Theater Gl Division s e t a
c e i l i n g strength on all s t a f f divisions and i a o r commands.

Cne

month later t h i s c e i l i n g w a s declared e f f e c t i v e , and a l l coirJaands

were ordered t o reduce t h e i r strength t o t h e established c e i l i n g o r
t o f u r n i s h full j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e excess.(57)

On 9 December 1945

most of t h e t e r r i t o r y i n t h e Breinen Enclave ivas restored t o t h e

B r i t i s h Zone.(58)

On 18 December t h e Theater Cornmander announced t h e

basis of t h e occupation force f o r the second half of 1946, when f o r

t h e first time the occupation would be t h e sole task of t h e forces

i n t h e Theater.

1946.

T h e t a r g e t of 3OO,OOO was t o be reached by 1 July

One army, t h r e e divisions, and a constabulary force of

38,000 w a s t o be t h e s e c u r i t y force f o r t h e whole United S t a t e s

.. 138 -

occupied areas, including Austria.

Theater Service Forces and the

base sections under it were t o be i n a c t i v a t e d by

15 'Arch 1946.

Unnecessary a c t i v i t i e s were t o be cut out, and necessary ones closely

reviewed t o insure t h a t no personnel savings were neglected.(59)

U+Y. Overstrength, Replacements, and Beinforcements.

a.

Several reasons combined t o cause t h e Theater t o r e l y on

overstrength, on units surplus t o t h e t a b l e of organization, and on

grades and r a t i n g s surplus t o the t a b l e of organization of t h e i r
u n i t s during the last half of 1945: no reinforcements on any s c a l e
could be expected a t this tirne;(60)

t h e point system of redeployment

made t h e whole s i t u a t i o n so f l u i d t h a t it was n o t f e a s i b l e a t t h e

and t a s k s had t o be performed

t h e t o b u i l d up new permanent units;

i n t h e Theater f o r which t h e r e was no organization, and in many cases

no precedent.

Considerable l a t i t u d e was allowed i n t h e Theater i n

t h e use o f overstrength and of grades surplus t o t a b l e s of organization,

but the policy t h a t permitted this emphasized t h a t t h e use of these
must be neither permanent nor unlimited.(61)

Even so, by July 1945

surplus grades had reached t h e number o f 54,000.

It was suggested

by t h e Yar Department t h a t a t o t a l of 38,000 of these might eventually

be allowed in t h e occugation forces.

I n order t o pare down require-

ments as far as possible, commands were i n s t r u c t e d t o make t h e

mini" use of c i v i l i a n help of a l l kinds.(62)

It was a long time,

however, before any reduction i n overstrength could be made.

Cn

8 October the Theater El Division requested a t o t a l of over 70,oOO

- 139 -

grades.(63)

The plan now submitted called f o r a steady monthly

reduction i n surplus grades in the Theater, and the Carget of 38,OOO

seemed not t o be too d i f f i c u l t .

After screening, t h e surplus grades

were reduced t o a t o t a l of 52,760, and this t o t a l was approved.(64)

On 30 iqovember 27,178 per,nanent surplus grades were approved. (65)
b.

The most urgent demand f o r replacements i n this period

was t h a t which occurred i n August f o r Quarterraster Corps officers.

Reassigments had been numerous, and tasks were heavy.

The 3ar

Department was approached, but replied t h a t any such replacements

must be found within the Theater,(66)

The f i r s t postwar replacements

promised t h e Theater were eq0,oOO who were t o a r r i v e between 1 October

1945 and

1 July 1946.(67)

As e a r l y a s 3 October t h e Theater

requisitioned 135,000 of these, asking f o r s p e c i a l i s t s , and making

t h e apecial request t h a t they should arrive before t h e end o f

January 1946. (68) The Ylar Department promised the replacements but
could not gu&antee t h e i r arrival by t h e date specified.(@)

At the

end of the year, though some replacements had arrived, t h e schedule

had not nearly been met.(70)

150.

S u i t a b i l i t y of Arrivals.
a.

Under these circumstances t h e correct placing of

reinforcements, not o n l y in t h e corrmLand where they were wst wanted,

but a l s o i n t h e job where they would do the most good, was an e s s e n t i a l
contribution t o t h e efficiency of the Theater.

But the s i z e of t h e

d r a f t s and t h e inadequacy of t h e i r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n t o military s k i l l s

- l40 -

before leaving t h e United S t a t e s caused more and more withdrawal from

this i d e a l , u n t i l finally, on 212 December, it was decided that
a l l o c a t i o n s t o major commands would be made by arm and service and
not by m i l i t a r y occupational specialty. (71)
b.

The Theater was n a t u r a l l y anxious t o know what standard

of t r a i n i n g could be expected of its replacernents.

request f o r this information,(72)

In r e p l y t o a

t h e War Department s t a t e d that

t h e f i r s t replacements might be ex9ected t o have seventeen weeks'

t r a i n i n g , but t h a t l a t e r ones were not likely t o have mre than basic
training. (73)

Theater Headquarters in r e p l y recommended t h a t t h e

reinforcements should be t r a i n e d in t h e United S t a t e s a t least u n t i l

1 July 1946, when some of t h e current Theater problems would have

been 30lved.(74)

No action, however, was taken on this recommendation.

Some specialist schools were started i n t h e Theater.

These were for

o f f i c e staff and t e l e t y p e operator categories, which were in s h o r t e s t

supply,(75) and they continued i n operation u n t i l t h e end of the
year, when t h e y were closed down f o r lack of s u i t a b l e students.(76)
The permanent Adjutant General's School, however, with a much smaller
monthly enrollment, assumed t h e t a s k of t r a i n i n g o f f i c e personnel

f o r t h e w h o l e Theater e a r l y i n t h e new year,(??)

C.

The whole system wqs complicated by t h e fact t h a t ,

with a rapid turn-over of personnel, a r a t h e r large proportion of

Theater strength at any given time consisted of m n who w e r e
i n e f f e c t i v e , e i t h e r because they were not y e t assigned or because

they had been removed from assignment f o r shipment home.

Commands

were forced t o withdraw a man f r o m his assignment a f o r t n i g h t before

his replacement arrived in t h e Theater;

when t h e replacement arrived,

it was another f o r t n i g h t before he could take up his duties;

but all

t h e time they were i n t h e Theater b o t h inen were carried on t h e Theater

stren&h.(78)

A t year's end it was reckoned that out of an o f f i c i a l

Theater strength of 616,000 no l e s s than 163,000 were ineffectives.

O f these 90,000 were normal ineffectives, such as men on leave, pass,
O f t h e rest,

and furlough, in confinement, o r i n t h e hospital.

25,000 were on reenlistment furlough or on r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , recuperation,

and recovery d e t a c ' m n t i n t h e United States;

23,000 were shortages

i n replacements f o r high-point men who had already l e f t ;

25,000 were i n t h e redeployment pipeline.

151.

and

(79)

The Police-Type Occupation Force.

The o r i g i n a l occupational troop basis of 363,000 was intended

t o be assigned as follows:
Headquarters and other m i l i t a r y overhead
Ground Forces (seven divisions)
Service Forces
Air Forces

38,000

144,ooO
103,OOo

78,ooo
363J000*

I n t h e l i g h t of experience i n t h e occupation, it w a s decided by

November 19.45 t h a t these forces were not all necessary.
t o be no likelihood o f a general armed uprising.

There seemed

Yhat resistance

t h e r e was consisted of individual a c t s of indiscipline, sabotage,

- 142 -

Under these circumstances, t h e plan was changed so t h a t

and crime.

thwogs were assigned as follows: (80)

Headquarters and other military overhead
Mobile combat forces (three divisions)
Service Forces
A i r Forces
S t a t e Constabulary

20,000

65,000
80,000
78,000
38.000

281,000

A single army headquarters was t o be responsible f o r t h e combat

forces in t h e main zones of k m w y and Austria,

In F r U f u r t and

i n t h e separate areas of Berlin, Bremen, and Vienna, there were

separate independent comnands. (81)

CIVILIAN FlBSO12JE?.,( 82)

152. TYPes of Civilians Employed in Europe in Late 194.

a.

Two methods of recruiting United States c i t i z e n s f o r

employment in t h e Theater were adopted.

!.!en i n t h e forces were

allowed t o obtain t h e i r discharge fro:, m i l i t a r y service i n t h e

Theater and retain t h e i s jobs o r be assigned t o similar jobs; others
were recruited in t h e Ynited States.(B3)

Xonen were not recruited

a t t h e beginning of tnis period except f o r s p e c i a l i s t s , but t h i s

policy was changed before t h e end of t h e year.(84)
b.

Allied and neutral c i v i l i a n s were recruited i n a l l

cases through agreements with t h e governments concerned.

Some of

these governments allowed only small quotas of t h e i r c i v i l i a n s t o

go abroad.(85)

- 143 -

C.

Displaced persons o r A l l i e d nationals recruited in

Gemany were expected t o be a f r u i t f u l source of c i v i l i a n labor.

In

t h e first months of t h e occupation t h e moveinent of displaced persons

was too rapid f o r them t o be of much use as labor.

Later, many of

those l e f t in the Theater because they would not accept r e p a t r i a t i o n

were employed.(86)

As workers, however, they were often f a r fmm

satisfactory.
d.

\hen once Gernnn c i v i l i a n s were authorized as employees,

they soon became t h e main source of labor.(Q)

153. Procurement Policy.

I n July 1945 a survey of all available c i v i l i a n labor was
made by Theater ileadquarters as an aid i n determining procurement
policy.

On the basis of this, it was decided that, although some

units had violated current policy and even international agreements

i n h i r i n g and moving t h e i r c i v i l i a n s , contracts should not be terminated

f o r t h i s reason, so t h a t t h e first p r i o r i t y for employment was f o r
c i v i l i a n s already employed on a contract basis.(88)

Next in p r i o r i t y

came s o l d i e r s discharged in t h e Theater, then s p e c i a l i s t s from the

United States, displaced persons, and indigenous c i v i l i a n s .

The

term s p e c i a l i s t s was f a i r l y r i g i d l y interpreted, and comparatively

few United States c i t i z e n s were recruited i n America a t this time.(89)

The hope that Headquarters could be manned e n t i r e l y by United S t a t e s

and indigenous c i v i l i a n s had t o be abandoned because of serious

shortages in c l e r i c a l staff.

I n September, therefore, some B r i t i s h

- 1wc -

women c l e r k s were moved t o Frankfurt.(SO)

were a l s o employed t h e r e soon a f t e r .

f o r employment were as follows:
personnel;

A t t h a t time t h e p r i o r i t i e s

a s c h a r g e d United S t a t e s inilitary

United S t a t e s c i v i l i a n s recruited in t h e Theater;

placed persons;
civilians;

Citizens of other nations

enemy and ex-enemy c i v i l i a n s ;

dis-

Allied and n e u t r a l

and United S t a t e s c i v i l i a n s r e c r u i t e d i n t h e United States.(91)

L i t t l e a l t e r a t i o n i n t h e character of t h e c i v i l i a n labor force occurred

a f t e r t h i s time.

154. Administration of Civilian Personnel.

The administration of c i v i l i a n s i n t h e Theater was t h e
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e Gl,

G 3 y 12-4,and G5 Divisions and of t h e

Adjutant General of Theater Headquarters;

t h e general staff divisions,

t h e Adjutant General, t h e Engineer Labor Procurement Office, t h e

General Purchasing Agent, and t h e M i l i t a r y Labor Service of Theater

Service Forces, and major commands.

i n Theater Headquarters:
Vision over a l l c i v i l i a n s ;
units;
and

Functions were divided as follows

t h e G-1 Division had g e n e r a policy super-'

G-3 had supervision over l a b o r service

G-4 w a s responsible f o r supplying t h e services of these units;

G5 had s p e c i a l supervision over working conditions f o r ex-enemy

civilians.

I n Theater Service Forces, E l and Glr duplicated t h e

functions of the same divisions i n "heater Headquarters;

the .Adjutant

General had t h e operative supervision over all t h e c i v i l i a n s i n t h e

comand concerned;

and t h e other staff divisions mentioned above

had charge of c e r t a i p s p e c i a l aspects of c i v i l i a n labor.

- 145 -

Uajor commands

had operative c o n t r o l over civilians employed locally; thus,

Headquarters Command controlled civilians employed i n Theater

Heqdquarters (92)

PELISONERS OF WAR

155.

Conditions of Employment of Prisoners o f !iar.

The conditions under which prisoners of war ,night be used

as labor were c l a r i f i e d i n July by a message from t h e Secretary of

State.

He wrote t h a t with t h e unconditional surrender Gernlany had

l o s t t h e r i g h t s of a belligerent power, and t h a t consequently t h e

provisions of the Geneva Convention no longer applied t o Gernian
prisoners of war in Allied hands.(93)

Xost of t h e Gernian prisoners

of war who were working f o r t h e United S t a t e s forces were organized

i n Labor Service Companies.

These were bodies of not l e s s than 250

men working under a Labor Supervision Company, each of which consisted

of a f a i r l y small nucleus of U.S.

A m y supervisory personnel.(%)

I n August 1945 t h e r e were a t o t a l o f 2,430 Labor Service Companies

i n t h e Theater.(%)

Another type of prisoner-of-war unit t h a t was

wodcing f o r t h e United S t a t e s forces was t h e disarmed enemy unit.

T h i s was a u n i t t h a t had surrendered complete and was working under

i t s old organization.

Conditions f o r t h e disarued enemy units were

as follows: they were broken down i n t o companysize units, except i n

- L$6 -

s p e c i a l cases;

GernLan f i e l d grade o f f i c e r s might not r e t a i n operational

camand except in s p e c i a l cases, thongh they might r e t a i n supply and

a d d n i s t r a t i v e duties;

u n i t designations and a l l i n s i g n i a

insignia of rank, were abolished;

, except

United S t a t e s personnel were

responsible f o r all supervision of t h e work;

and, i n s p i t e of t h e

policy described abbve, t h e members of t h e unit possessed t h e p r i v i l e g e s

of prisoners of war under t h e Geneva Conveiltion.(%)

One o f these

units, a Luftwaffe Signal Battalion, worked f o r t h e U.S.

Air Forces,

Europe , from June t o November 1945, without armed guards, and showed
outstanding d i s c i p l i n e and cooperation. (97)

156. S t a t i s t i c s .
Most of t h e labor units w o l k i n g f o r t h e United S t a t e s f o r c e s

i n t h e e a r l y postwar period were under t h e control of t h e Comiunications

Zone, and l a t e r under Theater Service Forces.

The Communications Zone

and i t s successor kept complete s t a t i s t i c s of numbers of prisoners held

and numbers working.

A t V-E Day, i n a t o t a l of

280,937 were a t work.(98)

1,545,6&

prisoners,

The peak of prisoner-of-war l a b o r was

reached a t t h e end of August, when 491,442 prisonere were working out

of a t o t a l i n t h e Comlunications Zone of

716,568.

of a t o t a l of 535,023, workers nurcbered 331,521.(99)

- 147 -

On 29 December 1945,

157. General Develowents

during t h e F i r s t H a l f of

1946.

Tne f i r s t half of 1946 saw a steady coritinuation of t h e

process of reduction in i n s t a l l a t i o n s and personnel i n t h e European
Theater.

I n both t h e f i e l d f o r c e s and m i l i t a r y government, e f f o r t s

t o a t t a i n t h e same objectives of simplification and e c o n o q resulted

i n increasing efficiency u n t i l , by 30 June 1946, a streamlined

organization had been evolved f r o m t h e %ore complicated and unwieldy
one that had been i n operation on V-j2 Day.(l)

158.

Termination of t h e S i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t s .
On 2 January 1946 t h e Eastern and L'estern S l i t a r y D i s t r i c t s

ceased t o function, and t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s were redesignated as Third

and Seventh U.S.

Arqy Areas.(2)

As t h e i r respective headquarters

continued t o function, t h e elimination of t h e D i s t r i c t s brought few

changes i n operations, except as regards m i l i t a r y governaent supervision.

- 148 -

159. Reorganization on t h e Comand Level.

Considerable change occurred, however, on t h e major command
level.
a.

The Theater Motor Transport Service, EZlitary Railway

Service, and Theater Inland :';atexways Transport Service were discontinued

1 January. (3 )

b.

Continental Base Section, which had been formed a t Reims,

France., on 10 December

1945, moved on 3 January t o Bad f?auhe%n,

Germany, where it was combined with Advanced Section,(4) and became

operational on 15 January
C.

1945. (5)

On 15 January 1946, Western Base Section was formed i n

P a r i s t o t a k e over t h e f u i c t i o n s previously performed by Headquarters,

Theater Service Forces, European Theater (Kear), Seine and Oise
Sections, and t h e USFET Eission t o France.(6)
d.

Delta Base Section, t h e

idain

function of which had been

t h e redeployment o f personnel, first t o t h e Pacific and later t o t h e

United S t a t e s , was inactivated on 22 January 1946,(7) since t h e peak
of redeployment had been passed.

e.

The Ground Forces Iceinforceinent Command. was discontinued

on 31 January 1946, and t h e Ground Forces Reinforcement Coordinating

Group was established a t LLarburg, Gemany. ( 8 )
f.

On 1 February 1946, Hungary and ,%"nia

were incorporated

i n t h e European Theater,(9) and on 1 June 'Jest African Distjjict passed

t o European Theater control.

- ut9 -

g,

On 1 5 February Western Base Section was enlarged by t h e

addition of two new subordinate commands, Chanor Base Section and

London Area Office, both of which w e r e relieved of assignment t o

Headquarters, Theater Service Forces.(10)

A few days l a t e r , on

20 February 1946, Chanor Base Section was discontinued and i t s functions

were transferred t o 'iestern Base Section.(ll)

h.

One of t h e two remaining armies, t h e Seventh, was

inactivated on 31 hiarch 1946, leaving the Third Army t o serve as t h e

occupation army.(U)

Personnel of the Seventh A r r q was reassigned

e i t h e r t o t h e Third ;irnly o r t o the United S t a t e s Constabulary.

i. Bre,men Port Command, which had been assigned t o Continental

Base Section on 1 Uarch 1946,(13) was discontinued on 15 April,(14)
a f t e r which date t h e 17th Major P o r t was the main administrative
headquarters f o r t h e Bremen-Bremerhaven area,

160.

Inactivation of Theater Service Forces.

These and other measures were directed toward the final

e l b i n a t i o n of Theater Service Forces, European Theater.

On 1 February

1946 t h e Theater Chiefs of Claims, Special Services, and Information

and Edncation, and t h e Theater Chief Chaplain, Fiscal Director, and
Provost Uarshal were designated special s t a f f o f f i c e r s on t h e special
s t a f f of the Theater Commander.(15)

On 28 February 1946 the Theater

Signal Communications Service was assigned t o Theater Headquarters,

(16)

and the following special s t a f f o f f i c e r s were assigned t o the Theater

Commander's special staff: the chiefs of A m y &change Service and

- 150 -

Chemical llarfare Service, t h e Chief Surgeon, Chief Engineer, Chief

Cuartermaster, Chief Ordnance Officer, and Chief Signal Officer. (17)

The final s t e p came w i t h the inactivation of Headquarters, Theater

Service Forces, European Theater, on 28 February 1946.(18)

161. Naval Command in t h e European Theater.

a.

On 1Xay 1946, the headquarters of U.S.

Naval Forces,

Gemany, was s h i f t e d t o Bremerhaven, a s m a l l l i a i s o n group being

maintained a t Theater Headquarters i n Frankfurt.

The naval command

On V-E Day

had a l s o been giving through a process of consolidation.

the U S . Naval Forces, 3urope, comprised U S . Naval Forces, France;

U.S. Group Control Council, Naval Division;

Gemany, which i n turn included U.S.

Naval Ports and Bases, Germany;

Bremerhaven and Bremn.
the

ArrrEy

Naval Forces,

and t h e U.S.

Navy, Southwest Cerr~lany; U S .

and U.S. Naval Advanced Bases,

On 31 Lay 174.5 an agreement was signed between

and the Navy f o r t h e orderly operation of p o h s in Europe.(l9)

On 10 November t h e U.S.

i'orts and Bases, Germany and the U.S.

Fad

Advanced Bases, Bremerhaven and Bre:nen, were decomnissioned and their

a c t i v i t i e s consolidated in the U.S.
December, U.S.

Advanced Base, :,-eserRiver.

In

!!rival Forces, France, was decommissioned and its

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s transferred t o the Commander of Naval Forces, G e r r . ~ ~ ,

v;ith a l i a i s o n p u p remaining i n Paris.

The Advanced Base a t Le Havre

continued t o function as a subordinate a c t i v i t y of U.S.

Naval Forces,

Gemany, u n t i l 10 July, 1946, when it was decomnissioned.

Navy, Southwest Germany, was nev0r commissioned.

- 151 -

The U.S.

The naval elements

of t h e U.S.

Group Control Council, consisting of t h e Disarmament and

t h e Demobilization Units, were subsequently redesignated the Naval

Adviser, Office of KLlitary Government f o r &raany (U.S.),

This included the Naval Division

U.S. Kember, T r i p a r t i t e Commission.

of t h e Allied Commission f o r Austria;
Uission, Potsdam;

162.

and t h e

the U.S. Naval Yember, U i t a r y

and t h e Naval T e c ' d c a l G n i t , Europe.(20)

Headquarters Level.

In t h e development of military government policies f o r t h e

United S t a t e s Zone, t h e Office of Military Government for Ger(U.S.)

had t o coordinate with the staff of t h e Theater Commander and,

f o r supervision of the United S t a t e s element of t h e Berlin Kommandatura,

with t h a t of t h e Deputy U l i t a r y Governor.
l i a i s o n with the U.S.

It had also t o maintain

Group Control Council for Austria.

Prior t o

1 April Efilitary Government maintained personnel and agencies i n both

Berlin and Frankfurt.

Early i n 1946, however, i t was decided t o

consolidate a l l military government functions i n Berlin, leaving

only a small G5 Division in Theater Beadquarters.

On 1 h p r i l t h e

E 5 Division of Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater

reestablished, (21) with the following functions:

was

t o inform and

advise t h e Theater Connnander on military government matters as they

152

affected t h e occupation forces;

t o coordinate r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and

a c t i v i t i e s of t h e f i e l d f o r c e s with m i l i t a r y government agencies and

activities;

t o maintain l i a i s o n with t h e Office of U l i t a r g Government.

f o r Germany (U.S.)
Adiinistration;

aid with t h e United Sations Relief and Rehabilitation

t c supervise t h e control and care of displaced persons;

and t o conduct C i v i l Affairs fuatters outside t h e occupied countries.

The organization of the new G5 Division comprised a P l a x and

Coordination Branch, Economic Affairs Branch, Government Affairs
Branch, Supply Branch

, and Displaced Persons Branch,

with Information

and Administration Branches functioning as p a r t of t h e Executive's

Office.

B rear echelon of m i l i t a r y government o f f i c e s vias a l s o

maintained a t Frankrurt, attached t o Theater Headquarters f o r

administration and supply.(22)

163. Land Level.

a.

Development of t h e Land Offices of I S l i t a r y Civerninent.

I 5 t h t h e o f f i c i a l confinnation of t h e Eastern ikilitary

District on 12 ,mgust 1945, t h e o f f i c i a l designation of t h e G5

Section of Third kmy becane t h e Cffice of :Slitary Goverrment f o r
Bavaria, and i t was consolidated by t h e end of September with the
Regional Detachment X-201. (23) The 3d Lilitary Government P c e e e n t

was assigned t o Headquarters, Zastern LXLitary D i s t r i c t , i n September,

Personnel procedures were simplified as a l l i d l i t a r g goverment
personnel in Bavaria was now under t h e d i r e c t control of the D i s t r i c t
Yeadquarters.

I n Hestern f i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t , t h e reorganization of

- 153 -

(a)

t h e E 5 Section of Seventh Army had continued from August t o October

1945, and t h e Assistant Chief of S t a f f , G5, was placed on Deputy

Chief of S t a f f l e v e l and became responsible t o t h e a r q commander f o r
a l l m i l i t a r y government within t h e Efilitary D i s t r i c t .

The e n t i r e

staff of t h e headquarters was t o assist in t h e m i l i t a r y government

of the District. (25)
b.

Increase of Responsibility.
From 1 January 19.46, t h e three Offices of f i l i t a r y

Government f o r Bavaria, :!Urttemberg-aaden,

and Grosshessen each became

an independent command under i t s respective d i r e c t o r , who vias t o report

d i r e c t l y t o t h e Cornmanding General, U.S.

Forces, European Theater.

A l l comxmd and supervisory powers passed from t h e commanding generals

of Eastern and iiestern i 3 l i t a r y D i s t r i c t s .

They retained general

court-martial j u r i s d i c t i o n and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r supply and administrative

support,(26) and a l s o t h e i r previous functions and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s in
connection with security, prisoners of war, disarmament, and displaced
persons.

On t h e redesignation of t h e U i t a r y Districts i n January

as t h e Third and Seventh U.S.

Axmy Areas, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p previously

maintained between military government and t h e Ulitary Districts

continued between m i l i t a r y g o v e m e n t and t h e army areas.
C.

(2")

Revision of Relationship.
I n February 1946 t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p was revised, and c e r t a i n

functions connected with redeployment and t r a v e l outside t h e occupied

Zone, previously a s s i a e d t o the Land d i r e c t o r s , were r e a l l o t t e d t o

- 154 -

t h e a r e a commanders o r t o t h e Theater.(26)

I n June 1946, by which

time Third Army had been assigned r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e whole United

~
Berlin, and
States-occupied a r e a of Germany except t h Bremen,
Frankfurt areas, t h e G 5 Section was reestablished, t o exercise supervision and control over matters pertaining t o displaced persons and

C i v i l Affairs and t o maintain l i a i s o n with military government

officials.(29)

The Section was organized i n t h r e e branches:

administration, m i l i t a r y government, and displaced aersons.

d.

Office of Eilitary Government (U.S. Zone).

On 1 April 1946 t h e Office o f Military Government

(U.S.

Zone) was i n a c t i v a t e d and i t s functions were r e d i s t r i b u t e d

between t h e Office 'of L Y l i t a r y Government f o r

t h e new

G e r n l a ~(U.S.)

and

G 5 Division of Theater Headquarters.(30)

164. %elations between t h e Field Forces and t h e Office of

mlitary Government f o r Germans ( U.S.
a.

1.

Recommendations regarding d e t a i l s of staff coordination

between t h e Office of K i l i t a r y Government f o r Germany (U.S.)

and t h e

E 5 Division of Theater Headquarters were made by t h e Assistant Chief

of S t a f f , G-5, t o t h e Chief of S t a f f i n April

1946 and were approved

i n June. (31)
b.

I n t h e f i e l d , a similar tendency was seen toward

d e f i n i t i o n of t h e r e l a t i o n between t a c t i c a l troops and m i l i t a r y

government.

I n iiay 1946 provisions were made f o r t h e conmanding

o f f i c e r s of a l l t a c t i c a l and service trocps t o report the location

- 155 -

and extent of t h e i r u n i t s t o t h e m i l i t a r y govermfient detachrne~itsin

t h e Landkreis.

P a r t i c u l a r l y c l o s e coordination was t o be m i i i t a i n e d

i r i t h e adi2mistration of displaced .persons.

Confemnces were t o be

held between tine various military goverllment o f f i c e s and o t h e r

occupational units. (32)

165

The Cutlook f o r 1946.

On 1 Januanj 1946 t h e allotted sLren&h of t h e Theater was

616,000 and t h e a c t u a l s t r e n g t h 622,789. (34)

Shipping capacity

s u f z i c i e n t t o trans-nort an extra 20,000 :nen t o t h e United S t a t e s had

been a l l o t t e d f o r January t o take c a r e of t h e backlog and expected
losses,

Exclusive of these 20,900 men, t h e average monthly l i f t f o r

the first six nonths of 1946 vias estimated a t 90,150.(35)

This rneant

t h a t 238,000 nen must e n t e r t h e Theater by 1 July 1946 i f the

occupational troop basis of 3C0,oOO was t o be f i l l e d .

O f these,

90,000 m u l d be men r e t u r n i n g from reen1ist:iient furlough;

recuperation, and recovepj;

United States.(36:

A ma-@

rest,

arid o t h e r temporary absence i n t i e

of about 14,000 rxn was allowed against

wexpected shipping shortages or delays;

were expected. (37;

- 156 -

so 135,WO replacements

166, The January Distunbance s

T h i s program, and e s p e c i a l l y t h e p a r t of it which cut the

monthly shipments fro:ii a peak of 4O0,OOO t o 90,000, did not appeal
t o t h e troops i n t h e Theater.

They f e l t t h a t they were forgotten,

an a t t i t u d e lihich was not helped b y t h e news on 6 January 1946 t h a t

t h e r e would b e no more redeployment on a point b a s i s and t h a t nen
with 50 points would s t i l l have t h r e e months t o serve i n t h e Theater.(38)
The explanation f o r t h i s order was t h a t t h e r e w e r e no replacernents.(39)
l h o other press r e l e a s e s served t o i n t e n s i f y t h e feelring and t o cause

it t o f i n d voice.

One t o l d t h a t war brides were being snipped t o t h e

United States, t h e other that open demonstrations i n t h e P a c i f i c

Theater had been e f f e c t i v e in g e t t i n g men with 50 points sent home
f r o a t h a t Theater.(&O)

"he e f f e c t of these r e l e a s e s was that

demonstrations began i n t h e European Theater, too.

I n Paris, London,

Frankfurt, and i n other p a r t s of Gemany crowds o f soldiers gathered

and marched, o r shouted slogans.
who f e l t t h a t t h e meetin;s

Cn t h e direction o f General LcNarney,

were tne r e s u l t of t h e f a i l u r e of t h e

Theater arid t h e m j o r comands t o explain t h e t r n e f a c t s of t n e case,

no action was taken t o break up t h e meetings.

.it t n i s moment the

Jar L'epartment announced t h a t t h e demooilization pro&i-ax was t o be

revised.(L+l)

For the tirile being t h i s had no e f f e c t , but on January 13,

when t h e meetings had been going on sporadically f o r f i v e days,

GeneralILcNarney i n a press interview asked t h a t t h e ineetings be
discontinued i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y had served their purpose,(42)

- 157 -

The same day an intensive p u b l i c i t y progrard was law-ched t o b r i n g horne

t o t h e minds of t h e occupation f o r c e s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e vias at least
sone reason f o r keeping thein

167.

in Europe.(43)

The New E l a n and Its Effects.

The new Yar Jepartment demobilization plan kept t h e o l d

point system, but speeded u? t h e pace of r e l e a s e s under i t s povisions.

It a l s o i n t r d u c e d a sciiexe bihereby men could be released on length of

service alone.(4lb)

On t h l s basis i t was e s t h a t e d

points would be on t h e i r way home by mid-rebruar;.;

xith

53

4.0 p o i n t s

p o i n t s or

and so on

t h r a e and a half yearst service by t h e end of the nlonth;

dom to

55

t h a t I.;en v;ith

o r two years service by t h e end of Julle.(45:

r e s u l t of t h i s , all unit shipping dates were advanced.

-I

(is a

nevi shipping

plru? was devised which would concentrate about f o u r - f i f t h s of t h e

six-month l i f t over t h e f i r s t four months. (46)

163.

GutShiplieents i n t h e Xrst S i x Lonths of 1946.

Shipping was not a scarce f a c i l i t y i n t h i s period.

The

,;ar Departrrient sent i v h t i t tnocldit f i t , and would not cut a l l o c a t i o n s

even ivhen re3uested t o do so.

The Theater a u t h o r i t i e s reporteJ t h a t

overloading of vessels resulted i n an excess l e f t .

To a l l e v i a t e

this s i t u a t i o n , t h e ;,ar Lepartuient d i r e c t e d t h a t s:lips might be

uiderloaded. (47)

I n J a n u a r j shiprn-ts

exceeded even t h e increased

e s t i n a t e , 161,310 troops beinz s h i p 1 ~ 3out. (LE) T i l i s included tLe

accumulation from t h e previous y e a r , over 10,000 xen vho were nct

- 15s -

being redeployed, and about 40,000 who had been intended f o r l a t e r

shipment.(l,9)

13,000, but

In 7ebruary it

oyiiric

to

hoped t o b e t t e r t h e tarLet by

IELS

V ~ K ~ G Ucauses
S

nbo&t 10,000 cf tliese xere s t i l l

in the Theater a t t h e etid o f t h e iiioiith.(51?)

In Larch t h e e s t L i ; , a t e

was n@n exceeded, and over l3C,OOO were shipped out.

r.icr,tths t o t a l silipping xas al:,ost

In these three

400,000, irtcluding 370,000 redeployIn t h e next

rnent gersonnel., instead of an expected 327,000.(51)

t h r e e months ShipLents out of t h e Theater again clrop7ed off, and

only

169,345 aen for redeployment s a i l e d in t h e whole period.

This

ciid not grevent, hoxever, t a r L e t s f o r r e p a t r i a t i n g iller? due home on

accoilnt of point score and lengt!i of service from b e b g :.;et.(52)

169. Close o f Ennecessary F o r t I n s t a l l a t i o c s .

',litn t h e lessening of t h e hozeviard flow, it becxne possible

i n t h e early P a r t

oIr

1946 t o close

sone of t h e stag5ng and p o r t

i n s t a l l a t i o n s t h a t were serving troops on t;ieir. way hone.

I n January

and February all t h e loc,?l coi;~.landsin France were cc..:l%r;ed a s

:&stern Base jection, ai6 a t about tile sane t h e t h e irilportwce of

tile i n t e m e d i a t e stagilig areas was considerably reduced. by t h e transfer
of t h e processing of d1 but major w i t s t o the port stagink areas.(fjj)

I n January t h e lmrt of LarseLLle was closed.(54)

h t w e r p vias closed

a t t h e en6 of :Arch, ard Le !<awe a t t h e end of Juic.

Henceforth all

shipnients f r o x the CoRtinent were t c be frol;i Cremerhaven. (55)

- 159 -

170.

General Survey of t h e Redeployment Scheme.

From t h e point of view of t h e 2wchanics of t h e redeployment

scheme, t h e requirements o f t h e Tneater and t h e ..'iar Department, and

t h e neasures t h a t were taken t o meet then;, t h e propaIr1 was a conplete
success.

The nien were shipped out, slowly a t f i r s t , then with more

and more speed, until shortage of nen checked t h e operation.

171.

Theater Strength TarRets.

On 18 January

1946 t h e Theeter Corm"ler

su;;gested t h z t

by 1 J u l y 1947 t h e Theater strength should be 200,000, including a

permanent Air Forces component of 43,000.

In r e p l y t h e Xar Departrtlent

set up t h e following series of t a r g e t s , all of uhich included 43,000

i n t h e -Xr Forces;

230,030 by 1 September 1946;

200,OOO by L January

1947; and 160,000 by 1 J u l y 1947.(56)

172.

S t r e n d h Control.
a.

On 8 January 19~6,General L-cNarnejr d i r e c t e d titat

vigorous action 3hoCl.d be taken t o reduce overstren,th

Theater strength as
tion.(57)

S G O ~as
~

and t o bring

possible aitlrin unit t a b l e s of organiza-

The authorized personnel had been 37,607 f o r 1 July 1J4b.

Careful pruning reduced t h e requirezents of u j o r coaiznds t o 17,811.

The s t a f f s of t h e newly authorized miLitary c o r m m i t i e s required

- 160 -

l4,389. The new f i g u r e , therefore, stood a t

32,ZCO.

This cut d i d

not satisfy Theater I!eadquarters, and a f u r t h e r d r a s t i c screening

An overstrel:&tli of 25,000 was

brought t h e f i g u r e dova t o &,035.

a l l o t t e d , t o give a c e r t a i n ,?largin f o r unanticipateci rec;uire;llents. (58)

On 25 IIay 1946 t h e Xar De?artr,ent granted an i n d e f i n i t e extension of
t h e t i n e l i m i t f o r ineeting t h e occupational t r o o p basis.(59)

On

30 June a c t u a l Iiieater strength was 342,264.(60)

b.

Theater.

Replacerl;ents continued t o be one of t n e probleriE of t h e

It has alleady been rrientioned t h a t t h e shortage o f reinforce-

ments held u_o t h e hor.ieward shipment of troops. (61)

of t h e Yar Depn,-t.;.ent,

shipments s t i l l f e l l .

Despite cooperation

I n February, however,

t h e L-ar 3 e p a r t : x c t anr,cucced t h a t 64,000 replacements would be in t h e

Theater by t h e er.d of t h e month, which would ,t.eet scheduled requirements.
Replacements t o t h e number of 26,000 were prorised f o r Larch. ( 6 2 )
The ;:Br Departmnt I s c o m i t n e n t t o supply 310,OOC
30 June

1946 was p r a c t i c a l l y

illet,

replacements by

and f u r t h e r a r r i v a l s were f o r e c a s t

at t h e r a t e of 10,oCC a ncnth. (63)

C.

The shortage of o f f i c e r s in t h e first h a l f of 1946

w%sp a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i o u s as res-nects i t s chaplains 2nd those with

l e g a l experience. (64)

I n general, t h e hezter vias s u f f e r i n g frorii a

shortage of about 26 .cement i n o f f i c e r strerigtii.

3 e F s were taken

t o spread t h i s shortage as e v e a j z s possible;(65)

out i t was riot

expected t h a t t h e s i t u a t i o n would be relieved Tor so.;e tir:!e a f t e r t h e

end of June.

- 161 -

d.

In contrast t o t h e r-tmy shortage problem, one problem

vias cawed by a surclus.

The t o t a l nmber of Negro erilLsted nen i n

t h e Theater &rev: far beyond the authorized proportion, 10 percent,

of t:ie occu>ational troop basis, and eventually beyond the cacacity
of t h e Theater t o a s s i s them.(66)

Tne ;;ar Dep~rt.,ientaFpeared t o

i'more requests not t o s h i p t o t h e Theater men who iiad elllisted f o r

three years f o r ar..s and services not authorized I I e s o troops in t h e
Theater.

A fevi such 1:ien were transferred t o t h e United States, but

l a t e r t h e policy of t h e I?ar 3epartmert w a s t o a s s i s theia, regardless

of t h e i r choice, i f they refused t o i:alie a secclnd cl:oice.(67)

%r

3 e p a r t x n t raised t h e authorized p e r c e n t q e of I.!e:ro

The

t r o o p s in

t h e Theater fro;;:13 t o 15,(68) and t h e Theater authorized f i r s t 10,

then 20, and f i n a l l y 50 percent overstren&:i i n :!egro Wts and
directed a11 these wiits t o carry a t l e a s t 40 percent overstrength. ( 6 9 )

I n addition, a YTegro F r o v i s i o n a l liifaritry ;ie&afit

alti-icugii there vias
t h e Theater.

lio

Cn 12

was activated, (70)

per ,ia:,ent authorization f o r :legi-o irZa1tr;r i n

&tie

134<>it

::as esti;tateci t::& n t t h e en2 of t h e

;iioonth there vro.dcl be -:n o v e ; . s t ~ e r l ~ ctjhf I k g o trocps o f 75 gercent.

3 e n this was represented t o the . w Yepart. .ent, t h e l a t t e r agreed

t o sliip no ::.ore I;c;:ro

troq:s t o t h e ??!ester, i;lille Theater iieadquarters

wxie-took t o p l a c e those urho uere alrea(4.ythere. :yl) ~ o o r ia f t e r tile

end o f June, .fLethoirswere eukiiorized f o r retuminL urmecessaqr ! ! e g o
;uiits a i d gersonnel t o t h e Uilited s t a t e s , and a t about tile s u e t h e

t h e ,;ar 3epartmni; suqjended i1e;;l.o e n l i s t :ent i n tile Ile,dcrr .mqy

and t h e proble;:, was well on t h e way t o solution.(72)

162

173. The Liquidztion and :..anpower Eoard. ('13)

The ';?leater Lic:uidation z-,d 1:anpower Soard xas established
on 14 Zariusry 19,!+6,(74) t o c m s i s t of s i x o r seven seiiior o f f i c e r s .

Its

:gj..ssijq w.3

t o report d i r c c t l y t o t h e Shier of Staff on progress

being ;:;a& in stren$h

refiuctions, t o i i&:a r.eco..i.,encint,iotis 9s t o how

these could be speeded up, m d t o .;dxs p e c i s l surveys as re:,uked

by t h e T!iestsr CO:::..LLIICC.,*

acd tile Gljief o f S t a f f .

..
chairlcienwere .aj. kn. ievan
a

:.. Allen and 3rig.

(75) Successive
k n . liI)-bQ- i. Loore.

. ' i c t i v i t i w of t h e 2oai.d durin; t h e fLrst s t < !:ionths of 1?1&6 included

the f o l l o i r i n ~ : a suxrey of t h e Ui:iteci S t a t e s troop re,:;uii*e.ients
i n the Criited 2@0,:~,
;shri.ch resulted i n t h e plissing-out of t n e

London ;:rea Bffice;

tei-s

Co.xi.ilad;

survey of the use nade of mporver i n iieadquar-

a, ret%-;! o f t h e value of t h e contiiiuati.on of t h e C-5

Dlvision of Theater i'eadcluarters as a separate e n t i t y ;

recorrc.,endations

f o r t h e assunlition by t h e lldjutant % n e r d ' s i3epartl,ierit of much of

t h e routine work then done by each of t h e s t a f f divisions; reconxentlations f o r closing t h e p o r t s of Le &wre and Llzrseille, .and t h e
replacenent de,oot a t Xamur;

and r survey of t h e mm;ower

requirei;ents

f o r tho comunities i n t h e Zone.

171~. Civilian Personnel.

L i t t l e change i n ! J r i o r l t i e s and procurcr.ient p o l i c i e s i n t h e

emnployrent of c i v i l i m s Cook p 1 x a duri:ig t n e f i r s t six inonths of 19Lk6.

I n larch, t h e adoption of a staniiard enpl0jTCr.t contract and t h e

Sontinental ,;age Scale f o r J X e d c i v i l i b n s put a l l 2ui.ooean c i v i l i a n s

163

except displaced persons elid ex-enerzies on t h e same footing. (76)

slic!it d i f f i c u l t y i n
xas removed

recra5tink civili;,is

:L

f o r service ic t h e Theater

i n -.-ay, v;nen t h e wewing of tile c i v i l i a n uniforiii wirich

had been hard t o & e t on t h e Continent, v&s ;.ia.de optional.

Various

attempts t o build up a r a t h e r l a r s e cadre of United S t a t e s c i v i l i a n s

i n t h e Zone hLd xet with c o : ! p r a t i v e faf.11x-e.

Cp t o ;.pi1 1546 only

351 Tioxen of the liomens .<rq Corps, iricludirlg f Ive o f f i c e r s , had

accepted c i v i l i a n jobs.

6 the

first six foliths of 1946, o n l y 170

.-!en were discharged t o accept jobs i n the Tneater.(76)

.:t the end

of June 3,330 c i v i l l a i s were oil r e q u i s i t i o n fro.;, the U! i t e d S t a t e s .

Cnlr

743

nad a r r i v e d since 1 January.(79)

An attan?t was therefore

rnndc i n Ju,e t o induce dependents l i v i n g i n t h e Zone to accept c l e r i c a l

and a c l : ~ n i s t r a t i v ejobs. (60)

I n t h e shine montn, r e c r u h . e r i t i n t h e

Jnited S t a t e s m s vri2eiied t o -include t y ! ) e s of jous less responsible

than those f o r uhich United S t a t e s c i v i l i a n s ??adIxeviously been
considered.(Gl)

2;r June, too, tile corTect civi.1 c e r r i c e grades had

been assigned

nearl:

t.0

all lositions. ( 8 2 ) The nu-nbers of

cr,& displaced persons eii$oyed

months.

&rlikvls

increased v a s t l y during t h e s e six

That of Ser:i;ans rose from lh9,OGO t o 262,730, and. t h z t of

displaced Fersons from 28,090 t o 69,460. (33)

175.

Prisoner-of-,far Labor.
a.

Early in 1946 f u r t h e r s t e p s were tr?keii t o reduce t h e

nurrioers of prisoners of war a t work, by dischargink then and a l l o x i n g

- 164 -

t3em t o accent work as c i v i l l a n s .

In January conmanders were

authorized t o reduce t h e number and stren$h

t o t!le rllin5,num t h a t

,is&

of l a b o r sei-vice unlts

be s u f f i c i e n t for the j o b t o which they

were assigned, t o replace by l o c a l c i v i l i a n s all units doing cormon

l a b o r , and t o discharge a l l prisoners resident outside t h e United

S t a t e s Zone ~ 1 1 0vjere i n a category f o r ivhich d.l.scharge was authorized,
provided that t h e y were illmediately reemployed as civilians.
Soma.nde:-s were further d i r e c t e d t o hand over t o t h e Provost ;arsiial
a l l p r i s o n e r s v ~ h obeca;;e surplus owing t o t h i s a c t i o n

, arid

t o report

progress i n dischzrging prisoners o f war each month tnereafter.(8L+)

Later, however, it was i<-,!:adeclea;. that, though this policy w a s t o be

m e t as f a r as possible, it w a s not t o be followed t o t h e point of

depriving t h e Theater of necessary unskilled labor.
l a b o r was used e s p e c i a l l y i n l i b e r a t e d countries.

prison&

Prisoners-of-war

out o f U3,OOO

expected t o be necessary f o r labor after 33 June 1946,

l06,OCO were f o r i;ork i n t h e Xestern 3ase Section arid its i n s t a l l a t i o n s .

It was s t i l l t h e p o l i c y t o cilscilarge all !;risoners as s o o : ~as t h e y
were no lancer required. (85)

To f a c i l i t a t e t h e discharge of :,risoners

of war dj-rcct t o t h e work t h e y would t&e up as c i v i l i a n s , major

were authorized t o set up m o b i l e disciiayge teams t o visit

co;;L;i~ds

instal.12tioris fro,r. wnicii it would be d i f f i c u l t t o s e n d imisoners t o

discharge c e n t e r s and discharge thein on tile spot, sa tixt t h e y could
?ass d i r e c t l y i n t o c i v i l i a n ezqjloyxeiit.

b.

(86)

it t h e beginning of the p a r , t h e iiulnber of p r i s o n e r s

- 165 -

of war working as labor units was 331,521.(87)

T h i s figure declined

steadily throughout the f i r s t six xonths of 1946. On 31 Lay it was

j u s t over 200,000,[88), and on 30 June it had been reduced t o

136,327. ( 89

166

Chapter VXXI
ACCOILPLISHMENTS OF THE 0CCUPATU)N

WLIClES

ACCOWLISHUElITS CF LUXTA3.Y GoVEBI;DENT

176. penasif ication.

High on the list of military government accomplishments cane

denazification.

In the f i r s t half of 1946, the process of denazifying

the German government and c i v i l administration i n the area occupied

by the United States was brought t o completion.

An o f f i c i a l

announcement t o this effect was aade on 20 June 1946.

Toward the

end of 1945, emphasis had already shifted t o the denazification of

economic l i f e and institutions other than the government and c i v i l
actministration.

In 1946 a large share of the responsibility f o r

denazification was shifted t o the &mans.

A
n important step i n the

assumption of this responsibility by the Germans was the enactment

on 5 Xarch 1946, by agreement among the three LCInder in the United

States Zone, of the Ceman law on denazification---significantly

167

entitled:

"The Law of IJational Liberation.''

TJnder this l a w , special

rerrLan denazificatio!i courts knowri as Spruchkamern iiere set up f o r

tlie t r i a l of a l l ?.embers of t h e Xazl Party other than norninal

participants.

Cn

14 June 1946 t h e responsi'Jility l o r a&Tinistering

denazificztion ..,as t u r n e l over t o tlieze German courts, rinile -XLitzr,,

Zoverfiicnt retained t h e fw:ctio.ls
rejl

o r t Lng

of observation, liaisori, and

.1

s,iien ail L;er.rrki:, courts were closed arid j u s t i c e wa6 x h i n i s t e r e d

exclusively i n ~5.1:
t a r j ~ovcrilirleritcourts, t h e irA c i v i l courts were

rsonened i n iugust 1945.

By 1 A p r i l 1916, 372 courts on a l l l e v e l s

were f u m t i o n h : i n t h e Linited S t a t e s h n e .

ill these c o u r t s had

been y r g e d of .!,LE::- J.:.5rersonnel and influences.

-'LSconfjckxce

i n t h e i r e f l i c l e r x y oiid p o l i t i c a l r e l i a b i l i t y increase6 , i.iore arid iiiore

t p e s of cases previously t r i e d

irl

ixi1itar:-

Loverruileni courts were

turned cver t o thelLi. 9 w i r i E t h e same :;ericd, progressive rer0r.x

w r e intro?.uccd i n ~C~i-mn
prlson n~ILinis'iraticiimc: the > e n d syste!:!s.
proi;rz.i.i o f s e p e g a t l o n of prismers by age, sex, tylie o f offerlse,

an?&le:i&il of senter.ce rras carried out.

: riso:; n o s p i t d s

f o r the

i n s a m and disezsed Tiere s e t asPcle frm t h e re2ulc;r systerli.

17:.

Elections.
Cne of t h e i,iost inportmt m i l i t a r y toverru,ierlt acilieveuent s

168

i n this period was t h e r e i n s t i t u t i o n of free e l e c t i o n s in Gemany.

The f i r s t was held on 20 January

1946 i n Grosshessen, when 83 percent

of the eligible e l e c t o r s voted f o r inanbers of t h e GerzeinZerClte.

Social Denocrats pollec! 3s p:.celit
2'j' percent, Indepenlients

Liberals 2 percont.(l)

Gf L i e

The

votes, S h r i s t i a n Democrats

24 percent, Coinmuniats 4 percent, and

This was followed a week l a t e r by a zone-wide

election on the Gsneinde level,(2) w h i l e in April and iay elections

f o r -5

councils and f o r W i n d 2 councils f o r t h e l a r g e r Gemeinden

were held throughout t h e zone, (3) with the Christian Democratic U,;ion
outstripping t h e other parties.(k)

The culmination came on 30 June,

with t h e zone-wide e l e c t i o n f o r delegates t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

assembly t o draft charters f o r t h e t h r e e U n d e r s t a t e s .

Of the eligible

e l e c t o r s 71 percent voted, and Christian Democrats again emerged as

t h e strongest party.(5)

179.

Labor Unions.

On l4 April 1946 authoriaation f o r t h e organization of German

labor unions on a state-wide basis in the United S t a t e s zone was
announced a t a conference of Military Governlent o f f i c i a l s and German
labor representatives i n Frankfurt. (6)

180.

Be_=rations.

a.

A t an i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference held i n F a r i s from 9

November t o 21 Decenber 1945, the representatives of eighteen nations

considered plans for t n e equitable d i s t r i b u t i o n of Gerrizan surplus assets.

- 169 -

agreemerit. was reached on t h e share i n t h e r e p a r a t i o n s t o be paid

by .?em.any t o t h e respective p a r t i c i p a t i n g nations.

it t h i s

conference an a&TLnis t r a t i v e agency, t h e I n t e r - A l i ec! Aeparations

Conference, was e s t a b l i s h e d t o make a l l o c a t i o n s o f reparztions t o
t h e nember nations.

'?'his agency prepared "The Elan f o r P,eparations

an? t h e Level of Fostwar & r a n Economy i n irccordance with t h e

B e r l i n Frotocol," whic5 was adopted by t h e Allied Control Couricil
f o r Gemany on 26 LIarch

1946.

The

iiuiiii

object of this plan was t o

b r i n g aboct t h e i r d u s t r i a l d i s a m m e n t of Gerinany and a t ' t h e same

t i s e t c guarantee t o Cerxany t h e retefition of s u f f i e i e n t inchstrial

capacity- f o r self-suppoi-t.
b.

I n acccrclmce r : i t h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n d . agree;:-ent on

reparations, t h e Vnited S t a t e s Xlikrj ,%vernwent began t o survey

47ern:an i n d u s t r y and t o iiErk f a c t o r i e s and establishments f o r d e s t r u c t i o n

o r f o r d i s m n t l i n ~a i d delivery t o o t h e r n a t i o m as recarations i n kind.

9
.;

1 July

1.946,sixty-nine war p l a i t s i n t h e Lnited S t a t e s Lone were

l i s t e d fc,r d e s t r u c t i o n o r d e m l i t i o n .

3 i s r a n t l i n g operations were

s t s r t e d on t h e p l a n t s a l l o c a t e d as advance r e . a r z t i o n s , and sor;:e

mac(r,lnery was delivered t o t n e Soviet linion.
3eputg I . i l i t a r j Covernor
reparations deliveries

On 26 :.ayStrneral Clay,

announced t h z t t h e United S t a t c s had stopped

frolii

i t s zone i n Germny, exce-ct f o r f a c t o r i e s

which hac! already been dlocctted, u n t i l a l l occupying poviers had

agreed t o put i n t o e f f e c t t h e Potsdaz decision on administering
G e r a n y as an econozic vihole.

- 170 -

181.

Restitutions.
The program for t h e r e s t i t u t i o n of a r t objects and other

valuable property looted by t h e Nazis in the countries t h a t they

conquered was s t i l l ' delayed i n t h e f i r s t half of 1946 by the f a i l u r e
of t h e different nations concerned t o agree upon

~n

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of

t h e broad d e f i n i t i o n of r e s t i t u t i o n contained i n t h e London Declaration

of 5 January 1943. I n t h e e a r l y months of 1946, e f f o r t s t o reach an

agreement were continued.

In the meantime, a program of returning

stolen property found in the United S t a t e s Zone w a s i n s t i t u t e d .

The

Offenbach Archival Depot, which opened i n Karch 1946, received more

than two million pieces of library material written in 35 languages.
A t t h e end of June no decision had yet been reached on t h e disposal
of some 403,000 pieces of t h i s l i t e r a t u r e .

By June 1946 Hungarian,

Greek, and Soviet Restitution Zissions were in t h e United S t a t e s Zone.

The property involved in 39 percent of t h e 1,823 claims f i l e d by t e n
countries had been p a r t i a l l y o r entirely Zocated, while Germans had
f i l e d 20,000 declarations of knowledge of the locztion of property,

17 percent of which had been processed.

France received an oil-cracking

plant, and the N e t h e r l a d s received 297 s t r e e t c a r s out of a t o t a l of

301 taken from t h a t country,

182.

Importation of Foodstuffs f o r the Gemm Population.

I n January 1946 t h e importation of foodstuffs from t h e United

S t a t e s f o r t h e r e l i e f of t h e G
e
m population was begun.

For t h e

supplies t o be inported i n t o Gemany t o prevent disease and unrest,

- 173 -

184.

EIovenent toward. a C i v i l i a n Cccupation.

It had long been assuned by t h e rifilita?:y a u t h o r i t i e s t h a t

t h e l i n e o f development Viodd be frorri a :.filLtaly occapation t o a
c i v i l i a n s u p e m i s o m occupation. .,t t h e t h i e of t h e surrender, t h e

number of Up-ited St:.tes c i t i z e n s employed i n t h e 5;uropem Theater was

srm,ll, m3 c m s i s t e d l a r g e l y of h i w j t r a i n e d tecic..-l

specialists.

The Theater p o l i c y p r o h i b i t i n , recruitll:.ent of ciVj.li2n personnel from

t h e Lone of t h e I n t e r i o r , except f o r ;ersoris possessing u n u s u ~ d
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , continued througnouk tlie surmer of

194.5.

The use

of d i s c h x g e d r!filitary personnel as c i v i l i a n eiiyloyees was i n i t i a t e d

i n July 1945, and from Septcnber t h e recruitment of c i v i l i a n employees

I n addition, c i v i l i a n employees

i n t h e United S t a t e s was authorized.

were r e c r u i t e d fro:?. t h e A l l i e d and n e u t r a l courkrics, a i d auong

displaced persons arid enemy nationals.

I n t h e first h a l f of

1946,

t h e number of c i v i l i a n exployees of t h e United S t a t e s f o r c e s for t h e

f i r s t t h e surpassed t h e n 5 l i t a r y s t r e n g t h of t h e Theater, as shown

i n t h e f olloviing t a b l e . ( 1 2 )

Lonth

Ci v 5 l i a n

174

Zli1itaq.j

185.

AKi-eeriieiit with United Eations Elelief and Zehabilitation

ii&mini st rat ion.

To t a k e t::e place of t h e previous azreeine;it betvieeri the

United F!ations 3 e l i e f and He!iabilit _:tion .L,&Lnistration and Supreme

Headquarters, an aFeenent was s i s e d i n Frankfurt on 19 ?ebruarj

1946 by

L a j . Gen. I!.

2. i3Ul1, Chief of S t a f f , on behalf of tile United

S t a t e s forces, and Lt. Gen. S i r Frederick ;.organ, Chief of the United

Kations ilelief and 2ehabilitation :idministration in Cer!:Bn;r. (13) The

~rmycontinued t o provide basic supplies f o r displaced persons i n t h e

Zone, but j o i n t .kw-;icLilrinistration panels were established t o coordinate
supply operations.

The ~ r m ygave sup,ole:ilental iliedical and dental care,

and agreed t o c o n s d t carip directors f i r s t

a r r e s t , o r detention o f displaced persons.
displaced persons

iri

iristances of search,

Tne idministration operated

centers, arranged f o r Lie participation o f voluntary

agencies i n the displaced persons programs, operated a c e n t r a l t r a c i n g

bureau irlaintained records, and a s s i s t e d i n planriitie f o r repatriation.

186.

Aerial Lapping Fmjcct.

The proiect lcnom as CAY1 JC:SS f o r t!ie a e r i a l r,~ip?ingof

Europe and t h e nortic e s t coast of ..frica was n e 3 r h g completion on

1 Zuly 19k6.

T:?is pro:ect

was planned. by t h e United S t z t e s and Great

? i k a i n , and f l i g h t s ircre s t a r t e d i n June 191k5. The .Lr ?orce was

d-

cimrged ibith t h e a e r i a l photol;rap?lic ncissions cud t h e Theater Chief

Tngineer

wit:i

inspection and acceptmce of t h e finished fib;.

not covered , pendinz

Countries

r.:ore favdrable internLticiia1 situation, were

175

t h e Soviet iinion, Soviet-occupied Seriaany, Jugoslavia, d b a n i a , Spain,

a d Port U Z ~ (14)
.

t o l e a v e t h c Sorltincnt o a i i c d froin Le ::awe on tile ienerr.1 Caethals

on 6 Larch

1946. L ? thc

e:d of

June 191-6, L,5,2G5 ; ~ n i isc;ileci ant1

applicatioiis had 'seen received f r c I~ a z additiciid. 15,67.(16)

Fi,cures

f o r si.ipi,icnts fro. the t:.ree base sections t,hrodgh 30 June 1946 are
sI;om

i n t h e folln-ititiz tdblC-. (17)

- 176 -

<

Base Section

,:dult s

Children

Totel

Uriited i.in:,clo..rl
.;estern Sase
Contine;.tal Case

28,297

lO,&?.Lk

32,723

Totals
1BC.

5,973

526

673
63

34,125

11,160

45.225

5,390

Occzpational Pl:2nnin:, dntl

.aCcO.

11

,lishents.

The iriost e x k x s i v e acliievcmnts of t;ie m i t e t i

i n the first h a l f of

of a

St3;tes forces

1946 were t h e successful t r m s i t i o f i t o dn

e s t a b l i s h e d o c c u p z t i o n forces, desi:Fed iclr

t h e buildingTu;

569

SystEiJ

lo~g
occuprtior?, and

of ;.Lilit.ary co:!wuiities i n t h e occupation

wet*s.

a.

F l z n i n p . Sesponsibili.ty.

Tile resAnonsj.bility f o r

planning y;as i n t h e hands of t h e Special O c c u p t i o n a l 1 laniiing Gowsd,

wilich vias organized on 1 9 Septe..her 1945

cl!airnlan.(18)

iiit:i

General 2 u l l a s

Tile zo;._i-ciP:ZS t o draw up pla,ris Tor 1ivinL Guarters,

r e c r e a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s 2nd services f o r occupation forces arid t h e i r

dependents i n accordance r ; i t h c e r t a i n basic stadarcis.
b.

Ero:Tess of iiiilnninL;.

assuriiptior,s lind seal =rived

a t lesst five yezrs;

that

at:

i!.Ost

3y 8 Cctobcr. c e r t s i n b a s k

t h a t t h e occu--aLionn o u l d extend f o r
o f t h e c o s t of ccnstruction and

re:iabilitai,ion was t o be borne b ; ~t h e Ger:.-ais as reparatioris;

that

t h e t r o o p s were t o be s t a t i o m d i n coqmct n i i l i t a r y i n s t a l l a t i o n s of

- 177 -

not l e s s than r e L i m n t a l s i z e , siinilar t o

XI^ posts;

that facilities

were t o be at l e a s t t h e equivalent of t h e best o f t h e former kriiian

-.rmy;

and t h 2 t

IXLX~UIQ

.irr.Gr i n s t a l l a t i o n s .

use v~ast o be .ride of e x i s t i n g fonlier C e r n a n

It was estimated t h a t so-ne 90,000 dependents of

officers aid enllsted

ilel1

would be brought t o Gurope durinz t h e

following year, and trans_nortation, housing, sciiocls, and merchandising

f a c i l i t i e s were t o be provided.

Surplus vehicles -(/ere t o be sold

t o nii1iti:r;i perso;z.cl f o r tlieir 2ersonal use, m d gasoline and o i l

made available.

S;. December, t e n t a t i v e locatioiis had been put forward

for t,he c o m u n i t i e s , and t h e cGn)i.landhl; general o f Theater Service

Forces !xd been rAzde responsible f o r t h e ?regaration of f u r t l i e r plans.
S c n e r d s co:;.;rLanc15n,g geographical areas were t o pla:: for t h e use of t h e
f a c i l i t i e s e x i s t b 5 i n co..litunities of tiieir areas, uici t o submit t h e i r
reports a d estil.iates by 20 January 1946. C.n suomission of t h e Theater

plan, hoviever, t h e ..ar Depart:,iel-rt s t a t e d that no coi:struction,

either

t e q o r a r y o r -,erl.ianent, was t o be autiicri zed. (13)

c.

!IiCh p r i o r i t y was given, i n t h i s plannkig, t o t h e s h i p

-xent of dependents t o t h e Theater.

Originally, plans had excluded

t h e depecdents of e n l i s t e d xen except those of t h e first t h r e e grades.

3;. t h e time applications were accepted, however, i n t h e middle of

?eoruary, dependents o f all e n l i s t e d 5 a d e s had been declared eligible

by t h e ::ar >epartnlent.(20)

The ratter o f r e l a t i v e s by marriage was

l a t e r c l a r i f i e d i n W+larvs i n f a c t dependent and who a r e addit i o n a l l y

-bona f i d e iiier.ibers of t h e household were declared eligible for

- 178 -

t r a s ? o r t L t i o n on

snzceavailcible basis.(21)

;is of

25 February, 138

applications f o r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of dependents t o t h e Tneeater 11ad been

received, culd it was requested tha.t a l l personnel d e s i r i n g transporta t i b n should subrr.it a s p l i c a t i o n s by 29 Larch 1946. .it t k t date,

Ll5 o f f i c e r s , 26 e n l i s t e d i:ien, and 8 c i v i l i a n s had f i l e d ai3plications.

:dl dependents were processed throukh t h e

p o r t of Sremen.

..sin on 29 +ril

t o ai-rive i n Suroce reaciied Irai!:furt

The first

1946, and

by 28 June 2,467 deoencents had arrived i n t h e Thezter from t h e

United S t a t e s , including 2,328 dependents of o f f l c e r s , 60 of e n l i s t e d

:?en, m d 59 of c i V i l i m s . ( 2 2 )
cl.

Xduc,?;tional F a c i l i t i e s f o r Dependent Children.

.;ith

';he preseixe ~f farxilies i n t h e Theater, a need mGse f o r educational

f a c i l i t i e s f o r tlic ciiil.cken.
and i n 1-a;.

X lannlnf; for

19.46 puhlic-it:; wzs ziven t o

teac;iers.(23)

t,iiis i:ad s t a r t e d carljr,

t h e c p d i f i c z t i c n s deslred i n

3y tlic end of June, i'lcris were ne11 Ldvznced f o r the

or;enin, cf the sciiocls i n Cctoijer.

e.

.irw: kCbiijjhe Service F a c i l i t i e s .

Cel-tai;l Ceiieral

f - c i l i t i c s sild services uere a l s o erpmdcc! f o r tl,e use of a i l iIiexbers

of United S t a t e s comuni.i,ies.
Service.

h e o f tiisse was t h e i m y Zxctmlge

.it t h e cess;ltion of h o s t L l i t i e s , l i t t l e rras available i n

post exc:?ances exec$ tobcccc, candy, and

few t o i l e t a r t i c l e s .

Septeelliber 1945, ,post exchmge o f f i c e r s were he.'Ln; ur-zed t o extend

t l i e i r a c t i v i t i e s t o provide imre and S e t t e r services.(&)
submitted on 2s 3ece::bcr

envisaged

i:

- 179 -

Plans

greaL1y expzmkd service, t o

BJ

include t a i l o r i n g , and

ViLtC!l-

I n t h e l a s t r;usrter

and radio-renalr.

of 1?1+5, t h e f i r s t ~ e r c h a n b i s ebegan t o a r r i v e Zrom o t h e r c o u n t r i e s

i ; i t h xnlcn c o n t r a c t s iiad been iaade, namely, Spain, Sweden, Prailce,

3elgiwi1, Switzerland. (25)

I n t n e first h a l f of l?I+u, c o n t r a s t s

armuntin; t o n e a r l y f o u r i.lillion d o l l a r s w e r e placed

iii

Cer~~aiiy
and

i:ustrla, while c o n t r a c t s a,ioixitj.nL t o near-1:- t x r i t y ,,.i.l-lion d o l l a r s

were $laced i i , o t h e r Curo>em c o w t r i e s . (26j

The ..rrq 1Y.ciiange Service

i t s e l f s t q e r v i s e d t ! production
~
cf b e c , soft drinks, a d i c e c r e w ,
using Gerinan f a c i l i t i e s as far as p o s s i b l e . (27)

.:ut0 maintenance and

watch- a i d radio-reocir >;ere z l s o -xwvitied bz t h e -.my Axchange Zervice.

The s a l e o f jeeps bc+n

b:; l o t t e r y fro!% jdy

f.

i n Lune 1946, and It bias planned t o s e l l cars

1946.

Leave a d -lecreation.

Leave a i d r e c r e z t i o n f a c i l i t i e s

rerxiined abunc,at, d t h o u g h t h e currerlt polic;. vias m e of c u t t i n g

dorm ineffecti-ves mci e l i J x i f i i i t i r i ~e q e i l s e by i r i s t i t u t i n ; a pay-as-;ou-go

policy.

Ey Ju e 19L6, l e a v e c e n t e x a i d t o u r s itere operated i n Great

F r i t a i i i by t h e .uieric:m :,ed Zross;

i n riaris,

-~O:!E,

3russels, m d t h e

::iviera by the -=rqy; r;nd i n Switzerland, 2ewxtrk, tid t h e .?rellch .Jps

by n e g o t i a t i o n wit!i t h e foreign coverrment a t 2 f l a t - r a t e c o s t t o t h e

indivi.dila1.

::est

w e a s r:ithin t h e occupied areas ?:ere 3150 authorized

Carrxisch, arid 3iiieinsee i n .&rmri;r,

e n d a t ;ad I s c ; ~Sillurden,
,
anu

h n d s e e i n .Lust ria. (29)

180

lS9,

':,:ar Crimes,
a,

5'y t h e beLinning o f January 1946, Case Xo. 1, against

t h e twentptwo p r i n c i p a l defendents and seven &=e:x-n i j o l i t i c a l and

: n i l i t a r y orgarlizations, vias bsing prosecuted before t h e International
-3litar-y Tribunal n t lrUrnberL, and by t h e end o f J u . e t h e case vias
n e a r h e coi,ipletion.

P';.oceedinEs f o r violations of the laws of xar

t o t h e r)rej'i&ice of LTnited S t a t e s nation.als , riotably prisoners of war,

and f o r Atrocities conmitted i n the concentration can,us, were being

conducted before Iiulitarj commissions o r military govern2ent courts.

"!lese cases included t::e Eorkum Island Case, opened on 6 Februarj at
Ludviigsburg;

t h e .'.:authausen (Concentration 2 a p tria1,opened on 11 Kay

1946 a t Dachau; t h e :..aLaedy l a s s a c r e t r i a l , opened on 16 LAY;

t h e Flossenbtli-g SoncentraLion ,2aL!rt r i a l , oponed on

b.

The U.5..

.ir,qr

and

11 ,Tune,

had i n i t s c u s t o J j a large nuioer

OR

c i v i l i a n internees, arnountin< t o 150,030 Ljersons, who had been a r r e s t e d

durinz t h e f i r s t gear of t h e occupstlon i n L-liplenientation of t h e

automztic-arrest policy o f t .e Zoint Chiefs of ~ t a f f . ( 3 0 ) These

presented a problea of feeding and guuardin:,

and t h e d m g e r t h a t new

Yazi cliques might.be formed i n t h e camps.

It hzci beco:;Ie c l e a r t h a t

rnany people had been interned on purel:; teciulical :rounds.

The

autocztic a r r e s t actegory p o l i c y was aiierickd, t h e r e f o r e , frox time t o

time d u r i n & the f i r s t year of t h e occ-upation. I..and&ory arrests were
liniited t o active members of orLanizations uider indictzient and t o

war crirtes suspects m

n
id dangerous security suspects. (31)

- 1Gl -

190.

The Cnited S t a t e s Forces

011

33 June 1946,

The c a n s t i t u t i o n and t h e i n t e r r e l a t i o n of u.1it.s of t h e

United Staces f o r c e s in t h e 2uroix:a

Theater (is of

is shown i n t h e chart on t h e following page.

- 162 -

30 June 1946

191.

Eeginniiif; of the Cccupation.

The occup;2tioa of

'LkYrGlly

begin i n Spete.zbcr 19l+l~,when t h e

first t r o o p s oyxrztint-; uricler t h e Su,rJre!ne COL Ander enteibed &rrm

territory and capture<: a few towns.

The f i r s t C;en.ian c i t y t o f a l l

was :Lachen, which surrendered on 21 OctoSer a f t e r a five-day bunbardolent

b
j
r t h e F i r s t 2.S.

.imy.

Znemy defeilses west' of t h e ;-hifie A . l ~ e r

3

crunbled rapidly, and by 12 :-arch t n e 12th a d 2lst

on t h e

%rI:in

.mty

Groups stood

Bhine t1zrout;hout its entire lensth n o r t h of t h e Zosel.

Fracticdlly a l l emxy forces had

!ten

c l e a r e d fro!,, t h e area, * Y A ~ ~ h

of t h e civil p o y l r i t i o n had f l e d before t h e a d v a n c i q .iLLlied ar,xies,

blt enough ;xople were left to .rP;zrrant t&ir

m i l i t a r y security.

9ui-h.g t h e

f A l l

c o n t r o l f o r reasons of

and early wintcr of

1944-45,

a few inilitary cavamrxat d e t a c h t e n t s operated in t h e r e d o n already

conquered along the western f r o n t i e r , a i d a few t a c t i c d units got

- 123 -

t h e i r first excerience as s e c u r i t y troops f o r %he control of t h e

Ce:eI,:ali population.

i l i t n r y goverment &tachi:ieilt s had been t r a i n e d

f o r Gut;. in s p e c i f i c %i*:riin l o c a l i t i e s ar?d attaciied t o t h e arnlies,

:shlci-i h ~ been
d
ilirectacl u';

t h e 12th

.iri:!>r

Srou2i to leave d e t a c k m i t s

beiiind a l l !lopart:.!entz.l c ~ i dr e g i o n a l ca?nitals as tlie

boaidcq.r ,:oveci fcr:..:,rd.

rear

m x ~ r

Ey 24 September i9L5 t h e r e viere twenty-six

s u c h cietacliriieiits, i d i t i i e t o t a l s t r e n i t h of 133 o f f i c e r s ,

7 warrant

o f f i c e r s , m d 235 e n l i s t e d r;ien, senvinL vdith t:le Tiiiird U.S. -'irmy.

-ipproxfnately nine detacixmits were :,Ladeavailable t o each corps. (1)

161, -

r,s;.tlculnrly t k c i r i t c r y e t i n , ind x i j u s t i n 2 of confLLcts between

c i v i l i a n and :Yi.lj.tary needs s o t l i L t t h e v i t a l recpulrecents of esch
could lie sntisfiei..

It

v a s d i f f i c u l t f o r tmilez:aen,

producers, xicl

l o c a l o f f i c i a l s t c wderstanc! why coirhat-zone r e s t r i c t i o n s s i i c u l d be

coztinued so fa- behind tlie l i n e s ,
heard.

>JlierE! t,:ie

iris c c d d nc lonZ;ei* be

In 2e !5,.~ai:;,it becxte necessaqr for. tI?c f i r s t t 5 . 1t~

o est,a.blish

a 2Gvcrn;r.ent over a defezted pecjple.

b.

(3)

Civil .;ffaS.rs was orLanlzed as

t h e .iili.tzr.y a t e m y

charged n i t h kee-rinz t h e c i v i l i a n population " o f f t h e back" o f the

fighting fc-rces;

so f a r as t k e

-mr WLS
-1

was t o furtiler x L 1 i t z ; r ob,jectives.

concerned, i t s ciilef purpose

Zver;, assistance was given s t a t e

aut:ior.j.ties i n Qr.3rice, YelCiurli, and L71>re!,burC;ir, siirveyhg t h e i r

devzstated countries and i n e s t a b l i s h i n s control.

L f f i c l a l s of these

countries r6su;iled their p c s t s quick1;r a d took :rteascr.es i n support of

niL1itai-y operations.
a for.ier

gOVern:.ctnt,

I n 5ez1aiil. it
but

cif

Tias

riot a ~ i a t t e rof reii-istating

s e t t i n g uc, a couglete ::~lihry3.utnorit.y.

Such a u t h c r i t y was LO be exercised i n d i r e c t l y t h ~ o u local

s ~
self-govern-

ment, hut o n l y

y;hen sucli a

t;overnrrte.-.t, purged of a11 i:azi personnel

- lG5

and doctrines, could be Established. ( 4 )

194. Conditions Xncountercd in

Upon enterhie Germty t h e

.Ser!1my.
ariides

r e s t o r e order i n a Sssolated c o u i t l y t h a t
under enerry i'lre.
ordered t o evhcu;te,

f o u d i t necessary t o

PILLS

2etre.-tin;; enemy forces

s t i l l , i n m y regions,

clritl

civilians alike,

atternpted t o take -;:itil the& everjhi-ini of value

excent witi!reasiied Grain znd croy,s s t i l l i n tile zrourid, m d they

'

added t o t h e extensive cocbat darnage by destroyin;; public u t i l i t j . e s

s t i l l usable.

! l l i t a i - y gove-.nmcnt o c f i c e r s found tile pzople ivho

..t t h e
stayed behin2 bacily frig3tened, docile, atid t i r e d of ':;a-.
end of h i s f i r z t nee!: of .lilita:-y gGveinL.ent, t h e co.<u1ia,iidink officer
of Detsc;u.,ent l5Q,

S t a f f , C-5,

T h i r d a . ~ ~ : qre_cor%ed
r,
t o t h e .ksistmt Chief o f

t h a t t h e ;er.:.an

-cLllsEers iiad beym tc, siiovi an " a t t i t u d e

of f r i e n d l i n e s s a d cooperation" t o r ~ r i e r i c atroops.

!ie added:

''Some of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s have openly expressed tlleir anti-!,!azi

feelinks.

Consensus of opinion i s t h z t Germany i s doomed and t h a t

tiie quicker t h e J l i e s overthrow t h e I k z i s tule quicker Cerrmny w i l l

be a b l e t o hogin reccnstrcctioii.":5:

195.

F i r s t ,.ctiol:s

a.

of ;.ilitc2ry Gverruent..

Laws , ordiimices, &nd n c t i c e s were -yublished ix..ediately

i n a l l t o m s and were almost everyvihere r e a d i l y obeyed.

Zxceptions

were noted a t Koblcnz and Cochem, i:hcre t h e people were described

as tlsullen and uncooperative,

and detachineats rmvint east of t h e

- 186 -

?.fine observed a similar a t t i t u d e .

frequent*

Defiance of XLlied ruie was dost

shovm by t h e IIazi-indoctrinated yonth.

c i r c u l a t i o n of laws

:id

ordinances iviiich t:ie 2eople xzre expected

t o obey was obt.aii-:er! by d i s t r i b u t i o n of

:.'itteilunp,

ti

3ix:ediate and wide

s;:ecial i s s u e of

ne:;s!)+:er publisned LJ;~ agents of Pu'nli.city and i-sycho-

loLiczl '.iarfare.

Subsequent copies rrith si;ra.igilt n e w reports were

accorded respect by t h e Germns because of t h e o f f i c i a l cliaractep of

t h e first copy.

::s t i m went on t h e publication proved t o be popular

a d ? r i n t orders were iiicreased fror: wee!< t o week.

I n t h e Third ~ r m y

area alone, a c i r c u l a t i o n of 100,000 copies w 8 s a t t a i n e d by 31 Karch.(6)

b.

. i f t e r i s s u i n g d i r e c t i v e s , military governmnt turned

next t o those t h i n g s Yihich would be of help t o t h e .imy.

were i n s t r u c t e d t o clean u;; t h e s t r e e t s ana bury t h e dead.

?he i)eople
i!ig;hiv~ys

and water, l i g h t , telephone, and gas systems viere repaired with

i%rsian l a b o r as rapidly as possible.

To carry out ,iaF 3epartinent

i n s t r u c t i o n s , w.its I ' J k k i : unccjvered evkience of n c t r o c i t i e s required

t h e populace l i v i n g nearby to see and exaillilie t h e evidences o f t h e
control exercised by t h e Iyazi govcrment.

In soiie cases, Sei-mans

were forced t o b u y tile bcdies of t h c v i c t i m .

Cn t h e whole t h e

i r i l i t a r y security s i t u z t i o n was b e t t e r t i Ian iiad been a n t i c i p a t e d

mcl x i l i t a r y ;;ovenu!;crit vias zble t o e f f e c t resonablc orgarilzation

a12 ti,.ht c c n t r o l over t h e neoplc a l t e r o n l y a b r k f ;,erid of anarchy.

3ve-y 3er;iian cver twelve years of aze vias r e s l s i e r e d '02; iriilitary

government detacli.;er:ts and nai;.:es were checked agaiiist l i c t s provided

- 137 -

by t h e Cou.ter IntelliLence Corps.

soon as 9ossible c i v i l

Zovernixeiit and lavi e ~ ~ f o r c i nbodies

g
viere s e t u?, (7)

196.

The Sstablishrient of C i v i l Govcrnment.

m*

ILie

;:Llitzry Government detachiiients

iiioviii3

found no govermicnt i n operation ;.;hen they arrived.

inlc %:lie ?.hineland

Z - i v i l authorities

hat1 f o r t h e m s t p a r t been evacuated by t h e T:eri.r&l d-!:iy and it was

liard t o f i n d r e s i d e n t s r h o know anytliing about govcrrurlcnt.

dl

nurnber

of BUrger:~ieistars V/ho remained behind. had t o be removed froin o f f i c e

because screel;irj;; shcwd them t o have becn ardent :lazls.

coonerative officicLls r : ~ r efound by rmking use
datilig b~.cr..t o 1927-37.

or

The

Iiiost

olci c i v i l lists

I n i.,=qJ c,f t h e i k e l s e , non-!!azis vi:io had

I-

been re:.:oveil frc::: c,fice by tiie !mi co-ircrlL;:ent

iii

1323 were reirjstated.

I n so:.ic of t h e sr.d.ler k x e i n d e ncri-!yazi officials werc fouid

who had

riot been rei1:oved bccL.use cf t h e i r lorig service t o t h e co.munity and

so;!e

of theri were retained.

:it t h e l e v e l of goverrxefit next hi&er

than t h e iireis, t h e ;:e,lerunk:sbeiirk,

an6 at tiie s t i l l h i g h l e v e l of

Irovinz it was :::ore d i f f i c u l t t o s e c u e s a t i s f a c t o r y c i v i l servants.

.;t a l l l e v e l s ;;!leime cliief tidiainistrative o f f i c e r s were &?pointed,

t h e y were able t c o r g a i z e p o l i c e c..,id o t h e r e s s e r ; t i s l s e r v i c e s on a

liJidted scale.

i.11 apnoint;iients riere oii a teqJorary basis, and. some

ap?ointees were sd.wequently dis:.;issed s f t t r I n v e ~ t l ~ a t i .o;1, n t h e

Couritx I n t e l l i g e n c e

CGIL)S.

(6j

190 -

was t o be read21 t o take over a d d i t i o n a l areas across t!ie Hl?ine.(l5)

d.

Cn 10 $ril

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r an a r e a west of t h e

2hine and south of the '&riaan-l!etherland

Ilinth

-'.rm;r

ret:ining

front5.er isas assul;:ed, t h e

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for screcninC m d p 2 r o l l i n g t h e

x e s t bad; o f t h e r i v e ? 'and f o r the mai.n'ieiiance and protection o f t h e

bridges.

The follov;tnz day, t h e T h i r d

k q r

?rea arourrd Lo'denz was

T.le c i t t ; of Koblenz

added t o t h e F i f t e e n t h ..r.r!y's responsibility.

i t s e l f vias tr..l-:en o v a t!iree days l z t e r .
i n s t a l l a t i o n s v;.i.t?!h

Zxceot f o r c e r t a i n su.i>ly

t h e c i t y and t r a f f i c c s n t r o l a t the east

ap,sroaches of bridzes, 3onn and t h e su:roVridiriL

control OS t h e Fifteenth

:.r.qr

frox tne F i r s t

t h e next two days, t h e r e l i e f of Third

Ai-Jqj-

area passed t o t h e

on 15 .+ril.

-'ZJLIJ

During

u ! l i t s was coi.pleted and

preparations 'were iilade f o r 1110ve:r~eiit

of ttie Fifteenth .tn.iy t o t h e
Severit!: .:my a r e a viest of t h e 3iine.

C'n 20 +ril

boundaries were

extended t o t h e .Ihke Liver f r o 2 3oppard t o O!)>enheh.

p c r t i o n s o f tile Saarlclnd were taken over on 24 ;.pi1 &d

";he reiiiaining
t h e area

viithin t h e 3'neinprovi.nz lying e a s t of t h e river and t h e l a s t portions

of !iessen were talcen over t h e folloviinE day.(l6j
200.

The Last ?.esistnnce

a.

-.

.!nineland,

in t h e 3iineland.

Ifiien t h e Xf'teenth :"qr

asswed responsibilit;.

f i g h t i n g continued i n approxinsitely

ORB

for the

3 f t h of it.

'The

combat area included aboxL one half of each of t h e T.ei;ierwil:sbezirke

o f 3llsseldorf and Z o l o s i e and a t i p of t h e i:ec.ierunjisbezirk of Xoblenz,

a l l l y i n z east of t h e Iliver.

Tile t a c t i c a l operations alonz t h e

- 192 -

194

202.

Jo~~e.r5iiiel:liTolice ..ct ivitiils.

The F i r s t , Tiiird, ~ ~ l:inth
n d
. . r i e s i n L>.eir :Xivar1ce p a s t

the ;liiliie

Lecn uricble t c Live coiltplete cou.tei.iiiiellli.;;er!ce

coverake,

but the;! had been successful i n e x p l o i t i n g a l m u e nur:ic:c? of !;el-sonality

Ixirgets, inclur2inz P&sta.po and x i l i t s r y i n t e l l i j e n c e persoiLL5tlies,
m d i n f i r s t uxoveri;:::

t h e .,erewolf orkanrzation.

t.ii.ien t h e F i f t e e n t h

took c v e r t h e :..i!iilehnd, t h e ccur,terii;telligence

.m!i;r

coveraze was, a t b e s t , s u p e r f i c i a l . ( 2 2 )

331

s1:;itc of t h i s ,

- 197 -

t h e s e i,eo?le licti becii i s s x d f r o n t i e r passes b;r each co>ultry concerned,

per

t t i n g : t h e m t o p s c back mci f o r t ; i t o carni;'

i.:ariy people l i v i n g i n t h e !IctheTl;.u.ids,

%r,,,zny.

oti t h e i r husiness.

for i n s t a c e , ixid f a n s in

Tile s;~s~;c!T~
v i o r h d a iiardship on suci! people, but no solutiori

was eyer reached.

(31)

- 200 -

Assistance Given t o Counter Intelligence Corps.

207.

The t a c t i c a l forces a s s i s t e d t h e Cow-ter Intelligence Corps

i n s i t u a t i o n s requiring force beyond t h e l a t t e r ' s c a p a b i l i t i e s .

In

arrests, f o r exmple, the ager?ts of t h e Counter Intelligence

&ing

Corps were often backed up by m i l i t a r y police o r d e t a i l s of regular

troops.

The Counter Intelligence Corps called upon t h e troops f o r

a s s i s t a c e i n d i n g systematic searches of houses o r outdoor ereas,

i n p o s t i n g s i e c i a l guards i n unusual circunistances, and i n guarding

In t u r n , t n e Counter Intelligence Sorps served t h e troops

prisoners.

i n an advisory capacity respectill;; t h e i r s e c u r i t y prob1w.s and. went

i n t o action when sumncned by t h e troops t o undeitake interrogations

o r t o screen personnel.(32)

208.

Progress of : Y l i t a r y Governxent a t the End of Zesistance.

As of 1200 h0m-s

on 18 A p r i l , t h e remaining f r o n t along the

west bank of t h e % h e vias o f f i c i a l l y dee;l:ed mcovered, a d t h e t a c t i c a l

mission completed.

The reshuffling of t a c t i c a l troops t o conform with

p o l i t i c a l denarcations k i d simplified t h e 2-5 probleril, and t h e

improvenent was r e f l e c t e d i n t h e reaction of t h e %rmn population.
X policy of m i l i t a r y government had developed t h a t seezed t o be working,

and an over-211 adxfinistrative syste:.i had been set up.(33)

a.

3 ; z l i f i e d Germns were being appointed t o c i v i l o f f i c e s

as rapidly as possible.

i. high ?ercentage of t h e adult population

admitted Nazi membership, but inost

0
:
'

201

t h e people questioned gave s t o r i e s

of yielding t o outside pressure i n order t o r e t a i n jobs.

The problem

of incomplete E!azi r e g i s t r a t i o n records confronted all .rLLitary

government tems i n t h e area.

d new d i r e c t i v e was issued by Supreme

Headquarters, Allied EZ-,peciitionary Force, permitting people who had

joined t h e Nazi Party tinrough necessity t o hold o f f i c e a t l e a s t
terporarily, without which t h e .milftaSy governiient a u t h o r i t i e s would
have been hard pressed t o f i n d governmental Fersomiel of any caliber,
because the prohibition on a l l Eazis hac! t h e e f f e c t of preventing
Tne m i l i t a r y

p r a c t i c a l l y all q u a l i f i e d persons frori holding off ice.

government detachments were not as successful in establishing t h e

Germ courts a s they were i n establishing a c h h i s t r a t i v e agencies.

There were only a few q u d i f i e d judzes who hed not been t a i n t e d with
t h e Nazi ideology. ( 3 4 )
b.

P o l i t i c a l l y t h e people were apathetic, as they were mre

concerned with personal problems.

X t h t h e exception of t h e CoiFJnurLst

Party, which was t r y i n g t o regroup i t s .-,embership, there were no

noticeable attern:?ts of any of t h e p o l i t i c a l ? a r t i e s t o r e e s t a b l i s h
themselves. (35)
C.

A Yar Crimes Division was set up on 11; April consisting

of personnel suddenly converted f r o x t a c t i c a l to occuyition duties.

Kumerous cases were f i l e d , t h e .xajority of which were solved by t h e
a i d of volunteer r&rmn informers.

':any :iersons wanted

01:

charges of

war c r i r e s were !norm t o be i n t h e ::uhr area, including some of h i g h

rank such as Field !:arshal :,:odel, t h e comiander of t h e &man .:my
Group ftBII, nhLci: had been trapped i n t h e Ruhr pocket.

- 202 -

The outstanding

case during t h e period concerned t h e murder of seventy-one p o l i t i c a l

prisoners of t h e Nazis, j u s t p r i o r t o t h e arrival. of t h e United States
troops at Landswehr, near Solingen, and t h e i r hurried b u r i a l in a mass
grave i n a sand p i t near t h e village.(%)

209.

The Cordon Sanitaire.

Lvartine l i v i n g conditions, particularly i n prisoners-of-war

and displaced-persons camps, had created a high incidence of typhus and

it was necessary t o take steps t o control it.

On 23 April the Fifteenth

Army, as directed by Theater Headquarters, established a cordon sanitaire

along t h e Rhine 3,iver t o protect the areas t o the west from t h e

louse-bome disease.

Ports of entry o r guard s t a t i o n s were established

and all c i v i l i a n s and liberated prisoners of war traveling from east

t o west were deloused before crossing.

Delousing s t a t i o n s were s e t

ug t o carry out disinfectation on an around-thedock schedule.

Reception centers provided temAporarys h e l t e r and food, as well as
medical inspection.

Individuals suspected of having any c o m i c a b l e

disease were isolated f o r observation. (37)

210. The Situation on and a f t e r V-E Day.

Before the end of h o s t i l i t i e s , the ZWI and XXIII Corps of
the Fifteenth A r q were engaged i n t n e occupation, organization, and

administration of an area of 1 4 , W square miles, about eight times

t h e area of t h e L'nited States occupition zone after World riar I, but
including t h e same area and i t s c a p i t a l c i t y , Koblenz.

In s p i t e of

the d i f f i c u l t i e s r e s u l t i n g from continWus shifting and readjustment

- 203 -

of troops within t h e area due t o redeployment, a &reat d e a l of progess

had been nade (38)

a.

The occupation d s s i o n of t h e XXII and E111 Corps was

not announced by Supreme Fieadquarters, Allied 3xpeditionax-y Forces,

u n t i l 19 Yay.

On t h z t day t h e Rheinprovjnz :.9litarJ District Frovincial

Cfimmxnt was i n i t i a t e d .

According t o t h e plan, t h e a r e a of respon-

s i b i l i t y of t h e Fifteenth .'my was t r e a t e d as one ! i l i t a q r District.

The three !?egieruqysbezirke of Dtlsseldorf , .'lachen, and Colo'Te,
c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e area of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e XXII Corps, were placed
under one Oberre~ierunas.sPrllsidect, while ezch of t h e t h r e e had a
i?egiewigsbezirk-PrCLsident

staff.

and a cozpletely c o n s t i t u t e d administrative

This unit was supervised by t h e military g0Vernii;ent personnel

The Re-ierungsbezirke of Trier and Koblenz

attached t o t h e XXII Corps.

and the Saarland, t h e Ffalz, and Hessen were siriularbj organized as a

unit w : e r t h e supervision o f t h e YXLII Corps.

By 20 2uly 1945,

e f f e c t i v e c i v i l administration within t!ie e n t i r e area of t h e meinprovinz I 3 l i t . x - y District had been established

2t

a l l levels of

administratton fro". t h e provinz level. down t o and includb;: t h e Kreis

level.

The area was under control and had becor,:e serer?e enol?& t o

?emit the beginning o f F o l i t i c a l reorganization bg t h e Ger,.an population.

The S o c i a l 9einocratic , Cormmist, ani t n e -inti-F&

(inti-Fascist)

P a r t i e s were t ! f~
i r s t t o organize, w i t h t.leir a c t i v i t i e s centering

i n Dtisseldorf.

The Anti-Fako 1 a r t : r see:.ed

c l e r i c a l support. ( 3 9 )

204

ts ..ave so.-e Catholic

b.

i!ithin t h e first few days of June, t h e process of

--

t u r n i n g over t h e

of 3Usseluorf, Aachen, and Cologne

T h i s division of t h e Rheinprovinz

t o B r i t i s h c o n t r o l was be,yn.

I:ilitargr D i s t r i c t brought t o an end t h e progress i n t h e reconstitution

of t h e c i v i l government.

T5e provincizl govemTent as it exk-jted on

20 June, together w i t h t h e Obermbsident and his s t a f f , ;iassed t o t h e

control of the I Sritist: Corps.

The south p a r t of t h e 2heinprov;lnz

was then attached t o t.?e administrative system whlch had been

established at Neustadt (40)

c.

Under a n agreerent reached with t h e French, t h e XXIII

Corps was directed on 5 July t o t u r n over i t s t e r r i t o r f o f t h e Saarland,

t h e Pfalz, Hessen west of t h e Lhine, and t h e ZeKierungsbezirke of Trier
and Koblenz t o t h e F i r s t French Army.

The r e l i e f of United S t a t e s

u n i t s by t h e French was completed by 10 July.(W)

211. The Value of t h e r-hbeland OccuDation.

The ?hineland occupation served as a t r i a l run i n military
go-Jerrunent.

For t h e first tine, t h e t a c t i c a l objective of an arqy

was secondary an? ni1ita-y governnent t h e primary concern.

Tne

statement from General Eisenhower's headquarters tlizt t h e Germans

were "going t o get m i l i t q y Covem-ent and a r e going t o know it i s

m i l i t a r y government," was borne out i n the ,hirieland.

The

XXII and

XXIII Corps, w i t h sone of the vetezan buropean Theater f i g h t i n g units,

were com landed by two of t h e . ' . r As~most

l
experienced conbat generalsl!aj. Cen. Srnest I!.

Ilarmon, corrmander o f t h e 1st and 2d Armored Divisions

- 205 -

i n nearly every ,mjor campaign fron t h e IJorth African l a d i n g on,

and Yaj. Cen. Hugh J. Gaffey, comander of t h e 4 t h h x o r e d (Spearhead)
r ) i v i s i o n , which t h e Gerxan S3 troops c d l e d Ytoosevelt Butchers.

Actual experience ses:?ecl t o prove t h a t cooperation was as important

as force.

I n , m y ways t::e original plans f o r t h e occupation had t o

be changed when they were t e s t e d in practice.

and l ~ u c hw a s learned t h a t

wcls

I:UC!I

was accomplished

t o ?rove helpful i n t h e l a t e r more

Ferrnanent job of occu:)ation. (42)

212.

The First Stages.

a.

The t o t a l Gennan surrender iqcluded, of course, a

surrender of t h e i r f o r c e s in Ilorway, dthoug'n these had not been

defeated in t h e f i e l d .

In f z c t , durin.!; t h e ?eriod o f h o s t i l i t i e s

thezbe had been no invasion of :Torway a f t e r 1?LO by Vnited Vations

forces, exce,pt f o r a Soviet expedition i n t o Finmark, in t h e far Rorth.
Shortly after '1-3 Day, hoivever, a s:tall j o i n t 3 r i t i s h - m e r i c a n force
r
l !Torwa:i t o control t h e 347,000 Geman troops l o c a t e d there
laniied i

and t o h e l p r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e i-iorwegian nation. (4.3;

b.

I n !~mgways, conditions i n :!orway were found t o be

b e t t e r than expected.

The Konvegians were hard workin:? and w e l l

disciplined, and quickly restored t h e i r governzent t o good working

- 236 -

order.

The country w a s not devastated except F i n n m r k , wnere the

,?*mans had l a i d waste t h e country in t h e i r r e t r e i i t before t h e Soviet

forces.

213.

Attermts t o 3emove Cermn I n s t a l l a t i o n s .

Tt vdas not p o s s i b l e t o removs "ernan i n s t a l l a t i o n s irA.:ediately.

Few

It was not even possible t o disarm t h e Cema~si x e d i z t e l y .

untoward inciiients occurred., however, and t h e 2erma.ri f o r c e s proved

cooperative.

Their wits x e r e graduallp noved i n t o restrricted areas

and t!lence slovil::

trans:>orted back t o Serxany.

.ill t y p e s of s h i p s

were pressed i n t o s e r v i c e t o b r i n g t h e s e surrendered trooFs back t o

t h e i r noineland, b u t Geriaan s h i p s predoiiunzted.

25,000 % m a n p r i s o n e r s !?ad been mved from

S t a t e s Zone and l5,&Xl t o t h e !!ritish

3
.:

1~

i'OiTii%y t o

Zone o f C e r x a y .

1945,

~ U ~ i S t

t Le h i t e d
iin attempt

was mad.e h e d i a t e l y t o b r i n g d l mmbers of t h e ,%;en;lan Dlavy, includinE Serrilan civilian e q l o y e e s , i n t o t h e s e r e s t r i c t e d a.reas o r

reservations.

Tne i-e were i n s u f f i c i e n t 3rit is:? end i<orvie,gian n a v a l

personnel, hoviever, t o c o n t r o l c o q l e t e l y t h e naval s t z t i o n s and

s'iore b a t t e r i e s , s o t h a t a skeleton Ck?-:wn naval organization was
retained.

By 10 July 191~5,t h e r e were 70,052 GerLmnaval personnel

on the reservati0r.s snd 19,699 outside t h e r e s e m t i o n s . (44)

2l4.

Reocvered .'Jlied :.ilitcrTj I er.soiwe1.

a . , A t o t a l o f 66,458 forrner . S l i e d p r i s o n e x of viar were

discovered i n !'orway, d i s t r i b u t e d i n 403 camps ?.nd work detackrents.

- 237 -

On l.!+ ::-a;- 1945 a l l ';er,m m r d s on camps contairLrig ex-prisoners of

vrar were ortilered renoved, and t h e Gerxams were d i r e c t e d t o leave a

thirty-day susply cf food zt each of the camps.

F'riscxer-of-war

exchange teami were sent i n t o a11 camp a r e e s , each includinc; a B r i t i s h

o f f i c e r , a representative of t h e Soviet Sepatriation Cor,dssion, and,
where necessaqy, Polish o r Jugoslav pisoner-of-war
b.

exchange officers. (45)

@n 16 Yay 19k5 a Soviet delegation arrived i n Cslo fro=

Stockholm t o suDervise t h e r e p a t r i a t i o n of t h e recovered military

p e r s o m e l and displaced persons of' Soviet riationalitjr who were loczited
i n i~ronvay. Cn 10 J u e an agreement .;ias reac!ied between the Soyiet

and t h e :.:orwec&m kvernr%nts prcviding f o r the evacuation of Soviet

n x t i o n d s fron southern 'Torwqr b
j
r r a i l and sea tnrou;$ Sweden ,and
Finland, w d f o r t h e i r evecuation from northern Ilorway by sea d i r e c t

to 2:urrmnsk.

The evacuation throulrb Sweden and F i n l z n d coirmenced on

13 June 1?45 and was completed by 13 July 1945; t h e evacuation by

sea d i r e c t t o l ' u r s i x k co.menced on 23 2w.e 19b5 and was c o q l e t e d
by 26

215.

19k5.

.41to::etner,

18,852 people were evacuated.(h6)

Continued Lvacuation of rfirnan Personnel.

a.

By 15 ..ugust 1945, 124,000 k x m s had been evacuated

from 'Torway. ?y that d a t e the s t a f f of the Serxan Headquarters near

Oslo h2d been g r e a t l y reduced, a1thou;n

,iian;*

of i t s Ineubers were held

in !:orway f o r interrogation. ( h 7 )

b.

On 20 September 1945 it was e s t i m t e d t h a t a i l disarmed

krmnans i n t h e following categories who were s l a t e d for t h e United

- 208 -

St&,es Zone of Ger,z:ang would be evacuated by 15 Cctober 19.45: all

wllose residence vias i n t h e I!nited S t a t e s Zone of Germany, except

4,500 who were i n arrest o r e s s e n t i a l labor categories;

and 50 percent

residence was in Austria, except t h e S o v i e t Zone;

of those whose residence

R ~ in
S

all whose

t h e S o v i e t Lone o f C;erdmg.

Zespon-

s i b i l i t y f o r t h e d b p s i t i o n of the remaining 50 percent, or about

57,000 persons, w 8 s accepted by t h e S r i t i s h .

It was e s t i m t e d t h a t

about 70,720 disarmed %mans would remain i n !lorway a f t e r 15 Cctober

1945, of xhon 4,509 resided in t h e 2 r i t i s h Zone o f Sermny, 57,000

i n t h e Soviet ::one o f Germny, and 4,5'90 i n the Cnited S t a t e s Lone

of Gerrmn.,. and ~ i h oviere I n a r r e s t or in an e s s e n t i a l labor categories.

I n a.ldition, about
c.

11,ooC, &ri.Xin

By 20 Septeilber

c i v i l i a n s would be l e f t i n F!orvray.(48)

1945, a i l Geman forces i n

been disarzed. except a small iiui~berused as guards.

251,818 had been evacuated to Germany and .&&ria

3y

i!orwCly had

17 t c t o b e r 194.5,

and a t o t a l of

approximately 70,700 repained t o be evacuated t o those two countries. ( 4 9 )

d.

Dy

5 September 1945, t h e disarmnent o f the %r,mn Navy

and of Sermn naval f o r t i f i c a t i o n s hsd been colnpleted.

3:f

15 Gctober,

over 50,000 German naval personnel had been e v a c u t e d t o Saxany.

By

t h a t date, 10,113 Geman naval p e r s o r i e l r e m i n e d "frozen" and were

employed i n such c z ? a c i t i e s as dumpins aimunition and ninesweeping,
and as crews of !;lerciiant ships o r on dockyard duty. (53)

216.

Heturn of kin^ Haakon.

King 22.akon returned t o ' ' o r w y on 7 Zune 19:'5.

- 20.2 -

Cn t h c t date,

t h e SY1TF I'ission t o T'omsyhanded nost g c v e m e n t a l powers back t o

This was only a :nonth a f t e r t h e

t h e !!orwegian c i v i l gavernnent.

original landing on Norway. ( 51)

217.

Destruction of Geman :','ar :;ateriel.

It had been ,XLied policy tiirou&out Europe t o destroy

captured G
e
m
?w e r ,:ateriel.

The carT:ng

out o f t h i s policy created

resentment among ilcmegians , who f e l t t h a t tkis illateriel should have

been turned over t o t h e ?orwegian Government, and nuch criticism was
exwessed i n Ilorwegian newspapers.

Eventually, t h e Allied Land Forces

issued a news release t o the !?orv:egian 9ress explaining t h e necessity

f o r such destruction, t o ?revent any future war potential.

It

mentioned t h a t c e r t a i n exceptions had been i:w:e in t h e cases of

!!orway

and the !!etherlmds, as enough German war :;lateriel had Seen

l e f t t o su:;ply t h e ccast defenses.(52)

218.

Inactlvation of SupreL.re>ieadc:mrters.
The .;!!-.'ZF
1.2ssion t o !Jon*!ay ceased t o e x i s t , as suc:~, on

I4 ,!uly 1915, when Suprci:!e 1Ieadqu.z-rters, . , l l i e d Expeditionary Force,

was dissolved.

On t h z t date, the Li.ierican e1e::ient.s of t h e SLiz'J2F

1;iseion t o Norway b e c z e t h e LSF3T :.Yssion t o Xomay.

Zffective

24 August 191+5, the Ileadquarters Allied Land Forces, Xomay, took

over all troops i n Norway.

headquarters.

Two co:nmnds ncre formed under t h i s

h e , t h e C s l o Zone, col..:jrising t h e Allied Zones of

Oslo and Stavamger, was =der ='naerican conmiand;

t h e other, co...p r i s i n g

the Allied Zoi:es of ?ergen, Trondheim, and Tromso, was designated

- 210 -

B r i t i s h Land Forces IJorway. (53)

Establishment of I.!orwegian riuxiliary Forces.

219.

rhch enthusiasm f o r the .*dlies was f e l t mong ti!e Ilorwegian

populace.

I n f a c t , mny F!omegians wished t o j o i n t h e U.S. h n y f o r

service against Japan.

The Xomegian Covcrnmnent asked .'.llied Head-

quarters whether i:orwegians could e n l i s t in t h e U.S.

.:rnies,

and e'ere Lnfor!:ied. t k t t h e y could not,

o r the 'kitish

It was f i n a l l y agreed,

however, t h a t t h e I.!onvegiar. Coverniient would r a i s e an amy coxposed

of " l i b e r a t e d rmpower units" which would a i d tile , d l i e s within E!orway.

This was t o be under t h e t a c t i c a l co:?mC! o f t h e Allied Land Forces

Vorwag, but t h e !'!orwegian Goverment was t o r e t a i n f u l l d i s c i p l i n a r y

powers over these u-its.

The ageeicent with t h e !Torwegian Government

e s t a b l i s h i n g t h i s new array of "liberated rranpower u n i t s " was signed

on 28 June 1945,(54)
220.

Evacuation of United States,Troops.

A.

It had o r i g i n a l l y been planned t k t United S t a t e s

troops would leave i'omay

b.7

1 I:.u&ust 1945.

T h i s proved i i i p o s s i b l e

because of t h e cornpar&ively low speed a t which German disarned persotlnel w a s .noved out of :!orway.

United S t a t e s forces i n C-errnany were

unwilling t o accept a large-scale 2oveinent of Ce:312ns over a short

period of time.

:?ence t h e r e c a t r i a t i o n o f disarmed Gerxans was gradual

and h e r i c a n occunatioii f o r c e s i n ;Jorway were %?able t o leave during

t h e swner of 1945.(55)

- 2u. -

b.

The USF!? ILission t o Eorway fina lly became inoperative

20 October 1945.

.Lrtericcm Task Force t'A,rc which co.iprFsed a l l American

forces i n Norway except s p e c i a l i s t s and headquarters groups, became

inoperative on 5 October and was coapletely phased out of 15Jorviay'by

17 Cctober 1945.

X detachriient of Theater Service Forces personnel,

known as Tnezter Service Forces Euro?ean Theater Liquidation DetachTent

Forway, remained a short while t o close out the relvaining supply and

ad-xinistrative d e t a i l s .

Likewise, a mall ,roup of o f f i c e r s and

e n l i s t e d Inen remined t o work with t h e -Lmrican Einbassy t o clear up

such matters as h c l t o be handled a t t,ie aabassadorial level.

.,8th

t h e excention of t h i s l a t t e r group, t:,e C X i T : 5 s s i o n t o orwa way was

phased out on 31 Cctober 1945,

Likewise, IIeadcparters Land -7orces,

Yonvay, becme ino?erative on 31 Cctober l9ir5.

combined co:;iiand i n Koniay and, a f t e r t h z t
f o r c e s i n :Toma::

221.

'Ete,

This t e r . i n s t e d t h e
the cox:and oi' land

beca.&eTiurely a L r i t i s h responsibilit:-. (56)

3eEinninEs of t h e Gccupntion.
a.

i2n 4 ::ay 1915 t h e T.hird U.S.

-=rnlywas

directed t c advance

into Czechoslovaliia t o an agreed p o h t of contact % i t h t.ie & v i e t forces.

By 8 !-ay t h i s agreed point of contact !.ad been reached by t h e United

S t a t e s forces, vi:?ich occupied a l i n e beyond t h e c i t i e s of Budejovice,

- 2L2 -

Pilsen, and Karlsbad.(57)

Until 17 June 1945, t h e p a r t o f Czechoslovakia

occupied by United S t e t e s forces vas uvicier tile t a c t i c a l control of t h e

7 ,Corps of t!le Third Ar-qr, co.cxandec! by L'aj. Gen. Clarence 2. Huebner.

On 17 June 19Lt5t h e co,xxind of a l l V ,Corps troops and m i t s still

occupying Czec?.oslov&is passed t o t h e EII Sorps under 3 . j . Sen.
Ernest !?.
'Jar,mn. ( 5 8 )
b.

The xission assigned t o Third ?eqy w a s t o ?ut i n t o

i?nmediate e f f e c t t h e t e r m of t h e sllrrender

suck; !irovisions of

aid.

Cperation EC?!I??E as were applicable t o t h e situation.

holding a l l

P~OSS

T i i s involved

w;e.cfiTl.ird -''.r.qytroops occupled t o prevent any

Riovei:!ent of Ger-mn troops i n t o Genxmy until tile::

2nd properl2r discharged;

S t a t e s and Soviet forces;

could be disarrxed

maintaining t h e b o u x k r y between United

and occupation o f the ?art of Czechoslovakia

allocated t o t h e I!::ited States.

C.

After V-3 Dag, there was l i t t l e resistance t o t h e

A fer: i m i d e n t s ::gere reported o f s . ! m l l

enforcement of t h e surrender.

bands of arned eneqy troops operating i n the r e a r l i n e s of the Corps,

but these were speedily brought under control.

There were no major

outbresks of Xerewolf a c t i v i t y , although a nunber of cases of cutting

G e r m s o l d i e r s and Czech partiszns

of telephone l i n e s , occurree..

exchanged a few shots, but no large s k i m i s h e s were reported.

To

avoid c a p t i v i t y o r internment by t h e Soviet forces, inany German s o l d i e r s

continued t o atten:::t

t o p a s s t h e United S t a t e s lines, but these were

returned t o Soviet control in accordance with agreei;;ents. ( 5 9 )

213

d.

Contact Ivith t h e Soviet .irxy in Czechoslovakia was

established a t t h r e e points on 10 i,Ay 1945. The 6th :irmred Division

%et elenents cf t h e Soviet forces i n t h e v i c i n i t y of Karlsbad; t h e
2d Division contacted an o f f i c e r from t h e V 2ussian Tank Corps a t
Rokyca.r!y;

2nd

t h e 1 6 t h Ariiiorea Division met elernents of tine CII

iiussian Corps a t Veserbury.

Further contact ivas aade a l l along t h e

control l i n e within t h e next few days.(60)

e.

C i v i l a f f a i r s a c t i v i t i e s ivere i n i t i a t e d in Czechoslovakia

The l i b e r a t e d Czechs

almost irmediately upon cessation of h o s t i l i t i e s .

were both anxious and willing t o take up t h e reins of governnent a t

t h e point where they had been snatched away by t h e 2azis.

:ilitary

government proper was not esta;21is.ied9 since t h e country was liberated

.and therefore received tile sane treatment as t h e E b e r a t e d t e r r t t o r i e s
of France, 3 e l g i m , t h e Yetherlands, and Luxe:aburg.

iissistarice

rendered t o t h e Czech avenlinent, therefore, took t h e form of assistance

i n th.e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of t h e cow.try by Its own zovwment.
f.

The occupation brought numerous probleins, chief of w:hich

were : eliminatioc of Kazis fro:,; t h e SudeteriLaF-d; disbancixnt o f

%" forces;

problel:.s of refuzees and displaced persons;

o f Sudeten :Germ";

evacuation

locztion of war criminals and high-rankiqg !Cazis;

and mintainin; t h e Pilsen Line yiith t h e Soviet forces.

222.

Xecovered .dlieO Prisoners of *,iar.

En 9 ':ay 19&5 Third h q y evacuated

.CWI

r:llied ex-prisoners

of war, and by t h e evening of t h e follavring, day a l l United S t a t e s ,

214 -

D r i t i s h , and French ex-?r.; soners of w r had been !loved from t h e Tilird

.=rqy are%. :lost United S t a t e s , B r i t i s h , French, and ::etherland
prisoners of war had been l o c a t e d i n Karlsbad, 3rm, and Schuneau.

V Corps used a nundred t r u c k s

tnea t o iilsen.

m d seventy-five :;i:bula.t~cest o evacuate

Froln t h e r e , Uxited S t a t e s and -2ritish ,persome1 were

evacuated by air, t r a i n , o r truck.(61)

223.

Recovered Soviet !.lationals

$11
exchange

point was e s t e b l i s h e d a t F i l s e n , where Allied

ex-prisoners of v a r and displaced txrsons who were v:estern n a t i o n a l s

were exchailged f o r Soviet c i t i z e n s . (62)

An agree:;ent was reacried with

t h e Soviet f o r c e s niiereby 5,WO or" t h e i r ex-prisoners of war o r

displaced ?ersons would be turned over t o them daily.

'The Chief of

S t a f f , w i t h s e v e r a l s t a f f nenbers, attended a conference with t h e

Sliief of S t a f f of the Fourth Soviet Gu.ards Lrq- a:-.d arraxged details
of t h e mutual t r a s f e r o f personnel, b o t h -dlital-,. and c i v i l i z n . ( 6 3 )

Soviet p a t i e n t s were returned t o Soviet-cor.trolled ter:.itorJ. .QY

Untted S t a t e s a::b:Sultmces, and Lurin;; t h e -mriod 2 t o 28 June 1945

a t o t a l of 1,117 Soviet A?ilitary j7ersonnel n e r e e v m E t e d i n t h i s

manner.

All r e l a t i o n s with t h e Soviet f o r c e s on t h e s e arrangements

were c o r d i a l . (6b)
2Zt.

Displaced persons.

The T h i r d .my in Czechoslovakia was entrusted w i t h t n e

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for displaced persons l o c a t e d within t h e i r s e c t o r and

- 215 -

%'!lose passing through it.

Ordinarily, inost t r a i n s carrying Polish

displaced p r s o n s being r e p a t r i a t e d t o Poland were routed through

i n -ku;.ust 1945 an investigation by t h e XXII Corps

Czechoslovakia.
of t h e Third

revealed t h a t sone displaced persons and prisoners

of war were i:ot necetvinz a s u f f i c i e n t amunt of c a l o r i e s t o neet

t h e standards set by hig!ier headquarters.

Lxnediate a c t i o n corrected

t h i s s i t u a t i o n azd 1ar:;e s t o r e s of captured eneuny food stocks were

b u i l t up, f r o x which these individuals were fed.

2 u ~ i n gt k e .period

1 t o 6 Cctober 1945, t h e Szech Government assxed cor,f,rol of a l l

displaced-persons

CELIL
JIS

esce-3, m e , vhich t h e Z I I Corps continued

t o rai:itain as a transie:it camp.

E 1 1 Corps continued t o inspect

a l l camps, however, to insure t h e i r proper mintenance.

During

Octo'Ler ar,d Love7iber 19i:5, 201 Foles, 133 Jugoslavs, 15s Iiungarians,

193 Bxaanians, 5,892 Gerzans, 1,590 Austrians, and enough displaced

nersons of o t h e r n a t i o n a l i t i e s t o reach of t o t a l of 8,923 were

processed.

Cn 1 5 :!ovezber 1945 t h e t r z n s i e n t

Canip

o?erated by ZII

Corps was closed.(65)

225.

..

Xar Crmnals.

Foth Theater 11eadcuartei-s a d Czech o f f i c i a l s nere eager t o

screen out f r o 3 t h e 7 5 , ~ WSen:iin prisoners of wr held by t h e United

S t a t e s forces i n Czechoslovakia a l l wnbers of t!ie Gestapo a d o t h e r

p o l i t i c a l of enders y u i l t y of 'lazi crhies.

Cowter 1ntelli:;ence Corps

ar-ents c a r e f u l l y cyiecked a l l Cer.nan prisoners c f m r , i n accordance

v i t n t h e d i r e c t i v e s , t o d e t e r r h e whether they should be discharged

- 216 -

o r held f o r further investigation.

.hone those deYainedwere two

notorious Fazis, vrho were captured on 9 :lay 1945:

Hermann Frank,

Xeich Protector f o r 3ohemia and loravia, and Lonrad Henleiri, Fazi

IIenlein l a t e r co.l...Yitted suicide

Tart:. leader f o r t h e Sudetenland.

t o avoid tria1.(66)
226.

Geman F'risoners of .tar.

%r:!ra prisoners of war i n t h e established camps throughout

t h e area, nu-ibering about 70,000 Zen, were dischzr;led s o raFidly t h a t

by the end of Luly there rei.akecl but so:ne 35,030.

UnJer hos?italization

in t h e area were scme 15,000 Grcan prisoners of wer znd 1,600 German

The hospitals were staffed by k r . x n x i l i t a m :-.ersonnel

civilians.

w d e r t k e control of V.5.
227.

::edical 3epartment supervisorj. team.(&)

Expulsion of Germans from t h e Sudetenland.

a.

3y far the ;Lost serious problem faced by :',le occupying

troops vias t:iat o f t h e Ceman-speaking population o f t h e Sudetenland.

T h i s area, composin;; t h e nort'iem, western, and southern borders of

Czechoslovakia, had been included r'.ithin t h e borders of t h e Republic

s i n c e i t s forciatior, in 1918.

Since t h e people of t h i s area had been

used a s a pawn by the l'azis in t ' l e i r syste.mtlc destruction of t h e

Czech state i n 1938 ard 1939, it bas cot unnatural t h a t the Czechs,
on regaining t'leir inclependence i n 19L5, ehould desire t o expel these
people f r o s Czechoslovakia i n order t o saf elward therrsclves against

any f u t u r e repetition.

..hiZe t h i s was Arharil;ra Czech problem

r a t h e r than one a f f e c t i n g the Enited S t a t e s troops, it nevertheless

217

presented a problem, sir?ce t h e t r o o p s , unacquainted w i t h t h e 'oackgrould

of t h e matter, tended t o consider the imwier of e x p l s i o n unduly harsh.

There was a l s o t!ie e d d i t i o n a l probleni of border c o n t r o l , s i n c e t h e
.yudeten SerrraLs ::'ere n e a r l y a1v;a:;s expelled i n t o t h e United S t a t e s %one
was t e n p o r a r i l y
of Ger;nanyv. ( 6 8 ) - 3 i l e t h e expulsion of' Sudeten .7k?rii9ai1s

sus?ended ir! t h e s u x ? e r of 19h5, pend.ir.:: a study by t n e ; i l l i e d Control

Couccil t o deter::Lne inow many &i-~a,n expellees f ro:n l i b e r a t e d ric;.Lions
each n a t i o n a l 20,-.e could absorb, i l l e g a l crossings colitinued, a d
i x i l i t a r y units reported t h a t o n l j about cne-tenth of t h e 9 r s o n s
a t t e n - t i n g t o e n t e r Cermany i l l e g d l y could be restrt?iried. (69)

The

bulk of o f f i c i a l expulsions occurrcd a f t e r Unite& S t a t e s t r o o p s had

left Czechoslovzkia a t t h e end of :{ovember 19b5;

nevertheless,

United S t e t e s t r o o p s hzd :rade t h e i r sympathies s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r

t o cause t h e Sudetenlmders t o believe t h a t t h e fo:mer were i n

Czechoslovakia c h i e f l y t o s h i e l d t h e l a t t e r frow t h e Szechs. (70)

228.

;kl.ations between Czechs and hnericans.

a.

. k i t h t h e exception :-loted above, z n excelLent u n d e r s t a i d i n g

e x i s t e d between Szechs a i d Knited S t a t e s nersonnel, and c o n t i . x e d

e f f o r t s were made on both s i d e s t o maintain f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s .

Anerican

t r u c k s and g a s o l i n e x e r e e l l o c a t e d t o Czech a L r i c u l t u r e i n t h e summer

of

1945;

a heay.7 enuipnent s c h o o l

VKLS

established i n s i l s e n t o teach

United S t z t e s f o r c e s an2 Czech c i v i l i a n er.;ineers

the nse and ::lainten-

ance of heavy em-tli-~:orkin~: e q u i p x n t , which l i x l 'see!: s u p y l i e s t o t h e

Szechs t o assist i n r e h a h i l i t 3 t i o n .

218

T!ie sexdin; o f Unlted iiations

Relief and l e h a ' o i l i t a t ion ..&ini st r a t i o n sil > ? l i es t o

<2 echc Slovakia

was lar;e l y a n ', e r i c a n r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . (71)

b.

Close c o n t a c t an6 f rier,dl;.

w i t h t h e Szech ; r e s .

.&

r e l a t i o n s were ! ? a i n t a h e d

cor!tinuous flow of i n f o r n a t i o n as t o t h e

a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Lynited Sti.tes f o r c e s in Czec'ioslovakia and elewhere

vias r i v e n t o r e ? r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e Czech p r e s s , ar-d f u l l coveraze of

a l l news eveilts vias obt'a4ned by c l o s e cooperation.
were given i d e n t i f i c c i t i o n bad;es

Fress representatives

t o p e r d t ti.err.ready access t o all

events. (72)
c.

C o u n t e r i n t e l l i p e n c e personnel maintained c l o s e r e l a t i o n s

n i t h t h e Czec? p o l i c e 2nd cooperated w i t h them i n uncovering and

apprehending Axis war c r i : i n a l s and o t h e r !xrsona.lities of counterintelligence interest.

:-any such .persons were turned over t o t h e

Czech a u t h o r i t i e s f o r t r i a l by t l t e r n , i n c l u d i n g : : o n s e i g e u r Tiso, t h e
puppet s r e s i d e n t o f Slovakia d u r i n g t h e %r"n accusation. (73)

d.

The Szeclis themselves d i d much t o maintain t h e good

r e l a t i o n s between -he tv:o nations.

.a ".-z:er.ican I n s t i t u t e " was

e s t a b l i s h e d w i t ? a xiin o f f i c e i n I!ra;ue and branciies i n

3~16r i l s e n .

'

arienbad

I t s p r o ram, i n a d d i t i a n t o pronoting b e t t e r Czech-herican

understanding, ;vas t o h r i n ? t o E c t h e r Zzec:is w.!o had s t u d i e s in t i e

United .?tates and t o assist ..t:clerj cans i n t e r e s t e d i n p r o f e s s i o n a l ,
s o c i a l , and c u l t u r a l a c t i v i t i e s . (74)

- 219 -

229.

13.elatioiis with t h e Soviet Forces.

a.

m,.'kilet h e United S t a t e s forces occupied t h e .art of

Czechoslovakia west of t h e Budejovice, :'ilsen, and Karlsbad line,

and inclufirq those t h r e e towns, t h e Soviet f o r c e s occu?ied t h e p a r t

of Zzechcslovakia l y i n g e a s t o f t h a t Line.

;:el&ions between t h e

LTnited S t a t e s and Soviet f o r c e s viere f r i e n d l y .

Zussian-speaking

personnel i n t h e XXII ",r?s were b . s u f f i c i e n t , honever, t o maintain

l i a i s o n w i t h t h e Soviet f o r c e s and t o serve as i n t e r p r e t e r s .
Sonsequently, a rec!uest was rcade t o t h e G-2 Section of t h e Third Army
f o r two Ttussian ' i l i t a r y I n t e r p r e t e r Teaqs.
each c o n s i s t i n g of two o f f i c e r s

These were obtained,

four e n l i s t e d inen.

s t a t i o n was e s t a b l i s h e d a t .:okycany,

.. l i a i s o n

a border point betseen t h e

United S t a t e s and Soviet zones of occupation and on t h e main highway

between ? i l s e n and PrreLxe, and s t a f f e d with one o f f i c e r and t n r e e men.
Its mission was t o f x i l i t a t e crossings of t h e c o n t r o l l i n e and t o
rcaintain l i a i s o n w i t h Soviet forces a t this coint.
"hers

EJI

The reilraining

of t h e two tearis were r e t a b e d a t t h e Seadquarters of t n e

Corps, where t h e y could a c t as hssian i n t e r p r e t e r s , t r a n s l a t o r s ,

end couriers. (75)

b.

For an e f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l of t h e :!Lovernent of personnel

i n t h e Corps area o r crossing t h e Toviet-.t-aerican control l i n e , a

v i s i t o r s ' bureau was s e t up i n t h e headquarters of t h e XXII Corps,
operated under t h e superv;-sion of t h e 5-2 section.

The bureau was

s t a f f e d with United S t a t e s personnel and witn Czech civilian

i n t e r p r e t e r s speaking Szech, 3ussian, Cerrnan, and Cnglish.

220

bong

i t s functions was t h e i s s u e of ,?XI1 Sorps c i r c x l a t i o n passes f o r t r a v e l

withir, t i e corps area, and ?ussian-kaerican

control l i n e pennits f o r

t r a v e l i n t o t h e 2ussian zone o f Czechoslovakia by U.S.

-lrrny verscnnel

on o f f i c i a l dutr or corzpassionate leave.

c.

The o n l y point of disagreement between United S t a t e s and

Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s in Czechoslovakia arose in connection rvith t h e

Soviet policy of " l i v i n g off t n e countrj."

The Czech Govermient had

authorized the requisitioning by Soviet forces of l o c a l supplies and

also s u p p l i e s located within t h e United S t a t e s zone of Dccupation.

The U.S.

.army,

however, refused t o p e m i t requisitioning i n t h e i r

zone by rnembers of t h e Soviet ."qy.(77)

230,

::ithdrawal of United S t a t e s 'I'roops from Czechoslovakia.

a.

.'.s e a r l y

as June 1945 t h e question of withdrawal of

United S t a t e s troops was discussed.

%en t h e S t a t e 3epartlnent raised

t h e point, it was r e p o r t e d t h a t Fresident Senes, though desirous t h a t

both United S t z t e s and Soviet forces lezve t n e country, asked that

k i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s remain f o r t h e present enti t h a t t h e i r eventual
withdrawal be synchronized with t h a t of t h e Soviet forces. (78) I n
t h e middle o f Z1d.y 1945, t h e Szech Soverment rnade

2.

f o r m 1 request

t h t l'nited S t a t e s troops be withdrawn, simultaneously with Soviet

troops. (79) Toward t h e 16ddle of Septenber, houever, it was noted
t h a t Soviet withdrawal froE Szecnoslovakia proceeded slowly, i f a t
a l l , and Czech officials hegar? t o ex?ress considerable concern. (80;
A t this time ?resident ?enes infor. ~ 1 1 yrequested t h e United S t a t e s

t o draw up a withdrawal plan and request t h e Soviet Uriion t o provide

a si.?lilar )lan.

The I r e s i d e n t suggested t h a t , i f t h e Soviet a u t h o r i t i e s

refused, t h e Lxited S t a t e s should give t h e w i d e s t p u b l i c i t y t o t h e

r e f u s a l . (81)
b.

I n e a r l y Cctober 1945 p l a n s f o r t h e withdrawal of troops

were formulated.

Cne corps with two divisions was t o remain in

Czechoslovakia u n t i l 15 ;'ove::ber

1945.

If c o . q l e t e nithdrawal of

United 3taktes troops by t h a t date proved impossible, t h e occupational

t r o o p b a s i s of t h e i'uropean Theater ::odd have t o h e increased.(82)
Later staterzents of :my o f f i c i a l s sugcested t h a t t n e Uiiited S t a t e s
f o r c e s would leave as soon as t;ie haphazard evacuation of Sudeten

Ter - - a s could be c:Iaiged i n t o an orderly evacuation , regardless o f

Soviet plans f o r evacustion.(83)

The S t a t e

e?art.nent f i n e l l y

requested t h e '.'ar De:;art::ient t o postpone t h e dzte f o r the United

S t a t e s withdrawal t o 1 DeceAer L945 , and t h e Yar 9epart.i:ent agreed
t o this. (84)
c.

Crders were issued f o r t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e evacuation

on 20 :'ovenber 1945 am. i t s cornpletion by 1 3ecmiber lj45. Cn 13

Y'ovember all troops attached o r assigned t o tlie X L I Corps had been

a l e r t e d t o t h e f a c t t l i & all United S t a t e s troops would c l e a r
Czechoslovakia b;- midnizht on 30 I7ove::iber 191;5 and that d1 United

S t a t e s supplies a,,d instal1atior.s would be evacmted from 2zechslovakia.

The siove was c a r r i e d out on schedule, and by 1 Decezber 1945 a l l
T!nited S t a t e s t r o o n s had l e f t Czecimslovakia. (85)

- 222 -

FOOTNOTES

FOCTMOTES

Chapter I

1.

See pars 14-23.

2.

Ibid .
-

3.

Seventh b u y , Report of Operations 1-31 b y 19Lt5, G-2 Xistory.

4.

Stars and StriPes, 9 Xay

5.

Ibid, 8 Xay 45.

6.

a 1 0 my 45.

7.

PBQ, 13 U y 45.

8.

S H W Press Releases Nos 1455, U56, 1457, 10 Xay

1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 11 l!ay 45.

9.

SHAJF, =War

10

45.

45; and Nos

Room Daily Sur.nraary, C;p 9/10 my 45.

SkW, E 3 Xonthly War Diary, :.hy

4 5 , file GCT 314.61-1 Fxec.

11. S t a r s and S t r i p e s , 14 Xay 45, Reuter from Allied Zediterranem

Headquqrters, 11 t;ay k5.

12

Baltimore Sun, rlF, Oslo, 20

13

Newsweek, 25 Jun 45,

14

S t a r s and S t r i p e s , 6 Jwi 45.

15

u.,
5 Jun 45; Chicago Sun, 28 ;Lay 45;
No 23, Hq, 12th A r m y Group t o Armies.

16.

F i f i e e n t h k n q , IieDort of Operations. 16 Ax-10 Jul 45.

17

45.

L e t t e r of Instruction

T h i r d Army, Report of ODerations. 9 Zay-30 Sep 45.

18. Ninth dr;ny, tieport of Operations, 1 Xay-15 Jun 45.

19- F i f t e e n t h Army, Report of 0.erations, 16 A p r - l O Jul 41.
20.

SHAEF, G-3 iionthly %ar Diary, ;;aS 45, file GCT

- 223 -

314.81-1 Exec.

FOOTKOTZS-CHAFTEX

I (continued)

21.

S M F , S-3 Var Room Daily Sumnary, Op 13/14 iday 45;

Release No 1513, 17 Ray 45.

22.

Fifteenth Arrqy, Zeport of Operations. 16 Apr-10 Jul .&I

23

E 3 i3attles Studies, Sumaarsr of Cperations 1 2 t h A x m y h u e ;

Third AT,
E 3 Historical Rem& , 9-31 Xay 45.

W Bress

24. Stars and Stripes, 9 May 45, AP, London, 8 b y ; S M F Press

Release, Naval Teras of Surrender, hky 45.
25

S!?%F Press Release No 1496, 15 h!ay 45.

26.

SHAiCF, G-2 Yeekly I n t e l l i m n c e S w a m , 6 May 45.

27

SHrlEF,

28.

Ibid, Op 11/12 U y

29

S.WF Press Release No U96, 15 !'ay 45.

30.

Stars and Stripes,

31

:;xT, qy-3 ~ a -1:ofi:

r

32.

Stars

and Stripes, 17 Xay 45.

33.

>-Ibid

7 Jun 45,

G 3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 1O/ll May 45.

45.

18 Lay 45.
*

~wnary,OP 18/19 a y 45.

nil::

Up, Lisbon,

34. S W F , G 3 'Eiar Room Daily

35. S t a r s

Portugal, 6 Jun.

Su;iunary, Op 3/4 Jun

45.

and Stripes, 27 my l t 5 , Reuter, 26 May.

36.

Ibid, 8 Eky 45.

37

-9

38.

S t a r s and Stripes, 9 liay 45.

39

E 3 Battle Studies, Third A r m y Gperations in Bavaria; Cable

3-31966, 6 Lkq~45, 12th Army Group t o T.lird and iiinth Armies,
sgd Bradley; Third A r q , G3 Iiistorical Report, 9-31 %Y 45;
SHAEF, G-J-Lontiily
.Yar Diary. Yay L5a file GCT 314.61-1 Exec.

40

G,1 Battle Studies, T h i r d Army Operations i n Bavaria;

Army, G3 f i i s t o r i c a l Report, 9-31 i:ay 45.

Ibid

10 Lay L+5; Third

w,E 3 Historical

- 221e -

Seport, 9-31

crlas 45.

Third

FOOTNOTES-CUPTEi

4.l.

Third Army, G3 Historical ReDort. 9-31 &Y

42.

S t a r s and S t r i p e s , 1 5 jliay 45.

43.

Third Army, G 3 Historical Zeport, 9-31 Laay 45.

u. Third :\my and Eastern f i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t ,

I (continued)

45.

Report of Operations,

9 May-30 Sep 45.

45.
46

For more detailed informtion, see monograph, W i v i l Affairs,Il

Occupation Forces i n Europe Series, 1945-46, chap III.
Cable S-96715, 6 Jul 45, S U E F k i n sgd Tedder t o 12th A m y
Group, ACXAR, AEHQ, 15th Army Group, CaM Z.
Third Army, Information Bulletin, Wrtelligence heview," t3 iday 45
(U Ariny G r o ' W 2 Periodic 2eport. Lay 45,
annex No 3, No 240 dated 2 Yay 45; 'Aeekly Intelligence Xeport,
Naval Intelligence Division, iiaval Staff Admiralty, HM Navy,
No 270 dated 11b y 45.

47

46. S
49

W Press Releases, 2 B y 45.

. SXW

Press Releases, 1-10 B y 45.

50.

Cable FtD-207l.4, 6 2ay 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower t o 30 Military

Mission, Edoscow

51

Cable RID-20904, 7 Yay

52.

Cable FND-21068, 9 my 45, S W F'wd sgd S C Z to EXFOB T U .

53. Ltr.Omers,

S;LBP,

45, SKAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF t o EXFOR

Lain.

G3 Div (Fwd), 13 'Ay 45, file GCT 387-8 Ops (C).

54.

Sable FYD-21085, 9 Lay 45, SK-U i%vd sgd SCAEF t o 3XFOR.

55

Cable ;9-24345, 17 3 y 45, W i t a r y Xission, iioscow, sgd Archer

to SH.EF F'wd t o Eisenhouer, A m :'or CCS and A;LsSC f o r B r i t i s h
Chiefs of Staff.

56.

L t r Orders, S:-IAEF,

57

56.

ll

Xay

&5, file GCT-7 Ops (C) . to General Books.

Cable R'ID-210g2, 9 Kay 45, S W F Fwd sgd Zisenhoxer, t o 30

Yilitary blission, Lbscow.

Cable 2, 10 Lay 45, SHazF K d sgd Zisenhower t o OKK.

- 225 -

EKIOTNOTES--CHAPTEFi

59

I (cont h u e d )

Ltr, 3 W 7 , E?Div (Fwd), 13 Kay 45, f i l e GCT 387-8 Ops C,

t o General of Infantry Fangehr, Wii Liaison detachaent.

60

Cable EiD-21456, l.4 .ay 45, SHAEF Fwd t o SHAEF Control P a r t y

( O W ) f o r Rooks.

61.

Cable RD-2l475, U 'Xay 45, SKAEF F'wd, sgd SCkEF t o SHilEF

Control Party OUT f o r Rooks.

62. Cable PEl-21547, 20 L y 45, S W F Fwd sgd SCMF t o 6th, 12th

and fist Amy Groups; S W Control P a r t y 0IC.V; and ANCXF
Bin.

63. Cable FI1YD-Z?O9l, 21 stay 45, S W sgd

S C U F t o 1 2 t h and 6th
Groups; Cable FWD-22222, 23 iday 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd S C W
t o S W Control Party OKW.

64.

65

W G3 Div, 17 ;*lay 45, file CCT 38&3-1/GPS;

Cable
FVYD-22322, 24 2ay 45, S W h d sgd SCUF t o S W Control

Ltr, S

Party OW.

Admiral Dbnitz and most members of h i s s t a f f were menbers of

several a r r e s t categories determined upon p r i o r t o t h e occupation
of Germany. For irlstance, J o i n t Chief of S t a f f Directive No
1023/6 provided t h a t all men;bers of t h e Reichskabinet, all members
of t h e High Command, including Army, Navy, and A i r Force, a l l
members of t h e General S t a f f Corps, all high o f f i c e r s of t h e
Nazi Party, all ::enbers of paramilitary organizations, and a l l
members of t h e German Intelligence Service should be automatically
arrested when apprehended. b s t members of t h e DUnitz "governmentf1
f e l l i n t o several of these categories.

66, Cable FWD-21846, 18 Xay 45, S

67

W Fwd sgd Eisenhoyier t o IICGI'AR t o

CCS.

Cable FY&2189;,
to ccs.

19 h y 45, S W Fwd sed Eisenhower t o B G U R

68.

Ltr, SXAEF, G3 '3iv (Fwd), 22 Lay 45, f i l e GCT 322.01-2/GPs.

59

T h e , 4 Jun 45.

7m.

Cable 5-91271, 17 Jun 45, S W U a i n sgd Zisenhower t o Xinisterial

Control Party OKi South f o r iiatkins.

71

- 226 -

FOCTHOTES-CWTER

I (continued)

73.

Cable Fm-22531, 1 5 b y 45, S W F Fwd t o SHAD &in, AlJCXF';

Cable E'VD-21758, 17 M@y 45, SHAD Fwd sgd Eisenhoxer t o major
commands.

74.

Cable 67, 26 May 45, SHAZF Control Farty OK;; f o r Rooks t o SLUF
Fw
' d for B u l l .

75.

Cable i%D-22568, 28 k y 45, S W Fwd sgd Sisenhower t o :rZnisterial

Control Farty OKd (Flensburg) f o r i'iatkins X n i s t e r i a l Control
Party OKK (Munich) for Naring.

76.

S W F , G4 Div Beport, 2 Jun 45.

77.

Cable FtD-23664, 5 Jun 45, S W sgd disenhoNer t o 12th Army Group

Lain f o r G 1 f o r Robertson, US CCC, HUchst, S W t%in f o r B r i t i s h
CC Component. SHAEF Special Echelon,

78.

Ltr, S

79.

SGS Files No >91.1 Germany, 3 1 Jan 45-16 Nov 45, "Disposition

of German X i n i s t r i e s and Agencies;" L t r of Instpuctions Sent
t o Director of Intelligence, USCCC by Byran L. Milburn, Brig

W Fwd, 13 Jun 45, f i l e AG 370-7 ET-AW, subj:

"Xinisterial Collecting Center,!' t o CG, 1 2 t h A m y Group.

Gen, CSC.
80, W h " e s of Leeting Concerning Troop Requirements f o r L i n i s t e r i a l
15 Oct 45.
Collecting Center," G3 Div, Hq USFET (%in),

81. L t r , USFZT G 3 Div, 19 Oct 45, f i l e XT.350.05/OFS, subj:

"iiid.sterial Collecting Center (Kassel) 'I; Cable S-268110,
22 i c t 45, USFLT sgd Sisenhuwer t o Q'GUS;
Cable S-33552,
2 3ec 45, USFTT sgd YcNarney t o O-ZUS, Hq Berlin X s t r i c t ,
CG 7 t h Xrq.

82.

L t r , 0. GUS, 5 Jan 46, f i l e PIG 322-132 (31) subj:

of U a t e r i c l Collecting Center t o Berlin. I f

83.

itAccount of the Activities of the X i n i s t e r i a l C o l l c c t i n g Center,"

by Xajor John F. *ieineck of the 7771st Docurr-ent Center.

lttoveiuent

84. A l i s t of enactmefits p r i o r t o 14 July 45 i s t c be found in

USWT, G:-GUS, ;:G s e d a t i o n s , t i t l e 23, U G Legislation,!!
part
85.

n.

Ibid.

- 227 -

FGGTNCT.'dS--CHAPTZR

86.

m.

87.

Stars and Stripes, 29 hby 45.

SR.

Third . h y a EXD,

@.

USFZT,

90.

See par 131, below.

oxr~s,~

e r a t i o n s , 9-31 UTl&.
i s t o 4
of

o ~ i m ~ ( u s c pby-NOV
~c.
G.

- 228 -

I (cont h u e d 1

Chapter

II

1.

Xemo, S U F , 11 Jul 44, f i l e S W 21234/0 & E, o r SGS 322

ETOUSA, subj: Qeorganization in t h e ETO. t1

2.

idem, SKUF, 21 Jul 44, f i l e SGS 322 ETGUSA, t o t h e C/S, sgd DDE.

3.

00

66, DGUSA, 17 Apr 45.

4. Memo, S W , 22 Jul U , f i l e SG5 322 ETOUS.4, subj:

lladministration

o f American Theater.

5.

b m ~ ,SHAEF,

t h e ETO.

11 Jul

45,

f i l e SCS 322, subj:

%Aeorganization in

'1

6.

S t a f f Study, G b SHAEF, 18 Sep 44, f i l e SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj:

I'Organization and Co.;nmand of US Forces*f t o C/S, sgd Rob'". Crawford,
lSaj Gen, USA, ACofS, G4.

7.

Ltr, ETOUSA, 5 Xay 45, f i l e 322.011 OpCS, subj: "Duties and

R e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of t h e Deputy Tneater Commander 11

8.

See par

9.

Memo, SHAEF, 1 6 Jul 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj:

Order of t h e Organization of t h e EM," sgd VBS.

34, above.

10. L t r , SHAEFj ll Jul LA, f i l e SGS 322, ETOUSA, subj'

. and Functions of CG, COLI 2.11

" D r a f t Ceneral
"i3esponsibilitier

11. CO 118, COL; 2, 29 Jun b5, see I.

12. The breakdown i n t o corps and divisions as given i n this s e c t i o n
is t&%enfrorn t h e Biennial Report of t h e Chief of S t a f f f o r period
1 JU~
43 t o 30 J U 45.
~

13. Cable W68, 13 Kay 45, London sgd Winant t o State Dep.
11. Cable r1;-23985,

28 Jun 45, AGUR from IIlkilcOS t o ETOUSA Main.

15. Memo, US P o l ddv t o L t Gen ii.B. Smith, C/S, SHUF and L t Gen
Lucius D. Clay, Dep fil Gov, Geraany, 11 Jul 45.

- 229 -

FOOTNOTiS-4HirpTEa

11 (continued)

16. EAC, 26 Jul 45, :&Utes of Meeting held at Larsaster House,

London, Shl, on 26 Jul 45 at 1900 h,

17

Cable 'a-24456, 29 Jun 45, ACFiiAil from CCS t o S W U t o

Eisenhower, A F I Q to Alexander, US LLi Xission t o Deane and

Gammell.
18.

Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 1-31 Jul 45.

19

Cable S-12796,
for JCS.

20.

12th Army Gp, G3 Report No 401, I3 Jul 45.

21.

12th A r q r Gp, G3 Report No 399, 9 Jul 45.

22

See monograph on "Supply, Procurement, Storage, and Issue,"

Occupation Forces i n Europe Series. 1945-46,

23

Cable FlEle-2yI.5, 10 Jun 45, SHAEF FWD sgd Eisenhower t o BGYJA61

for CCS.

24.

Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 1-31 Jul 45.

25

Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, U S E T 3Eain sgd Eisenhower t o AGiAR

for JCS,

26.

USFA, Beport of Cperations. 8 Lias.-30 Sep

27

Ibid.
-

26.

See monogra?h, C i v i l Affairs," Occupation Forces i n Europe

Series 1945-46, chap 111.

29.

Cable YbX-24456, 2
j Jun 45, .iGJ!AE from CCS t o S H - W Akin t o
Zisenhower, AF4? t o Alexander.

30.

Cable CO 159A, 30 Jun 45, EXFOR d i n t o VI11 Corps D i s t , XXX

Corps D i s t , TAC 7 l"d Div.

31.

Cable

32.

USFA, R e p o r t of Gperations, U Corps. 8 Lhy-30 Sep 45.

17 Jul 45, USFZT U i n sgd Eisenhower t o AWAR

42.

S-12796, 17 Jul 45, U S E T Kah sgd Eisenhower t o

for JCS.

- 230 -

aC;I;'AR

F O O T P J O T E S - 4 H ~ 11 (continued)

33. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Kain

sgd Eisenhower to AGAR

for JCS.

34.

See moncgraph, tlCivil hffairs," Occupation Forces in Europe

Series 1945-46, chap 111.

35.
36.

Cable S-95715, 6 Jul 45, S

W W n agd Tedder to 12th Arw Gp,

AKiAii, S K G , 15th A r m y Cp, Cog 2.

See monograph, " C i v i l Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe

Series 19J+5-&6,

chap III.

37. Cable tU-2f+456, 29 Jun 45,

AGVihFi from CCS to S

Eisenhower, AFHQ for Alexander.

- 231 -

W Elain f o r

FOOTNOTES
Chapter IXI

1.

Crlmea Conference Cominunique, 3-11 Feb 45, sgd Wnston S .

Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, J.V. Stalin.

2.

See par 155, below.

3.

See pars

53-57, below.

4.

V i D , 30 Jun 4J+, Spec Planning Div, fieport on t h e S t a t u s of

Demobilization and Postwar P l d n q .

5.

EAC Report,

6.

L t r , S H M , 17 Apr 45, f i l e cCT/388-3/US,

14 Nov 44.
subj:

'IUS Theater

Organization. It

7.

Xemo, S W , 8 Jun L5, subj:

Aspects of t h e Problem."

8.

Cable FWD-22471, 28 Xay 45, S'MF from Eisenhower t o

Urshall

9.

Cable E-56393, 17 Jun 45, STOUSA Yain sgd Devers t o ETOUSA FdD.

W S Theater Organization General

AE;IyAfi

for

10.

u.
%"nd

12.

JCS l.400, 28 Jun 4.5, subj:

Austria.

13

GO 154, USFETj l.4 Jul 45, sec I.

Directive f o r Germany and

l4. S t a f f Study, 12th Army Gp, 4 Jan 45, f i l e 323.33 (G-3), subj:
" T e r r i t o r i a l Organisation of US Zone of Occupation, Germany."

15

Lemo, S H W , G-3 3iv, 26 Jan 45 , f i l e GCT-387 . ~ ~ / P H,Psubj :

" T e r r i t o r i a l Cirganization of t h e United S t a t e s Zone of

Occupation, Germany," approved, 27 Jan 45, by Y.B. Smith, CofS.

16.

17

Cable CA-11685,

25 May 45, CONAD t o C0;lt 2 .

- 232 -

FUOTNOTES--CHLTSR 111 (,Zontinuedl

18. W: 2 , 28 :Jar 45, P l a n n i n ~Directive S e r i e s K, Operation ECLIPSE.

a9

Cable E-11668, 22 Feb 45, ETOUSA from Lord t o SH%F for Crawford.

20.

Staff Study, S W F , 23 Feb 45, file 231/GDP-l,

o f COX Z Yonconcurrence."

21.

L t r , COE: %,
Comands. I'

22.

GO 159, USXCY, 17 Jul 45.

23

Cable S-13239, 20 Jul 45, USF,T t o CC-' Z.

24. 12th

L!+Jd. 45, file !iG 322 OpO, subj:

Army Gp,

(3-3 Report !To 345, 16 Xay 45.

Arw

G3 Report KO 435, 14 ;ul 45.

Gp,

25.

12th

25

GO 168, USFET, 21 Jun 45, sec I.

27

subj:

llAnalysis

"GO2 Z Service

12th Army Cp, C-3 heport Eo W6, 26 Jul 45.

45, sec II.

28.

00 306, USFET, 6 Ilov

29.

12th Arrng Cp, E 3 Report KO 3 U , 1 5 Uay 45.

30.

12th tlrnpr Gp, E 3 Report No 352, 23 Xay 45.

31.

USET, AG Oprs Card Files, Frankfurt, Gemmy.

32.

1 2 t h Army Gp, G3 Report No

33. 12th Army

Gp,

G3

Fieport

375, 15 Jun 45.

No 398, 7 Jul 45.

34. USFET, AG Oprs Card Files, Frankfurt, Germany.

35.

Cable EX-52150, 1 J u n 45, co1, Z to DEB.

36.

Chanor Base Sec, Report of Operations, 8 Uay-20 F e u .

37. USFET, G3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, Wontfly

Redeployment Progress. I)

38

39

Did.
USFET, G3 Div, 30 Juri 45, Wonthly Xedeployqmt I'rogress.fI

- 233 -

FOOTNCTES--CHAFTEH IXI (continuedl

USFET, G3 Div, Redeplopent Branch, 31 Oct 45, Wionthly
Redeployment Progress,

Ibid. Throughout this section, figures for actual shipments

a r e taken from the Theater Headquarters, E 3 Division, Redeploy-

nent Branch, Wonthly Redeployment Progress'' for October 1945,

while t h e forecasts for June shipments a r e taken from t h e report
by E 3 Division f o r June. Actual figures f o r shipu;ents for May
and JwLe are taken from t h e October report rather than t h e June
report because of t h e f a c t that, during early redeployment,
s t z t i s t i c s were difficult t o keep and thus subject t o inaccuracies.
I n orcter t o obtain an accurate set of figures, s t a t i s t i c s were
worked over i n September of 1945. These were published i n t h e
October Uonthly Redeployment Progress. '1
42.

USFET,

G 3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

43.

US",

G 3 Div, 30 Jun 45, l%onthly Redeployment Progress.'I

44.0 USmT, G3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct k5, Wonthly

Redeployment Progress

45

Ibid.
-

46.

USF",

4?

USFET, G3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, Uonthly

Progress Report ,11

48.

USFET, G3 Div, 30 Jun 45, IXonthly Progress Report."

49.

USFET, Bedeplopent Coordinating Group, Report of Operations

17 Apr 45-28 Feb&(, annex rrBrr.

G3 Div, 30 Jun 45, Wontbly liedeployment Progress."

USFEX, G3 Div, 30 Jun 45, Wonthly Progress Reportoft

USFET, US, G3 Div, ReDort on Hedeploymsnt , Nov 46.

UsFET, G3 Div, 31 Oct 45, Illdonthly Progress Report.8q
USF'ET, E 3 Div, 31 Jul 45, Wonthlg Progress Reportotl

USFET, G3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Cct 45, Wonthly

Progress Report.('
55.

Bid.
- 234 -

-_-

FOOTNCTES--CHAPTER XI1 (continuedl

56. USFET, G3 Div, Report on Redeploymnt, Nov 46.

57. See chap I, pars U-23,above.
Army Group P l a n f o r Operation ECLITPSX,~~4 h y

5s.

%!th

59.

L t r , Hq, ETOUSA, 8 A p 45, file AG 383.6 Opck, subj:

Citizens of t h e Soviet Union.Il

60.

COX 2, ProfJress Report, May 1945, sec I.

61.

EXLIFSE &no 17, 16 Apr 45, par 20, sec F.

62.

SHMF DisbandT.ent Directive, 15 Xay 45, 130s 1 & 2.

45, annex 7.
IILiberated

63. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 18 Kay 45, No 3.

5 Jun 45, No 4.

64.

SH&F Disbandment Directive,

65

W Disbandment Directive, 30 Jun 45, Bo 5.

66.

W Disbandment Directive,

6 Jul 45, No 6 .

. Ltrs,

67

ETOUSA, 25 Oct and 11 Nov 44, file AG 383.6 OpGA, subj:

I1Repatriation, Secovery, and Rehabilitation of American Prisoners
of Nar i n Europe.!

68. SHAEF, 1 5 Mar 45, Y3tre&$h

Px-Gl Div.

of POW Camps i n G e r q as known t o

It

69.

SOP 58, ETOUSA, 3 Apr 45, subj:

70

TSFiT, S t a f f Conference Leport, 7 Sep 45.

71

Cable YX-70557, 20 Apr 45, AGSCA?i?i t o S

W e t al.

72.

S F ! , 3 Jun 44, f i l e AG 383,7-IGG-AW,

Outline P l a n f o r Refueee

%ece;tion, Processing, Claintenace, and Disposition of Recovered Allied Z i l i t a r y Personnel.

and DPIs.
W Administrative Memo 39, 25 Xov 44, appendix lfClf, subj:
Wnployment of U Personnel with B:ilitary Forces.l1

73.

74.

Handbook f o r U i t a r y Government in Germam P r i o r t o Defeat o r

Surrender, Dsc 44, part III.

- 235 -

III (continued)

FWTJOTES-CHkYTEB

-.

75. Ibid

76. Ibid.

77. L t r , S M F ,

8 Jul

DP Ekecutive."

45,

f i l e AC 363.7-1 C&AGb&

"Combined

subj:

78.

Ltr, S I W , 18 Dec 4l+, f i l e AG 383.7-1 GEAW, subj: "kesponsi b i l i t y f o r Assembly C n t e r s f o r DPls and hefugees.ll

79.

For further infomation, see mnograph, "Displaced Persons,I'

Occumtion Forces i n Europe Series, 1945-46, chap I.

80.

BSWT, General Board, Study No 35, undated, DP's, Refugees. and

see d l s o DP Rpt No 40, appendix 'lACt.

RJU"s;

81. B i d .
82.

The source f o r t a b l e I is OUWS, DP Div, Status of DPIs (USBritish and French Zones), 31 Jul 45. The figures f o r DP's
outside camps are estimates carried forward from 24 June, a f t e r
which date no estimates are available f o r %stern o r fleatern
Xilitary Districts

83.

General Board Study No 86, p 9.

a.

General Board Study No 86, p 9 .

85

Cable YE-18961, 19 Jun 45, AGKiil2 t o S W .

86.

Judge Advocate F i l e :
Trial., item 13.

e.

Ltr, USFET, 1 kug 45, f i l e AG 250.4,

Military Commissions. 11

88.

L t r , USET, un6ated, f i l e AG 000.5 ;;VCB-tiCO, subj:

War Crhes Cases.l$

89.

USF'ET, Theater JA, 2ewa-t of Operations. 8 Xay-30

90

Crimea Conference Communique, 3-11 Feb 45, sgd by Tiinston S.

Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and J.V. S t a i n .

91.

New York Times, 13 :.fay k5.

92.

fiecutive Order ~ J o 95rC7, 22 Xay 45.

iu'ar Crimes Trials and Procedure after

- 236 -

subj:

"huthority t o Appoint
"Trial of
Sep

45, pp 1-2.

FoOTNOTES--CWl'ER

III (continued)

93. Cable YE-18961, AG;:AFL t o S W .

94.

JCS 1023/10, 8 Jul 45.

95.

GD 128, ETOUSA, 17 Jun 45; amended by X) 182, USfiT, 7 Aug 45;

00 312, USFET, 20 ILov 45.

96.

Go 312, USFET, 20 ljov 45.

97.

GO

128, ETOUSA, 17 Jun 45.

98.

CO

l4.4,USFST, 4 Jul 45.

99.

GO 289, USFET,

14 Oct 45.

100. Ltr, LSET, 6 Aug k5, file AG 334 Q)S-AcO, subj: "Establishment
of the Office 02 t h e Army-Navy Liquidation Commission,"
101. Stars and Stripes, 13 Jun 45.

102. PRD Release No 15, U S E T , 14 Jul 45.

103, L t r , SHPJZF, 22 'Lay 45, to Srig Gen Marion V a n Voorst, American

Embassy, sgd J.B. Zoore XI, Col, Secretary General S t a f f .

- 237 -

FOOTNOTES
Chapter IV

VI, pars 152-54, below.

1.

For later developments,

2.

Cable

3.

GO 80, ETOUSA, 9 A u g 44.

4.

L t r , S W , 17 Feb 45, file 322, subj:

5.

GO 28, ETOUSA, 5 h!lar 45.

6.

Cable

7.

CO 22,

8.

USGpCC(G), &Utes

9.

L t r , ETOUSB, 31 Mar 45, f i l e 322, subj:

10.

Ltr, ETOUSA, 26 kpr 45, f i l e GCT.322.01,

ne

See chap I, pars 1-5, above.

12.

Berlin Declaration, 5 Jun 45.

;ii-75373, 5

see a l s o chap

kug 44, JCS t o SHUF.

CC-12381, 20 Xar 45, USGpCC(G)

IlHqs Comnand f o r USCpCC(G)."

to S W .

USGpCC(G), 15 h y 43.
of Xeeting of 10 Liar 45.

"fission of t h e USGpCC(G)."

subj: "The Belationship

of the Deputy Uitary Governor and t h e US Group Control Council
(Germny) t o t h e T h e a t e r Staff."

13 e ED, CG D i a r y , BD/FAA, 29 Jun 45.

u. TKl No 39,

BD/FAA, 30 Jun 45.

15. BD/FAA, C I S D i a r y , 1 Jul 45.

16. BD/FAA, C/S D i a r y , 7 Jul 45.

17. Cable +24669, 30 Jun 45, A G A R from 'NARCOS t o COMGENETO;
also chap 11, pars 45-51.
18. ACC ( G e r r i ) , '&Utes

of LZeeting, 30 Jul 45.

19. EAC, Minutes of Keeting, 14 Nov 44.

- 238 -

see

FOOTNOTES--CHATIB I V (continued)
20.

Histom of OMGUS (UScpCC(G)), ch2p 111.

21.

History OKCUS (USGpCC(G)3 , chap 11.

22

23.

LIoscow 3 e c l a r s t i o n on Austria, 1 Nov 43.

Cable F-46U2, 16 Uay k4, AFHQ t o AWAR.

24. Cable ;vx-20896, 27 Jan 45, U'X'OUSA

t o SHAEF.

25

USFA, USACA Sec, Xlitary Government, Austria, 30 Sep 46.

26.

Ibid .
-

27

Ibid .
-

28.

Cable FX-17725, 5 Jul 45, AFHQ to 15th Army Gp.

29

12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 400, 10 Jul l+5.

30. GO 1, USFA, 5 Jul 45.

31

JCS, 28 Jun 45, Comnanl Directive for Germany and Austria.

32-

Cable FX-17725, 5 Jul 45, AFHQ to 15th &my Cp.

33

Cable 0-721, 14 Jul 45, 85th GpAAF t o subordinate units.

34.

154, USFXT, 14 J U ~45.

- 239 -

Chapter V

1.

L t r , H q E'RUSA, 16 Jun 45, t o US Xcn'Party t o Berlin.

2.

Hq Berlin D i s t r i c t (Zasterwork), Strength Returns, 16 Jul 45.

3.

USHq B e r l i n D i s t r i c t & H q F i r s t Airborne A r i p y , History and

Report of Operations, 8 May-31 Dec 45, p t I.

4.

Enactments and Approved Papers of t h e Control Council and

Coordinating Committee, Allied Control Authority, Germany,
vol 1, 1945, p 23.

5.

u,
p 26.

6.

m, p 20.

7.

Ibid, p 20.

8.

m, p

9.

&g
p,75.

10.

GO 168, USZT, 23. Jul 45, aec I.

75.

LL. Go 177, USFET,

1 .lug 45, sec I.

G 3 Rpt Eo 31, 25

45.

12.

USFET,

13

See a l s o par 147.

14

CO 262, TSET, 21 Sep 45.

15

GO 361, TSET, 12 Dec 45, see I , 11, I V .

Xug

16

Bremen T o r t Command, Report of Operations. 9 Dec 45.

17

Gy:

18

GO 317, USFET, 26 ?!ov 45.

19.

CO 115, USSTAF, 16 nug 45.

20.

See

380, TSFLT, 29 Dec 45.

also Cha-her 111, secs 111, IV.

- 240 -

FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER

21.

Ltr, USF'ET, 21 Jul 45, file AG 322 GCT-AGO,

Organization.

22.

GO 167, TSFZT, 21 Jul 45.

23

00

V (Continuedl

subj:

"US Theater

355, USFET, 29 Dec 45.

24. TSFET, 1 Bug 45, Planning Directive Series L, No 1.

25.

TWLT, P r o q e s s Report, Aug 45.

26.

See pars 29-40.

27.

GO

28.

GO 244, USFZT, 15 Sep 45.

29

Go 259, USF'ET,

30.

For specific examples see pars 97-100 and 102-104.

179, U S L T , 2 Xug 45;

31- IJSFST,
32.

see also

0;)

199, TSFET, 16 Aug 45.

22 Sep 45.

OlLGUS, Proclamation No 2,

19 Se;, 45.

L t r , YSFET, 5 Jul 45, file AG Ol.4.1-1 (Gemany), c;E, aubj:

tlAssumption of Certain Xilitary Government Responsibilities.

33. GO 283, USFET, 8 Oct 45, sec X I , III.

34. See

a l s o chap

IV, pars 91-96.

35.

M 283, USET, 8 Oct 45, see I.

36.

Staff m a w , USFET, OELJS, (USZ), 17 Oct 45, f ile "

Plans 322
(MG) subj: "Separation of Military Government Organization from
.4rmy Tactical F i e l d Forces and Administrative and Supply Service.1)

37

GO 331, U S m , 11 Dec 45, sec II.

38,

T h i r d Amy, G5 Sec, Cuarterly Report of Operations. 1Oct-31 Dec 45.

39.

For d e t a i l s on t h e e a r l y occupation of Austria, see pars 97-100.

40.

USFA, USACA Sec, IjiG Austria, 30 Sep 46.

41.

U p , Austria, 1:00,000, Bezirk Boundaries

-24l-

- Vienna.

TCOTNDZFS--CWTER V (continuedl

-~

42- USFA,

IDG AUSTRIA, Rpt of t h e US Commissioner 120 1, Nov

43. Li0nthl.y Report of

i,;ilitary Government, US Zone, 20 Sep

45.
45.

44. Ibid.
45

. S t a r s and Stripes, 28 Jan 46.

46.

Monthly ,%port of K l i t a r y Government. US Zone, 20 Oct 45.

47

%nthly R e p o r t of Lzlitary Government. US Zone, 20

Nov 45.

18. Ibnthly Report of LCilitary Government. US Zone, 20 Dec 45.

49. Wntldy aeport of t h e X i t a w Governor, US Zone, 20 Aug 45.
50.

b n t W y Report of t h e L i l i t a r s Governor, US Lone, 20 Sep 45.

51.

USFET, PRD Release No 352, 1 5 Sep 45.

52

For further particulars see monograph

Forces i n Europe Series 1945-46.

53.

See also monograph, "The Care and Repatriation of Displaced Persons,"

Occupation Forces i n Europe Series 1945-46.

54. Hq,

Occupation

COY 2 , ETOUSA, Promess Report, June 45.

55. Cable MGl7l8, 20 Aug 45, EXFOR t o I Corps & &.

56.

Cable S-18908, 22 Aug 45, USWT i.:ain sgd Eisenl!:.-s*ert o TSF" Rear
f o r USECT !Zssion France.

57.

\iar Crimes Committee, Chartel. of t h e International IXLitary

Tribunal, 8 Aug 45.

58.

Hem, Chief International L a w Section, TJA, f o r Theater Jk,

16 Gct 45, subj: IfOrganization f o r Froceedings Against Axis
Criminals and Certain Cther Offeilders,fl par ll.

59.

L t r , IlSFET, 20 Sep 45, subj: "Identification and Apprehension

of Persons Suspected of :iar C r ~ n e so r Other Offensee, and T r i a l
of Certain Offenders.11.

60.

LIemo,

Chief Interriatiorial L a w Se,ctrLon, TJA f o r TneaLer JA,

16 Oct 45, subj: "Grganization f o r proceedings Against Axis
Criminals and C e r t k n Other Gffenders," par 10.

- 242 -

FCOTNOTZS--CHAPTEH

61.

PD Cable

V (contiriued)

';EL-38715, 18 Jan 46, AGVAR t o USFET.

L a w No 10, 20 Dec 45, Punishment of Persons

Guilty of 'dar Criyes. Crimes against Leace, and Crimes against
Humanity.

62. Control Council,

63. Baltimre Sun, 30 Aug 45.

Intelligence S u x r k o 11, 27 Sep 45.

64.

USFET, G 2 , =kly

65.

USF'ZT, FFUI Eelease :To

438, 27 Sep 45.

66. USFET PRD Release No 707, 13 Nov 45.

67. Cable,
68.

June 45.

COY 2, ETCUS.4,, - P

Ibid .
USFET, S-29064, Eisenhower t o EMD, ','PI, ED, USFA, USWE,
TSF (Bear), CC3?.4VFCRGER, 24 Oct 45.

69. Cable,
70.

L t r , Hq USF,T, 22 Dec 45, f i l e AG 371.24 GCT-AGE, subj:

IlPolice-Type Lietimod of Occupation;
and cable, USFET, S-30332,
Eisenhower t o AG;M for iiTARCOS, 1 Wov 45.

71

Cable, USFET, 5-30332, Eisenhower to AG~":~R

for 3ARCCS, 1 PJov

72.

Provost &rshal,

73

Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4

Type Method of Occupa.tion.11

74.

Cable H q USFET, S-32630, Patton t o AGWAEI f o r Y&XOS, 24 Nov 45;

Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, f i l e AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj:
IIPolice-Type Uethod of 0ccupation.Il

75

L t r , Eq USWT, 22 Dec 45, f i l e AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE,

Type Method of Occupation.'!

45.

Beport of Operations. 8 UY-30 Sep 45.

- 243 -

GCT-AGE,

subj:

subj:

"Police-

'IPolice-

FOOTKOTES

Chapter V I

1.

Unless other refereaces a r e given, the source f o r any statement

in t h i s section i s the mnograph Qedeployment, Occui;at&oAI
IzbrL I7. -'or- CWU' L.:Forces i n Eu_mdcS e r i e s 141j4+6, ci:s:%I
inforinition see t M s nonograph.

2.

USFZT G3, Hedeploper,t Branc!;, Lorit hll-lrogress

and 31 Oct 45.

3.

USF,T E 3 iiedeploynent Branch, Xonthly P r o g e s s kepohs; USFET

Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr t o
28 Feb 46.

4.

Cable ~ - 4 7 2 U , 10 A U g 45, AGiAR t o USF" and Theater concerried;

cable V,X-47209, 10 Aug 45, AG'/JL? from Xarshall t o USFET Akin
personal f o r Eisenhower and LTCUSA personal f o r LcNarney.

5.

Cable UlO, U+ Aug 45, hS:IAR t o Theaters concerned;

'AX-l+9784, 15 Aug 45, ACXAFi t o USFLT.

6.

USF'ET G3, Seport on Redeployment, Xov 46.

7.

Ibid.
-

8.

Ee&-z,

31 Jul

cable

Ibid .
-

9.

Cable a-8oOo3, 16 Aug 45, USmT t o major comands. The point

system was t n e result of investigation by t h e Var Departinent i n t o
soldier opinion on t h e subject of p r i o r i t y f o r release. Four
types of c r e d i t were recognized: service c r e d i t , based on the
t o t a l months of k r q service since 16 Septe.nber 1940; overseas
c r e d i t , based on the number of months of overseas service; conbat
credit, based on the f i r s t and each additional award of a decoration; and parenthood c r e d i t , which allowed for each dependent
child undei. eighteen years ug t o the l i r n i t of three children.
For each of tnese c r e d l t s the s o l d i e r was awarded a c e r t a i n number
o f points, t h e t o t a l of which ruade up his adjusted service rating
score, which i n turn decided his e l i g i b i l i t g f o r release. The
exceptions t o t h i s were c e r t a i n tyApesof irreplaceable s p e c i a l i s t s
whom t h e A m y was unable, on grounds of militarg need, t o release.

10.

Cable !W+95?6, 14 Aug 45, AGtVAR t o USFET W n , personal t o Eisenhower.

-244-

FOOTNOTES-CHAPTER

V I ( cont d l

ll. Cable W49544, 14 Aug 45, AU.YAl?t o USFET, personal t o Eisenhower;

cable S-17802, 1 5 Aug 45, USWT t o AG'LEL.
12. Cable Z-81337, 23 Lug 45, TSFET t o base Sections and Brenen Port
Comand
US"?,
ing

I n t e r i a Directive f o r Redeployment and Bead.iustment Followthe Defeat of Japan, 22 Aug 45.

UC.

USmT G-3 Div, $eport on Redeploylaex&, Iiov 46.

15

Cable 3X-80003, 18 Aug 45 , US:XT t o major con lands.

16. Cable S-2")'6,

17.

USF"

28 Aug 45, USFET t o AG?'&Y.

G3, iieport on &deployment, Nov 46.

Ibid
18. -

19

Cable S-20075, 28 Aug 45, U S E T t o AGX:AEI.

20.

Cable Ur-5'/182, 30 Aug 45, rSG%

21.

USFET G3, R e p p r t on Etedeployment, Rov 46.

22.

Cable WX-57162, 30 kug 45, AG'A'A8 t o USFZT.

23

USF3T

to USFET.

G3 Div, liedeployment B r , !!onthly Progress Report, 31 Oct 45.

24. USFET G 3 Div, Report on Redegloyment, XOV 46.

25

Telephone Conference, Xashington (Laj Gen Craig and Laj Gen Henry)
2 Sep 45.

w i t h F r a n k f u r t (arig Gen Eys;er),

26.

Special TViX Conference, XGWR and USFLT, TT-4059, 3 Sep 45, subj:
l+Xedeplopcnt

27.

USFdT E 3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.

28.

Ibid.
--

29

Cable 3X-60240, 6 Sep 45, .4Z;;.UL t o Theaters, Comruands, and iiD

Staff Divisions.

30. U S m G 3 Div, Zeport on%deployment_, Nov 46.

31.

Ibid.
-

- 245 -

32.

ad.

33.

U S m G3 Div, Trps and Redeployment B r , &deployment F r o g e ~

Report, 30 Sep 45.

34.

USFET G-3 Div, Report on_&edeployment, b!ov 46.

35.

w.

36.

m.

37.

USFXT "-3 Div, Trps and Eledeplopnt Br, ROdeployment Progress

Report, 31 Oct 45.

38.

u.

39. USF'ET G-3 Div,

iieport on &deployment,

Nov 46.

40.

USFET E 3 Div, Tr2s and Redeployment Br, R e d e d o m n t Prone=

Report, 30 !!OV 45.

l+l.

US"?

42.

m.

43.

USFET c-3

G 3 Div, Report on Eedeploynlent,

PJOV 46.

Div, Trps and Redeployment 3r, :',ede,olo:ment Tro,olz.ess

Eleport, 3 1 Dec

45.

44* Ibid.

45.

_Ibid.

46.

Cable XAR-31908, 9 NOW 45, A G d R t o TJSFZT Xah personal to Zisenhawer

47.

m.

48.

USET G 3 Dlv, Trps and .Ledepioyaient B r , Redeployment Iro~s'ess

lieport, 31 3ec 45.

49.

USFET E 3 Div, Rewrt on Redeoloyment, Nov 46.

50.

USFTT SGS, Report of Operations, 8 2ay t o 30 S e P A .

51.

9
.

52.

m.

IQOTNC!"ES--CXA?TIQ?

53

E 3 Report Mo 89, USET, 22 Oct 45, par 3;.

54.

USFET SGS, Report of Operations, 8 Kay t o 30 Sep lt5.

55

E 3 Report No 130, USFZT, 2 Dec 45, par 35.

V I (cont Id)

56. Cable, S-25879, USFST t o BGNAR and major coinmmds.

57.

Theater Comanderts u':eekly Staff Conference iieport, USF'ET NO 7,

Rpt of ACofS, El.

58.

Sremen P o r t Command, Report of Operations, Gct t o Uec k5.

59.

Theater Co;nmanderts ireekly Staff Conference Heport, USFET No 1,

18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, Gl.

60

Cable 7.'-75415, 1 i i i 45, RG,iA!! from Ku;l t o ETCUSA personal f o r

Eisenhower.

61.

USFTT SGS, Report of Gperations, 8 Yay t o 30 Sep 45.

62.

Cable S-149&5, 1 Aug 45, USF'ET t o major comands.

63. Xemo, IJSnT, ACofS, G3, 8 Oct 45 f o r CofS.

64.

USITT Gl, keport of Cperations, 1 Oct t o 31 Dec 45.

65

AG Non-T/O nllotment Letters, No 501 A, Jun 45 t o Jul 46.

66.

IFls USFET, O c a t o ;iG i J i l Fers through El, 18 Aug 45; cable

5-21115, 1 SeF 45, L F E T t o iiGX3; cable 74437, 29 Sep 45,
AS? sgd Henry C. Xolfe, 3 r i g Gen, USA, O i r Pla'"g
DiV; Eiemo,
t'o;X. 0. I!.
Zaj &n D&ei Noce, Acting CofS, ASP, f o r Lt
C"

67

**;?-

USmT G l , Report of Operations 1 Uct t o 31 Dec Q.

68.

Ibid.
-

69

hem, BCofS, S-3, 6 Dec 45, f o r CofS.

70.

Theater Conumnderts '!!eekly Staff Conference Seport, USFjT NO 1,

18 Dec 45, Rpt of .GofS, El.

71

USF'ET E l Div, Report of Operations, 1 Oct t o 31 Dec 45.

- 247 -

'

V I (cont d)

FOO'i'MOTES-CHLFl'ER

Cable ETX-4015, 23 Oct 45, U S E T t o ACX?.

72
9

Cable 11--80642,2 Sov L 5 , AGXR t o USET.

74;

Cable S-34223, 8 Dec L,5, USFET t o AWAR.

75.

Lem, USFET,
?!ov 45, for major commds;
Report of Operations, 1 Oct t o 31 Sec 45.

76.

i e m , CSFET CTIG, 23 Jan 46, subj:

heplaceu-ent s, It f o r Cof S

77.

I R S , USFST, El, 13 Feb 46, subj:

Replacements, It for S6S.

78.

Theater Co;;Mander's Xeeldy Staff Conference i?epoh*, USET, :!o 1,

18 Dec 45, Rpt of t h e ACofS, Gl.

73

79. USFET, G3, Report

80.

81.

USFET E l Div,

"Lethod of ~ s s i y i n g

"IG Report on Assignrrht of

of O+Derations,.- Oct-2ec 42.

L t r , USFET G 3 Div, 29 Vov 45, f i l e GCT 370 J P S , subj: IIEstimates

on Future Troop Basis, ET," t o Y E ) , sgd A. S. IJevins, ijrig Gen,
CSC k/kCofS, G3.
Theater Commander's Y" ekl Staff Conference Iieport No 1, 18 Dec

2?--

45, and No 2 , 2 Jan 4

82.

Unless o t h e r references are given t n e material i n t h i s section

is drawn from t h e monograph tti&n-mwer,tl Occunation Forces i n
firow Series 1945-4, p t 11. F o r further information see
this monograph.

83.

L t r , USET, 21 Aug 45, f i l e AG 230 GAP-AGO,

of Civilians. 11

e4.

Civ Pers C i r 15, UjFE:T, 20 Fay 46, subj:

Priority. 1 )

85.

"El and i t s ?ole i n t h e Fight against MazFsm i n t h e ETO,"

USFET G l Div, 1545.

86.

USFET E 4 Div, Xeport of Operations, 8 :lay t o 30 Sep 45.

87.

Third US

88.

Staff Stu3y, USF'ET El Div t o CofS, 1 5 Sep 45, subj:

ment of Civilians i n t h e Occupied Zone."

A r q ,

subj:

"Employment

"Civilian Aqloyment

G 2 Sec, ijistoricdl iieport, Jun h5.

- 2.%$ -

tt&nploy-

V I (cont 'd)

FOOTNGTES--CHA?TER

89.

L t r , USFET, 21 hug 45, file AG 230 W-ACC, subj:

of Civilians. 11

%uplopent

90.

Ltr, USFET, 22 Sep 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO,

Civilian Volunteer Clericals.

"British

subj:

91. L t r , USF'ST, 15 Sep 45, f i l e AG 230 GAP-AW, subj:

of Civilians

92.

'%nployment

SCP 29, ETCUSA, 26 Kay

subj: ItFrocurement, Utilization and
Administration of Civilian Labor i n Liberated o r Gccupied
!o 45, USFET, 18 Sep 45, subj: IfStaff
Territcry"; Staff k m o T
Responsibilities f o r Civilian Personnel," appendix 1; ltr,
USFET, 8 Se? 45, f i l e AG 322.011 rCWWiG0, subj: "Delegation
of Civilian Personnel Authority,tl appendix 2; ltr, USmT,
3 Oct 45, f i l e AG 322.011 GAP-hm, subj: llfiesponsibility
f o r Civilian Personnel Administration. 11

93.

Cable 125, 17 Jul 45, bSCSTATE t o USET M n .

94.

SOF 49, ETCUSA, 9 Lay 45, subj:

95.

USFET G-4, Kotes of G 4 Daily Conference, 15 Liar 46.

96.

L t r , USFET, 23 Oct 45, file AG 322 GCT-Am, subj: fl?olicy f o r

Employnent of 3isaimed Eheqy U n i t s and Labor Service Units."

f l . L t r , H q US&Y, 2 ;iov 45, subj:

Wmployment of Pti's."

"Luft:iai'fe

Signal Battalion.11

98.

TSFYT PL, Eeport of Operations, 8 L!ay t o 30 Sep 45.

99.

TSFET Prosresu Report, f o r August and December f+5.

- 249 -

FOOTNOTES
Chapter V I 1

1.

C f charts i n chaps I V .and V I I I .

2.

GO 1, USFET, 2 Jan 46.

3.

GO 26,

4.

!$em, TS?",
17 Nov 45, subj:
of Germany. It

5.

CBS, Report of Operations. 15 Jan-31 Lar 46.

6.

CO 374, TSlTT, 26 Dec 45.

7.

GO 16, TST:;T, 22 Jan 46.

6.

L t r , USFJT, 12 Jan k6, f i l e AG 322 GASAGO, subj:

of GFRC."

9.

USFET, Theater Conuander's Iieekly Staff Conference No

10.

GO 18, 26 Jan

USFET, 30 Jan 46, 11.

"Logistical Support of US Cccupation

"Inactivation

1, 8

Jan 46.

46, I, 111.

11. GC 19, TSFET, 29 Jan

46.

66, USFZT, 13 b r 46.

12.

GO

13.

CO 24, TSFET, 5 Feb 46.

u.

Go

15

GO 16, USFET, 18 Jan

16.

GO

17.

GO 3 6 , USFET, 11 Feb 46, 11.

18.

-Ibici,
.

19.

Stark-Lee Agreefient

20.

The . = t e r i a l f o r t h i s paragraph was furnisned by t h e Reval Liaison

Office, Hq ZCCOL:, June 1947.

103, USFET, ll A>r 46.

46, I.

63, USFET, 8 !Kar 46, I.

I.

, 31 Lay 45.

- 250 -

FOOTNCTES--CHAPTER

VI1 (cont Id)

a.

GO 61, USmT, 7 Uar 46.

22.

Ibid.
-

23.

T h i r d Army,

24.

USST, 'Troop Assignment No 139, 5 Sep

25

Staff -:em L o 72, Seventh Army, 4 Sep 45; f o r furthef d e t a i l s

see monograph, Itcivil Affairs, 11 Occupation Forces i n Surope S e r i e s

G5

Sec, Historical AeDOrt, Sep

45, p t V I .

45.

194546.
26.

03 337, USFET, 1L:dec 45.

27. Ibid.

28. GO 43, USWT, 19 Feb 46.

ll7, Third Anq, 14 Jun 45.

29.

GO

30.

cc) 61, 'JsFET, 7 Kar 46.

31.

Staff

32.

L t r , USFET, 7 Liay 46, f i l e AG 371.2, EC-AGO, subj: "Security

Liaison betyieen A r m y U n i t s and f i l i t a r y Government'.f1

33.

Unless other references are given, the source of any information

i n t h i s section is t h e monograph ttRedeployment,tt OccuDation Forces
i n Europe Series 1945-46. For further information see t h i s
monograph.

34.

Redeployment i-'-rop.ressiieport, USFJT G3 Div, 31 Dec 45.

431~0

57,

USFET, 13 Jun 46.

35. Ibid.
36.

U S E T G3 Div, Lermolt or, dedeoloJmnt, iIov 46.

37

Ibid.
-

38.

S t a r s and Stgipes, 6 Jan 46.

39.

Ibid.
-

40.

B; a l s o

edition of 9 Jan 46;

Frankfurt, 8 Jan 46.

- 251 -

Conference, ivashington-

F@O"?JOTZS--CM"Eii

VI1 (cont Id)

S t a r s and Stripes, 11 Jam 46.

I h i d , 13 Jan kb.
USWT E 3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Liar

Cable LCL-3750, 15 Jan 46, AQAR to USFET;

USFET PRD, 15 Jan 46.

46.

press release No 1045,

45

Ibid.
-

46

USM' E 3 3iv, keport of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Y a r 46.

47.

Ibid.
-

48.

USFET G 3 Div, Trps and Redeployment B r , Redeployment h"rEress

R e p o r t , 31 Jan 46.

49.

Ibid; a l s o US:sFM: G3 3iv, Report on aedeployment, Nov 46.

50

USFET G3 X v , Trps and Redeployment Br, &deployment rrogress

Report, 25 Feb 46.

51

USFET G3 Div, Trps and Kedeplopent B r , Redeplopxent P r o a e s s

Report, 31 Ear k6; USFET G3 Div, Heport of Omrations 1 Jan31 Lar 46.
USmT G3 Div, Redeployment 'rogress Tieport, 30 Hpr 46; 31 &y
46; 30 Jun 46; USF3'i' G3 Div, iieport on Hedeploment, No 46.
~ S r i , lG3, :ieoox% 02 Clperations. 1 Oct

45-28 Feb 46.

53.

m -n

54

-9

55

USFZT G3 3iv, deport on dedeployaent, Xov 46;

Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.

Ibid.

540 USFXT

C3FZi'

G3, lieport

of Cperations, 1 Jan-31 Xar 46.

S X , .teport. o f Cperations 1 Gct-31 Dec

l!SFt.T

G 3 Div,

45.

57.

i:S!TI', Theater Coimander 's ::eekly Staff Conferelice Leport No 3,

8 Jan 4g, Rpt of ACofS, El.

58

!:em0 X o f S , G-3,

59.

Cable 3-eg263

29 Jan 46, f o r CofS.

, 25 L2.y

46, AG,;AP. sg'i ,:d.CCS t o USFET.

252

FWTI~C'IXS-CHAP"ER VI1 (cont 'd)

-.

60. Ibid
61.

See par

166, above.

62. USFET, Theater Co. .ander I s Weekly Staff_Conference&ofi.-?J8,

12 -'eb 46, Xpt of ACofS, El.

63.

64.

65.
66.

Cable,

T-90337 , 5 Jul h6, AGXAFt t o USFET.

USFET , Theater Comraander I s iieeklg Staff Sonfer~nce-itepoort No U+,

6
,
1
J
o
l
m
%
k
p
46,
r and No 12, 26 h?r $ & R g t of ACofS,
26 tzar t
Gl.

Ibid, KO 24, 4 Jun 46,

Interview w i t h Col Leslie E. Jacoby, forxerly Chief, SerSkc Br,
El, TS?'ET;
USFLT, Tneater Comnanderl s Weekly Staff Conference
Feport I\!o 4, 26 :ar 46, Rpt of ACofS, El.

67

Ibid, No 20,

68.

Interview wit!i col. Jacoby, as c i t e d n. 66.

69

cable :$'--99263,
27 my 46.

46; cable S-2935, 29 .ipr 46, U S E T t o AG:!AX;

25 Lay 46, AG;L? to USFET; LW USFET, G l t o AG,

Zay

USFET, T h e a t e r C o n m d e r fs Pleek3.y Staff Conference Zeports No 20,

Iky 4
G No 2 6 , 9 Jun 46, Rpts of AcofsJ G-1; cable, 20 !.Ay
46, USFET t o major commands.

70

USFD, Theater C o m a d e r t s !Veeekly Staff Conference geport :do 26 ,

19 J u ~
46, R p t of ACofS, Gl.

71.

L t r , U S r i , 22 Jun 46, subj:

72.

"h'egro %poweri'

t o major cormnands.

Theater Cormanderts Weekly Staff Conference iieport No 29,

XofS, Gl; cable b 9 3 5 2 4 J 4 Jul 46, AQ;itP t o
USEET; cable !PrCL-27934, 16 Jul 46, A G i U to USFET.

USF",

9 Jul 04f-

73

A l l infonuation in t h i s ?aragraph, unless otherwise cited, i s

from USET Report of Operations of the Theater L i q d d a t i o n and
&inpower Board, 1 Jan-31 Blar and 1 Apr-3C) Jun 46.

74.

CO 10, USnT, 10 Jan 46, subj:

and i*;anpower

75.

C i r 4, W S m , 4 Jan 46, subj:

and iianpomer Boardoll

"Estaolis'nment of the Liquidation

ltEsLaolishmerit o f the LiGuidation

- 253 -

FC@TNOTES--CFiA?T?Zi V I 1 (cont'd)
76.

L t r , USFZT, 11 ;Ar 46, file AG 230 W - A C P C , subj: Vontinental

;Jage Scele; Civ Pers C i r No 16 (revised), V S m , 28 Jun 46 ,
annex 'tAtl Wontinental :;age Scale."

77

Cir 60, USFET, 1 biay 46.

7s.

USFET, Tneater Commander's 2ieekly Staff Conference Iiepoyt_s_Nos 3

to 30, Jan-Jul 46.

79.

u.

80.

:{em, USFET AG, 27 B y 46, subj: 'Wnployment of Dependents of

llilitary and Civilian Personnel,I' f o r Chiefs of Staff and Special
9iuisions.

81.

Civ Pers C i r 15, USmT, 20 Liay 46, subj:

Priority.

82.

L t r , USFET, 23 2un 46, f i l e AG 248 GXP-AGE,

Employee Pay Act of 1946,lf

83

USF"ET Theater Commnder's Neekly Staff Confereiice RePo&

)!os 13
and 35, 19 Liar and 20 Aug 46; USFET G-l Div, Civ Pers B r ,
statistical bulletins, April, b y and June 46.

84.

Cable S-37399, 10 Jun 46, USFLY t o Seventh US Army.

V i v i l i a n Smployment
subj:

85. L t r , H q USET, 23 i!ar 46, f i l e AG 383.6 GAP-AGO,

of Prisoners of Xar f o r Labor in US Zone.fl

"Federal

subj:

"Discharge

86.

CTPK, Report of Cperations, 1 Apr-30 Jun l&, p 13.

87.

TSF'ET,

88.

GTP!:,

Report of-Operations. 1 Jan-31 Lhr 46, p 37.

USF'T

Theater Ccnmander's ?ieekly Staff Conference Report No 26,

89.

trogress Report, Dee 45, p 111.

19 Jun 46.

254

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VI11

1.

USFET G-2, rieekly I n t e l l i g e n c e Sumnary No 28, f o r wee.. ending

24 Jan lt6.

2.

S t a r s and Stripes, 29 Jan 46.

3.

G2, Xeekly IntelliEence Summaries Nos 4%. 42, f o r weeks

ending 2 and 9 U y 46.

4.

Christian Science Itionitor, 6 Jun 46.

5.

S t a r s and Stripes, 2 Jul 46.

6.

NY Herald Tribune, 15 Apr 46.

7.

L t r , USFET, 30 Xay k6, f i l e AG 353 GCT-Am, subj:

Training Program and Heduction of Ineflectives."

IIInitiation of

8.

L t r , USFET, 20 Xay 46, file AG b61 GCT-Am,

Comumd Pamphlet f o r Officers.1t

'ILeadership and

9.

S t a r s and S t r i p e s , 19 Jan 46.

10. TK 66, Third Amy, 7 hkr 46, subj:

subj:

"Training of US Constabulary.11

11. For f u r t b e r p a r t i c u l a r s , see monograph "The US Constabulary,"

Occugation Forces in Europe S e r i e s 19h5-46, chap 11.
12.

For further d e t a i l s , see monograph Wmpower,n Occupation Forces

i n Europe S e r i e s 1945-46.

13

S t a r s and Stripes, 21 Feb 46.

14.

USFET, Theater Com-anderls iceekly S t a f f Conference ReDort Ro

2 Sep 46.

15

L t r , USFET, 9 Gct 45, f i l e AG 510 GCLD-AGP,

of Dependents f rohi Overseas. I'

16.

CBS, Gl Sec, R p t of Opns, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.

17

For f u r t h e r details, see aocograph "The Shipment of d i e n Depende n t s t o t h e US," Gccupation Forces in huro;je S e r i e s 1945-46.

- 255 -

subj:

37,

"Transportation

18. Ltr, USFET, 1 9 Sep 45, subj:

%pecial Occupational Planning

Board."

19.

For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see monograph, 'IShipment of Dependents t o t h e

ET and Sstablisiinent of i d l i t a r y Co.munities,tl Occupation Forces
in Europe S e r i e s 1945-46.

20.

USF'ET, Theater Ccnltlanderl s weekly S t a f f Conference deport No 7,

5 Feb

21.

USFET, Theater Commander's iieekly Staff Conference iLeport No 25,

11 Jun 46.

22.

USfiT, Theater Comander's Vveekly Staff Conference iieDort KO 28,

2 Jul 46.

23

S t a r s and?trir;es,

a.

CTSFET, 2 p t of .W, c3 Kay-30 Sep 45.

25

USFXT, R p t o f AES, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.

26.

USET,

a.

USFET, Summary of S?ecial Theater Lrctivities f o r the Under SecretaIy

of Xar, 25 Yay 46.

28.

L t r , USFET, 6 Yov 45, f i l e kG 354.1 G@-kcO, subj:

t o Govern Operation of Theater Leave Cefiters. 11

29.

For f u r t h e r d e t a i l s see uono&Taph '@TheZecreational and Entertainment Program of t h e US Forces, ET," Occuiational Forces in Europe
Series 1945-46, chap IV.

30.

JCS 1067/6, 26 Apr 1+5.

31.

Cable, CC-20114, 8 Dec 45, OXGUS t o AG'/,W..

G-

ut o f

26 ;day 45.

U S , 1 Jan-31 Lar 46, 1 Apr-30 Jun

- 256 -

46.

ItInstrwtiocs

FOOTNOTS!3
Chapter

1.

G 3 Battle

Studies, Summary of Cperations 12th Army- Group;

A m y Fistor& 26 Jan LA-9 bby 45, vol 11, G5 sec.

Third

2.

Third Ammy After-Action dewrt, 26 Jan 44-4 Xay 45; vol 11,

G5

sec.

3.

Ibid.

4.

m.

5.

g&.

45, vol 11, E

5

sec.

7.

u.
u;and Xinth A r m y Tactical H i s t o n , 1 Sep 44-30 A p r 45.

E.

Third Axmy .4fter Action l i e p r t , 26 Jan 44-9

9.

Ibid.
-

6.

lky

s.
n. u.
10.

12.

E 3 B a t t l e Studies, Sumrary of Cperations 12th

13.

Firteenth A n y History, 21 Aug U-$.,l?ag45.

Army

Grou~.

14. E.
15.

m.

16.

Fifteenth A m , G 3 Bi-Daily Report, 2 kpr 45-14 Jul 45.

17. Ibid; and F i f t e e n t h Arm History, 21 AUE k4-e

h y

45.

18.

gg.

15.

Third . 4 w After-Action Heport 26 Jan a - 9 May 45, vol 11, E 5 secj

and F i f t e e n t h Army History, 21 11ua a - 8 Fay 4fi.

257

FOCTNOTES4HAPTEH IX (cont'd)

~-~

20

Ibid.
-

21.

Fifteenth P

22.

Ibid .
-

m Sistozy, 21 Aug 44-8 Kay 45.

Ibid. and Third Army History, vol 11, E 5 sec, 26 Jan LA-9 Kay 45;
and Ninth A r m y Tactical History- 3 Sep 4.4-30 Apr 45.

23

-9

24.

Ibid.
-

25

Nihth Army Tactical History, 1 Sea 44-30 Apr 45.

26.

Fifteenth

27,

and T l t i r d Army Historg, v01 11, G5 sec, 26 Jan 4 4 4 a y 45;

u;
and Ninth Army Tactical Histoqy, 1 Sep LA-36 Apr 45.

28.

Fifteenth Army 3istory, 21 Aug &-8 !Lay 45; and Third A r m y P i s t o r y ,

vol 11, G5 sec, 26 Jan 44-9 Yay 45; see a l s o Public Safety,
chaps I and 11.

29.

Fifteenth Arm History, 21 Aug

30

31.

-..

krmy H l S t O I Y ,

21 8ug 44-8 my 45.

.'!&-e

Europe S e r i e s

Fifteenth A r m y Histcrx, 21 Aug 44-8 !Lay 45.

Ibid.
Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid, 16 Apr-10
38. Ibid.
39 -

34

Jul 45.

40.

45.

Ibid.
Ibid.
-

32. Fublic Safety, 0ccu;atior. Forces in

33

:!lay

Ibid.
-

- 258 -

1945-46.

42 *

Ibid, and idew York Tixes,

43.

L t r s , S W F /23l/5 GDP, "Liberation of Norway";

11 Sep 45, USF,T a s s i o n to U S E T '%in.

w+.

S!IASF - 5 s s i o n t o Norway, Report f o r 13 July 45.

45.

USm

46.

S W F VLssion t o F:orway,

47.

U S m t5ssion to ?Iorway, Eteport for 13 Lug

@.

Cable 3-24328, 20 Sep 45, USFET

co- Lands.

49

USmT LLission t o I J o z a l , ?.eprt for 15 O c t 45;

20 Sep 45, USFLT Main t o major conrnands.

50.

USF'ST fission t o ICorwax, Report f o r 1 5 Oct 45.

51

SPAEF f i s s i o n t o ';omday, Report f o r 13 J u l

52.

USF" U s s i o n to Jlo~way, Report f o r

53

USFET :fission t o Morwm, Report f o r 13 Aug 45.

54

Eemorandurn of kgreeraent between the Supreme

SGS File, O9l :!orway.
Co.?inander, Allied Ekgeditionary Force, and the Government of the
Kingdom of Norway, 28 June 45.

Xi..sion

to j

20

45.

!Lay

cable E-N-74,

~
Seport
~ for
~ 13,Xu5 45.

Report for 13 July 45.

ah,

45.

sgd Sisenhower t o major

cable S-24328,

45.

13 Sep 45.

X-26600, 4 Jul 45, AE;r'ilR fro= !VAFtCOS to SHAEF b i n to

COXGENETO; cable S-95426, 5 Jul 45, SFIAP t:ain t o BG'iM for
Joint Chiefs of S t a f f , SCGFOR.

55. Cable,

56

USFET l h s i o n t o Nor,/ay, Report f o r 15 Gct 45; cable 5-25879,

30 Sep 45, USFET Yain sgd Eisenhower t o major couaands; ltr,
H q Allied Land Forces, Forwa~,22 Oct 45, f i l e GO:, 301/1, subj:
"Termination of Combined Comandt'; cable S-25794, 21 Cct 45,
USFET Kain, sgd Eisenhower t o major comnands,

57

12th X r r q Gp, F i n a l After-Action Beport.,

58.

H q MCLI Corps, 2epox-t of bperations 6 ;ay-30 S e p g - , p 3.

59.

V Corps, Report of Gperations, Jan 42-Xay 45, p 465.

- 259 -

G-3 sec, pp 50-53.

60.

Ibid.

61.

u,
p 464;

4$,

Hq TUSA, He?ort of Gpsrations, W-Sep

62. Hq LXII C o r p , Report of Operations, 6 3 y - 3 0 Sep 45;

1 cct-30 NOV Q.

63. Hq TUSA,

Keport of Operations, hlay-Sep

45, p

p 22.

and

22.

64.

H q XXlI Corps, Report of Operations, 8 W - 3 0 Nov 45.

65.

Hq XXIf Corps, Fieport of Operations. 1 Oct-30 ?Iov W .

66. V Corps, Report of Operations, Jan 4 2 - h ~453 P 4589

67. H q XXII Corps, Rem& of Operations. 8 Us-30 Nov 45.

68. Hq XXII Corps, Eeport of Operations. tlasrSep

45,.

69.

Hq XXII Corps, G2, Periodic ileport of Operations #51, 1 6 Oct 45.

70.

Hq

71.

Hq XXIX Corps, G2, Report of Operatiom, 30 Sep 45, p 4; Hq XXII

Corps, G2, Periodic Report of Operations, &, 26 J u 45.
~

72.

H q XXII Corps, G 2 , Report of Operations.

73.

w.

74.

Hq 2 Z X I Corps, G 2 , periodic %port

75.

Yq XXII Corps, G2, Zewrt of Cperations. 1 6 Jun-30 Sep 45.

76.

m.

77.

XXII Corps, G2, Periodic R e l ~ o r tof Operations, #52, 23 O c t 45;

l t r , Gen Harimn to CG 3d US A m y , 2 Oct 45, sub3: llRemoval of
US Troops from Czechoslovakia. If

Ltr,

Geri

US Troops

16 Jun-30

Sep

45.

of Operations. #39, 24 J u l

Harmon t o CG Third US limy, 2 O c t 45, subj:

from Czechoslovakia."

45.

"Removal of

78.

Cable W-16162, 13 Jun 45, AG;;AR f r Marshall t o SFAEF F'wd for

Eisenhower.

79.

Cable ;$:-26L+89, 4 Jul 45, IU%'JJB f r Joint Chiefs of staff t o SKGF

&in to Eisenhovier.

- 260 -

FOOTNOTiB-CWE.?.?

IX (cont 'd)

Cable unnumbered, 3 Sep &5, Xi1 Attache Prague, sgd i k l d i k e t o

Washington and USFET ih0ain.

:.!IUD

hhm, 22 Sep 45, for J. D. Beam, O f f i c e of U.S.

f o r Gemany, Y a j Gen V. R. Bull, DCofS.

P o l i t i c a l Advisor

Cable S-27335, 6 Oct 45, USFET ihh, sed Eisenhoqer, t o Hq

Eastern L J i l D i s t .
Cable 'ti-77097, 19 Oct 45, AGW3 from ,'AdCGS to USET %in
Eisenbmer; ltr, 23 Oct &5, Gen Harmon t o Gen B u l l .
Cable ?,-80709,3 h'ov 45, AGi.QH sed .:'AfiZGS t o
Iqq 3d US Army, heport of Operations 1 Qct-31 uec

- 261 -

&tin.

45.

for