ry ¢ EeESCatl rcl | V\ | gPANCE { A VARIETY OF SUBJEC THE ABSTRACT AND THE ? Edited by Patricia A. Rowe and Ernestine Stodelle DANCE RESEARCH ANNUAL X CORD 1979| | | Acknowledgments PART ONE: OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 1. On the Nature of Theories of Dance Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 2, Toward a Scientific Explication of Synesthetic Phenomena through Kinesthetic Stimulation Annselm Vinje-Morpurgo 3. The Human Action Sign and Semasiology Drid Williams 4. A Cross-Cultural Approach to Dance Criticism Suzanne Walther 5. A Call for Valid Black Dance Criticism Wade Tynes Pretlow Goss and Julinda Lewis Williams 6. Symbolism and the Meaning of Movement David Best PART TWO: OF PRACTICAL CONSIDERATION 7. Floors for Dance Daniel Peterson 8. Information Survey of Dance Departments Joanna Friesen 9. Transcribing African Music from Synchronized Film A.M. Dauer trans. by Irmgard Bartenieff and Nancy Glawischnig-Shaw 10. The Use of Observation Techniques for the Identification of Neuromuscular Excitation Patterns Sally Sevey Fitt 11. Structure in Dance Therapy: A Model for Personality Integration Marcia B, Leventhal 12. Dance is for Everyone Nadia Chilkovsky Nahumck1 On the Nature of Theories of Dance i Fi Do theories of art have anything in common? One might be tempted A Maxine (2niver wt sr much ne twit fc ft ty ae and | Sheets- cite as example the titles of essays listed in a leading anthology on aesthetics: “Art as Appearance,” “Art as Imitation,” “Art as Beauty,” ‘ Johnstone “Ar asa Virtue of the Practical Intellect,” “Art as Intuition.” The | same example, however, might be used to substantiate the claim that : theories of art do share certain characteristics, that is, processes inher- the making of a theory. Insofar as each author has singled out ‘one aspect within aesthetic experience as the pivotal one which defines art and insofar as the theory set forth is grounded in that particular aspect, the processes of abstraction and generalization are clearly com- ‘mon to all the theories. Abstraction and generalization are equally evident in the formula- tion of theories concerning particular art forms such as music and dance, John Cage’s theory of musical structure, for example, singles out duration as the fundamental characteristic of sound. Cage writes that: j ) Sound has four characteristics: pitch, timbre, loudness, and ) duration. The opposite and necessary coexistent of sound is } silence. Of the four characteristics of sound, only duration in- volves both sound and silence. Therefore, a structure based on i durations (rhythmic: phrase, time lengths) is correct (corre- | sponds with the nature of the materials), whereas harmonic struc- ture is incorrect (derived from pitch, which has no being in | silence)? Again, Doris Humphrey quite obviously abstracts certain characteristics | from the phenomenon of human movement in everyday life in forging her theory of dance, She writes: ‘All clues for this theory come from life itself. Every movement ‘made by a human being . . . has a design in space:a relationship ‘to other objects in both time and space; an energy flow, which we will call dynamics; and a rhythm. Movements are made for a complete array of reasons... . which we will lump all together and ‘call motivation... . So, with a simple analysis of movement in general, we are provided with the basis for dance . .... The four elements of dance movement are . . . design, dynamics, rhythm and motivation.>OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ‘The above examples point up the fact that any particular phenomenon has a manifold of features, any one of which or any number of which might be abstracted from the whole. The abstraction is made in order to bring to the fore the essential character of the Pee to be explained and thus to serve as the major stepping stone in the formulation of a theory aban’ the phenomenon. Suppose, for example, that art were the focus of our theoretical inquity. We might begin by considering the wealth of features apparent in any array of artworks. Many © those features have already been abstracted to serve as the comerstone of a theory of art. We might illustrate this multiplicity of features by envisioning a box ealled “ART” which is Hille with a diversity of characteristics printed, for our two-dimensional convenience, on the facing side: organic unity form style imagination representation surface-texture ART feeling beauty expression meaning dynamics content harmony quality What are we to make of all these features? If we were to construct our own theory of art, which one or ones would we choose as essential? In other words, what features common to the experience of all art works would we abstract and thereby deem essential to the realization of art? And in what way would we formulate a generalization based upon our abstractions in order to make a theory? The task of building a theory is not complete in simply isolating cer- tain essential characteristics from the whole; one must also discover the principle of the whole which is prefigured by those particular abstracted features. Suppose, for example, we were to abstract “feeling.” Our effort must then be to explain how feelings come to inhere in works of art. Susanne Langer has, of course, done just this.? Her theory is that a work of art is a form which is symbolic of the form of human feelings. A generalization has thus been made, but such a generalization must be unwrapped, as it were, so that its meaning shines forth fully and clearly. The theorist must set forth a thorough-going and logical analysis of the details or parti- culars which the theory engenders. This means going back to the elements which are abstracted and describing their nature and inter-relationships. ‘Thus through Langer’s theory we come to a i wnderriending tae -Pheramat a sn form, primary illusion, virtual objects, sem- bangs and 0.009 a ry is secured by its commitment to certain particulars and by e elaboration of those particulars in respect to the generalization the theory sets forth. In the above discussion, the process of theory-making has bee a notoriously simplified. F in whi ic noracuny, Resnaes eve ously simplified. For example, the order in which the process of theory-making develops is not in| AD limited to the Sequence presented here nor is it the result of a male rational- izing mind. One might seize intuitively upon a theory and then discover its particular roots. OrMAXINE SHEETS-IOHNSTONE 5 ‘one might intuitively be drawn to certain particulars, ponder their nature and inter-relationships, question their significance, and then discover the theory they enunciate. Theory-making, like any other truly creative process, is not a matter of sheer intellectual effort; the flash, the Eureka moment, the sudden insight, the intuitive grasp is a vital and central feature.° _ Further- more, not only is the order of the process and the play between intellect and insight variable from the scheme presented here, but the manner in which one accomplishes or sets about theory-making is also variable, Beginning with a hypothetical box full of predetermined charac- teristics was an expedient rather than dramatic coverage of how abstractions are made, and if it appears more of a shopping spree than a quest for knowledge, it is because the accomplish- ment of abstraction has been so simplified. Nonetheless, if we were to accept as fact that theories do have something in common, that they do fundamentally involve abstraction and generalization, then we might say that a theory is a speculative generalization grounded in the particulars of the phenomenon it is generated to explain. Were we to consider scientific theory, however, we would have to qualify the statement in several respects, beginning with the kind of generalization a scientific theory might set forth. It should be clear from the previous examples that the aesthetic theorist is concerned with finding essential characteristics or regularly occurring features in the world of art; from these the theorist formulates empirical generalizations. More sophisticated scientific theorists, how- ever, are not concerned with finding regularities in the natural world but rather with elaborating their form; they offer explanatory rather than empirical generalizations. A physicist, for ex- ample, explains how it is that certain regularly occurring phenomena—shadows, for example— may be accounted for by providing a principle “. . . in accordance with which we can make inferences about [the] phenomena.”? A simple example of such an explanatory generalization is, in fact, the Rectilinear Propogation Principle, the theory that light travels in straight lines. No one has ever seen light traveling in straight lines, yet we have all seen shadows cast upon a surface, The physicist utilizes the theory not only in accounting for shadows but also assumes it in accounting for any deviations of light from its rectilinear path, e.g. refraction, reflection, diffraction, and so on. ‘That abstraction plays just as vital a role in the formulation of explanatory generalizations is evident in the fact that an explanatory theory singles out certain aspects of the theoretical entity or event which it postulates: “The theory does not attempt to describe all aspects of the phenomena in its intended scope; rather it abstracts certain parameters from the phenomena End attempts to describe the phenomena in terms of just these abstracted parameters.”* For ex- ample, in explaining the earth’s gravitational attraction, the physicist discounts direction, assuming the distribution of mass to be everywhere equivalent, and focuses instead on the dis- tance from the earth’s center. As Wangsness notes, “Using this consequence of geometrical symmetry, it is possible to simplify the problem by restricting one’s attention only to those possible solutions which do not depend on any angle or direction.”° In effect, what is ab- stracted is just that feature or features deemed crucial to the explanatory thesis. ‘A further dimension of scientific theories vis 4 vis abstraction and generalization concerns the use of models which anchor the theory in conceptual or visualizable terms. A physicist, for ‘example, explaining how it is that light travels in straight lines might draw a ray diagram show- ing how objects cast shadows on a wall or screen. What is crucial in the physicist’s model is the geometry of the phenomenon, not the peculiar shape of a shadow, not the texture of the wall se vereen, not the intensity of light, and so on. Whether a model in the sense of a epresenta- tion as above, or whether a model in the sense of an idealized structure, e.g., Bohr's model of the atom, the process involved is the same: the physicist focuses upon certain aspects of theF OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE observable or idealized entity or event and it is just those aspects and no others which are utilized in constructing the model. In brief, it is again a matter of abstracting certain para- meters from the phenomenon in question. Finally, a consideration of scientific theory would oblige us to take account of Kuhn’s con- cept of paradigms in relation to abstraction and generalization. Paradigms are world views, particular perspectives upon the natural world which fundamentally affect all scientific inquiry. ‘As Kuhn says, paradigms reflect “. . . incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practic- ing science in it.” The Copernican revolution, for example, consisted precisely in overturning the existing world view of the earth as the center of the universe and replacing it with a new paradigm based upon the apparent movement of the planets. To follow Kuhn’s account of Scientific theory is to view the processes of abstraction and generalization as functions of a particular way of seeing the world, as functions of a certain paradigm of observation. Given any particular paradigm, what elements can be abstracted within that conceptual framework? Kuhn gives an excellent illustration of the impact of differing paradigms of observation in discussing the difference between Aristotle’s and Galileo's account of swinging stones (stones tethered to a piece of string). Aristotle, he writes, was concerned __ -with the weight of the stone, the vertical height to which it had been raised, and the time required for it to achieve rest. Together with the resistance of the medium, these were the conceptual categories deployed by Aristotelian science when dealing with a fall- ing body. Normal research guided by them ‘could not have produced the laws that Galileo discovered . .. . Galileo saw the swinging stone quite differently. Archimedes’ work on floating bodies made the medium nonessential; the impetus theory rendered the motion symmetrical and enduring; and Neoplatonism directed Galileo’s attention to the motion’s circular form. He therefore measured only weight, radius, angular displacement, and time per swing, which were precisely the data that could be interpreted to yield Galileo's laws for the pendulum .... Regularities that could not have existed for an Aristotelian . . . were consequences of immediate experience for the man who saw the swinging stone as ileo did.t1 To understand theories within the context of conceptual parameters is to understand how paradigms limit what is seen, ie., abstraction, and what is said about what is seen, i., general- ization.!2 . The above qualifications of scientific theory in respect to aesthetic theory are not intended to be exhaustive. The intent has been to launch our inquiry into the nature of theories of dance by first delimiting, and in a preliminary way, the nature of any theory, i.e., showing that whatever the field of inquiry, the processes of abstraction and generalization remain funda- mental. Moreover, although it might be assumed that because it is a question of dance, our con- cern need be only with aesthetic theory, we should not prejudge the order to which a theory of dance might belong. If we wish to gain insight into theories of dance, we must know ae about the kind of theory any particular theory of dance might be. Yet we also need to examine wore fel he uate of a theory itself, that is, quite apart from the processes teins to its cam consideration of theory as accomplished product then that we shall first It was stated earlier that i i izati plain. Through the discussion which followed, it is called a conclusive conclusion. out a particular phenomenon, it is not what might be 15 d {ts speculative nature is always present, chiefly because itMAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE rl purports to speak for all cases of which it has sampled only a portion so that what it expresses remains always a probability rather than a certainty; but sometimes, too, because the things of which it speaks are not directly accessible to experience, e.g., atoms, black holes, natural selec- tion, and so on. On the other hand, and particularly in the case of art, the things of which a theory speaks may be qualities or modalities, for example, which while being concretely present, that is, directly accessible to experience, cannot be pointed to or reduced in an objective way. If the “evidence” for a theory cannot be objectively pinned down-the significance of a work of art, the expression of an aesthetic form, even form itsel{—the theory, according to traditional standards, i.e., scientific crit would necessarily be characterized as speculative. We might therefore conclude that no matter how much a theory beguiles us to believe that such and such is the case, whether on the ground that the generalization it presents has been logically and rigorously arrived at, proven valid in every situation to date, or whatever, we must Suggest nevertheless and always question its validity on the basis of our experience of the phenomenon it explains. Yet were we not to believe in a large number of theories, if we were not to assume them to be certain, that is, conclusive conclusions, our everyday world would be thrown into turmoil and confusion, hesitation, and, perhaps, paralyzing doubt. If, when we go to bed tonight, we wondered whether the earth would continue to revolve about the sun through the night, we might suffer such anxiety that we could not sleep. Or if we wondered whether if we jumped up we might not come down, we might throw a neighbor child into panic or fits of laughter, to say nothing of a situation in which we were forced to leap in order to save our lives. There are obviously some theories and even laws which, for the sake of our get- ting on with the process of living, we would do best to acknowledge once and for all as specula- tive and then choose to ignore. Alternatively, we could decide in a very literal sense to make- believe, to convince ourselves that, after all, at least instances of commonplace theories and laws are instances of absolute and irrefutable certainties. If, we chose to do so, we could of course perform the same magical rite with respect to all theories. The point is, however, that no matter what we choose to do or make of them, we cannot alter the fact that theories, by their very nature, are speculative and as such always demand validation. Their speculative nature notwithstanding, scientific theories are relatively stable in a double sense. To begin with, the world of which they speak does not change in such fundamental or catastrophic ways as to demand global reappraisal and consequent revised theoretical explana- tions. Consider astronomy, for example: the planetary and star-laden sky has not fundamen- tally changed since men first began searching the heavens to understand the nature of earth’s relationship to astronomical bodies or the interrelationship of the astronomical bodies them- selves. Certainly there have been changes, e.g., stars have increased or decreased in brilliance in respect to the earth since those early times, but such changes do not demand basic revisions in a theory which proposes to explain the nature of the relationship of the earth to those bodies or the relationship of those bodies to one another. On the contrary, a scientific theory aims toward stating a principle of invariance about those relationships because those relationships are, by human or earthly standards of measurement, constant. It is precisely in respect to this fundamental constancy of the natural world that scientific theories may be characterized as relatively stable. Their relative stability is equally apparent in respect to the Weltanschauung or paradigmatic frame of reference within which they are formulated. Insofar as any scientific theory is ground- ed in a particular world view, in a particular paradigm of observation, its stability is relative to the maintenance of that perspective. Because the discovery of new facts about, or a new way of looking at the phenomenon in question remains always a possibility by virtue of anew para- digm, the stability of a theory is not absolute but hinges on possible changes in ways of viewingB OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE the natural world and hence ultimately, on changes in knowledge about the natural world "A further dimension of the relative stability of scientific theones is evident in the interplay or inter-connectedness of theories within particular and/or related fields. Each newly formu- Tated-and accepted—scientific theory opens up a fresh vantage point {Pam fhenatualjyodd and each successive theory or law must accord itself with the new knowledge or show how that new knowledge is limited, or in the case of theories alone, false. The former situation wanalo: gous to a certain game where, if you ask the direct question, “is the animal a quadruped?,” and are told, Yyou cannot then ask if the animal is a domestic feline. The latter situation is analogous to receiving a bank notice to the effect that your account *$ ‘overdrawn. In the same way, the new theory is retroactively affective: all previous scientific theories and laws must aa rracirandorth the nowskncwledge. Aninia wey. 20 Saunaayie =m eye SPA, NOH ever special its range of application, is seldom or never just an increment to what is already Krave tts assimilation requires the reconstruction of prior theory and re-evaluation of prior fact, an intrinsically revolutionary process that is seldom completed by a single man and never overnight.”!4 Tt becomes clear then that any scientific theory or law necessarily exists within the larger framework of other scientific theories and laws and their relationship to that larger framework can never be compromised. This does not mean that controversy is not to be found but simply that theories and laws within the same or related fields must form a coherent whole.!® When disputes do arise, they are resolved by the particular community of scientists involved since sP'there is no neutral algorithm for theory-choice, no systematic decision procedure which, properly applied, must lead each individual in the group to the same decision.” On the other hand, a theory can conflict and continue to conflict with another theory because each is specu- lative, e.g., the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum phenomena and the hidden variable ex- planation. A law can even conflict with a theory, e.g., Newton’s laws of motion and Einstein’s theory of relativity, because the law is of limited scope, that is, applicable to the context of events which describe everyday observable phenomena, but not the cosmic universe. But generally, a theory “. . . must be consistent with the bulk of accepted knowledge if it is to have the support of more than just its instances, and if it is to be regarded as an addition to know: edge and not as an extraneous body.”!7 A scientific theory is thus not an isolated entity in any sense. Not only is its meaning and validity tied to the fundamental constancy of the natural world and to a particular paradigmatic frame of reference, but the theory also exists in relation to a larger framework with which it fe be compatible, or if not compatible, the theory must demonstrate how laws or other eories are erroneous or of a limited order. In effect, a scientific theory exhibits relationshij at three inter-connected levels: at the level of the universe, a relationship to the fundamental constancy of the natural world; at the level of a world view, a relationship to a particular com- Bea of scientists practicing science within its purview; at the level of any specified field of scientific inquiry, a relationship to all other theories and laws within that field. Given these findings about scientific theory, ou 4S meniiaiieiean’ ry, our task now must be to determine how they accord with To have spoken at all of a fundamental const stancy or of a common meeti ith ety fomework oul eau already to have taken us far afield from a Lae damental constancy within the world of art and neither are there invariant phenomena in forming, performing, or viewi mans » perf ig, or viewing works of art. penal aseene4 ors fancies are yet to be found on an eas ine Hee predicted.1® Thus it would seem that aesthetic theory and scientific theory,MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE. 9 while sharing the same characteristics of abstraction and generalization, and the same specula- tive nature, eventually part ways: in view of nature’s fundamental constancy and of particular paradigms of observation, the theoretical conclusions of scientific theory are relatively stable; in view of art’s myriad faces and/or the unpredictability of human behaviour, the theoretical con- clusions of aesthetic theory are patently unstable. In contrast then to our theoretical knowledge about the natural world, our theoretical knowledge about the world of art is not incomplete in the sense of being open to further refinements and discoveries, it is limited, and necessarily so: each work of art is a fresh and unique presence in the world, a presence which cannot be predicted in advance of its creation. ‘On the surface such a view of aesthetic theory appears incontestable. But to assure ourselves of being on firm ground, let us consider the issue from another point of view. It was stated that there are no invariant phenomena in forming, performing, or viewing works of art. A disclaimer however, could be made to the effect that works of art and human activity are both or either of them invariant phenomena. To aver that works of art themselves are invariant phenomena, however, would lead us not to the formulation of a theory but of a tautology: works of art are works of art; or works of art explain works of art. In turning back on itself, the “theory” tells us nothing. To aver that human activity is an invariant of art would not be to theorize about art, but about its causal origins, e.g., creativity, play, and so on.!9 One could not there- fore claim to have isolated a fundamental constancy within the world of art on the basis of which a theory of art could be founded. On the contrary, one would have to advance other characteristics in order to forge the theory. An instructive case in point is Erich Kahler’s theory of art which purports to have distinguished art on the basis of its being a special kind of human activity. “Art,” he says, “is a human activity which explores, and hereby [sic] creates, new reality in a suprarational visional manner and presents it symbolically or metaphoncally [sic] , ‘as a microcosmic whole signifying a macrocosmic whole.”2° As is evident, the theory proper is rooted not in a specific human activity but in the effect of, or the product in which that activity results, ie., a “new reality . . . (presented) symbolically or metaphoncally [sic] , as a microcosmic whole signifying a macrocosmic whole.” The purported invariant—human acti- vity—could as well be omitted from the theory with no loss of meaning. Its inclusion simply deflects us to consider a separate question about the non-human creation of art; for example, the nest of a satin bower bird or the paintings which a monkey might render, to say nothing of orange-tinted sunsets or majestic snow-covered peaks. ‘A theory of art rooted in invariants should approach law-like stature. To be worth its salt, it should not only be potent enough to stand the test of time but enliven our knowledge by sharpening our sensibilities. That is, if an aesthetic theory affirms an invariant principle, then it should, at the least, like a scientific theory, achieve relative stability and hold the promise of more knowledge through additional study or research. The discussion above confronts us directly with the question of whether such an aesthetic theory is possible. It focuses our atten- tion upon the heart of the matter; to wit, is it futile for a theory of art to strive toward relative stability, toward stating an invariant principle? Is one struggling in vain to fashion aesthetic theory after scientific theory? Is the fact being overlooked that in aesthetic theory it is not fundamentally a question of incomplete knowledge but of limited knowledge? If instead of aiming toward relative stability the proposed invariant factors—human activity and works of art—are themselves called into question, several points compel our attention. Since these so-called invariants are themselves variable—human behaviour is never absolutely predictable and artistic expressions are never identical with one another—it becomes clear why theories of art are necessarily unlike theories of science and why they can never aim at the dis-10 OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE covery of fundamental constancies but must always and necessarily calmenae ane without further appeal—in perpetually unstable as well as inconclusive conclusions. | inlike the natural world, changes in the world of art are frequently, if not usually, so fun‘ sais and cata- Strophie that they do demand radical revisions of theoniss © new theories altogether. It isnot then only a question of change, but of radical change. For example, we might consider “new dance,” as exemplified in the works of Merce Cunningham, Yvonne Rainer, Twyla Tharp, and of many other choreographers who diverged from the formal precepts of Martha Graham and Doris Humphrey. ‘A theory of dance written prior to its development is quite likely to creak and totter, per- haps fall altogether, We might take two examples to illustrate this point. To begin with, a theory of dance which affirms dance to be symbolic simply does not jibe with those dance forms which have discarded emotions and sentiments in favor of the sheer phenomenon of movement itself, Along with the possibility that new dance is really not art at all, the only pos- vo validation of the theory is to be found in the proclamation that no matiet what he creates, and whether wittingly or unwittingly, man is perforce a creator of symbols. This non sequitur ie a difficult though not impossible one to counter. In another essay We shall explore it further. What is to be noted here is that the theory does not appear to accord directly with the radical changes apparent in the art of dance. The theory that dance “ . . is an embodiment of emotional experience in expressive art movement upon which the principles of composition are consciously imposed by the per- sonality"? is equally at odds with the new dance. With its found movement. every day gestures, aleatory schemes, and so on, consciously imposed principles of composition are peculiarly lack- ing, yet the dance is not. We could simply conclude that because dance is no longer an embodi- meni of emotional experience, principles of composition are no longer relevant or de rigeur. But even if this were 80, it does not save the theory as such for the theory is really a generaliza- tion about a special kind of dance and no longer embraces the art of dance in all its present manifestations. If the original example highlighted the problems in attempting to root aesthetic theories in invariants, both of the above examples highlight the inescapably unstable conclusions of theories of dance or art and point further toward an unequivocal understanding of their instability: because the art of dance does change and change radically at times, and because there is no way of predicting in which direction creative human enterprise or expression will next tum, it is impossible to formulate a relatively stable aesthetic theory of dance, one whose richness and ely ae not aes change. Of course if change were taken as the singular invariant in the eal ree ould a eae rare io relatively stable, that is, stable relative to bare OE ee ut this characterization seems rather trivial; it simply, an aesthetic theory is valid so long as it is valid. Yet if we cease searching for invariant phenomena and if we are willing to settle for what might be histori i sapioly accurate theories of dance, such as the ones described ore eae ad a selves in a more iti ic e 5 Sie ten inisteerd and harla ens cate eat eee ed might also approach each new experience Se ee eee Lae tempted to package dance in an unchangin, exis luttered vision because we have not at- ging, ever-lasting theoretical box; and finally, we might come to an appreciation of the limi insi i eae imitations as well as the insights which any aesthetic theory of We hay it ee ee ee auestion of change and not knowledge, nd |, theories of art are not and cannot be expectedMAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE 4H to be relatively stable in the same sense that scientific theories are. Moreover in further con- trast to scientific theories, aesthetic theories do not seem bound to reverberate with or against one another within a larger framework. Since there are or can be theories of art as sublimation alongside theories of art as beauty, or theories of dance as the artistic manifestation of life forces alongside theories of dance as symbolic communication, it appears that although they might conflict with one another, aesthetic theories do not of necessity have to confront one another. Because there is no common singular unchanging world in face of which aesthetic theories are forged, there is no common singular unchanging ground upon which all such theories meet, whether to collide, to fuse, to support or to deny one another. We might there- fore tentatively conclude that each aesthetic theory is a point of view which can be maintained independently. There is a further aspect to, or better, consequence of this latter major difference between aesthetic and scientific theories. If we consider the larger framework of scientific theory not as an array of separate articles of theoretical faith but as an interlocking whole, we see that it is an expression of a global perspective upon the universe; it reflects a particular world view or picture, in Kuhn’s term, a paradigm. Mention was made earlier of a world view in the discus- sion of theory-making, ic., abstraction and generalization. To develop further the nature of a world view, we need to consider Kuhn’s more recent elaboration of paradigms as disciplinary matrices,?3 that is, as a commitment by a particular scientific community to certain symbolic generalizations, to certain models, and to certain values. Now such commitments clearly bespeak a set of beliefs of philosophic proportions. They might be particularly visible during a critical period of theoretical contention when one group of scientists is attempting to win over another group to their set of beliefs. As Waisman points out, “. . . to the degree to which their arguments are attempts at changing the whole intellectual attitude they take on a philosophical character.”24 In just what sense these beliefs or attitudes qualify as philosophic we will ulti- mately clarify. For the moment, let us first note that any particular paradigm is both suppor- tive and generative of particular theories: it provides” . . . scientists not only with a map but also with some of the directions essential for map-making.”25 A paradigm or disciplinary ma- trix not only undergirds an existing theoretical structure, but also points the way toward further theoretical research and discoveries, Secondly, a change in paradigm is always a possi- bility. A new theory can revolutionize the existing world view and replace it with a new paradigm. Copernicus’ theory did just that. So did Darwin’s and Einstein's. Each produced a startling new global perspective upon the natural world. Such new paradigms do not ordinarily call into question universal laws, although they might, but rather, dispute heretofore accepted theories which support a different paradigm. In effect, whatever our present Weltanschawung, it is not an absolute, unchanging view of the natural universe, an ever-lasting paradigm, but one which by the force, the vision, and the knowledge which a new theory offers, is malleable, alter- able, or replaceable altogether. The thrust of contemporary physics and parapsychology, for example, pushes us to the brink of considering “mind stuff” and not matter to be the ultimate world reality.26 oe Now if dialogue between aesthetic theories appears by scientific standards sparse so that the larger framework is hard if not impossible to come by, it would seem that a world picture of art emerging from a composite of theories of art would be out of the question. Yet if we come along statements which hold, for example, that “man has always danced,”27 it certainly appears as if a global view of dance, and by extension, a global view of art, were adumbrated if not pro- posed outright. There are several reasons however why such a statement falls short of the mark. In the first place it is a global view which is neither supported by nor generative of theories,that iste is neither, a/consequence/of.thebrynoriths|a0usce/of further theories: Anjthesecond place the statement might be characterized as a speculative generalization but one which is not grounded in the particulars of the phenomenon in question; hence it cannot itself even be founted as a theory about the world of dance or art. Thirdly, even though it might be a philo- sophical statement, philosophy understood in a particular sense, it commonly appears dis- jointed from any philosophical treatise. In contradistinction then to scientific paradigms, that is, in lieu of a singular paradigm being reflected by a composite of theories, we have in art the possibility of many paradignlike views being proposed The immediate problem comes from the fact that, as a general view upon the world of art, the presented picture is not filled in and cannot be for the theoretical structure and concrete details necessary to its image are and always will be lacking. The question we must ask hinges precisely on that observation: because Scientific theories are generated by and supportive of a global view and because aesthetic theories are not, is the gap simply and adequately filled by statements about art which envision a world picture? Prom: the discussion above, the answer would seem to be “no.” The above example of a slobal-seeking aesthetic statement would seem in fact to illustrate how an abstraction, our existing knowledge of the art of dance, while masquerading as evidence for a theory actually serves as the comerstone of an assumption for the theory. As noted above, the “theory” puts forth a generalization which is quite beyond the scope of its particulars. Because our experi- ence of dance is limited by the time span of our own lives, by our own culture, by accessibility tothe dance of past or even contemporary cultures other than our own, our knowledge of dance is also limited, Moreover not only is any statement which might emerge in the form of a global view of dance or art not supported by a composite of theories, but the statement itself is not capable of generating further theoretical speculation: it is a closed perspective. It looks out on nothing other than itself, its own reflection, and if it happens to see the past-present- future world of dance or art in that reflection, that world cannot be granted a privileged posi- tion, The emulation of a scientific world picture would thus appear to be in vain. In the same way that we cannot get a fast and secure theoretical foothold in the changing universe of art and thus gain relative stability; so try as we like, we cannot attain either a comprehensive grasp of that universe and gain a sound global perspective. There is however another path we might explore whereby we might arrive at bona fide aesthetic paradigms. What might be taken as of the nature of an aesthetic paradigm is the distinctive aura surrounding the composite works of art in any particular historical period and geographical setting. That is, instead of a paradigm being supported by and generative of theo- ries, we might consider the possibility of paradigm being supported by and generative of works of art28 Such a possibility is encouraged by the fact that the dynamics of paradigm poate pe well with the frequently radical changes in the world of art. For example, @ ree pacieay to dance, as evidenced by a totally different kind of creation, may par aeieey pi ce and es has been the model of dance to date. At the same particular view of the world and man’s relationship to it which that model reflects. The work of Isadora Duncan, Martha Graham, and Merce Cunningham are dramatic cases in point. Each created not only a radically different world of dance but a radically dif- ferent view of man in relation to the world. Such artists revolutionize the existing world view by calling into question, whether intentionall iB ; a tconat atios elise ATC ly or not, the heretofore accepted practices of theit clstacticioaksleupconivieysatel eee aesthetic paradigm. Although there are differences, paradigm may continue to be created,?9 we might never”MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE 13 theless say that paradigmatic revolutions in art take place in a manner analogous to those in science. In sum, if we have in art the possibility of many paradigms being proposed, it is not because an array of global-seeking statments may be made but precisely because radical changes in the world of art create them. And if this is so, then the theoretical structure and concrete details necessary to a man-world picture are not lacking but are, on the contrary, filled in within the life-span of each paradigm, directly and indirectly by the works of art themselves, i.e., by the works and critical writings about them. Furthermore, although we grant that our knowledge of the world of art is limited and that such limited knowledge cannot generate theories to the ex- tent that a viable paradigm emerges, when we view aesthetic paradigms as supported by and generative of works of art, and not theories, we see that it is no longer a question of an im- poverished knowledge. In fact, the question of limited knowledge is elided altogether in that each paradigm simply is what it is: here, now, in this place, at this time. Aesthetic paradigms, like the theories of dance mentioned earlier, might thus have an historical and geographical relevance rather than a universal or enduring one, a relevance consistent with the fact that the world of art is an ever-changing one. Finally, we should note and note emphatically that in the replacement of one aesthetic paradigm by another, no greater or lesser value inherently attaches to either. One paradigm is not better than any other, it is only different. This is because there is no singular given world of art of which all paradigms are a reflection. If paradigms there be in the world of art, or if we insist upon having them, we must content ourselves with the fact that one is as good, as valid, as significant as the next. We have come to a point now where with our distinction between aesthetic and scientific theories, we could ask why it is that we cannot simply assume that because it is a question of dance, any theories so concerned are necessarily aesthetic ones. After all, the examples given have all underscored a placement of dance within the purview of art. Moreover we might not easily see a fit between dance and the world explained by scientific theory, nor would we readily tend to associate dance theories with the kinds of characteristics attributed to scientific theory. Examples, discordances, and associations notwithstanding however, were we to grant such an assumption, we would in part beg the very issue in question and thereby abort our insight into the nature of theories of dance. We are obliged therefore to hold in abeyance still further the question of whether theories of dance might be scientific or aesthetic and to pursue our inquiry along different lines in order that that question be properly dealt with. (On the surface it might seem that in the discussion of paradigms we have strayed far indeed from our original investigation of theories. Yet if paradigms, whether anchored in aesthetics or in science, are conceptions of philosophic dimension, we should want to know something about the ways in which a philosophy of dance might impinge upon a theoretical account of dance. The possible introduction of philosophy into our account of theories dance was intimated earlier when it was remarked that any particular paradigm engenders a certain set of beliefs and that global-seeking statements on the order of “man has always danced” might be preliminary philosophical statements, philosophy understood in both cases in a particular sense. We cannot then ignore the question of how philosophy or a philosophical view of dance might be related to a theory of dance. Moreover if dances can be supportive of or generated by a paradigm, then one must be able to philosophize as well as theorize about dance. The question is, how are we to tell the difference? How may we distinguish between a theory of dance and a philosophy of dance? There are additional reasons which will illuminate further the necessity of examining philosophy in relation to theory.ii OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: In the first place, since our efforts will result nal aaa ofthe nature ofa refforts WHy trom a pilosophy, we may expect that out theory a We ate ones of dance wil be concomitantly the richer. Secondly, while the Inte mic study of dance frequently includes COs. Y the theory of dance and the philosophy aacerce, the distinction between these two sources Mind kinds of knowledge is not always as clear as it could be. Through such clarification We might hope to shed an oblique light on dear vance of an understanding of theory Pet $¢ © Mt understanding of theories of dance. toe eau clarification we might of course aso gain Fr practical insight as to what pro- Mery should be treated under the subject of theoris edance and of philosophies of dance Pay Roms of such possbiities brings us to a tied rear for pursuing this course: it seems rae oar expect that with a clearer understanding oF the difference between a theory and rrrarophy of dance, a clearer understanding might be had concerning people’s thoughts aaa or example, would it not be more correct oF us) correct to categorize Langer’s presentation of dance a philosophy rather than a theory? Are the writings of educators in presentation sptly characterized as theories or philosophies? To ‘all upon the artists themselves, Sane rnerjtien presentations of dance by Merce Cunning ‘and Doris Humphrey, for ex- ar Je theories or philosophies? And what of Alwin Nikolas) Louis Falco, Meredith Monk, wre aley, and so on? Does a theory ora philosophy of danc® need to be verbally expressed Alvin vey, en neory or philosophy? Its hoped that answers to soc) questions as these will i orge as we pursue the course of our inquiry. Accordingly, We shall look at philosophy in Cee ae i ninds of theories and will begin by focusing upon the. charsvic™SS of a elation t6 both aml relative stability and relationship to a larger framewor fo what sae hey have upon philosophy. It should be noted that the discussion which follows is bearing the J dsentangle the philosophical from the theoretical in a mininal but definitive an ater pot to present a comprehensive, in-depth account of their differences. Such a Task would obviously fll outside the scope ofthis paper. It Should also be noted that although {Rhsemenology Is philosophical mode of inquiry, itis radically different from traditional philosophical practices and as such would necessitate a third term of comparison 30 It will Therefore not figure hee specially in the characterization of philosophy i Unlike a ‘scientific theory, a philosophy is not a relatively stable entity and has no purpose or intention of being 302, although it accords with “the facts,” it does not explain them or predict them, As Waisman succinctly put it, philosophy is very unlike ae SE ee ate y is very unlike science in three respects: “. ‘proofs; there are no theorems; and there are no questions which ca be decided, Yes or No.”3! Philosophy is thus ive i a am ‘As a reflective enterprise at the highest imate Eee the an ee thatpa theonyiy empirical data but its reflective vision merallzation, ia) philosophy ii: ethe because the questions proper to pulasanevtehe Ee and deepey terrain ani asked in science. The philosopher's concern, for ex sete i and/or fundamental than those empirical questions about the natural world, e.g., whi ple, is| with metaphysical rather than Soe tacattayeaatueimeas Men wtenaati at is time?, or what is reality?, not how sopher’s concer is not with factually-oriented exmoon made; oF Bysenens ons the philo- eS rene Reet about art but with questions concern- . of dance, and so on. Answers to these questions engender a world view in two sen Ae Sie of seine theories aa ae a of which is roughly coincident with the Weltan- To begin with, insofar as questions proper to philosophy are general and/or fundamental q questions, they are necessarily questions whose scope cuts across traditional a ject areas ion: an embraces instead the whole of the world and human life within it; thus, for example, the a é t orld fife within i ions, what does it mean to perceive something?, or what rete 2 ae a : . ss? ers to these ques” taMAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE 15 tions are themselves world views; they are attempts to “ ‘see the whole picture’.”*> As two writers on philosophy have put it, “Philosophy is the attempt to ‘get it all together’.”* Par- ticular philosophies might elaborate only a part of the global picture as, for example, in a treat ment of ethics, aesthetics, or epistemology. Others might envision through the complete works of a philosopher a total or near total picture as in the case of Sartre, Plato, Wittgenstein, or Kant. In any event, a world view, whether partial or whole is necessarily embodied in any philosophy by the very nature of philosophy itself. Secondly, in elaborating that world view, a philosophy may be said to be anchored to a particular philosophical tradition; it elaborates that world view from a particular point of view: rationalist, empiricist, analytic, idealist, realist, dialectical materialist, and so on, The philosophy put forth is not so much seen against that point of view as unfolding it, that is, as fathoming its meaning and consequences. In other words, while it is true that a particular philosophy is to be understood within the purview of eg., rationalism or idealism, rationalism or idealism as a particular doctrine of beliefs about the world has no meaning apart from the elaboration of those beliefs within the particular philosophy. Since the task philosophy sets for itself is obviously different from that of science, its truth claim is also different. ‘The truth claim of a philosophy is based upon an attempt to enunciate, coherently and consistently, the nature of the human world, be it political, sociological, scienti- fic, linguistic, moral, aesthetic, or whatever. The account, as we saw, might be elaborated from any number of points of view, but whatever the point of view, the philosophy is logically struc- tured and its truth claim cannot be separated from its logic. If it were said, for example, “what is wanted most in the creation and appreciation of dance is ‘the utmost decrease of Distance without its disappearance’,”2* or “meaning in movement is rooted in symbolic transforma tion,”3$ it is clear that each statement is part of a larger reasoned structure of thought, part of 1a systematic presentation of a particular philosophical position, perhaps even the culmination or central tenet of that position. As such, neither statement can be looked at apart from the general frame of reference and context within which it is made. At the same time, the truth claim which either statement makes cannot be looked at apart from its logic, the inherent sys- tematic reasonableness of meaning which the philosophical exposition sets forth. Like any philosophic statement then, each of the above statements carries with it its own criteria of intelligibility and philosophical validity. No outside rules apply in the form of a necessary and substantiating empirical methodology. Only the “laws” of logic itself apply, i.e., certain princi- ples of correct reasoning having to do with “laws of thought,” with inferences, syllogisms, and the like, We might say then that the touchstone of a philosophical truth claim is in the sound- ness and force of the reasoning which the philosophy sets forth. In contrast, the truth claim of a scientific theory is based upon an attempt to understand the world as an entity whose structures, relationships, and evolution are explained in terms of in- variant principles. According to scientific theory the sun, for example, will become in four or five billion years a red giant star which will, in the succeeding one hundred million years deplete its nuclear fuel and fizzle out, so to speak, becoming a white dwarf star. Regarded scientifically as precisely such a stellar entity, the sun is bound to follow its own invariant order of stellar evolution, that order being the theoretical one men have claimed as true in view of their empiri- cal findings about stellar objects. The theory is relatively stable, as we have seen, because those findings might conceivably be modified by future insights and discoveries as well as by a newly generated world picture. But the relative stability of the theory is in part based too upon “all things being equal,” ie., the fundamental constancy of the natural world. Since obviously no ‘man has lived long enough to witness the evolution of such a star, the relative stability and hence the truth claim of the theory is necessarily rooted in the assumption that the world willor THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 16 apri invari ec th vara as sues OE PEST ofthat asumpuon that # prin Faraone cn be stated and 2 Uru staked out thus Bentific theory #8 rooted in is relative philosophy is rooted in i : th of th sabi undesont T gpove that a PosoPhS opal athe an ate on ant eee fevely, caentiic theories af© 10% 2 eee mpl et that ip gpecuation about such entities ee gc a 0 Sk i dover ion by theoretical physicists Belor® Sa gun a Te pally ‘. vision counters such a notion. But the 08 ya they ise ny el so any The loglcality of the latte Coe t isl neal stematic reasonableness ‘of meaning of internal validity, Whereas the relationships ng oF md volume of a 38 for example a le Press pati, as establishing connections between why, of conscious- in logics SFonahips outined in a philosopl ys Rapa dependent penomene ped ax being of atm Togical order; they are Cay ody, for example, might be descr "i 5 mighty fabric of ideas or conceDts philosophy examines or analytic relations, embedded i pe e8 01 i aa I quoted that tbe relate SaDLY 9 ich characterizes scienti- proposes. It might therefore PE that the irrelevance of sta- = theory is adducible in part to its objective logic and conversely, 1 ae ee philosophy is edtuctble to the fact that the logic of a philosophy cannot be excised Vithout demolishing the philosophy itself. In other words, while we cap examine the logic of 4 theory apart from and therefore Y ‘thout destroying the scientific theory itself, we cannot ex- 2 ine the logic of a philosophy apart from the philosophical enterprise itself. ‘This point becomes clearer if we consider that something cannot be adjudged to be stable umess it is supported in some way and ‘inless those supports in turn can be independently assayed in some manner. In effect, Nomething cannot be characterized as stable unless its supports are shown to be logically proper to it, as two legs, for example, can be shown to be Togically proper supports to an upright Tors ‘in fact, to illustrate the point specifically in re Tetion to theory, we might theorize that walking with an upright torso could be as effectively accomplished by a uniped, a triped, or a quadruped, and that in consequence, evolution of a bipedal upright creature was mere chance ther than necessity. Outlandish though the theory might be, and however counter to a sound understanding of evolution, the logic of the theory cad be tested by building facsimiles of upright torsos, for example, and attaching those torsos we ecuialy coe or otherwise controllable facsimiles of legs to make unipeds, tripeds, quadrupeds. Because the logicality of a scientific theory is experimentally accessible, i.e.» objective, because we can detach it from the generalization we are making, we can assay the logical evidence for t ; se a a ioe theory and thereby evaluate the possible soundness of the theory. b that the test mentioned above which allows us ic of the theory experinentally, would neither confirm nor deny the cee 1 ee ioe of te a a i ee spes,ot te 0, itself is always greater than its logic. As is evident in ‘the eX- ile et ee of evolution in terms of chance and necessity is beyond the reach of exbigil ope hg eae only examine the logic contained in any scientific theory and PETRA i . but we cannot examine the theory itself, The theory itself is of cause the immediate event or phenomenon is outside our sensibilities (how does salt crystallize?) or b ica See TET ecause it is outside our immediate and direct understanding (WHY .d above Since the truth clair is Soe ee proposition which a scienti pene een ict se oy tent eons Fee ee eee amet a ea ay Hee sce take trath tobe sa thing authenticate objectively. Because the truth claim of @MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE, 7 losophy is intrinsic to the philosophy, it cannot be authenticated in the way we might usually understand and go about verification, that is, through objective experimental standards. More- over because philosophy bespeaks man’s relationship to the world, the truth claim it makes does not suppress but rather affirms the human side of that relationship. This does not mean however that a philosophy can be authenticated by others only on the basis of its logical pres- entation in language, ie., a verbally reasoned argument or discussion. A philosophy or philo- sophical position can be affirmed by others not only by their confirming the force and sound- ness of its reasoning, but also by their confirming experientially the logicality of meaning en- gendered by the position. For example, by listening intently to his arguments for, and his analysis of his position, I might be convinced of a solipsist’s claim that “all that exists is that of which Iam aware,” But I might also look at the wall or the table in front of me and wonder what reasons I have to believe that anything exists on the other side or even that there is another side. And I might go on from there to question whether the flowers and trees I see out- side the windows are not standing in amazing balance on the surface of the earth, and so on. Because any philosophical issue is bound up with man’s relationship to the world, experience of the issue in question always remains a possibility. Indeed, philosophical accounts are not free~ floating reflective reveries, As noted earlier, philosophy is tethered to empirical data. It is not however tethered to an empirical methodology, except in the sense of being tethered to the reality of human experience in all its usual and peculiar guises. If we were considering, for example, whether within a philosophical disquisition on dance, the statement, “the ephemeral nature of dance belies the force of its expression,” were valid, we could look to and examine the logical structure within which that statement appears, thus making sure that we understand all of its terms, its context, its frame of reference, and the reasoning leading to its formulation. But we could also look to our own experience of dance to weigh the validity of the proposition. The crucial requisites are that we understand the proposition in the same way as the person put ting it forth and that our experience be without preconceptions or prejudgments, whether slanted in a direction favorable or disfavorable to the proposition. To prejudge the phenome- non would be to preclude the opportunity for insight which the statement might offer and to perpetuate instead the prejudices of our own vision, Experiential authentication hinges then as fhuch on the clearness of our vision as it does on the clearness of our understanding. Whatever the outcome might be of our weighing the validity of the statement, there is no reason for a majority to approve the philosophical position, for although the full exposition of that position may aim at convincing others of its rectitude, it is not necessary that it convince ‘a majority in order for it to stand as a philosophy. This is because a philosophy isself-supporting, the logical exposition of its point of view being its own support. A further difference between a philosophy and a scientific theory thus becomes obvious. Whereas a scientific theory depends ‘upon verification by others and acceptance by a majority to be counted as a bona fide theory, a philosophy may be point by point refuted by others and stil be counted as a philosophy, in principle enjoying approval by a majority of no more than one. ‘Thus, for example, the philo- Sophical position first enunciated by Plato which affirms art to be an imitation of the Ideal or “truly real.” "As to the second characteristic of a scientific theory, a relationship to a larger framework, it is apparent that philosophies like scientific theories confront one another directly. Confronta- tion may not be immediate, but ultimate confrontation is inevitable. This is because philoso phies in their very formulation do not stand isolated from one another; strands from related Philosophical inquiries continually impinge upon the issue or issues in question and the philoso- pher is duty-bound to consider all relevant evidence.37 Moreover points of arrival for one Philosopher are frequently points of departure for other philosophers. In contradistinction to the larger framework of scientific theory however, within the larger framework of philosophy. it is not compatibility but integrity which is at issue. So long as questions can be asked andOF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 jon a the philosophy remains criticisms made, the soundness of a philosophy, is oe eet LRGs vulnerable. Yet in a sense what Keeps a PLIOSOPOY 7. ik statutes about the relationship of ‘A philosophy does not aim at discovering tas of lawiike sit ory knowledge about the man to the world. It offers essentially descriptt za 2 ste. Hence such issues, prob- rea ergs wat it is, rather than wity iis or how i€ COKE TO ie consciousness, fems, or phenomena as meaning, space, univers FTG another of them has been at and so on arise. These are classically philosophical SY 1. sense, philosophy is an on- the hub of all philosophical inquiry since philosophy began. Ut «ay be ones which originated going quest for knowledge: the issues to which it addreses itself may be on et at hundreds of years ago and they may remain issues for hundreds of yé pea ey noi + philosophic inquiry or endeavor, but to the changing ways in which man natate,di deficiency, Oy ria ation to the world and to the changes can and does formulate his understanding of himself in relation a in that relationship itself. Hence, wherever and whenever contention exists, soundness remains an issue, and whenever and wherever soundness remains an issue, philosophy is hard at its task. ee aequence, wheteas In science the question might be asked felative several theories, oar serte corect?” in philosophy such a question would be meaningless. in sno%, repeated tests or other experimental evidence might be looked at to demonstrate the validity of fone among several conflicting theories. In philosophy, intemal validity alone, whether con- ceptually and/or experientially demonstrated, is the touchstone of conflicting position. There is in other words, no external arbiter which might finally resolve any issue i philosophy and rence no meaning to the question which of several philosophies is correct. Philosophy concems itself with questions whose answers lie not in careful experimentation, measurement, or ob- servation of the natural world, but in the richness and vitality of one’s own experience and Understanding, and in the scope of one’s reflective capacities. Thus, within the larger frame- Work and in confrontation with other philosophies, each philosophy or philosophical position stands or falls according to its own intemal consistency, its own inherent systematic reason- ableness of meaning. In effect, while the larger framework of science might be likened to a gymnastic pyramid-in-the-making, where imbalances or deficiencies play havoc with the whole, where each new addition or position necessitates adjustments throughout the entire structure, the larger framework of philosophy might be likened to a continuous series of jousting matches where each challenger in turn is met head-on and the battle for integrity waged. neat extention of pilosphy in lation Lo scientific theory has given us some insight into nature of plop s tat we could approach te comparison of philosophy and aesthe- seh mene yale ot edit example, in the same way that we explored the relative stability of s ic theory in relation to philosophy, we could explore the instability of aesthetic theory in relation to philosophy. Similarly, we could consider and compare the | K i Sai ein arte erie ata ae cacti area eee Tea bytieea west dupes be iecaldiaeetasioes Renee et dhfaibtout ich ShUhigpeasy ond nae ee throughout much of this esa and now forces itself to the surface and demands clarification is {utes an area withiy pillosoph kor ieee eae ona es Gc thing apart from philwophy] The ance o ee eral cestuetie thea == Isaaie rat a in a age ase would seem to be that any aesthetic theory is people in disciplines such as psycholo; ory. Yet if theories of dance are also put forward by exclusive to philosophy. Puzzling oe Sociology, or anthropology, aesthetic theory cannot be fact two different kinds of aesthetic ie ie a) then be, it appears that there are in Ty possible.38 Why this would be so is something We ‘must consider. To begin with, although a we have spoker : asa purely aesthetic theory, This isan eee one, there is actually no such thins lem: ands a particular manner of 8?MAXINE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE 19 proach and/or a particular method. In respect to this requisite, the area of aesthetics is a pecul- iar one: it does not define an area of study in quite the same way that science and philosophy do. While the study of scientific matters may be scientifically undertaken and the study of philosophic matters philosophically undertaken, the study of aesthetic matters may not be aesthetically undertaken unless of course one actually studies painting, dance, music, and so on. When it comes to formulating ideas about such study, however, a particular approach or method must be adopted which is actually para-aesthetic. There are three broad ways in which this might be done although only two of these concern us here: scientifically, philosophically, and theologically. If we approach the formulation of a theory about aesthetic matters scientifically, we must necessarily convert the world of art to a set of characters that can be read objectively. In es- sence this means that what is abstracted is limited to that which is quantifiable or otherwise manipulable. It also means that those factors which are identified fall into already fixed cate- gories—else they should not be noticed. These categories, whether space, time, style, move: ment behaviour, expression, perception, volitional body movement, nonverbal body movement, or whatever, are not themselves examined or questioned but on the contrary assumed as given, in the same way that space, time, or causality, for example, are taken as given by people in the physical sciences who proceed without accounting for the nature of those phenomena them- selves.2° That the scientific theorist moreover removes himself or herself from interacting with the object of study, that he or she is “objective,” goes without saying. If, on the other hand, we approach the formulation of aesthetic theory philosophically, ab- stractions and generalizations are made in terms of features which defy objectification but which have been experientially predicated of art since people first began theorizing about it: form, expressiveness, feeling, and so on. While a delineation of such features may be the aim of some theories, oftentimes it is a new matrix which is sought or discovered by which we might more reasonably and comprehensively understand art. A philosophical theory might also under- take to describe the very categories assumed in scientific accounts by confronting such ques- tions as, “what is the nature of space in dance?,” “does dance express?,” or “what is style?” Moreover the philosopher does not discount himself or herself as a figure in the event he or she seeks to understand. On the contrary, it is the philosopher's self-chosen task to elaborate the phenomenon as he or she sees it, through his or her own studies, experiences, understandings, and insights. ‘The two kinds of theoretical formulations obviously give us two different kinds of know- ledge about art or dance. The difference might be more finely elaborated in terms of the way in which the phenomenon of dance itself is regarded. The point of departure for the scientific theorist is the world of dance as a given world and at the same time one among the many which man creates or already inhabits. As such, that world is looked upon as something, that is, itis already characterized: a realm of cross-cultural differences, a manifestation of man’s symbol- making capacity, a socio-political phenomenon, a form of human behaviour, a form of language, and so on. The nature of the phenomenon of dance itself remains unquestioned. In philosophi- cal inquiry, the world of dance is understood on its own ground, not as something other than the artistic phenomenon it is. In principle, then, philosophical theorists come to their task un- armed with categories to be assigned to or discovered in dance. The peculiar sociological struc- tures, for example, which are theorized as supporting a particular society's dance, are quite beyond the scope of a philosophical theory of dance. In this sense a philosophic aesthetic theory is always narrower than a scientific one. But again, in principle and also by definition, philosophical inquiry transcends any particular disciplinary approach. It aims, on the contrary, to unite them inva single vision. In this sense a philosophic aesthetic theory is broader than a scientific one. It becomes apparent then not only why: aesthetic theory has been considered by