256 srateies assigned postive probailiy must yeld the highest expected payott and itis for that reason that a player is content to lta random device determine hhow she behaves. If that werent the ease, then, after performing the randomiza- tion, player might decide to ignore what was recommended and choose a beter strategy. This equilibrium property of indiflerence is highly useful in solving for Imixed-strategy Nash equilibria, ‘A players security strategy was defined tobe that strategy which maximizes his pay when he makes the highs cautious assumption that whatever strategy he chooses, the other players will et in the worst way possible for him, For wo Player games of pure conflict, © security solution, whereby both players se a security strategy. ialso a Nash equ brim, Thus, regardless of whether a player is pessimistic (thinking thatthe ether player has outsmarted him) or optimistic (hiking that he has coretly anticipated the other players strates), he proper behavior i the same Reproduced below i the telephone game from Section 42 Find all Nash ‘equlleia in mised srategls The Telophone Game Winnie an | Wale concen | 2" | 20 | 23 wot [32 [ia counts thre balls and two sekes andthe bass ate empty, The batter ans to maximize the probability of geting 2 hit ora walk, whe the | pitcher ans to-minimize this probability The pitcher has to decide | wheter to throw a fast ball or a curveball whle the batters to decide | wheter to prepare for fart bal ra curve ball. The sraiegic form of tis | ttm: i shown here. Find all Nash equa in mixed strategie, | Baseball Pitcher [Fee | cera anuer| ator] anes | a7 Coreisi | 28 [38 {ovard For Lauderdale, Do you rave the legal limit of 65 miles per hou | > 15 smog bres andyoute eng south on Interstate 9S, Reding | ode you crank it up o 8 and hope that hers no speed trap? And whatbout the state police? Do they seta speed tap or instead head into town fd ind ut wheter the “Hot and Pres” neon igh sit up atthe Krispy Kreme? (Oxeh, thas» cheap shot!) The plie lke to nal speeder, but ‘hey dont want tose «sped rap ithere wot be any speedersto nab. A ‘trntepe form for this sewing is shown In the accompanying igure. The {ror can iter the legal imit of 65 mph or speed at 80 mph. The police ‘lier can set a speed rap or ead nto town and gra some of those dl ‘ious highearb doughnuts. The best outcome for the ever is that she speeds and nat exught the payo fr that ease i 70. The worst outcome {Rha she spose ia nalled oy the poss, for whieh he pay 10. 1F ‘She chooses to drve th lps limit then her ayo s 40 and i the same regardless of wha the state police do. (ln other words. the driver does ‘are about the calorie Intake ofthe trooper) As forthe police oct his | best outcome le sting a sped trap and naling «speeder, gvng him 2 ‘ayo of 100 His wore outome i siting out there In sped tap and Falling to write a chet this uteome delivers payof of only 20. His payott is 50'when he chooses to goto the Keepy Kreme Find all Nash equlibria | inmited strates. ‘Speed Trap and Doughnuts State police officer | ‘Speed rap | Key Kreme, ‘women | 0100 | 7050 ‘simon | 020 | 1050 Driver 4A mugger and a vitim meet on a dark street. The muguer previously decided whether to bring a gun and, iF he did, whether to show i ring the robber ifthe mugger doesnot show a gun—either because he does't fave ane or has one and hides then the victims to decide whether 0 | resist (Not that i the mugger does havea gun and shows i then the ve tims payoll 5 regardless ofthe strategy chosen, because the vetim's Strategy is what oo f no pun e shown) The strategie form ofthis tus ton is shown bdowt. Note tha all pyots have been specified, except for the muggers ayo when he chookes to have a gun and abow st lod a ‘condition on whereby a Nash equim exsts in which the mogget ‘andomizes ove the two pure strategie gu, hide and gun andthe ve- tim randomlaes ver reit and donot ei. Vien Fest | Do nat an | Nose 33 Mucger | don fie | 32 [5a as235 EE NG aN SATE 5. Foe the yur below find all mind-strategy Nash equilib Player 2 sipaa[ aa 3746 [54 Player 1 5, Find all Nash guia in mixed strateles forthe game shown hee, Payor 2 Tat | aate | Rare Prayer [meade | 13 | 30 | 10 the closing seconds of football game, andthe king team has just ‘sored a ouchdowa. Now down by only ane point, he team decides 19 {fora tworpoint conversion that, f secessul, wil win the game, The fens chooses among three possible running pays un wide lef, run wide right and run up the middle The defense decides between defend leg against a wide run and a nin up the middle. The payoff tthe defense Is the probability that te offense does not core, and the payoff te the offense isthe probability that It does score. Find ll mixed- strategy Nash eau. ‘Two-Point Conversion ‘un wie et | Bun up wide | Pun wide right Bend agent | ee | awe Defense | mean ‘Detend epaiat |. The childhood game of Rock-Paper-Scizor x shoun in the accompany ing figure. (Ifyou unfamiliar wih this game, see Sesion 42) Show that ‘ach player assigning equal probbiliy to his or her thee pure strategies tea symm Nash ull,Rock Paper-Stissors Use Tock | Paper | Sesare sen [Peper | 1 | 30 | seems oe fe | om 9 Bach of thee payers decidlog between the pu tele g and tp ‘The pay ogo Is whee mis the number of players that choose td the poo tpi 58 che ecved repens of wha the ter bayer do) Find all Nash equi In midsole, 10. Ato of n= 2 companies are considering ent into new market. The Cost of ety it 30, Tony one company ener ts gros profi s 200, IFmore tha oe company ete, the ach eta eres a oss ral of 40. The payot toa company that emesis grows prof mins sey ‘ont whe the yo to eompary that does notener 60. Fd sym tot Nah qa in mised sate 1. Sada Hosen deciding where thie hit weapons of mass denon (WMD), while he United Nations decding wha ook for he, The Paolo Hosen fom sucessfully hiding WMD ts Sand rom bang {hem found 2 For the UN, te paolo finding WD i 9 ad rom nt Ending them a4 Husain can bide them in faaity X.Y, or Z. The UN inepecton eam has to decide which ities o check. Beene the ape tor are limited Io tems of ie apd personne they eannot check ll feces 1 Supote the UN has wo pare stein: It can ther nsec flies Xand Y oth af which ae geopaphlal clo 0 each thes) or nope fly Z. Find» Neph etiam nme sates o. Suppor the UN cat Snpet ay cin otha tha thre pure Suntepcs The UN can nopect Xand Y.XandZ, or YandZ. Fod& Nash eqlbriam in mined sete 2. Consider the tworlayer game blow. Fad al ofthe mixedsctegy Nash sculls Sow Player 1 | Pestum [372: Consider the two-player same below Find al of the mine-traegy Nash ‘equilibria Player 2 Tr | Ane Te 2 02 Prayer! pon | 70. zy ‘Consider the two-player pve below Assume layers are allowed io randomize « Derive players best-reply functions Find all ofthe misedatrategy Nath euibra, Player 2 Player 4 | 28 33 | 15. Phil Stu, and Doug are deciding which featersty to pledge. They ll assign ‘8 payolf of§ to pledging Phi Gamma and s payoff of to Dela Chi. The ayo from no pledging ether houses I. PRi Gamma and Tete Chl each have to slots Fall hee of them happen to choose the sane house then the house wil domly choose which two are sdmited, In that case, each has probably 23 of geting in and probability 1/3 of not pledging eny house. they do nota choos the seme house then ll are aie to the house they chose Finda symeteie Nath equlibrium in mised sateen, 16. Thyee real chains ar each deciding whether to locate store in town A oF town B. The profit or pajal that a chain receives depends on the town Selected and the numberof ether chains that put sores in that tom see sccompenying able ‘umber ct Ofer China with Chains On Location] _Storssla That Tw chain's Prof x 0Finda syrmenie mied-trategy Nash equilibria in which chains one o. Find ll ixe-trategy Nash essa in which one ofthe chins pots «Find ll ixedsrategy Nash eulbra in which one ofthe chains puts store intoun B for sure. 17. factory is suspected of hiring egal immigrants as workers, The author hy is decdrg whether to conduct an inspection Ifthe factory has egal workers andan inspection takes place, the workers will be discovered. The ost of an nipecton tothe government i 00 The benefit For the inspec ‘oni 500 i legal worker are found, but OP none are found. The payott to the auherty from conducting an inspection Is the benefit minos the ‘oa, wile te pay from not inspecting Is. Fr the Factory, the pase From having ilegl workers and nt geting caight 8 200, fom not using ‘legal workers 0, a fom using legal workers and geting caught Is 300A facory mst decide whether or not o use fegal workers, and the rmermment mt decide wherher ar not ta conduct am napection. Fis ll ried strategy Nash guia. For the gare below, find al of the mixed strategy Nash equa. The ‘i payo na cele for payer , the eacond payor player 2, andthe ‘hid payois for player 3, Payer 39 Payer 3: Stove Pipe 2 Ts | Sp feel 7453 ea Paver rote 332 Payer Tiate For the Auranches Gap game in Figure 7.10 find the security strategies and sccurtypayots for General Bradley and General von Kluge Consider the modified Rock-Paper-Sclssors below. Find a symmetric rixed-trategy Nash equilibrium Phyer 2 Player 1 [Boner 6