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Facts of the case
In 1867, the provisional state legislature of Mississippi chartered the Mississippi
Agricultural, Educational, and Manufacturing Aid Society. The Society was chartered
to run a lottery for the next 25 years; however, in 1868, a new constitution ratified
by the people outlawed lotteries in the state. John Stone and others associated with
the Society were arrested in 1874 for running a lottery. The Society claimed they
were protected by the provisions of their charter while the state declared that the
subsequent enforcement legislation had repealed the grant.
Did Mississippi violate the Contract Clause by repealing the Society's grant?
A unanimous Court found that the Mississippi classification of lotteries as outlawed
acts was valid. The State legislature do not have the power to bind the decisions of
the people and future legislatures. The Court stated that no legislation had the
authority to bargain away the public health and morals. The Court viewed the
lottery as a vice that threatened the public health and morals. The contracts
protected in the Constitution are property rights, not governmental rights.
Therefore, one can only obtain temporary suspension of the governmental rights (in
this case, the right to outlaw actions) in a charter which can be revoked by the will
of the people.

101 PHIL 1155

Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships,
brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that RA 1180 is unconstitutional.
Petitioner contends, among others, that said act violate the equal protection of laws
and that it violates the treaty of the Philippines with China. Solicitor General
contends that the act was a valid exercise of the police power and that not a single
treaty was infringed by said act.

Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of laws

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination on oppression of inequality. The real
question at hand is whether or not the exclusion in the future aliens for the retail
trade unreasonable. The equal protection clause is not infringed by a specified
class if it applies to all persons within such class and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do
not. Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a
classification otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls
along the lines of nationality. The difference in status between citizens and aliens
constitute a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

3. BAYAN MUNA vs. Romulo G.R. NO. 159618: February 1, 2011

In 2000, the RP, through Charge dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome
Statute which, by its terms, is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by
the signatory states.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to
protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that
might be brought against them in international tribunals.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and
ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at
least declared as without force and effect.

Whether the Respondents abused their discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement in contravention of
the Rome Statute.
Whether the agreement is valid, binding and effective without the concurrence by at
least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First issue
The Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome
Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a
matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the ICC.
to Art. 1 of the Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC is to be
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the signatory states]. the
Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling
or unable to prosecute.

Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a StateParty and a signatory to a treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, a signatory state is only obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of a treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome
Statute and not a State-Party for lack of ratification by the Senate. Thus, it is only
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute. Any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty
would be premature. And even assuming that the Philippines is a State-Party, the
Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of international agreements entered into
between States, even when one of the States is not a State-Party to the Rome
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 2/3 concurrence
Second issue
The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of
subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the
earliest days of our history, we have entered executive agreements covering such
subjects as commercial and consular relations, most favored-nation rights, patent
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and
the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned
by our courts.
Executive agreements may be validly entered into without such concurrence. As
the President wields vast powers and influence, her conduct in the external affairs of
the nation is, as Bayan would put it, executive altogether. The right of the
President to enter into or ratify binding executive agreements has been confirmed
by long practice.

4. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Assoc., Inc vs Mayor of Manila

On 13 June 1963, the Manila Municipal Board enacted Ord 4760 and the same was
approved by then acting mayor Astorga. Ord 4760 sought to regulate hotels and
motels. It classified them into 1st class (taxed at 6k/yr) and 2nd class (taxed at
4.5k/yr). It also compelled hotels/motels to get the demographics of anyone who
checks in to their rooms. It compelled hotels/motels to have wide open spaces so as
not to conceal the identity of their patrons. Ermita-Malate impugned the validity of
the law averring that such is oppressive, arbitrary and against due process. The
lower court as well as the appellate court ruled in favor of Ermita-Malate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws
enacted by Congress (in this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong
foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a
stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the
challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only
discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases
the revenue of the lgu concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as
well. The due process contention is likewise untenable, due process has no exact
definition but has reason as a standard. In this case, the precise reason why the
ordinance was enacted was to curb down prostitution in the city which is reason
enough and cannot be defeated by mere singling out of the provisions of the said
ordinance alleged to be vague.


Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme
Ledesma, seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal
Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar
Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or
persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane.
Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aid
and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is
not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause
unconstitutional and void. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus
this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act (Commonwealth Act
567) is unconstitutional.
The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said
Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the
great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement,
therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act
is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature
may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its
protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike
constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise
funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the

implement of the states police power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes
be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied
under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

6. Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board

Petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators
adversely affected assailed the constitutionality of PD 1987 entitled "An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. The Decree promulgated on October 5, 1985,
took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after completion of its publication in
the Official Gazette.
PD 1994 issued a month thereafter reinforced PD 1987 and in effect amended the
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Petitioner contended among others that the
tax provision of the decree is a rider.
Whether or not the PD 1987 is unconstitutional due to the tax provision included
RULING: PD 1987 is constitutional.
1. The title of the decree, which calls for the creation of the VRB is comprehensive
enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covered
in all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or
that the latter be an index to the body of the decree.
2. The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the general object of the decree, which is the regulation of
the video industry through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not

inconsistent with nor foreign to the general subject and title. As a tool for regulation
it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the
3. The express purpose of PD 1987 to include taxation of the video industry in order
to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videos is
evident from Preambles 2 and 5. Those preambles explain the motives of the
lawmaker in presenting the measure.

7. Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of

Agrarian Reform
These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O.
No. 228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the
constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
They contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their
right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued
the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
Whether agrarian reform is an exercise of police power or eminent domain
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of
eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same
time on the same subject. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be
destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But
where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of
whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the
use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical
possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor
of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of
the power of eminent domain.


WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT G.R. No. 175356 : December 3, 2013
On February 26, 2004, RA 9257 or the Expanded Senior Citizens Act amended
certain provisions of RA 7432, granting 20% discount to qualified senior citizens and
the establishments may claim the discounts granted as tax deduction based on the
net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the
discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year
that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed
tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross
sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to
the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
The Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006 and the DSWD issued its own IRR for
their implementation of the tax provision of RA 9257.
Petitioners Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic
corporations engaged in the business of providing funeral and burial services,

feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners prayed that Section 4 of
RA 9257 and the IRR issued by DSWD and the DOF be declared unconstitutional
insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to
senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from
enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the
former Section 4 (a) of RA 7432 be reinstated.
Whether or not Section 4 of RA No. 9257 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, insofar as they provide that the 20% discount to Senior Citizens may
be claimed as tax deduction by the private establishments are invalid and
The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior
citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers them an integral part of our
The priority given to senior citizens finds its basis in the Constitution as set forth in
the law itself.
As a form of reimbursement, the law provides that business establishments
extending the twenty percent discount to senior citizens may claim the discount as
a tax deduction. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to
the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioners must accept the realities
of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the
operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the
Without sufficient proof that Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9257 is arbitrary, and that the
continued implementation of the same would be unconscionably detrimental to
petitioners, the Court will refrain from quashing a legislative act.


Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the
Philippines. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of RA 9257,
otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003. Section 4(a) of RA

9257 grants twenty percent (20%) discount as privileges for the Senior Citizens.
Petitioner contends that said law is unconstitutional because it constitutes
deprivation of private property.
Whether or not RA 9257 is unconstitutional
Petition is dismissed. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar
to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object.
Accordingly, it has been described as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is the
power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for
the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature,
property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights,
though sheltered by due process, must yield to general welfare.

10. Jacobson v. Massachusetts

Cities in Massachusetts could require that all residents be vaccinated, as authorized
by a state statute. This type of regulation was adopted by the city of Cambridge.
Such state statute was alleged to be unconstitutional for requiring vaccination.
In order to protect public health and safety, does the scope of the states police
powers include the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so?
Yes. In order to protect public health and safety, the scope of the states police
power includes the authority to enact reasonable regulations to do so. The

Constitution secures liberty for every person within its jurisdiction, but does not give
an absolute right for each person to be free from restraint at all times and in all
circumstances. Every person is required to be subject to various restraints for the
common good. The efforts by Cambridge to stamp out smallpox are substantially
related to the protection of public health and safety. There has been nothing to
clearly justify the Court holding the statute to be unconstitutional. Affirmed.

Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the
province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or
caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer
of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of
Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large
Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other
draft purposes for human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the
slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by
the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality of Carmen
has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the

act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of
the enjoyment of their private property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.
Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of large cattle at
any place without the permit provided for in section 30. Where the language of a
statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction should
be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the
lawmaker and promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a
construction should be rejected which would tend to render abortive other
provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the legislator sought to
attain by its enactment

Fabie vs City of Manila

The appellees are the owners in common of a large tract of land which forms a part
of the estate known as the Hacienda de Santa Ana de Sapa and which is inclosed
between Calle Herran of the District of Paco and an estero known as Tripa de
Gallina, and lying within the corporate limits of the city of Manila. On the 26th day
of November, 1909, the plaintiffs and appellees sought to obtain from the city of
Manila a building permit authorizing the construction of a small nipa house upon the
property in question. It was claimed that the purpose of the building was to serve as
a guard house in which watchmen might be stationed in order to prevent the

carrying away of vacate from the premises. The permit was denied by the city
authorities on the ground that the site of the proposed building did not conform to
the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila, this
provision is unconstitutional and in violation of the fundamental rights of the
property owners that it constitutes an invasion of their property rights without due
process of law. The lower court found in favor of appellees and declared the
ordinance null and void.
ISSUE: WON the requirements of section 107 of the Revised Ordinances of the city
The purpose and object of the ordinance is avowedly and manifestly to protect and
secure the health, lives and property of the citizens of Manila against the ravages of
fire and disease. The provision that denies permits for the construction of buildings
within the city limits unless they "abut or face upon a public street or alley or on a
private street or alley which has been officially approved," is in our opinion
reasonably necessary to secure the end in view.
There can be no question as to the intent and purpose of the provision of the
ordinance under discussion. It is manifestly intended to subserve the public health
and safety of the citizens of Manila generally and was not conceived in favor of any
class or of particular individuals. Those charged with the public welfare and safety
of the city deemed the enactment of the ordinance necessary to secure these
purposes, and it cannot be doubted that if its enactment was reasonably necessary
to that end it was and is a due and proper exercise of the police power.