METAPHYSICS AS FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2014.

Aristotle and Aquinas designate metaphysics as first philosophy (prote philosophia,

, prima philosophia) since it studies the first causes of all things and studies and
defends the first principles of all things, which are presupposed by the other sciences. Dicitur
etiam philosophia prima, in quantum aliae omnes scientiae ab ea sua principia accipientes eam
consequuntur.1 Hoc autem modo se habet philosophia prima ad alias scientias speculativas,
nam ab ipsa omnes aliae dependent, utpote ab ipsa accipientes sua principia, et directionem
contra negantes principia.2 St. Thomas states at the beginning of his Commentary on the
Metaphysics concerning metaphysics as prima philosophia: It is called first philosophy
inasmuch as it considers the first causes of things(Dicitur autem prima philosophia, inquantum
primas rerum causas considerat.3). And metaphysics is prima philosophia because it gives the
first principles (like being [ens], which is the primum cognitum4 and the principle of noncontradiction) to the other sciences, which presuppose them. Kenneth Dougherty writes: In
respect to the other sciences knowable by reason metaphysics is a scientia rectrix, a governing
science. It governs not that its principles can be used in solving the problems of other sciences as
mathematics or physics but rather in the sense that its first principles are basic to all science and
it judges and defends these principles in which all science is grounded.

In Boeth. De Trinitate, q. 5, a. 1.
Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 25, n. 9.
3
In Metaphys., Prooemium.
4
Regarding the primacy of the notion of being (ens) in human knowledge, Alvira, Clavell, and Melendo state: The
real primacy of esse with regard to the other perfections of things gives rise to the primacy of the notion of being
(ens) in the realm of knowledge. Every object of our knowledge, before anything else, is perceived to be, and
consequently our intelligence first knows it as something which is, as being (ens). For this reason, the notion of
being (ens) is implicitly contained in all other intellectual concepts. Everyone understands that a tree and a horse
are things which are and which possess the act of being in some particular way; he knows them as beings which are,
with a definite essence. Hence, the constituent elements of being (ens), which we have already explained, are
inseparably present in every intellectual knowledge we acquire.
The notion of being (ens) is the first among all notions which our intelligence acquires. Before we understand in
detail what a thing is and what its characteristic perfections are, we know, first of all, that that thing is, that is, that it
is something. Given this initial knowledge, we gradually acquire a better understanding of that reality through our
experience. Thus, even before a child is able to distinguish well the objects found in his surroundings, he knows that
they are; this is his first perception, which takes place at the very awakening of intellectual knowledge. Nothing at
all can be understood unless it is first understood that it is.
One must not think, however, that this is solely an initial apprehension; man relates all aspects of reality which
he comes to know in his lifetime to the realm of being, in one way or another. This is what we mean when we say
that all knowledge is resolved into or reduced to being (ens).
Our notion of being (ens) is initially imperfect, and we gradually perfect this notion through experience, as we
come to know more beings (entia) and diverse manners of being. A similar progress occurs in all areas of
knowledge. Thus, a student of Botany already has some knowledge of plant life, but it is only through wider
experience and observation that he acquires a deeper knowledge of its meaning. In like manner, our knowledge of
being (ens) becomes deeper and wider as we discover its manifold characteristics and the different manners of
being. Metaphysics endeavors to achieve this task on a scientific level(T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO,
Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 28).
2

It is only in the light of the most universal principles of reality that the less universal
principles dealt with in the particular sciences basically have value in a science. Each science has
its own special principles. Metaphysics cannot take over the problems of physics and biology.
However, the truth of the principles of the special sciences as physics, biology, astronomy,
ultimately depends on the validity of the first principles, such as the principles of noncontradiction, identity, causality. Metaphysics in defending the first principles and contemplating
their significance performs a useful service to the other sciences all of which presuppose the first
principles.5
Metaphysics has primacy not only over the particular sciences, but also over all the other
parts of philosophy (the so-called second philosophies, such as cosmology, philosophical
anthropology and ethics). Such a priority is not a temporal priority or chronological primacy,
since many subjects need to be studied before undertaking a serious study of the difficult science
of metaphysics, such as studying logic (the art and science of correct thinking) and cosmology
(philosophy of nature). Metaphysics, though not having a temporal priority or chronological
primacy, has, in the first place, an ontological primacy inasmuch as God (Ipsum Esse Subsistens,
Esse Divinum) is studied by the highest branch of metaphysics, which is natural theology
(philosophy of God). Herman Reith states: As directive knowledge metaphysics is called first
philosophy. The name does not refer to the chronological order of learning but to the priority that
metaphysics enjoys with respect to other human sciences. Metaphysics has priority over other
sciences because it, as the science of indemonstrable principles of being, is the guardian of the
first principles of other sciences. In addition, metaphysics, as natural theology, is able to direct
other sciences toward God, who is the origin and end of all things.6
John F. Wippel explains that, for St. Thomas, when metaphysics is called first philosophy
(prima philosophia) because it gives principles to the other sciences, it is being viewed in terms
of intrinsic causes (secundum rationem) and according to the process of synthesis with respect to
these sciences, but when it is so named because it studies the first causes, it is being viewed in
terms of extrinsic causes (secundum rem)7 and according to the process of analysis or the way
of resolution rather than according to the process of synthesis8 with respect to these causes9:
reason sometimes moves from knowledge of one thing to knowledge of another in the
order of reality (secundum rem), as when there is demonstration through extrinsic causes or
effects. Reason may thus advance either according to the process of synthesis, by moving from
cause to effect, or according to the process of analysis, by moving from effect to cause. This
application of synthesis and analysis to cause and effect reasoning can be made because causes
are simpler, more unchangeable, and more constant than their effects, and because, as has been
observed above, in the process of analysis one gathers one simple truth from a many.10 Hence in
5
K. F. DOUGHERTY, Metaphysics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Being, Greymoor Press, Peekskill, NY,
1965, p. 24.
6
H. REITH, The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, Bruce, Milwaukee, 1958, p. 10.
7
J. F. WIPPEL, First Philosophy According to Thomas Aquinas, in J. F. WIPPEL, Metaphysical Themes in
Thomas Aquinas, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1984, p. 65.
8
J. F. WIPPEL, op. cit., p. 67.
9
J. F. WIPPEL, op. cit., p. 65.
10
Ratio enim, ut prius dictum est, procedit quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quando est demonstratio
per causas vel effectus extrinsecos: componendo quidem, cum proceditur a causis ad effectus; quasi resolvendo, cum

this case by the process of analysis one arrives at knowledge of that which is simpler (the cause)
by moving from knowledge of that which is less simple (the effect). Consequently, the ultimate
term of the process of analysis when one reasons secundum rem or in terms of extrinsic causes is
a knowledge of supremely simple causes, that is, the separate substances.11
At other times, however, reason moves from one thing to another in the order of reason
(secundum rationem), as when one proceeds in terms of intrinsic causes. This too can occur
either according to the process of synthesis or according to the process of analysis. In the first
case one advances from the most universal forms to the more particular. In the second case one
proceeds in reverse order, that is, from the more particular to the most universal. This is so,
suggests Thomas, because what is more universal is simpler and, as has already been noted, in its
process of analysis reason gathers one simple truth from a many, here the most universal from
the more particular.12 But, continues Thomas, the most universal things are those which are
common to all beings. Therefore, the ultimate terminus of analysis in this movement of reason in
terms of intrinsic causes (secundum rationem) is a consideration of being and that which pertains
to being as such.13
In sum, therefore, Thomas has now shown that the ultimate term of the process of
analysis when one reasons in terms of extrinsic causes (secundum rem) is a knowledge of
separate substances. Its ultimate term when one proceeds according to intrinsic causes
(secundum rationem) is a knowledge of being and the properties that follow from being as such.
But as he has already shown above in q. 5, a. 1 and q. 5, a. 4, these two, being and separate
substances, are the things of which divine science treats.14 Moreover, since he has already
indicated in the present context that that consideration is intellectual to the maximum degree
which is the terminus of all human reasoning, one is not surprised to find him concluding that the
consideration of divine science is supremely intellectual.15
At this point in the discussion Thomas again briefly considers the different names
assigned to divine science. The name divine science itself is not at issue here, since this is the
title used by Boethius in the text upon which Thomas is commenting, and primarily by Thomas
himself until this point in q. 6, a. 1. Because intellectual consideration is the principle or starting
point of rational consideration, Thomas now comments that divine science gives principles to all
the other sciences. For this reason it is called first philosophy. But because intellectual
consideration may also be regarded as the terminus of rational consideration, this science is

proceditur ab effectibus ad causas, eo quod causae sunt effectibus simpliciores et magis immobiliter et uniformiter
permanentes(Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate, B. Decker edition, 2nd ed.,
Leiden, 1959, p. 212).
11
Ultimus ergo terminus resolutionis in hac via est, cum pervenitur ad causas supremas maxime simplices, quae
sunt substantiae separatae(Ibid.).
12
Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas
intrinsecas: componendo quidem, quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis particularia proceditur;
resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod universalius est simplicius(Ibid.).
13
Et ideo terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratio entis et eorum quae sunt entis in quantum
huiusmodi(Ibid.).
14
Op. cit., pp. 165-166, 195.
15
Op. cit., p. 212.

learned after physics and the other sciences. For this reason it is called metaphysics, beyond
physics, as it were, because it comes after physics according to the process of analysis.16
With respect to the title first philosophy, therefore, it will be recalled that Thomas holds
that intellectual consideration is the principle of rational consideration according to the process
of synthesis. If he now styles this science first philosophy because it gives principles to the other
sciences, this is because intellectual consideration is the principle of rational consideration. But
according to what we have now seen, this in turn is true only according to the process of
synthesis, not according to the process of analysis. Consequently, when Thomas names this
science first philosophy because it gives principles to the other sciences, I conclude that he is
then regarding its consideration as the principle or starting point of the other sciences, to be sure,
but that when he so correlates this science and others he is considering the movement from one
to the other according to the process of synthesis.
Moreover, in the preceding context he has distinguished between the advance of reason
in the order of intrinsic causes (secundum rationem) and its advance according to extrinsic
causes (secundum rem). He has noted that the processes of synthesis and analysis may be applied
to either of these. The ultimate terminus of analysis in the movement of reason according to
intrinsic causes was identified with being and the properties that belong to being as such.
Consequently, it would seem to follow that when Thomas entitles this science first philosophy
because it gives principles to the other sciences, he is then viewing the movement from this
science to the others according to the process of synthesis rather than according to the process of
analysis, as has already been suggested, and in the order of intrinsic causes (secundum rationem)
rather than in the order of extrinsic causes (secundum rem). In other words, he is viewing it as
the science of being as being and suggesting that it gives principles to the other sciences insofar
as more particular concepts and more particular principles follow from the most general concepts
(being, etc.) and most general principles. As he indicates in other contexts, just as it pertains to
this science to study being as being, so too does it pertain to it to examine and defend the
principles that follow immediately from being as being
in the Prooemium to his Commentary on the Metaphysics Thomas offers a different
reason for describing this science as first philosophy. There he writes that it is so named because
it considers the first causes of things. In that context it is clear that the latter are to be understood
as extrinsic causes. Hence, if one may apply the distinction between the movement of reason in
terms of intrinsic causes (secundum rationem) and in terms of extrinsic causes (secundum rem)
of q. 6, a. 1 of his Commentary on the De Trinitate to the present context, the Prooemium, it is
reasoning in terms of extrinsic causes (secundum rem) that Thomas now has in mind. Moreover,
if one wonders whether the process of analysis or that of synthesis is at issue here, it appears to
be the former rather than the latter. As Thomas has already stated in q. 6, a. 1, the ultimate term
of the process of analysis when one reasons in terms of extrinsic causes is attained when one
arrives at a knowledge of supremely simple causes, that is to say, the separate substances.
Consequently, when metaphysics is described as first philosophy because it gives principles to
16
Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur principia omnibus aliis scientiis, in quantum intellectualis consideratio est
principium rationalis, propter quod dicitur prima philosophia; et nihilominus ipsa addiscitur post physicam et ceteras
scientias, in quantum consideratio intellectualis est terminus rationalis, propter quod dicitur metaphysica quasi trans
physicam, quia post physicam resolvendo occurrit(Op. cit., p. 212).

the other sciences, it is being viewed in terms of intrinsic causes (secundum rationem) and
according to the process of synthesis with respect to these sciences. Such is the standpoint of q.
5, a. 1 and q. 6, a. 1 of the Commentary on De Trinitate. But when it is so named because it
studies the first causes, it is being viewed in terms of extrinsic causes (secundum rem) and
apparently according to the process of analysis with respect to these causes, since according to
this perspective one reasons from a knowledge of effects to a knowledge of separate substances
as their causes. Such is the standpoint implied by Thomass explanation of the reasons for this
title in the Prooemium to the Commentary on the Metaphysics
In conclusion, therefore, when Thomas styles this science metaphysics whether in the
Commentary on the De Trinitate or in the Prooemium to his Commentary on the Metaphysics, it
is because it comes after the physics in the order of analysis. This is so because it studies being
and its properties and because these are discovered after one has investigated sensible things, at
least to some extent, and because one is dealing with a movement of reason according to intrinsic
causes (secundum rationem) rather than according to extrinsic causes (secundum rem). When he
names it first philosophy because it gives principles to other sciences, this is because he is
viewing the movement of reason from it to other sciences in terms of intrinsic causes (secundum
rationem) once again, to be sure, but according to the process of synthesis rather than the process
of analysis. When he names it first philosophy because it studies the first causes of things he is
now viewing the movement of the mind according to extrinsic causes (secundum rem), and
according to the process of analysis or the way of resolution rather than according to the process
of synthesis.17

17

J. F. WIPPEL, op. cit., pp. 61-65, 67.