CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES CASES

PALANCA v DIR. OF LANDS

FACTS:
Carlos Palanca is the applicant for the registration
of the parcel of land marked lot No. 2 described in
the plan accompanying his application. Roman
Santos opposes the registration of the eastern
portion of this lot which is more fully described in
this written opposition. The trial court dis missed the
opposition and ordered the registration of the entire
lot No. 2 in favor of the applicant.
Lot No. 2 together with lot No. 1, which is the
subject of another proceeding, form one piece of
land, lot No. 1 being located within the Province of
Pampanga and lot No. 2 in the Province of Bulacan.
SALE. The sisters Irene Mojica and Consuelo Mojica
sold the hacienda composed of these two lots to
Felipe Buncamino Suntay and in December of the
same year said Suntay sold the same lands to Carlos
Palanca. In the description of this hacienda in the
document of sale to Suntay the portion claimed by
Roman Santos appears to have been excluded. In
January, 1918, Irene and Consuelo Mojica sold to the
opponent Roman Santos the said portion that had
been excluded. The deeds of sale of Felipe
Buencamino Suntay (Exhibit C) and of the applicant
Carlos Palanca (Exhibit B) were recorded in the
registry on January 26, 1918, and the document of
sale to Santos was also recorded on August 6, 1918
(Exhibit 3).

This deed of sale, after describing the property sold,

recites that: "The said two parcels from but a single
property, which during the lifetime of the deceased
father of the vendors was known as the 'Hacienda of
Sapang Cawayan' and is nw morgaged to the
Philippine National Bank in the amount of eleven
thousand pesos (P11,000) and leased to Messrs.
Song Fo & Company . . . on December 21, 1911."
From the foregoing the inference is that what was
sold, according to the intention of the parties, was
the farm known as "Sapang Cawayan," the same
property that was leased to Song Fo & Company
and, as before stated, included that part of the land
which is now in question
THUS, exclusion from the description of doc of sale
is a MISTAKE w//c cannot annul the intention of the
contracting p.
It results, therefore, that the land under discussion
was twice sold to two different purchasers. In
accordance with article 1473 of the Civil Code the
sale that was first recorded must be given
preference. Although the sale to Suntay and the sale
by the latter to Palanca wre recorded, it must be
deemed that no record was made as to the portion
of land in question

Although the description in the document of sale

executed by the sisters Irene and Consuelo to Felipe
Buencamino Suntay does not contain that of the
portion now objected to, we are of the opinion that
the contracting parties intended to include this
portion of the land in the sale.

On the other hand, although the sale to Roman

Santos was also recorded, it was only effected in
August, 1918, after the herein applicant had already
filed his application for this land claiming to have
bought it from the sisters Irene and Conseulo Mojica
and after the said Palanca had filed an oppostion to
the application of Roman Santos for the registration
of the said parcel of land, it being noted that
Palanca, before that time, had brought an action for
injunction against Santos on account of the same
portion of land. Wherefore, when Santos recorded
his sale he knew that Palanca was claiming the land
in question by virtue of a former purchase.

IT IS A SINGLE PPTY. This hacienda, composed of lots

No. 1 and 2, formerly belonged to Benito Mojica.
Although it is composed of several parcels of land
with different titled. Benito Mojica considered it as a
single property calling it "Hacienda of Sapang
Cawayan," which includes the part sold to Santos.

RULING: ADJUDGED LAND TO PALANCA; PALANCA

HAD POSSESSION OF THE LAND AS A LESSEE BEFORE
THE LAND WAS SOLD AND AFTER THE
CONSUMMATION OF THE SALE HE CONTINUED IN
SUCH POSSESSION UNINTERRUPTEDLY, NOT AS
LESSEE, BUT, AS OWNER OF THE PROPERTY.

HELD:

In the DOAS executed by Mojicas w/ Suntay:

SIGAYA v MAYUGA
FACTS:
Dionisia Alorsabes owned a three hectare land in
Dao, Capiz, denominated as Lot 3603. In 1934, she
sold a portion of the lot to Juanito Fuentes while the
remainder was inherited by her children Paz Dela
Cruz, Rosela Dela Cruz, and Consorcia Arroja (an
adopted child), and a grandson, Francisco Abas, in
representation of his deceased mother Margarita
Dela Cruz. These four heirs executed an ExtraJudicial Settlement with Sale dated February 4,
1964 wherein Consorcia sold her share with an area
of 6,694 square meters to spouses Balleriano
Mayuga. On April 1, 1977, Paz also sold her share to
Honorato de los Santos. Later, another document
entitled Extra-Judicial Partition with Deed of Sale
datedNovember 2, 1972 was uncovered wherein the
heirs of Dionisia purportedly adjudicated Lot 3603
among themselves and sold their shares to
Francisco. On January 9, 1978, Francisco executed a
Deed of Sale over Lot 3603 in favor of Teodulfo
Sigaya. Thus, the title over Lot 3603 was cancelled
and a new one was issued in the name of Teodulfo,
[1
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein.
The petitioners, who are the widow and children of
Teodulfo, filed Civil actions for recovery of
possession and damages against Diomer Mayuga,
Honorato de los Santos, Sps. Jose Viva and Rosela
[2]
Dela Cruz-Viva, and Renato Distor, respectively,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City,
Branch 16, praying that respondents be ordered to
vacate Lot 3603, and turn over the same to
petitioners.
Respondents in their answers with counterclaim
averred that: the Deed of Sale executed by Francisco
in favor of Teodulfo and the title thereon are null
and void for being based on a fictitious Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale; Rosela Dela Cruz-Viva and Paz
Dela Cruz, who are illiterates, were fraudulently
made to sign as vendees in the Extra-Judicial
Settlement with Sale dated 1972, when Francisco
represented that they were merely signing as
witnesses to the sale of Francisco of his share to
Teodulfo. As counterclaim, they asked for attorneys
fees and damages.

ISSUE: WHETHER A PERSON DEALING WITH A

REGISTERED LAND CAN SAFELY RELY ON THE
CORRECTNESS OF THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE ISSUED
THEREFOR
HELD:
Teodulfo bought the land and had the title
subsequently issued in his name; the fact that
Teodulfo examined the lot does not give rise to the
conclusion that he is not an innocent purchaser in
good faith as adverted to by the CA; if indeed Abas
committed fraud in acquiring said lot, Teodulfo is
also a victim of misrepresentation; there was no
evidence that Teodulfo and Francisco connived to
defraud respondents; Teodulfo did not have actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel him to make further inquiry; and as purchaser
in good faith, Teodulfo enjoys the protection of the
Torrens system
Both parties concede that a purchaser in good faith
can safely rely on the four corners of a Torrens Title.
The disagreement lies, however, as to whether or
not Teodulfo should be considered as a purchaser in
good faith and thus enjoy the protection of
the Torrens system. Indeed, this question is one of
fact and not one of law.
he determination of whether Teodulfo is a buyer in
good faith is a factual issue which is generally
outside the province of this Court to determine in a
[18]
petition for review. If for this matter alone, the
petition should be dismissed because the remedy of
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court contemplates only questions of law
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court gave weight
to the testimonies of Engineer Jesus Pimentel, a
geodetic engineer commissioned by the court to
conduct a survey of the land, who found that
respondents acquired their respective lots through
sale or inheritance.
of Rolly Daniel, a barangay official who lived 50
meters from said lot, who said that respondents had
been in possession of their respective lots even
before 1960 and that Teodulfo and Francisco asked
him to accompany them sometime between 1976 to
1978 as they went to the different houses of

respondents because Teodulfo was going to buy

Franciscos share;
Indeed, it is a well-settled rule that every person
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor
and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond
the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Where there is nothing in the certificate of
title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of
the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the
purchaser is not required to explore further than
what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in
quest for any hidden defects or inchoate right that
may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
However, this rule shall not apply when the party
has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make
such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge
of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of
sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent man
to inquire into the status of the title of the property
in litigation.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: preponderance of evidence
shows that respondents had been in actual
possession of their respective portions even prior to
1960. Rolly Daniel, which the trial court considered
as a credible witness, testified that not only were
respondents in actual possession of their respective
portions prior to 1960, he even accompanied
Francisco and Teodulfo to the different houses of
respondents sometime between 1976 to 1978 as
Teodulfo was going to buy the portion of
[36]
Francisco. This Court cannot give credence
therefore to the claim of petitioners that Teodulfo
found no occupants in the property.
RULING: PETITION DENIED; DECLARING MAYUGA AS
THE ABS. OWNER

leased the building at No. 218 Calle Rosario, owned

by the defendant, up to December 31 of the same
year, undertaking to pay therefor the sum of P310
from said March 15 to June 30, 1913, and P315
from the subsequent first of July until the
termination of the lease.
On April 14, 1913, because of the leaks in the roof of
the storeroom of said building, without fault or
negligence on the plaintiff's part, some of his
merchandise stored in said storeroom was so wet
and damaged as to cause him a loss amounting to
P1,169.
That afterwards the defendant expressly authorized
the plaintiff to sell the damaged goods at any price,
promising to pay the difference between the selling
price and the regular price of the articles in good
condition; that by virtue of said authorization and
promise, plaintiff accordingly disposed of all the
damaged goods that could be sold, at a loss of
P1,169; and that notwithstanding the repeated
demands made upon him to pay this amount,
according to promise, said defendant had refused
and refuses to pay. Therefore, judgment is prayed
against the defendant, sentencing him to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of P1,169 with legal interest, and
the costs.
SPECIAL DEFENSE: Bldg had been recently finished;
that there fell over the city of Manila a torrential rain
the heaviest from the month of January of that year;
that because of the large amount of water and the
extraordinary violence of the downpour many
buildings in the Escolta and adjacent business
sections, not only many buildings of wood merely,
but even those of reinforced concrete, were flooded
ISSUE: W/N the owner of a tenement is responsible
for the deterioration thru the wetting of the cloth
and other goods of the defendants
HELD:

YAP KIM CHUAN v TIAOQUI

FACTS:
Counsel for the plaintiff filed a written complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, alleging as his
first cause of action that on March 15, 1913, plaintiff

Defendant's building, composed of four apartments,

had just been finished and a few months ago was
inspected by the city engineer and approved for the
use for which it was intended. There is no record
that said building presented any indication or sign of
having defects in its roof such as might cause leaks
and damage to the merchandise placed therein.

FORCE MAJEURE. he occurrence was undoubtedly

due to force majeure, being a fortuitous event which
could not have been foreseen by the owner or the
plaintiffs-tenants, or many other proprietors of
stores whose interiors were flooded as a result of
that heavy rainfall, and consequently the damages
and losses the water inflicted upon the plaintiffs
could not be ascribed to the owner of the premises
so as to hold him liable for the indemnity.
NO PROVISION FOR LIAB,. It was not stipulated in
the lease executed between the defendant and the
plaintiffs that, if the goods and merchandise the
defendant-tenants might have on the premises
should get wet, the defendant would as lessor
thereof be liable to indemnity , nor have the
plaintiffs been able to allege such liability in their
claim; and we do not know of any article of the Civil
Code included in the chapter which deals with
leasing of urban property that makes any provision
for such liability on the part of the owner of the
property.
ON WARRANTY. In connection with a lease warranty
is the obligation to repair or correct the error
whereunder the lessee took over the property
leased, but when the law declares that the lessor
must warrant the thing leased, it is not to be
understood that he must also indemnify the lessee.
Liability for the warranty is not equivalent to
liability in damages, as the latter is an obligation
distinct from the former.
For proper understanding of the provisions of
articles 1484 and 1485 of the Civil Code dealing with
warranty it is necessary to remember that under
their provisions the lessor is liable for the warranty
of the thing leased against any hidden defects this
liability for warranty of the thing leased does not
amount to an obligation to indemnify the tenant for
damages, which is only to be allowed when there is
proof that the lessor acted with fraud and in bad
faith by concealing to the lessee.
Hence, while the lessor is obligated by the general
rule to warranty of the thing leased, whether or not
he may know of the existence therein of defects that
render it inadequate for the use the tenant intends,
he is only liable for an indemnity for damages in
addition to the warranty when he knew of the
defects in the thing leased and had not revealed
them to the lessee, a procedure which induces the
presumption that he acted with fraud and in bad

faith; but in order to hold him responsible for the

damages and losses caused by such defects there
must be the express condition that the lessee
should choose rescission of the contract, according
to the prescription of the second paragraph of the
article quoted above, whence it is inferred that,
should the lessee insist upon continuing the
contract by occupying the property, he must be
understood to have waived the indemnity.
It has not been demonstrated in the that the
defendant lessor failed to fulfill the conditions of the
lease or that he acted with fraud, negligence or
delay in the fulfillment of said conditions
Summing up, the record fully demonstrates that the
defendant Alfonso M. Tiaoqui is not liable under the
law to pay indemnity for losses and damages
because of the wetting of the goods and
merchandise of Yap Kim Chuan, plaintiff in case No.
10006; of Marciano Ong Qui Sing plaintiff in case No.
10007; and Tan Tiap, plaintiff in case No. 10008; and
that on the other hand these cases do not reveal
satisfactory and conclusive evidence that the
defendant lessor Tiaoqui to make up all or part of
the loss or depreciation on the sale of the goods and
merchandise that was wet.

MOLES v IAC
FACTS:
Jerry Moles(petitioner) bought from Mariano Diolosa
owner of Diolosa Publishing House a linotype
printing machine(secondhand machine). Moles
promised Diolosa that will pay the full amount after
the loan from DBP worth P50,000.00 will be
released. Private respondent on return issued a
certification wherein he warrated that the machine
was in A-1 condition, together with other express
warranties. After the release of the of the money
from DBP, Petitioner required the Respondent to
accomplish some of the requirements. On which the
dependant complied the requirements on the same
day.
On November 29, 1977, petitioner wrote private
respondent that the machine was not functioning
properly. The petitioner found out that the said
machine was not in good condition as experts

advised and it was worth lesser than the purchase

price. After several telephone calls regarding the
defects in the machine, private respondent sent two
technicians to make necessary repairs but they failed
to put the machine in running condition and since
then the petitioner wan unable to use the machine
anymore.
ISSUE/S:
1.

Whether there is an implied warranty of its quality

or fitness.
2. Whether the hidden defects in the machine is
sufficient to warrant a rescission of the contract
between the parties.
HELD:
1.

It is generally held that in the sale of a designated

and specific article sold as secondhand, there is no
implied warranty as to its quality or fitness for the
purpose intended, at least where it is subject to
inspection at the time of the sale. On the other
hand, there is also authority to the effect that in a
sale of secondhand articles there may be, under
some circumstances, an implied warranty of fitness
for the ordinary purpose of the article sold or for the
particular purpose of the buyer.
Said general rule, however, is not without
exceptions. Article 1562 of our Civil Code, which was
taken from the Uniform Sales Act, provides:
"Art. 1562. In a sale of goods, there is an implied
warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness of
the
goods,
as
follows:
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication,
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are acquired, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not),
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose;"

2. We have to consider the rule on redhibitory defects

contemplated in Article 1561 of the Civil Code.
A redhibitory defect must be an imperfection
or defect of such nature as to engender a certain
degree of importance. An imperfection or defect of
little consequence does not come within the
category
of
being redhibitory.
As already narrated, an expert witness for the
petitioner categorically established that the machine

required major repairs before it could be used. This,

plus the fact that petitioner never made appropriate
use of the machine from the time of purchase until
an action was filed, attest to the major defects in
said machine, by reason of which the rescission of
the contract of sale is sought. The factual finding,
therefore, of the trial court that the machine is not
reasonably fit for the particular purpose for which it
was intended must be upheld, there being ample
evidence
to
sustain
the
same.
At a belated stage of this appeal, private respondent
came up for the first time with the contention that
the action for rescission is barred by prescription.
While it is true that Article 1571 of the Civil Code
provides for a prescriptive period of six months for
a redhibitory action, a cursory reading of the ten
preceding articles to which it refers will reveal that
said rule may be applied only in case of implied
warranties. The present case involves one with an
express warranty. Consequently, the general rule on
rescission of contract, which is four years shall
apply. Considering that the original case for
rescission was filed only one year after the delivery
of the subject machine, the same is well within the
prescriptive period. This is aside from the doctrinal
rule that the defense of prescription is waived and
cannot be considered on appeal if not raised in the
trial court, and this case does not have the features
for an exception to said rule.