Afghanistan

Public Policy Research Organization

Security Transition and Women: A Synthesis

December 2015


Synthesis Paper

Acknowledgements

APPRO wishes to express its sincere gratitude to individuals and organizations that agreed to be
interviewed for the baseline report, the four subsequent monitoring reports from September 2012 to
December 2014, and the follow up visits in early 2015. APPRO is particularly indebted to the many
government officials and members of civil society including school teachers, principals, doctors,
midwives, home makers, security officials, and elders who continued to share their views and insights
over a three-year period on the security transition and the place and situation of women in Afghanistan.

About the Researchers

The APPRO research team responsible for this report consists of (in alphabetical order): Ahmad Shaheer
Anil, Nafasgul Karimi, Mohammad Sabir Khyber, Farid Nasery, Saeed Parto, Zahra Qasemi, Ehsan Saadat,
Zarghona Saifi, Khalid Siddiqi, and Mohsin Usyan.

Saeed Parto and Khalid Siddiqi authored this report.

About APPRO

Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO) is an independent social research organization
with a mandate to promote social and policy learning to benefit development and reconstruction efforts
in Afghanistan and other less developed countries through conducting social scientific research,
monitoring and evaluation, and training and mentoring. APPRO is registered with the Ministry of
Economy in Afghanistan as a non-profit non-government organization and headquartered in Kabul,
Afghanistan with offices in Mazar-e Shrif (north), Herat (west), Kandahar (south), Jalalabad (east), and
Bamyan (center). APPRO is also a founding organization of APPRO-Europe, registered in Belgium.

For more information, see: www.appro.org.af and www.appro-europe.net
Contact: mail@appro.org.af

Cover Photo: Ehsan Saadat (APPRO)


APPRO takes full responsibility for all omissions and errors.





2015. Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization and Integrity Watch Afghanistan. Some rights
reserved. This publication may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted only for non-commercial
purposes and with written credit to APPRO and links to APPROs website at www.appro.org.af. Any
other use of this publication requires prior written permission which may be obtained by writing to:
mail@appro.org.af.
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... 2
Background / Rationale .......................................................................................................... 3
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4
Key Findings From Monitoring: September 2012 December 2014....................................... 12
Overall Security.............................................................................................................................. 14
Access to Work and Public Life ....................................................................................................... 17
Access to Services (Health and Education) ...................................................................................... 18
Access to Justice............................................................................................................................. 19
Violence Against Women ............................................................................................................... 20
Women and Current Affairs............................................................................................................ 21
Conclusion............................................................................................................................ 22
Recommendations................................................................................................................ 25

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Background / Rationale
Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, women and womens rights groups have increasingly demanded
and received significant improvements in their place in society and having access to basic services.
Some of the most visible signs of progress are the increased numbers of girls attending school and
women working for schools, hospitals, governmental entities, and international organizations. Despite
these achievements there have been serious concerns regarding the sustainability of these
achievements since the formal withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) by the
end of 2014 and the full handover of national security to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

In a consultation between Cordaid and Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO) in mid2012 it was agreed to form a partnership and initiate a monitoring program to examine changes, both
positive and negative, in the situation of women in Afghanistan as a result of the ongoing security
transition and to make policy relevant recommendations to the Government of Afghanistan and the
international donors on women-centered programming in Afghanistan. The partners also agreed to
work closely with Afghan Womens Network on how best to carry out advocacy based on the findings
from monitoring on womens rights in Afghanistan and, in collaboration with Cordaid and APPRO,
internationally.

The baseline assessment, carried out during September-December 2012, and the subsequent four
monitoring cycles, carried out from January 2013 until December 2014, sought to assess the likely
impact of security transition on the lives of Afghan women based on changes observed in the following
composite indicators:

1. Overall Security
2. Mobility and Access to Public Life
3. Access to Services (Health and Education)
4. Access to Justice
5. Violence Against Women, and
6. Women and Current Affairs (Peace Process, Bilateral Security Agreement, Elections).

The scope for data collection was increased from seven provinces for the baseline assessment and Cycle
2 to 12 provinces for Cycles 3-5, consisting of Badakhshan, Balkh, Bamyan, Helmand, Herat, Kabul,
Kandahar, Kunduz, Laghman, Nangarhar, Parwan, and Samangan. For the baseline assessment and each
of the subsequent monitoring rounds, approximately 700 individuals (two thirds female, one third male)
were surveyed and then engaged in interviews or focus group discussions. The quantitative data from
the surveys were used to generate the illustrative graphs used in this report. It has to be noted that
these illustrations are not statistically significant and serve only as possible indications.

The findings from this monitoring exercise, and the recommendations based on the findings, have been
intended to inform programming and action by the Government of Afghanistan, Afghan civil society
organizations, and Afghanistans international donors in meeting their commitments to gender equality
in Afghanistan.

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Introduction
The year 2014 has been marked as the year Afghanistan underwent its first democratic transition of
national government, despite the long period of uncertainty following the two inconclusive rounds of
presidential elections. The debates around the outcome of the second round of presidential elections
were peacefully concluded in mid-September 2014 and were followed by the immediate signing of the
Bilateral Security Agreement by the new Afghan government, ending a relatively long period of anxiety
among Afghans and their international allies.

The end of the year 2014 also marked the beginning of Afghanistans transformation decade,
characterized by reduced presence of international military forces, reduced but targeted development
aid, and commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to pursue peace with armed opposition groups
(AOGs), fight corruption, maintain rule of law, and protect the hard earned development and
humanitarian gains made since 2001, particularly for women and children.1

By the end of 2015 it was clear that numerous aid programs, operating under the perceived or actual
security provided by the presence of international security forces, had ceased to operate largely due to
the transition but also because of reduced aid funding from international donors. The departure of
international security forces has resulted in the loss of the many auxiliary local businesses and services
that emerged since 2001 and served the international security force bases throughout the country.
Many of the thousands of women who worked for the international security forces, auxiliary businesses
serving international security forces, or numerous humanitarian and other NGOs have lost their jobs
since 2014 due to the draw down of international forces.

Many of the women engaged for this monitoring initiative view the current instability and uncertainty as
products of the security transition, the subsequent decline in the number of women-centered programs,
and increased unemployment among women and men. These factors are also viewed as key drivers for
increased domestic violence against women, increased criminality, mistreatment of children, and an
increase in child labor. The increases in domestic violence are attributed to general poverty, increased
unemployment, and drug addiction among the men but also, increasingly, women.

Access to education, health, and justice by women has been affected more by the uncertainty following
the transition than by the transition itself. In fact, a number of provinces reported improvements in
womens participation in social and political arenas immediately after the transition. The added
instability and uncertainty following the two rounds of Presidential Elections appear to have negatively
affected even provinces such as Laghman, Nangarhar, and Samangan that had shown some
improvements after the transition. Access to services, particularly for women, has been negatively
affected in all provinces due to continuing political uncertainty and heightened criminal and AOG activity
following the elections.

The widespread participation of women in the elections, especially during the first round in April 2014
was significant in many ways. At around 38%, the estimated percentage of female voters in the first
round of 2014 presidential elections was lower than the first and second presidential elections in 2004

1

See the statement by the Government of Afghanistan at: http://mfa.gov.af/en/page/6547/transformationdecade2015-2024

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and 2009. But, in absolute terms the turnout by women to vote in the presidential elections of 2014 was
the highest ever throughout Afghanistans history. Even if this number is discounted for questionable or
fraudulent votes, the number remains very significant.

Despite the irregularities and numerous allegations of fraud in the voting process, the overwhelming
majority of the women and men voting in the 2014 presidential elections appear to have voted mainly
to exercise their democratic right to vote, rather than choose a president. Having risked voting despite
serious security threats, there followed much admiration for and pride about ANSF in having maintained
order and safety of voters to cast their votes. However, the initial sense of enthusiasm and increased
trust in ANSF soon gave way to despair and disenchantment because of the inconclusive result from the
first round of voting. Grudgingly, Afghans came out in their droves to vote again, only to find out later
that their votes in the second round had also failed to yield a president.

Regardless of the political rationale for the delayed outcome of the elections, and the dynamics of the
negotiations between the disputing presidential candidates and Afghanistans international allies, to
many ordinary Afghan women and men the lack of a clear outcome from the elections meant that their
brave effort to vote had been in vain. A strong theme that overshadowed the findings from Cycles 4 and
5 in 2014 and the subsequent period to date has been the sense of disappointment, despair, and
worries about the countrys future and personal safety due to increased lawlessness and criminal
activity such as kidnapping and theft and a sharp rise in bribe seeking by formal officials.

Still, relative to many other countries, and despite the many challenges faced by Afghan women,
Afghanistan has one of the highest percentages for the number of women in governmental positions,
even compared to some western countries.2 However, there has been a steady drop in almost all
provinces in the percentage of female employees with the exception of Herat and Bamyan which show
no changes (Figure 1).3

Figure 1: Fulltime Female Government Employees 2012-2014
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

% Female 2012/2013
% Female 2013/2014
% Female 2014/2015

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbooks, 2013, 2014, and 2015

See the monitoring report for Cycle 3, available from: http://appro.org.af/preview/women-in-transition-cycle-3findings/

3
CSO (2014). Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2011-2012 (pages 17-18). Currently there are 70,634 female
government officials working in these 12 provinces, constituting 22 percent of the total number of all
government officials.
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PM in Percents

The average percentage of female employees in government has remained at around 22 percent,
however, with a commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to reach 30 percent by 2018.4
In healthcare, the indicative aggregate trends based on official data suggest continuing improvements in
the conditions of women in terms of access and service (Figure 2). According to the World Health
Organization (WHO) maternal mortality rates (MMR) and portion of deaths of women of reproductive
age due to maternal causes (PM) have declined significantly since the peak year in 2000.5 From having
the highest number of maternal mortality rate prior to 2000, at 1,100 deaths per 100,000 births,
maternal mortality rate in 2013 stood at 400 per 100,000 births.

Figure 2: MMR and PM Between 1990 and 2013 in Afghanistan
60.0%

1400

50.0%

1200

40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

Source: WHO

1000

PM

800
600
400
200

MMR (/
100,000
Live
Births)

The traditional limiting factors in girls education such as early marriage, traditional conservatism, and
insecurity still persist in many provinces. However, the transition and its aftermath appear to have had a
additional negative impact on access to education for girls for two related reasons. First, with the
perceived or actual deterioration in security conditions many families, and older girls themselves, are
hesitant to risk traveling from home to school due to fears of harassment, sexual violence, and
kidnapping. Second, the departure of international security forces and the drawing down of numerous
aid projects have resulted in fewer job opportunities for many families who may view the cost of
sending girls to school as being not the most effective way of using their limited financial resources.

Even without the risks to girls attending school, there has been a persistent trend of dropping out of
school for girls and boys since intensified programming in education started shortly after 2001. The
dropout rates for students by grade 6 are estimated at just less then 70 percent. For girls the estimated
rate is over 80 percent.6 While it is important to acknowledge the gains made in the education sector
with significant increases in the numbers of schools, teachers, and students, the emphasis in the post
4

See: http://mowa.gov.af/fa/page/6814
WHO (2013), Maternal mortality in 1990-2013 WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, The World Bank, and United Nations
Population Division Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-Agency Group Afghanistan. Available from:
http://www.who.int/gho/maternal_health/countries/afg.pdf?ua=1, accessed October 27, 2014.
6
See, for example, CARE International (2011), High Stakes: Girls Education in Afghanistan, available from:
http://www.careinternational.org/uploaddocument/news/publications/reports%20and%20issue%20briefs/english/afghanistan_j
oint%20report_girls%20education_240211.pdf
5

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2014 period will need to be placed on retaining students, particularly girls at higher grades, in the school
system while increasing the quality of the education more broadly.

In the political arena women make up 22 percent of the members of the lower house of parliament (68
women), 17 percent of the upper house (47 women), and are likely to make up 20 percent of the total
provincial council members (96 women).7 Afghanistan has a higher percentage of women in its
government than the United States, France, Australia, and the United Kingdom.8 According the World
Bank, females make up 16 percent of the labor force in Afghanistan.9 (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Women in Workforce Regional Comparison
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

2008
2011
2013

Afghanistan

Iran

Iraq

Rep. Of
Kyrgyzistan

Pakistan

Tajikistan

Turmenistan

Uzbekistan

Source: World Bank

The key difference between Afghanistan and these countries is, of course, that the high percentage of
women in government in Afghanistan has been made possible by a quota system put in place as part of
the reconstruction efforts since 2001.

Commitment to gender equality has been a major feature of post-2001 reconstruction and development
programming in Afghanistan. This commitment was first made in the Bonn Agreement (December
2001), followed by similar commitments in the Constitution of Afghanistan (2003), Afghanistan Compact
(2006), National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA 2008 2018), and Afghanistan National
Development Strategy (ANDS 2008 2013). In addition, Afghanistan is signatory to the Convention for
the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 2003) and has made specific
commitments to meet Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) including Goal 3, Promote Gender
Equality and Empower Women.


7

Afghanistan Watch (2014). Women in 2014 Transition: A report on the concerns and demands of women and
civil society organizations in Afghanistans 34 provinces. (Kabul: Afghanistan Watch), page 15. Available from:
www.watchafghanistan.org. Also, Government of Canada (2014). Afghan 2014 Presidential and Provincial
Council Elections. Available from: http://www.international.gc.ca/afghanistan/elections.aspx
8
See: http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/27/1137274/-The-Gender-Gap-Percentage-of-Women-inGovernment-Worldwide-We-re-Number-One-Right-Not-So-Much#. Canada also had fewer women in its
government than Afghanistan until the new Canadian Prime Minister, elected in October 2015, effected gender
equality in his first Cabinet by splitting the Cabinet posts 50-50% between males and females.
9
World Bank (2015), Labor Force Female (% of Total Labor Force), available from:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.TOTL.FE.ZS
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As a member state of the United Nations, Afghanistan is bound by the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). Each of these commitments emphasizes gender mainstreaming as a
crosscutting theme to be incorporated into all government policies and all manner of donor aid
programming. Afghanistan is also signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 1979), ratified by the Government of Afghanistan in 2003, the
Platform of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (1984), and the
Beijing Platform of Action from the Fourth World Conference on Women (1985).

UNSCR 1325, adopted by the United Nations member states on October 31, 2000, formally
acknowledges womens right to participate in all aspects of conflict prevention and resolution,
peacekeeping, and peace building, and to be included in decision making bodies at all levels of
government. UNSCR 1325 was followed by six subsequent resolutions on Women, Peace and Security
(WPS), creating a normative policy framework for UN Member States to adopt a gender perspective in
their peace operations and provide guidance for translating high level recommendations into concrete
policies and action plans (Box 1).

Under UNSCR 1325 each member state has been expected to develop a National Action Plan as a
national strategy to implement UNSCR 1325 and other resolutions of the Women Peace and Security
agenda. UNSCR 1325 does not mention National or Regional Action Plans (N/RAPs) for implementation.
The need for N/RAPs was further elaborated in the UN Security Council statement (2002), UN Secretary
Generals Report (2004), and UNSCR 1889 (2009), inviting member states to prepare National Action
Plans as a step towards the implementation of UNSCR 1325.

Box 1. Subsequent Resolutions to UNSCR 1325
Resolution 2122 (2013) on womens leadership and empowerment as a central component for resolving
conflicts and promoting peace through a number of specific calls for regular consultations, funding
mechanisms to support womens civil society organization and changes in the Councils working methods in
relation to WPS.
Resolution 2106 (2013) on the need to better operationalize existing obligations, particularly those related to
sexual violence.
Resolution 1960 (2010) calls for refining institutional tools to combat impunity related to sexual violence,
notably through the set up of a naming and shaming list in annual reports.
Resolution 1889 (2009) focuses on womens participation in peace building and calls on United Nations
Secretary General to develop a set of global indicator to measure impact of UNSCR 1325 at global and
national levels. It further welcomes the efforts of member states in implementing Resolution 1325 at the
national level, including the development of national action plans.
Resolution 1888 (2009) calls for appointment of a Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, and
the establishment Womens Protection Advisors within Peacekeeping missions.

UNSCR 1820 (2008) draws attention to sexual violence being used as a weapon of war and calls for the
need for prosecution of gender-based war crimes.
Source: UN Women, Global Technical Review Meeting: Building Accountability for Implementation of Security
Council Resolutions on Women, peace and Security, Final Report, November 2013.

Through its Recommendation Number 30, issued in October 2013, the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) further renewed the focus on the implementation
of UNSCR 1325 through adequately funded National and Regional Action Plans, while calling on all
member states to

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 cooperate with all UN networks, departments, agencies, funds and programmes in relation to the full
spectrum of conflict processes, including conflict prevention, conflict, conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction to give effect to the provisions of the Convention and enhance collaboration with civil
society and non-governmental organizations working on the implementation for the Security Council
10
agenda on women, peace and security.

A later (2014) interpretation of National Action Plans for UNSCR 1325 states:

. [National Action] Plans should contain concrete recommendations on how women should be included
in all peace and conflict related decisions and processes, and how a gender perspective should be
included in efforts to prevent conflict and sexual violence, protect women and girls, and in relief and
recovery activities. [The Plans] provide an opportunity to assess priorities for the states work both
nationally and internationally and to co-ordinate relevant actors, including co-operation with civil society.
Plans should contain clear goals, actions and responsibilities and mechanisms for monitoring and
11
evaluation.

In Afghanistan the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has had the responsibility for developing a National Action
Plan for WPS. Afghanistans NAP 1325 was released formally in June 2015.

These advances at the formal level have come under increasing criticism and attack from the more
traditionalist / conservative elements in the social and political arenas. The reduction in 2013-2014 of
the quota for female provincial council members in Afghanistan from 25 percent to 20 demonstrates the
tenuousness of relatively high numbers of females in different structures of government. Indeed, many
have argued that the rapid proliferation of measures soon after 2001 to bring Afghanistan in line with
international conventions and charters on womens rights has in fact created a backlash against such
measures. The successful attempt by a sizable number of parliamentarians to reduce the quota for
women in provincial councils, and attempts by others elsewhere against legal provisions for womens
rights, are manifestations of this backlash and polarization.12

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) reports increases in violence against
women in 2012.13 While, arguably, the rise in the number of cases of violence may be attributed to more
women willing to register their cases of violence, the fact remains that violence against women
continues in many forms (Figure 4).

In the meantime, the Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW), signed into law through a
presidential decree, has come under heavy debate in the Parliament since late 2013 with little or no
prospect of being approved without major changes being demanded by the traditionalist / conservative
factions. Also, since mid-2013, there have been increased pressures by the more conservative members
of the Parliament to weaken sections of the Criminal Code deemed inappropriate or inconsistent with

10

Adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly, ratified by Afghanistan in 2003.

See: OSCE / PRIO (2014), Study on National Action Plans on the Implementation of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1325 (Oslo: PRIO)
12
See Abirafeh, L. (2009), Gender and International Aid in Afghanistan: The Politics and Effects of Intervention
(Jefferson: McFarland and Co.), pages 50-52 and Kandiyoti, D. (2007), Old Dilemmas or New Challenges? The
Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan, Development and Change 38(2), 169199, both cited in
AREU (2013), Womens Rights, Gender Equality, and Transition: Securing gains, moving forward, page 12.
13
AIHRC (2012). Violence Against Women in Afghanistan: Biannual Report (Kabul: Afghanistan Independent
Human Rights Commission). This is the latest publicly available document with statistics on violence against
women.
11

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strict interpretations of Islam. Some parliamentarians have even asked for bringing back stoning as
punishment for adultery.14 In 2014 Afghanistan was ranked as one of the most dangerous places for
women in the world.15

Figure 4: Reported Cases and Forms of Violence Against Women 2012-2013
1400
1200
1000
800
600

2012

400

2013

200
0
Physical Violence

Sexual Violence

Verbal and
Economical Violence
Psychological Violence

Other Instances of
Violence

Source: AIHRC

Despite these challenges numerous gains made by and for women in Afghanistan since 2001 remain.
The percentage of girls in schools, the numbers of schools and clinics and the numbers of teachers and
medical personnel have steadily risen, albeit unevenly and with reservations about service quality,
throughout the country.16 At the formal policy level, the National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan
(NAPWA) of 2008 and the National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NAP 1325) have
committed the Government of Afghanistan to continue to make measurable steps to increase number
of women in the workforce and strengthen womens place in society.17 In the 12 provinces covered
under this monitoring exercise, the upward trends in the number of enrolments for girls and boys have
continued though there are regional variations (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Students Enrolled in Public Schools 2011-2014
60%
50%
40%
30%

% Female Students 2011/2012

20%

% Female Students 2012/2013

10%

% Female Students 2013/2014

0%

% Female Students 2014/2015

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbooks, 2012 2015

14

Afghanistan Watch (2014), pages 17-18.

Deutsche Welle News Agency: Afghanistan, the Most Dangerous Country for Women. Available from:
http://www.dw.de, cited in Afghanistan Watch (2014), page 18.
16
See, for example, APPRO (2014), Implementation of the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan.
Available from: http://appro.org.af/a-critical-assessment-of-napwa/
17
See: http://mowa.gov.af/fa/page/6814)
15

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Similarly, there are upward trends for the number of male and female teachers, also with regional
variations (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Male and Female Teachers in Public Schools 2011-2014
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

% Female Teachers 2011/2012

% Female Teachers 2012/2013
% Female Teachers 2013/2014
% Female Teachers 2014/2015

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbooks, 2012 2015

There has been a steady increase in the ration of doctors / population with the largest increases in
Nangarhar, Laghman, and Kabul (Figure 7). little or no change in the number of Comprehensive Health
Centers and Basic Health Centers between the years 2011 and 2012 and the numbers for medical
doctors and health assistance professionals (Figures 7).

Figure 7: Medical Doctors per 1,000 Persons 2012-2014

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbooks, 2013-2015

There has been a large drop in the ratio of health assistance professionals (HAPs) per 1,000 persons in
Badakhshan, Bamyan, Helmand, Herat, and Parwan between 2013 and 2014. In contrast, there has been
an increase in this ration over the same period for Balkh, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Kunduz, Kabul,
Laghman, and Samangan (Figure 8).



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Figure 8: Health Assistance Professionals per 1,000 Persons 2012-2014
1.80

HAPs / 1.000 People

1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40

2012/2013
2013/2014
2014/2015

0.20
0.00

Source: CSO Statistical Yearbooks, 2013-2015

A survey conducted by Afghanistan Watch in 2013 reported that 25 percent of those surveyed
emphasized the importance of strengthening cooperation between the public and the government
during and after the transition, 22 percent wanted stronger judicial institutions, 22 percent wanted
more effort in implementing gender equality policies, and 19 percent wanted increased participation of
women in the Afghan National Army.

That little or nothing in practice has happened as a direct result of NAPWA since 2008 or NAP 1325 since
June 2015 should not lead to the conclusion that these two important legal documents have no utility.
Rather, the challenge for the government, the international donors, and civil society is to find ways of
using these two important policy instruments as legitimacy for their proposed actions on improving the
conditions of women in Afghanistan. A key step in this direction is to link the significant, albeit ad hoc,
gains made for women through sectoral policies in such key sectors as education and health to the
objectives of NAPWA and NAP 1325 and use these two policy instruments to place legitimate demand
on the government (and its international donors) to allocate a higher portion of funds for ensuring basic
and sustainable rights for women.

Key Findings From Monitoring: September 2012 December 2014

Evidence from the baseline report, completed in late 2012, suggested that the overall security
conditions had deteriorated in some (but not all) of the transitioned areas.18 In areas with deteriorated
security there was evidence of increased criminal and politically motivated incidents while civilians and
civil society organizations particularly those working on womens issues were being subjected to
greater restrictions in their daily activities and existence. Civil society organizations also reported that
the overall funds available to them were being rapidly reduced.

18

See APPRO (2013), Afghanistan: Monitoring Womens Security in Transition Baseline Report, (Kabul: APPRO),
available from: http://appro.org.af/women-in-transition-baseline-assessment/

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Evidence from Cycle 2 of monitoring suggested that the overall security conditions continued to evolve
in multiple directions. In a number of cases, e.g., Herat and Nangarhar, the situation had been
deteriorating since the transition while in others, e.g., Aybak (Samangan), there had been no significant
change.19 In yet others, e.g., Laghman, after the initial rapid deterioration following the transition, there
were signs of stability and improvement by the time the monitoring data was being collected for Cycle 3
during February-April 2014.

By Cycle 3 of the monitoring, carried out in the second half of 2013, except for Bamyan, Herat, and
Laghman, the women from the other nine provinces were reporting a general deterioration in the
overall security situation. The period of data collection for Cycle 3 coincided with the first round of
voting for the Presidential Elections, held together with elections for the Provincial Councils on April 5,
2014. As a result the discussions with the many women and men interviewed inevitably revolved around
the elections, the negotiations over the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States, and
negotiation of peace between the Government of Afghanistan and the Armed Opposition Groups
(AOGs).20

Cycle 4 identified three sources of insecurity. First, there was heightened AOG activity including terrorist
attacks and high profile killings particularly in Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar. Second, there was
heightened criminal activity including murders, thefts, and kidnappings particularly in Kabul and Parwan.
Third, instability and unrest began to increase following the protest demonstrations that followed the
second round of presidential elections in 2014. After these protests, unrest increased in such provinces
as Samangan, which had been the most stable province in all previous rounds of monitoring. In
Badakhshan, Balkh, and Kunduz women felt less secure compared to 2012 and expressed concerns
about the high levels of criminal and AOG activity.21

Areas of concern by the end of 2014 (Cycle 5) and early 2015 included the weakness in upholding the
rule of law, weak governance, inadequate access to justice and corruption in the formal justice system,
and insecurity at large. Many of the women felt that the security transition had been rushed through to
completion by the end of 2014 as a result of domestic pressures to disengage from Afghanistan by the
constituents of the nations that make up ISAF, rather than a realistic assessment of the ability and
readiness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to assume the responsibility for Afghanistans
security.22

Using the composite indicators used for monitoring, the following subsections provide a synthesis of the
findings under each indicator for the period 2012 2015.

19

See APPRO (2013), Afghanistan: Monitoring Womens Security in Transition Cycle 2, (Kabul: APPRO), available
from: http://appro.org.af/women-in-transition-cycle-2-findings/
20
See APPRO (2014), Afghanistan: Monitoring Womens Security in Transition Cycle 3, (Kabul: APPRO), available
from: http://appro.org.af/women-in-transition-cycle-3-findings-2/
21
See APPRO (2014), Afghanistan: Monitoring Womens Security in Transition Cycle 4, (Kabul: APPRO), available
from: http://appro.org.af/women-in-transition-cycle-4-findings-2/
22
See APPRO (2015), Afghanistan: Monitoring Womens Security in Transition Cycle 5, (Kabul: APPRO), available
from: http://appro.org.af/women-in-transition-cycle-5-findings-2/

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Overall Security
Out of 12 provinces monitored, Laghman was the only province that showed signs of improvement after
the transition. The main cause of improvement was collaboration between ANP, ALP and the local
community leaders in response to heightened insecurity and lawlessness. All other provinces reported
no change or a general deterioration in security since the transition (Figure 9 and 10).

Figure 9: Perceptions of Security Outside the Home (Women's Views)
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%
0.00%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

Men and women in all provinces have generally similar perceptions of the security situation (Figures 9
and 10). The main causes of the deterioration were said to be the post-election uncertainties, from
which many provinces have not recovered, and the increase in unemployment caused by the security
transition. The deterioration is most evident in increased AOG activity and increased criminality.

Figure 10: Perceptions of Security Outside the Home (Men's Views)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

In Badakhshan the initial concerns after the transition were mostly about the increase in lawlessness
and criminal activity. During Cycles 3-5 the complaints were mostly about the heightened activity by
armed opposition groups (AOGs). Some interviewees suggested that many criminals joined the AOGs as
a means to continue criminal activity under the protection of AOGs.

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14

No significant changes were reported in Parwan and Samangan immediately after the transition. The
situation in these two provinces began to deteriorate with many people taking up arms in response to
the inconclusive outcome of the Presidential Elections and the long period of uncertainty that followed
until September 2014. Balkh province showed some improvements during the first two cycles. Between
the second and the third cycle of monitoring the security situation had remained unchanged. During the
fourth and the fifth cycles, however, a general deterioration was reported and attributed to the postelection uncertainties. The security situation in Herat has remained volatile throughout, before the
transition and the elections and after with a general trend toward deterioration.

Helmand, Kandahar, Kunduz, and Nangarhar have been the most susceptible to AOG activity. In
Kandahar and Nangarhar, the AOGs have continued to carry out a number of suicide and other forms of
attack and assassinations. In Helmand the AOGs managed to establish themselves relatively quickly after
the transition, culminating in attempt for a full take over of the province in late 2015. Similarly, Kunduz
witnessed steady increase in the presence and establishment of AOG pockets around the province,
culminating in a full take over of Kunduz City for at least three days in late 2015. There are numerous
reports of targeted assassinations in all these provinces. According to many, the Kunduz fall had its roots
in the uncertainties following the Presidential Elections.

The departure of international forces has led to concerns, more so among women than men (Figures 11
and 12). In some provinces such as Kabul, many men stated that they felt more comfortable about their
female relatives outside the home since the transition because there were no foreigners present in their
communities and on the streets.

Figure 11: Are you Happy About the Departure of International Forces? (Women's Views)
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

The security transition coincided with the uncertainties following the Presidential Elections and the
delay in signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) between Afghanistan and the United States. The
combination of these factors was cause for worry among the vast majority of those interviewed and
surveyed during the third and the fourth cycle of monitoring from 2013 to mid-2014. However, by Cycle
5, from September to December 2014, there was more ease about the departure of international forces
since the President had been inaugurated and BSA had been signed.

In Bamyan, Kunduz, Samangan, and Badakhshan there was clear evidence of concern by women about
the departure of international security forces, given the uncertainties following the elections in 2014.
Kabul witnessed a surge in AOG activity during the fifth cycle (September-December 2014), with a
significant number of those interviewed wishing for some presence by the international security forces.
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Figure 12: Are you Happy About the Departure of International Forces? (Men's Views)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

Confidence in ANPs ability to maintain security has been high among women and men throughout the
monitoring cycles (Figures 13 and 14). Good security during the two rounds of Presidential Elections
appears to have contributed to the positive perception of ANSF by the general public. The Afghan Local
Police (ALP) or the arbaki, however, are considered to be a source of general concern with links to
criminality and unrest in most of the provinces.

Figure 13: Can ANSF Protect Women? (Women's Views)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

Figure 14: Can ANSF Protect Women? (Men's Views)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

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16


In all provinces there were complaints about reckless driving by ANP personnel in heavily populated
areas and endangering the physical safety of civilians. The exceptions regarding the otherwise favorable
view of ANSF are Kandahar and Herat. In Kandahar the main complaints are about ANP harassing young
girls on their way to school. In Herat, during the fifth cycle, the interviewees complained that ANP was
not responsive to the needs of the community in general and of women in particular (Figures 15 and
16).

Figure 15: ANSF Respectful Toward Women? (Women's Views)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

Figure 16: ANSF Respectful Toward Women? (Men's Views)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

Laghman is the only province where there are little or no concerns about ALP. This is due, largely, to the
close cooperation between security forces and civilian leaders in response to a sharp increase in
lawlessness and criminality immediately after the security transition.

Access to Work and Public Life

The security transition has been detrimental for womens access to work. In all districts employment
opportunities for women have declined over the cycles. The main cause of the decline is the reduction in
the number of women-centered projects and funding. During the third, but especially fourth and fifth
cycles, this was compounded by post-election uncertainty resulting in a loss of confidence among
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17

funding and employment sources. Because of the delay in the announcement of the new cabinet after
the elections, all governmental organizations froze hiring new employees.

The perception of women working outside the home remains positive on the condition that they abide
by the traditional dress code. In all provinces communities approve of women working in health and
education sectors while there are reservations about women working for NGOs. The opinions of
religious leaders on working women vary significantly within and between provinces. However, in urban
areas the attitude toward working women is significantly more positive than rural areas.

Womens access to public life is primarily impeded by insecurity, harassment in public spaces, and
traditional conservatism. Because of harassment, many women do not leave their homes, even in
provinces where the security situation is relatively stable or has improved (Figures 17). The main types
of harassment are verbal such as inappropriate remarks in public spaces and incessant anonymous
phone calls, and sometimes physical such touching and grabbing, particularly by young men.

Figure 17: Harassment in Public Spaces (Women's Views)
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

In some districts such as Paghman (Kabul) and Sorkhrod (Nangarhar), women stated that concerned
community members had started consultations on how best to manage and control increasing
harassment of women in their communities.

Access to Services (Health and Education)

Though access to health and education has fluctuated through the cycles though there is a general
aggregate decline in access. Security deterioration is pointed to by many as the cause for the decline
since many citizens feel less protected in making the trip to and from health or education centers. In
Herat, Kabul, Nangarhar, Parwan, and Samangan womens access to health has remained generally
unchanged.

During Cycles 4 and 5 women in Helmand, Kandahar, and Laghman reported improvements in access to
health and attributed this to better services and new hospitals. Complaints about the quality of health
services such as lack of medication, unhelpful attitude of health professionals, and congestion at the
health centers persist in all provinces and have been present throughout the cycles, however.

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In the less safe districts of Badakhshan most of the girls schools had closed down during Cycles 4 and 5.
In Nangarhar during the same period a dispute between the AOGs and the local authorities in Dehbala
district had led to the closing down of 25 education centers, depriving approximately 7,000 female
students from access to school.

In Balkh, Bamyan, Parwan, and Samangan access to education has remained unchanged while in
Helmand, Kandahar, and Laghman the interviewees reported a deterioration during the first three cycles
and better access during Cycles 4 and 5. The improvement in Helmand is limited to the capital and
attributed to the opening of new girls schools in Lashkargah. In Kandahar the quality of education is said
to have improved, due largely to efforts by the provincial Department of Education to recruit qualified
teachers and monitor service provision.

Access to Justice
The effect of transition on womens access to formal justice has been limited. Women in general have
little access to formal justice. The main impeding factors are traditional conservatism, corruption within
the judicial institutions, and unfair treatment of women by formal judiciary officials. Customary justice
seems to be gaining ground in a number of more remote and rural districts. Despite the limited access,
the womens views on the ability of the formal justice system to protect women remains largely positive
though generally less positive in 2014 (Cycle 5) than 2013 (Cycles 3 and 4). (Figure 18).

Figure 18: Does Formal Justice Protect Women? (Women's View)
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4

20%

Cycle 5

10%

Average

0%

In Badakhshan and Kunduz the deterioration in security conditions has reduced the already low access
by women to formal justice. In Bamyan the post-election uncertainties seem to have resulted in less
duty of care by formal justice officials, limiting womens access to formal justice. The inauguration of the
new government and its initial hard stance against corruption were said to have resulted in
improvements in the formal justice system in Balkh, Laghman, and Helmand. In Samangan and Helmand
higher awareness among women was said to be a key factor in relatively higher access by women to
formal justice.

In all provinces, women complained about the bad attitude of the judiciary toward women. Women
complained of being treated unfairly and on occasions even scolded at by the members of the formal

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judiciary. The unfair treatment is not only limited to women seeking divorce or not tolerating domestic
abuse, but also concerns those who claim their inheritance.

Despite the complaints about the judiciary, women still believe that the formal justice system can
protect them and their rights if purged of prejudice against women and general corruption within the
system (Figure 19). This is based on a belief that the laws to protect women are there, all that needs to
be done is its proper application.

Figure 19: Does Formal Justice System Protect Women? (Men's View)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Cycle 5
Average

Men generally believe that the formal justice system can protect women (Figure 19) and appear to be
less aware of the challenges faced by women. In most communities such those in Paghman, Parwan and
Sorkhrod families do not approve of women who seek justice through the formal justice system or
outside the home. In any event, the overall confidence by men and women in the formal justice system
appears to have dropped over time (Figure 18 and 19).

Because of traditional conservatism and the deficiencies of the formal justice system most women have
to resort to customary justice to resolve their issues and conflicts. Customary courts usually mediate
between the conflicting parties and apply traditional solutions, including bad and badal, which are
fundamentally against the most minimal rights of women. The use of customary justice for conflict
resolution remains widespread and in many districts has more legitimacy than the formal courts, to the
extent that the police often make allowances for citizens to resort to customary justice to resolve their
conflicts.

Violence Against Women

The overwhelming majority of interviewees believe that there is a direct relationship between the
increase in violence against women and the rise in poverty and unemployment. Other causes are said to
be a general deterioration of the security, drug addiction mostly among men, and the lack of awareness
on womens rights among men. Laghman was the only province where the interviewees found violence
against women to have decreased, attributing it to an overall improvement in security initiated by the
community.

Male and female interviewees argued that more awareness among women without comparable
awareness among men results in more violence against men. The men and women argued that once
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20

aware, the women who object to their mistreatment by their husbands or in-laws are often severely
punished by unaware husbands and/or in-laws who resent the women breaking the traditional mould.
There have been numerous cases of women committing suicide and running away from home,
attributed by some interviewees to uneven awareness about womens among men and women. Suicide
was said to be a response to forced marriage and domestic violence, particularly in Herat and, during
Cycles 4 and 5, Bamyan.

The most common types of violence against women are physical beatings, psychological abuse,
economic deprivation, exchange of girls in double marriages, forced marriages, and underage marriages.
Forced and underage marriages usually lead to other complicating and violent situations such as
escaping from home, divorce, severe domestic violence and even suicide and murder.

Though reported in many provinces the practice of bad, where women are used as retributions to settle
feuds, was most prominent in Helmand. It was only during the fifth cycle where community elders
reported using property, such as land, instead of women to settle feuds.

Exchange of girls and women is common throughout the provinces and is primarily caused by the
practice of asking high bridal prices by the brides family. To avoid paring high bridal prices, families
usually exchange girls in double marriages of brother and sister from one family to sister and brother
from another.

Women and Current Affairs

The initial draft of the new Elections Law proposed in 2013 lowered the female representation quota to
zero. However, the efforts made by womens rights advocates ensured that there was a 20 percent
quota. The reduction of the quota for female representation in provincial council demonstrates the
tenuousness of these relatively high numbers of females in different structures of government.

Institutionally, womens participation in politics has come under attack by the more traditionalist
elements. During the 2014 Provincial Council Elections, in the 12 provinces monitored, there were a
total of 1,603 candidates of whom 154 were female. This compares to 1,795 candidates in total in 2009
of whom 179 were female.23 The percentage of female candidacy remains unchanged between 2009
and 2014 at around nine percent. The reduction in the female quota from 25 to 20 percent, however,
has reduced the percentage of female provincial council representatives from 27 to 21 percent (Figure
20).

In all provinces, especially Kandahar, Helmand, Nangarhar, and Laghman female Provincial Council
members, other prominent women, and female government employees live under constant threat of
assassinations. At the same time, there were high rates of participation by women in both rounds of
presidential elections. The subsequent irregularities and allegations of fraud resulted in much political
uncertainty and demoralization among voters who felt let down for the risk they took in coming out in
droves to vote.


23 Pajhwak (2014): http://www.elections.pajhwok.com/en/content/biographies-kunduz-provincial-council-

members, and IEC (2014): http://results.iec.org.af/en/elections/get_prview_elected, both accessed June 10,

2015.

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Figure 20: Comparison of Female Candidacy and Representation in Provincial Councils 2009 and 2014
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%

Candidates 2009
Candidates 2014
Winners 2009
Winners 2014

Source: IEC (2014)

Women in most of the provinces stated that a general lack of facilities and organization limits womens
participation in politics. Womens participation in the formal peace process is viewed by many as purely
symbolic and has been very limited throughout the cycles in all provinces. Female representation in
Provincial Peace Councils (PPC) in the twelve provinces averages at around 10 percent (Figure 21).

Figure 21: Female Representation in Provincial Peace Councils
40
35
30
25
20
15

Total

10

Female

5
0

There is a shared sentiment in all provinces that women can contribute to peace through informal
means. There is a broad consensus that women could play a major role in convincing their sons,
husbands, fathers and brothers to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence.

Conclusion
There have been significant accomplishments by and for Afghan women at the formal and practical
levels since 2001 in addressing the numerous challenges they face. At the same time, there is broad
recognition that many of the gains made are at the risk of being severely undermined or reversed in the
aftermath of the full security transition of 2014 and during the peace negotiations with AOGs. Protecting
and building on these achievements will require continued support from donors and the international
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22

community. Specifically, concrete and effective measures will be needed to implement and move
forward the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda formulated under UNSCR 1325 and articulated
in Afghanistans National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325 (NAP 1325). To succeed, the approach in
implementing NAP 1325 and numerous other women-centered legislation and policies such as NAPWA
would have to learn from past failures, however.

The overwhelming majority of gender-related legislation and policies in Afghanistan are poorly designed,
focus on inputs at the expense of outputs and outcomes, and lack adequate resources for
implementation. In many instances the inclusion of a gender perspective in programming, a consistent
requirement by the donors, has not gone beyond being a mere item to tick off on the checklist used for
releasing development funds. As a result, several reports have raised major concerns about genderbased development programming and the lingering misunderstanding of what gender mainstreaming
entails.24 The almost exclusive focus on women in gender mainstreaming has been called, appropriately,
women highlighting.25

Future gender-based programming in Afghanistan must be based on the recognition that the
implementation of gender mainstreaming strategies and policies by the international donors in
Afghanistan has consistently fallen short of meeting program objectives.26 The policies reflect the
intentions of donors and what donors stress, seek, should do, or will support but fail to provide
clear mechanisms and points of entry for implementation guided by specific outcome-oriented
indicators to monitor and evaluate progress. Moreover, intentions set out in the various action plans are
often not reflected in indicator matrices, if and when these are available. Several reports have pointed
to a lack of understanding within the donor community and among the implementing organizations of
the concept of gender and the challenging environment for implementing gender mainstreaming in
Afghanistan.27

In addition, though acknowledged as necessary, the inclusion of men and boys in gender programming
remains minimal, or poorly conceptualized.28 In the least, gender mainstreaming in such contexts as
Afghanistan must include a particular focus on the rights of boys who, like girls and women, are
systematically exposed to the risks of physical and sexual abuse and violence. As a consequence of male
exclusion, advocacy for gender rights and gender mainstreaming has become, in most cases, womens
rights activism. While rights activism is and must remain an integrated component of advocacy,

24

See, for example, AREU (2008).

Abirafeh, L. (2005), Lessons from Gender-focused International Aid in Post-Conflict Afghanistan ...... Learned?
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Division for International Cooperation Department for Development Policy (Bonn: FES),
available from: http://www.fes-afghanistan.org/pages/publications.php
26
For a critical self-assessment confirming this, see, for example, Norad (2012), Evaluation of Norwegian
Development Cooperation with Afghanistan (2001 2011).
27
See, for example, AREU (2013), Womens Rights, Gender Equality, and Transition: Security Gains, Moving
Forward, (Kabul: AREU); AREU (2008), Moving to the Mainstream: Integrating Gender in Afghanistans National
Policy, (Kabul: AREU); Abirafeh, L. (2005), Lessons From Gender-focused International Aid in Post-Conflict
Afghanistan Learned?, (Berlin: Firedrich Ebert Stiftung); and Kandiyoti, D. (2005), The Politics of Gender
Reconstruction in Afghanistan, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development).
28
BAAG (2014), Getting it Right: Examining Gender Programming in Afghanistan, (London: BAAG), available from:
http://www.baag.org.uk/sites/www.baag.org.uk/files/resources/attachments/Getting%20it%20Right%202014_F
INAL.pdf.
25

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23

advocacy should also have elements of engagement and awareness changing through dialogue,
incentives, and education of men and women, girls and boys.29

Approaches to womens integration in decision-making processes thus remain wanting both at the
institutional and grass-root levels. Womens political participation is often presented from the
perspective of participation through the number of seats reserved for women in the Parliament,
Provincial Councils, Community Development Councils, or national security forces, without much
thought on the conditions in which these women must function. At the grass-root level womens
participation in decision-making remains minimal at best while there are numerous barriers for women
in terms of access to work and public life, health, education, and justice.30

There is now an urgent need for clear WPS policies, informed and driven by up-to-date contextual
knowledge and achievable goals based on applied research, implemented through conscientious
coordination mechanisms and sustainable financial support and planning, and monitored and evaluated
systematically to inform future programming. In 2016 the new government of Afghanistan, supported
and reassured during the December 2014 London Conference by a host of international donors, remains
committed to effecting measurable improvements in womens conditions, opportunities, and access to
and control over their productive assets and income.31 The post-2014 period thus presents numerous
opportunities, as well as risks, for advancing toward greater gender equality in Afghanistan.

Based on the findings from the five rounds of monitoring between September 2012 and December
2014, the following recommendations may be made for future women-centered programming in
Afghanistan.

29

See, for example, APPRO (2013), Gender Screaming versus Gender Mainstreaming in Afghanistan, available
from: http://appro.org.af/blog/gender-screaming-versus-gender-mainstreaming-in-afghanistan/ and BAAG
(2014).
30
See, for example, APPRO (2014), Monitoring Womens Security in Transition Cycle 5, available from:
http://appro.org.af/women-in-transition-cycle-5-findings-2/
31
The reports and communiqu of the London Conference of December 2014 are available through:
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/international-community-welcomes-afghan-reform-vision-at-londonconference; and https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/383205/TheLondon-Conference-on-Afghanistan-Communique.pdf
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24

Recommendations
Overall Security

Relevant Entities

1. Continue to provide trainings to the ANSF (ANP and ALP) on

gender-sensitivity and engagement with civilians.



2. Ensure monitoring and evaluation of provincial and local security
forces by central authorities.

3. Hold senior members of ANSF accountable for respecting gender
equality by evaluating them for their ability to address cases of
unfair treatment of women in the forces under their command.

CSOs
MoI
MoWA
UNDP/LOTFA
International Donors
MoI

4. Continue efforts to recruit more women for ANSF, increase female-

friendly amenities and facilities in ANP and ANSF more generally,
and ensure identical processes for promotion are applied to female
and male ANSF officers.

5. Conduct additional research and contextual/conflict analysis for

lessons learned in Laghman to inform security management in
other provinces such as Kunduz, Helmand, and Herat.
6. Insure enhanced representation of women in leadership and
decision-making position within ANSF at national and local levels
7. Provide adequate compensation and support to women whose
family members have died or suffered severe injuries as a result of
conflict-related violence

CSOs
MoI
MoJ
MoWA

MoI
MoWA
UNDP/ LOTFA
International Donors

International Donors
Research Organizations
UNAMA
International Donors
Research Organizations

Access to Work and Public Life

Relevant Entities

8.

Sustain development cooperation for income-generating projects

for women at the community level.

Government of Afghanistan
International community

Earmark project funds for recruitment of local female staff by

national implementing partners.

International Community
INGOs and NGOs

Government of Afghanistan

9.

10. Remove the freeze on recruitment in the civil service and ensure
recruitment quotas for women are respected in civil service
positions

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25


Access to Health and Education

Relevant Entities

11. Develop community monitoring mechanisms to ensure corruptive

practices of health workers are reported and prosecuted. Cases of
ill-treatment of patients in health services need to be documented,
prosecuted, and offenders brought to justice.


12. Increase staffing of health services at the local level by continuing
to train and recruit professional medical staff, from doctors to
nurses and midwives.

13. Intensify efforts for provision of quality medicine in local health
services.


14. Continue training and mentoring of health personnel on gender
sensitivity at all levels.


15. Increase the protection of girls schools, particularly at higher
grades. At the same time, engage with parents on the virtue and
value of education for their daughters.

MoPH
INGOs and NGOs
International Community

MoPH
INGOs and NGOs
International Community

MoPH
INGOs and NGOs
International Community

MoI
MoE

MoPH
MoI
MoJ
INGOs and NGOs
International Community

Violence Against Women

Relevant Entities

16. Sustain provision of awareness raising on violence against women

and womens rights for women and men. Continue integrating
awareness raising with vocational and literacy training programs.

17. Sustain training on the Family Law at the community level and
include local decision makers, traditional justice providers, and
male and female members of communities.

www.appro.org.af

CSOs
IDLG
MoJ
MoWA
International community
INGOs and NGOs

MoJ
MoWA
MoE
International community
INGOs and NGOs

26

Access to Justice

Relevant Entities

18. Continue training and mentoring of ANP personnel in dealing fairly

and equitably with domestic violence.




19. Continue efforts to increase womens access to formal justice by
increasing the availability of courts at the district level; sustain
providing women-centered legal awareness programs for women
and men; make special provisions in the formal justice system to
fast track womens legal cases.

20. Ensure that prosecution resulting in conviction in reported cases of
violence against women is followed up with correctional measures
for the offenders.

21. Ensure effective prosecution of cases of violence against women in
accordance with national and international legal frameworks,
including through the adoption of measures to combat impunity
when State actors perpetrate violence against women.

MoI
MoWA
UNDP/LOTFA
International community
INGOs and NGOs

MoJ
MoWA
International community
INGOs and NGOs

MoI
MoJ
MoWA

Women and Current Affairs

Relevant Entities

22. Strengthen active engagement of women in national and provincial

High Peace Councils.
23. Increase involvement of CSOs and womens rights organizations in
the peace process, including engagement with the High Peace
Council at national and provincial levels.

24. Increase advocacy and dialogue on including women in the peace
process.

25. Raise awareness among female and male citizens about the High
Peace Council, the peace process, and the rights of the citizens to
participate in the peace process.

26. Sustain existing position quotas for women, particularly in senior
decision making positions, across all sectors (health, education,
judiciary, sub-national governance structures, and Parliament).

27. Strengthen measures for the security and protection of high
ranking female government officials

MoJ
International community
INGOs and NGOs
MoWA
UNAMA

Government of Afghanistan
HPC
International Community

Government of Afghanistan
International community
NGOs

Government of Afghanistan
International community
INGOs and NGOs

Government of Afghanistan
International community
INGOs and NGOs

Government of Afghanistan

MoI

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27


Further Research

Relevant Entities

28. Gender relations and regional diversity: Establish, through indepth assessment, why the outcome of the security transition in
some provinces has been more positive than other provinces, why
some provinces have experienced little or no change after the
transition, and whether there are lessons to be learned from these
cases for critical provinces such as Kunduz, Nangarhar, and
Helmand.

29. Benchmarking and baseline information: Prior to any and all
interventions on security and service provision in the posttransition period, government and international donor
programming must be based on situation analyses and baseline
assessments with a central focus on gender relations and how the
proposed interventions affect, negatively and positively, preexisting gender relations in the target communities.

Government of Afghanistan
International Community
Research Institutes and
Organizations

Government of Afghanistan
International Community
Research Institutes and
Organizations

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