I. Republic Act No.

9225 otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and

Reacquisition Act of 2003 declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their
Philippine citizenship.
II.
III. Omnibus Election Code, Batas Pambansa Bilang 881
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of
another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died,
withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political
party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the
election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day
before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate,
or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission.
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the instances wherein substitution may be
allowed: They are death, disqualification and withdrawal of another. A candidate whose CoC has
been cancelled or denied due course cannot be substituted. This was the clear ruling in
Miranda v. Abaya.

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.

- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
In Mitra v. Comelec, the nature of a petition under Section 78 was further explained as follows:
Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code governs the cancellation of, and
grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined application of these sections requires that the
candidates stated facts in the COC be true, under pain of the COCs denial or cancellation if any false
representation of a material fact is made. The false representation that these provisions
mention must necessarily pertain to a material fact. The critical material facts are those that
refer to a candidates qualifications for elective office, such as his or her citizenship and residence. The
false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." Given the

purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate as to the
would-be candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation that Section 78
addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the
intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results. The deliberate
character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the consequences of any
material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he
cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.
In Fermin v. Comelec, it was stressed that a Section 78 petition ought not to be interchanged or
confused with a Section 68 petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and
resulting in different eventualities. In the said case, it was written: While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all.

IV. JAPZON VS COMELEC

Issue: WON Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under the
Local Government Code.
Held: YES. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or
legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).
A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
where the childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court already
acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship, he must
establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a
naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily abandoned Barangay 6
as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.
Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic
impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the
USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had
the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his
domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent
when, immediately after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he
applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in
the Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty voluntarily

submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General

Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing CTCs from the
said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6. Thereafter, Ty applied
for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6.

V. LUCY TORRES GOMEZ VS HRET

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO vs. HRET AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, G.R.
No. 202202, March 19, 2013.
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10,
2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency
requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
"disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division,
which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private
respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto
petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified and not that his
CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled would mean that he could have
been validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.
As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya (Miranda), a candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77
because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has
been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted
because he is not considered a candidate. Stated differently, since there would be
no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a
CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not
obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to
be substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued.

On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the

instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said
section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate
substitution.

VII. Immunity of diplomats and consuls

The doctrine of diplomatic immunity is one of the oldest notions of foreign

relations and the fundamental rule of diplomatic law. This rule was mentioned
under article 29 of the Vienna Convention in 1961. The diplomatic agent who goes
to the receiving state to serve as a medium of communication between his country
and the receiving state must be given immunity in order to carry out their duties
effectively. Therefore it seems necessary for the diplomatic agent to enjoy the
immunity from the criminal and civil jurisdiction in the receiving state. In general
there are various types of persons in the diplomatic mission some of whom should
be granted a higher protection than others. The immunity for diplomats was
established before by the rule of customary international law. However, the
immunity from jurisdiction in modern practice is regulated by the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relation, 1961'. It is important to emphasize that the rule
of customary international law will continue to apply if any matter is not regulated
by the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relation 1961.

VIII. Acts allowable in the high seas

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 532 August 8, 1974
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW OF 1974

IX. INNOCENT PASSAGE

The term innocent passage under Section 3 of the UNCLOS stated that, the right
of innocent passage that is subjected to the Convention is ships of all States,
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea (Article 17). Stated under Article 19 of the same section in the
Convention, passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity
with this Convention and with other rules of international law.
Stated under the same article, passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the costal State if in the territorial
sea it engages in any of the following activities; Any threat or use of force against
the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or
in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in
Charter of the United Nations; Any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind,
Any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of defense or security of
the coastal State; Any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defense or security

of the coastal State; The launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft or on
any military device; Loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the
coastal State; Any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
Any fishing activities; Carrying out of research or survey activities; Any act aimed
at interfering with any system of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State; Any other activity not having a direct bearing on
the passage.