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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR
Quezon City
EDMUND JORDAN RAGON
Complainant,
I.S. No. 03-INV-14-G06915
For: Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Damage to
Property

- versus -

ERNANIE UY VILLAZOR,
Respondent.
x-------------------------------------x

COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT
I, ERNANIE UY VILLAZOR, of legal age, married, Filipino,
residing at Blk. 14, Lot 5, Rolling Meadows I Subdivision, San
Bartolome, Quezon City, after having been duly sworn to in
accordance with law, hereby depose and say:
1.
I am the Respondent in the above-entitled case for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.
This Honorable Office should
dismiss outright this present
Complaint, the same being filed
by a party who has no cause of
action for civil liability against
me.

2.
At the onset, this Honorable Office should dismiss this
present Complaint outright for having been filed by a party who has
no cause of action or claim against me. The Complaint is for supposed
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, that is, a Toyota
Vios with plate number TXV820 (Subject Vehicle). It should be
noted, however, that the Subject Vehicle is owned and registered in
the name of Nine Star Transport Corp (Nine Star), with address at
37 Rose St., Reparo, Baesa, Quezon City, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt attached in the
Complaint- Affidavit.

3.
It is undisputed, however, that Ragons Affidavit only
contained supposed damage sustained by the taxi he was driving,
which is owned by Nine Star. Ragon did not impute any damage
he personally suffered but only purported damage against a vehicle
owned and registered under a corporation which has a personality
different and separate from its driver. It is therefore clear that it is the
corporation, as the registered owner of the Subject Vehicle, which is
considered the injured party. Since Ragon was not shown to be the
owner thereof nor duly authorized by the corporation to pursue its
alleged claims against me, he has no personality to sue and has no
cause of action for civil liability against me.
3.1 My counsel advised me that the Supreme Court in a
certain case entitled, Tam Wing Tak vs. Hon. Makasiar, GR
No. 122452, 29 January 2001, sustained the Public
Prosecutors decision to dismiss the complaint upon a finding
that petitioner failed to show any proof that he was authorized
or deputized or granted specific powers by Concord's board of
director to sue Victor And Siong for and on behalf of the firm. It
ruled that Concord, a domestic corporation, was the payee of
the bum check, not petitioner. Therefore, it is Concord, as payee
of the bounced check, which is the injured party. Since
petitioner was neither a payee nor a holder of the bad check, he
had neither the personality to sue nor a cause of action against
Vic Ang Siong. Under Section 36 of the Corporation Code, read
in relation to Section 23, it is clear that where a corporation is
an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of
directors or trustees.
4.
Accordingly, this present Complaint should be dismissed
by this Honorable Office after it was clearly shown that Ragon is
neither the injured party nor duly authorized by Nine Star to institute
this action against me.
Assuming that this present
Complaint can proceed despite
Ragons absence of cause of
action against me, it is
nonetheless evident in the
attendant circumstances that
the legal and proximate cause
of the accident is the wrongful
and negligent manner in which
the Subject Vehicle was parked.

5.
Meanwhile, assuming that this present Complaint can
proceed despite the fact that it was instituted by Ragon who was
neither the injured party nor duly authorized by Nine Star, it is
nonetheless clear in the following circumstances that the manner in

which the Subject Vehicle was parked is the legal and proximate cause
for its damage.
5.1 The incident happened in the evening of 27
February 2014 while I was on my way home from the office. My
vehicle was then traversing the northbound direction of KJ
Street when suddenly another vehicle from the southbound lane
overtook my lane. Following this, I was left with no other option
but to veer my vehicle towards the right to avoid collision.
5.2 However, as I veered my vehicle away from the
overtaking vehicle, I did not notice that there was a vehicle
parked along KJ Street. Consequently, I slightly hit the left
portion of the Subject Vehicle.
5.3 However, at the time of the incident, the area was
not well- lighted and there were no hazard signs, or any socalled early- warning devices set anywhere near the Subject
Vehicle. The Subject Vehicle was parked in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the other northbound
lane of KJ Street. This Honorable Office should note that KJ
Street is a busy street and there are several commercial
establishments located therein. It goes without saying therefore
that parking along such a busy two-way street will cause an
obstruction to passing vehicles especially at night when the area
is not well- lighted.
6.
Following the foregoing circumstances, the parked
Subject Vehicle maybe considered an illegal obstruction along KJ
street which poses danger to moving vehicles traversing it which have
the right to be on said road. It is not incumbent upon me to expect
that the Subject Vehicle was parked along KJ street considering that it
is a major thoroughfare which should be free from any obstruction
such as an illegally parked vehicle. To reiterate, the Subject Vehicle
was parked along a dark area without any hazard sign or early
warning device that would properly forewarn vehicles of its presence
and the danger it poses.
7.
My counsel then advised me that in a similar case of
Phoenix Construction, Inc., and Armando Carbonel vs Intermediate
Appellate Court and Leonardo Dionision, GR No. L-65295, March
10,1987, the Supreme Court ruled that the improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the
truck driver must be held responsible:

Secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far


from being a passive and static condition was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between
the dump truck and the private respondent's car would in
all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not
been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector
devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created
an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down
General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk,
the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than
the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the
accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent
cause. What the Petitioners describe as an "intervening
cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent
manner which the truck driver had parked the dump
truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a
duty to private respondent Dionisio and others similarly
situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it
were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper
parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever
the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once
more from Professor and Keeton:
Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the
intervening cause is one which in ordinary
human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of
failure to guard against it; or the defendant
may be negligent only for that reason. Thus
one who sets a fire may be required to foresee
that an ordinary, usual and customary wind
arising later wig spread it beyond the
defendant's own property, and therefore to
take precautions to prevent that event. The
person who leaves the combustible or
explosive material exposed in a public place
may foresee the risk of fire from some
independent source. ... In all of these cases
there is an intervening cause combining with
the defendant's conduct to produce the result
and in each case the defendant's negligence

consists in failure to protect the plaintiff


against that very risk.
Obviously the defendant cannot be
relieved from liability by the fact that the risk
or a substantial and important part of the
risk, to which the defendant has subjected the
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable
intervening forces are within the scope
original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally
agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly
in this category will not supersede the
defendant's
responsibility
(underscoring
supplied)
Thus it has been held that a defendant
will be required to anticipate the usual
weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary
forces of nature such as usual wind or rain, or
snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that
one who leaves an obstruction on the road or
a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle
or a train will run into it; ...
The risk created by the defendant may
include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. ... [The standard of
reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against
'that occasional negligence which is one of
the ordinary incidents of human life, and
therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a defendant
who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff
will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic
becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down
by a car, even though the car is negligently
driven; and one who parks an automobile on
the highway without lights at night is not
relieved of responsibility when another
negligently drives into it. ---(underscoring
supplied)
8.
This Honorable Office should likewise note that as
advised by my counsel, Ragon failed to observe Article IV, Section 34
(g) of RA No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which reads:

(g) Lights when parked or disabled- Appropriate


parking lights or flares visible one hundred meters away
shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle whenever such
vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not
well-lighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger
passing traffic
9. Given the foregoing narrated circumstances, it is
therefore clear that the legal and proximate cause of the accident is
the wrongful and negligent manner in which the Subject Vehicle was
parked. The improper parking of the Subject Vehicle created an
unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving along KJ Street and for
having so created this risk, I cannot be held responsible for the
damage suffered by the Subject Vehicle. Instead, it is Ragon who
should be held accountable for his own negligence.
Courts have traditionally been
compelled that an actor who is
confronted with an emergency
is not to be held up to the
standard of conduct normally
applied to an individual who is
in no such situation.

10. Meanwhile, my counsel also informed that under the


emergency rule adopted by the Supreme Court in the case of Gan vs
Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 378 (1988), I cannot be held liable for
negligence considering the situation I was in immediately prior to the
incident. To reiterate, I was in the right lane northbound KJ Street on
my way home from the office when suddenly, I was forced to veer my
vehicle to the right to avoid a head-on collision with an oncoming
vehicle who overtook my lane. According to my counsel, under the
emergency rule, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a
situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending
danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution,
unless the emergency as brought by his own negligence.
11. My counsel mentioned to me that in the cases of
Valenzuela vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 115204, 7 February 1996
and Li vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 117944, 7 February 1996, the
Supreme Court reiterated the foregoing doctrine on emergency rule
and likewise stressed its earlier ruling that courts have traditionally
been compelled that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is
not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an

individual who is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses


of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and
does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care
from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening
conditions.
12. Given the foregoing narrated circumstances, it is therefore
clear that the legal and proximate cause of the accident is the
wrongful and negligent manner in which the Subject Vehicle was
parked. The incident would have been avoided had it been that the
Subject Vehicle was not parked in such manner as it became an illegal
obstruction to vehicles passing along KJ road that posed great and
imminent danger to them, including myself, who was suddenly
confronted with an emergency situation of avoiding a possible headon collision with an oncoming vehicle.
Finally, assuming that there is
alleged negligence on my part,
the amount of damages sought
by Ragon exceed the actual
damage to the Subject Vehicle.

13. Finally, assuming for arguments sake that negligence


could be imputed against me, the amount of damages sought by
Ragon exceeds the actual damage to the Subject Vehicle. In his
Complaint- Affidavit, Ragon claimed the amount of damages suffered
is Fourteen Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Pesos (PhP14,960.00)
because allegedly the Subject Vehicle would require the replacement
of the rear door and tinsmithing and painting, labor and materials. It
is clear from the pictures however that the Subject Vehicles rear door
only was not destroyed or damaged to the extent that it would require
a replacement. In fact, the Subject Vehicle had no dents but only
scratches which would need only painting and tinsmithing.
14. Clearly therefore, the amount of damages, even assuming
that Ragon is entitled to it, exceed the actual damage to the Subject
Vehicle. The job estimate is beyond what is required to restore the
Subject Vehicle to its condition prior to the incident.
15. Based on the circumstances related above and in light of
prevailing law and jurisprudence, I respectfully submit that there is
absolutely no probable cause to hold me for trial on the charge of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.
16. I have executed this Counter-Affidavit to attest to the
truth of the foregoing.

AFFIANT FURTHER SAYETH NAUGHT.


City of Quezon, 16 September 2015.
ERNANIE U. VILLAZOR
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to and I HEREBY CERTIFY that I
have personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he
voluntarily executed and understood this Counter-Affidavit before me
__ day of September 2015, Quezon City
_________________
Honorable Prosecutor