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06 - RODOLFO T. GANZON vs. COURT OF APPEALS | G.R. No.

93252 August 5, 1991


FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City.
10 complaints were filed against him on various charges, among them, abuse of authority,
oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable
violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention.
The Secretary of Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based
on the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days
of suspension. Ganzon obtained a preliminary injunction vs the Secretary.
Ganzon then appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order by the
Secretary.
SC issued a TRO v the Secretary and the CA.
Petitioner's Arguments (Ganzon):
The 1987 Constitution does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend
and remove local officials; this is because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy
and strengthens the same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power
Denial of due process of the law
Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards Ganzon, which arose from his
alleged refusal to join the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino party and the running political
rivalry they maintained in the last congressional and local elections; and his alleged refusal
to operate a lottery in Iloilo City.
Ganzon also requested the Secretary to lift his suspension since it had come ninety days
prior to an election (the barangay elections of November 14, 1988), to no avail.
Ganzon requested postponement on "valid and justifiable" grounds which was unduly
denied:
He was suffering from a heart ailment which required confinement
A "vital"witness was also hospitalized, another lacked transportation
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and
or remove local officials. (Yes.)
Held:
TRO Lifted.
Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere
supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her
control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression
because legally, supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of supervision by the
President over local government officials in contrast to the power of control given to him
over executive officials of our government wherein it was emphasized that the two terms,
control and supervision, are two different things which differ one from the other in meaning
and extent. In administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority
of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this pronouncement it
cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over local
government officials does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.

The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in suspending
Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day
suspension.
The SC is ill at ease with suspensions; injustice inflicted to the accused if acquitted
since right to office will have been nullified and to the people who are deprived of
the services of the man they elected.
The sole objective of a suspension:to prevent the accused from hampering the
normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible
witnesses or to keep him off the records and other evidence.
A preventive suspension may be justified. BUT, its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process question
Suspension is temporary and Local Government Code provides:it may be imposed
for no more than sixty days. A longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable,
nothing less than tyranny.
Ganzon's guilt has not been proven; the length of his suspension would have, by the
time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenure considerably-this cannot be allowed.
Court laid down the following rules:
1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of
administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide;
2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;
3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was
meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter
from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise
of autonomy;
4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by
law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not
signify "control" (which the President does not have);
6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may
no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:
a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his
fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be
counted in computing the time of suspension.
b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive
suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and
abuses for which proper charges are filed against him by the
aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be
a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted
under subpar. (2), Section 63 LGC

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