Presumptions, Probabilities, &

Evidence
MANNY RIGUERASUNDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 2015

In David v. Poe, the SET found that Grace Poe was a natural-born Filipino from
the following facts:
1. She has the physical features of an ordinary Filipino.
2. She was found abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Jaro, Iloilo, the
population of which is predominantly Filipinos.
Thus according to the SET in accordance with Section 3(y), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court which provides that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life, the foregoing facts give rise to a
disputable presumption that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos.
The evidential issue if this case is brought to the Supreme Court is whether these
facts indeed give rise to a disputable presumption that Grace Poes parents are
Filipinos or whether these facts merely show that it is much more probable that
Grace Poes parents are Filipinos rather than foreigners.
In the first situation where the facts give rise to a disputable presumption that
Grace Poes parents are Filipinos, the Petitioners evidence that Grace Poe is a
foundling is simply not enough to overthrow the disputable presumption, since
clear and convincing evidence is needed to override a disputable presumption.
Evidence that Respondents parents are unknown is not clear and convincing
evidence that her parents are not Filipinos.
On the other hand, if the facts merely show that it is much more probable that
Grace Poes parents are Filipinos rather than foreigners, it would appear that the
facts are not sufficient to prove that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. That an
alleged fact is quantitatively probable is not probative evidence of its actual truth.

(Day v. Boston & Marine R.R., 96 Me. 207, 217-218, 52 A. 771, 774 (1902) see also
Toledo St.L., & W.R. Co. v. How, 191 F. 776, 782-783 (6th. Cir. 1911). To render a
finding based on quantitative probabilities would amount to a bet on the odds. In
Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co. 406 F.2d 1315, 1318, the plaintiff employee of
Sears was injured when a tire which he was installing exploded. The court held
that proof that 80% of the tires marketed by Sears were made by defendant
Armstrong Rubber Co. is not proof that the tire which injured the plaintiff was
manufactured by defendant.
The resolution of the evidentiary effect of the foregoing facts could be material in
the ultimate decision in this case.