A ceasefire, an election, a new government:

Progress towards peace in Myanmar

Emma Leslie

7 JANUARY 2016
Whatever progress is made on the Myanmar
peace process or political reform in 2016 and beyond, it will be on the foundations built by various stakeholders over the past four years.
While the trust emerging between the Chairperson of the Myanmar Peace Centre, Minister U
Aung Min, and his team and ethnic armed groups
has been significant, what is becoming more apparent is the internal cohesion and increased
capacity of ethnic armed groups to organise, negotiate, articulate their interests and needs, and
network internally, politically, and amongst themselves.
Despite the fact the solidarity of these ethnic
armed groups has been severely tested over the
last year, they have to date maintained a reasonable working relationship that ensures they can
still function as a cohesive negotiating body during the next stages of the peace process. This is
due to both the strategic and visionary leadership
among the groups, which is supported by local
constituencies longing for peace, as well as significant financial and capacity investment in ethnic armed group leadership structures, including
training, technical assistance and international
exposure visits.
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The Current Situation in Myanmar

The National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA),
signed on October 15, 2015, was a significant
milestone in the Myanmar peace process. Notably, the Joint Monitoring Committee, comprising
civilians, members of the Tatmadaw Myanmar
armed forces, and Non-State Armed Group
(NSAG) representatives, met immediately after
the signing, and have met several times since.
Strengthening key components of this ceasefire mechanism is important. Likewise, further
solidification of cross-table relationships and
reinforcing each partys ability to implement the
ceasefire will be crucial to the agreements future
success. Indeed, effective implementation of the
NCA will prove to the constituencies of ethnic
group leaders who signed the agreement that the
right decision was made and that the Myanmar
Government and Tatmadaw are sincere.
Equally, genuine implementation and the associated peace dividends are important factors that
will be carefully observed by those yet to sign.
Smaller groups like the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and New Mon State Party
(NMSP) are still battling internal divisions, skepticism, limited capacity and misinformation, and

require ongoing accompaniment and support. On

the other hand, larger non-signatory groups like
the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)
need to maintain close relationships with similar
sized NSAG structures that did sign on, such as
the Karen National Union (KNU).

strategic stakeholder in the peace process for

many years to come.

Looking ahead
National Ceasefire Agreement Signing Ceremony, October 15, 2015
Naypyidaw, Myanmar

It is yet to be seen how the National League

for Democracy (NLD), under the leadership of
Aung San Suu Kyi, will manifest their values and
policies in the national peace process. Early postelection meetings between ethnic armed group
leaders, Daw Suu and senior NLD officials, as
well as between Daw Suu and representatives of
the Myanmar Peace Centre (MPC) bode well for
a continuation of the process. Furthermore, recent public statements by Daw Suu committing
the incoming government to working towards a
comprehensive national peace indicate the NLDs
positive intent to build on the progress made in
the last four years. The adoption of the Framework for the National Political Dialogue indicates
that the process will continue at least into the
coming months.

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2016 and beyond will see more communitybased conf licts emerging around land, infrastructure developments, business developments,
resources and labour. Again, State parliaments,
civ i l ia n a nd non- St ate actors w i l l need to
strengthen their capacities to implement the outcomes of the peace process.
In our work with State-level civil servants,
community-based peace organisations and ethnic armed groups, we regularly hear there is still
confusion about the peace process and its implications for different areas and groups. Thus, this
capacity building is as much about providing accurate information about the process as it is about
continuing to make available case study examples
and lessons from other actors involved in peace
processes in the region.

NSAGs like the Karen National Unity have

been building bridges with the NLD for some
time, and key figures within the MPC, such as
Hla Maung Shwe, are close to the NLD inner circle. To date there is no serious threat to the ongoing ethnic peace process and its developments.
However, it is yet to be seen how the NLD leadership might tackle other complex sensitive issues
that could affect national reconciliation, such as
the Rohingya issue and the ongoing activities
of the more extreme, xenophobic anti-Muslim
movements.

More efforts should be made to promote understanding and normalisation of the concept
of ceasefires and peace processes. In particular,
support needs to focus on how to transition from
an armed group to a peace actor, building trust
within organisations as well as with the other,
and what it means to be given the space to govern. Groups from Myanmar have benefitted
from hearing the Communist Party-Maoist in
Nepal reflect on their challenges in passing a new
constitution and from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao as they prepare to govern
an autonomous region in the Philippines.

Aside from the NLDs inf luence, the Tatmadaw will remain a significant and influential

Support for Myanmars peace infrastructure

of NSAG Liaison Offices (LO), civil society or-

ganisations and civil servants across the country

should focus on ensuring they are updated on
the peace process, exchange experiences, and
build confidence and capacity in resolving local
confl icts and managing the complex relationships
they handle at the community level.
NSAGs experiencing difficulties with internal
unity require ongoing support in strengthening relationships, sharing analysis and information, and
developing joint strategies with splinter groups.
Despite critics of the long road towards a national ceasefire, progress in the Myanmar peace
process has often come swiftly and unexpectedly,
with shifting and changing dynamics seemingly
the norm. Emerging key players and organisations involved in the process have demonstrated
an adaptability and flexibility that enables them to
quickly respond to opportunities and openings.
Our experience with armed groups, as well as
with the government, has routinely demonstrated
the need to be able to respond quickly when
such stakeholders are ready to engage in confl ict
transformation activities. Similar opportunities
will continue to emerge in the future to positively
engage with key confl ict actors in Myanmar and
this flexibility and adaptability of response will
remain essential in effectively supporting the
countrys peace process.
Emma Leslie,
7 January 2016
Director, the Centre for Peace and Confl ict Studies (CPCS)
CPCS is a Cambodia-based NGO working in the
field of peacebuilding and confl ict transformation
in Asia.
Emma Leslie has worked on confl ict transformation and peacebuilding throughout Asia since
1993. While living in Cambodia, Emma founded
numerous peacebuilding organisations and actively supports peace processes across the region,
particularly in Myanmar and the Philippines.
Find out more about the CPCS

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