Lt. E. Toffant Fron; Troopers D. Fraher ER. Ba gubject: Maria Ridulph case pocrusting Stations in Northern Tainess Survey oe Mosedbie suspect who would have ite, 6 sudden enlistments Aree tne period of Decenber 3rd through 7% 1967.This survey 315° guring ‘he eons rejected during thie sano periods Reference: Survey of Armed Forces kb the start of this assignment wo contacted {he varius branches of the i td Forces Recruiting Stations in Rockford and vere advised to contact tha hemed Forces ReckivdtgsOenter which is Jocated at 617 W. Van Buren, Chicago, ILldnois, because this station received draftees and recruits Guon ULL the various services covering a Lares Stet dn the middle-wost, songs the Sth Army area and the 9th Naval: District. je went te 617 W. Van Buren, Chicago, and tried be contact Hajor Davis vino Ye yertuerge of the Receiving contor. Worever, he was 0) ‘vacation and we is an cpereea to Yoster Sev. Verterts who advised ue tor ue particular Problem without a specific porson 4n mind that ‘ib vould be easier tor cturn Eo the local recruiting station level. tore time opent on this eurvey then anticipated. These various recruiting etetions have sub-stations and travel to various appointed locations in states tome to recruit. vfe were told by the various ‘branches that the Ghligtwents durang the month of Decenber wore always Light because most er ghe men wait until after Christmas to enlist. KY sone. of the various oF te ren Geations the enlistnents wore Light for the entre Jno for TScaple: the nigin station recruited to men for tthe month of December Sha a total of 56 men for the year of 1957. Jan the personnel at the recruiting stations were cages, 60 cooperate and thle giving us the nanos of the men that) enlisted in their particular Teahingsy whenever possible they would give their om persona! opinion of the andividual and other pertinent information avatlabies One of the seeeuiters phoned leaving a messege for us containing nanos he found while Zourring through records after our departure. the hurora U.S-2.C- vos not open until Yarch 1958 and the P-S-i- reported the AeeCtaents for this area betwoon Nov. 29 and Dec. 30, 1957. Following are the names, dates of enlistments, of nen within approximately word uile area of Sycamore during the crucial dates decided upon. Decenber 3, 1957 Earl J. Lecompte - 1068 Douglas - furora John §. Cherry - 227 Center Cross — Sycamore (le were advised by tho recruiter that the FBI had checked ‘on this subject. we contacted Asst. States Atty. Boyle and he stated that the FBI did considerable work on this ints background, etc. .He was apparently alibied through a phone call he made fromthe Rockford recruit! tat: ther to..come.to-Rockford and. ee i oeisnot, strictly speaking, a post-conviction matter. The petitioner sought to enforce an agreement with the State to provide evidence against another murder defendant inexchange for consideration on a collateral challenge to the petitioner's conviction ‘This arrangements analogous to a “cooperation agreement,” which is construed under contract principles. Cooperation agreements are strictly construed against the government to ensure that they comport with the highest degree of fairness People v. Stapinski, 201511118278 at ¥ 45-7 (court enforces agreement by police with defendant not to charge him with a drug offense in exchange for his cooperation in gathering evidence against others). The standard of review of the validity of a cooperation agreement is de novo. The proper remedy for violation of such an agreement, however, isreviewed for an abuse of discretion. Stapinski, at 133-34. Analysis Preliminarily, a few matters ought to be put to rest. The State argued in the trial court that whether it had waived its right to object to the timeliness of petitioner's pleading in exchange for the petitioner's testimony had no “place in a post-conviction.” (R 764) Indeed, the State suggested that it was unaware of a “forum” or “venue” to have the petitioner's claim addressed. (R 764) This is assuredly erroneous. “Due process is a fundamental premise of our system of justice, designed to protect an individual's personal and property rights from arbitrary and capricious governmental action.” Stapinski at (50. Itisacourts job toprotectdue process. The petitioner must have somewhere to goto vindicate his rights under a cooperation agreement, Judge Stuckert, who presided over the post-conviction proceeding, suggested that whether a cooperation agreement existed should be addressed by the judge who heard McCullough’s trial. (R711)The trial judge in that case would urge (correctly), that the petitioner's post- conviction, and the issue of the cooperation agreement connected therewith, was not before him and rightly belonged before Judge Stuckert.’ Secondly, Judge Stuckert questioned whether the consideration contemplated by the agreement - waiver of the statute of limitations - was “something that the Court would have been obligated to follow.” Judge Stuckert noted that the case was “much different than a plea agreement.” (R766) But fSepiatiinakes clear that cooperation agreements are enforceable, as long as there is detrimental reliance onpromises by the State. Stapinshi, at {/46. Therefore, that the alleged agreement arose outside of traditional plea bargaining is without any legal consequence. Tt also does not make a difference that a cooperation agreement was entered into by law enforcement officers and not the State’s Attorney's Office. Promises in plea bargaining and analogous contexts must be kept by whoever made them on behalf of the prosecution. Stapinski, at 147-48. Moreover, an agreement by the State to waive the statute of limitations would be binding on the court. In People v. Boclair, 202 11.24 89 (2002), one of the defendants in that consolidated appeal filed a post conviction petition. The trial court found that the defendant was culpably negligent and dismissed summarily asuntimely. The appellate court reversed, holding that a post-conviction petition cannot be dismissed as untimely at the first stage. Boclair, at 95-96. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, agreeing that the trial court haderredin dismissing the post-conviction petition on timeliness grounds. pesoreomneen 1 Mc Cullough was tried before James C. Hallock. People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (24) 123364. 10According to Boclair, time is not an inherent element of the right to bring a post- conviction petition. For that reason, the time limitations in the Post-Conviction Hearing Act should be viewed as an affirmative defense which has to be raised by the State or be considered waived or forfeited. Importantly, noted the Court, “if an untimely petition demonstrates that a defendant suffered a deprivation of constitutional magnitude, a dutiful prosecutor may waive that procedural defect during the second stage of the post conviction proceedings.” Boclair, at 101-02. Here, Boclair shows that Judge Stuckert wrongly: found that she could dismiss the post-conviction petition as untimely ifthe State did not so move. A trialcourt has an obligation to consider its own jurisdiction. Brandon.v. Bonell, 368 1l1-App.34 492, 507 (2d Dist. 2006). In stark contrast, a statute of limitations is subject to waiver. People v. Gwinn, 255 TIL App.8d 628, 631 (2d Dist. 1994). Had the State here kept its promise and not filed a motion to dismiss, Judge Stuckert could not have dismissed the petition on timeliness grounds. To do so would be to view the time element as jurisdictional. As Boclair makes clear, the time limit under the Post Conviction Hearingis not. jurisdictional. In fact, ifJudge Stuckert’s view were correct, Boclair’s promise that a dutiful prosecutor can clear the way for a post-conviction petition if he senses a deprivation of constitutional magnitude would be mere empty rhetoric. ‘The petitioner admits thathe denied receiving any promises for his testimony at McCullough’s trial. McCullough, at 61. However, both he and the State had an interest in concealing the cooperation agreement. People v. Vasquez, 313 IIL App.3¢ 82, 96-99 (2000) (Gtate’s failure to disclose cash payments to State witness for his testimony requires a new trial). Despite the petitioner's denial of any 11Promises, the record Points to sources of evidence that could 8 e of a cooperation agreemons e hat could show the existence imene ects . prosecutor stated that one of the prosecutors coe , Mr. Escarcida, had denied entering any bargain with - However, Harris admitted that he had not spoken with the other Prosecutor (Trevarthen), and he did not mention Officer Hanley. (R 764) Post Conviction counsel alleged that the promise was extended by Trevarthen and Officer Hanley. (R765) Counselalso alleged that prior post-conviction counsel (Gruber), was part of those discussions and would corroborate the petitioner’s assertion that the State agreed to disregard the lateness of the petition. (R 760) Judge Stuckert apparently was inclined to disbelieve the defendant's claim because the existence ofa cooperation agreement was mentioned only in the motion to reconsider the dismissal order. (R778) But this is not correct. The State filed its motion to dismiss on June 10, 2018 (C 826-30), which the court granted on June 26, 2014. (C 905-13) However, during a pre-dismissal hearing on March 5, 2014, Judge Stuckert asked Transier, “You're indicating there had been some agreement reached between the State’s Attorney’s Office, police officers et cetera, that’s [sic] something would happen on the post-conviction reliefshould he testify in the other case?” (R 709) (emphasis added) Transier responded, “That's the issue I’m having right now Judge.” (R709) Thus, the petitioner revealed the cooperation agreement prior to the dismissal of the petition. Finally, one of the petitioner's allegations is a matter of constitutional magnitude and may be worthy of treatment on the merits in spite of the lapse oftime. The petitioner alleged that one of his trial lawyers, Robert Carlson, was also representing Nathan Jefferson in case No. 86 CF 281 when Jefferson testified 12