Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
RELATIONS:
2013 CASE UPDATES
1
Acknowledgements
The cases cited in this presentation were
prepared by Blocks 1B and 1C (SY 2013-2014)
OUTLINE
OUTLINE
OUTLINE
Guardianship
Interlocutory Orders on Support pendente lite
Succession
Republic Act No. 7610
Republic Act No. 9262
ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
[ART. 4 FC]
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, Jan. 30, 2013)
Facts:
The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony between Pakistani SyedAzhar Abbas
and Filipina Gloria Goo on January 9, 1993. The marriage contract stated that the couple was
issued a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993. The copy of marriage license
was apparently presented to the solemnizing officer during the marriage ceremony.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar to secure a copy of the
marriage license in relation to a bigamy case filed by Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification declaring that the office has not issued a marriage license to Syed
and Gloria. It further verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed and Glorias marriage
contract was issued to a different couple.
Syed filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria. He argued that
there was no actual marriage license issued to them prior to the supposed marriage in January
1993. Gloria maintained, on the other hand, that a valid marriage license existed. She presented
their marriage contract, photographs and testimonies of people present during the marriage
ceremony to negate the certification from the municipal civil registrar. She countered that a
certain Qualin secured the marriage license for her and Syed. But she was not able to present a
copy of the actual marriage license.
RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that there was a valid marriage license because the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value
Issue: WON a valid marriage license was issued to Syed and Gloria
Held:
No. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, proof does exist of a diligent
search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed, does not operate to
cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." This
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void
ab initio.
ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
[ART. 4 FC]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario (A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)
Facts:
Due to an administrative case filed on July 6, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) formed a judicial audit team that investigated on irregularities in the solemnization of
marriages in several MTCs and RTCs in Cebu. The head of the audit team created went
undercover with another lawyer to see if the allegations were true that there were fixers or
facilitators offering package fees to parties who would like to apply for marriage. After their
interviews and investigation, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the following judges and
court employees generally for gross neglect of duty due to the following circumstances:
Judge Necessario - solemnized marriages with questionable documents even where one of the
contracting parties (foreigner) submitted an affidavit instead of a certificate of legal capacity from
his embassy; and under Art. 34 (one of the contracting parties was a minor during cohabitation)
Judge Acosta failed to make sure that solemnization fee has been paid and also solemnized a
marriage under Art. 34
Judge Rosales failed to make sure the solemnization fee has been paid and solemnized marriage
between foreigner who only submitted an affidavit; also solemnized a marriage without the
marriage license
Judge Tormis solemnized marriages with questionable documents; failed to make sure
solemnization fee has been paid; solemnized marriage between foreigner who only submitted an
affidavit; solemnized marriage with expired marriage license.
Helen Monggaya violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
prohibition from soliciting any gifts and for giving false information for the purpose of perpetrating
an irregular marriage
Rhona Rodriguez violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 by participating in the collection of an agreed upon
additional fee to process the documents, and in one case, received 4,000 pesos to facilitate an
irregular marriage
Desiderio Aranas and Rebecca Alesna provided couples who are to be married under Art. 34 with the
required affidavit of cohabitation even if one or both of them were minors during cohabitation
Celeste Retuya, Emma Valencia, Rebecca Alesna violated Sec. 2 (b), Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct of
Court Personnel because they received tips in assisting parties engaged in the transactions with the
Judiciary. Also, they effectively screened all documents before submitting them to the judges.
However, OCA recommended the dismissal of complaints against Judge Econg, Corazon Retuya and
Marilou Cabaez for lack of merit.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person
Issue: WON the Judges and personnel of Cebu MTCC and RTC are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross
neglect of duty, or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct
Held:
duty.
YES. Judges Necessario, Acosta, Romis and Rosales are guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of
Neglect of duty, as defined in Rodrigo-Ebron vs. Adolfo, is the failure to give ones attention to a
task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the
offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare.
This is reflected in the evidence submitted: Documents showed evidences of tampering, absence of
receipts to show that solemnization fees were paid, documents submitted by the parties showed
irregularities, testimonies were made regarding solemnization of marriages without licenses, among others.
It was held that the actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the
validity of the marriages they solemnized as, for instance, absence of a marriage license would
render a marriage void pursuant to Art. 4 of the Family Code.
SC dismissed the argument of the respondents that it was beyond the scope of duty of the
solemnizing officer to check the validity of the marriage pursuant to People vs. Jansen.
Court finds respondents guilty, orders the dismissal of the judges and employees from service.
The SC through Navarro vs. Domagtoy, established that: The judiciary should be composed
of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more
than the ordinary layman. Employees are also held liable as established in Villaceran vs. Rosete, which
said Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice these court
personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurable affect the
honor and dignity of the Judiciary.
10
12
Held:
YES. Petitioner is still guilty of bigamy despite declaration of second marriage as void. The
crime of bigamy exists so long as a second marriage was contracted during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. This is true even if the second marriage was
declared to be a nullity.
According to the RPC, the elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity
In the present case, all the elements are present. At the outset, it is therefore clear that the
Petitioner is liable for bigamy. Additionally, the second marriage was contracted during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the
second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.Even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated, there is still a crime of bigamy.
Jarillo v. People held that:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt
in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.
13
14
Held:
No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into the purported
marriage, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was still valid
and subsisting. Benjamins marriage to Azucena was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage
contract.
15
16
Issue: WON the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal
of the on for bigamy filed against her.
Held: No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not justify the dismissal of
the bigamy case.
In Jarillov. People, the Court ruled that when an accused contracted a
subsequent marriage without the prior marriage having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. This is
so because the first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by
a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. As long as there is no judicial declaration of
nullity, the marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore, he/she who
contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage can be prosecuted for bigamy. Yes, what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no declaration, the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
17
prosecuted for bigamy.
18
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
[ART. 36 FC]
Mendoza v. Republic (G.R. No. 157649, Nov. 12, 2012)
Facts:
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza met in 1989, as next-door neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while both were still in
college. Arabelle became pregnant with their daughter, Allysa Bianca. On her eighth month of pregnancy, they got married in civil
rites in Pasay. Dominic had to borrow funds from Arabelles best friend to settle the hospital bill for their babys delivery. Thereafter,
he remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished college.
Arabelle took on various jobs to meet the familys needs. Being the one with fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses. On
the other hand, Dominic sold encyclopedias after his graduation, then worked as a car salesman for Toyota. Ironically, he spent his
first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their childs
schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon.
Arabelle discovered Dominics illicit relationship with his co-employee. This then affected their communication and sexual relationship.
Dominic gave Arabelle a car as a birthday present, and told Arabelle to issue him 2 blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars
insurance. She later not only found out that he used the check for his personal needs, but also that he did not pay for the car
itself, forcing her to both rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car and for her to bear the balance. Dominic was later
fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer, and charged and arrested for violation of BP 22
and estafa.
Dominic subsequently abandoned the conjugal abode. A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him
to threaten to commit suicide. Arabelle then filed in the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic
based on psychological incapacity, which the OSG opposed.
Arabelle presented herself as a witness together with a psychiatrist Dr. Samson and Professor Jimenez. Meanwhile, Dominic did not
appear during trial and presented no evidence. RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity,
antecedence and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina), were attendant, establishing Dominics
psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Samson, which were concluded only on the basis of information given by Arabelle herself. It held that the Arabelle's testimonies failed
to establish Dominics psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted, citing
Republic v. Dagdag, Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, and Pesca v. Pesca. Additionally, the husband's immaturity, sexual infidelity, and
being a suspect for estafa and violation of BP 22 do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
19
Issue: WON CA erred in its refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and evaluation and their reliance on the Dagdag, Hernandez, and
Pesca cases
Held:
20
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
[ART. 36 FC]
Republic v. C.A. and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594,
Nov. 12, 2012)
Facts:
Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, they were not blessed
with a child because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage. Eduardo
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a
ground. He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she
engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual
needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their
adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker; and
that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.
As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of
a neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina
exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was no longer treatable. Catalina
did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting
with different men and abandoning the conjugal home.
Issue: WON Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.
21
Held:
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
[ART. 36 FC]
Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)
Facts:
In 1979, Cesar Encelan married Lolita, and they bore two
children. In 1984, Cesar left for Saudi for work and 2 years later,
he found out that Lolita was having an illicit affair with Alvin. In
1991, Lolita left the conjugal home with the children and lived
with Alvin. In 1995, Cesar filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.
Lolita denies all allegations of infidelity and psychological
incapacity.
Lolitas psychological evaluation report stated that she:
Was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness
Had not been able to provide the expectations expected of her for a
good land lasting marital relationship, as she refused to go abroad
with Cesar
Was transferring from one job to the other, which depicts some
interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions
23
24
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of
Robert Narcedo.
Held:
Art. 41(2) states: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. The OSG availed
the wrong remedy when it filed its notice of appeal. The wrong filing
did not toll the running of the period for filing the Petition for
Certiorari, which has lapsed. As a result, petitioner's contention that
respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.
26
COLLUSION IN ANNULMENT OR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CASES
[ART. 48 FC]
Chan v. Chan (G.R. No. 179786, Jul. 24, 2013)
Facts:
Petitioner Wife filed against Respondent Husband a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her, claiming that Respondent
Husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed
him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited
drugs.
Respondent Husband claims that it was the Wife who failed in her duties.
And that he initially agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon
arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave
him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof that
he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same
form carried a physicians handwritten note that the Husband suffered from
methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physicians handwritten statement, Petitioner Wife requested
for the issuance of a subpoena ducestecumaddressed to Medical City, for the
production of the Husbands medical records. The Husband opposed, arguing that the
medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.
The request of Petitioner Wife was denied and her subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration on the matter was also denied. She then filed a Petitioner for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but this was also dismissed. Her subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration with the CA was also denied.
27
Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena ducestecumcovering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication
Held:
Issuance of a subpoena ducestecum is premature. Petitioner Wife made the
request before trial started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a
request for the issuance of a subpoena ducestecumcovering her husbands hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that the
husband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to
their disclosure.
Petitioner Wifes motion for the issuance of the subpoena ducestecum also
cannot be treated as a motion for production of documents as a mode of discovery
because Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is only limited to disclosure of
documents which are NOT PRIVILEGED.
Petitioner Wife claims that the documents are not privileged because it is the
TESTIMONY of the physician that is supposed to be privileged. This contention is
wrong. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined regarding their (physician-patient)
professional conversation. To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records (including the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment given) would, in effect,
be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patients consent. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
without the latters prior consent.
Lastly, Petitioner Wife argues that her Husband already admitted in his
answer that he had been confined in a hospital. However, as already mentioned
above, trial in the case had not yet begun. Since trial had not yet begun, it cannot be
said the Husband had already presented said Philhealth claim form as evidence. The
Husband was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.
Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.
28
29
30
Issue: WON the sale is null and void on the ground of absence of consideration?
Held:
31
Issue:WON Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the purchase of
the real properties subject to the dissolution proceedings?
Held:
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the
above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of
such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the
latters name.
The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated,
he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.
This case provides the exception to Art. 117, which provides that, the following
are conjugal partnership properties:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses; XXX
33
Issue:WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
Held: Yes, the conjugal properties may be levied and executed in light of the disputed fact that
MeleciaPana has no exclusive properties.
Further, however, the Supreme Court ordered that before the conjugal properties may be
levied and executed the RTC Surigao shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution
on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and MeleciaPana for the satisfaction of the
indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in the criminal cases, the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Article 122 of the FC: However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as
well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against
the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if
it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall
be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of
her own, the above applies. Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of
the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been
covered.
No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article
122 states that at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall35be
charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
Held: YES. The SC believes that believe that it was appellant instead who concocted
his defense. Not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her
own father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him
is true.
As has been repeatedly ruled, [n]o young girl x x x would concoct a sordid
tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical
examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial,
if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
Thus, taking into consideration that the parties are close blood relatives, AAAs
testimony pointing to her father as the person who raped her must stand.
The trial court was thus correct in imposing the penalty of death on
appellant. However, since the death penalty for heinous crimes has been abolished
by Republic Act No. 934619 the appellate court correctly modified the trial courts
imposition of the death penalty by reducing it to reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility
for parole.
To justify the imposition of death penalty, however, it is required that the special
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
appellant be properly alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. All
these requirements were duly established in these cases. With respect to her
relationship to appellant, it was likewise specifically alleged in the Informations that
appellant is AAAs father. During trial, appellant categorically admitted that
37
AAA is his daughter
39
40
42
43
Issue: WON the sale by a legitimate heir of his share in the estate
qualifies as a supervening event that will justify setting aside
the order of demolition or execution of the partition.
Held: NO.
A supervening event in order to qualify as exception to
the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable
judgment rule must directly affect matters litigated upon and
substantially alter the rights and relationships of the parties to
render the execution unjust. In this case, even on the
assumption that the sale of Jimmy Flores share is true, the
same does not alter or modify the judgment on the property at
issue. In addition, the appellate court found the whole sale
transaction suspicious and not supported by evidence. The
execution has dragged on for 17 years now since order
of implementation was given, it is high for the Court to
put a stop to further delays to finally enable the heirs
and successors-in-interest of Francisco to exercise their 45
rights as legitimate heirs and as winning parties to a
final judgment.
Facts: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for support pendent lite amounting to P500,000.
Respondent on the other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give as much
as 75,000 as support.
RTC ruled that the amount of 250,000 support per month is sufficient, notwithstanding the
separate medical support for susan when the need arises. However this amount was eventually
reduced by the CA, citing the fact that there was no evidence adduced to show the alleged
millions of income of respondent, and that based on the evidence presented the proper amount
to paid should be 115,000. This was not assailed by any party does it became final and
executory.
Issues once again arised, when respondent in complying with its obligation paid only the
amount of P162,651.90 to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision,
he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered
by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005),
totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum
of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings). On the other hand petitioner
contends that respondent shouldnt be allowed the deductions he made arguing that under
Article 194, support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family, that in this case the cars and credit card charges are not part of support.
Once again RTC, ruled in favor of petitioner granting a writ of execution, however upon appeal
such was decision was reversed and the CA allowed the deductions made by respondent. Hence
the case at bar.
46
Facts: Gotardo and Buling were lovers. During their relationship, they had several
intimate sexual encounters resulting to her pregnancy. When told of the
pregnancy, he made plans to marry her but subsequently backed out. Eventually,
she gave birth to a son. When he did not show up and failed to provide support for
the child, she sent a demand letter demanding recognition and support for the
child. This was ignored. Hence, she filed for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite. He denies the imputed paternity. However during trial, it was
established that she only had one boyfriend to whom she had sexual relations. The
allegation that she had previous relationships with other men remain
unsubstantiated.
Issue: WON the court may order Gotardo to recognize and provide legal support to
his minor son.
Held: Yes. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter
of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable
and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the 48
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support.
DESIGNATION OF PARENTAL
AUTHORITY (ART. 213 FC)
Beckett v. Sarmiento A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30,
2013
Facts:
Geoffrey, an Australian citizen, was previously married to Elseta, a Filipino
citizen. Said marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr. The couple were subsequently
divorced and by virtue of a compromise agreement, custody over Geoffrey, Jr. was
granted to Geoffrey who took his son with him to Australia, subject to yearly
Christmas visits here. In one of the Christmas visits, Geoffrey consented to have
Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return the child on January
9, 2011. However, on the said date, Eltesa did not return Geoffrey Jr., hence, this prompted
Geoffrey to file a petition for violation of RA 7610 and prayer for the issuance of a writ of
Habeas Corpus.
Geoffrey relates that, during the conference on the application for habeas corpus,
Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct,
shouting and crying, not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a
total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, directing
Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. to
Geoffrey did not materialize.
Hence Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of the Order. But instead of
enforcing said order, Judge Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody
49
over Geoffrey, Jr. Geoffreys main contention is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant
provisional custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on compromise agreement.
GUARDIANSHIP
Abad v. Biason (G.R.No. 191993, Dec. 5, 2012)
Facts: Abad filed for guardianship over the person and properties of
Maura, his aunt. Biason opposed the appointment of Abad prayed to
be appointed guardian instead since he was previously granted
power of attorney to manage Mauras properties. RTC appointed
Biason as guardian. Abad filed a motion and pointed out that Maura
chose him to be her guardian. The RTC denied the motion. Mauras
choice was not given decisive weight because her advanced age. Abad
appealed to the CA. Eduardo then appealed to the SC. During
pendency of the case Biason passed away. Petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss the petition and terminate the guardianship of Biason.
Issue: WON Guardianship is terminated upon death.
Held: YES. The case has become moot and academic as there is no
longer a justiciable controversy. It is a well established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by
death. There is no longer any juridical tie between Maura Abad and 51
Leonardo Biason, rendering it pointless to delve into the propriety of
Biasons appointment.
SUCCESSION
Neri v. Uy (G.R. No. 194366, Oct. 10, 2012)
Facts:
Anunciacion had 7 children, 2 from her first marriage with
Gonzalo and 5 from her second marriage with Enrique. Anunciacion and
Enrique acquired several homestead properties. Anunciacion died
intestate. Enrique, in his capacity and guardian of their minor children,
executed an extra-judicial settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale
adjudicating to themselves the properties. Thereafter, it was sold to the
spouses Hadji and Julpha Uy for P80,000. The children of Enrique filed
an annulment of sale on the ground that it was sold within the
prohibited period. RTC ordered the annulment of said deed. RTC said
that even though the sale was beyond the 5-year prohibitory period,
Anunciacions children from her first marriage were deprived of their
hereditary rights and Enrique had no authority to sell the shares of
their minor children. CA reversed the RTCs ruling and declared the
extrajudicial settlement and subsequent sale as valid and binding. The
minors were deemed to have ratified the sale when they did not
question the same sale upon reaching the age of majority.
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Issues:
WON CA erred in upholding the validity of extra-judicial settlement of
the estate with absolute deed of sale as far as the shares of the 2
children from the first marriage of Anunciacion were concerned.
WON CA erred in not nullifying or annulling the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale with respect to the
shares of the minor children, depriving them of their inheritance.
Held: In the execution of the extra-judicial settlement of the estate with
absolute sale, all the heirs of the Anunciacion should have participated.
Since the children from the first marriage were admittedly excluded, the
settlement is invalid and not binding upon them and consequently, a
total nullity. Although the settlement of the estate was invalid, the sale
of the subject properties made by Enrique and his children (excluding
the minor ones), in favor of the respondents are valid but only up to the
extent of their respective proportionate shares. As guardians of the
minor children, Enrique had no power of alienation with respect to their
shares to the estate of their mother, Anunciacion. He only had powers of
administration. Administration includes all acts of preservation of the
property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the
thing.
54
SUCCESSION
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, Oct. 10,
2012)
Facts:
Upon the death of Cristina Suntay, two of her grandchildren
(Isabel, a legitimate grandchild, and Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild) both sought for the issuance of Letters of Administration in
their favor with respect to the settlement of the estate of Cristina. The
trial court granted the same in favor of Emilio III. The appellate court
reversed the trial court and appointed Isabel as the administratrix of
the estate. On appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, Isabel and
Emilio III were both appointed to the position, the two of them being coadministrators. Isabel filed a Motion for reconsideration of this decision.
Issue: WON the Letters of Administration should be issued to both55of
them, or to only one of them.
Held:
Isabel should be appointed as the sole administratrix of
the estate. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in the estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. Thus, Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court provides for an order of preference to be
followed with respect to whom letters of administration shall be
granted. This notwithstanding, the court in certain
circumstances has upheld the appointment of co-administrators.
In the case at bar, the appointment of both Isabel and
Emilio III as co-administrators will not redound to the benefit of
the estate, for the two have a deep aversion for each other.
Although the two of them have an interest in the estate, being
grandchildren of Cristina, the mere demonstration of such an
interest does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to coadministration thereof. The seeming impossibility of Isabel and
Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may
result in prejudice to the decedents estate, ultimately delaying
the settlement thereof. Moreover, it was shown that Emilio III
was remiss in his duties as administrator. He failed to faithfully
discharge the duties of settling the decedents estate with the
end in view of distribution to the heirs.
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SUCCESSION
De Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334, Feb. 13, 2013)
Facts: Leandro Figuracion died intestate, leaving behind two parcels of land.
Petitioner sought an extrajudicial settlement of Leandros estate before prior
settlement had been made.
Issue: WON there should be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate
before partition?
Held: YES. Partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an
issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate.
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SUCCESSION
Casilang v. Casilang-Dizon (G.R. No. 180269, Feb. 20, 2013)
Facts: Libonio Casilang died intestate. He has 8 children. The
children made a verbal partition on his estates. Rosario (daughter of
his son Ireneo) sued Jose (son of Liborio) for unlawful detainer on the
lot, where Jose is residing, claiming that her father owns the lot based
on a tax declarations.
Issue: WON the oral partition was valid.
SUCCESSION
Galvez v. CA and Montano (G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013)
Facts:
Sps. Eustacio and Segundina are owners of land in Leyte. When
they separated, Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita
without the knowledge or consent of Segundina. Jovita mortgagd
property to PNB. PNB foreclosed property and sold property to Sps.
Montao. They tried to get actual possession thereof but Segundina
refused to vacate which led Montaos to sue for recovery of ownership
and possession and damages in the MTC. A petition for review was also
filed but the court dismissed on the ground that no copies of pleadings
and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations were attached as annexes in violation of Sec. 2, Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue: W/N failure to attach the pleadings and other material portions of
the record as would support the allegations of the petition is a ground
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for outright dismissal of a petition for review
Held: No.
Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of
attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition:
First, only pleadings and parts of case records which are relevant and
pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the
petition.
Second, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents
thereof can also found in another document already attached to the
petition even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case
record may still be given due course) upon showing that petitioner
later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
60
The Court considers the attachments (i.e. certified true copies of the
MTC and RTC Decisions and Order) already sufficient to enable
the CA to pass upon her assigned errors even without the pleadings
and other portions of the records. To still deny due course despite
the MTC decision having substantially summarized their contents
was to ignore the spirit of the rule to give sufficient information to
the CA.
Since her petition focused only on questions of law (effects of the lack
of her consent, ant of consideration, and the conduct of the
foreclosure sale), it was plain that she was not assailing the
propriety of the findings of fact but only the conclusions reached
after their appreciation of the facts. In dealing with the questions
of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of the
MTC and the RTC.
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SUCCESSION
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian (G.R. No. 201815, April 8, 2013)
Facts:
The Heirs of Fian refused to acknowledge the sale of 2 parcels of land
made by Spouses Fian to Spouses Mesina and are claiming
ownership over the same. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of
title entitled: Heirs of Sps. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina v.
Heirs of Fian, represented by Theresa Fian Yray.
The representative of the Heirs of Fian allege that the complaint has
no cause of action because it violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. She contends that the Heirs of Mesina and the
Heirs of Fian could not be considered as juridical persons or
entities authorized by law to file a civil action. She maintains that
all the heirs should be individually named in the complaint and
since this was not complied with, she prays for the dismissal of the
action.
Issue: WON the failure to implead the other heirs in the complaint
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warrants the dismissal of the action.
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SUCCESSION
Catedrilla v. Lauron (G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013)
Facts:
Petitioner Rey is a co-owner, along with other heirs, of a parcel of
land. He acquired the land via succession from his mother. Rey, as a
co-owner, filed with the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against
herein respondents Lauron alleging that through the tolerance of
Reys co-owners, they constructed a building in a portion of the land
and occupied the same. Demands from the heirs to vacate the
premises were unavailing. One of the defenses raised by the Laurons
is that the complaint should be dismissed because it did not include,
as indispensable parties, Reys co-heirs who are co-owners of the land
in dispute. The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Rey, while the CA,
reasoning that the co-owners (co-heirs) are indispensable parties,
reversed the RTCs Decision and dismissed the complaint for
ejectment.
Issue: WON co-owners (co-heirs) should be included as indispensable
parties in a complaint for ejectment
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Held: No
A co-owner (co-heir) can file an action for ejectment
without impleading his co-owners as long as he does not claim
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. This is because based on
Article 487 of the Civil Code, any co-owner may bring such an
action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.
Here, Rey filed the complaint for the purpose of
recovering possession of the land, which would redound to the
benefit of the co-owners. He did not file the action to claim
possession of the land for himself. He was acting on behalf of his
co-owners, who were also his co-heirs when his mother died.
Hence, there was no need to implead his co-owners as
indispensable parties for the action to prosper.
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SUCCESSION
Garcia v. De Caparas (G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013)
Facts:
Heirs of Makapugay along with heirs of Eugenio filed a complaint
with the PARAD of Bulacan for the nullification of the leasehold
and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Dominga
(wife of one of the deceased heirs of Eugenio named Pedro) They are
praying that the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract between
Pedro and Amanda be nullified and that they be recognized as colessees, be allowed to cultivate the land as agreed upon.
Dominga then claimed that petitioners never assisted in the
farming of the land and that they have violated Sec. 38 of RA 3844
because their cause of action has prescribed. Dominga claims that
she has succeeded Pedros rights as lessee by operation of law and
prays that the complaint be dismissed.
Issue: WON Garcia and Salamat can claim to be co-lessees of the land
upon Pedros death
Held: No. The administrator, has the duty to make inquiries and66
choose within one month from Eugenios death, who would succeed
as agricultural lessee pursuant to Sec. 9 of RA 3844
SUCCESSION
Calingasan v. Rivera (G.R. No. 171555, April 17, 2013)
Facts:
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SUCCESSION
NHA v. Baello (G.R. No. 200858, Aug. 7, 2013)
Facts:
In 1951, Land Registration awarded to Pedro Baello and
Nicanora Baello Rodriguez the registration of land in Caloocan. This
land was subsequently exproprited by the NHA during the Martial
Law Period. After the People Power Revolution, Heirs of Baello
executed an extrajudicial partition of Baello's estate including the
Baello property, to which NHA opposed. But court ruled in favor of
the heirs.
NHA filed a complaint for nullity of the the O.C.T. During
the pendency of the case for nullity, Baello heirs filed an action for
recovery of possession and damages against NHA.
RTC ruled in favor of Baello heirs. It ruled for: (1) the dismissal of
the expropriation and declaration of nullity left NHA with no right
to hold possession of Baellos' property. (2) entitlement of the heirs to
compensation equal to the fair rental value of the property as well
as moral and exemplary damages.
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THANK YOU!
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End of Presentation