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PERSONS & FAMILY

RELATIONS:
2013 CASE UPDATES
1

By: Atty. Melencio S. Sta. Maria

Acknowledgements
The cases cited in this presentation were
prepared by Blocks 1B and 1C (SY 2013-2014)

This PowerPoint Presentation was prepared by


Blocks 4B and 4D (SY 2013-2014)

OUTLINE

Absence of Essential Elements of Marriage [Art. 4


Family Code (FC)]
Void Ab Initio Marriages [Art. 35 FC]
Psychological Incapacity [Art. 36 FC]
Bigamous Marriage; Absence or Disappearance of
Spouse [Art. 41 FC]
Collusion in Annulment or Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage Cases [Art. 48 FC]
Ownership, Administration, Enjoyment and Disposition
of Community Property [Art. 96 FC]
Dissolution of Absolute Community Regime [Art. 99 FC]
3

OUTLINE

Conjugal Partnership Properties [Art. 117 FC]


Charges against the Conjugal Partnership of Gains [Art.
122 FC]
Suit between Family Members [Art. 151 FC]
Constitution of Family Home [Art. 153 FC]
Establishing Filiation of Legitimate Children [Art. 172
FC]
Rights of Legitimate Children [Art. 174 FC]
Support [Art. 194 FC]
Demand and Payment of Support [Art. 203 FC]
Designation of Parental Authority [Art. 213 FC]

OUTLINE

Guardianship
Interlocutory Orders on Support pendente lite
Succession
Republic Act No. 7610
Republic Act No. 9262

ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
[ART. 4 FC]
Abbas v. Abbas (G.R. No. 183896, Jan. 30, 2013)
Facts:
The case stems from a supposed marriage ceremony between Pakistani SyedAzhar Abbas
and Filipina Gloria Goo on January 9, 1993. The marriage contract stated that the couple was
issued a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993. The copy of marriage license
was apparently presented to the solemnizing officer during the marriage ceremony.
In July 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil Registrar to secure a copy of the
marriage license in relation to a bigamy case filed by Gloria. However, the Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification declaring that the office has not issued a marriage license to Syed
and Gloria. It further verified that the marriage license indicated in Syed and Glorias marriage
contract was issued to a different couple.
Syed filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria. He argued that
there was no actual marriage license issued to them prior to the supposed marriage in January
1993. Gloria maintained, on the other hand, that a valid marriage license existed. She presented
their marriage contract, photographs and testimonies of people present during the marriage
ceremony to negate the certification from the municipal civil registrar. She countered that a
certain Qualin secured the marriage license for her and Syed. But she was not able to present a
copy of the actual marriage license.
RTC ruled that there was no valid marriage license issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona. CA ruled that there was a valid marriage license because the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value

Issue: WON a valid marriage license was issued to Syed and Gloria
Held:
No. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, proof does exist of a diligent
search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the
records of her office.
In the case of Cario v. Cario, it was held that the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a marriage
license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and
Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed, does not operate to
cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." This
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void
ab initio.

ABSENCE OF ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS OF MARRIAGE
[ART. 4 FC]
Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Necessario (A.M. No.
MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013)
Facts:

Due to an administrative case filed on July 6, 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) formed a judicial audit team that investigated on irregularities in the solemnization of
marriages in several MTCs and RTCs in Cebu. The head of the audit team created went
undercover with another lawyer to see if the allegations were true that there were fixers or
facilitators offering package fees to parties who would like to apply for marriage. After their
interviews and investigation, the OCA recommended the dismissal of the following judges and
court employees generally for gross neglect of duty due to the following circumstances:
Judge Necessario - solemnized marriages with questionable documents even where one of the
contracting parties (foreigner) submitted an affidavit instead of a certificate of legal capacity from
his embassy; and under Art. 34 (one of the contracting parties was a minor during cohabitation)
Judge Acosta failed to make sure that solemnization fee has been paid and also solemnized a
marriage under Art. 34
Judge Rosales failed to make sure the solemnization fee has been paid and solemnized marriage
between foreigner who only submitted an affidavit; also solemnized a marriage without the
marriage license
Judge Tormis solemnized marriages with questionable documents; failed to make sure
solemnization fee has been paid; solemnized marriage between foreigner who only submitted an
affidavit; solemnized marriage with expired marriage license.
Helen Monggaya violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
prohibition from soliciting any gifts and for giving false information for the purpose of perpetrating
an irregular marriage
Rhona Rodriguez violated Sec. 2, Canon 1 by participating in the collection of an agreed upon
additional fee to process the documents, and in one case, received 4,000 pesos to facilitate an
irregular marriage

Desiderio Aranas and Rebecca Alesna provided couples who are to be married under Art. 34 with the
required affidavit of cohabitation even if one or both of them were minors during cohabitation
Celeste Retuya, Emma Valencia, Rebecca Alesna violated Sec. 2 (b), Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct of
Court Personnel because they received tips in assisting parties engaged in the transactions with the
Judiciary. Also, they effectively screened all documents before submitting them to the judges.
However, OCA recommended the dismissal of complaints against Judge Econg, Corazon Retuya and
Marilou Cabaez for lack of merit.
Art. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The
contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person

Issue: WON the Judges and personnel of Cebu MTCC and RTC are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross
neglect of duty, or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct
Held:
duty.

YES. Judges Necessario, Acosta, Romis and Rosales are guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of

Neglect of duty, as defined in Rodrigo-Ebron vs. Adolfo, is the failure to give ones attention to a
task expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the frequency of instances, the
offense is so serious in its character as to endanger or threaten public welfare.
This is reflected in the evidence submitted: Documents showed evidences of tampering, absence of
receipts to show that solemnization fees were paid, documents submitted by the parties showed
irregularities, testimonies were made regarding solemnization of marriages without licenses, among others.
It was held that the actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the
validity of the marriages they solemnized as, for instance, absence of a marriage license would
render a marriage void pursuant to Art. 4 of the Family Code.
SC dismissed the argument of the respondents that it was beyond the scope of duty of the
solemnizing officer to check the validity of the marriage pursuant to People vs. Jansen.
Court finds respondents guilty, orders the dismissal of the judges and employees from service.
The SC through Navarro vs. Domagtoy, established that: The judiciary should be composed
of persons who, if not experts are at least proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more
than the ordinary layman. Employees are also held liable as established in Villaceran vs. Rosete, which
said Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation of justice these court
personnel serve as sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurable affect the
honor and dignity of the Judiciary.

VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES


[ART. 35 FC]
Fujiki v. Marina (G.R. No. 196049, Jun. 26,
2013)
Facts: Fujiki a Japanese National married Marinay in the Philippines.
Fujiki was not able to bring Marinay to Japan and they eventually lost
contact. Marinay remarried another Japanese national but claimed she
was being maltreated. She contacted Fujiki and they reestablished their
relationship. Fujiki sought judgement from the Japanese courts for nullity
of Marinays second marriage on the ground of bigamy which the Japan
court granted.
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC for Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage). RTC
dismissed petition based on Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-1110-SC). This rule prescribes that the parties who can file a declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage are limited to only the husband or wife.
Issues: WON rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage applies
WON the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

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HELD: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a


foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country. The court went on to cite Juliano-Llave v.
Republic wherein the court ruled that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that
only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of
the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The rule is clear that any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register may file a verified petition for cancellation or correction of entry.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court.
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VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES


[ART. 35 FC]
Capili v. People (G.R. No. 189805, Jul. 3, 2013)
Facts:
Respondent charged herein petitioner Capili with the crime
bigamy before the Pasig RTC. Respondents claim that a
second marriage was contracted before the first marriage
was declared void. Petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend
alleging that there is currently a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the
RTC of Antipolo filed by Karla Medina-Capili. The
arraignment was therefore reset. Ultimately, RTC Antipolo
declared the second marriage void. Because the second
marriage was ultimately declared to be void, petitioner
argues that there cannot be any crime of bigamy.
Issue: WON Petitioner is liable for bigamy, considering that
the second marriage was declared to be void?

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Held:
YES. Petitioner is still guilty of bigamy despite declaration of second marriage as void. The
crime of bigamy exists so long as a second marriage was contracted during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. This is true even if the second marriage was
declared to be a nullity.
According to the RPC, the elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows:

the offender has been legally married;

the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;

that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity
In the present case, all the elements are present. At the outset, it is therefore clear that the
Petitioner is liable for bigamy. Additionally, the second marriage was contracted during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the
second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.Even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was
celebrated, there is still a crime of bigamy.
Jarillo v. People held that:

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt
in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to
prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is
contracted.

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VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES


[ART. 35 FC]
Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan ( G.R. No. 201061, Jul. 3,
2013)
Facts:
Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) alleged that he was married to
Azucena Alegre (Azucena), where they had three children. However, Benjamin
developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan (Sally) who was a
customer in the business owned by Benjamins family. Sometime after Azucena
left for America, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. They
sign a purported marriage contract even though Sally knew of Benjamins
marital status. Sally assured him that the marriage contract would not be
registered. Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children.
When the relationship ended, Sally went to Canada bringing with her
their 2 children. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of
public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract
as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court.
Issue:

WON the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was valid

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Held:
No. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into the purported
marriage, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was still valid
and subsisting. Benjamins marriage to Azucena was duly established
before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage
contract.

Furthermore, the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally had no valid


marriage license because the Local Civil Registrar confirmed that the
Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally did not match the Marriage
License series issued for the month of February 1982. The Civil Registrar
also said that it did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 (the alleged
Marriage License of Benjamin and Sally) to the couple. Such certification
from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without
a license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license.
Therefore, it is clear that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
null and void ab initio and non-existent.

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VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES


[ART. 35 FC]
Montanez v. Cipriano (G.R. No. 181089, Oct. 22, 2012)
Facts:
On April 8, 1976, Lourdes married Socrates. On January 24, 1983, while the
first marriage has not yet been judicially dissolved, Lourdes married Silverio.
Lourdes filed a petition in 2001 to annul her marriage with Socrates for psychological
incapacity. The first marriage was declared null and void on 2003
On May 14, 2004, Merlinda Cipriano Montaez, the petitioner and Silverios
daughter from the first marriage, filed a bigamy complaint against Lourse. Attached
to the complaint was a marked and signed affidavit of Silverio stating that Lourdes
concealed her marriage to Socrates.
On July 24, 2007, Lourdes alleged that since her marriage was declared void
ab initio in 2003, there can be no bigamy in the absence of two valid marriage, is
therefore wanting. RTC ruled that bigamy was not committed by the respondent. The
subsequent marriage was solemnized in 1983 prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code; hence, the existing law at that time did not require judicial declaration of
nullity as a condition to remarry. Due to the unsettled state of Jurisprudence, RTC
interpreted the law liberally in favor of the accused.

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Issue: WON the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal
of the on for bigamy filed against her.
Held: No, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not justify the dismissal of
the bigamy case.
In Jarillov. People, the Court ruled that when an accused contracted a
subsequent marriage without the prior marriage having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. This is
so because the first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by
a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting.
The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the
subsistence of the first marriage. As long as there is no judicial declaration of
nullity, the marriage is presumed to be existing. Therefore, he/she who
contracts a subsequent marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage can be prosecuted for bigamy. Yes, what makes a person
criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no declaration, the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
17
prosecuted for bigamy.

VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES


[ART. 35 FC]
People v. Odtuhan (G.R. No. 191566, Jul. 17, 2013)
Facts: Respondent contracted marriage with Jasmin in 1980. Thirteen
years thereafter, he married Eleanor. However, his first marriage was
declared void ab initio because it was celebrated without a marriage
license. Meanwhile, the second spouse died. Respondent was charged with
bigamy. He raises the defense that the facts in the information do not
charge an offense of bigamy since his first marriage was void ab initio;
hence, there is an absence of an essential element in the crime of bigamy.
Issue: WON respondent is guilty of bigamy.
Held: Yes, what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is
so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no declaration,
the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
[ART. 36 FC]
Mendoza v. Republic (G.R. No. 157649, Nov. 12, 2012)
Facts:
Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza met in 1989, as next-door neighbors in the apartelle they were renting while both were still in
college. Arabelle became pregnant with their daughter, Allysa Bianca. On her eighth month of pregnancy, they got married in civil
rites in Pasay. Dominic had to borrow funds from Arabelles best friend to settle the hospital bill for their babys delivery. Thereafter,
he remained jobless and dependent upon his father for support until he finished college.
Arabelle took on various jobs to meet the familys needs. Being the one with fixed income, she shouldered all of the familys expenses. On
the other hand, Dominic sold encyclopedias after his graduation, then worked as a car salesman for Toyota. Ironically, he spent his
first sales commission on a celebratory bash with his friends inasmuch as she shouldered all the household expenses and their childs
schooling because his irregular income could not be depended upon.
Arabelle discovered Dominics illicit relationship with his co-employee. This then affected their communication and sexual relationship.
Dominic gave Arabelle a car as a birthday present, and told Arabelle to issue him 2 blank checks that he claimed would be for the cars
insurance. She later not only found out that he used the check for his personal needs, but also that he did not pay for the car
itself, forcing her to both rely on her father-in-law to pay part of the cost of the car and for her to bear the balance. Dominic was later
fired from his employment after he ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer, and charged and arrested for violation of BP 22
and estafa.
Dominic subsequently abandoned the conjugal abode. A month later, she refused his attempt at reconciliation, causing him
to threaten to commit suicide. Arabelle then filed in the RTC a petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic
based on psychological incapacity, which the OSG opposed.
Arabelle presented herself as a witness together with a psychiatrist Dr. Samson and Professor Jimenez. Meanwhile, Dominic did not
appear during trial and presented no evidence. RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity, i.e., gravity,
antecedence and incurability, as set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals (Molina), were attendant, establishing Dominics
psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal, Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and refused to be bound by the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Samson, which were concluded only on the basis of information given by Arabelle herself. It held that the Arabelle's testimonies failed
to establish Dominics psychological affliction to be of such a grave or serious nature that it was medically or clinically rooted, citing
Republic v. Dagdag, Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, and Pesca v. Pesca. Additionally, the husband's immaturity, sexual infidelity, and
being a suspect for estafa and violation of BP 22 do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

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Issue: WON CA erred in its refusal to be bound by the expert testimony and evaluation and their reliance on the Dagdag, Hernandez, and
Pesca cases

Held:

NO. The findings of the expert were one-sided, given that


Dominic himself was not subjected to such, and that the findings
and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were
solely based on the self-serving testimonial descriptions and
characterizations of him rendered by the petitioner and her
witnesses (those whom the petitioner herself referred)
CAs reliance in Dagdag, Hernandez, and Pesca were not
misplaced. Based on the doctrines established in these 3 cases, it
was not the absence of the medical experts testimony alone that
was crucial but rather the petitioners failure to satisfactorily
discharge the burden the showing the existence of psychological
incapacity at the inception of the marriage.
The totality of evidence of proving such incapacity at
and prior to the time of the marriage was the crucial
consideration. To entitle petitioner spouse to a declaration
of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the
evidence must sufficiently prove that respondent spouse's
psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing
prior to the time of the marriage.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
[ART. 36 FC]
Republic v. C.A. and Quintos (G.R. No. 159594,
Nov. 12, 2012)
Facts:
Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, they were not blessed
with a child because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage. Eduardo
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a
ground. He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she
engaged in petty arguments with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual
needs; that she spent most of her time gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their
adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his remittances as an overseas worker; and
that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.
As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of
a neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina
exhibited traits of a borderline personality disorder that was no longer treatable. Catalina
did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting
with different men and abandoning the conjugal home.
Issue: WON Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.
21

Held:

No. Marriage remains valid. Psychological incapacity is an


incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations.
In Republic v CA(Molina), SC has established guidelines involving the
nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity. These
were not met in the instant case since the gravity, root cause and
incurability of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were not
sufficiently established.
Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without
Eduardo's consent, refusal to do household chores, and take care of their
adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no other witness to
corroborate these allegations. Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr.
Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support this claim. The
report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the
incapacity.Even the testimony of Dr. Reyes stated a general description of
borderline personality disorder which did not explain the root cause as to why
Catalina was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or omissions or
the gravity which constituted the disorder.
What was established was that Catalina was childish and immature.
Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the
depth and objectivity of an expert assessment. From the scant evidence
presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal
to perform her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity
alone. It must be shown that such immature acts were manifestations of a
disordered personality that made the spouse completely unable to discharge
22
the essential obligations of marriage.

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
[ART. 36 FC]
Republic v. Encelan (G.R. No. 170022, Jan. 9, 2013)
Facts:
In 1979, Cesar Encelan married Lolita, and they bore two
children. In 1984, Cesar left for Saudi for work and 2 years later,
he found out that Lolita was having an illicit affair with Alvin. In
1991, Lolita left the conjugal home with the children and lived
with Alvin. In 1995, Cesar filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological incapacity.
Lolita denies all allegations of infidelity and psychological
incapacity.
Lolitas psychological evaluation report stated that she:
Was not suffering from any form of major psychiatric illness
Had not been able to provide the expectations expected of her for a
good land lasting marital relationship, as she refused to go abroad
with Cesar
Was transferring from one job to the other, which depicts some
interpersonal problems with co-workers as well as her impatience in
attaining her ambitions

23

Issue: WON psychological incapacity exists


Held:
NO.Psychological
incapacity
contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume basic marital obligations, not merely the
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse.
For sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal
dwelling to constitute psychological incapacity, it must be
shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that completely
prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations. Otherwise, the alleged sexual infidelity
and abandonment are merely grounds for legal separation.
Interpersonal problems with co-workers does not
conclude that Lolita, at the time of the marriage, was
psychologically incapacitated. Aside from the time element
involved, a wifes psychological fitness as a spouse
cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship. Their relatedness and relevance to one another
should be fully established for them to be compared or to serve
as measures of comparison with one another.

24

BIGAMOUS MARRIAGE; ABSENCE OR


DISAPPEARANCE OF SPOUSE
[ART. 41 FC]
Republic v. Narceda (G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013)
Facts:

Robert P. Narceda and Marina Narceda got married on July 22,


1987. In 1994, Marina went to Singapore and never returned or
communicated with respondent. The last the respondent has heard about
her is that shes been living with a Singaporean husband.
For purposes of remarriage, on May 16, 2002 Robert filed a Petition
for a judicial declaration of presumptive death and/or absence of Marina.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the Presumptive death of
Marina. Petitioner appealed the decision with the Court of Appeals on the
guround that respondent failed to conduct a diligent search of his wife and
there was no well-founded belief that Marina was dead. The CA dismissed
the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and ruling that the
hearing of a petition for the declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding under the Family Code, being such the judgments
herein shall be immediately final and executory.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was also denied hence, this petition.
25

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of
Robert Narcedo.
Held:
Art. 41(2) states: For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
No appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. The OSG availed
the wrong remedy when it filed its notice of appeal. The wrong filing
did not toll the running of the period for filing the Petition for
Certiorari, which has lapsed. As a result, petitioner's contention that
respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead may no longer be entertained by this Court.
26

COLLUSION IN ANNULMENT OR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE CASES
[ART. 48 FC]
Chan v. Chan (G.R. No. 179786, Jul. 24, 2013)
Facts:
Petitioner Wife filed against Respondent Husband a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, with the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her, claiming that Respondent
Husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist diagnosed
him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited
drugs.
Respondent Husband claims that it was the Wife who failed in her duties.
And that he initially agreed to marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon
arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him by both arms while another gave
him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as proof that
he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same
form carried a physicians handwritten note that the Husband suffered from
methamphetamine and alcohol abuse.
Based on the physicians handwritten statement, Petitioner Wife requested
for the issuance of a subpoena ducestecumaddressed to Medical City, for the
production of the Husbands medical records. The Husband opposed, arguing that the
medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege.
The request of Petitioner Wife was denied and her subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration on the matter was also denied. She then filed a Petitioner for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals but this was also dismissed. Her subsequent
Motion for Reconsideration with the CA was also denied.

27

Issue: WON CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a
subpoena ducestecumcovering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are
covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication
Held:
Issuance of a subpoena ducestecum is premature. Petitioner Wife made the
request before trial started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a
request for the issuance of a subpoena ducestecumcovering her husbands hospital
records. It is when those records are produced for examination at the trial, that the
husband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but more so to
their disclosure.
Petitioner Wifes motion for the issuance of the subpoena ducestecum also
cannot be treated as a motion for production of documents as a mode of discovery
because Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is only limited to disclosure of
documents which are NOT PRIVILEGED.
Petitioner Wife claims that the documents are not privileged because it is the
TESTIMONY of the physician that is supposed to be privileged. This contention is
wrong. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the physician cannot in a civil case,
without the consent of the patient, be examined regarding their (physician-patient)
professional conversation. To allow the disclosure during discovery procedure of the
hospital records (including the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment given) would, in effect,
be tantamount to allowing access to evidence that is inadmissible without the
patients consent. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling the
physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient,
without the latters prior consent.
Lastly, Petitioner Wife argues that her Husband already admitted in his
answer that he had been confined in a hospital. However, as already mentioned
above, trial in the case had not yet begun. Since trial had not yet begun, it cannot be
said the Husband had already presented said Philhealth claim form as evidence. The
Husband was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer.
Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

28

OWNERSHIP, ADMINISTRATION, ENJOYMENT


AND DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
[ART. 96 FC]
Republic v. Domingo (G.R. No. 197315, Oct. 10, 2012)
Facts: A parcel of land titled under the names of Spouses Ramoso was inherited by
Angel Tinio from her sister Trinidad Tinio-Ramoso. This was sold to the respondents.
However, they were only given the duplicate OCT. The Registry of Deeds declared
the original OCT destroyed. Hence, the respondents filed a petition for the
reconstitution of the original OCT. A notice of hearing was sent out to the Spouses
Ramoso, the Domingos, Angel Tinio and the concerned agencies. Republic of the
Philippines contends that the court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Heirs of
Spouses Ramoso and a certain Gabaldon were not notified of the proceedings. Their
names do not appear in the duplicate OCT.
Issue: WON the heirs of the Spouses Ramoso and Gabaldon were required to be notified
of the said proceedings.
Held: No, the source of the reconstitution falls under Section 2(a) of RA 26the owners
duplicate certificate of title. Hence, the procedure to be followed falls under Sec. 10 in
relation to Sec. 9 of RA 26 and not Sec. 12 and 13 thereof. Sec. 10 states that the
notice shall be published in the manner stated in Sec. 9, which prescribes that the
notice shall specify among others: the names of the interested parties appearing in
the reconstituted certificate of title. Since the names of the heirs and Gabaldon did
not appear in the certificate of title, they were not required to be notified.

29

DISSOLUTION OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY


REGIME
[ART. 99 FC]
Heirs of Dr. Intac v. CA (G.R. No. 173211, Oct. 11, 2012)
Facts:
Ireneo Mendoza was married to SalvacionFermin and had two children: respondents Josefina and Martina
(Salvacion is their stepmother). He was the owner of a property with TCT 001 situated at Quezon City.
In 1977, Ireneo, with the consent of Salvacion, executed a deed of absolute sale of the property in favor of
Angelina and her husband, Mario (Spouses Intac). TCT 002 was issued in favor of spouses Intac. Despite the sale,
Ireneo and his family continued staying in the premises and paying its realty taxes.
After Ireneo died intestate in 1982, his widow and respondents remained in the premises. After Salvacion
died, respondents still remained there. They are in the premises up to present time, paying real estate taxes thereon,
leasing out portions of the property, and collecting the rentals.
Meanwhile, however, in 1994, respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Cancellation of TCT against
spouses Intac. It prayed not only for the cancellation of the title, but also for its reconveyanceon the ground that the
sale is simulated, therefore, void. Pending litigation, Mario died and was substituted by his wife and their children
(petitioners).
Respondents alleged that when spouses Intac borrowed the title of the property from Ireneo, it was to be
used as collateral for a loan from a financing institution. Respondents objected to the request but Ireneo tried to
appease them, telling them not to worry because Angelina would not abuse the situation as he took care of her for a
very long time. Lastly, respondents were paying the real estate taxes over said property.
Spouses Intac countered, among others, that the subject property had been transferred based on a valid
deed and for a valuable consideration and that the action to annul the deed had already prescribed.
On April 30, 2002, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents and against Spouses Intac, ordering that the Deed
of Absolute Sale is an equitable mortgage; and that the RD was to cancel TCT 002 and, in lieu thereof, issue a new TCT
in the name of Ireneo.
On appeal, the CA modified the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that the RTC erred in first declaring the
deed of absolute sale as null and void and then interpreting it to be an equitable mortgage. The CA believed that
Ireneo agreed to have the title transferred in the name of spouses Intac to enable them to facilitate the processing of
the mortgage and to obtain a loan. This was the exact reason why the deed of absolute sale was executed.
The nephew of Ireneo testified that the latter never intended to sell the subject property to the Spouses
Intac and that the deed of sale was executed to enable them to borrow from a bank.
The CA further observed that the conduct of spouses Intac belied their claim of ownership because when the
deed of absolute sale was executed, spouses Intac never asserted ownership, either by collecting rents, by informing
respondents of their ownership or by demanding possession.

30

Issue: WON the sale is null and void on the ground of absence of consideration?
Held:

YES. A contract without consideration is void. In this case, the contract of


sale is simulated, and is void under Art. 1346.
A contract is absolutely simulated if there is a colorable contract but
absent substance because the parties never intended to be bound by it. The
main characteristic of an absolute simulation is the absence of desire or
intent to produce the legal effect of a contract or in any way to alter the
juridical situation of the parties.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract is the intention of the parties. If the words of a contract conflict the
evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail.
Intention is determined by the following:
express terms of their agreement,
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
The following contemporaneous and subsequent acts of both parties in this
case, point to the fact that the intention of Ireneo was just to lend the title to the
spouses Intac:
testimony that Ireneo personally told him he was going to execute a document of
sale because spouses Intac needed to borrow the title to the property and use it
as collateral for their loan application .
testimony of Angeline that she and her husband mortgaged the property to
finance the construction of a small hospital and that Ireneo offered the property
as he was in deep financial need.
Ireneo and family continued to be in physical possession after the sale and up to
present.
Ireneo and family even went as far as leasing the same and collecting rentals.
complete absence of any attempt on the part of a vendee to assert his right of
dominion over the property.
spouses Intac failed to show that they had been paying the real estate taxes of
the subject property.

31

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES


[ART. 117 FC]
Beumer v. Amores (G.R. No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012)
Facts:
Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, was
married on March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of Negros
Oriental declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the
formers psychological incapacity. Consequently, petitioner filed a
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership and prayed for the
distribution of several properties claimed to have been acquired
during the subsistence of their marriage.
Amores averred that, with the exception of their 2 residential
houses, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties
during their marriage, and that she was able to acquire 4 other lots
out of her personal funds and 2 others by way of inheritance.On the
other hand, Beumer testified that while the 4 other lots were
registered in the name of respondent, these properties were acquired
with the money he received from the Dutch government as his
disability benefit.
32

Issue:WON Beumer has the right to claim reimbursement from the purchase of
the real properties subject to the dissolution proceedings?
Held:
NO. In the case of Muller v. Muller, the Court held that one cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign
ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the
above-cited constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of
such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the
latters name.
The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated,
he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
The Court cannot grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its
unconstitutional purchase. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution
and the law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and
produces no legal effect at all.
This case provides the exception to Art. 117, which provides that, the following
are conjugal partnership properties:
1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for
only one of the spouses; XXX

33

CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL


PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
[ART. 122 FC]
Pana v Heirs of Juanito, Sr. (G.R. No. 164201, Dec. 10,
2012)
Facts:
The prosecution accused petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others
of murder before RTC Surigao. The RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren
of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as
charged and sentenced them to the penalty of death.The RTC ordered those found guilty to
pay each of the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and P150,000.00 actual damages.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of both accused but modified
the penalty to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the monetary awards, the Court also
affirmed the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but deleted the award for actual
damages for lack of evidentiary basis. In its place, however, the Court made an award of
P15,000.00 each by way of temperate damages. In addition, the Court awarded P50,000.00
exemplary damages per victim to be paid solidarily by them.
The decision became final and executory on October 1, 2001.
Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002 the RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the
34
names of Efren and Melecia.
Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution were issued to which
petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.

Issue:WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and executed upon for
the satisfaction of Melecias civil liability in the murder case.
Held: Yes, the conjugal properties may be levied and executed in light of the disputed fact that
MeleciaPana has no exclusive properties.
Further, however, the Supreme Court ordered that before the conjugal properties may be
levied and executed the RTC Surigao shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the writ of execution
on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and MeleciaPana for the satisfaction of the
indemnities imposed by final judgment on the latter accused in the criminal cases, the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family Code have been covered.
Article 122 of the FC: However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as
well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against
the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article
have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if
it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall
be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. (Emphasis supplied)
Since Efren does not dispute the RTCs finding that Melecia has no exclusive property of
her own, the above applies. Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of
the criminal indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before
these are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been
covered.
No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article
122 states that at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall35be
charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned.

SUIT BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS


[ART. 151 FC]
People v. Venturina [G.R. No. 183097, Sept. 12, 2012]
Facts:
The accused, Venturina assails the decision of the CA in finding him guilty for two
counts of rape committed against his daughter, AAA.
The names of the victim and the relatives mentioned in the case are not identified
pursuant to RA No. 7610, An Act Providing For Stronger Deterrence And Special Protection
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation And Discrimination, And For Other Purposes which states
that the identity of the victim or any information which could establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family or household members shall be withheld.
All the arguments raised by the appellant challenges the credibility of AAA. At the
center of appellants defense of denial is his assertion that the accusation against him was a
mere concoction. According to him, AAA filed the case because she resented being
disciplined by him.
Issue: WON the Venturina is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of rape against his
daughter AAA
36

Held: YES. The SC believes that believe that it was appellant instead who concocted
his defense. Not even the most ungrateful and resentful daughter would push her
own father to the wall as the fall guy in any crime unless the accusation against him
is true.
As has been repeatedly ruled, [n]o young girl x x x would concoct a sordid
tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of her own father, undergo medical
examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial,
if her motive were other than a fervent desire to seek justice.
Thus, taking into consideration that the parties are close blood relatives, AAAs
testimony pointing to her father as the person who raped her must stand.
The trial court was thus correct in imposing the penalty of death on
appellant. However, since the death penalty for heinous crimes has been abolished
by Republic Act No. 934619 the appellate court correctly modified the trial courts
imposition of the death penalty by reducing it to reclusion perpetuawithout eligibility
for parole.
To justify the imposition of death penalty, however, it is required that the special
qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
appellant be properly alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. All
these requirements were duly established in these cases. With respect to her
relationship to appellant, it was likewise specifically alleged in the Informations that
appellant is AAAs father. During trial, appellant categorically admitted that
37
AAA is his daughter

CHARGES AGAINST THE CONJUGAL


PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
[ART. 122 FC]
Sps. Fortaleza v. Sps. Lapitan (G.R. No. 178288 Aug. 15, 2012)

Facts: The court issued a judgment against Sps. Fortaleza


which resulted to the execution of their conjugal house.
Issue: WON he family home can be executed.
Held:A family home is exempt from execution or forced sale under
Article 153 of the Family Code, provided such claim for exemption
should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. Failure to do so estopps the party from
later claiming the exemption

In this case, reasonable time for purposes of the law on


exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the
one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the
property.
38

ESTABLISHING FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN


[ART. 172 FC]
Makati Shangri-La Hotel v. Harper (G.R. No. 189998,
Aug. 29, 2012)
Facts: The alleged widow and the son of the Christian Harpers
death in Shangrilla premises wants to prove in court filiation
with the deceased for standing in court. Documents presented
were Birth Certificates of father and son and Marriage
Certificate.
Issue: W/N the Plaintiffs-Appellees were able to prove with
competent evidence the affirmative allegations in the
complain that they are the widow and son of Mr. Christian
Harper?
Held: In this case, the respondents were able to present the
mentioned documents, all of which were presumably regarded
as public documents under the laws of Norway. Such
documentary evidence sufficed to competently establish the
relationship and filiation under the standards of our Rules of
Court.

39

ESTABLISHING FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN


[ART. 172 FC]
De Belen v Tabu (G.R. No. 188417, September 24, 2012)
Facts:
o
The property subject of the controversy is a 9,000 square meter lot situated in
Mariwalo, Tarlac, which was a portion of a property registered in the name of the late
Faustina Maslum.
o
Faustina died without any children and left a holographic will, which was not
probated, assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces.
o
One of the heirs was the father of Domingo Laxamana who allegedly executed a Deed
of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 square meter share of the
land to LaureanoCabalu.
o
Meanwhile, a Deed of Extra-judicial Succession with Partition was executed by the
legitimate heirs of Faustina. The said deed imparted 9,000 sqm. of land to Domingo
where he sold 4,500 sqm to his nephew EleazarTabamo and the rest of it was
registered under his name.
o
Domingo purportedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent Renato
Tabu wherein the latter subdivided it into two.
o
Laxamanatogether with the heirs of Domingo filed an unlawful detainer action
against Cabalu et. al. against all persons claiming rights under them. The heirs
claimed that the defendants were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by their
late father, Domingo, but, when asked to vacate the property, they refused to do so.

40

Issue: WON the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land


covering the 9,000 sqm property executed by Domingo in
favor of Laureano Cabalu is valid
Held: No.
o
o
o

The sale cannot be deemed valid because, at it was made,


Domingo was not yet the owner of the property.
Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into
upon future inheritance as void.
In this case, the original owner was Faustina, who during her
lifetime, had executed a will. In the said will, the name of
Benjamin, father of Domingo, appeared as one of the heirs.
However, when the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not
yet probated and the property still formed part of the inheritance
of Domingos father from Faustinas estate.
Therefore, Domingos status as an heir of Faustina by right of
representation being undisputed, the said property served as the
future inheritance of Domingo from Faustina.
41

ESTABLISHING FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN


[ART. 172 FC]
Perla v Baring (G.R. No. 172471, Nov. 12, 2012)
Facts:
o
Mirasol Baring and her minor son, Randy, filed before the RTC a
Complaint for support against Antonio Perla.
o
Petitioners allege that Mirasol and Antonio lived together as
common-law spouses for 2 years and as a result, Randy was born.
Antonio subsequently abandoned them to become a seaman.
o
However, Antonio, who had a family of his own, denied having
fathered Randy.
o
During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys Certificate of Live Birth
and Baptismal Certificate and claimed that Antonio supplied the
information in the said certificates. Randy, on his part, claimed that
he knew Antonio to be his father, calling Antonio Papa during their
first meeting. Also, it was alleged that Randy lived with Aunt Lelita
(Antonios relative) for one week who treated Randy as a relative.
o
On the other hand, Antonio admitted to having sexual intercourse
with Mirasol, but denied having supplied the information in the
certificates.

42

Issue: WON Randy is entitled to support from Antonio.


Held: No.
o The lower courts failed to establish the illegitimate filiation
between Randy and Antonio since they based their decisions
on the certificates of Live Birth and Baptism, despite the
absence of Antonios signature on the said documents.
o In Cabatania v. CA, it was held that a certificate of live birth
purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent
evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate.
o Randys testimony of having met his father for the first time
and his living with Aunt Lelita cannot be considered as
indications of open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under Article 172 and 174 of the Family Code.
o Lastly, nothing from Mirasols testimonies sufficiently prove
that she had sexual intercourse with Antonio prior to the usual
period of pregnancy or 9 months before the birth of Randy.

43

RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN


(ART. 174 FC)
Abrigo v. Flores (G.R. No. 160786, Jun. 17,
2013)
Facts: A parcel of land was inherited by siblings Francisco and Gaudencia
from their deceased parents. A partition of the land was agreed upon,
whereby the western portion shall pertain to Francisco and his heirs,
while the eastern part shall pertain to Gaudencia. However, no actual
partition occurred and heirs of both parties enjoyed and possessed the
property as co-owners. During this time, the heirs of Gaudencia made
improvements on the property, which encroached upon the western
portion of the lot.
Eventually, the heirs of Francisco decided to partition the property. The
Court ruled for the partition in accordance with the original agreement
and ordered the removal/ demolition of the improvements encroaching
upon the western part of the property.
Heirs of Gaudencia prayed to set aside the order of demolition on the
44
basis of a supervening event. They alleged that one of the heirs of
Franciso- Jimmy Flores, sold his share of the western portion of the
lot, thereby making them co-owners thereof.

Issue: WON the sale by a legitimate heir of his share in the estate
qualifies as a supervening event that will justify setting aside
the order of demolition or execution of the partition.
Held: NO.
A supervening event in order to qualify as exception to
the execution as a matter of right of a final and immutable
judgment rule must directly affect matters litigated upon and
substantially alter the rights and relationships of the parties to
render the execution unjust. In this case, even on the
assumption that the sale of Jimmy Flores share is true, the
same does not alter or modify the judgment on the property at
issue. In addition, the appellate court found the whole sale
transaction suspicious and not supported by evidence. The
execution has dragged on for 17 years now since order
of implementation was given, it is high for the Court to
put a stop to further delays to finally enable the heirs
and successors-in-interest of Francisco to exercise their 45
rights as legitimate heirs and as winning parties to a
final judgment.

SUPPORT (ART. 194 FC)


Lim Lua v. Lua (G.R. No. 175279-80, Jun. 5, 2013)

Facts: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, and for support pendent lite amounting to P500,000.
Respondent on the other hand, refused and manifested that he is only willing to give as much
as 75,000 as support.
RTC ruled that the amount of 250,000 support per month is sufficient, notwithstanding the
separate medical support for susan when the need arises. However this amount was eventually
reduced by the CA, citing the fact that there was no evidence adduced to show the alleged
millions of income of respondent, and that based on the evidence presented the proper amount
to paid should be 115,000. This was not assailed by any party does it became final and
executory.
Issues once again arised, when respondent in complying with its obligation paid only the
amount of P162,651.90 to petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision,
he deducted from the amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered
by the CA -- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005),
totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum
of P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings). On the other hand petitioner
contends that respondent shouldnt be allowed the deductions he made arguing that under
Article 194, support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family, that in this case the cars and credit card charges are not part of support.
Once again RTC, ruled in favor of petitioner granting a writ of execution, however upon appeal
such was decision was reversed and the CA allowed the deductions made by respondent. Hence
the case at bar.

46

Issue: WON the deductions made by respondent including the two


automobile and credit card charges are valid deductions and considered as
advances.
Held:
The Supreme Court reversed the CA, and stated that CA
should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be
credited against the accrued support pendente lite.
The amount of support which those related by
marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.
Here, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial
court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries
of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions.
Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his
children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and
Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry
goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to
47
the judgment awarding support pendente lite. Any amount respondent
seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for
sustenance and household expenses

DEMAND AND PAYMENT OF SUPPORT


(ART. 203 FC)
Gotardo v. Buling (G.R. No. 165166, Aug. 15, 2012)

Facts: Gotardo and Buling were lovers. During their relationship, they had several
intimate sexual encounters resulting to her pregnancy. When told of the
pregnancy, he made plans to marry her but subsequently backed out. Eventually,
she gave birth to a son. When he did not show up and failed to provide support for
the child, she sent a demand letter demanding recognition and support for the
child. This was ignored. Hence, she filed for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite. He denies the imputed paternity. However during trial, it was
established that she only had one boyfriend to whom she had sexual relations. The
allegation that she had previous relationships with other men remain
unsubstantiated.
Issue: WON the court may order Gotardo to recognize and provide legal support to
his minor son.
Held: Yes. Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter
of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is variable
and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the
amount shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the 48
necessities of the recipient. It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to support.

DESIGNATION OF PARENTAL
AUTHORITY (ART. 213 FC)
Beckett v. Sarmiento A.M. No. RTJ-12-2326, Jan. 30,
2013
Facts:
Geoffrey, an Australian citizen, was previously married to Elseta, a Filipino
citizen. Said marriage bore a child Geoffrey, Jr. The couple were subsequently
divorced and by virtue of a compromise agreement, custody over Geoffrey, Jr. was
granted to Geoffrey who took his son with him to Australia, subject to yearly
Christmas visits here. In one of the Christmas visits, Geoffrey consented to have
Geoffrey, Jr. stay with Eltesa even after the holidays, provided she return the child on January
9, 2011. However, on the said date, Eltesa did not return Geoffrey Jr., hence, this prompted
Geoffrey to file a petition for violation of RA 7610 and prayer for the issuance of a writ of
Habeas Corpus.
Geoffrey relates that, during the conference on the application for habeas corpus,
Geoffrey, Jr., then nine (9) years old, displayed inside the courtroom hysterical conduct,
shouting and crying, not wanting to let go of Eltesa and acting as though, he, the father, was a
total stranger. Despite Geoffrey Jr.s outburst, Judge Sarmiento issued an Order, directing
Eltesa to return Geoffrey, Jr. to Geoffrey. For some reason, the turnover of Geoffrey, Jr. to
Geoffrey did not materialize.
Hence Geoffrey sought the immediate implementation of the Order. But instead of
enforcing said order, Judge Sarmiento, issued another order giving Eltesa provisional custody
49
over Geoffrey, Jr. Geoffreys main contention is that Judge Sarmiento can no longer grant
provisional custody to Eltesa in light of the adverted judgment on compromise agreement.

Issue: WON Respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law


when it granted provisional custody over the minor child to the
mother despite a previously approved compromise agreement and
order granting custody to the father.
Held: NO.
Respondent judge, in granting provisional custody, did
not disregard the res judicata rule. The matter of custody, to borrow
from Espiritu v. Court of Appeals,is not permanent and unalterable
[and] can always be re-examined and adjusted. And as aptly
observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody
agreement can never be regarded as permanent and unbending,
the simple reason being that the situation of the parents and even of
the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement
would no longer be to the latters best interest.
Under, the Family Code, case of separation of
the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the
parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is
unfit. Geoffrey Jr., at the time when he persistently refused
to be turned over to his father, was already over 7 years of
age. As such, he was very much capable of deciding, based on
50
his past experiences, with whom he wanted to stay.

GUARDIANSHIP
Abad v. Biason (G.R.No. 191993, Dec. 5, 2012)
Facts: Abad filed for guardianship over the person and properties of
Maura, his aunt. Biason opposed the appointment of Abad prayed to
be appointed guardian instead since he was previously granted
power of attorney to manage Mauras properties. RTC appointed
Biason as guardian. Abad filed a motion and pointed out that Maura
chose him to be her guardian. The RTC denied the motion. Mauras
choice was not given decisive weight because her advanced age. Abad
appealed to the CA. Eduardo then appealed to the SC. During
pendency of the case Biason passed away. Petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss the petition and terminate the guardianship of Biason.
Issue: WON Guardianship is terminated upon death.
Held: YES. The case has become moot and academic as there is no
longer a justiciable controversy. It is a well established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by
death. There is no longer any juridical tie between Maura Abad and 51
Leonardo Biason, rendering it pointless to delve into the propriety of
Biasons appointment.

INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS ON SUPPORT


Calderon, Ma Carminia vs. Roxas, Jose Antonio and CA
(G.R. No. 185595, Jan 9, 2013)
Facts: Complaint of declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by
Calderon against husband Roxas. Trial court granted support pendente
lite, ordering Roxas to support minor children. Upon motion, the support
was reduced. The order to reduce support was appealed from, but was
denied by CA.
Issue: Whether orders on the matter of support pendente lite are
interlocutory or final
Held: Orders on matters of support pendente lite are interlocutory. It
decides an incidental matter but is not a final decision on the main issue
of the case. The proper remedy is a special civil action, not an appeal of
the interlocutory order. Thus, CA properly dismissed appeal.
52

SUCCESSION
Neri v. Uy (G.R. No. 194366, Oct. 10, 2012)
Facts:
Anunciacion had 7 children, 2 from her first marriage with
Gonzalo and 5 from her second marriage with Enrique. Anunciacion and
Enrique acquired several homestead properties. Anunciacion died
intestate. Enrique, in his capacity and guardian of their minor children,
executed an extra-judicial settlement with Absolute Deed of Sale
adjudicating to themselves the properties. Thereafter, it was sold to the
spouses Hadji and Julpha Uy for P80,000. The children of Enrique filed
an annulment of sale on the ground that it was sold within the
prohibited period. RTC ordered the annulment of said deed. RTC said
that even though the sale was beyond the 5-year prohibitory period,
Anunciacions children from her first marriage were deprived of their
hereditary rights and Enrique had no authority to sell the shares of
their minor children. CA reversed the RTCs ruling and declared the
extrajudicial settlement and subsequent sale as valid and binding. The
minors were deemed to have ratified the sale when they did not
question the same sale upon reaching the age of majority.

53

Issues:
WON CA erred in upholding the validity of extra-judicial settlement of
the estate with absolute deed of sale as far as the shares of the 2
children from the first marriage of Anunciacion were concerned.
WON CA erred in not nullifying or annulling the extra-judicial
settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale with respect to the
shares of the minor children, depriving them of their inheritance.
Held: In the execution of the extra-judicial settlement of the estate with
absolute sale, all the heirs of the Anunciacion should have participated.
Since the children from the first marriage were admittedly excluded, the
settlement is invalid and not binding upon them and consequently, a
total nullity. Although the settlement of the estate was invalid, the sale
of the subject properties made by Enrique and his children (excluding
the minor ones), in favor of the respondents are valid but only up to the
extent of their respective proportionate shares. As guardians of the
minor children, Enrique had no power of alienation with respect to their
shares to the estate of their mother, Anunciacion. He only had powers of
administration. Administration includes all acts of preservation of the
property and the receipt of fruits according to the natural purpose of the
thing.

54

SUCCESSION
Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, Oct. 10,
2012)
Facts:
Upon the death of Cristina Suntay, two of her grandchildren
(Isabel, a legitimate grandchild, and Emilio III, an illegitimate
grandchild) both sought for the issuance of Letters of Administration in
their favor with respect to the settlement of the estate of Cristina. The
trial court granted the same in favor of Emilio III. The appellate court
reversed the trial court and appointed Isabel as the administratrix of
the estate. On appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, Isabel and
Emilio III were both appointed to the position, the two of them being coadministrators. Isabel filed a Motion for reconsideration of this decision.
Issue: WON the Letters of Administration should be issued to both55of
them, or to only one of them.

Held:
Isabel should be appointed as the sole administratrix of
the estate. In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration reckoned with is the interest in the estate of the
one to be appointed as administrator. Thus, Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court provides for an order of preference to be
followed with respect to whom letters of administration shall be
granted. This notwithstanding, the court in certain
circumstances has upheld the appointment of co-administrators.
In the case at bar, the appointment of both Isabel and
Emilio III as co-administrators will not redound to the benefit of
the estate, for the two have a deep aversion for each other.
Although the two of them have an interest in the estate, being
grandchildren of Cristina, the mere demonstration of such an
interest does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to coadministration thereof. The seeming impossibility of Isabel and
Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may
result in prejudice to the decedents estate, ultimately delaying
the settlement thereof. Moreover, it was shown that Emilio III
was remiss in his duties as administrator. He failed to faithfully
discharge the duties of settling the decedents estate with the
end in view of distribution to the heirs.

56

SUCCESSION
De Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334, Feb. 13, 2013)
Facts: Leandro Figuracion died intestate, leaving behind two parcels of land.
Petitioner sought an extrajudicial settlement of Leandros estate before prior
settlement had been made.
Issue: WON there should be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate
before partition?
Held: YES. Partition is inappropriate in a situation where there remains an
issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate.

57

SUCCESSION
Casilang v. Casilang-Dizon (G.R. No. 180269, Feb. 20, 2013)
Facts: Libonio Casilang died intestate. He has 8 children. The
children made a verbal partition on his estates. Rosario (daughter of
his son Ireneo) sued Jose (son of Liborio) for unlawful detainer on the
lot, where Jose is residing, claiming that her father owns the lot based
on a tax declarations.
Issue: WON the oral partition was valid.

Held: Yes, Jose is the rightful owner. Regardless of whether a parol


partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will be considered in proper cases, where it has been
consummated by taking possession and in exercise of ownership by
the parties with respect to their portions. The equity will confirm such
partition and decree title in accordance with the possession in
severalty.
Joses possession of Lot No. 4618 is well borne out by the records. It is
also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings.58
Actual possession and exercise of dominion are considered strong proof
of an oral partition which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.

SUCCESSION
Galvez v. CA and Montano (G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013)
Facts:
Sps. Eustacio and Segundina are owners of land in Leyte. When
they separated, Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita
without the knowledge or consent of Segundina. Jovita mortgagd
property to PNB. PNB foreclosed property and sold property to Sps.
Montao. They tried to get actual possession thereof but Segundina
refused to vacate which led Montaos to sue for recovery of ownership
and possession and damages in the MTC. A petition for review was also
filed but the court dismissed on the ground that no copies of pleadings
and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations were attached as annexes in violation of Sec. 2, Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue: W/N failure to attach the pleadings and other material portions of
the record as would support the allegations of the petition is a ground
59
for outright dismissal of a petition for review

Held: No.
Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of
attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition:
First, only pleadings and parts of case records which are relevant and
pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the
document in question will support the material allegations in the
petition.
Second, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents
thereof can also found in another document already attached to the
petition even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition.
Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case
record may still be given due course) upon showing that petitioner
later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the
higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.
60

The Court considers the attachments (i.e. certified true copies of the
MTC and RTC Decisions and Order) already sufficient to enable
the CA to pass upon her assigned errors even without the pleadings
and other portions of the records. To still deny due course despite
the MTC decision having substantially summarized their contents
was to ignore the spirit of the rule to give sufficient information to
the CA.
Since her petition focused only on questions of law (effects of the lack
of her consent, ant of consideration, and the conduct of the
foreclosure sale), it was plain that she was not assailing the
propriety of the findings of fact but only the conclusions reached
after their appreciation of the facts. In dealing with the questions
of law, the CA could simply refer to the attached decisions of the
MTC and the RTC.
61

SUCCESSION
Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of Fian (G.R. No. 201815, April 8, 2013)
Facts:
The Heirs of Fian refused to acknowledge the sale of 2 parcels of land
made by Spouses Fian to Spouses Mesina and are claiming
ownership over the same. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of
title entitled: Heirs of Sps. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina v.
Heirs of Fian, represented by Theresa Fian Yray.
The representative of the Heirs of Fian allege that the complaint has
no cause of action because it violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court. She contends that the Heirs of Mesina and the
Heirs of Fian could not be considered as juridical persons or
entities authorized by law to file a civil action. She maintains that
all the heirs should be individually named in the complaint and
since this was not complied with, she prays for the dismissal of the
action.
Issue: WON the failure to implead the other heirs in the complaint
62
warrants the dismissal of the action.

Held: No, the issue is about a non-joinder of an


indispensable party, not a failure of the complaint to
state a cause of action. The non-joinder of indispensable
parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At
any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times
as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a
party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If
the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss
the complaint for the plaintiffs failure to comply with
the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party
claimed to be indispensable.

63

SUCCESSION
Catedrilla v. Lauron (G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013)
Facts:
Petitioner Rey is a co-owner, along with other heirs, of a parcel of
land. He acquired the land via succession from his mother. Rey, as a
co-owner, filed with the MTC a Complaint for Ejectment against
herein respondents Lauron alleging that through the tolerance of
Reys co-owners, they constructed a building in a portion of the land
and occupied the same. Demands from the heirs to vacate the
premises were unavailing. One of the defenses raised by the Laurons
is that the complaint should be dismissed because it did not include,
as indispensable parties, Reys co-heirs who are co-owners of the land
in dispute. The MTC and RTC ruled in favor of Rey, while the CA,
reasoning that the co-owners (co-heirs) are indispensable parties,
reversed the RTCs Decision and dismissed the complaint for
ejectment.
Issue: WON co-owners (co-heirs) should be included as indispensable
parties in a complaint for ejectment
64

Held: No
A co-owner (co-heir) can file an action for ejectment
without impleading his co-owners as long as he does not claim
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. This is because based on
Article 487 of the Civil Code, any co-owner may bring such an
action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as
co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all.
Here, Rey filed the complaint for the purpose of
recovering possession of the land, which would redound to the
benefit of the co-owners. He did not file the action to claim
possession of the land for himself. He was acting on behalf of his
co-owners, who were also his co-heirs when his mother died.
Hence, there was no need to implead his co-owners as
indispensable parties for the action to prosper.
65

SUCCESSION
Garcia v. De Caparas (G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013)
Facts:
Heirs of Makapugay along with heirs of Eugenio filed a complaint
with the PARAD of Bulacan for the nullification of the leasehold
and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees against Dominga
(wife of one of the deceased heirs of Eugenio named Pedro) They are
praying that the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract between
Pedro and Amanda be nullified and that they be recognized as colessees, be allowed to cultivate the land as agreed upon.
Dominga then claimed that petitioners never assisted in the
farming of the land and that they have violated Sec. 38 of RA 3844
because their cause of action has prescribed. Dominga claims that
she has succeeded Pedros rights as lessee by operation of law and
prays that the complaint be dismissed.

Issue: WON Garcia and Salamat can claim to be co-lessees of the land
upon Pedros death
Held: No. The administrator, has the duty to make inquiries and66
choose within one month from Eugenios death, who would succeed
as agricultural lessee pursuant to Sec. 9 of RA 3844

First, there was no proof of the existence of the agreement


between Garcia and Salamat with Pedro that they would have
alternate turns in cultivating the land. Though there was a
verbal declaration to Amanda, there was no written
memorandum put forward.
Also, the fact that they only brought it 17 years after Pedro
was installed, SC upheld PARAD decision that petitioners
slept on their rights and are thus precluded from questioning
the leasehold contract.
The 1996 agreement between Amanda and petitioners are also
invalid as it is grounded on Pedros inadmissible verbal
admission and was entered into without obtaining Domingas
consent resulting to undue infringement of Domingas rights
as Pedros successor-in-interest. Under Sec. 7 of RA 3844,
Dominga is entitled to security of tenure and any modification
of the lease agreement must be done with the consent of both
parties (Sec. 16).
67

SUCCESSION
Calingasan v. Rivera (G.R. No. 171555, April 17, 2013)
Facts:

Husband and wife acquired several parcels of land


during their marriage. Wife died, leaving husband and their 2
children.
Husband waived his rights to the property in favor
of his daughters upon the execution of an extrajudicial settlement
of his wife's share in the conjugal estate. Husband reserved the
usufruct to himself. New TCTs were issued in the names of the
daughters with the husband's usufructuary rights annotated at the
back of the title.

After 10 years, husband files a forcible entry case


against daughter and the daughter's lessee. Pending the resolution
of the case, husband died.

68

Issue: Whether or not the death of husband rendered the


forcible entry case moot and academic
Held: A recovery of possession of real property is a real
action, hence, it cannot be extinguished by the death of a
party. The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive
between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is
enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased.

69

SUCCESSION
NHA v. Baello (G.R. No. 200858, Aug. 7, 2013)
Facts:
In 1951, Land Registration awarded to Pedro Baello and
Nicanora Baello Rodriguez the registration of land in Caloocan. This
land was subsequently exproprited by the NHA during the Martial
Law Period. After the People Power Revolution, Heirs of Baello
executed an extrajudicial partition of Baello's estate including the
Baello property, to which NHA opposed. But court ruled in favor of
the heirs.
NHA filed a complaint for nullity of the the O.C.T. During
the pendency of the case for nullity, Baello heirs filed an action for
recovery of possession and damages against NHA.

RTC ruled in favor of Baello heirs. It ruled for: (1) the dismissal of
the expropriation and declaration of nullity left NHA with no right
to hold possession of Baellos' property. (2) entitlement of the heirs to
compensation equal to the fair rental value of the property as well
as moral and exemplary damages.

70

Issues: (1) Whether the C.A. committed a reversible error in


finding that the NHA was a builder or possessor in
bad
faith
(2) Whether the C.A. committed a reversible error in
awarding damages to respondents
Held:
In determining whether a builder acted in bad faith the
rule in Art. 526 of the NCC shall apply. NHA not only acted in bad
faith but violated the Constitution for taking possession of the
property without just compensation and for waiting 14 years before
expropriating it. The Dagat-Dagatan project may have a laudable
purpose but the manner of taking it was scary, it was seizure by the
barrel of a gun.
Having established that the NHA acted in bad faith, the
C.A. did not err in sustaining the award of damages and attorney's
fees to respondents. It was also not entitled to reimbursement for
the improvement it introduced to the cproperty because of said bad
faith (Art. 449).

71

People v. Caballo (G.R. No. 198732, Jun 10, 2013)


Facts:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old. The two
became sweethearts. Sometime in 1998, Caballo persuaded AAA to have
sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by several more incidents
of sexual congress.

Issue: WON Caballo is guilty of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.


Held:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse
when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for
money, profit, or any other consideration; or (b) under coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Consent is not material in
cases under RA 7610.
Moreover, the abuse is punishable whether habitual or not. In the
case, Caballos actuations of assuring AAA of his love and promise to
marry may be classified as coercion and influence within the purview72
of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. These were meant to influence AAA to
set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with him,
in which he succeeded.

Dabalos v. RTC (G.R. No. 193960, Jan. 7, 2013)


Facts: Dabalos was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA
9262 before the RTC of Angeles City. The Information indicated
that Dabalos was the boyfriend of the complainant. The boyfriend
allegedly used personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her
hair, punching complainants back, shoulder and left eye. Dabalos
averred that at the time of the alleged incident on July 13, 2009, he
was no longer in a dating relationship with the complainant; hence,
RA 9262 was inapplicable. In her affidavit, the complainant
admitted that her relationship with petitioner had ended prior to
the subject incident.

73

Issue: WON RA 9262 should be construed in a manner that will favor


the accused.
Held:
In Ang v. Court of Appeals, the Court enumerated the
elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment,
to wit:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the
offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or
series of acts of harassment against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to her.
Notably, while it is required that the offender has or had a
sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman, for RA 9262 to
be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a
consequence of such relationship.
74

THANK YOU!
75

End of Presentation

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