MariePla&JrmeDouaud,forUrbanistesduMonde

Septembre2015

THEGOVERNANCEOFENVIRONMENTALISSUES
ATTHECITYLEVELOFBEIJING

CityofDatonginShanxiprovince,JrmeDouaud,2013

1.Ourstudy

Our goal was to examine the governanceofenvironmentalissuesatthecitylevelofBeijing:

we decided to focus on four fields in order to have a comprehensive understanding of this
complex network. Wethusstudiedmunicipalwastemanagement,greenbuildingcertificates,
energysupplyandenergymix,aswellasthetransportationsystem.
We will begin by discussing our findings regarding governance in Beijing before discussing
the four research topics we just mentioned to offer a wide perspective on environmental
issuesatthecitylevelofBeijing.

2.Methodology

This report is based on a monthlong fieldresearchinBeijingduringwhichwe intervieweda

variety of actors: NGOs, public agencies, private companies (involved either in energy
supply or urban services), a Tsinghua university professor and consulting firms. The short
duration of our stay and the difficulty we faced to meet officials both limited the scope and
quality of data we could gather. However, even if our research cannot always be based on
scientific data, we managed to gather enough information to propose a broad analysis of
environmentalgovernanceinBeijing.

3.Beijingscontext

Before analyzing the results of our research, we will begin by discussing thecharacteristics
ofthecityaswellasthesalienttraitsofitsgovernance.

Since Chinas rise as a major economic power, much attention has been drawn to air
pollution issues in its cities. Beijing, as the countrys capital and facing among the most
severe pollution conditions due to harsher winters than in the Southandthusabiggeruse
of coal for heating purposes, was particularly pointed to by foreign media. For instance,the
2008 Olympics raised concerns about athletes health because of the levels of air pollution
that were observed inthecityatthetimeandBeijingoftenmadeittotheheadlinesbecause
ofitsoutstandingconcentrationofPM2.5.
This context must be kept in mind as China, initsattemptto
attractforeigninvestors
,had
to tackle the issue of air pollution of its cities to make them more attractive therefore
achieving international standards was a key component of Chinas environmental
policy
.

Beijing is both Chinas capital and one of its leading cities, which implies that it is a crucial
display of Chinas success for the Chinese Communist Party as well as for the City
Government. This
double role leads to a problem of double governance and potentially
overlapping competencies as the CCP wants to keep the upper hand on the capitals
evolution.

This double governance can also be understood as a competition between the twoentities:
for instance, the announcement made lastyearofmovingpartsofthelocaladministrationto
the suburbs ofBeijing(Tongzhoudistrict)canbeseenasawaytokeeptheCitygovernment
at bay from local affairs. This competition between both governments partly explains the
governanceissuesthatthecityofBeijingfaces.

However Beijings peculiar governance features do not remove the city from the overall
trends that China is experiencing.Indeed,justlikeinotherChinese cities,nationaldynamics
of rural migrations and urban sprawl to serve the real estate sector feed Beijings growth.
Indeed, local governments are inclined to selling arable land to developers to inflate their
GDP growth figures: such phenomenon can be observed throughout China, and is key to
understanding Chinese urban dynamics. Our point here is to insist that despite Beijings
specificities,wecannourishouranalysiswithexamplesandcomparisonswithothercities.

4.Governance

As mentioned earlier, Beijing is a precious tool for the Chinese Central government to
showcase the countrys accomplishment: from what we could witness, policies were first
tested in a number of
pilot cities before, if successful, potentially being used in Beijing.
Indeed most actors that we met during our fieldtrip mentioned that they had projects in
various Chinese cities (Wuhan, for instance, with the French development agency and a
FrenchChinese intergovernmental project managed by Vivapolis) but rarely did they do so
in Beijing. This observation entails that
most policy innovations are not taking place in
thecapital,butratherintherestofthecountry.

Beijings governance is also characterized by the ambiguous and moving role attributed to
civil society and a strong compartmentalization of sectors, which we will illustrate further
below.

Civilsociety

NGOs are actors of urban governance throughout the country, collaborating with local
governments on specific projects (Greenpeace, WWF), as well as acting as consultants (in
the case of NRDC). For instance, the WWFisconductingalowcarboncityinitiativewitha
few cities like Baoding in Hebei where they implement concrete solutions to reduce
greenhouse gases emissions with a number of tools (the improvement of industrial
processes, the promotion of building efficiency or testing new finance instruments for
renewableenergyindustry).

China has undergone periods of liberalization as well asperiodsofhardeningoftheregime:

Xi Jinpings rule, the current CCP leader,fitsunder thesecondcategory.Publicparticipation
has long been astruggle:indeed,accordingtoNRDC (NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil),
public environmental litigation is illegal if you areanenvironmentalNGO.However,thegrip
on civil society tightens as a law is being drafted to revise the status ofinternational
NGOs
: the Foreign NGO Management Law1 would drastically limit the scope and
possibilities of action of these organizations. This political context has repercussions on
urbangovernanceaswell,leadingtoasignificantdecreaseincivilsocietyinvolvement.

Thelackof transparencymaysoundobviousundersucharegime,buttheimplicationsit has

with regards tourbangovernancedeserves someexplanation.Thisphenomenongoeshand
in hand with low public participation, as citizens may not even be made aware of urban
projects in their neighbourhood. According to Sinapolis (a research centre), the Guloudajie
urban renewal surprised inhabitants as they saw construction begin without having been
previously informed. It seems that
this lack oftransparencyis muchstrongerinBeijing
than in other Chinese cities, which can be linked to the issue of double governance we
discussedbefore.

Strongcompartmentalizationofsectorsandalackofintegratedthinking

Through the example of ecocities projects in China, we can highlight a structural problem
appearing in Chinese governance. Ecocities are still pioneer projects in China. Tianjin
sinosingaporian ecodistrict is among the most famous but the whole country developed
230 projects of this kind. However, none of these ecocities were successful: corruption for
instance appeared to be a major obstacle. Furthermore, the example of Dongtan ecocity
near Shanghai2, like many similar projects, faced a wider political problem. Following
Kenneth Lieberthals analysis (1997),relationsbetweenthegoverning structure andpolicies,
for instance environmental policies, are undermined by a
topdown fashion that divides
goals layerofgovernance by layerofgovernance. Taken from a traditional communist
vision of politics, it impedes a successful implementation of a lot of policies, not only
environmental ones. It induces that units of the same rank, on the same

Jngwifizhngfzzhgunlf
Englishtranslation:
http://chinadevelopmentbrief.cn/articles/cdbenglishtranslationoftheoverseasngomanagementlaws
econddraft/
2
EcocitiesinChina:EcologicalUrbanRealityorPoliticalNightmare?
,SilvioGhiglione&MartinLarbi,
JournalofManagementandSustainabilityVol.5,No.1February20,2015
1

layerofgovernance, cannot issue bindingorderstoothers

.Itisforexamplethe caseof
ministries, which cannot give any order to provinces. This creates mistrust in the overall
governance between different scales. It also can be seen as a way for peripheries to lie to
thecentre,whatincreasescorruption.

This analysis can be furthered through the works of Jonathan Schwartz (2003), who
demonstrates the different layers of law.
Fal3
, literally meaning Law/Act,ispublishedby
the State.Itsa vagueandgeneralAct,mostofthetimeexplaininggoalsbut notmeans.The
State Council then publishes
fagui,
followed by the Ministry, which publishes guizhang
(regulation). The periphery thus choose the tools it wants to use to determine regulations.
However, this system remains defective because of the lack ofcompliancewiththeStateto
ensurethatobjectivesareachieved.

For instance, even though the Central government hasacknowledgedenvironmentalissues

for quite a while (indeed, they makeupasignificantpartoftheBeijingmasterplansincethe
1970s),localauthoritiesremaincluelessastohowtoachieveenvironmentalgoals.
Thus, most ecocities were not successful because local authorities and the conceptors did
not understand local features (Silvio Ghiglione & Martin Larbi give the example of a
greencity project where garages were built in every house even though none of the
inhabitants owned cars). This can be at least partlyattributedtotheabsenceofconsultation
ofcivilsociety,whichwouldpreventsuchaberrations.

JingJinJigovernance

The creation of JingJinJi4, a megametropolitan region encompassing the cities of Beijing

and Tianjin as well as Hebei province (about 100 million people), has given rise to hopes
that Beijing will overcome its lack of integrated development. The main goals include a
better integration of transportation, governance and resource monitoring
, main
problems of Beijing we discussed beyond. It also includes a
more harmonious
development between Beijing and the closest regions
, since there is a tremendous
development gap between the city center and peripheries5 (Tianjin is a very important
harbour, concentrating storage, manufacturing and import capacities Hebei concentrates
most factories and agriculture resource of theregion).Though,evenifthisannouncementis
the core project of the coming revision of Beijingmasterplan,therealpowerandmeansthis
newadministrativeentityforBeijingandits surroundingwillhaveremainsunknown.Thelack
of information available on this project due to its early stage made it difficult to study it in
depth. No one actually knows which shape it will take, whether it be a new
layerofgovernance or just a stronger cooperation summit for existing administrations and
governments.Butitshouldbekeptinmindasatoolthathasthepotentialtotackleanumber
ofissuesthatwediscussinthisreport.

(law/act),(law/decree),(regulation)
,
Jngjnj
,forBeiJINGTianJINHebei(JIbeingasynonym)
5
http://www.lqz.cn/gsnews/tcxx/201507206748.html,
,,2015/07/20
3
4

5.MunicipalSolidWasteManagement(MSWM)

Waste is an insightful topic, as it illustrates both the consequences of a rising middle class
(an increase in waste output) as well as the governance capacities it then demands (waste
collectionpointsandcontroloverinformaldumpsites).

In Beijing, there is a dual waste management system whereby rubbishiscollectedeitherby

the municipality or by informal waste pickers. These two systems diverge with regards to
recycling: indeed, even though recycling bins were introduced in the city in2008,peopledo
not actually sort their waste. Urban dwellers do not separate because the waste did not
remain sorted in the collection process (inhabitants saw the different bins being emptied in
the same truck) at the time, probably due to the lack of infrastructure to implement it. The
municipality is thus faced with a prisoners dilemma: should it enforce a separate collection
despite the absence of sourcesorting? Would educating the public suffice? Or is there an
issueoflacktrustpreventingsuccessfulimplementation?
The states incapability in implementing sourcesorting makes wastepickers the major
actors inthisfield:itisestimated that
200,000informalcollectorscollectand recycle30%
ofBeijingswaste6.

The informal sector works differently and generates its income with recycling. An
underprivileged population is generally in charge of waste picking: this process includes
going door to door, rummaging through garbage cans, etc. They then sell it to the picker
while the waste collector works with bicycles, small vehicles or on foot,thepickertendsto
use a truck. Pickers arespecializedincertaintypesofwaste:plastic,glass,paper,etc.They
then sell their merchandise to buyers, so either to an informal landfill or through large
recyclingmarkets.

These markets, which used to be along the6thRingRoad,wereremovedbytheauthorities

before the 2008 Olympics and seem to have resurfaced further away from Beijing. Informal
landfills on the other hand, formed whatphotographerWangJiuliangcalledthe7thRingin
his 2008 project Beijing Besieged by Waste. He spent two years photographing and
pinning on a map the illegal dumpsites he encountered, amounting to the astonishing
numberofover500landfills.
These two examples illustrate the
displacement of environmental harm at play in waste
management: rubbish, andthetransactionsthatcomewithit,are pushedawayfromthe city.
There undeniably an issue of space: as the city expands, it is difficult to keep refuse within
its walls for sanitary reasons. Yet, the destructionofrecyclingmarketsalsoshowsapolitical
will to removetheinformaleconomy,eventhoughthere doesnotseemtoexistafitstructure
to replace it yet. However civil society seems to haveplayedaroleintheevolution ofwaste
management in Beijing: as we were told in an interview, rumor has itthatXiJinpinghimself
watched Wang Jiuliangs documentary and made it a priority to remove and transfer these
illegaldumpsites.

JudyLi,
WaysForwardfromChinasUrbanWasteProblem
,TheNatureofCities,2015
http://www.thenatureofcities.com
6

Figure1.WangJiuliang,BeijingbesiegedbyWaste,2008

The removal of recycling market and of taking in charge informal landfills brings a
considerable amount of waste in the hands of the city government. As Beijings current
landfills were designed ten to twenty years ago, and nowreceivetwicetheamountofwaste
they were planned for, they are not a fit solution to the problem. This situation lead the
government to turn to incineration: building an incineration plant is heavily subsidized,
therefore people have strong incentives to build such units. However incineration is not a
sustainable manner of dealing with waste in China, given the proportion of
food waste,
which ranges from 50 to 70% of municipal solid waste
: as a comparison, food waste
represents 13.9% of American municipal solid waste (Environmental Protection Agency).
Organic waste is difficult to burn, especially given the high concentration of oil in Chinese
food which demands higher temperatures to be consumed, and thus requires significant
quantities of coal to keep the incineration process going,leadingtohighgreenhousegases
emissions.

Another key aspect of this issue is the

production of waste itself
: as Beijings population
increases and has access tomassconsumption,wasteincreasesaswell.Thecityproduces
an estimated
twenty thousand tons of garbage a day
, and this figure
increases by 10%
every year
. The propaganda posters we could observe in Beijing mostly pointed to using
less energy and water, savingpaperand notwastingfood.Indeed,government effortsfocus
on individual behaviour shifts rather than tackling the consumer society framework that is a
major impediment to such evolutions. Dealing with the growth in waste output is a major
challenge for the municipality of Beijing, and we did not find strong evidence that it will be
doneinasustainableway.

6.Transportation

As the city is sprawling rapidly, the public transportation system is still growing and not
complete yet, as newsubwaylinesarestillbeing constructedeachyear.Beijingsubwayhas
the highest annualridershipintheworld,with3,41billionpeople7usingthesubwayperyear,
which translates into more than 9 million riderships a day. Three problems thus emergedin
the transportation system with Beijings development: a certain lack of intermodality, an
incompletepolycentricityofthecityandanincreasingrelianceontheprivatecar.

Lackofintermodalityofthepublictransportation

The citys governance lacks integrated thinking, as most decisions are taken by different
actors and are not coordinated. This phenomenon is particularly visible in the transport
sector when examining intermodality: bus stops and metro stops tend not to coincide,
illustrating the absence of collaboration between the relevant administrations and
companies.

Metro stations are also really far from each other: indeed, the average distance between
stations is about 2 km8 , while it is only about 570m in Paris9. As a consequence,
mixedmode commuting is a necessity for most Beijingers
,wholiveeither inresidential
areas somewhat far from metro stations or in the suburbs. The situation is even worse for
the latter, who have to rely onseveraldifferentmodesoftransportation(bicycle,shuttlebus,
publicbus,metro,taxi)foreverydaycommutes.

Beijings urban sprawl was encouraged by the fare ticket price, which cost 2 yuan (around
0,3) until 2014, when a distancepriced fare ticket was implemented. Thisdecision ledtoa
significantincreaseofthetransportshareinhouseholdsbudget.
All of these factors thus led to an increased reliance on theprivateautomobile,thesimplest
means of transport available in the city: caruse however has wellknown negative
externalities,suchasairpollutionandcongestionissues.

Incompletepolycentricity

Beijing 20042020 masterplan points out a dynamic of two axis two belts several
centers10. Beijing developed a kind ofincompletepolycentricity becauseoftwosuperposing
structures. The first structure is Beijings main road grid: this skeleton ismadeofconcentric
rectangles which are in fact the Beijing ring roads. The city road system is only built on
perpendicular avenues (for historical reasons). The most famous onesthusinspiredthetwo
axis:
the WestEast line, Changan Jie, with the political and military center on the West,
andtheeconomicandfinancialcenterontheEast
theNorthSouthline,thehistoriclinecrossingtheOlympicpark,oldtraditionalhutong
districts,TiananMenSquareuntiltheTempleofHeavenintheSouth.

,(20140212).
"2014
",
retrieved20150212
8
227stationsforasystemlengthof456kminBeijing
9
302stationsforasystemlengthof219,9kminParis
10

Figure2.Beijingmasterplanscheme,twoaxistwobeltsseveralcenters

The second important structure istheconsequenceofthedevelopmentof severalcentersin

the city, designed by successive master plans to avoid a massive cluster in the historic
citycenter. These different centers are responsible for specific sectors, such as hightech
and universities in the NorthWest, political in thecenter,financialintheEast,manufactures
in the SouthEast,etc.PolycentricityisperceivedasasolutiontoBeijingscongestionissues
bylocalauthorities.

However these different centers are not connected to each other efficiently: for instance,
distance from Zhongguancun hightech center to Guomao financial center takes about 40
minutes by metro and a little bit less by private car without traffic jam. It appears that the
citys polycentricity, thoughaddressingthecrucialissueofBeijingscongestion,wasplanned
without sufficiently acknowledging the existing road infrastructure and without providing the
requiredtransportationnetworkstoconnectnewcenters.

Planning for a polycentric development was a relevant way to address Beijings congestion
issues. However, the structural lack ofcommunicationbetweenthelocalDRC(development
and reform commission) and the Transportation department actually leads to a not
sufficientlyintegratedtransportsystem.

Figure3.MapofBeijinghighlightingthefiveinnerringsandmainroads

Increasedautomobiledependency

As we mentioned before, people often suffer from the lack of intermodality and thus resort
to multimodal commuting, using both public and private means of transportation. Chinas
economic growth also led to the emergence of a significant middle class in Beijing and
those who gain access to the consumer society have strong incentives to invest in a car in
order to overcome the citys inefficient transportation system. Therefore, the number of
private cars is increasing fast as the middleclass keeps on growing: the city has nowgone
past 6 millionprivatecars.50%ofthevehiclesontheroadonlyrepresent10%ofthetraffic11
, while 90% of the riderships on the road only represents 25% of the traffic, which implies
that most of the road space is taken up by private cars. Traffic jamsindeedhavebecomea
major issue in Beijing and congestion during peak hours becomes unbearable. As a
consequence, private cars became the first source of air pollution in the city,
representingaroundoneinfourPM2.5particles
inBeijing.

Despite the public health issues, it is difficult to stand against caruse in China because of
the importance of the car industry in thenationaleconomy.Indeed,theCentralGovernment
promotes internal market growth, and through for instance the purchase of Chinese
automobiles. Due tonational goals,reducingcarconsumptionisnotanobjectiveinspiteof
theacknowledgednegativeexternalitiesthatitleadstoinBeijing.

However, we witnessed innovations at the individual level to cope with Beijings mobility
issues that have positive externalities on the citys air pollution. For instance, a significant
number of urban dwellers ride electric scooters. It is difficult to obtain figures about electric
vehicles use since the legislation on vehicles from 1999 states that electric scooter are
illegal. Therefore this phenomenon points to astuteness and energy from Beijings citizens
individual initiatives, that ultimately result in a meaningful trend addressing issues ahead of
themunicipality.

The citysregulationonvehiclesalsoincludesalargepartonalternativecirculation,whereby
when pollution levels are highthreedaysinarow,alternativecirculationisenforceduntilthe

PollutionatmosphriqueetdveloppementurbainenChine
,BenjaminGuinot,Perspectives
chinoises,p6777,2008/4
11

10

air is breathable again. Beijing also tries to mitigate car emissions throughthedevelopment
of 3700 buses fuelled with natural gas inside the 5th Ring, the development of public
bicycles since 2011 echoing an international trend of developing this mode of
transportation, and the city government is considering developing a public electric car
systeminthenearfuture.

7.Greenbuildingsandconstruction

Beijings annual population growth was 3,8%12between2000and2010,sixtimesmorethan

the national average, and 4,61% between 2010 and 2015. The current population is
estimated to 21,5 millions inhabitants13 (2015), and the UN forecasts thecityspopulation to
reach27,7millionsinhabitantsin2030.
The fastgrowing urbanization of Beijing thus induced a massive need of investment in the
construction sector. Such a fast growing population creates a demand for housing, and a
need for new construction. While construction concentrated 12% of Beijing city overall
investments in thenineties,itreachedanastonishing50%ofthetotalinvestmentsofthecity
in200214.

Unregulatedconstruction

Beijing, unlike other Asian cities like Shanghai or Hong Kong, has developed horizontally
and not vertically. Historical reasons may explain a part of this choice, since the Hall of
Supreme Harmony in the Forbidden City (about 60 meters high) used to be the highest
building in Beijing and no building could overpass it as a form of respect to the imperial
power. Even if this tradition does not rule Beijing urban planning anymore, it still remains
relevant to a certain extent: most buildings in Beijing are massiveinwidth,but notinheight,
even if vertical buildings have developed since the late 2000s with the development of
GuomaoCBDandsuburbanresidentialareas.

Through thecomingrevisionoftheBeijingmasterplan15,thatshould bepublishedattheend

of 2015, the government announced its intention to change the big pancake spread 16
model of the last decades. The urban sprawl caused by the lack of regulated construction
induced a rarefaction of available land in Beijing municipality. Besides, horizontal urban
model is not energyefficient, because it increases pressure on energyandwaterresources
for the municipality. Control17 thus became the keyword of this coming revision. This
control can be declined in two different domains. On one hand, urban sprawl needs to be
limited by regulating real estate sector. Taxreformsandthelaunchofrenovationstodensify
12

Beijingpopulationdata:
http://www.geopopulation.com/20110714/demographiechinelapopulationdepekinaugmente6foispl
usvitequelamoyennenationale/
13
Though,lotsofinterviewedpeopledonotbelievetothisfigurebecauseofthemigrantworkersand
peoplenotregisteredtothe
hukou
system,Chinacityregistrationsystem.Mostofthepeoplesay
Beijingspopulationisupto23or24millionsinhabitantsnowadays.
14
cf.Beijingcitymasterplan20042020,
:
http://www.bjghw.gov.cn/web/static/catalogs/catalog_233/233.html
15

http://news.sina.com.cn/c/20140805/023930630164.shtml
,,
,2014/08/05
16

tuidabing
,thechineseexpressionusedbypoliticstoevokehorizontalurbansprawl
17

kongzhi

11

Beijing citycenter will be decisive actions to regulate this sector. Onthe otherhand,energy
and resources uses are not sustainable anymore. The construction sector thus need to
implement higher environmental standards, through the tools of green buildings certificates
forinstance.

Ataxreform?

The tax system in China18 has an important impact on investments and governance at the
citylevel. The complexity of the tax system lies in the tax sharing system19, implementedin
1994, that enables transfer between local and central governments. Since Chinas
administration is based on five layersofgovernance (central government, provincial
government, city, county, village), this division induces a heavy cost on the State financial
balance. According to Lou Jiwei20, in 2011, 85% of the governmental expenses are
transferred to local governments. Besides, local governments are expensive and inefficient,
because of the cost of civil servants first (on 8 million civil servants in China, only 6% work
for the central government), but also because of their wide range of activities such as
monitoringthepensionsystem.
Therefore even if local governments receive a considerable amount of money from the
central government, they have a real need for autofinancing to achieve their objectives
becauseofstructuralinefficiency.Thisneedhasbeensatisfieduntilnow,above allinremote
regionsbutalsoinBeijingsuburbs,throughsellinglandtorealestate developerswithoutany
environmental consideration. As a result, tremendous residential areas have been
constructed in the suburbs, favorising urban sprawl, creating pressureonlandresourceand
evenleadingtoghostcitieslikeOrdosinInnerMongolia.

As a solution, a new tax reform implementing a property tax in the whole country may be
implemented in 201721, after Chongqing and Shanghai pilotcities have experienced itsince
2011. This property tax aims at giving negative incentives to limit the real estate boom and
investments. If the tax goes to the local government, it may also be a new solution for
autofinancing. However, experts are divided on the impact of this property tax22, that could
indeedlimitconstructionbutalsoinducehigherpricesanddistortthecurrentmarket.

Developmentofgreenbuildingcertificates

As standards evolved in a lot of countries, China is also developing more and more green
building certificates. Certificates aim at encouraging developers to follow higher
environmental standards, gathering a wide range of criteria for energy efficiency such as
automatic lightning systems, materials and window quality, reducing heating and cooling
losses andsoon.Chinahasitsofficialstandardcalled
GreenBuildingLabellingSystem
23
(GBL) . Itwaslaunchedin2006toidentifyenergyefficientbuildingswithanawardofoneto
three stars. The system distinguishes two different labels: the Green Design Label and the
LafiscalitenChine:dunerformelautre
,RomainLafarguette,etHeweiZhou,14avril2012,
ChinaAnalysis,no.38
19

fenshuizhi
20
Lareconstructiondelarelationdugouvernementcentraletdesgouvernementslocaux
,Lou
Jiwei,31mars2012,Caijing,
21

http://french.china.org.cn/china/txt/201411/04/content_33963113.htm
:laChineprvoitdintroduirela
taxefoncireen2017,LiangChen,2014
22

XiangHuaicheng:Larformesurlepartagefiscalnestpasencorefinie,
MaGuochuan,2012
Caijing
23

lsejianzhupingjiabiaozhun
18

12

Green Operations Label. The first one can be obtained straight after the launch of the
project, whereas the building has to operate for one year atleastafterthecompletionofthe
project to obtain the second one. Thus, it is notsurprisingthattherehavebeen1,471green
design labels in China since 2006 against only 99greenoperationlabelsawardedsincethe
design label has a lower threshold. A few building applicants distinguish themselves for
taking the lead in this development, such as Wanda, specialised in public and commercial
buildings, but also Wanke or Greenland, more focused on residential areas. For some
developers looking for a wider recognition, international certificates may be preferred for
higher standards and operation controls. The american US certificate, named LEED for
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design, is the most famous one in China. For
instance,theOlympicvillageappliedtothiscertificate.

Such certificates can be understood as marketing tools for real estate developers, as
environmental concerns have also morphed into a wide range of international norms.
However the environmental impact of certain green building certificates may be
questioned: indeed, a number of them are awardedbeforeconstruction starts,basedonthe
buildings plans, and there is no followup ensuring that these plans were executed.
Therefore, green building certificates can be used as a marketing argument without
necessarily having to pay the real cost of respecting the high environmental norms.
Moreover, as these environmental standardsarecostly,developerscanalsoaddapremium
to the buildings price and benefit economically from this situation. Though pessimistic, this
scenario only aims at pointing to the loopholes of green building certificates: we are not
arguing that developers never keep their commitments, but rather that there is little
constrainttodoso.

Eventually, if cities like Shanghai showed a real interest in green certificates, as the
government settled a goal to reach 30% public green buildings by the end of 201524 , green
buildings development sometimes seems to be closer to a showcase development since
most buildings in China have really poor energy conservation systems. But the green
refurbishment of existing buildings may turn into areallyinterestingbusinessinthenextfew
yearsastheconstructionboomisslowing.

8.Energyconservationandindustrialshift

Since coal consumption is one of the maincausesofairpollutioninBeijing,thegovernment

tookactiontochangetheenergymixatthecitylevel.

Individualinitiativesmotivatedbyeconomicincentives:theexampleofsolarwaterheaters

The rapid development of solar water heaters (solar panels placed on individual rooftops)
reduces the demand for fossilfuel energy. They can be found in alotofresidentialareasin
Beijingandaboveallinthevillagessurroundingthemunicipality.
Solar water heaters spread much faster than photovoltaic power plants because PV plants
need to beconnectedtothecityelectricitypowergridandsoldfirsttothegridcompany(and
there is no debate around autoconsumptionyet),whilesolarwaterheatersareautonomous
and economical. This example illustrates the
existence of individual initiatives which,put
together,formagreatertrendofcleanerenergysources.
24

www.econetchina.com

13

Anewregulatoryframetoreducecoaluseandcarbonemissions

The city began a shift in energy supply at the end of the nineties. A cityscale plan in 1998
made for the Olympic Games appliance included a rapid increase to gas consumption25 for
domestic use instead of coal. The lastlawin2014alsoforbidstreetbarbecuesusingcoalto
restrainsmallparticlescausingairpollution.
Different announcements and reglementations also illustratethegovernmentswilltoensure
a cleaner air in Beijing municipality. Factories, including coal factories but also all kind of
polluting industries have been little by little relocated far away from the city center. In2014,
all coal factories producing under 400 MW were closed. The bigger ones were moved out
from the 5th Ring Road. Only two exceptions remain: the two autonomous coal factories of
Tsinghua and Beida University. Such exceptions may be understood as a result of the
complexity of Chinese multilevelgovernancewe evokedbefore,whichputsBeijingslargest
universities at the same level as the municipality: they are thus not obliged to enforce
citylevelreglementations.
Relocation of coal factories will continue until 2017, since a recent announcement from the
government promised to completely remove coal from the municipality by this date. The
energy mix will thus replace electricity from coal withelectricityfromgasfor70% ofthetotal
supplyofBeijingselectricityby2017.
However these decisions do not mean that coalfueled energy will disappear from the
country, but rather that coal factories are displaced from Beijing to other regions, like the
surrounding province of Hebei. Therefore the evolution of Beijings energy supply may not
improve overall air quality as much asexpected:itcanbeconsideredasa
displacementof
environmental harm
, as Beijings air quality may improve but poorer regions could suffer
fromanincreasedrelianceoncoal.
China seems willing to better Beijings energysupply,butdoesnothavethemeanstodoso
in the rest of the country. These policies therefore have an impact on a small geographical
area andarelimitedat awiderscale,buttheyremainrelevantenoughatthe citylevel.Other
actions and reglementations are also implemented in additiontorelocationpolicies,suchas
coal washing and quality reglementation for instance. In the end, even if control is not fully
implemented,thesituationstilltendstobeimproving.

Alongpathontothesmartcitytechnology

Beijings electricity transmission system remains old and not efficient enough. For example,
most of the public buildings and residential areas still work on a central heating system.
Thus, electricity supply and demand are all managed by central authorities, and there is no
economic incentives to regulate consumption or promote energy efficiency. This central
heating system also prevent from developing new smart grid technologies to improve
customersenergyefficiency.

The heating and cooling systems could also be improved. Several foreign companies try to
implement their technologies in China. However because of the regulation system,
cogeneration26 and trigeneration27 urban grids were not successful, because the law does

HaoJ.M.etWangL.T.,
ImprovingUrbanAirQualityinChina
,J.Air&WasteManage.Assoc.,
55,2005,p.12981305.
26
Cogeneration:alsocalledcombinedheatandpower(CHP).Cogenerationistheuseofheatengineor
powerstationusedtogenerateelectricityandusefulheatatthesametime.
25

14

not oblige linking buildings to heating or cooling systems, and there are no economic nor
ethicsincentivetodoso.

9.Casestudy:WilltheShougangprojectbringaboutashiftforurban
governance?

Figure4.ApictureoftheShougangindustrialsiteinBeijing

The Shougang corporation is an emblematic stateowned enterprise of Beijing for it is the

second most important steel company in the country. Because of the Olympics plan to
control air pollution, the 8,63 km2 factory, close to the 6th ring ofBeijingcity,was relocated
inHebeiprovincein2005.

The Shougang case is interesting for urban governance as it seems todifferfrom anyother
case in Beijing before. The industrial site was supposed to be demolished since 2005, but
the corporation managed to obtain specific ownership rights in January 2014 as Shougang
was deemed industrial patrimony. Thus, the local government was not abletotake control
of the site nor to demolish it, and the Shougang corporation started a reconversion of this
industrial site. The combination of a private initiative, or at least not ruled by the
government, and the the effective enforcement of patrimony law in China are already two
componentsshowingasignificantchangeinurbangovernance.
Our interest for Shougangprojectdoesnotstopinthose twopointsthough,sincethe
company is trying to implement since 2014 the new Shougang hightech area that would
essentially concentrate tertiary activities. The government has already approved the new
urban plan of the area. The new project would include an important transportation
development with 3 metro lines, 5 metro stations and a tramway line. It also includes an
ambitious environmental programme.Throughthisproject,Beijingcitywould like tointegrate
the C40 club where it is already an observer city28 . The C40 is the world urban initiative
encouraged with the COP21 for sustainable cities innovations. Thus, the Shougang project
27

Trigeneration:alsocooledcombinedcooling,heatandpower(CCHP):simultaneousgenerationof
threekindofpower(electricity,usefulheatingandcooling)usedfromthecombustionofafuelorthanks
toasolarheatcollector.
Thetwoprevioustechnologies(cogenerationandtrigeneration)aremoresustainableandefficientsince
itenablestokeepenergylossesduringthecombustionofafuel.Besides,heatingandcoolingsystem
transportationaremoreefficientthananelectrictransportationwouldhave.
28

http://www.c40.org/cities/beijing/blog_posts

15

could be a successful initiative since it is already incooperationwithafewresearchcenters

like Tsinghua University for green buildings or the english laboratory ARUP for climate
questions. It could also induce a new decentralised energy company to organise a positive
energy system with a new distribution system operator created by the Shougang
corporation.
Though apparently unique, Shougang is showing the
rise of a new kind of
environmental governance encouraged by economical and political opportunities,
introducingnewstakeholdersintheurbangovernanceinChina.

Figure5.PlanelaboratedforShougangnewservicedistrict.ThedistrictiscrossedbytheWestEast
ChanganAvenue,whichisthebiggestwesteastaxiscrossingBeijing.

10.Conclusion

Despite significant efforts to rely on cleaner energy sources,

displacement of
environmental harm
remains a powerful analytical tool to understand Beijings
environmental governance. Indeed, the city is a showcase of Chinas successes for the
Chinese Communist Party, while the surrounding region of Hebei remains unknown.
Monitoring air pollution at the city level proves insightful, but it hides the deepening
inequalitiesthatmayimprovethesefigureswithintheurbanarea.

Beijings embodiment of the countrys achievement also has perverse effects

,
particularly in the construction sector, with a growing number of green building certificates
16

that are awarded based on plans and not on the finished product, and on waste
management, as informal recycling structures were removed and refuse is now being dealt
withthroughincineration.

The city is also embedded in a complex net of doublegovernancebetween theCCPand

the municipal authorities. The hold of the central government on Beijing is therefore much
stronger than in other Chinesecities,thusleadingto alowerparticipationofcivilsociety.For
instance, NGOs andevenforeignprivatecompaniesoftendirectedprojectsin pilotcities
but rarely did they intervene in the capital. The
Foreign NGO Management Law
, currently
beingdrafted,shouldhinderthecapacityoftheseactorstointerveneevenmore.

Environmental issues also pose the question of

awareness to these problems: there is
undoubtedly an issue of individual consumption (level of waste output, automobile
dependency) and thus awareness at the individual level. Local governments also lack a
longterm commitment to addressing environmentalissues:incentivestoreduce airpollution
are marketbased (make the city more attractive), what often lead to a displacement of
environmentalharmtosurroundingregionsratherthaneliminatingtheproblematitssource.

In spite of these considerable challenges paving the path to environmental governance,

there are reasons to be optimistic: indeed, a number of bottomup trends such as electric
scooter use and reliance on solar water heaters have positive externalities in reducing
greenhouse gases emissions. Chai Jings documentary
Under the Dome (February 2015)
was watched by over 300 million Chinese people within aweekafteritsrelease:thefilm did
not only point to the governments responsibilities, but also aimed to trigger individuallevel
action and awareness. Though our analysis of Chinese civil societys prospects is rather
gloomy, we must not overlook the impact activists, NGOs and filmmakers still have today,
as well as the potential translation of their action into public action,such asWangJiuliangs
BeijingBesiegedbyWaste
thattriggeredinformaldumpsitesremovalbythegovernment.

In a nutshell, two main conclusions may be drawn from our research. Unlike Western
countries where citizens initiatives to mitigate greenhouse gases emissions are welcome,
Chinas environmental protection path lies in
a stateled environmentalism (Shapiro
2012) where governance is highly centralized. This induces a number of issues that we
raised throughout this report, but the central government is adapting quickly to rising
environmental concerns, for instance through the 12th Five Year Plan (20112015),
consideredthegreenestinChinesehistory.

Secondly, the environmental showcase that we witnessed in Beijing could lead us to

believe that China is not actually tackling this problem. However Beijings air pollution has
actually started to decrease, and it seems on track to continue to do so. The question now
lies in
whether JingJinJi will bring about a change in governance and lead to less
displacementofenvironmentalharm.

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