People v.

Tan
G.R. No. 177566, March 26, 2008
Tinga, J.
FACTS: Armed men forcibly boarded Ruiz Saez Co into a car while he was just taking
his meal outside his companys premises. He was handcuffed and blindfolded while
inside the car. After driving an hour, Ruiz was led out of the car, brought inside a house,
and locked into a room. A certain Ka Rudy told him that he had just been kidnapped in
exchange for Php 40 Million for his freedom. Meanwhile, Mrs. Sonia Co received a call
from the Vice Mayor of Cabuyao, Laguna that her son had been kidnapped. She
immediately called Vice-President Estrada to seek assistance. Mrs. Co finally received
a call from the alleged kidnapper who identified himself as Ka Rudy. The latter
confirmed that Ruiz was in his custody and the demand money was lowered to Php 1.2
Million after negotiations. After surveillance, a team of policemen were able to locate the
place where Ruiz was being held captive. Police Officer Cesar Mancao, the head of the
surveillance team, recounted that seven persons were arrested. Also, there were
several high-powered firearms that were recovered from the house.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the appellants guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of kidnaping with ransom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants committed the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
HELD: No. The primary element of kidnapping is actual confinement, detention and
restraint of the victim. There must be showing of actual confinement or restriction of the
victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor. Hence, having
proen that detention was perpetrated by appellants, it is sufficient to convict them of the
crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. However, the demand for ransom
was not clearly attributed to any of the appellants. Ruiz divulged that the deman for
ransom was intimated to him by a certain Ka Rudy. Mrs. Co, in her testimony,
corroborated this fact, when she declared that they were able to negotiate the amount of
ransom from Php 40 Million to Php 1.2 Million in a series of calls made by Ka Rudy and
a female caller. But the duo was never ascertained to be any of the appellants. Thus,
we are constrained to reverse the judgment of the trial court and appellate court
judgment in convicting appellants of kidnapping for ransom.

People v. Rodrigo
G.R. No. 173022, January 23, 2007
Tinga, J.
FACTS: On 10 September 1996, Oliver Caparas, then 13 years of age, was waiting for
a ride to school when four men forcibly seized and boarded him into a car wherein he
was blindfolded and taken to Baguio. The next day, Eleazar Caparas received a call
from the kidnappers asking for Php 10 Million ransom in exchange for the release of his
son, Oliver. In the meantime, the kidnappers went to Bonitas Resort in Pangasinan.
After three days of negotiation, the kidnappers agreed to lower the ransom money to
Php 1.7 Million. Through Olivers uncle, the kidnapper were able to receive the money.
Then, they brought Oliver to a Petron Gas Station in Meycauayan Highway, gave him
money and told him his uncle inside a canteen in the gas station would fetch him. After
the kidnapping incident, an investigation was conducted by the Intelligence Section of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Malolos, Bulacan, through SPO2 Epafrodito
Aliling and SPO2 Antonio Chungtuyco. It appears that one of the suspects was a
member of an NPA rebel returnee group headed by Armando Rodrigo, Jr. Upon the
killing of Bert Liwanag, his girlfriend, dela Cruz, who was a suspected member of the
group, was invited for questioning. On that occasion, she admitted her participation in
the kidnapping of Oliver Caparas and implicated appellants.
ISSUE: Whether or not elements constituting the crime of kidnapping are present to
convict appellants of the said crime.
HELD: Yes. Under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of Kidnapping is
committed with the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (1) that the offender
is a private individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; and (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
and (4) that in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
present: (a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than five days; or (b) that it is
committed simulating public authority; or (c) that any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d)
that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public officer. It is evident
from the testimonies of the witnesses that the essential elements of kidnapping were
present. First, appellants are private individuals. Second, Oliver was abducted by four
armed men. Third, he was detained in a house in Pangasinan against his will. Fourth,
the detention lasted for seven days. Fifth, Oliver Caparas was a minor at the time of the
kidnapping incident.

Madsali, et al. v. People

G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010
Peralta, J.
FACTS: After a confrontation between the victim and her aunt Inon Dama while fetching
water, the appellant (Maron) and his father (Sajiron) appeared suddenly in the victims
house with a gun and told the victim to come with them. When she refused, Sajiron and
Maron tied her hands behind her back, covered her mouth with a piece of cloth, and
brought her to the forest. There, Sajiron had carnal knowledge with the victim against
her will while Maron stood guard and watched them. They left the forest and brought the
victim to the house of Egap, where she was detained in a room. Sajiron instructed Egap
to guard the victim and to shoot her if she would attempt to escape. A day after, the
victims mother came to get her; unfortunately Egap refused and threatened to kill her
daughter if she would report the matter to the authorities. Out of fear of losing her
daughter, she went home and did not report the incident to the police authorities. Egap
asked the victim if she wanted to marry Sajiron, but she refused. She was then forced to
sign an unknown document, which she was not able to read. Nine days after she and
Sajioron were married by Imam Musli Muhammad. After the marriage, she and Sajiron
lived in the house of Egap. While detained, she did not try to escape because her house
was very far from the place where she was held captive, and her captors threatened to
kill her and her family if she would attempt to escape. Months after the marriage, Sajiron
and Egap were arrested by the police.
ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed was kidnapping and serious illegal
detention.
HELD: Yes. Further perusal of the allegations in the information appears that the crime
charged was actually the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and rape, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
The crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing a person in an
enclosure, but also of detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty. For
there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Its
essence is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of
the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. In this case, although the victim was
not actually confined in an enclosed place, she was clearly restrained and deprived of
her liberty, because she was tied up and her mouth stuffed with a piece of cloth, thus,
making it very easy to physically drag her to the forest away from her home.

People v. Silongan
G.R. No. 137182, April 24, 2003
Per Curiam
FACTS: For automatic review is the decision of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 103,
convicting appellants Abdila Silongan, Macapagal Silongan, Akmad Awal, Rolly
Lamalan, Sacaria Alon, Jumbrah Manap and Ramon Pasawilan of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention and sentencing them to suffer
death penalty. Appellants, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap Alexander Saldana,
America Rejuso, Jr., Ervin Tormis and Victor Cinco for the purpose of demanding
ransom in the amount of Php 12 Million, detaining and depriving Alexander Saldana of
his personal liberty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the appellants has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt that kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom.
HELD: Yes. The essence of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as
defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is the actual deprivation
of the victims liberty coupled with proof beyond reasonable doubt of an intent of the
accused to effect the same. It is thus essential that the following be established by the
prosecution: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention
or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the four
circumstances enumerated in Article 267 be present. But if the kidnapping was done for
the purpose of extorting ransom, the fourth element is no longer necessary. The
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the kidnapping was
committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from Alexander, as to warrant the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty. It is not necessary that there be actual
payment of ransom because what the law requires is merely the existence of the
purpose of demanding ransom.

People v. Suriaga
G.R. No. 123779, April 17, 2002
Per Curiam
FACTS: On February 22, 1995, an information was filed with the RTC charging Ruben
Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera with kidnapping for ransom and serious
illegal detention committed as follows: That on January 22, 1995, accused Ruben
Suriaga, Rosita Dela Cruz, conspiring together, kidnapped and took away Nicole
Ramos, a two-year old female child, without the consent of her parents, for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the latter, and thereafter, detained her and deprived her of her
freedom and liberty up to and until 4:30 in the afternoon of the following day. Joel
Isidera, having learned of the kidnapping and without having participated therein as
principal or accomplice, took part by assisting the principal accused to profit by the
effects of the crime by accompanying and driving for accused Ruben Suriaga to the
place where the pay-offs was made and receiving the ransom money in the amount of
Php 100,00.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ruben Suriaga is guilty of kidnapping for ransom.
HELD: Yes. The essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victims liberty,
coupled with indubitable proof of the accuseds intent to effect the same. And if the
person detained is achild, the question that needs to be addressed is wehter there is
evidence to show that intkaing the child, there was deprivation of the childs liberty and
that it was the intention of the accused to deprived the mother of the childs custody.
Undoubtedly, the elements of kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a private
individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking permission from her father;
2) appellant took the gilr and brought her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived, without
informing her parents of their whereabouts; 2) he detained the child and deprived her of
her liberty by failing to return her to her parents overnight and the following day; and 4)
he demanded a ransom of Php 100,000 through telephone calls and gave instructions
where and how it should be delivered.

People v. Llaguno
G.R. No. 91262, January 28, 1998
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Appellant Judy Reyes, together with two others, was charged in an Information
with the following: that said accused, armed with firearm, conniving and confederating
together and mutually helping with one another, with deliberate intend, did then and
there kidnap and detain one Bienvenido Mercado, and while under detention, with intent
to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and
unexpectedly shot said Bienvenido Mercado with said firearm, hitting him on the vital
part of his body, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries as a consequence of which
he died a few days later. Although appellant, was charged with kidnapping with murder,
the trial court convicted him only of murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. The trial court did not, however, find him liable for serious
illegal detention under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code because the victim was
detained only for one day.
ISSUE: Whether or the trial court is erred in not finding accused liable for illegal
detention.
HELD: Yes. The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently proves
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence presented by the
prosecution, which was sustained by the trial court, clearly established that appellant
had in fact detained the victim without authority to do so. Banzon testified that he
witnessed the victim hanging by the arms in appellants room. Banzons testimony
significantly jibes with the physical evidence showing that the victim sustained multiple
abrasions in both arms. Furthermore, Dr. Ceniza narrated that several employees called
her up in the morning of February 5, 1987 asking for permission to go home because
there was a man hanging at the back in one of the buildings of GF International. Dr.
Cenizas testimony was unrebutted. All these ineludibly prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the victim was deprived of his liberty by appellant.
It must be emphasized that appellant was charged with the special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder, not of two independent charges of kidnapping and murder. In a
complex crime, although two or more crimes are actually committed, they constitute
only one crime in the eyes of the law as well as in the conscience of the offender.
Hence, in deciding this appeal, the Court is not confined to the conviction for murder;
rather, the scope of its review encompasses the offense charged in the information,
which the prosecution sought to prove. It is a well-settled doctrine that an appeal throws
the whole case wide open for review and empowers (even obligates) the appellate court
to correct such errors as may be found in the appealed judgment even if they have not

been assigned.When an accused appeals, he stands for a new trial of the whole case.
Since the information charged the complex crime of kidnapping with murder, the acts
constituting slight illegal detention were necessarily included in the information, and may
thus be validly taken into account in the resolution of the present appeal. Manifestly,
appellant was fairly apprised of the nature of the crime of slight illegal detention and
granted a fair opportunity to defend himself. At this juncture, we deem it significant to
reiterate that the trial court merely made a finding that appellant could not be convicted
of serious illegal detention for the sole reason that the victims detention did not exceed
five days. The court a quo, however, found that appellant illegally detained the victim for
at least one day, which act by itself constitutes slight illegal detention. Besides, the trial
court appreciated the act constituting slight illegal detention as a qualifying
circumstance, i.e., employing means to weaken the defense. While we find no proof
beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction for murder, the records indisputably
prove culpability for slight illegal detention

People v. Dadles
G.R. Nos. 118620-21, September 1, 1997
Francisco, J.
FACTS:Appellant Narito alias Naring Dadles was charged in two separate informations,
to wit: That on or about 24 th of May 1989, in the Municipality of Binalbagan, Province of
Negros Occidential, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
first above-named accused, in company of his five other co-accused, whose true names
are still unkown and herein designated only as Ka Morito, Ka Willy, Ka Dindo, Ka Mike
and Ka Juanito, who are still at large, aremed with assorted firearms of unknown
claibers, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take,
kidnap, detain, and keep Alipio Tehidor and Dioniso Tehidor and bring them somewhere
in the hinterlands of said municipality, under restraint and against their will, without
proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victims of their civil liberties since then
up to the present. The trial court rendered a decision convictin the appellant of two
counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
ISSUE: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting appellant with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.
HELD: Yes. Based from the evidence presented during the trial, the appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping the victims. However, since none of the
circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping with
serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping was established,
we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code.

People v. Pastrana
G.R. No. 143644, August 14, 2002
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS: The RTC of Manila Branch 18 convicted Pastrana of violating Article 270 of the
Revised Penal Code, or the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and
imposed the penalty reclusion perpetua. In 1997 she was entrusted with the care of
Willy, a nine year old boy by the mother Erma who works as an OFW in Canada.
Because of Ermas failure to fulfill the demands for financial support for Pastranas water
pump and for processing of papers for work in Singapore, Pastrana brought the boy to
her apartment in Tondo. He was declared missing by the relatives and the mother had
to come home to the Philppines.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused committed the crime of Kidnapping and failure to return
Minors
HELD: Yes. Said offense requires that 1) the offender is entrusted with custody of minor
and 2) the offender fails to restore the minor to his parents or guardians. Pastrana used
the boy as pawn when demand for money was refused by Erma. Failure to return the
boy consummated the crime. Wherefore, Pastranas conviction is affirmed with penalty
of reclusion perpetua with modification and reduction of moral and nominal damages in
the sum of Php 150,000 with 6% interest per annum.

People v. Ty
G.R. No. 121519, October 30, 1996
Kapunan, J.
FACTS: Accused-appellants Ty own, administer and manage St. Johns Clinic in
Caloocan. In 1987, complainant Johanna Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella,
then only seven months old, for treatment in the hospital of accused-appellant. The
infant was diagnosed with bronchitis and diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to
confine the former at the clinic for speedy recover. A week later, when the infant was
fully recovered, the complainant came back but did not have enough money to pay the
hospital bill in the amount of Php 300. She confided to Dr. Carmen Ty about her
situation and the latter suggested to leave the infant to the nursery. But the complainant
was never heard of again. Five years after abandoning her infant, complainant returned.
She filed a petition for habeas corpus and a criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellants committed the crime of Kidnapping and
failure to return a minor.
HELD: No. To be convicted for kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270
fo the Revised Penal Code, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender has
been entrusted with the custody of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to
restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The essential element herein is that the
offender is entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is actually punishable is not
the kidnapping of the minor, but rather the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian
of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. Said failure or refusal must
not only be deliberate but also be persistent as to oblige the parents or the guardians of
the child to seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain custody. In the case at bar, it is
evident that there was no deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the accusedappellants to restore the custody of the complainants child to her. When the accusedappellant learned that complainant wanted her daughter back after five (5) long years of
apparent wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein complainant find the child
as the latter was no longer under the clinics care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did not have
the address of Arabellas guardians but as soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga
who was already working abroad, she personally went to the guardians residence and
informed them that herein complainant wanted her daughter back. When the guardians
refused to return the child, accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which conducted a conference among the parties
but since a case was yet to be filed, the custody of the minor remained with the
guardians. Wherefore, appellants are acquitted.

People v. Roluna
G.R. No. 101797, March 24, 1994
Puno, J.
FACTS: An information was charged against eight persons for the crime of Kidnapping
with Murder before the RTC, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. One of those charged was
accused-appellant Abundio Roluna. The information against them reads as follows: That
on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of Baybay, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with the use
of firearms and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Moronia and take him away to
a place unknown up (to) this time whereat said victim was killed.
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, finding Roluna guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex rime of Kidnapping with Murder. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented is sufficient to establish that accusedappellant and his companions were liable for the offense charged.
HELD: No. An accused is presumed innocent until proven otherwise. No less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On the whole, the evidence
adduced by the prosecution would not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that accusedappellant should be convicted for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of
Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime,
more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its commission. Thus, since
the generic aggravating circumstance of band attended the commission of the crime
and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period as maximum and prision mayor as minimum should be imposed on
accused-appellant.

People v. Mendoza
G.R. No. L-67610, July 31, 1989
Fernan, C.J.
FACTS: Information charged Angelina Mendoza Ramos with the crime of Kidnapping
and Failure to Return a Minor. The information contained the following: That on or about
September 28, 1982, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being a private
individual and without authority of law did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously
and illegally kidnap and carry away EDWARD POLICARPIO, a one year and three
months old baby boy, for the purpose of selling him and separating him from his mother,
Mrs. EUGENIA T. POLICARPIO, by then and there, befriending the said child and his
parents at the Luneta Park, this City, carrying him away without the knowledge and
consent of his said parents, and deliberately failing to return him to said Eugenia T.
Policarpio, his mother.
Giving full credence to the prosecution version and rejecting as incredible and
unacceptable the defense of the accused-appellant that the minor child Edward was
voluntrarily given to her by his parents to take care of, the trial court convicted accusedappellant of the crime of kidnapping a Minor in violation of Article 270 of the Revised
Penal Code. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting accused with kidnapping of a
minor.
HELD: Yes. While the Information against accused-appellant is captioned "Kidnapping
and Failure to Return a Minor", the allegations in the body thereof properly constitute
the crime of kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. Thus, instead of alleging the
elements of kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor that the offender had been
entrusted with the custody of a minor person and that said offender had deliberately
failed to restore the latter to his parents or guardians, the text of the Information alleged
the elements of the crime of kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267
of the Revised Penal Code
It is well-settled that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
facts in the complaint or information.

People v. Santos
G.R. No. 140074, February 27, 2002
Vitug, J.
FACTS:

Information was filed against respondent for the crime of Kidnapping and

Serious Illegal Detention. According to the complainant Leonida de la Pea, after a

confrontation in her house between her and the accused, she was flanked by another
accused and was forced to ride a vehicle and was threatened to be killed by her
captors. After presenting evidence to during the trial, the lower court rendered a
decision convicting the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping. The lower court based their decision on the ground that the deprivation of
private complainant Leonida de la Pea of her liberty, regardless of its purpose and
although lasting for less than twenty-four hours, was sufficient to support the charge of
the said offense.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting respondent with the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.
HELD: Yes. The trial court had well-founded reasons to conclude that the so-called
"encounters" between the CIS agents and Josephine Santos and company were indeed
far from being "purely accidental." But that is just about all. Nothing else can be
gathered to support the charge of kidnapping. The circumstances that have surfaced
instead warrant a conviction for grave coercion. Grave coercion is committed when a
person prevents another from doing something not prohibited by law or compelling him
to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong, and without any authority
of law, by means, of violence, threats or intimidation. Its elements are - First, that the
offender has prevented another from doing something not prohibited by law, or that he
has compelled him to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; second, that the
prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such display
of force as would produce intimidation and control over the will of the offended party;
and, third, that the offender who has restrained the will and liberty of another did so
without any right or authority of law. Where there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved and the offense charged
necessarily includes the lesser offense established in evidence, the accused can be
convicted of the offense proved.

People v. Villamar
G.R. No. 121175, November 4, 1998
Romero, J.
FACTS: Based from the facts of the cases, Villamar went to the house of the
complainant Cortez and inquired if the latter was interested in adopting her daughter.
Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and immediately prepared a Sinumpaang
Salaysay to formalize the adoption. Unfortunately, Villamar regretted her decision and
tried to take her daughter back from Cortez. Unfortunately, Cortez vehemently refused
to relinquish the custody of the girl. According the Cortez, sensing imminent danger,
Villamar demanded money and a get-away vehicle to extricate herself from her
predicament. On the other hand, the defense narrates a different scenario. Villamar
admits that a struggle did occur between her and Cortez, after the latter refused her
request for the return of her child. However, while she acknowledged that she
brandished a pair of scissors before Cortez, this was motivated more out of fear of the
crowd assembled outside the house which might harm her. In other words, in order to
protect herself, she had to use Cortez as a "human shield" to keep the crowd at bay.
The trial court, not having been convinced with Villamar's version of the incident,
convicted her for serious illegal detention and less serious physical injuries, but at the
same time acquitted her on the charge of frustrated murder.
ISSUE: Whether or not trial court erred in convicting Villamar with serious illegal
detention and less serious physical injuries.
HELD: Yes. Contrary to the prosecutions assertions, this Court is of the opinion that
Villamar had no intention to kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty. The
undeniable fact that the purpose of Villamar was to seek the return of her child was
never assailed by the prosecution. Until the defendant's purpose to detain the offended
party is shown, a prosecution for illegal detention will not prosper. Moreover, since there
is no showing that Villamar wanted to extort money from Cortez prior to their
confrontation, the essential element of kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom is
therefore absent. When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of
the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" for the purpose of destroying the same, the act merely
constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another
from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or
her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by
violence, either by material force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation
and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party; and (c) that the person
who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that
the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right

FACTS:
People v. Astorga
G.R. NO. 110097, December 22, 1997
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Appellant Astorga told Yvonne to go with him by telling her that they were going
to buy candy. When Yvonne recognized the deception, she demanded that she be
brought home, but appellant refused and instead dragged her toward the opposite
direction against her will. While accused and Yvonne were walking in the situation as
described, somewhere near the Luponlupon bridge they met some group of men.
Having met on their opposite direction, the two were noticed by the group of youngsters.
The group were bound to Maco Catholic Church to see a drama. Having met the two
and as noticed by the group accused keep [sic] on looking back at them. The group
were suspicious about the man who was bringing a child. The group decided to follow
them. Accused hurriedly walked fast with Yvonne, and to prevent from being overtaken,
he carried the victim and ran. They were chased. After a distance of half a kilometer
they were overtaken. While it is unclear whether appellant Astorga intended to detain or
lock-up Yvonne, there is not question that he forced her to go with him against her will.
ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping.
HELD: No. The narration of the testimony does not adequately establish actual
confinement or restraint of the victim, which is the primary element of kidnapping.
Appellants apparent intention was to take Yvonne against her will towards the direction
of Tagum. Appellants plan did not materialize, however, because Fabilas group chanced
upon them. The evidence does not show that appellant wanted to detain Yvonne; much
less, that he actually detained her. Appellants forcible dragging of Yvonne to a place
only he knew cannot be said to be an actual confinement or restriction on the person of
Yvonne. There was no lockup. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of kidnapping
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused appellant should be convicted only of grave coercion. Grave coercion has
three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by another from doing something not
prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or
wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material
force or such a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control
over the will of the offended part; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and
liberty of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made
under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. When appellant forcibly
dragged and slapped Yvonne, he took away her right to go home to Binuangan.
Appellant presented no justification for preventing Yvonne from going home, and we
cannot find any.

Baleros v. People
G.R. 130833, February 22, 2006
Garcia, J.
FACTS: Complainant was a medical student in UST. On the morning of December 13,
1991, she was awakened by a smell of chemical on a piece of cloth pressed on her
face. She struggled to break free but his attacker was pinning her down, holding her
tightly. When her right hand finally got free, she grabbed and squeezed the sex organ of
his attacker. The man let her go, enabling Marilou to seek help from her maid and
classmates living nearby.
An investigation was conducted in which the evidences pointed to accused-appellant as
the attacker. The RTC thus found Chito guilty for attempted rape and ordered him to
suffer an indeterminate sentence (from prision correccional as minimum to prision
mayor as maximum) and to pay Malou of Php50,000
ISSUE: Whether or not trial court erred in its decision.
HELD: Yes. In order for a crime of rape to have been committed in an attempting stage,
the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating the womens vagina with his
sex organ but was not able to completely do so due to some reason or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance. Even with the acts of kissing the victim and
mashing her breasts, the offense would not have constituted attempted rape absent the
accuseds commencement of penetrating the victims vagina with his sex organ. In the
present case, the perpetrator was even fully dressed when it attacked Albano. The
Court reversed and set aside the decision affirmed by the CA and adjudges Baleros
guilty of unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under article 287 of the RPC.

Ong Chiu Kwan v. CA

G.R. No. 113006, November 23, 2000
Pardo, J.
FACTS: On April 14, 1990, at around 10 in the morning, Ong Chiu Kwan ordered
Wilfredo Infante to relocate the telephone, electric and water lines of Crazy Feet,
because said lines posed as a disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kuwan failed to present
a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut the electric wire, water pipe and
telephone lines of the business established. After due trial, trial court found Ong Chiu
Kwan guilty of unjust vexation. The court also ordered him to pay moral damages,
finding that the wrongful act of abruptly cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone
lines of Crazy Feet caused the interruption of its business operations during peak hours,
to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong.
ISSUE: Whether nor not the trial court erred in convicting accused with the crime of
unjust vexation.
HELD: No. Petitioner admitted having ordered the cutting of the electric, water and
telephone lines of complainants business establishment because these lines crossed
his property line. He failed, however, to show evidence that he had the necessary permit
or authorization to relocate the lines. Also, he timed the interruption of electric, water
and telephone services during peak hours of the operation of business of the
complainant. Thus, petitioners act unjustly annoyed or vexed the complainant.
Consequently, petitioner Ong Chiu Kwan is liable for unjust vexation.