FEATI v.

Bautista
Facts:
Certain cases arose in the Court of Industrial Relations between
FEATI and the Faculty club. FEATI contended that the CIR has
no jurisdiction over the cases because it is an educational
institution and it is not considered an employer under the
industrial peace act.
Issues:
1. Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over cases involving
unfair labor practices of educational institutions?
2. Whether or not FEATI may be considered an employer
under the industrial peace act?
Held:
1. In this case, YES. The cases cited by FEATI bolstering its
claim that CIR has no jurisdiction over educational
institutions only apply to non-profit educational
institutions. Therefore, having admitted that FEATI is an
educational institution organized for profit, CIR has
jurisdiction over the case.
2. YES. It will be noted that in defining the term "employer"
the Act uses the word "includes", which it also used in
defining, "employee" (Sec. 2[d], and "representative"
(Sec. 2[h]); and not the word "means" which the Act
uses in defining the terms "court" (Sec 2[a]), "labor
organization" (Sec. 2[e]), "legitimate labor organization"
(Sec. 2[f]), "company union" (Sec. 2[g]), "unfair labor
practice" (Sec. 2[i]), "supervisor" (Sec. 2[k]), "strike"
(Sec. 2[I]) and "lockout" (Sec. 2[m]). A methodical
variation in terminology is manifest. This variation and
distinction in terminology and phraseology cannot be

presumed to have been the inconsequential product of

an oversight; rather, it must have been the result of a
deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we
consider that as legislative records show, Republic Act
No. 875 had been meticulously and painstakingly drafted
and deliberated upon. In using the word "includes" and
not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete
definition of "employer", but rather that such definition
should be complementary to what is commonly
understood as employer. Congress intended the term to
be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the
statutory definition includes not only "a principal
employer but also a person acting in the interest of the
employer"; and secondly, the Act itself specifically
enumerates those who are not included in the term
"employer", namely: (1) a labor organization (otherwise
than when acting as an employer), (2) anyone acting in
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization (Sec. 2[c]), and (3) the Government and
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof
insofar as the right to strike for the purpose of securing
changes or modifications in the terms and conditions of
employment is concerned (Section 11). Among these
statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not
included; hence, they can be included in the term
"employer". This Court, however, has ruled that those
educational institutions that are not operated for profit
are not within the purview of Republic Act No. 875.5
"An employer is one who employs the services of others;
one for whom employees work and who pays their
wages or salaries (Black Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 618).

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"An employer includes any person acting in the interest

of an employer, directly or indirectly (Sec. 2-c, Rep. Act
875)."
Under none of the above definitions may the University
be excluded, especially so if it is considered that every
professor, instructor or teacher in the teaching staff of
the University, as per allegation of the University itself,
has a contract with the latter for teaching services,
albeit for one semester only. The University engaged the
services of the professors, provided them work, and paid
them compensation or salary for their services. Even if
the University may be considered as a lessee of services
under a contract between it and the members of its
Faculty, still it is included in the term "employer".
"Running through the word "employ" is the thought that
there has been an agreement on the part of one person
to perform a certain service in return for compensation
to be paid by an employer. When you ask how a man is
employed, or what is his employment, the thought that
he is under agreement to perform some service or
services for another is predominant and paramount.
NYK International v. NLRC
Facts:
On February 8, 1995, herein petitioner NYK hired respondent
Virginia Publico as a sewer. Under the terms and conditions of
her employment, Publico was paid on a piece-rate basis, but
required to work from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 midnight. On the
average, she earned P185.00 daily.

At about 10:00 P.M. of May 7, 1997, Publico requested that she

be allowed to leave the work place early, as she was not
feeling well due to a bout of influenza. Permission was refused
but nonetheless, Publico went home.
The following day, Publico called up her employer and notified
management that she was still recovering from her ailment.
On May 9, 1997, Publico reported for work. To her mortification
and surprise, however, the security guard prevented her from
entering the NYK premises, allegedly on managements order.
She begged to be allowed inside, but the guard remained
adamant. It was only when Publico declared that she would just
complete the unfinished work she had left on May 7 that the
guard let her in.
Once inside the factory, Publico requested to see the owner,
one Stephen Ng. Her request was declined. She was instead
asked to come back the following day.
On May 10, 1997, Publico returned to NYK as instructed. After
waiting for three and half (3) hours, she was finally able to
see Stephen Ng. When she inquired why she was barred from
reporting for work, Mr. Ng told her she was dismissed due to
her refusal to render overtime service.
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioner corporation and its manager,
petitioner Cathy Ng.
Issue:
Whether or not Cathy Ng may be held solidarily liable with
NYK?
Held:

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Yes.
Anent petitioners assertion that they cannot be solidarily liable
in this case as there was no malice or bad faith on their part
has no leg to stand on. What the Court finds apropos is our
disquisition in A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU v. NLRC, which
held that since a corporation is an artificial person, it must
have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer,
being the person acting in the interest of the employer. In
other words the corporation, in the technical sense only, is the
employer. In a subsequent case, we ordered the corporate
officers of the employer corporation to pay jointly and solidarily
the private respondents monetary award. More recently, a
corporation and its president were directed by this Court to
jointly and severally reinstate the illegally dismissed employees
to their former positions and to pay the monetary awards.
In this case Cathy Ng, admittedly, is the manager of NYK.
Conformably with our ruling in A. C. Ransom, she falls within
the meaning of an employer as contemplated by the Labor
Code,[17] who may be held jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, Cathy Ng, in her capacity
as manager and responsible officer of NYK, cannot be
exonerated from her joint and several liability in the payment
of monetary award to private respondent.

Allied Free Workers Union v. Compaia Maritima

Facts:
MARITIMA is a local corporation engaged in the shipping
business. Teves is its branch manager in the port of Iligan City.

And AFWU is a duly registered legitimate labor organization

with 225 members.
On August 11, 1952, MARITIMA, through Teves, entered into a
CONTRACT 4 with AFWU to do and perform all the work of
stevedoring and arrastre services of all its vessels or boats
calling in the port of Iligan City, beginning August 12, 1952.
During the first month of the existence of the CONTRACT,
AFWU rendered satisfactory service. So, MARITIMA, through
Teves, verbally renewed the same. This harmonious relations
between MARITIMA and AFWU lasted up to the latter part of
1953 when the former complained to the latter of
unsatisfactory and inefficient service by the laborers doing the
arrastre and stevedoring work. This deteriorating situation was
admitted as a fact by AFWU's president. To remedy the
situationsince MARITIMA's business was being adversely
affected -Teves was forced to hire extra laborers from among
"stand-by" workers not affiliated to any union to help in the
stevedoring and arrastre work. The wages of these extra
laborers were paid by MARITIMA through separate vouchers
and not by AFWU. Moreover, said wages were not charged to
the consignees or owners of the cargoes.
On July 23, 1954, AFWU presented to MARITIMA a written
proposal5 for a collective bargaining agreement. This demand
embodied certain terms and conditions of employment
different from the provisions of the CONTRACT. No reply was
made by MARITIMA.
AFWU sued MARITIMA for unfair labor practice saying that
MARITIMA refused to bargain collectively. CIR dismissed the
case on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:

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Whether or not CIR has jurisdiction over the case?

Whether or not MARITIMA can be considered an employer of
the members of AFWU?
Held:
No to both.
It is true that MARITIMA admits that it did not answer AFWU's
proposal for a collective bargaining agreement. From this it
does not necessarily follow that it is guilty of unfair labor
practice. Under the law the duty to bargain collectively arises
only between the "employer" and its "employees". Where
neither party is an ''employer" nor an "employee" of the other,
no such duty would exist. Needless to add, where there is no
duty to bargain collectively the refusal to bargain violates no
right.
The court a quo held that under the CONTRACT, AFWU was an
independent contractor of MARITIMA.
Neither is there any direct employment relationship between
MARITIMA and the laborers. The latter have no separate
individual contracts with MARITIMA. In fact, the court a quo
found that it was AFWU that hired them. Their only possible
connection with MARITIMA is through AFWU which contracted
with the latter. Hence, they could not possibly be in a better
class than AFWU which dealt with MARITIMA.

Producers Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC

Facts:

Prefatorily, at the time the instant controversy started,

petitioner was placed by the then Central Bank of the
Philippines (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) under a
conservator for the purpose of protecting its assets. It appears
that when the union sought the implementation of Section 1,
Article XI of the CBA regarding the retirement plan and Section
4, Article X thereof, pertaining to uniform allowance, the acting
conservator of the petitioner expressed her objection to such
plan, resulting in an impasse between the petitioner bank and
the private respondent union. The deadlock continued for at
least six months when the union, to resolve the issue, decided
to file a case against the petitioner for unfair labor practice and
for flagrant violation of the CBA provisions.
Issue:
The petitioner asserts since the employees have retired, as a
consequence of which no employee-employer relationship
exists anymore between it and the employees, the union no
longer had the personality to file the complaint for them.
Held:
Petitioner's contention in untenable. Retirement results from a
voluntary agreement between the employer and the employee
whereby the latter after reaching a certain age agrees to sever
his employment with the former.14 [Soberano v. Secretary of
Labor, 99 SCRA 549 (1980)] The very essence of retirement is
the termination of the employer-employee relationship.
Hence, the retirement of an employee does not, in itself, affect
his employment status especially when it involves all rights
and benefits due to him, since these must be protected as
though there had been no interruption of service. It must be
borne in mind that the retirement scheme was part of the
employment package and the benefits to be derived therefrom

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constituted, as it were, a continuing consideration for services

rendered, as well as an effective inducement for remaining with
the corporation. It is intended to help the employee enjoy the
remaining years of his life, releasing him from the burden of
worrying for his financial support, and are a form of reward for
his loyalty.15 [Laginlin v. WCC, 159 SCRA 91 (1988)]
When the retired employees were requesting that their
retirement benefits be granted, they were not pleading for
generosity but were merely demanding that their rights, as
embodied in the CBA, be recognized. Thus, when an employee
has retired but his benefits under the law or the CBA have not
yet been given, he still retains, for the purpose of prosecuting
his claims, the status of an employee entitled to the protection
of the Labor Code, one of which is the protection of the labor
union.

PAL v. PALEA
Facts:
Certain illegally dismissed PAL employees were
reinstated by the CIR which was affirmed by the SC.

ordered

Issue:
What are the rights and privileges of reinstated employees
during the layoff period?
Held:
Where, in the resolution of the CIR, it was held that the
reinstated employees were entitled to back wages from the
date of their dismissal to the date of their reinstatement and
without prejudice to their seniority rights and privileges, it

was held that the resolution intended to restore the said

employees to theri status immediately prior to their dismissal
and this means that they should receive Christmas bonus,
accumulated sick leave privileges and transportation allowance
during the layoff period. They were treated as if they had not
been absent from work and had been uninterruptedly working
during the layoff period. However, said employees are not
entitled to the free trip passes which were not given
automatically or indiscriminately.

Airline Pilots Association v. CIR

Facts:
There is a provision in the by-laws of ALPAP giving pilots who
resigned from PAL the option to remain as a member of the
union or resign from the said union.
On January 2, 1971, the Air Line Pilots Association of the
Philippines, represented by Ben Hur Gomez who claimed to be
its President, filed a petition with the Court of Industrial
Relations praying for certification as the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining representative of "all the pilots now under
employment by the Philippine Air Lines, Inc. and are on active
flight and/or operational assignments." The petition which was
docketed in the sala of Judge Joaquin M. Salvador as Case
2939-MC was opposed in the name of the same association by
Felix C. Gaston (who also claimed to be its President) on the
ground that the industrial court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the petition "because a certification
proceeding in the Court of Industrial Relations is not the proper
forum for the adjudication of the question as to who is the
lawful president of a legitimate labor organization."

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It must be noted that Gaston was originally the president of the

union. Upon his resignation from PAL (not the union), Gomez
staged an election with 45 other pilots to institute him as the
president of the said union.
CIR sided with Gomez, stating that Gaston and company
already resigned from PAL, as a sign of protest in the current
labor dispute, therefore cannot represent the union in
collectively bargaining with PAL. It also held that the union
cannot adopt a provision in its by-laws which in effect allows
membership of non-employees of PAL.
Issue:
Whether or not non-employees can represent and be a
member of a union of employees of a certain employer?
Held:
YES.
This Court cannot likewise subscribe to the restrictive
interpretation made by the court below of the term "labor
organization," which Section 2(e) of R.A. 875 defines as "any
union or association of employees which exists, in whole or in
part, for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with
employers concerning terms and conditions of employment."
The absence of the condition which the court below would
attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as
being limited to the employees of a particular employer is quite
evident from the law. The emphasis of the Industrial Peace Act
is clearly on the purposes for which a union or association of
employees is established rather than that membership therein
should be limited only to the employees of a particular
employer. Trite to say, under Section 2(h) of R.A. 875
"representative" is defined as including "a legitimate labor

organization or any officer or agent of such organization,

whether or not employed by the employer or employee whom
he represents." It cannot be overemphasized likewise that a
labor dispute can exist "regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee."
(Section 2(j), R.A. 875).
There is, furthermore, nothing in the constitution and bylaws of
ALPAP which indubitably restricts membership therein to PAL
pilots alone.1 Although according to ALPAP (Gomez there has
never been an instance when a non-PAL pilot became a
member of ALPAP, the complete lack of any such precondition
for ALPAP membership cannot but be interpreted as an
unmistakable authority for the association to accept pilots into
its fold though they may not be under PAL's employ.
The fundamental assumptions relied upon by the industrial
court as bases for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the
office and funds of ALPAP being, in this Court's opinion,
erroneous, and, in the absence of any serious dispute that on
December 18-22, 1970 Felix C. Gaston, and four other pilots,
were elected by the required majority of ALPAP members as
officers of their association, this Court hereby rules that the
mentioned authorization to ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the
office, funds and name of ALPAP was done with grave abuse of
discretion.
Moreover, this Court cannot hold as valid and binding the
election of Ben Hur Gomez as President of ALPAP. He was
elected et a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members called just one
day after the election of Felix C. Gaston as President of ALPAP
who, as shown, received a majority of 180 votes out of a total
membership of 270. Under the provisions of section 4, article III
of the Constitution and By-Laws of ALPAP, duly elected officers
of that association shall remain in office for at least one year:

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"The term of office of the officers of the Association shall start

on the first day of the fiscal year of the Association. It shall
continue for one year or until they are reelected or until their
successors have been elected or appointed and takes office in
accordance with the Constitution and by-laws."
While this Court considers the ruling of the court below, on the
matter of who has the exclusive rights to the office, funds and
name of ALPAP, as having been erroneously made, we cannot
hold, however, that those belonging to the group of ALPAP
(Gomez) do not possess any right at all over the office, funds
and name of ALPAP of which they are also members.
In our opinion, it is perfectly within the powers and
prerogatives of a labor organization, through its duly elected
officers, to authorize a segment of that organization to bargain
collectively with a particular employer, particularly where those
constituting the segment share a common and distinguishable
interest, apart from the rest of their fellow union members, on
matters that directly affect the terms and conditions of their
particular employment. As the circumstances pertinent to the
case at bar presently stand, ALPAP (Gaston) has extended
recognition to ALPAP (Gomez) to enter and conclude collective
bargaining contracts with PAL. Having given ALPAP (Gomez)
this authority, it would be clearly unreasonable on the part of
ALPAP (Gaston) to disallow the former a certain use of the
office, funds and name of ALPAP when such use is necessary or
would be required to enable ALPAP (Gomez) to exercise, in a
proper manner, its delegated authority to bargain collectively
with PAL. Clearly, an intelligently considered adjustment of
grievances and integration of the diverse and varying interests
that not infrequently and, often, unavoidably permeate the
membership of a labor organization, will go a long way, in
achieving peace and harmony within the ranks of ALPAP. Of
course, in the eventuality that the pilots presently employed by

PAL and who subscribe to the leadership of Ben Hur Gomez

should consider it to their better interest to have their own
separate office, name and union funds, nothing can prevent
them from setting up a separate labor union. In that
eventuality, whatever vested rights, interest or participation
they may have in the assets, including cash funds, of ALPAP as
a result of their membership therein should properly be
liquidated in favor of such withdrawing members of the
association.

Cebu Seamens Association v. Ferrer-Calleja

Facts:
The records show that sometime on 23 October 1950, a group
of dock officers and marine engineers on board vessels plying
Cebu and other ports of the Philippines organized themselves
into an association and registered the same as a non-stock
corporation known as Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc. (CSAI),
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Later, on
23 June 1969, the same group registered its association with
this Bureau as a labor union known as the Seamen's
Association of the Philippines, Incorporated (SAPI).
API has an existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with
the Aboitiz Shipping Corporation which will expire on 31
December 1988. In consonance with the CBA said company
has been remitting checked-off union dues to said union until
February, 1987 when a group composed of members of said
union, introducing itself to be its now set of officers, went to
the company and claimed that they are entitled to the
remittance and custody of such union dues. This group, headed
by Manuel Gabayoyo claims that they were elected as such on
January 20, 1987 under the supervision of the SEC.

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On 26 May 1987, another group headed by Dominica C. Nacua,

claiming as the duly elected set of officers of the union in an
election hold on 20 December 1986, filed a complaint, for and
on behalf of the union, against the Cebu Seamen's Association,
Inc. (CSAI) as represented by Manuel Gabayoyo for the security
of the aforementioned CBA, seeking such relief, among others,
as an order restraining the respondent from acting on behalf of
the union and directing the Aboitiz Shipping Corp. to remit the
checked-off union dues for the months of March and April 1987.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the release and custody of union dues from
Aboitiz? Nacua Representing SAPI or Gabayoyo representing
CSAI?
Held:
Nacua representing SAPI.
As stated in the findings of fact in the questioned resolution of
Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja, on October 23, 1950, a group of
deck officers organized the Cebu Seamen's Association, Inc.,
(CSAI), a non-stock corporation and registered it with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEQ. The same group
registered the organization with the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) as Seamen's Association of the Philippines (SAPI). It is
the registration of the organization with the BLR and not with
the SEC which made it a legitimate labor organization with
rights and privileges granted under the Labor Code.
We gathered from the records that CSAI, the corporation was
already inoperational before the controversy in this case arose.
In fact, on August 24, 1984, the SEC ordered the CSAI to show
cause why its certificate of registration should not be revoked
for continuous inoperation (p. 343, Rollo). There is nothing in

the records which would show that CSAI answered said showcause order.
Also, before the controversy, private respondent Dominica
Nacua was elected president of the labor union, SAPI. It had an
existing CBA with Aboitiz Shipping Corporation. Before the end
of the term of private respondent Nacua, some members of the
union which included Domingo Machacon and petitioner
Manuel Gabayoyo showed signs of discontentment with the
leadership of Nacua. 'Phis break-away group revived the
moribund corporation and issued an undated resolution
expelling Nacua from the association (pp.
58-59, Rollo).
Sometime in February, 1987, it held its own election of officers
supervised by the Securities and Exchange Commission. It also
filed a case of estafa against Nacua sometime in May, 1986 (p.
52, Rollo).
The expulsion of Nacua from the corporation, of which she
denied being a member, has however, not affected her
membership with the labor union. In fact, in the elections of
officers for 1987-1989, she was re-elected as the president of
the labor union. In this connections, We cannot agree with the
contention of Gabayoyo that Nacua was already expelled from
the union. Whatever acts their group had done
in the
corporation do not bind the labor union. Moreover, Gabayoyo
cannot claim leader. ship of the labor group by virtue of his
having been elected as a president of the dormant corporation
CSAI.
Public respondent Bureau of Labor Relations correctly ruled on
the basis of the evidence presented by the parties that SAPI,
the legitimate labor union, registered with its office, is not the
same association as CSAI, the corporation, insofar as their
rights under the Labor Code are concerned. Hence, the former
and not the latter association is entitled to the release and

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custody of union fees with Aboitiz Shipping and other shipping

companies with whom it had an existing CBA.

or concerns "terms, tenure or condition of employment" or

"representation."

FEATI v. Bautista

All the admitted facts (the 2 letters, the response from the
Universitys lawyers; the strike; the cases filed) show that the
controversy between the University and the Faculty Club
involved terms and conditions of employment, and the
question of representation. Hence, there was a labor dispute. 2

Facts:
(Facts already stated above)
Issue:

San Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Bersamira

FEATI contends that the President cannot certify, via section 10

of RA 8751, this controversy because it is not a labor dispute.
Held:
It is a labor dispute.
The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants
stand in proximate relation of employer and employee."
The test of whether a controversy comes within the definition
of "labor dispute" depends on whether the controversy involves
1

When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a

labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest and
when such labor dispute is certified by the President to the Court of
Industrial Relations, said Court may cause to be issued a restraining
orader forbidding the employees to strike or the employer to lockout
the employees, and if no other solution to the dispute is found, the
Court may issue an order fixing the terms and conditions of
employment.

Facts:
Sometime in 1983 and 1984, SanMig entered into contracts for
merchandising services with Lipercon and D'Rite. These
companies are independent contractors duly licensed by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The employees of these contractors sought to be regular
employees of San Miguel saying that Lipercon and DRite are
labor-only contractors.
San Miguel sought injunction from the RTC to prevent the
actions of the employees of the said employees of the
contractors. Saying that RTC has jurisdiction because there is
no employer-employee relationship between the employees of
Lipercon and DRite.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction because the present
controversy is not a labor dispute due to the fact that there is
no employer-employee relationship?
2

From the UP Labor 2 reviewer

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Held:
RTC has no jurisdiction. The present controversy is a labor
dispute.
A "labor dispute" as defined in Article 212 (1) of the Labor Code
includes "any controversy or matter concerning terms and
conditions of employment or the association or representation
of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or
arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless
of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee."
While it is SanMig's submission that no employer-employee
relationship exists between itself, on the one hand, and the
contractual workers of Lipercon and D'Rite on the other, a labor
dispute can nevertheless exist "regardless of whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relationship of employer and
employee" (Article 212 [1], Labor Code, supra) provided the
controversy concerns, among others, the terms and conditions
of employment or a "change" or "arrangement" thereof (ibid).
Put differently, and as defined by law, the existence of a labor
dispute is not negatived by the fact that the plaintiffs and
defendants do not stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.
That a labor dispute, as defined by the law, does exist herein is
evident. At bottom, what the Union seeks is to regularize the
status of the employees contracted by Lipercon and D'Rite and,
in effect, that they be absorbed into the working unit of
SanMig. This matter definitely dwells on the working
relationship between said employees vis-a-vis SanMig. Terms,
tenure and conditions of their employment and the
arrangement of those terms are thus involved bringing the
matter within the purview of a labor dispute. Further, the Union

also seeks to represent those workers, who have signed up for

Union membership, for the purpose of collective bargaining.
SanMig, for its part, resists that Union demand on the ground
that there is no employer-employee relationship between it and
those workers and because the demand violates the terms of
their CBA. Obvious then is that representation and association,
for the purpose of negotiating the conditions of employment
are also involved. In fact, the injunction sought by SanMig was
precisely also to prevent such representation. Again, the
matter of representation falls within the scope of a labor
dispute. Neither can it be denied that the controversy below is
directly connected with the labor dispute already taken
cognizance of by the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board.
Whether or not the Union demands are valid; whether or not
SanMig's contracts with Lipercon and D'Rite constitute "laboronly" contracting and, therefore, a regular employer-employee
relationship may, in fact, be said to exist; whether or not the
Union can lawfully represent the workers of Lipercon and D'Rite
in their demands against SanMig in the light of the existing
CBA; whether or not the notice of strike was valid and the
strike itself legal when it was allegedly instigated to compel the
employer to hire strangers outside the working unit;-those are
issues the resolution of which call for the application of labor
laws, and SanMig's cause/s of action in the Court below are
inextricably linked with those issues.

Nestle Phils v. NLRC

Facts:
The private respondents were employed by the petitioner
either as sales representatives or medical representatives. By

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reason of the nature of their work they were each allowed to

avail of the company's car loan policy. Under that policy, the
company advances the purchase price of a car to be paid back
by the employee through monthly deductions from his salary,
the company retaining the ownership of the motor vehicle until
it shall have been fully paid for. All of the private respondents
availed of the petitioner's car loan policy.
On September 14, 1987, private respondents Nuez,
Villanueva, Villena and Armas were dismissed from the service
for having participated in an illegal strike. On December 26,
1987, respondents Kua and Solidum were also dismissed for
certain irregularities. All the private respondents filed
complaints for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed their complaints and upheld
the legality of their dismissal. They appealed to the NLRC
where their appeals are still pending.

In the Notices of Dismissal which they received from Nestl,

the private respondents had been directed to either settle the
remaining balance of the cost of their respective cars, or return
them to the company for proper disposition.
As they failed and refused to avail of either option, the
company filed in the Regional Trial Court of Makati a civil suit to
recover possession of the cars. The Court issued an Order
dated March 7, 1988 directing the Deputy Sheriff to take the
motor vehicles into his custody.
The private respondents sought a temporary restraining order
in the NLRC to stop the company from cancelling their car
loans and collecting their monthly amortizations pending the
final resolution of their appeals in the illegal dismissal case.

Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction to issue such TRO?
Held:
NLRC has no jurisdiction. There is no labor dispute.
'Labor dispute' includes any controversy or matters concerning
terms or conditions of employment or the association or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or arranging the terms and conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."
Nestls demand for payment of the private respondents'
amortizations on their car loans, or, in the alternative, the
return of the cars to the company, is not a labor, but a civil,
dispute. It involves debtor-creditor relations, rather than
employee-employer relations.
Petitioner Nestl Philippines, Inc., correctly pointed out that:
"The twin directives contained in petitioner's letters to the
private respondents to either (1) settle the remaining balance
on the value of their assigned cars under the company car plan
or return the cars to the company for proper disposition; or (2)
to pay all outstanding accountabilities to the company
are
matters related to the enforcement of a civil obligation founded
on contract. It is not dependent on or related to any labor
aspect under which a labor injunction can be issued. Whether
or not the private respondents remain as employees of the
petitioner, there is no escape from their obligation to pay their
outstanding accountabilities to the petitioner; and if they
cannot afford it, to return the cars assigned to them.

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"As noted, the options given to the private respondents are

civil in nature arising from contractual obligations. There is no
labor aspect involved in the enforcement of those obligations."
(p. 7, Rollo.)
The NLRC gravely abused its discretion and exceeded its
jurisdiction by issuing the writ of injunction to stop the
company from enforcing the civil obligation of the private
respondents under the car loan agreements and from
protecting its interest in the cars which, by the terms of those
agreements, belong to it (the company) until their purchase
price shall have been fully paid by the employee. The terms of
the car loan agreements are not in issue in the labor case. The
rights and obligations of the parties under those contracts may
be enforced by a separate civil action in the regular courts, not
in the NLRC.

Kiok Loy v. NLRC

Facts:

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