Section 154 CrPC : The First Information Report

What is the First Information Report (in short FIR) and what are the options with you when
a police officer-in-charge of the police station or any other police officer, acting under the
directions of the officer-in-charge of police station refuses to register FIR?
Let us first understand what is the First Information Report?
An information given under sub-section (1) of section 154 CrPC is commonly known as first
information report though this term is not used in the Criminal Procedure Code (in short
CrPC). It is the earliest and the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by an
officer-in-charge of a police station. It sets the criminal law in motion and marks the
commencement of the investigation which ends up with the formation of opinion under
section 169 or 170 CrPC, as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under section
173 CrPC. It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more information than one
are given to a police officer-in-charge of a police station in respect of the same incident
involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every
one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in section 154 CrPC. Apart from a
vague information by a phone call, the information first entered in the station house diary,
kept for this purpose, by a police officer-in-charge of a police station is the first information
report- FIR postulated by section 154 CrPC. All other information made orally or in writing
after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the
facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the
police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the
investigation, will be statements falling under section 162 CrPC. No such
information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary
again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the
scheme of CrPC.
Take a case where an FIR mentions cognizable offence under section 307 or 326 IPC and the
investigating agency learn during the investigation or receive fresh information that the
victim died, no fresh FIR under section 302 IPC need be registered which will be irregular; in
such a case alteration of the provision of law in the first FIR is the proper course to adopt.

Let us consider a different situation in which H having killed W, his wife, informs the police
that she is killed by an unknown person or knowing that W is killed by his mother or sister, H
owns up the responsibility and during investigation the truth is detected, it does not require
filing of fresh FIR against H the real offender who can be arraigned in the report under
section 173(2) or 173(8) of CrPC, as the case may be.
Purpose and Object.
The purpose of registration of FIR is manifold that is to say
(1) to reduce the substance of information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence, if
given orally, into writing.
(2) If given in writing to have it signed by the complainant.
(3) To maintain record of receipt of information as regards commission of cognizable
offences.
(4) To initiate investigation on receipt of information as regards commission of cognizable
offence.
(5) To inform Magistrate forthwith of the factum of the information received.
The principal object of the FIR from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal
law in motion and from the point of view of the investigating authorities is to obtain
information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps to trace
and bring to book the guilty.
Evidentiary value of FIR.
FIR is not a piece of substantive evidence. It can be used only for limited purposes, like
corroborating under section 157 of the Evidence Act or contradicting (cross-examination
under section 145 of Evidence Act) the maker thereof, or to show that the implication of the
accused was not an after-thought. It can also be used under section 8 and section 11 of the
Evidence Act. Obviously, the FIR cannot be used for the purposes of corroborating or
contradicting or discrediting any witness other than the one lodging the FIR. It cannot be used
for corroborating the statement of a third party. If the FIR is of a confessional nature it cannot
be proved against the accused-informant, because according to section 25 of the Evidence

Act, no confession made to a police officer can be proved as against a person accused of any
offence. But it might become relevant under section 8 of the Evidence Act.
What you will do when police officer refuse to register FIR?
The police cannot refuse to register the case on the ground that it is either not reliable or
credible (Smt. Gurmito vs. State of Punjab And Ors 1996 CriLJ 1254 P&H). Further,
refusal to record FIR on the ground that the place of crime does not fall within the territorial
jurisdiction of the police station, amount to dereliction of duty. Information about cognizable
offence would have to be recorded and forwarded to the police station having jurisdiction
(State of Andhra Pradesh vs. Punati Ramulu And Others, AIR 1993 SC 2644).
When a police officer-in-charge of a police station or any other police officer, acting under
the directions of the officer-in-charge of police station refuses to register information, any
person aggrieved by such refusal may send in writing and by post, the substance of such
information disclosing a cognizable offence, to the Superintendent of Police under section
154(3) or to the Magistrate concerned under section 156(3) of the CrPC. It is the duty of the
officer-in-charge of the police station to register an FIR when investigation under section
156(3) of CrPC is directed by the Magistrate, even when the Magistrate explicitly does not
say so (Mohd. Yoysuf vs. Afaq Jahan, (2006), SCC 627).
Latest Case Law
Whether a police officer is bound to register a First Information Report (FIR) upon receiving
any information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or the police officer has the power to conduct a
'preliminary inquiry' in order to test the veracity of such information before registering the
same?
The Supreme Court of India, in Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of UP on 12 November, 2013
held that 'the police must compulsorily register the FIR on receiving a complaint if the
information discloses a cognizable offence, and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such
a situation'.

If the information does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an
inquiry 'a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether a cognizable
offence is disclosed or not'. In cases where preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint
a copy of the entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant forthwith and not
later than one week. It must disclose reasons in brief for closing the complaint and not
proceeding further.
As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may
be made are as under:
(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes;
(b) Commercial Offences;
(c) Medical negligence cases;
(d) Corruption Cases;
(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for
example, over 3 months delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the
reasons for delay.
The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant
preliminary inquiry. A preliminary inquiry should be made time bound, and in any case it
should not exceed seven days.

High Courts can quash FIRs : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court has recently ruled that the High Courts can quash an FIR against a person
if it did not prima facie disclose any offence. A two judge bench said that ordinarily criminal
proceedings instituted against an accused must be tried and taken to logical conclusions under
the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) and the High Courts should be reluctant to interfere
into the proceedings at an interlocutory stage. "However, if upon the admitted facts and the
documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without weighing or sifting
evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings instituted against the accused are
required to be dropped or quashed", the bench said. Where the allegations in the FIR or the
complaint or the accompanying documents taken at their face value, do not constitute the

offence alleged, the person proceeded against in such a frivolous criminal litigation has to be
saved, ruled the bench. One K. Ramakrishnan and others, senior officers of the United Bank
of India, have been arraigned as accused persons in the chargesheet submitted in a Patna
court. They sought discharge from the case on the ground that no case was disclosed either in
the FIR or in the documents, accompanying the final report submitted under Section 173 of
the Cr.P.C. Their plea was rejected by the trial court and also by the Patna High Court. The
apex court setting aside the High Court order, observed that the trial court under Section 239
and the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. did not embark upon an inquiry as to
whether evidence in question was reliable or not or evidence relied upon was sufficient to
proceed further or not. The inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC
could be exercised to quash proceedings, in appropriate cases either to prevent the abuse of
the process of any courts or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

FACTS
The present matter is an application made s. 482 of the Cr.P.C. to set aside orders dated 29-72002 passed by VII Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad and dated 8-11-2000 passed by
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad. Also an application is preferred to direct the Court
below to take cognizance on the application of applicant under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. to
direct the authority concerned to lodge a report.
The applicant applied to the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad under s. 156(3) of
Cr.P.C. to direct the police station George Town to register a case against the opposite parties
No. 2 to 4 under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 of IPC. The applicant claimed that her
maternal uncle Jangilal Was, willed an immovable property, a house through will executed on
20-4-1986 in her favour. On the basis of these records her name was registered in the Nagar
Nigam records. The applicant later sold a portion of said house in favour of opposite party
No. 4 by executing sale deed dated 29-12-1993. The applicant alleged that opposite parties
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 forged a will in the name of Jangilal giving no.2 (mother of No.3) the entire
property in question. This forged will had a thumb print of Jangilala, even though Jangilal
was literate therefore able to sign. Also, Jangilals fathers name was wrongly written as Lalji,
instead of Murli, and his place of residence had also been mentioned wrongly.

The special CJM ruled that allegedly forged will deed had not been declared invalid or forged
by any competent Court of law and therefore allegations made by the applicants did not
disclose a cognizable offence. Accordingly, he rejected the said application
Aggrieved, the applicants approached the Revisional Court viz. the Court of the VII
Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad. Opposite parties no. 2,3 and 4 filed counter affidavits
alleging that applicant sold the house in question to opposite Party No.4 by executing a
registered sale deed but did not deliver its possession to the transferee. Therefore the
transferee filed a civil suit for eviction of applicant which was pending. Also, they claimed
that Jangilal had executed a valid will deed in favour of opposite party No.2. The applicant
had also filed a civil suit for declaration that she is exclusive owner of property in dispute and
the case between parties was a case of purely civil nature.
The Revisional Court held that when civil remedy is available criminal case is barred and
thus dismissed the revision application. Finally, the applicants approached the Honourable
High Court at Allahabad to seek remedy.

ISSUES
Issue 1: Whether the Court can reject the application of the applicant solely on the ground
that case is of civil nature therefore criminal prosecution cannot be launched.
Issue 2: Whether there are sufficient grounds for the Magistrate to order registration and
investigation of the case under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.

RULES
Legislations
1. Sections 156(3) and 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
2. Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code 1869.

Case Laws
1. Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan, 2001 (2) JIC 68 : AIR 2001 SC 1226

2. Lakshaminarayana v. V. Narayana, 1991 Cri LJ 1419

3. Lalmuni v. State of Bihar, (2001)2 SCC 17 : 2001 AIR SCW 2504
4. S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 SC 397
5. Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370 : AIR 1985 SC 628
6. Ram Narain v. Mool Chand, AIR 1960 All 296

ANALYSIS
ISSUE 1:
Whether the Court can reject the application of the applicant solely on the ground that case is
of civil nature therefore criminal prosecution cannot be launched
According to section 482 of the Cr.P.C.-:
482. Saving of inherent power of High Court.
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Hence, the orders of the courts of the VII Additional Sessions Judge, Allahabad and Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad can be set aside if it is to prevent abuse of the process of the
courts or to secure the ends of justice. In the case of Ram Narain v. Mool Chand[i]it was said
that in order to seek interference by the court under the section, three conditions must be
fulfilled, namely1) The injustice that comes to light must be of grave nature
2) It should be clear and palpable and not doubtful
3) There exists no other provision of law by which the party aggrieved could have sought
relief.
Hence, only if it is shown that the order of the lower courts perpetuated any such injustice to
the applicant, can the application for quashing can succeed.

It was argued by the counsel on behalf of the applicant that the Revisional Court rejected the
application solely on the grounds that the case was of civil nature and therefore criminal
prosecution couldnt be launched.
The Allahabad High Court in this case has strongly disagreed with this opinion of the lower
courts, it has cited a number of decisions of the Supreme Court to support the fact the
presence of a civil suit does not bar criminal proceedings based on the same fact matrix.
In the case of Lalmuni Devi (Smt) v. State of Bihar[ii] the honourable Supreme Court
reported that it is settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an
offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal
complaint cannot be maintained.
Further, the two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly co-extensive and essentially
differ in their content and consequence.[iii] The object of the criminal law is to punish an
offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State, this does not,
however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the accused.
The court also cited the case of Alpic Finance Ltd. v. P. Sadasivan[iv] stating that when
somebody suffers injury to his person, property or reputation, he may have remedies both
under civil and criminal law. The injury alleged may from basis of civil claim and may also
constitute the ingredients of some crime punishable under criminal law. When there is dispute
between them, the aggrieved person may have right to sue for damages or compensation and
at the same time law permits the victim to proceed against the wrongdoer for having
committed an offence of criminal breach of trust or cheating.
At this point it should be noted that civil and criminal proceedings do not interfere with the
progression of each other. In M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras[v] it was observed that
possibility of conflicting decisions in the Civil and Criminal courts was not a relevant
consideration. It was also stated that the factor to be taken into consideration was that a civil
suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till
everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime so criminal matters should have
precedence.
The above case law is in agreement with the opinion of the court and all the other case that
the High Court relied upon. Therefore it is concluded that same set of facts can give rise to
both civil and criminal proceedings and both can carry on simultaneously.

ISSUE 2:
Whether there are sufficient grounds for the Magistrate to order registration and investigation
of the case under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973.
Section 156 of Cr.P.C. reads as the following:
(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate,
investigate any cognizable case which a court having jurisdiction over the local area within
the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of
Chapter XIII.
(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question
on the ground that the case was one, which such officer was not empowered under this
section to investigate.
(3) Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above
mentioned.
It is well settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take
cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, disclose the commission of an offence.[vi]
In the matter at hand, the applicants contended that prima facie, the offence under ss. 419,
420, 467 and 468 of IPC were made out in this case and thus the High Court should order the
lower court to direct the police to investigate into the matter under section 156(3).
The allegation of applicant was that the opposite parties No.2 to 4 committed forgery and
cheating by preparing a forged will allegedly executed by Jangilal in respect of entire area of
plot in question. The allegations regarding forgery and cheating were that fathers name of
Jangilal was Lalji while it was mentioned as Murali in the will deed. The High Court
observed that if Jangilal was literate, it couldnt be said that the will deed was not bearing his
thumb impression as there is nothing in the complaint to show that Jangilal had not put his
thumb impression. Mentioning wrong parentage and residence also would not constitute
offences punishable under contended Sections.

Section 419 is the punishment for personating an individual. Personation according to s. 416
involves cheating by pretending to be some other person, or by knowingly substituting one
person for another, or representing that he or any other person is a person other than he or
such other person really is. The facts do not constitute the occurrence of this offence even
prima facie.
Section 420 involves cheating and dishonestly inducing someone to deliver property. In the
matter at hand, the applicant willing sold a portion of the house in question to the opposite
party No. 4 through a registered sale deed. No information regarding any dishonest means has
been indicated. In fact, it was alleged by the opposite parties that the applicant even despite
executing a registered sale deed, refused to deliver possession of the portion of the property
to No. 4, for which there were ongoing civil proceedings. Hence charges on account of s. 420
are also not made out.
Section 467 and Section 468 requires the forgery of the will, but in the current matter, as
earlier mentioned, there is no true suspicion of forgery. Errors in the will can lead of
cancellation of the will in a civil suit but do not even prima facie make out the offence of
forgery.
It was noted by the High Court, the on the allegations, the applicant has not even included the
time, date or place of where the above alleged offences occurred. Hence there existed nothing
truly to indicate the occurrence of a cognizable offence that the Magistrate can order an
investigation into.
Therefore it is concluded that the High Court should not direct the Magistrate to take action
under s.156(3) of Cr.P.C

CONCLUSION
The Allahabad High Court after discussing the above issues finally concluded that there was
no necessity to quash the orders given by the lower courts, or order them to apply section
156(3). The court disagreed with the Revisional Court in as much that a fact matrix could
lead to both civil and criminal proceedings at the same time, but also agreed that the lower
courts they were right in rejecting the application where no prima facie offences were
observable

The Honourable High Court has done a commendable job in clarifying the settled point in
law that presence of a civil suit does not bar criminal proceedings arising from the same facts.
While it is true that determining the value of prima facie evidence when it comes to criminal
offences is the job of the trial court and in the current matter even in allegations were not
accurately made; but the complete disregard to the suspicious will is a little troubling.
It is true that the thumb print on the will of a literate man, who is able to sign his name does
not constitute an offence, along with the other errors in the will, they do give a suspicious
tinge to the document. Such suspicions could merit an investigation by the police even
though they errors lead to a civil suit for cancellation of the will deed.
But owing to the allegations from sides, affidavits and counter-affidavits filed, the matter was
observed to be one that would be resolved through civil proceedings such as for non-delivery
of possession or cancellation of the deed. There is not enough evidence as per the given facts
to actually make out the charge of forgery and the High Court of Allahabad by summarily
rejecting the application has avoided an acrimonious and long drawn criminal proceeding
which would not address the grievance of the parties.

A
Project on

QUAsing of proceedings and

direction to re-register fir with
special reference to
shakuntala devi v. State of
u.p.
Submitted towards the partial fulfilment of grading for the 5th semester of
BA+LLB(Hons.) (Criminal Proceeding Code) course for the subject

CrPC

Submitted To:

Submitted By:

Dr. Vijay kumar Himanshu

Ankit Bhalavi
B.A.L.L.B(Hons.), 13GSOL102063

INTRODUCTION:

There has never been a civilized society that did not find itself continuously "coping with
crime" (Coffey 1974). In this relentless struggle against crime, the significance of justice as a
social value has seldom been questioned (Duffee, et al. 1978). As a matter of fact, free and air
justice has always been a hallmark of every civilized community. According to the
philosopher Ginsberg, there are in the main three ingredients which make for justice:
(i). The exclusion of arbitrariness, more particularly of arbitrary power, whether exercised by
individuals on each other or by society on its members;
(ii). principles governing the distribution of the conditions of well-being;. and
(iii). provisions to ensure remedies or compensation for losses and In Junes (1965). Seen in
the light of these considerations, delay In the disposal of criminal cases is disquieting feature.

In a criminal case, where the victim has a grievance and the life and personal liberty
of the accused is at stake, the noble purpose of justice seemsto get defeated in the case of
delayed disposal of the cases. Owing to the prolonged pendency of a case, individuals may
suffer in many and different ways. Though the accused may be innocent, he is subjected to
psychological anxiety social stigma and probable economic impairment till proved innocent.
'Even if he is guilty, delay shakes his confidence in the system of
criminal justice and makes him cynical. The impact of this drama does not confine itself to
the accused but extends to his dependants who may be. Subjected to undue suffering. Worse
is the effect of delay on the complainant, victim to whose traumatic suffering the system
appears and IS heartless- (Ghosh 1976).

Given that justice is the highest function o! society, delay in the disposal of cases casts
avoidable doubts. Undue delay IS as inconsistent With the goals of the criminal justice
system as a hasty process in which decisions are made without an opportunity for
deliberation. They belie arbitrary powers of the state and discretionary functioning of the
criminal justice administration. What is worse, delays diminish the deterrent effect of the
criminal justice system (Task Force Report: the Courts 1967). When overburdened with the
mounting backlog of cases, it becomes difficult for the courts, the pivot on which the criminal

justice system turns, to maintain a proper balance between effectiveness and fairness. Pande
and Bagga have observed that "in the wake of increased volume of work in the criminal
courts "the dispensation of justice is (a) perfunctory affair.... A criminal case is disposed of
mostly in a random way" (1973). In certain situations, the delays and the consequent backlog
precipitate a situation in which courts may often give an impression of being a 'non-system'
(Coffey 1974). Undue delay in the disposal of criminal cases is incompatible with a
democratic and free society (Gajendragadkar 1976). These may tend to shake the confidence
of the common man in the criminal justice system and in the political process itself. On the
whole, the delay in the disposal of criminal cases amounts to indifference as much to law as
to human values (Germann et al. 1972).

It is hardly necessary to add that the delay in the disposal of criminal cases is also
incompatible with the democratic ideals enshrined in our Constitution. Article 124 lays down
that in the Country there will be a free, fair and public trial of criminal cases. Delays tend to
raise doubts in respect of free and fair disposition of criminal cases.