Frankfurt: Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person

I.

Mental conditions are necessary for being a person

A. Humans are the only living thing with this
1. animals do not have this requirement
2. it is the construction of our will
a) our ability to form second order desires
B. Important for Philosophy to discover our essence
1. Does harm to vocabulary if we use the word person
a) does not distinguish us from animals or those not human but rather what we
regard about ourselves and our lives
b) our concept of a person should not be understood as species to species
(1) some not of our species could be person and some humans can be
nonperson
(2) mainly humans because we have second-order desires
(a) ability to want different preferences and purposes from what they have
(3) animals have first-order desires
(a) to do or not do one thing or another
C. To want
1. Want can signify many different things
a) not as simple as A wants X
b) could be unaware that they want something
c) does not really want
d) would rather die than doing A than X
2. want can be a wide range of possibilities
a) can not guarantee the amount of desire or motives for doing something so it is
hard to distinguish between first-order and second
D. Will
1. to identify will is to identify the desires by which he is motivated in some action or to
identify the desires that he will or would be motivated when or if he acts
2. will is identical with one or more of first-order desires
a) but not coextensive with notion of first-order desires
b) not the notion of something that merely inclines an agent in some degree to act
in a certain way
3. notion of an effective desire
a) one that moves a person all the way to action
b) will is not the notion of what an agent intends to do
(1) some may have settled to do one thing but end up doing something else
instead because despite his intentions his desires to do one thing proves
weaker or less effective than the other
4. 2 distinguishes of second-order desires
a) someone may have a desire to do something contradictory to the first-order
desire and wants the first-order desire to remain unsatisfied
(1) ex: the physicians desire to desire the drug
b) someone wants the first-order desire to be satisfied
c) when he wants his desire to be his will it is a second-order volition
d) not having second-order desires or having second-order volitions is essential to
being a person

5. structure of a persons will presupposes that he is a rational being, however a

wonton (agent with first-order desires who is not a person) can reason and deliberate
a) difference between person and wanton
(1) two narcotics addicts
(a) one hates the addiction- therefore has conflicting first-order desires
i) he is not neutral with regard to the conflict between desire to take the
drug and his desire to refrain from taking it
ii) this constitutes his will
(b) other addict
i) conflicting first-order desire
ii) no concern of the conflict
iii) makes him a wonton
II. Connection to free will
A. Second-order volitions necessary to enjoy or lacking freedom of will
1. Free action v. Free will
a) free action- doing what one wants to do
b) free will- is willing what one want to will
(1) ex: unwilling addict is not free
(2) wanton addict neither has the will or has a will that differs from the will he
wants- since so volitions of second-order freedom of will cannot be a problem
for him
B. People can be more complicated and go past just second-order desires
1. Frankfurt says that as long as one identifies himself with one of his first-order
desires, then the application of will applies to every desire volition afterwards
C. Free will is important
1. consists in the satisfaction of second-order desires
2. animals lack free will because they do not have second-order volitions
D. Free will to moral responsibility
1. free will is desirable
2. if person enjoys freedom of will and of action
a) not only free to do what he wants but also want what he wants and therefore all
the freedom possible
3. person morally responsible when their will is free and could have and wanted to do
otherwise