Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Review completed by Ellen Smith, who runs Mine Safety and Health
News. It bills itself as the only independent, credentialed, legal news
service covering MSHA and FMSHRC, mine safety and health issues, and
case law.
http://www.minesafety.com/
2016
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
2/4/2014
Stand#
Fine
Notes
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: When checked the mine tracking system on the HG#2 MMU-004 long wall face was not being maintained in an
operational condition.
Editors note: After the 2006 Sago disaster and Aracoma fire, mine operators were required to install electronic tracking systems that
would enable them to approximate each miners whereabouts in the mine. The tracking system allows rescuers to fine miners in a
disaster. During the 2010 UBB disaster, where 29 miners were killed, the tracking system wasnt working. Quote from the UBB Report:
Blanchards crew reached Blake somewhere between 4:00 p.m. and 4:05 p.m. He sat down in front of the mantrip, and he told us that his
whole crew was down about 20 breaks away, Hilbert said. He said that he stayed with them as long as he could, put rescuers on them
and tried to keep them breathing until he knew he had to get some help. He said he tried to call on the radio. He pushed the button on the
tracking device to try to get help, and nobody ever came. As a result, for hours after the UBB explosion, there was complete confusion as
to how many miners were in UBB and who those miners were.
During the Sago Disaster, where 12 miners were still alive and hoping for rescuers to find them, Randal McCloy the only survivor
said they took a sledgehammer and would bang and bang as hard as they could on the roof bolts in hopes that rescuers on the surface
would hear them. Ten hours passed and eventually 11 of the men, all but McCloy, succumbed to carbon monoxide poisoning. Just a
month later, the Sago miners families learned that 72 potash miners in Saskatchewan, Canada, had escaped a mine fire and were
awaiting rescue in a refuge chamber. Not only were the miners in a safe place, they were in contact with rescuers on the surface. The
Sago families also learned that wireless tracking systems were commercially available and some mine operators were using them.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
48.7 - Training of miners assigned to a task in which they have had no previous experience; minimum courses of instruction.
(a) Miners assigned to new work tasks as mobile equipment operators, drilling machine operators, haulage and conveyor systems operators, roof
and ground control machine operators, and those in blasting operations shall not perform new work tasks in these categories until training
prescribed in this paragraph and paragraph (b) of this section has been completed. This training shall not be required for miners who have been
trained and who have demonstrated safe operating procedures for such new work tasks within 12 months preceding assignment. This training
shall also not be required for miners who have performed the new work tasks and who have demonstrated safe operating procedures for such new
work tasks within 12 months preceding assignment. The training program shall include the following: (1)Health and safety aspects and safe
operating procedures for work tasks, equipment, and machinery. The training shall include instruction in the health and safety aspects and the
safe operating procedures related to the assigned tasks, including information about the physical and health hazards of chemicals in the miner's
work area, the protective measures a miner can take against these hazards, and the contents of the mine's HazCom program. The training shall be
given in an on-the-job environment; and (2)(i)Supervised practice during nonproduction. The training shall include supervised practice in the
assigned tasks, and the performance of work duties at times or places where production is not the primary objective; on (a)(2)(ii)Supervised
operation during production. The training shall include, while under direct and immediate supervision and production is in progress, operation of
the machine or equipment and the performance of work duties. (3)New or modified machines and equipment. Equipment and machine operators
shall be instructed in safe operating procedures applicable to new or modified machines or equipment to be installed or put into operation in the
mine, which require new or different operating procedures.
7560813
10/31/2014 104(a)
0/31/2014
C
Y
48.7(a)
$52,500.00
In Contest
The mine operator failed to provide adequate task training for two roof bolters who were moving a roof bolting
machine in an area outby of a working section. A fatal accident occurred on May 14, 2014, at this mine during the
removal of equipment from the North Tailgate 1 area. William Daniel Payne, 25, was caught between the automated
temporary roof support of the company No. DBRB3 Fletcher roof bolting machine and the coal rib. The accident
occurred in the No. 3 entry of the Viking Portal, Tailgate 1, between No. 89 and No. 90 crosscuts. The machine was
being transported off the working section using a diesel generator to provide ac power to the machines tram and
operating systems. Payne was walking beside the machine when he was caught by the machine and the south side coal
rib. The task training provided by the mine operator was not adequate to address hazards associated with mining
equipment being moved in areas outby the working sections. (See related violation under 75.1725(a). See related
William-Daniel
violation under 50.10).
Payne, 25
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
8453318
9/24/2014
104(d)(2)
10/28/2014
O
Y
48.7(c)
$32,810.00
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: The mine operator has failed to train miners on the high voltage (4160 volt) power system on the MMU-004
longwall system. As per part 48.7(c) when miners are assigned a new task they shall be instructed in the safety and health aspects and
safe work procedures of the task. Management has failed to properly train the electricians at this mine resulting in a serious accident. A
miner came in contact with energized 4160 volt circuit in the 2 bay 4160 volt junction box S/N-201680-1-1. This violation is an
unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. (See related violations under 75.820).
Editors Note: Injury producing violations. I.E. was troubleshooting the Longwall crusher circuit. Maintenance locked out the crusher
circuit at the mule train. I.E. Entered the 2 bay disconnect at the monorail and came in contact with the energized shear circuit. He stated
that he got bit. I.E. appeared unharmed & asked to not leave the mine but was instructed to be checked as a precautionary measurement.
Small burn finger. Listed as days away from work accident.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
50.10 Immediate notification. The operator shall immediately contact MSHA at once without delay and within 15 minutes at the toll-free
number, 1-800-746-1553, once the operator knows or should know that an accident has occurred involving: ... (b) An injury of an individual at
the mine which has a reasonable potential to cause death;
7560566
1/28/2015
104(d)(2)
1/28/2015
50.10(b)
$5,000.00
In Contest
(Fine Under MINER Act)
The operator failed to immediately contact MSHA at once without delay and within 15 minutes once the operator knew or should have
known that an accident occurred involving injury to a miner which had reasonable potential to cause death. An accident occurred at this
mine on November 20th, 2014 involving a high pressure hydraulic hose. The actuation of hydraulic pressure to retract the base lift
cylinder for the No. 7 shield at the Viking Portal longwall, MMU-005 caused the hose to rupture at the base lift. This allowed high
pressure hydraulic fluid (4,200 psi) to strike the miner, resulting in internal injuries with reasonable potential to cause death. The operator
engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence in that the operator, once aware of the injured miners
condition, failed to call the MSHA hotline. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. **Standard
50.10(b) was cited 3 times in two years at mine 1103189 (2 to the operator, 1 to a contractor). This violation is an unwarrantable failure
to comply with a mandatory standard.
Editors note: ** Company failed to immediately report accidents on 3 occasions over the past 2 years. See related violation under
75.1725 Machinery and equipment; operation and maintenance. See note about injuries involving hydraulic fluid under pressure.
7560821
10/31/2014
104(a)
10/31/2014
50.10(b)
$5,000.00
In Contest
(Fine under MINER Act)
The mine operator failed to immediately contact MSHA at once without delay and within 15 minutes at the toll-free number, 1-800-7461553, once the mine operator knew that an accident had occurred with injury to a miner which had a reasonable potential to cause death.
A fatal accident involving crushing injuries to William Daniel Payne occurred in the Viking Tailgate 1 entries on the No. 3 entry between
No. 89 and 90 crosscuts at 2:15 p.m. on May 14, 2014. Due to the isolated underground location of the accident scene, underground
management personnel did not become aware of the accident until 3:20 p.m. The day shift mine manager reported to the management
personnel on the surface at the Viking Portal at 3:20 p.m. that an accident had occurred and the victim was unresponsive. The accident
was reported to the MSHA toll free number at 4:01 p.m., 41 minutes after the mine operator knew of the accident. Standard 50.10 (b) was
cited 1 time in two years at mine 1103189.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
9/18/2013
104(a)
3/20/2014
62.110(a)
$15,570.00
Closed - Settled
$11,000.00
Condition or Practice: The mine operator has not established a system of monitoring that evaluates each miner's noise exposure
sufficiently to determine miner's exposure to excessive noise levels. The mine operator was granted additional time in abating the
violation to receive dosimeters that were ordered PO#4500042710 and to use them to establish a system of monitoring that evaluates the
miner's exposure to excessive noise levels.
8452784
9/18/2014
104(a)
10/28/2014
62.110(a)
23,229.00
Hearing Case
Filed
Condition Or Practice: The mine operator has not established a system of monitoring that evaluates each miner's noise exposure
sufficiently to determine continuing compliance with this part. This standard was cited one year ago to the day and the operator still
does not have enough records to prove that they have evaluated each miner's noise exposure (emphasis added). Standard 62.110(a) was
cited 1 time in two years at mine 1103189.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
70.206 (a) Each operator shall take five valid representative samples from the designated occupation (DO) in each mechanized mining unit
(MMU) during each bimonthly period. DO samples shall be collected on consecutive normal production shifts or normal production shifts each
of which is worked on consecutive days. The bimonthly periods are: January 1-February 28 (29); March 1-April 30; May 1-June 30; July
1-August 31; September 1-October 31; November 1-December 31. ... (b) Unless otherwise directed by the District Manager, the DO samples
shall be taken by placing the approved sampling device as specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(10) of this section.... (3) Continuous mining
section other than auger-type. On the continuous mining machine operator or on the continuous mining machine within 36 inches inby the
normal working position; (emphasis added).
**FLAGGING** THERE HAVE BEEN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN CASES LIKE THIS.
7560554
12/30/2014 104(d)(2)
1/8/2015
O
Y
70.206(a)
$69,200.00 Closed paid $69,200.00
Condition Or Practice: The mine operator intentionally failed (emphasis added) to collect a valid representative respirable dust sample
that reflected the typical concentration levels with regard to MMU- 001 and normal mining activities during which the amount of
material produced is equivalent to a normal production shift during the November-December bimonthly sampling period. While
collecting a respirable dust sample (cassette #5139483) on 12/3/2014 at the MC #1 mine on the designated occupation 001-0-036, the
gravimetric sampling device that was to be placed on the continuous miner operator, was placed in the intake aircourse adjacent to the
section dumping point more than 300-feet outby where the continuous miner operator was performing his work activities. The mine
operator submitted the respirable dust sample from this occupation to MSHA as a valid representative sample know the sampling device
was not maintained within the 36 inch distance as specified in 30 CFR 70.206(b)(3).By submitting a respirable dust sample to MSHA as
a valid representative sample knowing the sample was not collected according to the provisions of 70.206(b)(3) the operator is
intentionally manipulating the outcome of the bi-monthly sampling results (emphasis added) and thereby has engaged in aggravated
conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. To
terminate this order, certified respirable dust sampling personnel not certified under the new dust rules established August 1, 2014, must
attend a MSHA respirable dust sampling certification class and pass the respirable dust sampling certification test.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
12/30/2014
104(d)(2)
2/5/2015
70.210(c)
$12,563.00
Closed - Paid
$12,563.00
Condition Or Practice: A person certified in sampling shall properly complete the dust data card that is provided by the manufacturer
for each filter cassette. The card shall have an identification number identical to that on the cassette used to take the sample and be
submitted to MSHA with the sample. Each card shall be signed by the certified person who actually performed the required examinations
under 70.205 (b) of this part during the sampling shift and shall include that person's MSHA Individual Identification Number (MIIN).
Respirable dust samples with data cards not properly completed may be voided by MSHA. The certified person who signed the dust data
card for sample #51319483 did not conduct the 2nd hour check of the dust sampling unit. The certified person stated he was not on the
unit when the 2nd hour check should have been conducted. By submitting a respirable dust sample to MSHA as a valid representative
sample knowing the sample was not collected according to the provisions 70.205 (b) the operator is intentionally manipulating the
outcome of the monthly sampling results (emphasis added) and thereby has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than
ordinary negligence. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
Editors Note: On February 3rd 2015, Dust sampling(Underground/Surface) certifications were revoked. Black lung disease in the U.S.
is on the rise, and the theory is that one of the reasons is cheating on dust samples, and therefore miners are continuously over-exposed to
dust that causes this deadly disease.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Marion-Dallas D. Travelstead, 36
6/17/2014
O
Y
75.202(a)
70,000.00
In Contest
On November 4, 2013, at approximately 1:50 p.m., the Longwall Chief Marion-Dallas D. Travelstead,
36, was killed while shoveling coal and loose rock between the coal face and the longwall panline at the
No. 123 shield on the South District 1 Headgate, No. 2 section face (MMU 004-0). Travelstead received
crushing injuries when a solid piece of coal and cap rock fell from the coal face, striking Travelstead.
The coal and rock combination measured approximately 4 feet 10 inches long, by 2 feet 3 inches wide,
and up to 24-inches thick. Review of the MSHA database shows that this accident is the second
accident and first fatality at this mine where a miner was struck by coal or rock that had fallen or
rolled from the longwall face since September of 2013. There were two other reportable accidents; one
on March 31, 2011 and one on March 29, 2012, where the longwall face fell or rolled out onto the
panline. In both of these accidents, the rock and/or coal were of such large size as to affect passage of the
miners off the tailgate end of the longwall face. The mine operator failed to support or otherwise control
the roof or face area of the longwall to protect persons from hazards related to falls of the roof or face
while working between the longwall face and the panline. The mine operator engaged in aggravated
conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence when miners were allowed to work between the coal
face and the longwall panline without any special precautions. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply
with a mandatory standard. Standard 75.202(a) was cited 8 times in two years at Mine 11-03189.
8452032
1/22/2014
104(d)(1)
1/23/2014
C
Y
75.202(a)
$11,000.00
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: The roof, face and ribs of areas where persons work or travel shall be supported or otherwise controlled to
protect persons from hazards related to falls of the roof, face or ribs and coal outbursts. At seven (7) cross cut of headgate #2 between #5
and #6 entries, three (3) areas of unsupported roof exists. 1) area exists where three (3) roof bolts are present where the roof rock has fell
away from the roof bolt bearing plate creating an area of unsupported roof ten (10) feet in width by fifteen (15) feet in length. 2nd area is
where two (2) roof bolts exist where the roof rock has fell away from the bearing plate creating an area of unsupported roof ten (10) feet
in width by twelve (12) feet in length. 3rd area is where three (3) roof bolts with 1 of the 3 is sheared off and the other 2 where the roof
rock has fell away from the bearing plate creating an area of unsupported roof 18 feet in length by 10 feet in length. This condition is
Summaries of serious violations at MC#1
-8-
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
obvious and extensive and has existed for an extended period of time. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a
mandatory standard constituting more than ordinary negligence. Standard 75.202(a) was cited 9 times in two years at mine 1103189. This
violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
Editors Note: This condition was been reported in the examination book as loose roof starting at June 5,2013, and continued to be listed
until July 7,2013 when the condition was reported as a pod out. No corrective action was taken to correct the condition. See related
violation under 75.364(d) #8452032. Roof falls remain the leading cause of death for underground coal miners.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
1/29/2014
104(d)(1)
1/29/2014
75.220(a)(1) $15,200
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: The mine operators approved roof control plan is not being complied with on the Headgate 2 Longwall belt at
cross cut #11 on the south side. Inby cross cut #11 the rib has rashed away from the row of installed roof bolts for a distance of
approximately 15 feet in length and the solid rib is approximately 6 feet to 7 feet from the row of installed roof bolts At cross cut #11 the
south rib has rashed away from the row of installed roof bolts for a distance of approximately 28 feet and is approximately 5 feet to 8 feet
from the solid pillar to the row of installed roof bolts. This condition was recorded in the examination book on 1/23/2014 as a rib roll.
The approved roof control plan (page 8 item 17 requires the bolts to be a minimum of 3 feet from the rib. This is an unwarrantable
failure of a mandatory standard constituting more than ordinary negligence. Standard 75.220(a)(1) was cited 10 times in two years at
mine 1103189. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
Editors Note: It took 30 men working 5.5 hours to install the necessary roof supports to comply with the plan. Failure to comply with
roof support plans, which leads to roof falls, is the leading cause of death for underground coal miners.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
75.313(a)(3) and (c)(1) Main mine fan stoppage with persons underground.
(a) If a main mine fan stops while anyone is underground and the ventilating quantity provided by the fan is not maintained by a back-up
fan system (3) Everyone shall be withdrawn from the working sections and areas where mechanized mining equipment is being installed
or removed.
...
(c) If ventilation is not restored within 15 minutes after a main mine fan stops (1) Everyone shall be withdrawn from the mine.
9033166
12/5/2014
104(d)(2)
12/5/2014
O
N
75.313(a)(3) $63,000.00
Hearing Case Filed
Condition Or Practice: The miners on the #3 Long Wall working section were not withdrawn from the working section upon
notification of the fan outage that occurred at 0728. There were miners still on the long wall face at shield 150 and 115 at 0743. This
violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. Violation affected mine in its entirety north and south portals.
All shifts had to be retrained in the evacuation procedures during a fan outage. 16 miners were affected.
9033167
12/5/2014
104(d)(2)
12/5/2014
O
Y
75.313(c)(1) $70,000.00
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: The miners from 3rd shift and 1st shift on the #3 Longwall working section were not evacuated from the mine in
a timely manner after the 15 minute period of the fan outage that occurred at 0728. Miners continued working under the supervision of
two section foreman (emphasis added) and did not start withdrawing from the working section until approximately 0830. This violation
is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. All shifts had to be retrained in the evacuation procedures during a fan
outage. 16 miners were affected.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
75.344(a) Compressors. (a) Except compressors that are components of equipment such as locomotives and rock dusting machines and
compressors of less than 5 horsepower, electrical compressors including those that may start automatically shall be: (1) Continuously attended by
a person designated by the operator who can see the compressor at all times during its operation. Any designated person attending the compressor
shall be capable of activating the fire suppression system and deenergizing or shutting-off the compressor in the event of a fire; or, (2) Enclosed
in a noncombustible structure or area which is ventilated by intake air coursed directly into a return air course or to the surface and equipped with
sensors to monitor for heat and for carbon monoxide or smoke. The sensors shall deenergize power to the compressor, activate a visual and
audible alarm located outside of and on the intake side of the enclosure, and activate doors to automatically enclose the noncombustible structure
or area when either of the following occurs: (i) The temperature in the noncombustible structure or area reaches 165F. (ii) The carbon monoxide
concentration reaches 10 parts per million above the ambient level for the area, or the optical density of smoke reaches 0.022 per meter. At least
once every 31 days, sensors installed to monitor for carbon monoxide shall be calibrated with a known concentration of carbon monoxide and air
sufficient to activate the closing door, and each smoke sensor shall be tested to determine that it functions correctly.
8432248
5/11/2011
104(a)
5/11/2011
75.344(a)(1) $19,300.00
Closed - Settled
$12,627.00
Condition or Practice: The 75 horsepower, company number one air compressor located at 83 crosscut along the # 3 entry on the
headgate unit intake travelway, was not continuously attended by a person designated by the operator who could see the compressor at all
times during its operation or enclose the compressor in a non combustible structure or area. This compressor was in the primary
escapeway, citation number 8432246 was also issued. There was no provision to disconnect the power in case of fire. The compressor did
not have a fire suppression system installed. Management did not comply with the mandatory standard. The compressor was removed
from the mine.
Editors note: It was a compressor fire that killed 27 miners in the 1984 Wilberg Mine Disaster. The escape route of the 27 persons was
cut off when the fire quickly engulfed the intake of the 5th Right longwall. See related violation under 75.344(a)(1).
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
75.344(b) Compressors. Compressors, except those exempted in paragraph (a), shall be equipped with a heat activated fire suppression system
meeting the requirements of 75.1107-3 through 75.1107-16.
8432247
5/11/2011
104(a)
5/26/2011
75.344(b)
$19,300.00
Closed - Settled
$12,628.00
The number one air compressor located at 83 crosscut along the # 3 entry on the headgate unit intake travelway, was not provided with a
fire suppression system. This compressor was in the primary escapeway, citation number 8432246 was also issued. There was no
provision to disconnect the power in case of fire. Management should have installed the fire suppression system before the compressor
was taken in the mine. The compressor was removed from service, and being removed from the mine. Potential Flagrant Violation
Indicator
Editors note: It was a compressor fire that killed 27 miners in the 1984 Wilberg Mine Disaster. The escape route of the 27 persons was
cut off when the fire quickly engulfed the intake of the 5th Right longwall. See related violation under 75.344(a)(1).
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
issued for accumulations of float coal dust on the belt conveyor entry. These conditions that were cited were obvious to the most casual
observer. Citations #8452149 and #8452150 are being issued in conjunction with this 104(d)(2) order. In order to terminate this 104(d)(2)
order all mine examiners must be trained in the mandatory health and safety standard as outlined in paragraph (a)(3) of this standard. This
is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard constituting more that ordinary negligence.
Editors Note: It was noted in the investigations into the UBB mine disaster that killed 29 miners in April 2010, and the Aracoma fire of
2006 that killed two, the Darby Mine Disaster that killed 5, that inadequate shift examinations were performed. This is one of MSHAs
Rules to Live By standards.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
104(d)(1)
1/29/2014
75.363(a)
$20,300
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: Any hazardous condition found by the mine foreman or equivalent mine official, assistant mine foreman or
equivalent mine official, or other certified persons designated by the operator for the purpose of conducting examinations shall be posted
with a conspicuous danger sign. Any violation of a mandatory health and safety standard found during a pre-shift, supplemental or onshift or weekly examination shall be corrected. A hazardous reported (sic) as a rib roll has existed on the Headgate 2 Longwall conveyor
belt at cross cut #11 since 1232014 with out any corrective action taken. 104(d)(1) order # 8452039 was issued in conjunction with this
104(d)(1) order. This is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard constituting more than ordinary negligence.
Standard 75.363 (a) was cited 2 times in two years at mine 1103189. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a
mandatory standard.
Editors note: See related violation under 75.220(a)(1).
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
75.364(d)Weekly examination
(d) Hazardous conditions shall be corrected immediately. If the condition creates an imminent danger, everyone except those persons referred to
in 104(c) of the Act shall be withdrawn from the area affected to a safe area until the hazardous condition is corrected.
8452033
1/22/2014
104(d)(1)
1/23/2014
75.364(d)
$12,900.00
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: On review of the weekly book for hazardous conditions an area of unsupported roof has been recorded in the
record book for the weekly return of Headgate 3 face to return fan. At Headgate 2 at cross cut #7 between #5 and #6 entry loose roof and
a pod out has been reported in the weekly book. This condition has been reported as loose roof starting at June 5,2013. On July 7,2013
the condition was reported as a pod out. No corrective action was taken to correct the condition. The weekly record book for hazardous
condition has been signed by mine management acknowledging the condition without corrective action taken. This is an unwarrantable
failure to comply with a mandatory standard constituting more than ordinary negligence. This 104(d)(1) order is being issued in
conjunction with citation # 8452032 (see violation under 75.202(a)).
* Editors Note: Roof falls are the leading cause of mining deaths for underground coal miners. It took 15 roof jacks to abate the
hazardous roof condition, which existed for over a month. Miners rely on these examination to make sure the mine is safe.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
8439682
1/22/2014
104(a)
1/22/2014
C
Y
75.370(a)(1) $10,437.00
Closed $5,000.00
The Company is not complying with their Approved Ventilation Plan. The Main North Travelway from Viking Shaft Bottom to the airlock doors at crosscut 83 is extremely dusty. Loose road dust measuring approximately 4 inches to 1/2 inch in depth throughout the
affected area. When equipment travels the roadway, road dust is suspended into the mine atmosphere creating a breathing and visibility
hazard for miners. The Approved Ventilation Plan states on page 8, item 2 that haulage/travelroads will be wetted with water to control
dust. Standard 75.370(a)(1) was cited 69 times in two years at mine 1103189
8450474
3/25/2014
104(a)
3/25/2014
75.370(a)(1)
$35,500.00
Hearing Case
Filed
Condition Or Practice: The Company's Approved Ventilation Plan was not being complied with on Head-gate #1 MMU-002. When
checked with a calibrated anemometer, the air velocity in the last open crosscut between #2 and #3 entry was 13,473 CFM. The plan
states that a minimum of 20,000 CFM will be maintained in the last open crosscut. Standard 75.370(a)(1) was cited 93 times in two years
at mine1103189
8452711
3/18/2014
104(a)
3/19/2014
C
N
75.370(a)(1) $11,306.00
Closed 6,000.00
Condition Or Practice: The mine operator is not following the ventilation plan approved by the District Manager on the North Mains
travel ways from shaft bottom and crosscuts around shaft bottom to the North Mains Unit (MMU-002), due to the following reasons: The
travel ways are dry and dusty and excessive dust is suspended in the air when vehicles travel them. The approved plan states on page #23
that haulage/travel roads will be wetted with water or treated unless water, natural or casual, makes this effort redundant. Standard
75.370(a)(1) was cited 85 times in two years at mine 1103189.
8452720
3/20/2014
104(a)
3/25/2014
C
Y
75.370(a)(1) $14,373.00
Hearing Case Filed
Condition Or Practice: The mine operator is not following the ventilation plan approved by the District Manager on the North Mains
Unit (MMU-002) due to the following reason: When checked by MSHA with a Davis anemometer, the air velocity in the last open
crosscut between #2 and #3 entry was 15,048 cfm. The approved plan states on page #21 that a minimum of 20,000 cfm will be
maintained in the last open crosscut. Standard 75.370(a)(1) was cited 90 times in two years at mine 1103189.
9031005
3/31/2014
104(d)(2)
3/31/2014
O
Y
75.370(a)(1) $52,500.00
Hearing Case Filed
Condition Or Practice: The company's approved ventilation plan was not being complied with on the Head Gate 2 working section,
MMU 002. When the air was measured behind the line curtain in Entry No. 1, there was no air movement found (emphasis added). The
air was measured with an anemometer and with chemical smoke. The chemical smoke drifted to the mine roof and did not move. The
Summaries of serious violations at MC#1
- 20 -
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
approved ventilation plan requires that 3000 CFM is required to be maintained behind the line curtain in all idle faces. Two miners were
observed working on the continuous mining machine in the idle face at the time of inspection. The idle face had been driven in
approximately 110 feet from the SS 4322. It took 1 hour and 40 minutes to correct the ventilation problem (emphasis added). Standard
75.370(a)(1) was cited 94 times in two years at mine 1103189 (94 to the operator, 0 to a contractor). This violation is an unwarrantable
failure to comply with a mandatory standard.
9033189
2/2/2015
104(a)
2/2/2015
75.370(a)(1)
15,971.00
Closed - settled
2,900.00
Condition Or Practice: The Company's approved ventilation plan is not being complied with on the MMU 002, HG #4 working section.
The #2 entry inby crosscut 54 had a mined section that measured approx 26 feet from the last row of bolts to the face. Page 10 of the
approved ventilation plan it shows the max cut depth to be only 20 feet from the last row of bolts. Standard 75.370(a)(1) was cited 104
times in two years at mine 1103189 (104 to the operator, 0 to a contractor). This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a
mandatory standard.
Editors Note: Failure to ventilate the UBB mine according to the approved ventilation plan in violation of 75.370 was a contributing
factor to the April 2010 explosion at the UBB Mine that killed 29 miners. A ventilation violation was the contributing factor in the 2006
Darby Mine explosion that killed five miners.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
75.380(f)(3)(ii) (f) Primary escapeway. (1) One escapeway that is ventilated with intake air shall be designated as the primary escapeway. The
primary escapeway shall have a higher ventilation pressure than the belt entry unless the mine operator submits an alternative in the mine
ventilation plan to protect the integrity of the primary escapeway, based on mine specific conditions, which is approved by the district manager.
... (3) The following equipment is not permitted in the primary escapeway: ... (ii) Compressors s, except(C) Compressors of less than five
horsepower.
8432246
5/11/2011
104(d)(1)
5/11/2011 C
75.380(f)(3)(ii)
Closed Paid
$16,400.00
Condition or Practice: A 75 horsepower compressor, company number 01, was installed at 83 crosscut along the headgate unit
travelway. This is the primary escapeway for the headgate unit. Compressors over 5 horsepower are not permitted in the primary
escapeway. This is the # 3 intake entry, which is also the primary escapeway. The compressor was immediately removed from service.
$16,400.00
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
30 CFR 75.517
Power wires and cables; insulation and protection.
Power wires and cables, except trolley wires, trolley feeder wires, and bare signal wires, shall be insulated adequately and fully protected.
7560510
7/31/2014
104(a)
7/31/2014
C
Y
75.517
$15,570.00
Hearing Case Filed
Condition Or Practice: The cable and insulated power conductors for the company #6 battery charger are not adequately insulated or
protected from damage. Three damaged areas are present on the 128 VDC power wires from the charger to battery plug. All three of
these areas exposed copper conductors. One damaged area is present on the 480 V.A.C. power cable from the belt power center to the #6
battery charger. This condition exposed insulated inner conductors. The company #6 battery charger was energized at Headgate #2,
crosscut #1, between entries 4 and 5.Standard 75.517 was cited 26 times in two years at mine 1103189
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
when he came in contact with the 4160 volt buss while performing work on the crusher circuit in this 2 bay disconnect box. Management
has engaged in aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence in that the shearer circuit was not locked out with a
padlock. This violation is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard. (See editors note). (See related training
violation under 48.7).
8453316
9/24/2014
104(d)(2)
9/24/2014
O
Y
75.820(b)(4) $32,810.00
In Contest
Condition Or Practice: The mine operator has failed to tag the disconnecting device to identify the shearer circuit that supplies 4160
volts to the 2 bay junction box (s/n-201680- 1-1), located on the longwall monorail in MMU-004 prior to performing electrical work. The
shearer circuit was not tagged prior to work being performed, causing an electrician to sustain an electrical shock, when he came in
contact with the 4160 volt buss while performing work on the crusher circuit in this 2 bay disconnect box. Management has engaged in
aggravated conduct constituting more than ordinary negligence in that the shearer circuit was not tagged for identification. This violation
is an unwarrantable failure to comply with a mandatory standard.(See editors note) (See related training violation under 48.7).
Editors Note: Injury producing violations. I.E. was troubleshooting the Longwall crusher circuit. Maintenance locked out the crusher
circuit at the mule train. I.E. Entered the 2 bay disconnect at the monorail and came in contact with the energized shear circuit. He stated
that he got bit. I.E. appeared unharmed & asked to not leave the mine but was instructed to be checked as a precautionary measurement.
Small burn finger. Listed as days away from work accident.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Editors Note: At the Massey Energy Aracoma disaster in 2006, the mine rescue efforts were hampered because the mine maps provided
by the operator were neither accurate nor up-to-date, resulting in the deaths of Elvis Hatfield and Don Bragg. Rescue teams must receive
an accurate map of the area so that they can explore and evaluate conditions accurately and document findings. One rescuer said that once
his team was underground at Aracoma, inaccurate maps made it difficult for us to do what the command center was asking. We had
trouble following stopping lines. We had trouble following finding doors to go through when we were told to make air readings.
Sometimes there was no stopping. Sometimes there was no door. Sometimes everything was a solid stopping line, again, with no doors.
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
9/18/2013
104(a)
9/24/2013 C
75.1506(c)(1) $34,652.00
Closed $18,900.00
Condition Or Practice: The Refuge Alternative for the South HG#3 working section (MMU-003) is located at cross cut #52 in entry #3
(primary escape way), the nearest working face is entry #3 at cross cut #67, a distance of approximately 1900 feet. Refuge Alternatives
shall be provided within 1,000 feet from the nearest working face. Standard 75.1506(c)(1) was cited 1 time in two years at mine 1103189
8446368
12/10/2013
104(a)
12/11/2013
75.1506(c)(1) $34,652.00
Closed
$16,716.00
Condition Or Practice: The Headgate #3 section (MMU-003) is not provided with a refuge chamber within 1000 feet of the nearest
working face. When inspected and tested as per the manufactures recommendations (General Overview & Operating Procedures, pages
14 and 15) specified in the approved Emergency Response Plan (page 8, item 6F), the affected refuge chamber was determined to be
inoperable. The O2-2 oxygen cylinder gage showed approximately 700 pounds per square inch (psi) of pressure; the minimum operating
pressure at 62 degrees F is 1810 psi as specified on the chart affixed to the refuge chamber. The Headgate #3 section was in production at
the time of inspection and the operator ceased production immediately upon notification of the inoperability of the refuge chamber.
Standard 75.1506(c)(1) was cited 2 times in two years at mine 1103189
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
DBRB3 Fletcher roof bolting machine from the completed Viking Longwall District 1 Tailgate #1 Section. Payne received crushing
injuries when he was pinned between the roof bolting machine ATRS and the south coal rib in the No. 3 entry between No. 89
and No. 90 crosscut. The tram control Split/Combine valve in the operators compartment was held in the combine position by
a nylon rope. The roof bolting machine was being operated with both electric motors operating simultaneously for the
hydraulic pumps. The Fletcher maintenance manual clearly states the Split/Combine valve is to be used in the combine
position for use with only one electric motor on the roof bolting machine operating. The Fletcher maintenance manual
clearly warns that operation in the Combine position will make tramming difficult to control when both electric motors are
in operation. Standard 75.1725 (a) was cited 9 times in two years at mine 1103189
William-Daniel
Payne, 25
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes
Date
Terminated
C/O
S&S
Stand#
Fine
Notes