Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
EDITORIAL
...je ne
4 Sartre for Starters
regrette
NEWS
rien...
5 News in brief
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE AT 100
7 Why Sartre Matters
Benedict ODonohoe
11 Was Existentialism a Humanism?
Gerald Jones
14 Being and Nothingness
Christine Daigle
16 Sartre Glossary
18 By Any Means Necessary?
Ian Birchall
21 Sartres Image in de Beauvoirs Memoirs
Willie Thompson
Happy 100th Birthday!
OTHER ARTICLES
p.7, 11, 14, 16, 18, 21, 48, 53
24 The Ontological Argument
Toni Vogel Carey
28 Is Skepticism Ridiculous?
Michael Philips
31 Socratic Humility
Glenn Rawson
37 The Machiavelli Inquiry
Casimir Kukielka
LEARNING & TEACHING
34 A Way of Thinking About Ethics
Philip Badger
LETTERS
40 Letters to the Editor
BOOKS
44 On Bullshit by Harry Frankfurt
reviewed by Petter Naessan
Whats Wrong with St Anselms
44 Existentialism edited by Robert Solomon
Ontological Argument? p.24
reviewed by John Shand
46 Introduction to German Philosophy by Andrew Bowie
reviewed by Peter Rickman
REGULARS
43 Dear Socrates
47 Crossword Deiradiotes
48 Philosophy & Theatre:
No Exit by Jean-Paul Sartre
reviewed by Tim Madigan
52 Moral Moments Joel Marks
SHORT STORY
53 Understanding Sartre
Mark Richardson
Jean-Paul Sartre
p.31
ISSUE 53 Nov/Dec 05
Philosophy Now,
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Tel. 020 7639 7314
rick.lewis@philosophynow.org
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David Pearce
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UK Editors
Philosophy in a nutshell
Philosophy (Philo = love; sophia =
wisdom) is often translated as the love of
wisdom or the love of truth. One way to
get a vague idea as to what philosophy is
about is to dissect the subject and investigate its skeleton. Here is a short guide
to some of the bigger bones!
Metaphysics
after-physics: the
books found after Aristotles books of Physics
The investigation of the underlying
nature and structure of reality as a
whole. Includes questions about the
nature of time, about the different categories of existence and about whether
there is a God.
Epistemology
Episteme = knowledge
logos = explanation of
What is knowledge? What is the difference between knowledge, belief and
opinion? Can we really know anything?
How could we know that we did?
Logic
logos = explanation of
This subject consists of two different
topics. (1) an analysis of what is meant
by logical consequence. (2) an analysis
of the validity of arguments, which
nowadays employs a sort of algebra
which can be used to crunch logical
problems.
Philosophy of Mind
What is the human mind? How does it
think? How is mind related to body?
Ethics
from Ethikos
How should we live? Why should we
live like that? What is good and
bad/evil? How should we decide that an
act is unethical? What is happiness?
Aesthetics
aisthetikos = concerning feeling
What is art? What is beauty? Is the
beauty of music beautiful for similar
reasons to that of a landscape?
Political Philosophy polis= city state
What would utopia be like? Is utopia
possible? How should society be organised? How should decisions be taken?
Other areas include philosophy of
mathematics, of science, of religion, of
language, of social science, of history.
Easy reads
The Problems of Philosophy by
Bertrand Russell. A short and stimulating
introduction to philosophy
History of Western Philosophy by
Bertrand Russell. A long, detailed and
readable history of philosophy. Although
dated, it gives a good introduction which can
then be built upon.
Philosophy and Living by Ralph
Blumenau. Another general history of
philosophy, but with an emphasis on relating
ideas to modern life.
Dictionary of Philosophy by Antony
Flew. Covers an immense variety of subjects,
people etc. Really useful.
News
News
intention to use the embryos to create
pregnancies.
Feds to Block Oregon Suicide Bids
The status of a law in Oregon that
allows doctor-assisted suicide in the case of
a terminally-ill patient was in the news
recently when the USAs new Supreme
Court chief justice defended the right of
the federal government to block
euthanasia. Oregon is the only state to
allow euthanasia following a referendum in
1997. The Supreme Court ruled then that
the law did not give the dying a right to
such assisted suicide but the door was left
open to the state to use its discretion. Now
it appears that door is being firmly closed.
Coming Soon to a Mall Near You
Meanwhile, Dignitas, the Swiss clinic
that carries out assisted suicide, has opened
a branch in Hanover, Germany. In spite of
vociferous opposition from politicians,
Church leaders and doctors, Dignitas
insists that under European Union law it
has the right to offer its services within the
EU. The founder, Ludwig Minelli, stated
that the office had been opened in response
Philosophy Now
Issue 53 was edited by:
Rick Lewis founded
Philosophy Now in
1991 in his spare
time while working
as a physicist for
British Telecom.
He thinks that
everyday life throws
philosophical
problems at us all, and the only question is
whether we tackle them badly or well.
Anja Steinbauer
says The uniqueness of the western
philosophical tradition has often been
pointed out, but
neither being unique
nor being philosophical is unique to
the western tradition. Anja is editor for
Continental, non-Western and feminist
philosophy in the magazine.
An Evolving Controversy
Educators across America have been
rivetted by an intelligent design versus
evolution court case in Harrisburg, in
Pennsylvania and several philosophers
have become involved in the controversy.
One philosophy professor, Barbara Forrest
from the Southeastern Louisiana
University, has been a pivotal figure in the
trial.
Professor Forrest, a researcher of the
history of intelligent design and author of
the book Creationisms Trojan Horse: The
Wedge of Intelligent Design, has been called
as an expert witness in the case between the
Dover School Board, near Harrisburg, and
eleven parents. The dispute arose when
the school board instructed teachers to
read disclaimer to pupils in biology classes
before teaching them about the theory of
evolution. The disclaimer states the
theory (of evolution) is not a fact. Gaps in
the theory exist for which there is no
evidence. It continues with the advice that
if pupils wish to investigate the the alternative theory of intelligent design they
should read a book called Of Pandas &
People. The parents object to this statement and are backed by groups supporting
the separation of church and state. The
school board maintains that intelligent
design is science, not religion. It is a recent
theory that proposes that the irreducible
complexity of present-day organisms
Chris Madden
that they chose to obey orders which they felt they ought to
disobey, and yet to which they freely and culpably assented.
To lie to oneself about the exercise of ones own freedom and
moral discretion is Sartres definition of bad faith.
The authentic person, by contrast, agrees that all his
actions flow from his inherent freedom, accepts that every
action is an implicit assertion of moral value, and realises that
our actions are the only basis on which others are entitled to
judge us. Action is our dimension-for-the-other in the world,
and we have a right of mutual moral scrutiny as if all our
actions are committed quite freely. Another entailment of this
ethical analysis is that all human life is human. This tautological maxim, adapted from Nietzsche and Heidegger, is
deployed by Sartre to undercut inauthentic interpretations of
actions as being, for example, bestial, diabolical, or inhuman.
The more apt we become to attribute inhuman or supernatural epithets to our behaviour, the more likely we are to be
talking about conduct that is, in fact, exclusively or even
characteristically human: no other species could conceive,
much less enact, Bergen Belsen or Abu Graib.
So, it flows from Sartres first principles that we are
embodied consciousnesses, alone in a godless universe, characterised by freedom, destined to act autonomously and by our
own lights, and to be wholly responsible for our actions and
therefore open to moral judgment on the basis of them.
Sartrean existentialism, then, is an ontology that entails an
exigent, unrelenting and burdensome deontology, or ethics,
whose premises are grounded in empirical good sense, and
whose complements derive from it logically and persuasively.
Yet there is a problem, which we might call relativity: the
individuals relation to his situation, or the interface of subjectivity and objectivity, the confrontation of person and history.
How does Sartre account for the historical moment, which he
calls facticity and which is axiomatically contingent? How
does facticity impact upon the agent? To what extent is my
freedom circumscribed by my conditioning? In Being and
Nothingness (1943) he wrote: If war breaks out, it is in my
image, it is my war and I deserve it But Frantz, the antihero of his play The Condemned of Altona (1960), says: It is not
we who make war, but war that makes us. To which of these
opposing perspectives did Sartre finally adhere?
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Sartre moved away from
what he called the analytical and apolitical phase of his
thought enshrined in Being and Nothingness which is subjectivist, individualistic and asocial towards a dialectical conceptualisation, culminating in Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960),
which is objectivist, collectivist, and socially focused. This is
another distinctive element of Sartres legacy: the attempt to
reconcile, without renouncing them, the main tenets of his
phenomenological ontology and ethics with a more comprehensive and inclusive worldview that would take account of
the historical moment in the narrative of the individual; that
is, to incorporate the ideology of existentialism into what he
called the unsurpassable philosophy of our time, Marxism.
This evolution can be encapsulated as a shift from the uncompromising analytical dictum, We are what we do, to the more
subtle dialectical statement: We are what we make of what
others have made of us. This is a pragmatic acknowledgment
that our freedom, albeit inherent and ineluctable, is necessarily conditioned by time and place. As Sartre once rebuked
Camus, in their dispute over the latters book The Rebel, the
Sartre did much of his writing in Paris cafs such as Les Deux Magots
(above) and the next-door Caf Flore.
Was
a
Existentialism
Humanism?
n the autumn of
1945 Jean-Paul
Sartre gave a
lecture at a club in
Paris entitled
Existentialism is a
Humanism. It was a
lecture that propelled
Sartre into the philosophical stratosphere:
he became a celebrity
overnight, and an intellectual icon whose
funeral in 1980 was
attended by 50,000
mourners. Sartre ignited
hearts and minds in a way
dreamt of only by princesses
and pop stars.
Sartres lecture was eventually
published as a short book, whose
English edition was poorly titled
Existentialism and Humanism. Although Sartre later renounced
the lecture its publication became the bible of existentialism,
selling in its hundreds of thousands. The lecture vividly
reveals the conceptual struggle that Sartre was to have
throughout his life and it was an explicit attempt to show how
this conflict could be resolved. Namely, to show how existentialism, a philosophy of individual freedom, could be seen as a
form of humanism, a philosophy that locates value in
humanity.
For Sartre the success of this project depended on the
success of a certain number of steps. He needed to explain
what he meant by humanism and how it differed from other
less savoury forms of humanism. He wished to give a
technical account of existentialism which distinguished it from
just another trendy, but vacuous, lifestyle choice black polonecks, smooth jazz, random acts of personal expression (such
as Audrey Hepburns crazzzzy freeform dance in the film
Further Reading
Thomas C. Anderson Sartres Two Ethics, Open Court 1993
(Chap. 5)
David Cooper, Existentialism Blackwell 2000 (Chap. 10)
Jones, Cardinal & Hayward, Existentialism & Humanism:
Jean-Paul Sartre Hodder Murray 2003 (Chapter 8)
Mary Warnock, Existentialist Ethics MacMillan 1967 (Chap. 4)
the hall and finds out that someone sees him; we read about
the masochist and the sadist, and about female genitalia as a
hole to be filled, as a lack of being, as an appeal Of the
latter passages Sartre says in a letter to Simone de Beauvoir
that they are titillating (croustillants) and that they ought to
compensate for the more boring ones (emmerdants)! Many a
reader of Sartre will be drawn by the power of the examples
he gives. Sartres literary talent is probably to be blamed here.
His prose is at its best when he describes a situation. What
better way to be introduced to existentialism than to feel in
ones own being the philosophy described?
What about this system, then? Setting his feet in the
phenomenological tradition, presenting himself as an heir of
Heidegger and as critical of the master phenomenologist
Husserl and of the whole idealistic and rationalistic tradition,
Sartre investigates the lived experience of the individual. True
enough, he subtitles his book a phenomenological essay on
ontology. However, while Heidegger had been interested
primarily in the metaphysical nature of Being and only studied
Da-sein (the being of the human individual) as an instance of
it, Sartre wanted to focus mainly on this human reality. What
of Being? The introduction of Being and Nothingness takes care
of it rather quickly and concludes: Being is. Being is in-itself.
Being is what it is. (p.29) Now what? Let us get down to
serious business and talk about what really matters: the foritself, human reality, and its relationship with the in-itself and
with others.
I will not enter into the details of Sartres ontological
theory, as this would entail an over-technical discussion that
would not enlighten the reader as to the real import of the
book. Rather, I will concentrate on the concepts that he
presents and that have shaped Sartres existentialism and
contributed to the impact of his work. Thus, what follows
will focus on freedom, responsibility, bad faith, and relationships with others. But first, a word on Being.
Being
The in-itself (in other words, Being), is the first of the pair
Being and Nothingness to be investigated by Sartre. It is not
to be equated with the world. The world is a later product of
the encounter between the for-itself (consciousness, human
reality) and the in-itself. What comes out of this encounter is
the world which is truly a human creation. Sartre has adopted
the phenomenological concept of intentionality whereby
consciousness is always conscious (of) something. If there is
nothing besides consciousness, nothing of which it can be
Sartre Glossary
being in-itself: non conscious being, the being of things
and phenomena.
being for-itself: conscious being, i.e. the human being as a
situated embodied consciousness
being for-others: the dimension of my being that is due to
the other's perception or conceptualization of me. I have no
control over it.
nothingness: mind-dependent aspects of reality, such as
values.
freedom: ability to make choices for the future.
facticity: those aspects of my being that are fixed about
me, e.g. who my parents are or what i did yesterday.
bad faith: ignoring what is true of myself either that I am
free or facts about me.
It is the difference
between travelling by
train to a well-known
terminus, with a room
already booked at a
nearby hotel, and
wandering across country
without maps, striking
camp where it appears
suitable.
In his discussion of
ends and means Sartre
refers in particular to
Leon Trotskys pamphlet
Their Morals and Ours.
(Trotskys works were
hardly easy to come by in
France in the 1940s, with Nazi Occupation having given way
to a period where the whole left was dominated by the
Communist Party. Sartre probably got the book from
Merleau-Ponty, who was knowledgeable about Trotskyism.)
Trotsky wrote with first-hand experience of the early years of
the Russian Revolution, and the harsh choices necessary when
foreign armies attempted to strangle the Revolution at birth.
Trotsky rejected the facile formulation that the end justifies
the means. A simple balance sheet of profit and loss could not
do justice to the problem; he argued that there was a dialectical interaction whereby the means used conditioned the end
arrived at. Since socialism involved the self-emancipation of
the working class, then the only means permissible were those
which raised proletarian consciousness the working class
could not be liberated behind its own back.
While Sartre noted some reservations about Trotskys
position, he basically accepted its logic. The problem was
examined from a different angle in his discussion of
oppression. For Sartre, oppression involved a human agent
and a human victim. We cannot be oppressed by a rock, only
by a free human will. (A rock becomes an obstacle only in
terms of a human project, so a rock can destroy a human body
but not human freedom.) Only a free human will can be
oppressed, precisely by the project of another to deny the
victims freedom and turn her/him into an object. The project
of oppression is always contradictory.
Thus Sartre considers the question of lying. Clearly he has
no truck with the idea of absolute truthfulness one could
scarcely criticise Resistance prisoners for lying to the Gestapo
to protect their comrades. But as he points out, lying often
fails to achieve its purpose. Thus if I lie about my achievements in order to be praised, the praise I win will be false and
unsatisfying. Only freely-accorded admiration can satisfy its
recipient.
Sartres musings on ends and means undoubtedly helped to
guide his political choices over the following years. In 194950, when information about Russian labour camps was circulating widely, Sartre signed
an editorial in his journal
Les Temps modernes which
stated clearly that there is
no socialism when one
citizen out of twenty is in a
camp. By its use of
repressive means the
USSR had undermined the
very end it purported to be
pursuing.
Yet when his former
colleague David Rousset
launched a campaign
against the Russian camps
in the right-wing
newspaper Figaro, Sartre
refused to give him any
Trotsky contemplating
support. Believing that
means and ends.
Russian Communism was
still, on balance, a
progressive force, he
refused to ally with the French right-wing press against it.
In 1956, when French Communists justified the Russian
invasion of Hungary by claiming it was necessary to defend
socialism, Sartre responded in terms that might have come
directly from the Notebooks: We agree with those who say: the
end justifies the means; but we add the indispensable
corrective: it is the means which define the end.
Sartre attempted to dramatise the issue in his 1951 play
Lucifer and the Lord. Goetz, a brutal sixteenth-century
Sartres Image in
De Beauvoirs Memoirs
Willie Thompson tries to see Sartre through the eyes of the person who knew
him best.
Adieux: A
Farewell to
Sartre) consists
of two parts,
the first
tracing Sartres
physical
decline up to
his death, the
second being a
lengthy
dialogue
between
Beauvoir and
Sartre ranging
over his
history, philosophic
outlook,
politics and
personal
foibles. After
the initial
volume, which is concerned with Beauvoirs personal growth,
the succeeding ones all intertwine her career with the course
of Sartres philosophic development, imaginative creation,
personal relations and political trajectory.
The mutual project
Readers first meet Sartre towards the close of the first
volume when, preparing for her Sorbonne degree, Beauvoir
encounters him as a member of a scarily intellectual and
somewhat disreputable group of Ecole Normale students who
mock every bourgeois convention and attitude. Sartre is
depicted as the brightest of them all, the most philosophically
informed and ablest in debate, who is nevertheless endlessly
willing to give all the others the benefit of his time and understanding. With money too his munificence was legendary.
She does not fail to mention his theatrical and musical gifts;
and Torpor, somnolence, escapism, intellectual dodges and
truces, prudence and respect were all unknown to him He
abhors conformity but also the pursuit of novelty for its own
sake. His ambitions to experience life are so comprehensive
that a note of irony creeps in when she recounts them, but she
is deadly serious when identifying his true superiority over
me the fact that he lived in order to write and that even
November/December 2005 Philosophy Now 21
In a second objection,
Gaunilo posits a Lost Island,
abundant beyond anything ever
experienced. We can picture
this most excellent island, and
can accept that it exists in
intellectu; but we would hardly
say that it therefore exists in
reality.
Anselm counters that the
Ontological Argument can only
apply to God; and if anyone can
prove otherwise, Anselm will
personally find and give him (or her, I
suppose) that Lost Island. His thinking is based on the
second version of the argument, the notion that God cannot
be thought not to exist. This makes sense, because one of the
traditional distinctions between God and everything else is
that only Gods essence contains or entails existence; we would
not say this of an island or mountain, no matter how
excellent or great. But as we know, Gaunilo has already
testified that God can be thought not to exist. And Anselms
rejoinder here is lame indeed:
If a being than which a greater is inconceivable is not understood or
conceived, and is not in the understanding or in concept, certainly either
God is not a being than which a greater is inconceivable, or else he is not
understood or conceived, and is not in the understanding or in concept.
But I call on your faith and conscience to attest that this is most false.
Hence
Stephen Lahey
Not irrationally, then, has the hypothesis of a being a greater than which
cannot be conceived been employed in controverting the fool, for the
proof of the existence of God: since in some degree he would understand
such a being, but in no wise could he understand God.
the term hierarchy, among other things, and has had considerable and lasting influence. Praised by Aquinas, called the
greatest of theologians by Nicholas of Cusa, criticized by
Luther as one who Platonizes more than he Christianizes,
Eastern Orthodox doctrine today still retains PseudoDionysian elements. And many, before and since, have
expressed pseudo-Dionysian views, some closely related to the
Ontological Argument:
The foolishness of God is wiser than men.
First Corinthians I:25
Our knowledge [of God] consists in knowing that we are unable to
comprehend Him.
Maimonides (1135-1204)
Absurd to Argue the Existence of God from His Ideawe have no Idea
of God. tis impossible!
George Berkeley (1685-1753)
Is Skepticism
Ridiculous?
Michael Philips asks whether anyone can really believe skeptical arguments.
At such times Hume finds himself absolutely and necessarily determind to live, and talk, and act like other people in
the common affairs of life. Thus reduced to this indolent
belief in the general maxims of the world he is ready to
throw all my books and papers into the fire, and resolve
never more to renounce the pleasures of life for the sake of
reasoning and philosophy.
But this is more easily said than done. For as he tells us
shortly thereafter, he is also constitutionally disposed to doing
philosophy. When he is tird with amusment and company
and have indulgd a reverie in my chamber or a solitary walk
by a river-side he is naturally inclind to refind reflection.
And hes not the only one. As he says, it is almost impossible
for the mind of man to rest, like those of beasts, in that
narrow circle of objects, which are the subject of daily conversation and action. Furthermore, without philosophy
ignorance and superstition rule and philosophy is preferable
to superstition of every kind or denomination.
So we are left with the conflict. On the one hand, we cant
take the skeptical conclusions of philosophy seriously in
everyday life. On the other hand, we cant help doing the
kind of philosophy that generates those conclusions.
Furthermore, philosophy is the voice of reason and, as such,
our chief weapon against ignorance and superstition. So what
is to be done?
For a start, its helpful to remember that philosophy is not
the only discipline in which there are conflicts between what
one says on the job and what one believes (how one acts) off
the job. Some behavioral psychologists denied that human
beings had feelings and emotions; others, more moderately,
denied that subjective experience had any impact on our
behavior (a view still widely held by contemporary psychologists who believe that all the causal action is in the brain). But
Im sure many of them explained surrendering to various
temptations with sentences like It felt so good. I just
couldnt resist (without understanding such sentences tautologically). Twentieth century sociologists of many persuasions
Socratic Humility
Glenn Rawson on humility versus arrogance in the Socratic method of philosophy.
not change any of them until they had looked at at least five
cases. I did this because I anticipated that, when faced with
practical cases, they would rapidly come to question the
merits of their original ideas.
Thus began a fairly exceptional experiment in what Ill call
empirical philosophy. I realised that what Id got was a kind
of philosophical laboratory in which I could test an important
hypothesis. I hoped we might be able to demonstrate the
possibility of a liberal ideal; that people of different cultures,
genders, class backgrounds etc, might be able to come to
some kind of workable consensus of core values. Indeed,
from Rawls perspective, such a consensus, attained between
ideally rational agents, is what constitutes moral knowledge.
Most of my students thought some principle about
preventing suffering was very important and several of them
considered it to be the most important principle of all. In
philosophy, this is what is called a consequentialist moral
viewpoint because it suggests that the intended or foreseeable
consequences of our actions are the most important criteria
for deciding if an action is morally permissible or not.
The problem with this point of view, as my new Supreme
Court found out when they were faced with real life cases,
was that it tended to lead to consequences with which they
were not at all happy. I gave them one dilemma to consider
in which they had to decide if they should allow involuntary
euthanasia in the case of a man who was ignorant of his own
terminal condition, in great pain and terrified of death. In
my fictional case, the mans family had asked that he be
administered a lethal dose of painkillers under the pretence
that it was a routine jab.
The students thought that this would be a gross
infringement of what they called the mans human rights but
felt obliged to accept that it would be the best way to
minimise suffering. This case highlights a very important
problem with consequentialist moral positions and that is that
there are other things, apart from their consequences, which
we recognise as making our actions right or wrong. This was
the viewpoint taken by those of the students who placed a
principle about respecting the autonomy of autonomous
beings at the top of their constitutions.
Various versions of this principle are at the heart of what
are called deontological moral theories. Deontological
theories begin from the premise that some actions, such as
deciding for another rational being that it would be better for
The
Machiavelli Inquiry
Casimir Kukielka asks: What might some of historys most
famous practitioners of power politics have thought about
the war in Iraq?
without UN approval,
thus he let neither moral
hang-ups, nor diplomatic
niceties stand in the way.
However Richelieu,
drawing on his
experiences in the Thirty
Years War, might object
that merely taking action
doesnt necessarily prove
that one is not blinded by
ideology. For example, he
might say, Ferdinand II of
the Holy Roman Empire
turned down highly
favorable peace terms in
order to continue fighting
the Protestant heretics. It
was a catastrophic
decision for his Empire.
Though Bush may not
have been inhibited by
popular morality, could
neoconservative ideology
have caused him to act
rashly when moderation
was in the best interests of
the US? One possible
clue that Bush was
addicted to ideology was
his seemingly unwavering
belief that Iraq possessed
a large arsenal of weapons
of mass destruction.
Despite the fact that Han
Blix and his team of
inspectors had found no
smoking gun,
neoconservatives said that
people were only living
with a false sense of
security if they doubted
the existence of these
weapons. Since the
resulting invasion found
no weapons it can be
argued that Bush was
November/December 2005 Philosophy Now 37
blinded to reality.
Metternich
and Bismark
might counter
that there were
many practical
reasons to go to
war: Iraq has
large oil deposits,
it is strategically
situated next to
Iran, Saddam
Hussein had
funded the
Palestinians, and
a Saddam-free
Iraq would
present a
democratic alternative to the
despotism
common in the
middle east. The
weapons of mass
destruction
argument was
only a means to
garner as much
support as
possible without
waiting for
counter
productive
conclusions from
weapons
inspectors.
Success, that is
military victory
and a democratic
Iraq, would
vindicate the
Bush team, with
or without the
weapons.
Likely outcome:
After weighing
both sides, the
panel concludes
that, despite some
high-minded
language,
neoconservatism
is really just a
philosophy that
argues for the
continuation of
the American
Empire. Either
way the Bush
team must have
intended to
38 Philosophy Now November/December 2005
2003, there was already a lot of talk that the White House was
planning on invading. More grievously, Bush declared his
willingness to go it alone when there were doubts among the
allies, thus undercutting his own bargaining position. If there
were any Asian or European politicians on the fence, he
removed all incentive for them to support the unpopular
measure, financially or materially. Even if they agreed that
Hussein had to be eliminated, they could publicly oppose the
war in order to win points with their respective publics,
knowing that in the end, Bush would do the dirty work for
them.
Likely Outcome: Bush was too clear too early about what he
was going to do. The panel votes unanimously that he did not
put off decisive commitments to the most advantageous
moment.
5) Was there proper assessment of the forces at
play? So far, the Iraq war has not created a direct
confrontation between the US and another great power; even
France now seems to be softening its stance. Bush gambled
correctly that those powers opposed to the war would or could
not stop him.
Where he may have gambled badly was on the effectiveness
of terrorist tactics. Bush should have realized, based on
Israels experience, that they are nearly impossible to stop.
Even a few thousand people out of a population of millions
can, if so determined, wreak unbelievable destruction and
stalemate a powerful army for years on end.
Likely Outcome: Though Cardinal Richelieu favors the
insurgency and sees it as proof that Bush did not properly
assess all the various forces, Prince Metternich loathes to be
seen on the same side as radicals and rebels. The Prince
aligns 3 votes behind Bush.
6. Were half measures taken? In Chapter III of The
Prince, Machiavelli states that if you intend to oppose
someone, you should crush them since they can revenge
lighter injuries, but not graver. Wherefore the injury we do to
a man should be of a sort to leave no fear of reprisals. The
emphasis here is on not shrinking from the implication of an
action. Doing something half way sets up future wars, which
all our panelists tried to avoid when possible.
The UN and the Security Council can be taken to task for
not heeding this warning after the first Gulf War. The
ceasefire agreement (weapons inspectors, sanctions, the no fly
zone) left Saddam weakened but still a threat, as he naturally
sought to alter a situation that he considered humiliating.
Being a Machiavellian himself, he used any means to do so,
which included manipulating world opinion by broadcasting
painful images of Iraqis suffering under the sanctions.
Pressure to remove the sanctions grew, in spite of the fact that
the sanctions were there in the first place because the international community deemed Saddam too dangerous to be left to
his own devices. The only way to safely remove the sanctions
was to first remove Saddam. In this respect, Bush gets power
politic points for his refusal to let Saddam steer world policy.
Machiavelli might raise the point that while Bush didnt use
half measures against Saddam, involvement in Iraq has
diverted men and money from the war against Osama bin
Laden, so a half measure was actually a product of the war.
Likely Outcome: The bin Laden argument is plausible, but
Casimir Kukielka is an
independent writer who lives and
works in Milan, Italy. He can
be reached at casimirkukielka@
hotmail.com
The Panel:
Niccol Machiavelli (1469-1527).
Had various diplomatic assignments for Renaissance-era
Florence. Was an early exponent
of Italian unification, and wrote a
famous treatise called The Prince.
Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642).
Sometimes referred to as the Iron
Cardinal. Considered the father of
the French state, broke the back of
the Hapsburgs in the Thirty Years
War. Made France dominant in
Europe.
Prince Klemens von Metternich
(1773-1859). Wily opponent of
Napoleons. He staved off the
death of the Austrian Empire by
100 years. Also credited with
inventing chocolate cake.
Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898).
Called the Iron Chancellor and
considered the father of Germany.
Famously said that the great
questions are not settled through
parliamentary debates but through
iron and blood. It has since been
misquoted as blood and iron.
Letters
When inspiration strikes, dont bottle it up!
Write to me at: Philosophy Now
43a Jerningham Road London SE14 5NQ, U.K.
or email rick.lewis@philosophynow.org
Keep them short and keep them coming!
Letters
What is Natural?
DEAR EDITOR: I felt it necessary,
although a little late, to comment on the
debate about the nature of homosexuality. In a letter in response to Mr.
Voytinskys article in Issue 48 Gay
Rights: Choice vs. Nature? a reader
states: That is said to be natural which
accords with what is good for human
beings. Then he goes on to say that, It
is common to the human condition for
humans to want to have sexual intercourse with those with whom they
should not or when they should not or in
ways that they should not. In general,
it would seem that pleasure, (the fulfillment of a desire) in itself, according to
this readers religiously-determined
metaphysics, goes against natural law.
Sex is not pleasure but a duty. Based on
these statements, we could also infer that
this reader believes, like so many major
religions have (and still do) believe, that
the female orgasm is also unnatural.
Obviously, according to them, the
female orgasm is not necessary for
procreation, hence unnatural.
Is not the pleasure of an orgasm
something in accord with what is good
for human beings? Or is what is in
accord with what is good for human
beings only procreation? If one would
answer yes to this latter, aside from the
fact that it is rather presumptuous of the
person to be able to determine that only
procreation is good for humans, it also
reeks of a biological basis. That is to say,
if we base what is good for humans on a
biological process, namely procreation,
then why shouldnt we consider other
related biological processes such as the
fulfillment of desires, as also being good
for humans? But the reader had already
stated his ideas on this matter. All
humans beings are, in fact, in an unnatural and disordered condition. So, even
though this unnatural and disordered
condition arises from the same place as
the natural condition of procreating,
i.e. our existence as biological beings, it
is not natural/good. So, some things
which are natural in us are good and
others are bad, and we should not
permit, (but should even punish), those
things in us which are naturally unnatural. I think Im beginning to understand religious metaphysics.
To continue with the original
question: Is not the pleasure of an
orgasm something in accord with what is
good for human beings? Although the
reader may not be concerned about his
wifes orgasm, Mrs. reader probably is
Neurotic Science
DEAR EDITOR: Leo Westhead and Harry
Goldstein (letters, Issue 52) criticize my
argument that science is neurotic (Issue
51). Both, alas, have misunderstood me.
I am sorry I did not make myself clearer.
Leo Westhead says There is no
historical evidence that arbitrary predictions have ever played a part in scientific
progress. I agree. That is, indeed,
central to my argument. Horribly
disunified theories, making arbitrary
predictions, even though empirically
more successful than accepted theories,
are rejected, or rather not even considered,
because of their disunity. I went on to
argue that this persistent rejection of
empirically successful but disunified
theories means science makes a big,
persistent, problematic assumption about
the world, and it is this which contradicts
standard empiricism.
Harry Goldstein complains that I do
not provide any evidence for my claim
that standard empiricism is the official
philosophy of science. Fair enough. But
lots must be left out in a short article. I
do, however, provide evidence elsewhere: see my The Comprehensibility of the
Universe (Oxford University Press,
1998), pp.38-45; and my Is Science
Neurotic? (Imperial College Press, 2004),
pp.4-7, especially note 5. Many scientists accept Poppers demarcation criterion which excludes metaphysics from
science: this means they accept a version
of standard empiricism. The failure of
science courses to discuss explicitly the
problematic metaphysical presuppositions of science is another indication.
And many scientists have expressed their
conviction that, in the end, evidence
alone decides what is accepted and
rejected in science. Few scientists explicitly declare that science accepts
untestable theses about the world as a
Letters
permanent part of scientific knowledge
(which is what is required if standard
empiricism is to be rejected).
Goldstein goes on to accuse me of
holding that science is not so very
different from religion. What I actually
argued was that scientists are reluctant to
acknowledge that science presupposes
that the universe is comprehensible out
of fear that this will make science look
too much like religion. I do not think
science is at all like religion. If Goldstein
looks again at Diagram 2 of my article he
will see that, at level 4, there is the
conjectural assumption that the universe
is physically comprehensible, quite
different from the presuppositions of
religion and politics. I agree in part
when Goldstein says science is an extension and refinement of common sense,
but in my view it also does violence to
common sense in presupposing the
physical comprehensibility of the
universe. Goldstein mentions Alan
Sokal. As it happens, Alan Sokal agrees
with my hierarchical conception of
science (personal communication).
Finally, I too want to defend science
from the attacks of irrationalists, as I
make very clear in, for example, the
Preface to my Is Science Neurotic? But it
is very important that we defend a
genuinely rational conception of science,
and not, as so often happens at present,
an irrational, neurotic one which
represses problematic assumptions,
concerning metaphysics, values and
politics, associated with the aims of
science.
NICK MAXWELL
WWW.NICK-MAXWELL.DEMON.CO.UK
Convinced Utilitarian
DEAR EDITOR: I always find Moral
Moments thought-provoking but Joel
has surely got it wrong in preferring
Occasional Liars
DEAR EDITOR: I think that the authors of
The Liar Lied (Issue 51) are a little too
restrictive in their solution to this
paradox. What about This sentence is
true.? Is this sentence any more meaningful than This sentence is not true.?
I think one of their original proposals,
that a sentence cannot meaningfully
make an assertion about its own truth
value, is adequate to cover both these
cases.
As for Epimenides, at least two other
articles in the same issue (A Logical
Vacation and Symbols Made Simple)
make short work of his paradox. Is All
Cretans are liars true or false? Its false;
sometimes they lie and sometimes they
dont, and this is an example of the
former. Just because its false that
someone always lies doesnt mean they
always tell the truth.
GLEN CRAM
TORONTO, CANADA
Labeling Error
DEAR EDITOR: There is a labeling error
in the article by Mike Alder (June/July
2005).
On page 19 Alder refers to the
second syllogism as EAE. The syllogism
is actually AII in the first figure. Some
As are Bs is an I statement, not an E
statement. Second, the premise that
contains the predicate of the conclusion
is usually stated first. The syllogism
should read
All Bs are Cs.
Some As are Bs.
Thus, Some As are Cs.
The syllogism itself is valid.
MARK ANDREWS
FAIRBANKS, ALASKA
Having returned from the turn of the Fourth Century B.C. to the turn of the
Twenty-First A.D., Socrates has eagerly signed on as a Philosophy Now columnist
so that he may continue to carry out his divinely-inspired dialogic mission.
Dear Socrates,
I hate you. I know why they killed you. You believe you are a
gadfly for the good of society, whose sting serves a greater good,
but in fact you introduced a way of thinking into the world that has
made life unlivable. What did I do? you might innocently inquire;
all I do is ask questions. Oh yes, but those questions are intended
to expose the assumptions upon which all human knowledge is
built, and you know full well that once that happens, there can be
revolutionary consequences. That too is for the better, you might
reply; if the foundation is rotted out, replace it with a sounder one
to secure the future. But the problem is that there is no such thing
as a sound foundation. According to you there must always be
assumptions; hence the questioning never stops. The only thing
that has been secured, therefore, is your profession!
Meanwhile, society is left with perpetual uncertainty. Let me
highlight just one example of the vile result. I believe that honesty
is the most important thing in the world. A cynic might respond
that its value comes from its exceeding scarcity. It is obvious to
me why there is so much dishonesty: precisely because an
automatic and healthy response has been replaced by a reflective
one.
I am a teacher of teenagers, most of whom have been infected
by the virus of doubt, just like the young Plato who was so
fascinated by your method. When faced with a decision, a few of
my students have no qualms: They choose to tell the truth and not
deceive in any way. They do this without thinking, because this is
what they have been taught from childhood is the right way, the
only way, the traditional way, perhaps the religious way.
But for the rest of my students, it is a matter of calculation.
They realize that there are many considerations, and the final
conclusion is all about assigning them various weights. Thus,
there is no predetermined outcome that favors honesty. How did
this situation come about? All because these students, who
include some of the brightest and most well-intentioned, have
become aware of the assumptions that underlie the tendency to
honesty. Sometimes, for instance, it is a belief in the word of God;
but who is this God? Sometimes it is simply that its the right thing
to do; but what is that? Different people believe different things
are right and wrong, so what authority has anyones conviction on
the matter? It is merely a feeling, or a habit caused by a particular
upbringing. And so on.
While any one question that you may pose could be apt, the
general practice undercuts the well-functioning of society. The
seed of doubt has been planted, Pandoras box has been opened,
the genie let out of the bottle we have many metaphors for what
happens. No one can ever settle a question once it has been
brought before the court of reason; everything becomes a
perennial problem. I conclude that morality is best left as it was,
as something unquestioned.
Regards,
Your prosecutor
Dear Prosecutor,
You have made a powerful case. I am almost ready to convict
myself! But of course in the end I must disagree with you. What
is curious is that I too favor the old values. Perhaps the
difference between you and me is that I have more faith in their
hardiness. I believe that it is precisely Truth that can withstand
questioning. Since we all are brought up in different ways and in
different cultures and have individual life histories and natural
propensities besides, we cannot rely on accustomed judgments to
reach universal agreement and discernment of what is right.
There must be vigorous and continual questioning of one
anothers (and of course ones own) assumptions.
Is this not the way science proceeds? Suppose a counterpart of
yourself were to argue that questioning in science is inappropriate, damaging? Their argument could be analogous to yours:
Continual questioning disrupts the smooth-functioning of
science. We know exactly how to proceed on, say, Newtonian
principles to reach the stars. Let us not be endlessly sidetracked
from reaching our destination by doubting the truth that has been
handed down to us.
But of course we would never have any hope of reaching the
stars in that way. Relativity becomes a factor that cannot be
ignored on such long journeys. But if Einstein had not questioned
the fundamental assumptions of Newtons notions of space and
time, how many goals that we have since achieved would not have
been achieved? Or indeed, in some cases not even conceived of
as goals? I think you discount the analogous progress that has
been made in morals while you focus on the unsettling
questioning that midwifed it.
I would agree, however, that there is a right way and a wrong
way to go about questioning and doubting. Sincerity has always
been the key for me. If one employs the technique of dialectic
purely for reasons of personal gain, or as a form of intellectual
adornment, or just to score points in debate, then one has
succumbed to sophistry. Philosophy is wholly different from that;
its single aim is truth. When one observes excessive calculating,
as by young people in the sort of situation to which you allude,
one suspects its employment is merely serving some short-term
self-advantage. That is an unavoidable hazard of any innovation:
witness the fire that Prometheus brought to us.
Yours as ever,
Socrates
Books
On Bullshit
by Harry Frankfurt
HARRY FRANKFURT, a
moral philosopher, starts
this little book with the
following observation: One of the most
salient features of our culture is that there
is so much bullshit. He then proceeds to
develop a theoretical understanding of
bullshit what it is, and what it is not.
Aspects of the bullshit problem are
discussed partly with reference to the
Oxford English Dictionary, Wittgenstein
and Saint Augustine. Three points seem
especially important the distinction
between lying and bullshitting, the
question of why there is so much bullshit
in the current day and age, and a critique
of sincerity qua bullshit.
Frankfurt makes an important distinction between lying and bullshitting. Both
the liar and the bullshitter try to get away
with something. But lying is perceived to
be a conscious act of deception, whereas
bullshitting is unconnected to a concern
for truth. Frankfurt regards this indifference to how things really are, as the
essence of bullshit. Furthermore, a lie is
necessarily false, but bullshit is not
bullshit may happen to be correct or
incorrect. The crux of the matter is that
bullshitters hide their lack of commitment
to truth. Since bullshitters ignore truth
instead of acknowledging and subverting
it, bullshit is a greater enemy of truth than
lies.
Having established the grave danger of
bullshit, Frankfurts next step is to ask why
there is so much bullshit around. The
main answer to this is that bullshit is
unavoidable when people are convinced
that they must have opinions about events
and conditions in all parts of the world,
about more or less anything and everything so they speak quite extensively
about things they know virtually nothing
about. Frankfurt is non-committal as to
whether there is more bullshit around now
than before, but he maintains that there is
currently a great deal.
There is an interesting problem
sketched at the end of the book, wherein
sincerity is described as an ideal for those
about existentialism and Peter Rickman peruses a thoughtprovoking book on German philosophy by Andrew Bowie.
Existentialism
edited by
Robert C. Solomon
THIS IS AN eclectic
collection of extracts, as
befits the decision of the
editor, Robert C. Solomon, not to define
existentialism tightly. Existentialism is
undoubtedly tricky to define, but Solomon
must have had something in mind when he
put together this collection other than just
following what people habitually call existentialism. At any rate, it includes those
philosophical giants most associated with
existentialism Kierkegaard, Nietzsche,
Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty
as well as slightly less famous philosophers similarly implicated de Unamuno,
Marcel, de Beauvoir, Hazel Barnes, Martin
Buber, Paul Tillich, Keiji Nishitani, Colin
Wilson, Viktor Frankl and finally those
whose existentialist credentials are
embedded in more literary genres
Turgenev, Dostoyevsky, Hesse, Rilke,
Kafka, Camus, Mrquez, Beckett, Borges,
Pinter, Heller, Roth, Miller.
Going where angels, and even
Solomon, fear to tread, I shall take a stab
at defining existentialism. The core of
existentialism is a recognition of
inescapable personal responsibility. It
involves the realisation that the human
Book Reviews
Books
individual is irredeemably free and responsible for choosing his outlook on the
world, for his conduct in it, for essentially
who or what he is, and that no appeal to
external authorities such as God, or to
rational philosophical systems, or to a
predetermined self, or to the norms that
surround us, or to science, can remove this
and do the job for us if we wish to live as
fully authentic human beings and not as
things enslaved by the world. The force
of existential choice comes charging home
to us when we feel alienated from the mass
of norms by which most people around us
govern their lives, but which to the
enlightened existentialist are absurd and
ungrounded. Solomon is right: this view
of existentialism leads not to a body of
doctrine, but to a pervasive way of
thinking about the human condition, a
comportment to the world, fired by
integrity.
Most of the above writers are well
known, so Im going to focus on one in the
collection who deserves far greater attention than he usually gets. For among the
most welcome additions to the second
edition of this book is an extract from
Colin Wilsons substantial essay AntiSartre. This is written with all the
engaging clarity that one would expect,
and facilitated by illuminating analogies.
Colin Wilson has been unjustly neglected
by academia, in the case of philosophy
almost totally so. This may be because he
has worked outside the university system
almost all his life, and therefore attracts an
irredeemable suspicion of not really being
sound. One does not have to agree with
every turn in his writings in general to
believe that his specifically philosophical
work is in fact of significant value. The
core of his philosophical ideas is contained
in The Outsider series of books, headed
up by the first in the set, titled The
Outsider. These ideas are condensed in his
The New Existentialism and further
explored in Below the Iceberg, in the latter
of which the full text of Anti-Sartre
appears.
Wilsons criticism of Sartre echoes
Nietzsches charge that what are
presented by philosophers as universally
valid conclusions based on cool reasoning
may often be an audacious generalization of very narrow, very personal, very
human, all too human facts. (Friedrich
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, Preface).
Even if we regard this as an exaggeration,
it is a reminder of the way in which nonrational factors may be the dominant
process leading someone to a belief and
others to accepting it, a process made
dangerous when what is really doing the
Book Reviews
Books
subjectivity gives to us. But this is a
mistake; we dont have to be passive; we
can do things to our consciousness awareness. The fog of subjectivity descends on
us: we become obsessed with our own
trivial affairs, and cant see beyond the end
of our noses. We see reality better when
subjectivity gets out of the way or at least
intensifies. There is nothing mystical or
wishy-washy about this. We completely
lose sight of what reality is truly like until
the next time we hear that, say, contrary to
what we believed, our daughter has not
been run over by a bus. In times like this
our passive subjectivity is swept away, and
the world seems suffused with meaning.
Wilsons quest has been to learn how to
sustain such yea-saying states as it was
Nietzsches. Hes written much on this,
and it comes down to a sort of mental discipline, not giving in, not taking the easy
way, not succumbing to being smothered
by the weak and watery view of the world
that we usually experience as our subjective
concerns obscure objective reality. Rather
one must learn to focus the mind. You may
not agree. Im not sure I do myself, but
you ought at least to think about it and
look over your shoulder at how you came
to have the view of reality you do. Is it
reality youre truly seeing, or is it reality as
seen by you?
DR JOHN SHAND 2005
Introduction to
German Philosophy
by Andrew Bowie
THE DISTINGUISHED
tradition of German
philosophy has substantially affected British cultural life and
particularly philosophy. Coleridge was
deeply impressed by Immanuel Kant, by
whose writing he was in own words
gripped as by a giants hand. He spent
months in Germany studying Kant and his
philosophical contemporaries, and nearly
gave up poetry for metaphysics. Kants
work were translated, commentaries were
produced and Kants works became part of
philosophy degree courses. Hegels
Book Reviews
Crossword Corner
Test your philosophical word-power with
crossword number seven by Deiradiotes.
Down
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
12
14
15
17
20
21
24
Across
5
13
14
16
18
19
22
23
25
26
No Exit to Portland
Theatre
Theatre
Crossword No.7
Solution
(See page 47 for the questions)
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by Joel Marks.
Philosophical Prestidigitation
Understanding Sartre
A short-but-disturbing story by Mark Richardson.
Dear Sally,
My girlfriend and I have been together six years. She has
recently returned to college. I am a blue collar guy who barely
graduated high school. Shes asked me to read a book that she says is
very special to her. However, this book Being and Nothingness
by Jean-Paul Sartre is written in some kind of fancy, Einstein
language. Any advice?
Rocco, Brooklyn, NYC
The final two days it still hurt to breathe, but Jean-Paul didnt
feel the pain. Not only was he being kept comfortable in his coma,
but he really was somewhere else entirely. It was a huge tent made
from blood-red sheets. It was night. Light came from a huge fire in
the centre. Round this fire was a stage on which women, some of
whom were dressed as nuns, performed a variety of sex-acts with
animals (mostly dogs, goats and horses) for the entertainment of an
audience. Jean-Paul was sat amongst the crowd, which encircled the
stage.
But it went on for days A never-ending series of sexually-gross
performances. Eventually bored, Jean-Paul stood up and walked in
the direction of the exit, but was blocked by a large man who
guarded the exit and refused to let anybody past. Jean-Paul
shrugged and sat back amongst the audience. So this, he realised,
was death. He noticed that he no longer had any bodily concerns: he
grew no hair, never needed to piss, at one point realised he wasnt
even breathing, didnt need to sleep or eat, had no compulsion to
smoke or do speed After the first couple of weeks, a girl across on
the other side of the tent sparked Jean-Pauls interest. Less
Spanish-looking than everyone else (except himself) and the only
woman in the audience, she had bullet wound traumas to her head
and chest, a suitcase at her side, and her eyes constantly searched the
crowd for something or someone she would, Jean-Paul presumed,
ultimately never find.
MARK RICHARDSON 2005
Philosophy Now
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