Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Book Forum:
Karen Jent
University of Cambridge
Ann Kelly
Kings College London
Perig Pitrou
Collge de France
Christos Lynteris
University of Cambridge
Carlo Caduff
Kings College London
Edited by
Todd Meyers
New York University - Shanghai
Carlo Caduff's The Pandemic Perhaps: Dramatic Events in a Public Culture of Danger (University
of California Press, 2015) is a story of the influenza pandemic that never was. Caduff tells this
story from an American perspective through his encounters with scientists and other actors who
engage in the august work of preparedness, but in doing so, often draw upon and amplify an
apocalyptic imaginary that doubtless shapes scientific and public priorities (and fears). With lucid
and critical detail Caduff shows how forms of prophecy (new and old) push catastrophe towards
further and further horizons.
We have an incredible group of commentaries on The Pandemic Perhaps. We hope you enjoy.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
http://somatosphere.net/2016/04/ book-forum-carlo-caduffs-the-pandemic-perhaps.html
University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC), noted, I have heard lots of criticisms about the
GHSA from people, saying its too American-centric, its too Western[but this is about] building
core public health capacities. She concluded, suggesting that if you dont think that the GHSA
is right for you, call it whatever you want. If you want to strengthen your capacity in the name of
[tuberculosis] control, thats fine. We just have to do something.
This is no longer about the push and pull of prophecy and counter-prophecy. Forget faith
or reasonthere is work to do.[6]
Beyond Belief
For as much prickly grief, censure, and outright lamentation that the entry of security into health
issues has produced, I cannot help but be struck in equal measure by which many of its proponents
have dispensed with the language, or outright rejected it. On the one hand, it should not be
surprising that such fervent policy-discourse might be frankly dropped or sidestepped, or deployed
primarily with strategic considerationsas one architect of the early Agenda noted, you dont
have to be a believer to know that security is where the money is. With over a billion dollars
invested in programs related to the GHSA, US government offices working on global health
security dont need to be reminded of this fact.[7] On the other hand, there are some who seem
oblivious to the scrutiny, suggesting that the concept of GHS simply addresses any and all efforts
to prepare for and prevent the next epidemicsomething nearly beyond argument a year after
the peak of the Ebola crisis. Of course, prioritizing what exactly must be done in the name of
preparedness is a rather uncertain process, invoking a very broad collection of endeavors; from
health systems strengthening, laboratory capacity development, to biotech R&D reform, health
workforce trainingthe list goes on.[8] Whether these experts are believers in the counsel of the
pandemic prophets or not, its clear that they are convinced of the work that remains to be carried
out in its name.
This capricious movement between endorsement and outright disregard over the issue of
security suggests that the survival of such an idea is not (necessarily) an issue of conviction, of
belief, or even faithless a matter of a formal pact and something more like a flexible
partnership. In Caduffs incisive turn of phrase, the effort to make global health work under an
umbrella of security today seems to be more about managing ones infelicities than it is about
actually meaning what one says. Nobody understands this better than the officials at the WHO
after the tragedy in West Africa, who only seem eager to speak of global health security as an
Agenda when the Americans are around.[1] So, the question seems to be less who these actors
are or what they believe underneath their masks of strategic policy as-ifs, but rather, what kind
of work can be accomplished when they are all at once on stage.
The Ministerial Meeting Session, September 18, 2015, Seoul, South Korea
A Culture of Danger?
Caduffs work both here in Pandemic Perhaps and in his recent review article on biosecurity
(2014) suggest that to enter a world of security is to enter a world of insecurity, a world of endless
suspicion, speculation, deception, anxiety, uncertainty, obscurity, and paranoia (110). No doubt,
in many instances, this is the mise-en-scne. However, working in global health security today
seems as much about entering a world of negotiated suggestions, fragile policy collaborations, and
political mobilizations as it is about performative promises or the perpetual politics of Fear. The
only thing one ought to feel, in other words, is urgency. Caduffs turn to the dramaturgical seems
one powerful way to address this strategic as-if that positions the ironic tone of what security
means today in the world of global health.
In some ways, this is a (by)product of the contingency of contemporary global health
projects. That is to say, GHS today does not name a set of stable commitments or projections, but
rather a number of rapidly shifting possibilities and projects. Like the radically indeterminate viral
clouds of influenza that Caduff traces at the benchside, the policy maelstrom surrounding global
health security is at once ambiguous, infectious, and powerful. Yet, it is striking that a project that
aims at such a profound reconfiguration of the coordinates and stakes of todays disease
diplomacy has not been a question of faith or belief as much as it has been of elastic iterability.
Like the diseases it aims to combat, the Agenda aspires to travel unimpeded across borders.
How might one study such an object, if the question no longer becomes about belief and
its political consequences? It is here that I find Caduffs resistance to producing an exercise in the
hermeneutics of suspicion both prudent and refreshing.[9] By refraining from an analytic bent
on debunking or revealing, Caduff is able to more carefully attend to the complex and
contradictory ways that his ethnographic object appears (or fails to appear altogether), and in
doing so, situates the possibilities within the science and politics of pandemic influenza. But it is
here we might ask: when security becomes dispensable, and the question is no longer
about believing, but getting things donewhat kind of analysis becomes possible? How might one
resist the prophetic urge itself, a reliance on the assumption that there is a truth that must be
revealed (Caduff 2015: 21)? I think it too early to declare, as the prophets do, This is how it
is.[10] In this regard, with Caduff (and James Ferguson) in mind, I would like to see more
written today about the uses rather than the abuses of global health and its various projects,
including global health security.[11]
It is clear, in any case, that Caduffs book shows us the generative and captivating force of
the dramatic and prophetic in this realm of public health preparedness; in many instances disbelief
suspended almost indefinitely by those forecasting the always-already pandemic event. Caduffs
detailed analysis of the sites, practices, and poetics of scientific authority and claim-making, in
and through both uncertainties and indeterminacy, is uniquely insightful and compelling. His
attentive, detailed, and discerning ethnography performs its own variety of dramatic workthe
text itself is a delightful and gripping read. It is both an erudite collection of insights about that
which goes into and makes up the contemporary world of scientific prophecy. Caduff no doubt
goes far beyond his modest aims to see like a scientist, offering a surplus of generative ideas and
his own brand of creativity and complexity in thinking through the politics of pandemic
preparednesstoday a domain that often appears at least as fragile as the vision of a threatened
humanity it intends to protect.
References
Caduff, C. 2014. "On the Verge of Death: Visions of Biological Vulnerability." Annual Review of
Anthropology 43(1): 105121.
Calain, P., and C. Abu SaDa. 2015. "Coincident Polio and Ebola Crises Expose Similar Fault
Lines in the Current Global Health Regime." Conflict and Health 9(1): 17.
Collier, S., and A. Lakoff, eds. 2008. Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in
Question. New York: Columbia University Press.
Hoffman, S. J. 2010. "The Evolution, Etiology and Eventualities of the Global Health Security
Regime." Health Policy and Planning 25(6): 510522.
Lachenal, G. 2014. Ebola 2014. Chronicle of a Well-Prepared Disaster. Somatosphere, October
5, 2015.
Lakoff, A. 2010. "Two Regimes of Global Health." Humanity: An International Journal of
Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 1(1): 5979.
Maguire, M., C. Frois, and N. Zurawski. 2014. Anthropology of Security: Perspectives from the
Frontline of Policing, Counter-Terrorism and Border Control. London: Pluto Press.
Masco, J. 2014. Theater of operations: national security affect from the Cold War to the War on
Terror. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.
Moon, S., D. Sridhar, M. A. Pate, et al. 2015. "Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential
Reforms before the next Pandemic. The Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel
on the Global Response to Ebola." The Lancet, November 26, 2015.
Morrison, J. S. 2014. The Global Health Security Agenda: A Snowy Promising Start.
Rabinow, P. 1999. French DNA: Trouble in Purgatory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rushton, S. 2011. "Global Health Security: Security for Whom? Security from What?" Political
Studies 59(4): 779796.
Notes
[1] It is important to add that recent increased dialogue has occurred between the US offices
spearheading the GHSA (particularly the National Security Council) and the WHO, who have
recently developed the Joint External Evaluation Toola monitoring and evaluation framework
that combines IHR compliance metrics with GHSA-related targets. Even so, the GHSA appears in
this document only through implicit reference.
[2] http://csis.org/publication/global-health-security-agenda-snow-promising-start
[3] See the recent joint Harvard-LSHTM Ebola report, Moon et al. (2015).
[4] http://limn.it/introduction-ebolas-ecologies/
[5] See Lachenal 2014, Hoffman 2010, Calain and SaDa 2015, Rushton 2011; Masco 2014.
[6] Such criticisms have been rebutted by pointing to the fact that the GHSA today is endorsed and
managed by a large number of both developing and developed countries. The Steering Group, for
instance, is made up of country representatives from Canada, Chile, Finland, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Kenya, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.
[7] For an overview of the large funding increases in the United States around issues of health
security, see Boddie et al. 2015, Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2016. Health Security,
13(3): 186-206.
[8] In fact, Susan Eriksons recent piece here in Somatosphere on the Financialization of Ebola
details very succinctly what large changes are happening at the World Bank in this regard:
http://somatosphere.net/2015/11/the-financialization-of-ebola.html
[9] Originally coming from Rabinows discussion at the end of French DNA (1999), pp. 173.
[10] For a review of anthropological engagements with apparatuses and scapes of security, see
Maguire (2014).
[11] For a great example, see Alex Nadings recent piece in Limn: http://limn.it/ebola-chimerasand-unexpected-speculation/. See also Collier and Lakoff 2008; Lakoff 2010.
Raad Fadaak is a PhD candidate at McGill University, working with the Departments of
Anthropology, Social Studies of Medicine, and the Global Health Programs. His PhD research
focuses on the projects and policies designed by governments, global health institutions, and
international agencies to prepare for, respond to, and recover from public health emergencies.
Read this piece online: http://somatosphere.net/?p=11454
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the cells in their vicinity as in the bone marrow. If the colony was too sparsely populated, the cells
would die for lack of mutual support. If the cells were stacked on top of each other, they would
cause each other to differentiate losing their valued stem cell state. The trick was, Robert
suggested, to make a monoculture that wasn't indeed a monoculture, where part of the cells
spontaneously differentiated and part self-renewed.
Successful stem cell culture necessitated, in other words, the introduction of heterogeneity
from within the cells, so the culture as a whole stayed in equilibrium between simultaneous
differentiation and self-renewal. This balance could be struck - in spite of the stem cells' lack of
support from their neighbors - by regulating how densely seeded the cells were in their container.
Having observed the minute intricacies of cell density time and again, Robert is proficient in the
necessary conscientious care of 'just getting it right', a skill cell growers need to painstakingly
acquire. This magic of care amplifies scientific reason about stem cell differentiation and selfrenewal in order to deal with the uncertainties of cellular growth. If scientific uncertainties about
the virus require reason+ that is augmented by faith, ambiguities about the stem cell are partly
resolved by the addition of magic.
Taken forward into the realm of the public health message however, scientific uncertainties
about the virus have an entirely different inflection than they have for the stem cell: While faith in
the pandemic threatens with apocalypse, stem cell magic promises salvation, allowing for a
peculiar relationship with the volatile and unpredictable entity at the heart of the public health
project. With its spark of magic, regenerative medicine offers a vision of a better world with a
capricious protagonist that is not threat, but hope; not death, but resurrection; not dystopia, but
utopia. Just like pandemic influenza though, the bodily cures of regenerative medicine are in equal
temporal deferral, not quite there yet. The cure will be ready tomorrow. To further think about the
intersection of scientific uncertainty and its relationship to the millennial public health message
Caduff's The Pandemic Perhaps is just the right companion.
References
Haraway, D. J. 1997. Modest-Witness@ Second-Millennium. FemaleMan [copyright]-MeetsOncoMouse [trademark]: Feminism and Technoscience. New York & London: Routledge.
Karen Jent is a doctoral candidate in the Reproductive Sociology Research Group (ReproSoc) at
the University of Cambridge. Her PhD project explores benign and malignant growth in stem cell
therapeutic development and regenerative medicine in Scotland. During her ethnographic
fieldwork, she engaged in learning the magic of care for cells in the laboratory.
Read this piece online: http://somatosphere.net/?p=11530
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and policyits multi-faceted political-materialityI will offer some brief reflections on how that
connection is drawn in other corners of the ever-shifting global health landscape.
Attention to what?
Given the precarious constitution of the category and the difficulty of defining
pandemic influenza, what are the prophets of pandemic influenza actually
predicting? (Caduff, 98)
Influenza, The Pandemic Perhaps teaches us, is a quintessential moving target. Constantly
mutating and recombining, the flus identity is a statistical compromise of emerging strains and
classic pathologies, a rapprochement of laboratory practice and clinical experience. The very
concept of pandemic flu revolves around degrees of genetic difference, and the ensuing
transmissibility across populations with no acquired immunity. This future orientation of pandemic
flu, its potential to spread and spread widely, provides the ground for large-scale global health
interventionan epidemiological perhaps that governments cannot afford to ignore.
Malaria shares influenzas ontological slipperiness: whether the disease is understood as
primarily a problem of the parasite or the vector, of the clinic, the home or the field, has a
considerable impact on how it comes to matter for global health. The Global Malaria Eradication
Program (GMEP), launched in the mid-1950s, was built upon a mathematical model of
transmission that foregrounded the interaction between vector and human populationa
precarious stabilization that, with the advent of DDT, nevertheless promised massive and rapid
global health dividends. Linked to the abundance and longevity of mosquitoes and to the chemical
agency of residual insecticides, malaria became an object of technocratic intervention: with sheer
manpower and manufacturing efficiency transmission could be irreversibly interrupted within a
matter of years. In this way malaria-control became a global event, a contest between an emerging
public health internationalism and the mosquito's adaptive resistance.
The collapse of the GMEP has been etched in the annals of environmentalism and global
health policy as a parable of American hubris and of the limitations of vertical interventions. In
the last decade, however, those failures have been recast (Kelly and Beisel 2011). Malarias
persistence, we are told, was the product of the programs lack of follow-through rather than its
overreaching ambitiona tragedy of untimely abandonment that has served as the rallying cry for
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.
A new eradication campaign, a new malaria: this time defined by the parasite. Doublingdown on the high risk-high reward strategy espoused by GMEP, the effort to remove the
parasites from the human population has precipitated a new arsenal of experimental vaccines and
novel drug regimens. Launched in 2013, the Foundations Accelerate to zero strategy reprises
the race against resistance, but this time its end game is not the interruption of transmission but
its preemption, assured through an ever-intensifying hail of magic chemical bullets (McGoey
2015).
Once the instrument for the West to win hearts and minds in the war against Communism,
malaria has returned to the limelight as an engine for biomedical innovation. Its eradication is no
longer driven by ideological commitmentthe disease owes its salience to the R&D opportunities
it presents.
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Salient Experiments
Once the virus was detected in the bodies of soldiers at Fort Dix, the outbreak was
considered a significant sign, announcing the event, and the fulfillment of a
prophecy. (Caduff, 71)
The swine-flu strain isolated from recruits at Fort Dix in 1976 triggered memories of overwhelmed
army infirmaries, a materialization of the past that had haunted global health since the First World
War. But this time the public health community had the tools to head off the pandemic before it
started; the outbreak therefore presented a splendid opportunity to prove the power of
preventative medicine (Caduff: 63). With ambition characteristic of the nation that spear-headed
GMEP, the 1976 National Influenza Immunization Program (NIIP) sought to vaccinate the entire
U.S. population by the end of the year, reaching over 40 million Americans in 10 weeks. That the
outbreak originated in an army base Caduff finds appositethe program was, in the rhetoric of
the time, a declaration of War.
The rally, however, quickly became a routthe campaign was, ultimately, sabotaged by
its own weapons. The strains similarity to the one that swept the globe in 1918 had been
overdrawn. Eventually only one death would be attributed to it. The vaccine became a greater
source of suffering: by the time NIIP was shutdown, 500 recipients had suffered serious side effects
and twenty-five died.
1976 was an eventful year for Global Health, albeit only in retrospect. A few months after
the virus was identified at Fort Dix, a storekeeper fell ill in Sudan, suffering from a disease that
after a second outbreak in DR Congo (then Zaire) would come to be known as Ebola. A disease of
terrifying but ultimately self-limiting virulence, for decades it was solely the province of remote
sub-Saharan villages and apocalyptic fantasy (Lynteris 2016). Classified as a potential bioterrorist
agent, Ebola took center stage in a new regime of scenario-based exercises and emergency
simulations, surveillance systems and intensive R&D investment intensified in the aftermath of
9/11 (Lakoff and Collier 2008; Keck 2014).
That the 2014 Ebola outbreak was partly the product of an emphasis on preparedness at the
expense of investments in basic clinical infrastructure is an irony that does not escape Caduff (see
also Lachenal 2014; Nugyen 2014). More telling is that Ebola became a global health problem
or formally, a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC)neither at the point
of its detection nor even when it had devastated communities across the Mano River Region.
Rather, it crystalized into a global health emergency after an infected Liberian collapsed upon
arrival at an airport in Lagos, threatening the apocalyptic scenario of a gigantic, ungovernable
metropolis in the grip of a lethal virus. At this moment, the outbreak shifted from a humanitarian
crisis to international security threat, best contained by checkpoints and border controls and,
critically, by accumulating vaccine stockpiles.
This is where Caduffs reading of the response to flu at Fort Dix is most instructive. The
NIIP, he argues, was propelled by two opposing figures: the virus, a living fossil of a past
catastrophe, and the novel vaccine, a harbinger of hope. For previous outbreaks there had not been
enough time from initial detection to manufacture a viable vaccine on a large scale. The early
isolation of the strain in Fort Dix made population-wide immunization a possibility, but only with
considerable political and financial capital. In hindsight, nation-wide immunization was perhaps a
reckless gamblethe WHO, for instance, shifted to a wait and see policy, monitoring emerging
infectionsbut in the U.S., where the battle between virus and was closer to home, the moral
imperative to vaccinate every man woman and child quickly became a feature of its own
momentum.
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The recent Ebola outbreak has also been configured as a scientific opportunity, though the
moral logics of experimental exigency have been decidedly more complex. Unlike the 1976 strain
of swine flu, the transmissibility of this pathogen was, if anything, underestimated. By the time
the pharmaceutical companies entered the scene, policy discussions were not characterized by bold
decisions but by desperate measures. We wasted time before speaking about a vaccine and
treatments lamented Jean-Herv Bradol, the director of Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF; Doctors
Without Borders) internal review body, back when the outbreak was at its peak: its very hard to
imagine controlling this epidemic now without a vaccine (Flynn and Bartunek 2014).
Urgency, again, provided the syntax for policy decisions: within a matter of months,
consortiums of international experts, government and industry representatives were assembled,
charitable funding was released, clinical trials designed, regulatory requirements streamlined and
indemnity funds set aside by the World Bank. But a large-scale immunization program resonates
rather differently in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa than it had in Gerald Fords America,
buoyed by the resounding success of the campaign against polio. A long and sinister history of
unethical experimentation and medical iatrogenesis, from forced sterilizations to pharmaceutical
negligence, has generated popular suspicions of vaccine as vehicles for western imperialism (e.g.
Giles-Vernick & Webb 2013; Fairhead and Leach 2012).
That legacy cast its shadow over high-level meetings at the World Health Organization
regarding design of vaccine trials, where West Africans were, at once, cast as needy patients denied
compassionate access and as guinea pigs exposed to unnecessary risks. Either way, the belatedness
of the global health response meant that the experimental delivery of the vaccine could only be
justified by the protection it would bring to future populations. As the WHO summarized in its
report of the meeting that "all efforts to develop, test, and approve vaccines must be followed
through to completion at the current accelerated pace even if transmission dynamics meant that a
vaccine was no longer neededas a contribution to global health security, fully licensed and
approved vaccines should be stockpiled in readiness for the next Ebola outbreak (WHO 2014).
Caduff reads the NIIP as the moment when the future took precedence over the present:
American experts, he writes, took rapid action, leaped over the present, and rushed forward to
the conclusion (65). The haste triggered by the Ebola outbreak carries an even heavier moral
freight: the experimental deployment of untested vaccines was compelled by the scale and severity
of the outbreak; a present that, owing to the belatedness of the response, was of global healths
own making. While efforts to enhance country capacitysetting up community care centres,
distributing home biosafety kits and training health workersmight help slow transmission only
the vaccine trials offered a way to make up for lost time, to halt the current outbreak while, at the
same time, refashioning response time oriented towards the inevitability of future outbreaks (Kelly
2015).
As the epidemic now submerges into endemicity, the apocalyptic outbreak is again
deferred, while for those populations in its immediate reach Ebola becomes an everyday reality.
Transformed from extreme event to, as Caduff puts it, an ordinary harm, it is unclear what kind
of sustained global health attention the virus will receive, other than as an object of research and
continued experimentation.
Time to Take Note
To what extent is the notion of a new regime of public health vigilance itself a
force in the making of structure and order?...to what extent such a form of analysis
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the fact that, for the hemagglutination inhibition (HI) assay, fertilized chicken eggs containing a
living embryo eight to eleven days old are commonly used as the primary medium to isolate and
grow influenza viruses in the laboratory (89), offers another good example of the imbrication of
vital and technical processes.
In addition to the exploration of the complexity of the inclusion of viruses in various spatial
environments, it is also their temporal evolution, which is scrutinized. Caduff shows how, instead
of the idea of regular pandemic cycles, the concept of emerging viruses has been invoked (78).
This shift in theorization has consequences for the perception of pandemic phenomena: At the
heart of the concept of emerging viruses is a particular temporality, a temporality that has left
behind the numerological hope of regular cycles and predictable patterns (78). But it also leads
to a growing complexity the conception of life as a reproductionand evolutionof forms through
linages. Phenomena such as lateral transfers, metagenomics or epigenetics, underline the
instability of the notion of individual and offspring; they also force anthropological investigation
and epistemological reflection to take into account interspecies relations[7]. In this framework, the
newness of emergent viruses is all the more complicated to understand that it could be, from
another point of view and through the transfer from animals to humans, a resurgence of a former
one. The swine flu virus appeared as a surviving agent, a living fossil [ But] the fossil,
after all, was alive, not in the humans but in swine. Thus, there was the theoretical possibility
that this type of influenza might come back one day and infect humans again (70). On another
scale, not only in the laboratory but also in the outside world, we find that the vitality of the virus
should be studied not only with a microscope but with a kind of kaleidoscope, in order to explore
the connections than can exist between a multiplicity of living beings, each of them possessing its
own temporality.
Last but not least, Caduffs work on the role of information in the modelization of the virus
tackles various important issues regarding the articulation between matter and form. In chapter 4,
he examines how biological matter has increasingly become informed matter, arguing that this
informational redefinition of biological matter has opened up new opportunities for the
understanding of a catastrophic disease (33). What is at stake here is the fact that, to a certain
extend, life can be conceptualized through the assemblage of data that can be, then, manipulated.
So, the problem is not just the question of transfer of virus between living bodies, but the possibility
of a conversion of vital processes in technical and informational devices in a context where the
biological body is a body of information. Using the work of Hannah Landecker, Caduff explains
that the biological body is circulated and exchanged in informational forms does not imply that
it is somehow not material; the body in-formation has, on the contrary, its own distinctive
materiality (115).
Even if the convergence between a biologic and informatic virus is a possibility that should
not be ruled outcf. Bardinis paper quoted abovefor the moment, the virus is a moving target
which is good to think because the cognitive and technical devices used to catch it seem to objectify
two distinct conceptions of life. On the one hand, an ecological conception, the borrowed life
(56), in which the development of each living being depends on a set of biological relations it
establishes with other living beingson this, see Latours analysis of Lovelock and Marguliss
theories in Facing Gaia. On the other hand, life can be considered as a more abstract phenomenon
that can be modelized and imitated, even using non-biological processes. In this context, we are
not in front of two separate options, but of two complementary ways of capturing vital processes.
The co-presence of these two models in scientific activity is described by Caduff as a kind of odd
assemblagein this case, the test with eggstinkering with elements belonging to various worlds
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Pandemic Returns
Christos Lynteris
University of Cambridge
Pandemic prophecy is the prophecy not of an event, but of an eventual return or recurrence. If the
next pandemic is a biopolitical apparatus revolving around the anticipation of a 1918-influenzapandemic-like event, what needs to be noted is that the formation of this recurrence-structure is
contemporary to the systematization of the notion of the pandemic. At the turn of the nineteenth
century, in the course of what came to be known as the third plague pandemic (1894-1959,
following WHO chronology), the chain of bubonic plague epidemics striking harbors, cities and
villages across the globe was made sense of as the reappearance of a medieval scourge: the Black
Death. Yet this was always already an incomplete return. On the one hand, it was the
bacteriological anchoring of modern plague that allowed the serialization of the pandemics
preceding it. And on the other hand, though microbiologically identical to them and hence, as
Caduff would put it, the return of a fossil the mortality resulting from modern plague did not
match the apocalyptic image of the event it was supposed to replicate. What this prophetic
discourse then generated was not simply a failed pandemic, but a recursive indivisible remainder:
the successive deferment of the pandemic event in its eternal return.
Within the biopolitical context of turn-of-the-century Empire, this pandemic vision rhymed
with the overall conception of disease as resulting from decay and degeneration. By contrast, in
our times the temporal ontology of the return of the virus seems to be at odds with the temporality
underlining the biological phenomenon said to be the driver of the next pandemic: emergence.
Yet what we have here is not a move away from the former towards the latter; for rather than
displacing recurrence, emergence envelops it in what Caduff calls its constitutional temporal
incongruity. Whereas in the model of degeneration the pandemic returns through the recrudescence
of a dormant disease, in the case of emergence pandemic recurrence results from the generation of
a new virus. Rather than interrupting the eternal return of the pandemic as the eventalization of
human-extinction, emergence -- that diagram of protean viral ontogenesis -- is the condition of
its biopolitical efficacy.
For if, as Caduff notes, the definition of what counts as new forms the undecidable
arcanum of emergence ontology, that which anchors the next pandemic as an imaginable and
hence preparable catastrophe is precisely the fact that it is projected as something which is not
(at) all-new. From preparedness exercises to pandemic movies and novels, whilst the identity of
the killer virus remains speculative, its social impact is depicted in a trite way, which can only be
described as the banality of plague: a meltdown of private property and law-and-order. It is
hence less the supposed biological impact of the next pandemic than the failure of its prophets
to imagine human suffering in any other way than in the form of a rupture of bourgeois values
which is striking here. What returns in the form of the new virus is not simply the specter of
human extinction, but, even for those few who survive, the bane of life not simply without but
before capitalism; a Hobbesian dystopia where humanity is led back to an animalistic state of
mutual predation. For this prophetic regime, the only true future for humanity is the present; any
other future would be simply a return to the dark ages or the stone age. It is this pandemic
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vision, as a vision of no imaginable alternative, which sets the prophetic scene of the coming
plague.
Christos Lynteris is a social anthropologist working on biopolitical and visual aspects of infectious
disease epidemics. He is Senior Research Associate at CRASSH, University of Cambridge, and
Principal Investigator of the ERC funded research project Visual Representations of the Third
Plague Pandemic. Christos is the author of The Spirit of Selflessness in Maoist China: Socialist
Medicine and the New Man (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) and Ethnographic Plague: Configuring
Disease on the Chinese-Russian Frontier (Palgrave Macmillan, to appear in spring 2016).
Read this piece online: http://somatosphere.net/?p=11524
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the heart of microbiology that makes emergence ontology so generative. Proliferating alongside
the compulsive concern with the new and correlated attempts to define it is a failure of the
imagination: the failure to envision pandemic disaster in any other way than in the form of a
rupture of bourgeois values. Todays view of pandemic disaster frames alterity as inverted image
of a normative account of everyday life. Joseph Masco argues that this view casts the suburban
life of the white middle class as a mode of existence in need of protection. The pedagogical point
of disaster fantasy (and there is no fantasy without a pedagogical point) is to make this mode of
existence an object of desire.
As Michel Serres taught us, the penchant of the parasite is to interrupt dinner parties (the
good meal in good company in Kants phrasing). The task of anthropology is to make room for
the uninvited guest.
References
Barthes, R. 1975. The Pleasure of the Text. New York: Hill and Wang.
de Certeau, M. 1985. What We Do When We Believe, in: Marshall Blonsky: On Signs,
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Hage, G. 2002. On the Side of Life. Joy and the Capacity of Being, in: Mary Zournazi. Hope.
New Philosophies for Change, Melbourne: Pluto Press.
Kant, I. 2006. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Masco, J. 2014. The Theater of Operations. National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War
on Terror, Durham: Duke University Press.
Serres, M. 2007. The Parasite. University of Minnesota Press.
Weber, S. 2005. Targets of Opportunity. On the Militarization of Thinking, New York: Fordham
University Press.
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