BPC rae Timothy A. MoKeover, Esq Siacey C. Stone, Esq Holmes Weddle & Barcot,P.C. IG HY 5 oy y 701 W. 8th Ave., Suite 700 SLERK, Ap #20 Anchorage, Alaska 99501 PPELLATE cover. Ph: (907) 274-0666 a i Fax: (907) 277-4657 CPO aR ‘Co-Counsl for Petitioner Paul D. Clement, Esa. Erin E. Murphy, Eg, Edmund G. LaCour Jr, Esq Bancroft PLLC '500 New Jersey Avenue NW, 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20001 Ph: (202) 234-0090 Fax: (202) 234-2806 Co-Counsel for Peitioner Pro Hae Vice IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Appellant, GOVERNOR BILL WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Alaska, and VALERIE DAVIDSON, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Health & Social Services, Supreme Court No. Ste? Appellees. ‘Superior Court No, 3AN-15-09208CI NOTICE OF APPEAL COMES NOW Appellant Alaska Legislative Council and Alaska House of Representatives, by and through their attomeys, Holmes, Weddle & Barcot,P.C., and Bancroft, PLLC end hereby gives notice that the Alaska House of Represertatives Alaska Leistaive Cone [NOTICE OF APPEAL ‘Governor Bll Weller Page lof2 Supreme Court Case No Superior Court Case No, SAN-TS05208 CLcorn, PC | Howaaes WeDDur & appeals othe Alaska Supreme Court fem the Superioe Counts Final Judgment, dated April 5, 2016, in favor of Appelles inthis matter. The Final Judgments attached hereto as Exhibit A. Appellant futher notifies this court that a Motion for Substitution of Party shall be fled with the Superior Court pursuant to Alaska R. Civ. P.25. Appellant shall seek an order from the Superior Court substit ting the Alaska House of Representatives for the Alaska Legislative Council. Upon resolution of the same, Appellant shal file with this Court the requisite documents pursuant to Alaska R. App. P.SI7. Dated this S**day of M sey, 2016, at Anchorage, Alaska airy of Mag _, HOLMES WEDDLE & BARCOTT, P.C. Co-Counselfor Appellant é. imothy A. McKeever ‘Alaska Bar No, 7611146 ‘Stacey C. Stone Alaska Bar No. 1005030 By: BANCROFT PLLC Co-Counsel for Appellant, Pro Hae Vice Dy: faul D. it NAHI7565. Erin E. Murphy NA# 17564 Edmund G. LaCour Ir. NA# 17566 Alaska Legislative Counc» NOTICE OF APPEAL. Governor Bll Walle, Page 20f2 Supreme Cour Case No. Superior Cou Case No SAN-I3.09008 1ocaces Wants & Bancorr, PC Timothy A. MeKeever, Esq Stacey C, Stone, E39. t Holmes Weddle & Barcot, PC 701 W. 8h Ave, Suite 700, 4ilbjce, “Anchorage, Alaska 99501 Ph: 607) 274-0666 Fax: (907) 277-4657 Co-Counse! for Fetioner Paul D. Clement, Esa, Erin E. Murphy, Esq. Edmund G, LaGour Ie, Esq, Bancroft PLLC 500 New Jersey Avenue NW, 7th Floor Washington, D.C. 20001 Ph: (202) 234-0060 Fax: (202) 234-2806 ‘Co-Counsel for Petitioner Pro Hac Vice IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA. ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Appellant, GOVERNOR BILL WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor for the State of Alaska, and VALERIE DAVIDSON, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Health & Social Services, ‘Supreme Court No. Ste30%_ Appellees Superior Court No. 3AN-15-09208CI STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL, COMES NOW Appellant Alaska Legislative Council and Alaska House of Representatives, by and through their attorneys, Holmes, Weddle & Bareott, PC. and Alaska Legislative Cour» ‘STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL Governor Bil Wale, a Page | of2 Supreme Court Caso, saat Suparioe Cor Case No. 3AN-ISO930RCIThese par maa Hops Weppus & Basco, PC ‘Bancroft, PLLC, and provides the following statement of points on appeal pursuant to ‘Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 204c) 1. Inits March 1, 2016 ruling on the Alaska Legislative Councils motion for summary judgment andthe Governors erassmotion for summary judgment, the Superior Court ered asa matter of law ints interpretation of AS 47.07.020. 2. The Superior Court ered in its interpretation ofthe Social Security Act, specifically, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 ~ 1396. 3. The Superior Court ered in it interpretation of Article I § 1 ofthe ‘Alaska Constitution. Dated this_ "day of M 4» 2016, at Anchorage, Alaska HOLMES WEDDLE & BARCOTT, PC Co-Counsel fos Appellant By: Timothy A. McKeever ‘Alaska Bar No. 7611146 Stacey C. Stone Alaska Bar No. 1005030 BANCROFT PLLC Co-Counsel fos Apellant, Pro Hac Vice Erin E. Murphy NA# 17564 Edmund G. LaCour Jr. NA# 17566 Alasa Legislative Couel ‘STATEMENT OF POINTS ON APPEAL Gosernor Bl Waller Page 20f2 Supreme Court Case No Superior Cout Case No.3IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Appellant, vs. RTF GOVERNOR BILL WALKER, in his, official capacity as Governor for the State of Alaska, and VALERIE DAVIDSON, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Department of Health & Social Services, Supreme Court No. SIE3O7 Appellees, Superior Court No. 3AN-15-09208CI CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND FONT VERIFICATION COMES NOW Alaska Legislative Council, by and through its attomeys, Holmes, Weddle & Barcott, P.C. and Bancroft, PLLC, and certifies that the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, Docketing Statement, Statement of Points on Appeal, and this Certificate of Font Verification and Certificate of Service is printed in Times New Room typeface 13 point. The undersigned also certifies thatthe on this S* day of May, 2016, a true and correct copy of the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, Docketing Statement, Statement of Points on Appeal, and this Certificate of Font Verification and Certificate of Service were served on the following via U.S. Mail: ‘Margaret Paton-Walsh, Fox, Esq/ Datio Borghesan, Esq Assistant Attorney General Attomey General's Office 1031 W. ath Avenue, Suite 200 Anchorage, AK 99501 )/Laura Alas Legislative Couey ‘CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ‘Governor Bill Welle Page of 2 (ca No_3AN-15-09208 Chig ez. iy BEap Base ene g Margaret Simonian, Esq./Molly Brown, Esq Jessica Dillon, Esq/Ray R. Brown, Esq, Dillon & Findley, PC 1049 W. Sth Avenue, Suite 200 Anchorage, AK 99501 meg@dillonfindley som molly@ditlonfindley.com. iessicat@dillonfindley.com ray@dillonfindley.com By: Legal Assistant/Secrstary Holmes Weddle & Barcott, P.C. (CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Page 20f2, Alaska Legislative Couey ‘Govemr Bil Walle. (Cae No. 3AN-15-09208 CinLPC Sooner iAP 23 2016 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, Plaine, (Case No, 3AN-15.09208 Cl GOVERNOR BILL WALKER, in his official capacity as Governor forthe State of Alaska, and VALERIE DAVIDSON, in baer official eapeciy as Commissioner of the Department of Health & Social Seevioes, FINAL JUDGMENT Defendants, The sboveented mater having been resolved by this Court in favor of defendants upon rss-motions for summary judgment, nd te Court avin ener its Decision and Order dated March 1, 2016, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED defendants shall have judgment aginst plant Alaska Legislative Council, without aay menetary award, costs, or fes. Sopecior Court Judge copy wae ma ane See dese Abo- mn. Palin Ltal. Tm Kasesns ibe “hdl Aan Aslant Alta Legtlive Come FINAL JUDOMENT ‘Goer Wat Page of2 cure 3AN15 09208 Gl user, a‘CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ‘ ‘The wntesigned cates that on his 23” ay fae, 26, ne ard sores copy fhe foregoing docaent ae sve i 5) ei US Man Freie CF Ht Bevery Marge Ptn- Wal, Ease Fox Eg Dar Deaton, Ea ‘Assan Atomey Genera ‘atarey Gonos Ofer O31 Wh Aven Sate 200 Aachorge AK 19501 Maa Eo. Wasa soy Maret Sizonin Eo Moly Brown, Esg/ ‘esi, rg /ReyK Brows Ee, Dillon & Fi, Pe 8 W. 5h aver Sue 200 Ancorge, AX 39501 ‘nedhllnine con, ‘nol@eloning am Jeeta con ‘mada en Tal Anisar Holos Wea & parson Pc. escape a enti lash Legit Come FINAL JUDGMENT ‘Gonna il ate o e Papedof2 cose Na 3 cv von pros 2 a 2.IN THESUP. ME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA DOCKETING STATEMENT A For Use in Appeals Under Appellate Rule 204 and 218, INSTRUCTIONS FOR MULTIPLE PARTIES OR ATTORNEYS, ewe ll ties or atop propa bex. Than be doo ‘Spr pe. Plate erly ste fiche) psc Wc par. L-TYPE OF APPEAL 5) Genera Ci Rue Cy Agpstin ca Cnty Cae (ap le 200), (dp. le 218) 2. PARTY FILING APPEAL (Appellant) [ime SEEATTACHED Fe paid #47712, Pee ee ete] Ci detenae ‘Py Waling Adie (nt ony aa) loose. sees: [Giga ai ose rae 4 3, APPELLANT'S ATTORNEY 7 Rane aan SEEATTACHED Anaey Maling Ae Tepe oie ow oa Ta Coie TFimTaame | 4, PARTY APPEALED AGAINST (Appellee) [Al pres int il cout wish ial onder wend ‘se opps nt musth inte ey dn oe faye, AR SUD] + Nine Stine Tal Coat SHE ATTACHED Crier a ostosin = Fay ling Adee Done. spi ow Tae Tp Cte Teepe S-APPELLER'S ATTORNEY ‘a Rane T harNmter SEEATTAGHED © Rory Ming hase Treo oie ow Sie Zinta Tay 6 SUPERIOR COURT PROCEEDING 3 Gee Super Cour ate © Die Tagen Disred SAN} 0920801 Frank. fine ‘ls. 2016 {FFesadpmest Mtn Li alps jedpest mots ha at nee ling pp. See Apple Re 2 ~_DATE OF FILING TATE OnSeR aRT iowa [bey [Yes ‘ype Psat Matin Mess | bey [Yow 17. CONSTITUTIONAT ISSUES oni ofa ssa oes Hae al? ive Tine yes esate rreplian_ AS 2210020. SCT-A (ev. 815) Relattol case See Soe Deny fs8, FINALITY OF JUDGMENT OR ORDER BEING APPEALED. Bl Te jotent or ter teing apple is at pas of ALL cane y ALL parts. (onde or ori fia ner Ci ané Boos fens, Tiber $98 Pa 626 (AK 19791) 1 Thejudgment er eer tig spel Se poe fl cans yl pri bt fal under Cv Rae 4). (he it cous Cl Re 540) order meat te ace) © 1 The judgment ror eng preset fl, The ry fr hs pels 9. ATFACHMENTS he flowing items re sited wt his frm excep that aspen ee nt wii 2B) Acny fein ero jen om whi he ape itien BB Aten of pin om ape © GH Asep0 ming ee or) amon ape pu expense (nec tenet dani ut eine), Coto wie fig fe bs fr ton inl op, foc samen afieit ‘orm mete ded. anaplieatian oc exemption fom linge unr AS 9.19010, (fing eis rue cee spline) repented by coursppitd easel ‘AS91900 dcr aa 1 eset orange the 1 anenpaee eating ei of bees nde "AS 180 npc Sey Aa) 4A S750 bantordepi coy ofa spr court re spain ages pets ed or copy of p's ato the sper fr ‘proof npesedestons bia ys mation to waive cos bond itis motion iio pay, Gani statement affair mst be cad). a oton tape publ expense (ei semen av frm ms beetle) cos bind seed bce apeln tC] est y coupon ese {Baste age, muni, re mani fi. 1D aseaployee speing desi of congestion by Alaa Wesker! ‘Congemaion ado ean berets nr AS 23.20 goymen Secry Ath © DesigntonoftmnsriptCJstited oot submited (no tase eingrequad) C}maon extend ibid Signture oF Appellant or Appellant's Avoraey CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE sty dar SFETUG_— acy oe nerf pea roe] ‘sien ed cer g ec ed ee FILING INSTRUCTIONS nied ewes Alar ie) Paseea aaa Parca actors ic original docketing 3 8 ‘eter Satenentand ptce of & oO 15 opened appeal with all atachments DB “MatenteT AS 47.07.040. ® ‘See Gross, 347 P3d 116, 122 (Alaska 2015) (holding AS 47.05010(9) not & statutory grant of authority thet entitles an agency to deference). In relevant portions AS-47.05.010(9) gives the Department the authority to “adopt regulations, not inconsistent with law, defining need, (and) prescribing the conditions of eligibility fr assistance.” % Id, at 122 n.40 (citing Kena! Peninsula Fisherman's Coop. Assinv. State, 628 P.2d 897, 903 (Alaska 1981), and Kelly v. Zamarell, 486 P.2d 906, 912 (Alaska 1971), a8 examples of such broad grants of authority). ® as 47.07.040, Decision and Order ‘Alaska Lezislative Council v. Governor Walker, ets. ‘3AN-15-09208 CL Page 11 of 26‘changes “not inconsistent with the law,” the role of determining the la is “within the traditional province of judicial review.” Finally, the Department's interpretation is not longstanding because this is the frst opportunity the Department has had to interpret AS 47,07.020(a) with respect to the situation created by NFIB, The Governor’s interpretation of AS 47.07.020(e) focuses on the textual command of the Social Security Act while the Legislative Council's interpretation focuses on the penalty for noncompliance. Before NFIB, the Social Security Act textually commanded states to cover groups listed in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX10)(A)( and supported that command with the penalty of expulsion from Medicaié.®" NFIB created a unique situation where, for the first time, the Social Security Act textually commands states to cover a group bt it does not penalize noseomplying states. While the Department has consistently provided Medicaid coverage to groups added to 42 USCC. §1396a(e)(10XAX) without additional state legislative action, these factions are consistent with both parties’ intepretetion of AS 47.07.020(a). ‘Therefore, it is not clear whether the Department's interpretation in this case % See Gross, 347 P.3d 116, 122 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Lakosh, 49 P.3d 1111, 1117 (Alaska 2002)). 5 42 USC. § 13960(a)(10)(A)(D, as relevant, states that a state plan “must. . provide for making medical assistance available” to the groups listed inthe clause. Decision and Order ‘Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Waller, et al, 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 12 of 26reflects fair and considered judgment rather then a converient litigation position, Accordingly, the longstanding-and-continuous factor dees not weigh in the Goverar’s favor. 2. Alaska Statute 47.07.020(a) requires the Governor to cover the expansion group. ‘Alaska Statute 47,07.020() states “Al residents ofthe state for whom the Social Security Act requires Medicaid coverage are eligible to receive medical ausistance under (Medicaid]” The parties disagree as to whether “requires” focuses on the language of the Social Security Act er on the penalty for noncompliance. Both interpretations are consistent withthe terms ofthe sttute, However, the Governor's interpettion is more convincing because itelies on the plain, ether than a specialized, meaning ofthe statute ‘Alaska courts “interpret statutes according to reason, practicality, and common sense, taking into account the plain meming and purpose ofthe law es well as the intent of the drafers”™ Courts “decide questions of statory interpretation on a sliding scale: The plainer the language of the statute, the more ® City of Hooper Bay v. Bunyan, 359 P.3d 972, 977-78 (Alaska 2015) (quoting Marathon Oi! Co. v. State, Dep't of Natwal Res, 254 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Alaska 2011) Cintexual quotation marks omitted), Decision and Order Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, et al. 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 13 of 26‘convincing contrary legislative history must be."®” Courts constue the language of a statue in “accordance with ts common usage,” unless the word or phrase in ‘question has ‘acquited © peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutcry definition or judicial construction.""™ “In ascertaining the plain meaning, of [a statute, [cours] reftain ftom adding terms.” ‘The Govemor’s interpretation is simple, The Medicaid program is found in Title XIX of the Social Security Act. 42U.S.C.§ 1396a(2) contains the requirements for a state Medicaid plan, Clause (10)(A)(0 contains a lst of groups that a state plan “must... provide for making medical assistance aveilable.” The “Affordable Care Act plived tie expansion group in clause (103(4)G). Therefore, the Socia. Security Act textually commands participating tates to provide medical assistance to the expansion group. ‘The Legislative Council's sterpretation is more complex because it requires understanding the anti-commandeering principle and Congress's constitutional spending powers. “As every schoolchild leams, our Constitution. > yd (quoting Marathon Oil Co, 254 ¥.3¢ at 1082 (Alaska 2011)) (lateral ‘quotation marks and alteration brackets omited. M Msteipality of Anchorage v. Susuki, $1 P.3d 147, 150-S1 (Alaska 2002) (quoting Muller v, BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1996) (alteration brackets omitted. ia. Decision and Order Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, e 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 14 of 26citablishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States end the Federal Government.™™* ‘The federal government does not have the authority under the Constitution to “commandesr the legislative process of the States by directly ‘compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.""” This limitation on the federal government's power has been referred to a the “anti- ‘commandeering principle."** While the federal government cannot commandeer a state's legislative process, the federal government can offen achieve the same result through its Spending Clause powers. Congress has the “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States." The federal government can % Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). * New York v. United States, $05 US. 144, 176 (1992) (quoting Hodel v. Va. Swface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 283 (1981)) (alteration brackets omitted), See New York, $05 US. 144, 202 (1992) (opinion of White, 1.) (referring to the majority's “‘anticommandeering’ principle”); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 301~ 02 (2003) (opinion af O*Connor, J, (refering to the Court's “anti-commandeering penciple"); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Governor of NL, 730 F.3d 208, 221-31 (3d Cir.2013) (discussing the “anti-commandeering principle”). U.S. Const, Art I, § 8, cl. 1, See also NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (“Put simply, Congress may tax and spend”) Decision and Order ‘Alaska Legislative Council v, Governor Walker, el 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 15 0f 26spend for the general welfare by offering funds to the states and making conditions con those offers? ‘The Legislative Council argues that the Governor's interpretation of ‘AS 47,07.020(a) ignores the fact that the federal government cannot merely roquite a state to act, Instead, the federal government convinces states to comply with its Medicaid requirements by conditioning funds on compliance. ‘The Legislative Council therefore argues that “requires” in AS 47.07.020 incorporates the constitutional prohibition on commandeering, Under the Legislative Councl’s reading, “requires” might be properly read to mean “requires in order to receive existing Medicaid funds.” ‘The word “require” is not defined in Alaska’s Medicaid statute or elsewhere in the Alaska Statutes, Tt has not acquired a particular meaning through judicial construction. A contemporeneous dictionary defines “requite” as “To direct, order, demand, instruct, command, cleim, compel, request, need, exact." ‘The Governor's interpretation falls squarely within this general definition. “The Sceial Security Act tells states they “must” cover the expansion group. The word “wust” implies a direction, an order, a demand, an instruction, or a command. © See South Dakota v, Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (citing examples). “ Black's Law Dictionary 1468 (4th ed, 1968). Decision and Order ‘Alaska Legislative Couneil v. Governor Walker, etal. 3AN-15-09208 CT Fage 16 of 26Although the Legislative Council's interpretation is consistent witk the scatute, this intepretation requires a specific meaning for the word “requies” Fad the legislature intended such e specific meaning, for clarity's sake, the Iejslatre could have used additonal erms. The court deine oad suc tems ‘without strong evidence that his was the legislature's intent. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the legislature was aware of the anti commandeeting doctrine when it enacted AS 47.07.020(a). The United States Supreine Court hs szule down lows under the ant-commandeesing principle on mas. Both of these cases were decided in the 1990s." It is nly to o0ce unlikely that the 1974 Alaska Legislature infused the word “requires” with a special meaning premised on a constitutional doctrine established in 1992." Finally, the policy behind the statute supports the court's conclusion. ‘There is a rule of statutory construction that courts should construe remedial statutes 9 See New York, 505 US. 144, 166 (1992); Printe v. United States, $21 US. 898, 918 (1997). It could be argued that NFB is another such case. © May of the cases foreshadowing the enti-commandosting doctrine similarly ovourred after 1974, ‘See, eg, Garcia ». San Antonio Metro, Transit Auth, 469 US. 528 (1985); FERC. v, Mississippi, 456 U.S, 742 (1982); Hodel, 452 US. 264 (1981); Na League of Cis v. Usery, 426 US. £33 (1976) “The court does not mean thatthe federal government could have commandeered state's legislative process in 1974 without violating the Constitution. Rather, the court thinks this ig relevant to the legislature's knowledge of the federal government's power and probative of the legislature's intent. Decision and Order Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, et al. 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 17 of 26Iberally* As a part of the Social Security Act, Medicaid is a remedial statute. ‘The primary purpose behind Alaska’s Medicaid statute is to provide “the needy persons of this state ... uniform and high quality care that is appropriate to their ‘condition and cost-effective to the state.” Interpreting the statute to require coverage of needy individuals rather than interpreting the statute to forbid coverage promotes this remedial purpose. ‘The cour finds thatthe Governors interpretation is corect. The operative pirase in AS 47.07.020(a) asks wheter the Social Security Act commands sates to provide Medicaid to a group. The Social Security Act does so inthis case with respect tothe Medicaid expansion group. Since it does, the group is “required” under state law, and members of the group are eligible for Medicaid services in Alaska, See Gross, 347 P.3d 116, 125 (Alaska 2015) (“[A] remedial stetute is to be liberally soosinied to effectunte i purposes”) (quoting State ex rel. Smith w Tyonek Tinber, In, 680 P-2d 1148, 1157 (Alake 1984)}; Sth, 689 P2d 1148, 1157 (Alaska 1984) (“There is no question that a remedial statute is to be liberally construed io effectuate its purposes.) “ Cf Gross, 347 P3d 116, 125 (Alaska 2015) (tating that federal courts recognize the Social Security Act as remedial) (citing Doran v. Sciweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir.1982); Haberman v. Finch, 418 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir.1969); and Granberg v. Bowen, 716 F.Supp. 874, 878 (W.D-Pa.1989)), © as47.07.010. Decision and Order ‘Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, etal. 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 18 of 26‘The legislative history of the Alaska Medicaid statute sheds lial light on the meaning of the operative phrase. Courts Iook to the legislative history of statute to help interpret the meaning of words or phrases in the statute. “(T]he plainer the statutory language the more corvincing the evidence of contrary legislative purpose or intent must be" The legislative history surrounding the 1974 amendment to Alaska’s ‘Medicaid statute is most relevant here because that statute created the pertinent language in AS47,07.020. The legislative history surrounding the 1972 Alaske Medicaid statue is less relevant, but may help provide context to the 1974 amendments, Unfortunately, the dearth of legislative history material provides litle aid to the court, “The legislative history materials from 1972 are almost completely devoid of ‘any references lo eligibility.” However, the materials do show tht the legislature considered optional and required servicer. A consultant named Alfred Gillen recommended tat Alaska only accept mandatory services because some states hed Derilbiss ». Matanuska-Susina Borough, 356 P-3d 290, 295 (Alaska 2013) (quoting State Dep't of Commerce, Cty. & Econ. Dev, Div. of Ins. v. Alyesita Pipeline Serv. Co,, 262 P.34 593, 597 (Alaska 2011) © The only references the court is aware of are a brief explanation of the definitions of “oategorically needy” and “medically needy” by Commissioner ‘MoGinnis and e request by Representative Joshua Wright for the Department to prepare a committee substitute that would define “medically needy.” Minutes of ‘House Finanee Committee Bill 56 (June 13, 1972). Decision and Order Alaska Legislative Council v, Governor Walker, et al. 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 19 of 26taken all options and found they could not afford them.” He also recomended that the legislature retain control over new optional services.*" Department Consistent with this Commissioner Fred McGinnis agreed with Mr. Gillen.* concern, the legislature included a probibition on adding optional services without the approval ofthe legislature." ‘The legislative history of the 1974 amendments only shows that the ‘changes inthe eligibility language in AS 47.07.020 were in response to the chenge in federal aw." In 1974, the legislature also added AS 47.07.020(d), which states “Additional groups may not be added unless approved by the legislature.” ‘The history behind this subsection is similarly unhelpful. Commissioner MeGinnis stated the new subsection “would clarify that in the future no groups or services Minutes of Senate Finance Committee Bill 56 (February 17, 1972). The ‘minutes identify Mr. Gillen as a consultant tothe Department on Title XIX. Sig ® See Minutes of Senate Finance Committee Bill $6 (April 26, 1972); Minutes of Senate Finance Committee Bill 56 (May 7, 1972) ® See Ch, 182, § 1, SLA 1972; Minutes of Senate Finance Committee Bill 56 (May 15, 1972). See 1974 House Journal 465-66, Letter from Governor William A, Egan to the Honorable Tom Fink (March 11, 1974); Letter from Commissioner Frederick MeGinnis to the Honorable Lowell Thomas, Ir. (March 22, 1974); Senate Finance Committee Report on Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 465. Decision and Order ‘Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, etal. AN-15-09208 CT Page 20 of 26could be added without legislative action. Commissioner MeGinnis helpfully ‘explained that the subsection “is selexplanatory."* ‘The court draws little fiom this legislative history. From the 1972 materials, the court can conclude that the 1972 legislature was concemed about leeping the cots of optional services low and chose to retain contol over adding cptional services in order to do so. These materials cast litle light on the legislature's intent two years later when the legislature changed 2 separate seton cf the starue, Prom the 1974 materisls, the court can only conclude thatthe changes in AS 47.07.020 were in response to changes inthe structure of federal law, ‘These eouclusionsweilhes support nor tefue either pests interpretation of the petinent language in AS 47.07.020. It isnot clear from the legislative history that the legislature intended to depart from the pain meaning ofthe terms used in 48 47.07.020. 5 Minutes of Senate Health, Education and Social Services Committee Bill 465, (March 22, 1974). Neither party argues that this section prevents new mandatory ‘0ups from receiving services without legislative action. % Letter from Commissioner Frederick MoGinnis to the Honorable Lowell ‘Thomas, Jr. (March 22, 1974) Decision and Order Alaske Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, etal. 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 21 of 26B. NFIB did not alter the requirement that states cover the expansion group. In NFIB, & sevenjustice majority agreed that withholding existing Medicaid funding from states that do not comply withthe Affordable Care Act exceeds Congress's powers under the Spending Clause."” However, a five-justice majority agreed that the unconstitutional provision did not require the Court to strike down the entire act** This five-justice majority was clea inthe limit ofits holding. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion states: {As for the Medicaid expansion, that portion of the A fordible Care Act violates the Constitution by threatening existing Medicaid funding, Congress has no authority to order the States to regulate according to its instructions. Congress may offer the States grants and require the States to comply with accompanying conditions, but the Stafes must havo a genuine choice whether to accept the offer. The States are given no such choice in this case: They must either accept a basic change in the nature of Medioaid, or risk losing all Medicaid funding. The > See NFIB, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2633-40 (opinion of Roberts, CJ, joined in relevant. part by Breyer and Kagan, J); Id at 2656-68 (dissenting opinion of Scalia, ‘Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, 11). The joint dissenters would have held the act umconstitutional in its entirety. Id “When a fragmented Court decides a case and mo single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the ‘holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds ....”" Marks v, U.S, 430 US. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JI)). Chief Justices Roberts's plurality cpinion isthe narrowest rational with respect to this holding, 8 See NFIB, 132 8.Ct. 2566, 2607-08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J, joined in relevant gart by Breyer and Kagan, J); ld at 2641-42 (opinion of Ginsberg, J. joined by Sotomayor, 1). Justice Ginsberg effectively concurred with Chief Justice Roberts -with respect to this isue. ‘Decision and Order ‘Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, et al 3AN-15-09208 CI Fage 22 of 26remedy for that constitutional violation is to preciude the Federal Government from imposing such a sanction. That remedy does not require string down other portions of the Affordable Care Act.” Meanwhile Justice Ginsburg’s opinion sates [ln view of THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s disposition, T agree with him that the Medicaid Act's soverability clause determines the appropriate remedy... ‘The Court does not strike down any provision of the (Affordable Care Act), Itprohibits only the “application” of the Secretary's authority to witthold Medicaid finds from States that decline to conform their Modicaid plans to the [Affordable Care Act's requirements.” Both justices expressly limited the remedy for the constitutional violation to preventing the sanction for non-compliance. States thet choose not to comply may suffer nc penalty. But prohibiting the aplication ofthe peralty didnot effet the requirement that states provide Medicaid services to the expansion group. ‘This requirement may lack the coereiveness that Congress intended, but itis sill @ requirement. In NIB, the Court “imifed] the financial pressure the Secretary may apply to induce States to accept the terms of Medicaid expension. Asa practical matter, iat means States may now choose to reject the expansion." In Alls, ® Jet at 2609 (opinion of Roberts, C5.) (emphasis added), © 14, at 2642 (opinion of Ginsburg, .) (emphasis added), 5" 44 at 2609 (opinion of Roberts, C.) Decision and Order Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, et al 3AN-15.09208 CI Page 23 9f 26tte choice of Medicaid expansion ultimately rests with the legislature, Under current law, the legislature has already made that decision according to this court's interpretation of AS 47.07.020(@). If it so desires, the current legislature can change state law to reject the expansion, Until then, state law requires the ‘Governor to provide Medicaid services tothe expansion group. ©. The Governor dd not violate the Alaska Constitution. ‘The Legislative Council argues that the Governor violated the Alaska Constitution, which gives “the legislature, and only the legislature... control over the allocation of state assets among competing needs."" However, the Legislative CCouncil’s argument assumes that its interpretation of AS 47.07.020(a) is correct. Because the court determines that AS 47.07.020(a) makes the expansion group eligible for Medicaid, the Governor's acts did not violate the Alaska Constitution, In Alaska, the legislature hs the right to decide whether a group is eligible for Medicaid; the governor executes the legislature's command, If the legislature does not make a group eligible and the govemor uses state assets to cover the group, the governor has violated the Alaska Constitution. However, if the legislature does make a group eligible, the governor would potentially violate the © City of Fairbanks v. Fairbanks Convention & Vistors Bureau, 818 P-24 1153, 1156 (Alaske 1991) (quoting Medlpine v. Univ. of Alaska, 762 P24 81, 88 (Alasien 1988)) (omphasia in original); ace alzo Alaska Const, Art. I, § 1. Decision and Order Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, et 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 24 uf 26‘Alaska Constitution if the governor dld not cover the group. Because of the court's conclusion regarding the meaning of AS 47.07.020(a), we are in the later seenario, The Governor's actions did not violate the Alaska Constitution, ‘The Legislative Council may disagree with the Governor about the merits of expanding Medicaid, The way for the legislature to exercise its constitutional ‘power fo control the state’s assets is through its constitutional power to pass laws, IV, CONCLUSION In conclusion, the court finds thatthe Social Security Act requires Medicaid expansion, The court reaches this conclusion based on the plain meaning of ‘AS 47.07.020(a) and the canon of statutory interpretation that ob constue remedial statutes liberally. Because the Soeial Security Act requires expansion, state law makes the expansion group eligible for Medicaid services. Because existing law quired the Governor to provide Medicaid tothe expansion soup, the Governor did not volte the Alaska Constitution by doing so. The court gants the Governor's motion for summary judgment and denies the Legislative Council's motion for summary judgment, This ease is dismissed Decision and Order Alaska Legislative Council v. Governor Walker, ct al 3AN-15-09208 CI Page 25 of 25Dated this__ LAE _ day of March, 2016, at Anchorage, Alaska, FRANK A. PFIFF! Superior Court Jud eertfy that on “-\~U\e_ a copy of the above was emailed: ‘T, McKeever 8. Stone M, Simonian/ M. Brown LL, Fox/ M. Paton-Walsh/ D. Borghesan ‘M, Regan’ J. Davis B. Cavanaugh, fi Decision and Order Alaska Lagislative Council v. Governor Walker, et. 3AN-15.29208 CI age 26 of 26,