The rmored Division as an assault landing

force. The Armred School.

May 52.

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE

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THE ARMORED DIVISION AS AN ASSAULT LANDING FORCE

A RESEARCH REPORT PREPARED

.

...

BY

COMMITTEE 34,

OFFICERS ADVANCED COURSE

THE ARMORED SCHOOL

1951 -1952
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ALVA "T. McDANIEL
MAJOR FRANCIS A.
MAJOR GEORGE V,

COOCH 3rd
LABADIE

CAPTAIN EDWIN VT. PIBURN JR

CAPTAIN JAIES R. PORTA

FORT KNOX, KENTUCKY

May 1952

Fl^,^

('S<

II

B~

TABLE OF COTTNTS
Chapter
1

Page

Scope "...
..

*,.

................................

INTRODUCTION

..

,,

Problems and Limitation

Definition

of Terms

.....

.*

...

...........

..

of the Study ...........

*.........

...........

Methods Of Research ...........................

Outline

....

Of Study

,,..

.*...........

IORLD WAR II
.................
Invasion of North Africa
.......................
Sicilian
Invasion ~ *....
.. *...
.....
*......
Okinawa -

1 April

Conclusion

",..............

DOCTRINE AND

...

,..

45
,,.......

. .

.....

10
12
28

0f.

.....

45

. .0 .

51

.*.........*...*...e...

ORGANIZATION

56

Characteristics of Amphibious Operations .......

56

World War II, Armored Division Organization

61

SPECIAL VETICLE
Equipment for
Conclusions

,..

35

...........

....

Conclusion ........ . *....

..
4

...

ASSAULT LANDI NGS,

Normandy - 6 June 44 ......

3
5

.....

REQUIREM'TTS
the Assault

Landing Craft,
Ship,

Landing
Landing

69
69

ATiPHIBIO{S TRAINING

CONCEPT OF EMPLOY1E T ......

Formations

*....

Conclusion

..........

.......

87
90

91
91

93
99

..

.....

..... ......

o..... ............

..

111
*.

:.........

.............. ......

113
115

116

...

.... ,,r......

Troop List, TF Red, CC "B", 1st Armored

Division, 8 November 42 ....................

118

Troop List, TF Green, CC"B" 1st Armored

Troop List, CC "A",
10

42

June

43

......... .........

119

2nd Armored Division,

........

..............

.......

120

Summary, Armored Division Strength and

Principal

BILIOGRAPHY

85

..............

.........
"...

Division, 8 November

IV.

82

......
(LCM-6)

APPENDICES ....................

III.

.,,

............................

Organization for Landing

II.

.....

Personnel (LCVP)

Vehicle,

I.

..

.......

Medium (LSM)
......................
Tank (LST)
......................

Landing Craft,

67

.....

............................

(LSU)

Ship,
Ship,

............

...

..................

Mechanized

Utility

..............

........................

...............

NAVAL RETIREMETS

....

Weapons
.....

....

............ .............
.......

....

..........

121.
...

123

CHPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The history of American diplomacy and foreign policy
since

the

founding of our country,

one of peace.

America has

rarely

aggressors of the world have

has,

with

few exceptions,

been the aggressor.

come to us.

been

Rather,

This policy has

the

put us

initially on the defensive in almost every war in which we-have

been engaged.

We

have had to suffer initial reverses while

our

industry became geared to war and our civilian armies were mobiliSed and trained.

While we

which later we must retake,

our necessity
stages

lief

for

retaking

of our wars

in

reverses.

are

in

ground -

losing

Herein lies the basis

ground we have

the

ground that

must be

the

lost

lost

initial

ground

of our study in

because

the

initial

of our be-

the proper conduct of nations.

The retaking

of lost

of the most important

greater example
in

suffering

we and our allies

of a war,

stages

are

World War II,

ground involves many factors..

of these

factors

is

One

amphibious warfare..

No

of this can be found than our recent experiences

Our Pacific

amphibious operations.

war was a

continual

succession

All of our great land operations

were preceded by amphibious

invasions..

During the

war,

of

in Europe
as

our

experience gained on the practical field of battle,.so did our

amphibious doctrine grow, was

studied, applied, corrected, tried

again, revised, and tried again., As a result, we have

we believe

to

be sound

War II landings,

amphibious

doctrine.

However,

today what
in

our World

little use was made of our armored divisions as an

77~"O~&

'

'

assault force.. This same omission is apparent in the doctrine

Doctrine concerning the use of

published and available today.

armor in an amphibious operation is limited to a few short

sentences.

Doctrine pertaining to the use of an armored div-

ision in such a role is, for all practical purposes, nonexistent.

The armored division, a relatively new organization, has
In the early days of World War II

a definite place in our army.

its capabilities and limitations were understood by only a few of

our leaders.

As the war progressed and experience was gained,

knowledge and understanding of the armored division grew.

How-

ever, there remains a general lack of understanding throughout

the army.

This misunderstanding applies not only to the armored

divisions but also to armor in general,

This study is not concerned with the overall doctrine of
armor, the above only being mentioned to show the need that exists
for studies on the capabilities, limitations, and uses of the
armored division in various roles.

Our mission is to determine

the practicability of the armored division as an assault landing

force.
Armor has a place in the American Army.

The armored

division has a definite role to play in any operations we may

undertake in
our study.

the foreseeable future.

With this fact we preface

From here then, let us move to the specialized field

of assault landings.
such an operation?

What is

the role of the armored division in

Given such a mission,

hvo

should the present

day armored division go about accomplishing this task?

2

These

are the questions we shall attempt to answer,

Scope
This study is

designed to look into one role in which

an armored division might be employed - that of an assault landing force.

We shall here attempt to formulate broad doctrine

which would apply to an armored division given such a role.

First we shall go. into the history of World War II

and look at

the few examples where an armored division was employed in an

assault landing.

With these few historical examples as a

springboard, we shall project ourselves into the future., Using

the current organization of the armored division as a basis,,we
will determine the practicability of such a mission for the division and the methods for conducting such a landing,
1.

showing:

The factors that would determine the employment

of the armored division in such a role;

2,

special training required;

3,

amphibious vehicles and vehicular equipment;

4.

shipping requirements;

5.

organization for the landing; and our recoormmenda-

tions concerning the concept of employment.

This is

our scope.

It will be as was stated above,

broad

doctrine - an overall look at the requirements for and practicability of the empl6yment of an armored division as an assault
landing force,
Problems and Limitations of the Study
In undertaking this study, we enter upon a virgin field.
The only document directly concerned with the subject, other than
3

historical examples, that came to light during our research was

sixteen volumes of loading tables for an armored division,

These

tables were prepared for the army at Camp Calvin B. Matthews,

California, by the Marine Corps in February 1945.1
based both on World

*War II

armored division organization, and the

capabilities and capacities

have,

therefore,

The tables are

of World War II

landing craft.

They

limited application as far as this study is

con-

cerned.
Further research brought out that,

during World War II,

an armored division as such, never made an assault landing.

be sure, major elements of armored divisions took part in

To

two

amphibious operations, and separate tank battalions took part in

many landings,

but the complete armored divisions was never used.

One other difficulty must be mentioned.

Both vehicles

and landing craft for use in future wars are still in the research
and development stage.

Many new developments are highly classified.

These two factors make it

impossible to determine exactly what

equipment will be available in

future amphibious operations.

With-

out this definite information, many of the details involved in a

landing cannot be exactly determined.
Assumptiors may be made,
to a division in

Generalities may be stated.

but much of the information so necessary

an assault landing cannot be exactly determined,

Many of the statements that follow in subsequent chapters,

because of the lack of historic example,
ledge of future equipment.
committee.

past research, and know-

Are entirely the opinidn

of the

Whe have attemped, wherever possible, to support

conclusions ~iith documentaytion,

Where it has not been possible,

we have attempted to draw conclusions which could be supported

by available facts, doctrine, or logical thought.
Definition of Terms
The terms listed below are used quite frequently in
Most of them are military.

this study.

Even among the military,

however, there is often a difference of opinion as to their exact

meaning.

In addition, many have special meanings when used in

connection with an amphibious operation.

Therefore, in order to

clarify their meaning as used in this study, we are defining them

below:
1.

Amphibious Operation - "A landing made from ships

or craft to achieve an objective on land...The forces involved

depend primarily upon waterborne means for transport to the
objective area, for initial tactical and logistical support, and
2
for special techniques and equipment used in debarking."

2.

Assault Landing Force - A unit making the initial

landings on a hostile shore.

3.

Waves - The order in which troops making an assault

landing move from either one shore to the next or from the ship
to the shore.
4,

H-hour - The time at which the first wave reaches

the hostile shore.

5.

D-day - The day the assault troops are to land

on the hostile shore.

6.

Landing Craft - "A craft which is especially de-

signed for beaching, unloading or loading, and retracting from

the beach.

The term generally is applied to non-ocean-going

vessels of less than 200-foot length designed for landing

operations." 3
7.

ROT - Regimental Combat Team.

Usually consists

of an infantry regiment plus supporting artillery and engineers.

Miscellaneous service troops may be attached.
8,

Combat Loading - "The loading of assault troop

units with their essential combat equipment, vehicles, and

supplies in the same vessel, and in a manner permitting immediate and rapid debarkation in a desired priority for the landing attack." 4
9.

Organizational Loading - "Troops with their equip-

ment and supplies embarked on the same ship but without regard
to

the prerequisites of a tactical debarkation."5

10.

-Convoy Loading - "The loading of troops, equipment,

and supplies on vessels in the same convoy, but not necessarily

on the same ship." 6
1.. Shore to Shore - "The bulk of the landing force
with certain supplies and equipment is transported in landing
ships....from a shore base directly to a landing beach without

transehipmon ' "7

12.

Ship to Shore - "A transshipment of troops, equip-

ment, and supplies from seagoing vessels to smaller landing craft

and the subsequent movement to the landing beach."8
13.

Demonstration - "Amphibious demonstrations are

made for the purpose of confusing the enemy as to the location

of the main landing. 't 9

Raid - "...an operation,......, involving the

14.

temporary seizure of a limited objective,

or a swift penetration

of hostile territory to seure information,

destroy his installations.

It

confuse the enemy or

ends with a planned withdrawel up-

"
on completion of the assigned mission. l0

15.

Occupation-

"...a

limited operation to seize and

secure a land area for use as an air, naval,

to support further operations,
enemy,

or logistical base

or to deny use of the area to the

11
16,

Invasion - "...a

large scale operation to seize

and secure a beachhead from which to launch and support a major

land offensive

....

17.

12

LVT - Landing vehicle tracked,

An amphibious

personnel or cargo carrier,

18.

LVT(A)

- Landing vehicle tracked (armored).

An

amphibious tank,
Methods of Research
In undertaking this study, our first

effort was to deter-

mine our scope.

Shortly after beginning the study we attempted

to set it

As research progressed, the scope,

down.

was revised.

Many factors,

of necessity,

originally thought necessary to be

included, have been dropped.

Conversely,

factors not originally

considered have been included,

Another factor that 'came under consideration was how deep
we should go into each phase of the subject,
7

After a few weeks,

we realized that many factors under consideration could conceivably,

in themselves,

We deceided, therefore,

be the subject of long research studies.

not to cover each phase of the landing

operation in great detail.

During the first four months of the project, all members
of the committee worked as individuals securing as much background
material as possible,

Toward the end of the fourth month, a com-

mittee meeting was held in which the chapters to comprise the

study were outlined.

At this point,

each member of the committee

became a specialist.

Each was assigned a particular chapter or

chapters which became his specific project.

This step was neces-

sitated because of the broad field of the subject.

It was felt

that a combined effort on each chapter would produce too much

diversion of effort.

Furthermore,

it

would allow no one individ-

ual sufficient time to dig as deeply as time would permit into any
particular phase.
This then was our method of research

- first,

we determined

a scope; second, we outlined the study; third, each member of the

committee assumed responsibility for the preparations of one or two
chapters.
Outline of Study
Following this brief explanation of our study and the
problems involved, the next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of armored participation in

several World T ar II

landings.

Subsequent chapters will consider the following as they affect

this studys

a brief review of amphibious operation doctrine;

8

current armored division organization; vehicular developments

since World War II

that affect the armored division shipping

requirements; training; and conclusions and recommendations.

_.

^13

~_

NOTES FOR CHAPTER I

Combat Loading of Armored Division (Loading Tables 16 volumes), prepared by US Marine Corps (Camp Calvin B. Matthews,
21 February 45).
2

FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

1951),

1.

1951),

329.

3
FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington;

4FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington: 1951),

322.

5FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Nashington: 1951),

332

6FM 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

324.

FM 100-5, Department of the Army (Washingtor

FM 100-5,

FM 17-34,

10

FM 60-5,

L:

233,

1949),

1941),

> 233,

Department of the Army (Washington 1: 1950),

FLl 60-5, Department of the Army (Washington:

12FM 60-5,
2
1

Department of the Army (ashingtor

1951),

p 71.

1951),

4.

Department of the Army (Washington:

1951),

4.

Department

1951),

3.

of the Army (Washington:

CHAPTER 2
ASSAULT LANDINGS - WORLD WAR II
We shall now briefly turn back the pages of history to
look at several World War II

landings.

many.amphibious operations.

However, in none was an intact

The past war involved

armored division employed as the assault landing force.

was employed in almost all landings.

Armor

In two major operations -

TORCH (Invasion of North Africa) and HUSKY (Invasion of Sicily)

major elements of armored divisions were employed.
tank battalions were employed in many landings.

Separate

Today,

these

separate tank battalions are organic to the Infantry Division,

Our study, however,

is

concerned with the armored division,

So, the lessons for us,

not be complete,
World War II

are few,

Nevertheless,

our study would

if we did not at least briefly look into some

landings.

Although specific lessons concerning the armored division

are few, many are the lessons concerning armor.
then, that if
together,

It would appear

we took these lessons concerning armor,

put them

and looked at the result, we would have a clear pattern

for an armored division.

This, at the best,

is

a half truth.

The armored division is more than just a collection of tanks.

True,

the division is

built around the tank - everything in the

division is

there with one mission - to get the tanks on the

objective.

The entire division is

try division, everything is

seizing the objective.

geared to this.

In the infan-

designed to assist the doughboy in

For this reason, the sum total of the

10

experiences of separate tank battalions operating with infantry

divisions in assault landings will not add up to complete
armored division doctrine for the same type of operation.

The

basic doctrine for and the techniques of employing the armor

in the two divisions is

greatly different.

Our review will be short.

Each of the four landings we

will discuss - North Africa - Sicily - Normandy . Okinawa are subjects for complete studies,

Accounts of the last two have

already been published by the Historical Section, Department of

the Army,

in

lengthy volumes.

Three years was spent in the prepa-

ration of "Cross Channel Attack" by Dr. G.A. Harrison,

accounts of all

four landings have also been published.

Many other
Here, we

shall touch each briefly to show the part played by armor,

particular, where applicable,

and in

the armored division,

Since we are covering these four landings briefly, we shall

make no comment on the manner in which the armor was employed.
Both praise and criticism will be left to more lengthy studies.
Here, we will state facts - the plans and what actually happened.
The critical analysis we leave to others.
The reader has probably wondered why we chose to discuss
only four landings,

and why,

after choosing but four landings,

we selected the four covered here.

To answer the first

four landings were chosen because time,

of the study did not permit more.

space,

quostion -

and the purpose

In answer to the second question,

the four landings selected were chosen because (1)

both the North

African and Sicilian landings represent the only occasion when

major elements of an armored division have been employed in

an assault landing; and (2)

the Normandy and Okinawa landings

represent two of the largest assault operations in two major

theaters during World War IIin

We could have picked many others,

addition to or instead of,V tho four we have chosen.

But,

within the time available and the scope of our study, these four
appeared to offer the most:
Invasion of North Africa
General:

On 8 November 42,

major step forward,

the Allies took their first

since the fall of Dunkirk in

the defeat of Germany."

1940, toward

On that day, landings in North Africa

(Operation TORCH) were initiated.

Months of planning had gone

into the operation."

During the spring and early summer of 1942, there was
much discussion of possible courses of action at the highest Allied
levels. 2

The main issue concerned whether we should put all effort

into plans for an invasion of the continent of Europe in

1943 or,

to keep Soviet Russia in the war, we should undertake a major

operation in

19424,

On the evening of 30 July 1942,

the President
tr4

informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff 'that he wanted to do TORCH..

The next day the information was cabled to General Eisenhower, then
in London,5

He was to take temporary comeand until a final

sion was made on a permanent commander.

deci-

'

The final TORCH plan involved three major Task Forces.

The Western Task Force,

under the command of Major General George

S. Patton was to sail directly 'Ifrom the United States to capture

Casablanca,

This force included five Regimental Combat Teams,

one armored combat command and one armored combat team.

The

shipping required for transport consisted of 12 combat loaders,

ten auxiliary combat leaders,

six cargo ships,

and one sea train.

The Center Task Force, under the command of Major General

L, R. Fredendall,

sailed from the United Kingdom and had the mis-

sion of seizing Oran.

This force consisted of three Regimental

Combat Teams (all from the lst Infantry Division),

one combat

command from the lst Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Bat talion.

The shipping required to transport the force consisted

of thirteen infantry landing ships, seven personnel ships, three

tank landing ships,

one gun landing ship, and twenty-three motor

transport landing ships.

The Eastern Task Force,

Charles W. Ryder,

Commanding General 34th U.

sailed from the United Kingdom,

Algiers.

under the command of Major General

S, Infantry Division,

and had the mission of seizing

Once a firm foothold was established, command of this

force was to pass to Lieutenant General Kenneth A.

Comnunding General 1st British Army.

N., Anderson,

In this study, we will concern ourselves primarily with

the armor of the Western and Center Task Forces,
into the details concerning these two landings,
detail must be brought out.

French.

one significant

This point involves around the

political background of the landing.

in all cases,

Before going

It

must be remembered that

the enemy who would oppose our landings would be

The French,

allies of the British until their collapse

in the summer of 1940, c~trolled all of that portion of North

Africa in which our landings were to take place.

Most French

Officers were torn between their traditional hatred of the

German and their loyalty to their governmamt, regardless of
what form that government took.. The pre-invasion political
intrigue is a subject in itself,. Hovever, no study on this
invasion would be complete without pointing out that the Allied
leaders felt, that, in all likelihood, little or no resistance
to the landings would be met.

This very fact made it possible

"to accept certain calculated risks which in other circumstances

The success of the assault phase

would have been unwarranted.

makes it apparent that the risks taken were justifield. " 9

Center Task Force,

The Center Task Force, consisting

of elements of the 12th Air Force

st

Infantry Division (/),

CCB, 1st Armored Division, plus attached and supporting service

troops, was ordered to attack at 080100 November 42 to seize
Oran and adjacent airfields.

The plan of attack was to land

on three beaches from east to west (Arzew Bay, Les Andalouses,

and Mersa Bou Zedjar) to capture the objective by converging
attacks from the Northeast, West, and South.

(Chart No I)

Two

RCTts of the 1st Division made the initial assault at Arzew

Bay.

Their mission - to secure a beachhead for CCB, protect

the left (West) flank of the Center Task Force, and to capture
Oran.

The assault at Les Andalouses was made by the 26th RCT,

1st Infantry Division.

The assault at Les Andalouses was made

by the 26th RCT, 1st Infantry Division.

The assault at Mersa

2{

Bou Zedjar was made by elements of CCB.10

This landing shall

be studied more in detail later,.

In addition to these main landings, elements of the Task
Force were ordered to sail on coast guard cutters directly into
Oran harbor in hopes for a rapid seizure of the city

ll

This

force was doomed to failure and suffered by large the greater

casualties of any force during the landing.
CCB,

1st Armored Division.

divided into two columns.

For this landing, CCB was

The East column was under the command

of Major General (then Brigadier General) Oliver, Commanding

General CCB, and was to land at Arzew Bay after the beach had
been secured by the 1st Infantry Division.

The West Column,

Green Force, under the command of Brigadier General (then

Colonel) Robinett, CO, 13th Armored Regiment, was to make the
assault landings at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-Ray beach). 1 0
Let us now turn our attention to each of these columns:
1.
troop list):

Task Force Red (East Column) (See Appendix I for

Task Force Red was ordered to land at Arzew Bay

(Zebra Red Beach) after the beachhead had been secured by

elements of the 1st Infantry Division.

In addition, the column

had several missions which are of interest.

They were:

a,

dispatch a Provisional Battalion ("Red

Flying Column") to seize and secure
Tafaraoui airfield

b.

seize and sec ure La Senia airfield

c,

:seize and secure Oggaz airfield; and

d,

assist the 1st Infantry Division in the

capture of Oran by attacks from the South.
1.

All in all, CCB, in Field Order #1 dated 11 October 1942, gave

the Red Column eleven specific missions they were to accomplish.
The "Flying Column" was under the command of Colonel
(then Lieutenant Colonel) Waters and consisted of the following
troops.:

1st Battalion 1st Armored Regiment (-); Company E,

6th

Armored Infantry Regiment; one platoon, Company B, 701st TD

Battalion; one .platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineers; and
an attached reconnaissance section.

The general plan called

for the column to land as soon as the beach was secured, assemble
in the vicinity of St. Leu, and then, as soon as assembled, move
out to seize Tafaraoui,

In addition to seizing Tafaraoui, the

column also had the mission of covering the assembly area of the
remainder of Task Force Red.
"Flying Column
and 0ran.

Once Tafaraoui was secured, the

was to be prepared to move on La Senia airport

12

Prior to the invasion, CCB had been located in the United

Kingdom.

On or about 1 October 42, in preparation for embarkation,

elements of the combat command began assembling at various ports

throughout England.
two "Maricabo" boats.

The "Flying Column" was combat loaded on

Prior to loading, all vehicles of the

Flying Column were waterproofed for a landing in at least 32 feet

of w- ter. 13
At 0051 on 8 November 42, land operations commenced on
Zebra Beach.

The landing was unopposed, and at 0221 hours the

beach was reported clear. 14

Shortly thereafter, the "Flying

Column" began unloading opposite St Leu (near Arzew), 1 3

The first

unit to strike out inland was the Reconnaissance

1 .Platoon).

Company (-

13th Armored Regiment.

This unit departed

the beach area at 0820,14,and by 0840 had cleared CR 106, three

miles southeast of St Cloud.

15

Here they remained throughout the

day protecting the left flank of. the troops at Tafaraoui,16

The "Flying Column" was not much longer in
The column departed from Tafaraoui at 0835, and,
encountering only ight scattered resistance,
assault the airport.14

getting started.

around 1100, after

was in position to

Company B, 1st Armored Regiment (lst

Platoon, Company E, .6th Armored Infantry Regiment Attached) a-s:saulted

from the East.
the South.

Company A, 1st Armored Regiment assaulted from

Company E,

6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-L Platoon)

was ordered to establish roadblocks to the North and Northeast

for the dual purpose of preventing reinforcements from Oran reaching the airport and also preventing the escape of the airport
garrison.

17

At 1112 the attack was launched and by 1215, the

airport and 300 prisoners were in the hands of the "Flying Column" 14
Meanwhile,

Company E,

6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-1 Platoon),

on road block duty, had captured,

intact,

guards enroute to Tafaraoui from Oran.

18

an ammunition train and

The road blocks es-

tablished by the company received ineffective artillery fire and

aerial bombardment during the day.
by French planes from La Senia,

19

Tafaraoui was also bombed

14

Immediately after securing the airport, the "Flying

Columns began to reorganize for a continuation of the attack
toward La Senia.

However,

the bombing and strafing attacks,

18

the

necessity for the guarding of prisoners of war and captured

material, the necessity for the destroying of seceral artillery
batteries,

and reports of troops coming up fran the South pre-

vented an assault on La Senia from being launched that day. 1 3

Shortly after daylight on 9 November 1942,
for La Senia - but that is

the column moved out

another story.

the remainder of Red Task Force,

Meanwhile,

the day getting ashore and reorganizing.

CCB,

spent

About mid-morning the

Command Post of CCB was established in the Post Office of St Leu.

The 2nd Battalion,

15

6th Armored Infantry Regiment :(4Company E with

the "Flying Column") completed their unloading at 1130 and were

immediately ordered to move to and occupy the high ground threequarters of a mile East of St Leu.

Here they remained for the

rest of the day, protecting the beachhead, without enemy contact. 2 0

Task Force Green (West Column - For Troop List,

2.
see Annex II):

Task Force Green, under Brigidier General (then

Colonel ) Robinett's command, was ordered to attack the beaches

at Mersa Bou Zedjar (X-ray beach) at 080100 Nov 1942 to seize
and secure the airport at Lourmel.

Thereafter,

to assist the

Red Force to capture the airfields at Tafaraoui and La Senia,

and to assist in the capture of Aran as directed by The commanding General,

CCB.

21

Colonel Robinett gave the assault mission to the 1st

Battalion,
ments).

6th Armored Infantry Regiment (-Company B and detach-

A "Green Flying Colun , was also organized .

This

force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Todd (killed

in Tunisia on 28 December 1942) consisted of the 1st Battalion,

13 Armored Regiment (-Companies A,. B, and a detachment of Headquarters Company), Company B, 6th.Armored Infantry Regiment
(-2 platoons), 2nd Platoon, Company.C, 701st TD Battalion, and
the 1st Platoon (Reinf), Company A, 16th Armored Engineer Battal21
ion,2
The assault force was ordered to assault the beaches at
080100 November 1942 with one company on X-ray Green beach and one
company on X-ray White beach.. As soon as the beach was secured,
plans called for the "Flying Column" to land, and, as soon as
assembled, to move out toward Lourmel to secure the airport and
facilities there,.

Upon seizure of the the Lourmel airport,

the

column was to reorganize and be prepared to advance on Tafaraoui

or La Senia airfields. 2 1
Landing operations against Mersa Bou Zedjar started on
7 November 1942 at 2347 hours,

There was no opposition any-

where on X-ray beach and at 0346, the beachhead was reported

clear.22 At 0400, Lieutenant Colonel Kern, CO, 1st Battalion,
6th Armored Infantry Regiment radioed the Task F:orce Command .Post
his entire unit was ashore and was proceeding to their final
objectives. 2 3

These objectives were soon secured, and the

Battalion (-Company B) spent an uneventful day securing the

beachhead.2 4
Meanwhile, the remainder,the Task Force began to unload.
The first unit to land, was a platoon from the Reconnaissance
Company, 13th Armored Regiment.

On the beach, soft sand was

20.

encountered which slowed down the unloading considerably.

Nevertheless, the "Flying Column" managed to get ashore and
at 0900 hours moved out for Lourmel, 2 2
Meanwhile, the Reconnaissance Platoon of the Reconnaissance Company, 13th Armored Regiment had 'proceeded the'"Fly-+
ing Column" toward Lourmel.
to the landing near Lourmel.
0903 had been overcome.

This unit met the first

However,

it

resistance

was very light, and by

The "Flying Column" occupied Lourmel

without incident at 1125.22

Orders went out almost immediately for the "Flying Column"
to continue the attack to seize La Senia.

So,

shortly after noon

on 8 November 1942, the column moved out. 2 2

The first resistance, an enemy roadblock, was encountered
one mile west of Bou Telis at .1408.

This roadblock was destroyed

by 1443, but. two friendly tanks were lost in the engagement. 2 2

An enemy roadblock, one machine gun, and one emplaced
75 mm gun were destroyed at 1517 near Brediah.2 2

However, another

vehicle was lost to the column during this attack - a half trackand the column by-passed Brediah to the South and continued on
their mission to La Senia.

La Senia was not to be reached that

day horWver, and the column bivouced for the night in Sabkra, 2 5

fthei
Summarys. :In- thi.s short review.:t-

a.t.ion.t ;,Q.CB:lt

Division, during the TORCH Operation, we have seen haov

one major

element of an armored division was given several missions to

accomplish during the assault landing phase.

One element of the

combat command landed after the beach had been secured and,
21

Armored

after

landing,

inland.

advanced rapidly to seize an objective deep

At that.same

manad was making its

time,

another element

own assault

landing,

of the

and,

combat com-

after

securing

a beachhead, dispatched a mobile Task Force deep inland to seize

an important objective.

landings were unopposed, and

occasions will it be possible to land so easily.

only on rare
gardless

True, the

of this

fact,

the

operation

does point

out several

Re-

poss-

ible missions for an armored division in an assault landing.

command of Major
States

General

in October 1942.

under the

The Western Task Force,

Western Task Force,

G.

S.

Patton,

Jr,

Their mission -

sailed

from the

to invade French Morocco

and seize the principal port and city of Casablanca.

vasion involved the longest pre-landing sea voyage

of warfare to
convoy to

that

time.

In

addition,

it

travel through submarine

infested

one ship of the convoy was

United

was

This in-

in the history

necessary

waters,

for the
Even so,

not

lost during the voyage.

The plans called for landings to be made in three places;

(a) at Fedala, thirteen miles northeast of Casablanca; the objecoperations for the capture

tive here was to initiate

Casablanca;

Safi,

at

(b)

from the East:

the immediate

130 miles to

objective

the

of this

southeast

of Casablanca
of

landing was to

land

armor and to prevent the French Troops at Marrakech from re-

inforcing Casablanca;
east of Casablanca;
Lyautey airfields

Force. 2 6

and (c)

approximately eighty miles north-

here the objective was to seize the Port

and to

protect

the northern

flank

of the

Task

This study will primarily concern itself with the landings at Safi, for it was here that the greatest amount of armor
was involved.
Safi.

Safi, 150 miles South of Casablanca, was assaulted

by Task Force Xray (Blackstone) under the command of Major General

E, N

Harmon, Commanding General, 2nd Armored Division.

Harmon was given the following missions:

General

(a) to secure Safi and

the airport East of the town; (b) to insure the unloading of the
armored units aboard the Sea Train LAKEHURST; (c) to secure
crossings over the Oued Oum Er Rebia River in order to insure
participation of his force in the capture of Casablanca; and (d)
to prevent the garrision at Marrakech from reinforcing Casablanca. 2 7
To accomplish the mission, the following troops were put
under General Harmon's command:

(a) an infantry landing;.team con-

sisting of the 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division and

the 2nd Battalion, 540th Engineers; (b) an armored battalion
landing team consisting of a tank battalion, an armored infantry
battalion (both from the 2nd armored division), and two platoons
of AAA; and (c) the 'Sea Train LAKEHURST carrying a tank battalion
from the 67th Armored Regiment, a detachment from the 56th Medical Battalion and a platoon from Company "B", 443rd AAA Battalion.2 7
This force comprised the bulk of the armor in the Western
Task Force.

It was given to General Harmon since the overall plan

envisoned his force moving the 150 miles up the coast to Casablanca
and attacking that city from the rear,2 7

Although a brilliant

attempt was made to accomplish .this mission, rapid conclusion of

an armistice with the French made this plan, in the and,, unnecessary.
23

received an invasion

The Safi garrison, 450 effectives,

0320 on the morning of 8 November

Then,

1942,

about

alert

at

0400,

under the cover of darkness, the destroyer BERNADOU, carry-

on from the

fired

ine gun and rifle

BERNADOU, countered this

fire

was silenced.

or the

machine

fire

and within

No further

guns at

IMERVINE, covering the

The destroyer

fire.,

the

was

followed by mach-

by a French 75 battery

shore

it

At 0428,

entered Safi Bay.

ing Company K, 47th Infantry,

six

opposition

minutes,

from the

all

enemy

75 battery

harbor mouth was encountered.

Hbw-

ever, at 0430 the BERNADOU ran aground necessitating debarking K

Company over the

side.

COLE tied

Regiment,

and that

done,

dock after

they

established

disembarked,

roadblock.

The main assault

the

to

main harbor area

the

Battalion,

began to

1st Battalion

North of the

fire

from French in

road.

This was the

move

position
initial

on the

regimental

commander,

took personal

Immediately after

machine

high ground just

baptism of fire

after deployinig, they bogged down.

light

landed

for

these

the
on

land-

At dawn,

South toward Safi.

town, the column received

just

where

South of Safi

47th Regiment landed in

on Green Beach and the

1st Battalion

47th

landings began at 0530 when the

1st

the' de-

At 0500,

L Company,

port

2 8

Blue Beach, about 2000 yards to the North.

the

of the

K Company of guarding

relieved

which K Company moved to

a

tanks attached

Dock.

the Phosphate

up at

on board,

the

ing

part

dock) was seized without opposition.

(Phosphate
stroyer

This was

gun and rifle

East
troops,

of the
and

However, Colonel Randle, the

charge

of the battalion,

led

an attack against' the position, and the resistance was quickly

28

overcome.2

The only other resistance of note during the day centered

around the French barracks in'Safi.

A combination of tanks and

infantry soon eradicated this resistance and the beachhead was

seized by 1000.

The final D day objective - a 10,000 yard beach-

head - was secured by 1600 hours.

28

The Sea Train LAKEHURST tied up at the Phosphate Dock

all the tanks on

at 1400 hours, and within twenty-four hours,

board had been unloaded.
Meanwhile,

28

the 2nd Battalion, 47th Regiment with one

platoon of light tanks attached had made an unopposed landing on

Yellow Beach, eight miles south of Safi,

Here,

the surf condi-

tions were bad and not until 1400 hours was the entire team on
shore.

By night fall, they had moved north without oppositon

and were occupying the south portion of the 10,000 yard beachhead,

An armored team was sent twelve miles east along the road

to Marrakech to cover any threat that might develop during the

night from French troops stationed there.
positions without incident,
The next day,

This force occupied its

28

General Harmon proceeded North toward Casa-

blanca with a large armored force.

By skillful maneuver,

he had

deceived the French as to his intentions and was well on his way
to Casablanca when the armistice was signed.
The landing at Safi,

although against only light opposi-

tion, illustrates another mission for which an armored division

25

THE PLAN OF ATTACK

LE

SHIMA

AFLD

.-.

INITIAL OBJECTIVES

MILES

III AMPH

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CORPS

CORPS RES

XXV J
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d^36Z
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KERAMA IS

L 6

[X77t-

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SOURCE:
DEMOS1TRATION
MAP NR 6, THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC, OKINAWA,
THE LAST BATTLE BY APPLEMAN, BURNS, GUGELER, AND STEVENS,
DA, 1948.
PUBLISHED BY THE HISTORIC DIV,

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might be used as an assault landing force - to land on a

lightly held beach several miles from the main landing, and
after landing, to move parallel to the coast and attack the
enemy defending the main beachhead from the rear,
Port Lvautey and Fedalah(See Maps 2 and 3).
same time the Safi operations were taking place,
were being made at both Port Lyautey and Fedalah.
Primarily infantry landings,

hndings
Both were

Within both Task Forces there

were armored battalion landing teams.

ran into some difficulties,

At the

Both of these landings

but in the end were successful.

For our purpose, they have little application and will not
be studied,
Conclusion.

In concluding the TORCH operation,

it

seems pertinent to quote firom the after action recommendations

submitted by the G3, Center Task Force:
... Armored Units.
In all future planning it is
believed that the use of Armored Units should be stressed.
The coordinated use of Infantry and Tanks permits maximum
exploitation of surprise or early success. Also, the psychological effect on the enemy caused by the early appearance of tanks cannot be overemphasized. It is futther
believed that the inclusion of tanks where practicable will
minimize casualties and reduce the time required to reach
the objective.
Special types assault craft to transport
large numbers of tanks, AA guns, artillery, and other
tehicles must be made available, 2 9 ...
Sicilian Invasion
Introduction (Se

Map 4).

On 10 July 1943. Allied

Forces invaded the island of Sicily

2nd U.S.
employed.

Operation HUSKY.

The

Armored Division was one of major United States units

Prior to the landing, the division received special

amphibious training at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center

C0
v

<4

.f

ti

,f.

fr

(FATIC)

in North Africa,

landings were conducted,

LCT's were studied

During this training period,

loading techniques

of LCI's,

practice
LSTts and

and vehicles and equipment were waterproofed

and prepared for shipment.

In order to acquaint the tank

gunners with the peculiarities of firing from LST,

actual gunnery

practice was conducted from the LST's during the practice landings.

30

The greatest difficulty encountered throughout this

training period was in unloading the LSTts.

This was brought

about by the flat beach gradient of the Mediterranean shore

and the deeper draft of the LST.

Both FATIC and naval personnel

attempted to solve this problem, and,

although much training

time was lost while this difficulty was under study, a completely satifsactory solution was never found.

31

Final plans for the la nding calle d for the division to

be split into two separate forces.

CCA was attached to the 3rd

Infantry Division - JOSS Force - and placed under the command of

Lieutenant General (then Major General) L. K. Truscote.
division,

The

less CCA but with the 18th RCT attached was to be the

army floating reserve.32

CCA,
Organization).

2nd Armored Division (See Appendix III for Task

In addition to CCA -commanded

(then Brigadier General) Maurice Rose.

by Major General

The JOSS Force consisted

of the 3rd Infantry Division, one ranger battalio,

ing troops.

33

':idsppeqt-

The missions of this force were to land in the

LICATA area, capture and secure the port and airfield

by dark
of D day, extend the beachhead,
30

and protect the left flank of

the operation against interference from the northwest.

right flanks

it

was to maintain contact with II

Corps,

On its
34

Prior to the embarkation; special floating ramps were

procured to expedite the unloading .of the LST s6

Beside this

difficulty with the beach gradients insufficient troop space

further complicated the loading.

This necessitated the separa-

tion of the armored infantry units from their personnel carriers:

35

One other technique employed during the embarkation phase

was that of split loading battalion and separate company headquarters.

Although this increased the loading problem, it

was

felt necessary in order that an entire headquarters would not

be lost with the sinking of one ship,

36

This split loading paid

off, for on the morning of 11 July 1943 (D /

109ts bombed the harbor at Licata.

1),

two folke-Wulfe

Two LST's were sunk, one of

which was carrying one half of Headquarters Company, CCA.

Al-

though person. el casualties were light, vehicular casualties

were high - 40% loss in Headquarters Company, CCA.

37

During the forty-eight hours prior to D day, the Western

Mediterranean experienced one of the worst storms in

recent years.

The entire invasion was nearly disrupted and serious damage was
done to the special floating ramps so necessary to the successful
unloading of the vessels.

36

At 100245 July 1943, the infantry of the 3rd Division and

the 3rd Ranger Battalion assault landed on the coast of Sicily,
Fc

the landing, the 3rd Battalion,

66th Armored Regiment was

detached from CCA and attached to the assaulting infantry..

31

Shortly after daybreak, three companies from the battalion were

debarked and deployed on: the beach assisting the infantry in
mopping up beach resistance. 3 8
Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry
Regiment,

led the debarkation of the main body of CCA.

Shortly

after getting ashore, twelve enemy soldiers were captured near

Licata by Company G of the Battalion.

38

The combat command continued to debark throughout the

rest of the day and night.

At midnight,

General Rose received

orders to attack at 0630 on the morning of 11 June 1943 to secure

Nardo and Canacat$i.

By daybreak, two-thirds of the combat

command had debrked and at 0630,

the advanced guard passed through

the leading elements of the 3rd Infantry Division.

The remaining

one-third of the combat command was ordered to close up on the

38
main body in company sized groups immediately after debarking.

2nd Armored Division (-CCA /

18th RCT) The 2nd Armored

Division - KOOL Force - was under the command of Iajor General

Hugh Gaffey.

This force ws the floating reserve of 7th Army

and was ordered "to be prepared to land in

support of any of

n 32
the assaults.At 1520,

on D day, KOOL Force received orders to land on

Dime Beach just West of Gela,3

hours

H hour here had been at 0245

'The command echelon went ashore at. 1700 and made arrange-

ments for assembly areas. 4 0

and at .1900, the 18th RCT and the

1st Battalion, 41st Armored Infantry Regiment began to debark.

These units were completely unloaded prior to daylight.

The first tanks to debark were two platoons of Company

I,

67th Armored Regiment which were unloaded at 0200 on the

mornihg of 11 July 1943.

congestion on the beach,

However,
it

because of high surf and

was decided not to unload any more

armored vehicles during the hours of darkness,

Until about noon,
were available
beachhead.
Colonel),

11 July 1943,

only four American tanks

for combat and in position

During the early morning,

CCB commander,

42

.to

fire on the entire

Major General White(then

had located these tanks.

He ordered

them to take up positions from which they could c over the CCB
command post and the troops in

the assembly area.

42

The unloading continued all day on 11 June 1943 and was

completed by early morning of 12 June 1943,
Concerning this landing phase,

43

General White has said

the following:
... A number of tanks were out of actions for a considerperiod of time after getting ashore because of two factors:
(a) Somervelt mats (chickens were laid to assist
wheel vehicles through deep sand) and
(b) Deep sand.
The Somervelt mats became entangled in the tracks
and could only be removed by cutting with large nippers.
In avoiding the Somervelt mats successive vehicles moving
up the steep sandy hill
near the beach bogged down in the
sand and generally threw one or both tracks,.., 4 4
While the main body of the division was busily engaged
in

debarkation, the 1st Infantry Division,

divisions,
hours,

one of the assault

was receiving a serious counterattack.

on the morning of 11 June 1943,

by approximately 30-40 German tanks.

About 1000

the division was attacked

The enemy tanks succeeded

in breaking through 1st Division position and debouching on the

plain Northeast of Gela

44

Here they were engaged and success-

fully repulsed by a-platoon of four tanks from Company I, 67th

Armored Regiment assisted by some 1st Division Field Artillery
and Infantry cannon;

This action lasted about two hours when

the enemy withdrew leaving behind fourteen knocked out tanks.

Most of these fourteen tanks were destroyed by the four American
tanks while the losses to our own tankers consisted of four men
wounded,. The defeat of this enemy counterattack was one of the
turning points of the Sicilian campaign.

4 5

The bulk of the 1st

Division anti-tank guns had been lost when the LST on which they
were being transported was hit by a bomb and burned on D day,
If the four tanks had not been present,
would have come of this attack.
Conclusion.

serious. consequences

4 6

The landings in

Sicily point out several

lessons of particular importance to thb

armored division.

These

are:
1.

It

is

essential that tanks be debarked early in

order to support an amphibious operation. 4

.2. Vehicles should be compactly and completely loaded

so that crews can sustain themselves until supply echelons can
become operations.47
3.
ship in

Unloading ramps are necessary on each tank carrying

order to permit quick unloading of units such as platoons.

4,

Split loading of units, especially headquarters units

should be practiced to the maximum extert consistent with shipping.

49

Normandy

Introduction.

6 June 1944

The long awaited assault against Fortress

Etrope began in the early morning of 6 June 1944.

under the supreme command of General Eisenhower,
initial

Allied Forces,
launched their

assault to secure a beachhead on the continent of Eurrsp

Many volumes have and will be written on this operation,

greatest invasion in

all

history .

For our purpose,

the

we shall

take but a few short paragraphs to see what armor was used and
how it

was employed during the initial

assault,

No armored divisions were initially employed in the

operation.

The first armored division to arrive in France was

the 2nd Armored Division, which began landing on 9 June - three

days after D day,5 0
The use of tanks in the assault was a subject of prolonged discussion and experimentation.

The final decision was

to empl.oyt'anks as close support artillery - not as an armored

force,

Two of the major characteristics

and shock action - were disregarded.

of armor - mobility

In addition, final plans

did not call for the tanks to make any exploitation off beaches.
This decision was brought about

y the feeling that only an

armored gun would have any change for survival on the beach.
addition, it

In

was felt, that tank cannon would be quite effective

for firing into pillbox embrasures.

The planners visualized

the tanks not leaving the beach during threassault phase, but,
rather remaining in and firing from positions hull deep in the
water. 51

I
1~

4.

I
i

L-

JN

.4-h

C/)
Id

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W
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U
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With this concept in mind then; a tank battalion was

These tanks were

attached to each of the assault regiments.

They were to get ashore in

to lead the attack.

one of two ways.

Some would be carried

a the beach on LCT's and land with the

first infantry waves.

Others were to be launched at sea and

"swim"

into shore.

The "swimmingu tanks were expected to reach

the beach prior to the arrival of the infantry. - 1

These amphibious tanks were commonly called "DD" Tanks.
Later chapters will explain them in more detail.
For the landings, the separate tank battalions were
placed in two armored groups - the 3rd and 6th.

These groups

were in turn attached to the ls t Infantry Division (3rd

Armored Group) for the landing on OMAHA Beach and the 4th Infantry
Division (6th Armored Group) for the UTAH Beach landings.

The

3rd Armored group consisted of the 741st, 743rd, and 745th Tank
Battalions while the 70th and 746th Tank Battalions made up the
6th Armored Group. 52
In turn, the battalions were organized fort he assault
into two echelons - assault and support.

The assault echelon

consisted of three medium tank companies.

Two were equipped

The third was not so equipped,

with the DD flotation device.

but did have a Tank Dozer Platoon attached.

The support echelon

consisted of a minimum of battalion command personnel plus a

maintenance section and supply vehicles.

It was not planned

for the residue of the battalions to land until about 15 June. 52

During the period 1 March 1944 to 16 May 1944, the 3rd
Armored Group conducted intensive trailing in the employment of
38

LANDING DIAGRAM, OMAHA BEACH

(SECTOR OF 1I6th RCT)

EAS

GREEN

D-----__
RED-_

i-

DOG WHITE

C (CD) 743 Th Sn

_____Co

Co A

743

Th

Bn

Co A 743 Tk

Co E !i6 lot

H!O

ooC
04

AAAW
Str

Co B (DII) 743 to 90

o0101p

Demolitipon

146

ControlSoat

AAWBr 1 n

lot

AWt
1-

lSn

Engr CT

146 Enyr CT

8450

0
CotL

0
1610n*

Co

81ml
SI

Wpng o

149

Enr

141 Engr
BeachBeach
8n

H+57

00

0
Colto

OOQ~on9

11l6n

121EnopSO

an

_..-1161
1st SpntnolI
141Bac
5

0 0 (30
Co

ARAW..
St

1ot

Bn 121
i
ngr C

0t00 12nLf

1n

0o0

0 M n 6 1 n

HQ

HQ-JA
COGtrLll1t
C(i)
AAAWStry

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GREEN

an

Co F 116of

Cl

46 r

000

30l

on

llnp

H121qn

llEogr~n

CoAsSB
2EdRanger

H"65

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a Lg;
u2S~i~

on

Alt IHOs H0 Go 6 lot

H"906

66
5

PA Sn Armd

Sl1t

8HIIO

FiA Sn (3 Stry's in OuKWS)

AT12
467 AAAW Sn

o nt
467 AAAWSn

EngrSp Brig

AT Plat 24 Sn AT Plot d n

1
467 AAAWBn
AT Co 11Stnt

1496

467 AAA S
6
AWOn47AA

Qec
o

[1e.ch50
U1, fnksHQ

8*21

461Atophittioa

lt 1'

Truck (.oJ
tNary

CMLJLCA

31

solvags

ODeo Tacnk

21 Eog,

on

5~t

Sni
Ranger on

of DD Tanks.

Then,

on 16 May, loading began.

On this date,

two companies each from the 70th, 741st, and 743rd Tank
On

Battalions loaded on LST's - four DD Tanks to a ship.

30 May, the 3rd Armored Group Headquarters and the remaining

battalions began loading.
June.

52

This loading was completed by 2

Everyone was ready for the big show.

Originally the landings were

6 June 1944 (See Map 5).

scheduled for 5 June,

but channel storms necessitated calling

off the operation for that day.

By now, the entire wold is

familiar with General Eisenhower's famous decision to go ahead

on 6 June even though the weather was not promising.
bad weather, and, as a consequence,

But this

rough sea was to play havoc

with our DD Tanks.

In the 4th Division sector, on UTAH Beach, where initial
resistance was unexpectedly light, thirty-two DD Tanks were supposed to la nd in the first

wave.

However,

they landed fifteen

minutes late because of the loss of a control vessel which

struck a mine.

But the opposition was so light that there was

no immediate need for them.

All but four of these thirty-two

tanks got ashore safely - the four being lost when the LST
carrying them hit a mine.53
On OMAH Beach, the picture was quite different.
the 1st Division had an extremely difficult time,

Here

Throughout

most of D day, the German LXXIV Corps believed they had stopped
this assault on the beach, 5 4
At H-50, two DD companies of the 741st Tank Battalion
40 -

OPERATIONS OVERLAY
PORT LYAUTEY OPERATIONS

OVERLAY
OPERATION MAP
1

50,000
TO ACCOMPANY FO NR 1
BY COMMAND OF BRIG GEN L K TRUSCOTT

+72

DON E CARLSTON
COLONEL,CAVALRY
CHIEF OF STAFF

RESERVE
II

OFFICIAL:
DAN H BOND
MAJ, INF
ASST C/S G3

SREIN
H

60 (+DE TS)

TO THIS LINE

LURE

MY

NORTH

THIS LINE

H -- 2:15

BROWN 2
SEIZE HOLDBRIOGE

/'
-Sd

NAVAL

A-B- BOMBARDMENT
0615
C-O-

SOURCE:

GUNFIRE

FIRES

(de,

HC'LDE

RFC

EPI

*am"mI
ER

THIS' t
TO

''

LN

AFTER

INTERDICTIONS

E- SCHEDULED
US LANDINGS IN FRENCH
MOROCCO, THE ARMORED
FORCE SCHOOL, APRIL 1943

ON CALL

--- 33

AFTER 0615

RED

SOURCE:

CENTER TASK
LANDINGS IN
SAFRICA

FO 1, HQS CCB, 1ST AD, 11 OCT 42

ON MF 307, DOCUMENTS SECTION, TAS

26RCT

8 NOVEM

FORCE
NORTH
BER

42

OR AN
LES ANDALOUSES
ST.

GREEN I

CCB

BON THELIS

MILES 5

I;

CC"B"

were launched 6000 yards off shore.

Almost immediately they

began to have difficulty with the sea.

two launched succeeded in

Only five of the thirty-

reaching shoreS 5 5

On the extreme right flank of the beach, sixteen tanks

were scheduled to land ahead of the infantry (Company "A",, 116th
Only eight survived enemy artillery and reached shore.

Infnatry).

on LST's,

it

the sea was to rough to launch them.

56

These eight were brough in

having been decided that

On the left flank of the 116th Regiment

situation was not so bad,

Here,

Meanwhile,

s sector, the

two companies of tanks were

landed by LST's ahead of the infantry.

not suffer any losses. 5

These companies did

in the 16th Regiment's sector (on the left

flank of 116th Regiment),

the troops were experiencing what

was probably the most difficult of the landings.

the DD tanks were swamped and lost.

Almost all

One tank company was

beached from LSTts and almost immediately lost five tanks.

a result,

only one-third of the planned armor support was

initially

available to the 16th Infantry.

Thus,

56

we have seen how on the UTAH Beach, where initially

tanks were not needed because of light resistance,

available.
was stiff,

On the other hand,

they were

on OMAHA Beach where resistance

most of the tanks were lost to the surf.

cluding its

As

In con-

report on the D-day landings, the 1st Army Armored

Section made the following pertinent statement:

... The use of DD Tanks in their present state of

0
cn

Icnn

4L

00
I0
0

F-

-J

~0

00

0.

'I

-^ -

"a

DcI

H
x ,

development is

restricted to quiet water.**

Oktnow
General.
Japanese "home"

57

1 April. 1945

The operation against Okinawa - the first

island to be invaded58- was one of the last

large battles of World War II.

It

is the only amphibious

landing from the Pacific Theater of Operations that we shall

study.
A brief statement as to why this battle is
cluded is

in

order.

being in-

As will be shown later, initial

resistance was almost non-existant.

enemy

However, the operation

was one of the largest undertaken in the Pacific Theater during

World War II.
,.,For the assault echelon alone, about 183,000 troops
and 747,000 measurement tons of cargo were loaded into
over 430 assault transports and landing ships at 11
different ports from Seattle to Leyte, a distance of 6,000

miles59 ..
Not just from the viewpoint of size alone is
important.

this battle

This plan was-in many respects the culmination of

experience of all previous operations in

the Pacific wara " 60

There were no armored divisions in the Pacific Theater during

World War II,
tank

There were,

battalions.

to this study.

however,

many tank and amphibious

Many experiences of these units are applicable

Here we have tim~e for but one landing.

Thus,

since our time limit was restricted, we attempted to choose

that landing that would offer the most.

Okinawa,

because

of the factors outlined above appeared to offer what we needed.

Background.. Operation ICEBERG, the plan for the

invasion of Okinawa, marked the beginning of the
Japan,

for

'zd

United States troops were at last to fight on land

considered by the Japanese to be part of their "home"

On 3 October 1944,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed

that a portion of the Ryukyu Islands be seized. 6 1

the most important

island in

this group.

der or (2)

Okinawa is

Not only that, it

is within the outer ring of Japanese defenses.

was under our control,

islands..

Once Okinawa

Japan had but two choices:

prepare for an all

(1)

surren-

out defense of their home islands.

The landings were to be conducted by the Tenth U.S.

Army under the command of Liutenance General S.
Jr.

B. Buckner,

For this operation, Tenth Army consisted of two najor

commands,

in

addition to air and naval forces - XXIV Corps

under command of Major General J.

Corps (Marine)

R.

Hedge andIII Amphibious

under command of Major General R.

S.

Geiger.

Attached to the XXIV Corps were two army divisions - the 7th
Attached to the III Amphibious Corps (Marine)

and 96th.

two marine divisions - the 1st and 6th.

were

In addition, under

Army control were the 2nd Marine Division, 27th Army Division
and the 77th Army Division.

63

Within the XXIV Corps,

Battalions,

coordination of the Tank

Amphibious Tractor Battalions,

and Amphibious

,Tank Battalions was accomplished through the 20th Armored

Group.

64

cerned.

It

is with this group that we are primarily con-

62

PLA N OF ATTACK)
(DETAILED
FEDALA- BEACHHEAD(DALEPANOATCK

MANSOURI A

SOURCE: f
US LANDINGS IN FRENCH MOROCCO,

THE ARMORED FORCE SCHOOL,

APRIL 1943

In January 1945, XXIV1, Corps was engaged in the final

phase of the Leyte operation when orders were received attaching them to 10th Army for the Okinawa campaign.
20th Armored Group was a part of XXIV Corps.
after receiving the corps order for Okinawa,
Officer,

20th Armored Group,

64

At this time,
Immediately

the Commanding

directed the amphibious units

within the group to hold show down inspections; to prepare

and submit loading plans; to requisition all shortages; and
to maintain command liaison with the divisions to which-they
would be attached in the assault.

These units would come under

operational control of the divisions when they (the amphibious

units) crossed the beach to load.

The Tank Battalions of the

group remained with the divisions with whon they had operated
during the Leyte Campaign.

65

During this preparation,

ily in an advisory capacity.

group headquarters acted primar-

Issue of major items of supply to

the Tank Battalions was controlled by the group through

coordination with XXIV Corps special staff.
amphibious units were issued by the Griup S4.

nijor items for the

In addition, the

Group Commander acted as Armored Advisor to the Commanding

General XXIV Corps.65
Time for training and rehearsal was limited by the
time required for maintenance.

The Group had learned from

their experience in the Leyte,

Saipan, and Tinian Operations,

that amphibious vehicles, because of their specialized nature,

required more maintenance time to ready them for the assault

after

the final rehearsal

part in

the

than

6
operation.

any other

ground units

taking

Upon completion of the training period, all units of

the Group loaded under division
available. 6
follows

For the

control

operation, the

as the

shipping became

units were attached as

67
7th Inf Div

96th Inf

Div

536th Amph Tractor

Bn

788th Amph Tractor

Bn

718th Amph Tractor

Bn

728th Amph Tractor

Bn

776th Amph Tank Bn

780th Amph Tank Bn

711th Tank Bn

763rd Tank Battalion

77th Division
773rd Amph Tractor Bn
715th Amph Tractor Bn
708th Amph Tank Bn
706th Tank Battalion

Landings

April

-1

1945.

The final plan to

attack

called for XXIV Corps and III Amphibious Corps to land with
two divisions
assault.

abreast

In addition,

the 2nd Marine

total

of four

divisions

demonstration was to

in

Units were

the

be made by

Division on the Southeastern side

(See Chart 7)68

shown in

of the island.

loaded and the assaults made as

Chart 8,69
B hour was

10 battleships,
began their

set

for

0830.

The fire

support force

9 cruisers, 23 destroyers, and 177

pre H hour bombardment

49

at

0530,.

Altogether

of

gunboats
this

was the largest pre-invasion concentration of naval gunfire

in history - a total of 44,825 rounds of five inch or larger,
33,000 rockets,
preparation.

and 22,500 mortar shells were fired in this

Then at 0745,

carrier planes covered the beach

with napalm. 70
Meanwhile, the troops and tanks to lead the assault
were readying themselves.

Amphibian tanks comprised the first

wave and at 0800 they were flagged across the line of departure,
4000 yards from the beach.

Behind them,

five to seven waves

of assault troops in amphibian tractors followed. 70

The way in was led by gunboats firing rocket, mortars
and 40 mm guns.

This concentration was so great that it

averaged 25 rounds in

each 100 yards square.

Upon approaching

the reef, these gunboats turned aside and the amphibious tanks
and tractors continued to the beach.

71

During the entire move the the beach, the only sign of
the.

the enemy was an occasional mortar or artillery shell"...

long line of invasion craft advanced as though on a large
scale maneuver

s. ... 71

At 0830, the first waves began to touch downall

tn

tin.

,7 1

almost

The entire landing was unbelieveably easy.

There

had been but little artillery fire, no enemy on the beach, and
only a few land mines.

By nightfall, the beachhead was 1 00

yards long and, in places, 5000 yards deep. 72

5 April 1945 that stiff

It wasn t t until

enemy resistance was finally met.

winning of the island was still

a long way off.

But a very

The

deviiite foothold had been secured.

Conclusion
Thus we have seen,

in

four landings, different methods

for the use of armor in an amphibious operation.

First, to

secure an objective deep inland; second, to advance parallel

to the coast and attack enemy opposing another landing from
the rear; third, as the army reserve; fourth, as armored
artillery; and fifth, leading an attack as amphibious tanks.
Armor has a place in

an amphibious operation.

We

will now determine the role of the Armored Division in an

assault Landing.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER ?

iArmy - Navy - Air Force Journal (Washington: 16 Feb

1952),p 749.
Invasion of North Africa
2Gordon A. Harrision, Cross Channel Attack (Washington:
Historical Section, Department of the Army, 1951)(hereinafter
referred to as Harrison), p 11
p 11

Harrison,
4

Harrison,,p.31

5Harrison,,p

31

Harrison, p 32

General of the Army D,D. Eisenhower, Commander in

Chief's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1V43, p 6
..

.=

,,

--

--

--

General of the Army DD. Eisenhower,

Europe (New York:1948), p 83

,-

Crusade In

9Major General J. C, haydon, DSO,, OBE, Impressions

Gained from the Assault Phase of the Operations in North Africa
between 6 November and 23 November 1942, p 1
10F #1,
October 1942,

Headquarters CCB,

11

1st Armored Division,

llA Short History of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored

Infantry Regiment (Author and date of publication unknown),

#1,

1F

(Headquarters Red Force,

CCB,

and 251,

P2

111800

October 1942
13

1st Bn, 1st Armored Regiment, After action Report

(Submitted 31 December 1942)
14

Operations Report,

TF Red, CCB,

1st Armored Division,

.
151

S-3 Journal,

13th Armored Regiment,

8 November 1942,

p 1
6

Opns Report, CCB,

November 1942.

1st Armored Division, as of 082400

17

A Brief History of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Armored

Infantry Regiment from October 11, 1942 to 1ay 12, 1943,
author unknown, ;p2 (hereinafter referred to as 2nd Bn,
6th AIR.)
12nd Bn, 6th AIR,
199
20

p 2

2nd Bn, 6th AIR,

p 2

2nd Bn, 6th AIR,

p 3

21FO #1,

Green Force,

22

CCB,

1st Armored Division

0perations Report, TF Green,

1942 to 1625 hours, 10 November 42.
2

30perations Joura,
8 November 1 9 4 2 , p 1
242 perations Report,

Regiment,
25

2347 hours,

7 November

13th Armored Regiment,

0400 hours,

1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry

8 %ovember 1942.
Operations Journal,

Green Force "Flying Column"

in

General of the Army DD, Eisenhower, Commander

Chief 's Dispatch, North Africa Campaign, 1942-1943, p 12.
2 7

U.S. Landings in Morocco, Tactics Department,

Armored School (Fort Knox: 1943) p8
28U.S. Landings in Morocco,
Armored School (Fort Knox,: 1943),

(APO 512:

Tactics Department, The

pages 12,13, and 14.

Compilation of Reports, on Lessons of operation TORCH

Allied Force Headquarters, 16 January 1943), p 10

30
3The
Committee -f4,
(Fort Knox:
#4, Advanced
3 1

The

2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian Campaign,

Advanced Class, The Armored School, 1949-50
May 1950),
(hereinafter referred to as Committee
Class, TAS, 49-50), p 10

Committee

#4,

Advanced Class,

49-50, p 11

323

Report of Operations, 7th US Army in the Sicilian

Campaign, by the Staff, 7th US Army (APO #758: September,
1943) (Hereinafter referred to as Opns Report, 7th Army),
p a6
333

Committee #4, Advanced Class,

#4

49-50,

33

34

Committee

3 5

Committee #4, Advanced Class,

36

Committee #4, Advanced Class, 49-50,

35

Committee

49-50,

37

49-50,

36

373

,Advanced

Class, 49-50,

i4, Advanced Class,

49-50,

3
34

38

Committee #4,

39

0pns Report, 7th Army, page 64

40

Committee

4, Advanced Class,

49-50,

20

41

Committee #4, Advance d Class,

49-50,

21

Advanced Class,

49-50,

22

42Committee

#-4,

Advanced Class,

43

Committee

4, Advanced Class,

49-50,

23

44

Committee

Advanced Class,

49-50,

24

45
4

Committee #4, Advance d Class, 49-50,

25

46

Committee #,

Advanced Class,

49-50,

26

47

Committee 74, Advanced Class,

49-50,

71

#4,

Advanced Class,

49-50, p 72

49Committee #i4

Advanced Class,

49-50, p 73

4 8

50
5

Cormmittee

Harrision,

p 3

1Hrrrision, p 192

52

1st US Army

August 1944, by Staff

53

Report of Operations

20 Oct 13 to 1

1st US Army, p 195 (annex 9 to report).

Harrision, p 304

5 4 Harrison,

P 305

5 5

Harrison, p 309

56

Harrision, p 315

575

1st US Army, Report of Operations, 20 Oct 43 to

1 August 1944, by Staff, 1st US Army, p 201 (Annex 9 to report).
58

Appleman, Burns,Gugelor and Stevens, The War in the

Pacific, OkinJaJa: The Last Battle, (Washington: Historical
Division, DA, 1948) (hereinafter referred to as Appleman, Burns,

Gugeler,

and,. tevenst. p 69
59

Appleman,

60

Appleman,

Burns,

Gugeler,

and Stevens,

p 36

Burns,

Gugeler, and Stevens,

p 17

61

Appleman, Burns,

62

Applemnan,

6363

Gugeler, and Stevens, p 4

Burns,

Gugeler,

and Stevens,

p 1

Appleman, Burns,

Gugeler,

and Stevens,

p 25

Major Daniel E. Westervelt, Armored Group in an

Amphibious Operation (Fort Knox: May 1948) (hereinafter referred to as Westervelt), p 1
6

festervelt,

p 2

6 6

Westervelt,

p 4

Westervelt,

p 6

67

6 8

Appleman,

Burns,

Gugeler,

and Stevens,

Appleman,
opposite p 43,

Burns,

Gugeler,

and Stevens, Chart IV,

70Appleman, Burns,

Gugeler,

and Stevens, p 69

6 9

54

p 30

7 1 Appleman,

Burns, Gugeler,

72 Appleman, Burns,

and Stevens, p 70

Gugeler, and Stevens, p 72

Charts And Pictures

Page 36 - Omaha Beachhead (6 June - 13 June 1944) (Washington:
Historical Division, War Department, 20 September 1945),
(hereinafter referred to as Omaha Beachhead), p 31
Page 37 - Utah Beach to Cherbour (6 June - 27 June 1944),
(Washington
Historical Division, DA, 1 October 1947),
(hereinafter referred to as Utah Beach to Cherbourg),
p 52
Page 41 - Omaha Beachhead,
Page 42 -Utah

p 109

Beach to Cherbourg,

Page 47 - Appleman,
page 43.

Burns,

Gugeler,

p 44
and Stevens, Chart IV opposite

CHAPTER 3
DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION
The tactics and techniques
World War

in

ations

varied

II

gained and lessons learned.

landing forces

changed with

The position

...

amphibious

oper-

as experience was

considerabley

The strength and composition of

each

but one thing

operation

became

of any landing force.

part

a necessary

was

the tank

apparent,

employed in

of tanks within

the

assault

upon...and the nature of the enemy defenses,

force

depends

and beach obstacles.

In any case, tanks must either closely follow or be followed closely

by infantry....
...When the terrain is suitable for tank operations and

the beaches are not heavily defended by antitank weapons and anti
tank obstacles, tanks may be in the

leading waves....
is

operations
tank
for
defended by antitank

... When the terrain

or when the beach is heavily

poor or restricted
weapons and

obstacles, tanks are used in later waves...3

concerned with

is

This chapter

tank is a necessary part of the landing force

during World War II, and secondable

for

such a

is

the

the

sihoe the

amphibious operations,
landing force

armored division

Before considering

role?

in

not used as an assault

why was the armored division

two questions

now suit-

armored division

organization, however, the general nature and characteristics of

amphibious operations must be fully appreciated.
The execution

of amphibious

operations

is

divided into

the

following. general phases:

Planning.
execution of a

Detailed planning is required for the successful

landing.

expected D-Day in

Planning begins months

order to

coordinate the

forces

in advance of the
required

for the operation.

The time required for this phase depends

upon the size of the operation,

For example,

the planning staff

for OVERLORD (invasion of France) was established under Lieutenant

General Frederick E, Morgan in April 1943 - 14 months before
the actual invasion,

Even before the end of 1941 British joint

planners had drawn up an invasion plan for the European continent called ROUNDUP,

This plan bore little.

final OVERLORD Plan but is

resemblence to the

mentioned here to show the degree

of planning required for an operation of this nature,

Concentrat.ion and special planning,

Forces selected

for the operation are concentrated and specialized training is

accomplished to insure the organization of an integrated task
force.

Specialized training includes rehearsals under conditions

as near as possible like those to be encountered in the actual

operation.

Embarkation.

Troops, equipment, supplies, and vessels

are concentrated at the places of embarkation.

is

combat loaded in
Voyage.

assault craft.

The landing force is

embarkation to the landing area in

Landing,

The landing force

moved from points of

preparation for the assault.

Naval and Air units are 'positioned to support

the landing force and begin preparation of the beach area by

naval gunfire and air bombardment.

The landing force assaults

the beach and secures beachhead lines,

Consolidation,
is

Reorganization of the assault forces

accomplished and beachhead lines are consolidated.

Major

supply points are established ashore and adequate supplies

are unloaded.
The detailed planning for landing operations is

required

because of the special problems created by unfavorable conditions

inherent in

such operations.

Some of these conditions are as

follows:
1.

Tactics and techniques of landing operations are

largely dictated by the availability of suitable ships and landing craft.

The strength, composition, equipment,

employed in

an operation must be fitted to the available shipping

and supplies

space.
2.

Organic supporting weapons of the landing force

function only to a limited degree in the early stages of an

operation and fire support must usually be furnished by the navy
and aviation.

The use of naval gunfire and close air support

increased the problems of coordination, communications, command,

and preinvasion training since most army units are unfamiliar
with naval fire procedures.
3.

Special organization of army units is

required to

provide appropriate forces for the landing and to facilitate the

debarkation of intact combat units.

Combat units uast be so

organized that they are self sufficient in

supporting weapons are landed.

fire power until

Automatic weapons and other fires

must be used in lieu of normal artillery support.

4.

Suitable beaches and terrain in

are of vital concern,

the objective area

Favorable beaches are those that permit

the beaching of landing craft and landing ships close to the

58

shoreline to permit rapid debarkation, and advance inland of

troops and equipment without excessive interference from
navigational hazards.

Suitable exit routes from the beach in-

land are required to facilitate rapid dispersion of vehicles and

supplies.
5.

Enemy strength and dispositions in the objective

area affect the composition of the assaulting forces.

Special

equipment may be required to remove obstacles and clear areas

for landing craft.

. Heavily defended shores may have pillboxes

constructed on the beach with flat trajectory weapons emplaced

to fire on assaulting troops while still

afloat.

The presence

of enemy mechanized forces in the objective area requires that

tanks be landed in the early waves to counter the threat and
protect the beachhead.
Many other problems can and do arise in amphibious
operations..

Assault troops may be landed on the wrong beaches.,

Ships may be forced by enemy action to leave the transport area

after landing the assault troops but before supplies and equipment can be. landed.,
deny certain beaches.
landings.

Underwater conditions and strong defenses may

Unfavorable tides and weather may prevent

All these factors affect the planning and successful

execution of landing operations,

however,

certain characteristics

of arrhibi:vs operations tend to favor the attacker and should

be considered here,
Amphibious ope rations are aggressive by nature.

The

choice of time and place lies with the attacking force and

require the defender to dissipate his forces in

order to defend

the entire coastline or leave certain area lightly defended and

relatively unprotected.
Tactical surprise may be obtained by the attacker.

The

enemy can often be deceived as to the true location of the main

landing by the use of demonstrations and feints.
surprise normally is

Strategic

not possible because of the necessity for

a buildup of supplies and troop concentrations.

The mobility of floating reserves makes it possible for
the attacker to take advantage of success in an unexpected quarter
or to exploit any weakness discovered in

the hostile defense.

The most outstanding characteristic

shock at the point of contact.

ations is

of amphibious oper-

This shock is

by the concentration of superior forces and striking in

obtained
over-

whelming strength at one or more selected points in the hostile

defensive system.

The initiative is with the attacker and allws

this concentration of force.

These are the general characteristics and conditions,
favorable and unfavorable,

that must be considered in the planning

and execution of a landing operation.

There are many details in

addition to the above that must be planned for but will not be
discussed here.
It

has been pointed out in the preceeding chapter that

the armored division was not used in World War II

landing force.

as an assault

The discussion to follow will attempt to show

some reasons why,

ORGANIZATI ON
The armored division of World War II was the result of
six separate reorganizations occurring during the period July
1940-'September 1943.4

Actually, two different organizations were

employed during World War II but only one will be discussed, the
organization prescribed on 15 September 1943, since all but two
were organized under this Table of Organization.
As stated in the initial training directive, 6 August 1940,
the role of the armored division was to conduct highly mobile
offensive warfare through a self contained unit composed of the
requisite arms and services. 5

This statement was amplified in the

Armored Force Field Manual 17-10, which stated:

"The role of the

armored force and its t components in the conduct of highly mobile

ground warfare is primarily offensive in character, by selfsustained units of great power and mobility composed of specially
equipped troops of the required arms and services."

By 15 January

1944, FM 17-100, The Armored Division stated the role of the

armored division as follows:

"The armored division is organized

primarily to perform missions that require great mobility and fire

power."
The various reorganizations of the division followed four
continuous trends:

a decrease in light tank strength, an increase

in the relative strength of the infantry elements of the division,

the elimination of needless command echelons, and the lightening
of the service elements.

Figure 1

lARMOPED DIVISION TO&E 17

(Abstract) 15 Sept 1943

Entire division
Div. Hq.
Tank Battalions
(3)
Infantry Battalions (3)
CC Hq & Hq Co,
(2)
Div Trains, Hq & Hq Co,
Reserve Comd Hq
Field Arty
(3 bns)
Car Recon Sq
Engr Bn
Med Bn
Ord Bn
Sig Co.
MP Plt
Div Hq Co
Band
Atch Medics
Atch Chaplains

10,937
164
729
1001
184
103
8
1623
935
693
417
762
302
91
138
58
261
8

Figures taken from the Army Almanac, Wash D,C.,

1950

A study of Figure 1 shois that even though the relative

strength of infantry in the division was improved over the former
organizations,
operations.

the strength was entirely inadequate for most

A total of three battalions of three rifle

companies

could harldy be considered sufficient for a landing operation.

Another weakness oft
support.

he division was inadequate service

No quartermaster battalion was organic and special

measures were required for service support in

normal operations.

A quartermaster truck company was attached to provide this

support in some divisions,

Division artillery consisted of three armored field
artillery battalions,

light.

No medium artillery was organic

to the division.
In addition to the weaknesses of the armored division,
a serious shortage of ships and landing craft existed throughout
the planning phase.
,*.The Allies did not have enough landing craft and
other facilities to mount simultaneously both the cross-channel
and the Mediterranean attacks in the strength we wanted 6 ,,,
Whether such a shortage will exist in
is

a matter of speculation.

future operations

. The requirements for landing craft

were not known, at the start of World War II and craft were designed and produced as the need became apparant.

Much experience-

was gained at this time and some craft are now available.

Research-

and development has continued to the present time as will be -seenin

later chapters.

There is

little

reason to believe that such-

a serious shortage should exist in future operations,-These factors no doubt influenced the composition of
landing forces in World

War

II

Certainly the shortage of land-

ing craft suitable for transporting armored vehicles was a

deciding factor in

all these operations.:

What has been done since then to correct the weaknesses

of the armored division and is
landings?

the division suitable for assault

By June 1945 organizational changes were being solid-

ified by the War Department for a new type armored division based
on the concepts of our armored commanders,,

It-was realized that

there was a definite pla ce in

our armored organization for the

heavy type division to perform missions beyond the capabilities

of the light armored division.
In the new armored division, prescribed in

October 1948,

combat effectiveness and service support were increased materially,

(See appendix IV).

The armored infantry units were reorganized

to provide four rifle companies in each armored infantry battalioa

and an additional battalion was added to give a total of sixteen
rifle companies compared to nine in the former organization.

quartermaster battalion was added to provide the much needed

service support to make the division logistically self sufficient
for limited operations.

A medium artillery battalion was added

to provide the balance of artillery required for fire support,

Other units added are the heavy tank battalion and an antiaircraft
artillery battalion to bring the total strength of the division
to 15,973.
The division now possesses a balance of arms and services
required for the accomplishment of assigned missions and son
characteristics particularly desirable in a unit employed in
amphibious operations.
A high degree of flexibility is

provided in

the division

by the combat command-seperate battalion organization.

seperate battalion is

The

self sufficient administratively with organic

supply, maintenance, and administrative personnel.

Battalions

and companies from the battalions may be assigned to the combat

commands for a particular mission

-without interference

with its

service support ar ability to operate independently.

This

flexibility in the formation of combat teams is of particular

importance in landing operations because of the required special
organization for landing,

Combat command staffs are accustomed

to having a variety of types of units under their control.

The

integration of these units into a fighting team for maximum

efficiency is

a daily problem.

One other point that cannot be overlooked.

The infantry

and tank soldi rs of the division are trained from the beginning
to take their place as a part of the tank infantry team.

Rarely

does the armored infantry battalion fight without attached tanks.

Conversely,
infantry.

the tank battalion rarely fights without attached

This practice of fighting as a part of a task force

rather than as battalions develops in the individual a ready

ability to fight in

any type of organization,

The automatic weapons essential to the early stages of

an amphibious operation are present in
power of the division is

the division.

tremendous.

the number and types of weapons in

The fire

The following table shows

the armored infantry battalion

compared to those of the standard infantry battalion,

Figure 2
COMPKRISON OF AUTOMILTIC

MG,

Armd

Inf.

Inf Bn,

Bn

Inf Div

Cal 30
light

TEAPONS

MG, cal 30
heavy

MGG cal 50

BAR

SMG

45

38

37

123

13

45

. . r .' -

" --.

"

- ...

- T .

. .

. .

. . ..

..

..

Figures taken from CS 2, The Armored School, Sept 1949 and

Reference Data Infantry Regiment, The Infantry School, May 1951,
The automatic weapons of attached tanks are added to the
figures above when combined into tank infantry teams,
The armored division operates with radio as the normal
means of communication.

This flexible means is

effective control of a mobile unit.

present in the division.

equipment is

required for

Adequate communications
For example,

the armored

infantry battalion is equipped with 202 radio sets of all types.

of which 169 are suitable for hand carry.

Special communications to

control assault units, naval gunfire and air support is essential

in landing operations.

The communications equipment of the armored

division meets this requirement.

The armored division is
ashore,

a completely mobile unit.

this mobility combined with the characteristic

Once

shock of

the landing would enable the division to quickly expand the beachhead and capture the assigned objective.
The characteristics favoring the employment of the armored
division in landing operations have been pointed out.
exists, however,

Ote

that should be considered at this time.

problem
The

heavy equipment providing the mobility and armor protection presents

a problem when considered in
World War II.

connection with conditions existing in

A comparision of the total vehicles in the armored

division and the infantry division is given in Fig 3..

This comparis6n

points up the fact that although the

armored division has fewer general purpose vehicles and trailers,

it has approximately 1000 more armored vehicles than the infantry
division;,

This requirement for shipping space could be lowered

somewhat by the elimination of some nonessential administrative

66

vehicles when combat 'loading and in

could land and operate initially
carriers.

This, however,

of the unit ashore if

addition,

armored infantry

without armored personnel

would seriously restrict the mobility

carriers did not follow closely and the

effectiveness of the division would be neutralized to some

degree.

Figure 3
COPARISTON OF V TTICL'S BY TYPE

Unarmored
(All types)

Armored
(All types)

Trailers

Infantry
Division

2334

259

1514

Armored
Division

2165

1241*

1358

*Figures include 636 armored personnel carriers

self propelled artillery.

Figures taken from Instructional Pamphlet CS 2,

Sept 1949 and Reference Data Infantry Regiment,
May 1951.

and all

The Armored School,

The Infantry School,

CONCLUSION

In

this

chapter

some of the factors

an attempt has been made to point out

that must be considered before a dedision

can be reqched to employ an armored division as an assault landing

force.

Many other factors must be

sea and weather,

organization of the force

ization of shore logistical

considerations

elements,

are inherent in

special considerations
characteristics

considered -

effect of adverse

for landing,

to name a few.

any amphibious

organ-

These

operation and not

affecting the armored division alone.

and capabilities

must be considered when planning

The

of the armored division of today

amphibious operations of the

future.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3

1

FM 31-5,

:Ibid,

FM 60-5,

(War Department,

November

1944),

p 150

p,151
(Department of the Army, February 1951),p 227

4The Army Almanac,

(US Government Printing Office,

1950)

p 275.
5

Ibid

6Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower,

& Co, 1948), p 231.

Crusade in

Europe,

(Doubleday

CHAPTER 4
SPECIAL VEHICLE REUIREMENTS
The use of an armored division as an assault landing
force is

govetned largely by the type and availability of the

necessary equipment to get the armored vehicles from transport

area over the last three to six thousand yards of water from
naval transports to the beach.

In this chapter we will discuss

the various methods and materiel used in the past, that presently available, and some possible future developments that will
get us through this particularly vulnerable stage of an assault
landing.
Equipment for the Assault
Beach landing of armored vehicles has been accomplished
in two ways; (1)

transporting tanks to the beach on naval land-

ing craft, or ships and (2), by making the tanks capable of

floating and propelling themselves over this distance.
Craft and considerations

discussed in detail in

involving their

the following chapter.

use will

HoNwever,

be

to

understand the necessity for the development of amphibious

vehicles and related equipment we should remember some of the
advantages and disadvantages

in the use of landing ships as a

method of getting armor on the beach.

This method requires

less shipping space than when tanks are equipped to float and
allows speedier movement to the beach.
beach is

The movement to the

easier to control and almost unlimited time can be

spent in the transport area prior to the assault,

69

On the other

hand use of our present landing Ships limits almost entirely

the employment of the tank guns during the assault, presents
a large target, and entails the loss of all tanks as well as
the landing Ship itself

if

sunk.

In some instances it

requires

a ship of the LSD type to carry the loaded landing Ship to the
assault area.
These and other considerations brought about the development of two general types of amphibious equipment to get armor
ashore.

Devices were built to make standard tanks float, and

for the primary purpose of amphibious operations, tanks capable

of "swimming" without special attachments were manufactured.
In discussing these vehicles and vehicular equipment we
should first realize what characteristos are desired and then
we will be better able to decide whether these requirements have
been met satisfactorily.

Also we must keep in mind that our

purpose in this discussion is to arrive at the best method of

landing an armored division in an amphibious assault.
Starting from the beginning we first want to take up as
little shipping space as possible,

We want ease of launching

from the transport, and a certain degree of safety in the water.

Sufficient speed to allow us to accompany assaulting infantry
is required.

We must have enough endurance to allow for

necessary assembly in the transport area, movement to the beach,

and. normal operation after landing.
be maneuverable in the water.
gun during the assault.

Also the vehicle should

We must be able to fire the tank

Upon reaching shore the vehicle must be

capable of immediate combat and should be able to discard in a

minimum of time any flotation equipment which hinders its
operation.

land

These requirements must in no way reduce the

amount of ammunition carried by the vehicle.

With these requirements in mind we will discuss in more
detail what equipment is

available or could conceivably be made

available to meet them.

Duplex Drive Tank.

One of the earliest developments for

floating standard type tanks was the Duplex Drive of DD tank.

Designed by

the British and used in World War II,

it

consisted

of a medium tank with a collapsible canvas wall built around it

just above the tracks,
it

Propellers were geared to the engine and

was steered by two rudders.

With the addition of waterproof-

ing the tank was able to float and propel itself through deep
water until the tracks contacted the ground.

Upon reaching shore

the propellers were disengaged and the canvas wall was collapsed,
allowing the tank to operate normally.
About three times as many DD tanks can be carried in
one landing craft as those fitted with pontoons.

The system

does not greatly restrict the mobility of the vehicle and it

enables a tank when so equipped to cross more than one water
obstacle.

Preparation for swimming requires very little

The vehicles can be used only in

water as there is

time62

comparatively quiet

danger of being swamped in heavy seas or by

the surf as the tracks make cn.tact with the beach,

Due to the

height of the canvas float the main armament cannot be fired

71

Y:
b

tp

while the tanks is

in the water.

The canvas is

also highly

vulnerable to underwater obstacles.

Rigid Flotation Devies.

A more rugged type of

flotation device for the M4 medium tank, known as the T-6 was
employed experimentally by Marine and Army tank units during
the Okinawa landing.
...The T-6 consists essentially of six steel pontoons;
one pontoon on each side of the tank, one on the bow, one on
the rear, with bow extension and rear extension pontoons which
hinge upward for more compact stowage prior to launching.
The
six pontoons are compartmented by sheet steel partitions into
many sub-compartments; Sub-compartments are filled with
plastic foam-to further ensure buoyancy should the pontoons
'bec one punctured.
T-6 floated tanks are seaworthy, having been successfully tested in twelve foot waves.
The floated tank is
fortythree feet long and therefore provides a fairly
stable gun platofrm, enabling a tank gunner employing the
gyrostabilizer to deliver accurate fire during the beach
approach.
Compared with LVT(A)ts (amphibious tanks), the
floated tank constitutes a more stable gun platform; the
higher velocity and greater accuracy of the stabilized
tank gun in comparision with the LVT(A) howitzer and the
tank's heavier armor, are important advantages.
Pontoons
are jettisonable form inside the tank on reaching the
beach.
Pontoons are remountable and can be reused.
T-6 devices, as used on Okinawa, generally provided
adequate flotation but needed further development to improve steering, to increase speed above the 42 knots obtained by the tank tracks revolving in the water, and to
provide a reverse...
Little modification has been made on this device.
is

now called the M-19 Flotation Device by the Army.

It

Some of

the disadvantages are readily apparent in the specificationsIts length is

47 feet 8 inches, width 11 feet,

and heiaght 11

feet 8 inches (including exhaust and intake stack of waterproofL

Ing kit) when prepared for launching:

The front and rear out-

boards can be folded upward for loading, reducing the length

to 33 feet 7 inches and increasing the height only two inches.

The weight of the flotation device is approximately 16 tons.
No improvement has been made in manner of propulsion and the
speed remains about five miles per hour in water.4
The same principle was employed in the development of
the TS swimming device for the M-26 Tank,

This model could

probably be adapted very easily for use on the M-46 or M-47

tank.
To compensate for the weight of the M-26 tank it was
necessary to increase the length of the device to 65 feet and
the width to 14 feet.
pounds. 5

The weight of the device itself is 34,000

Since this is the latest equipment built along this

line the following extracts from the development report gives

a good picture of its capabilities and limitations.
DESCRIPTION:
....
The Deive, T8 provides the means for floating the
Medium Tank, M26 as a self-propelled unit. It consists of
metal floats in four jettisonable assemblies with propulsion
furnished by the vehicle tracks; steering is accomplished
with two rudders....The rudders are manually operated by a
crank handle in the driver's compartment which connect to
the rudders by chain and cable. The vehicle is equipped
with a standard fording kit...
PURPOSE :
To provide flotation equipment which will permit the
Medium Tank, N26 to negotiate, under its own power, deep
rivers and expanses of ocean.
HISTORY:
The first test of the equipment was made at APG
(Aberdeen Proving Ground,) 25 April 1946,..(The size
and weight of the device poses a problem in logistics.
Assembly under field.caditions would be a major problem.
It was recommended.. "No further development work should
be carreid on with floating devices of this type for the
Medium Tank
or tther vehicles of equal or greater
5
weight except as an expedient ..

1.26,

The rear extension and the width of the device make

7>1

+44

launching from the landing Ships impossible.

They can only

be launched from a ship of the LSD type which actually floats

the tank inside the ship allowing it

to move out under its

own

power.
The poor speed and maneuverability in water of tanks
equipped with this device might possibly be improved with the
installation of removable propellers geared to each rear track
idler.

This would enable the driver to speed up or slow down

either propeller by use of the normal tank steering as is

done

with all water craft having two propellers.

LVT!a and LVT (A)s
Amphibious tanks ar Landing Vehicle Tracked (Armored)
while not organic to the Armored Division, might be issued for
the initial assault and used until the standard tanks can come
ashore, or Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalions could be
attached for the assault phase.

The initial

assault is

the

normal mission for units equipped with these vehicles.

LVT's have been used successfully in many amphibious
landings in the Pacific in World War II
inchon landing in Korea.

and as recently as the

These vehicles are all basically

the same with the exception that the LVT(A)l mounted a 37 mm

gun while the LVT(A)

-4)s and 5s mount a 75 mm howitzer.

The

4s and 5s are the only type in use by the Army at present.

primary differences in

The

the LVT(A)4 and the LVT(A)5 are the

addition of a gyrostabilizer and poweroperated turret on the

latter.

V7

~
: 04

LVT(A)'s

need no

special

preparation for swimming.

Their tracks are equipped with a double cup welded to each

section

which gives better

traction in

is still only about 5.7 mph.

amphibious

operations

ing the

it has poor cross country endurance,

for

vulnerable to

infantry

to

artillery

one-half
the

first

stages

persornnel

of a

is

capable

in

still

the suspension
Marine

of the

usually

in

used

over two and

short

supply in

LVT(4) type

are

cargo and

same suspension system and engine

Their cargo compartment

truck or 105mm howitzer.

ton

only in

but have
water.

system wTvhen
units

is

open and the

Such a

load is,

operating

They are rated

carry

as much as

of course,

hard on

on land.

are prosently equipped with LVT3 which

that

pontoons

been known to

it
instead

has two Cadillac

of the

two Cadillac
tanks and tractors

engines

engines mounted in

air--cooled engine

reduction of the cargo compartment.

of the

is

of carrying
often

drivers compartment as in the LV74.

nor the

it

a hinged ramp which allows the loading of such

as the

tons

the side

objective

tractors

8000 pounds capacity

differs

first

accompany-

landing.

amphibious tank,

equipment

eight

anti-tank fire, so after

carriers and have the

rear door is

at

It

A high silhouette and thin

of ammunition which is

Amphibious

as the

their

support.
tons

but speed

Being specifically designed for

particularly in regard to tracks.

armor make it

the water,

This results in some

'Neither the radial engine

give enough power

and the

behind the

loads they

for

carry.

the

weight

'The

Vehicles cannot be steered at low speeds in the water due to the

track propulsion.

Also continual turning causes the brake bands

to heat up and become inoperative.

None of these vehicles have been manufactured since
World War II.

Haoever, the Army has one regular battalion and

other Reserve and National Guard battalions consisting of two

companies of tanks and two companies of tractors each.

They

are equipped with the LVT(A)4 and LVT(A)5 in the tank companies
and the LVT in the tractor companies.
A modification has been made on the LVT3 by way of a
removable armored cover for the cargo compartment making it
a good armored personnel carrier.

It was used as such by the

Marines in the Inchon Landing and for two crossings of the Han
River.

This could well be an answer to the problem of armored

personnel carriers not being able to accompany the armored

infantry in the initial

assault waves of the armored division,

Deep Fording Kits.

either the DD or

As mentioned above all tanks using

rigid type of swimming device as well as

those brought ashore by landing craft require the use of deep

fording kits.

Such kits are available for all armored vehicles

presently in use and are composed generally of exhaust and intake stacks, waterproofing compound and tape.

Installation

required around four hours by a crew with proper supervision.

On some vehicles it is necessary to weld adapter plates to the
tank for installation of stacks.5
Deep fording kits allow a tank to be submerged to the
80

top of the turret if so desired4

Those portions of the kit

which inhibit normal operation of the vehicle can be quickly

and easily removed.
Wheeled Vehicles.

Wheeled vehicles .needed on an

amphibious assault present no particular problem as they will

necessarily be brought ashore in landing craft.

Most recently

developed wheeled vehicles are water-proofed when built and

some are capable of operation while completely submerged.5
If older type vehicles are used, water-proofing kits are available to make them capable of moving under their own power through
the water between the landing craft ramp and the beach.
Uhderwater Tanks.

An article In "Mechanic Illustrated"

envisions an underwater tank mounting a recoilless rifle 6 and

may not be as visionary as it sounds according to an unconfirmed
report of an ex-German officer published in "Armor Magazine".
This officer states he was trained in undersea tanks for the
planned invasion of England in World War

11.7

An operation using such undersea tanks would require

extensive reconnaissance of the ocean floor and the beaches.
Also many beaches which might otherwise make good landing areas
would have to be ruled out because of very deep water or because of the existence of a shelf, or other underwater obstacle.
This would limit even further the normally limited use of
amphibious tanks.

If, however,

standard tanks could be equipped

economically and with sufficient margin of safety for this type

operation, it

would solve some of our problems.

There would

be no need to fire the main armament between ship and shore,

shore batteries would have little

or no effect during the

most hazardous part of the operation,

and certainly there would

be a degree of surprise inherent.

Some problems which would probably arise in

such a

vehicle would be those of exhaust and air intake or a special

engine-burning fuel which supplies its own oxygen.
lems which would arise are air for the crew,

Other prob-

underwater navi-

gation, traction - on soft ocean floor, escape mechanism for crew,

and

lowering the vehicle from the ship to the ocean floor.

How-

ever, more thought could well be given this subject.

Planned Developments.

There is

no indication. of any

development or research at present in the U.S.

Army toward solv-

ing the problem of ship to shore movement of armored vehicles

under their own power.

Report of the Combined Conference on Armor

for 1949 states in effect that for the present the British will
proceed with their development of DD type swimming devices and
the United States will continue to develop the rigid type like
the T8 for all tanks of the light and medium classes,

The

Report of Cqmbined Conference on Armor for 1951 states essen-.

tially the same thing with no indication of any progress being
made in the intervening two years.
United States, as far as is

known,

The present plans of the

call for no research toward

the design of an improved amphibious tank,

Conclusions,
medium tank it

is

Due to the great weight of our present

obvious that any rigid device to float them

will necessarily be very large.

It is not desirable to modify

the tank at the factory for propellers because of increased

weight and cost,

Non-rigid devices have not proved reliable

under fire or in rough water.

The problems of speed, endurance;

maheuverability, as well as that of increased shipping space

requirements still remain in the use of the rigid type.

They

would probably be very useful on a shore tp-shore operation,

river crossing, or in crossing reefs, but the facts indicate
that an entirely different method should be developed to take
tanks to the beach on a ship to shore assault..
The LVT(A) s while giving the best solution available
at present still la ck speed and maneuverability.
more powerful gun, more armor, and a bigger engine,

They need a
but this

would cause a corresponding increase in size and weight.

The best solution for the problem of transporting
Armor in an assault landing, we believe, is the further development of a new tank landing craft which will eliminate many of
the disadvantages inherent in those presently available.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 4

1

Report of Operations, 1st U.S. Army, 20 Octcter 1943 to

1 August 1944, a report prepared by the Armored Sction lst U.S.
Army, P 194.
2

Report of Combined Conference on. Armor 17-24 March 1949

Amphibious Operations Empleyment of Tanks, Marine Corps

Schools, Quantico, Virginia, PHIB-18, pp 27, 28, 29.
4

Report of Subcommittee

on Automotive Equipment to

Ordnance Technical Committees,

5 MJ

194h
6

Research Developme nt Manual, Combat Vehicles and

Wheeled Transport '.,Vhicle Components, ORDMX-D, Detroit
Arsenal, Centerline, Michigan"Undersea Tank" Armor, Photographs and Editorial Comment,
January February 1951, LX, p 39
6

Armor,

7
Major Charles R. Cawthon, "Amphibious Tapk Experiment",
LX, September October 1951, p 26.

CHAPTER 5
NAVAL REQUIREMENTS
Through the ages Armies

have relied upon Navies to

move them from the continent to continent and'to maintain their

supply lines,

However,

World War II was the greatest period of

Development of the amphibious operation per se.

The combined

arems concept of warfare was extended to include joint ArmyNavy command relationships, staff planning, and fire support.
To execute these amphibious operations specialized ships were
required.

The necessity for invasion from the sea,

beginning

in North Africa and Sicily and continuing through Normandy

against the German; from Guadalcanal almost tlo the main islands
of Japan in

the Pacific brought about these developments.

oraft

shallow draft,

all

flat bottomed,

in men and vehicles directly onto a beach,

and capable

of unload-

ranging in

size from

seven foot rubber boats to ships of over 300 feet in

Since World War II,
Army equipment.

This is

These

length.

there have been many changes in

especially true of the Armored Division

where the weight of the medium tanks of its main striking force
have increased by approximately 15 tons.

This exceeds or alters

the rated capacities of most of the World War I.I landing craft.
The latest Naval concept of the ship-to shore movement
is

based upon dispersion and speed.

This is

dictate.

by the

obvious atomic bomb target that the invasion fleet presents

To gain dispersion, consideration is being given to moving

A2b-AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS

i|
Type
Amphibious Force Flagship

Class
ISymbol |
AGO Appalachian
Mt McKinley
Adirondack

Cargo Ship, Attack

Transport, Attack

Hi-Speed Transport
Escort Vessel, Control
Submarine Transport

kts
kts

Dlsp
7,431
7,234

Troop
Cargo Capacitv
Capacity
Landina Craft
Off Enl ITons (Combat)l SqFt | CuFt I LCM 8 LCM S LCVP ( LCPL
-2 |
4
105*1 500*
**
- I
- |
. 2
4
105* 500*1
**
- I
I

kts

6,884

105*1

ISe Id

c WAGC
ex
AKA
Arcturus
APA
President Jackson
| Crescent City
( Arthur Middleton
Bayfield
S
Haskell
APD
Charles Lawrence
Crosley
IDEC DE 217
ASSP Perch

Length Beam
459
63
459
63

(4)
(8)
(3)

(1)
(18)
(1)
(4)
(3)
(6)
(57)
(41)
(51)
(1)
(2) 1

459

63

244
459
492
491
489
492
455
306
306
306
312

36
63
70
66
70
70
62
37
37
37
27

Draft
24'
24'
24'

27'
27'
26'
29'
26'
24'
13'
13'
14'
18'

Range
Max |Cruising I
116 kts 15 kts 31,089 @ 15
16 kts 115 kts 31,089 @ 15
16 kts 15 kts I31,089 @ 15
16 kts
17 kts 115 kts 11',086 @ 15
18 kts
17 kts
18 kts
17 kts 15 kts li,630 @ 15
17 kts 115 kts
1,800 @ 15
24 kts 115 kts
i,00 @ 15
24 kts 15 kts i,100 @ 15
24 kts 15kts
5,100 @ 15
15 kts 13 kts*l 12,000 @ 13

1,5321
kts
6,456
10,305
8,4291
110,812
8,100
kts
kts
6,720
kts
1,400
kts
1,400
kts
1,400
kts*l 1,695

500*1

**

160*1
I 1500
15001
1200
1300
| 1475
151 |
151
110 ]

12

90
94
86
12
12
5

1500
500
500I
500
500
500
40
40
30

|
300,000

21,000
15,000
13,000
900
900

221,000 |
160,000 |
110,000
5,250
5,150

Landing Ship, Dock

IASSA
I

LSD

Barbero
Ashland
SCasa Grande
Cabildo
SFort Marion

(1)

27

312

(8)
(3)1
(9)
(1)

458
458
458
458

17'

72
72
72
72

18'
18'
18'
18'

15 kts 113 kts*l 12,000 @ 13 kts*l 1,525

I
1 15 kts 112 kts I 13,300 @ 12 kts
4,490
15 kts 12 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts
4,490
15 kts 112 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts
4,547
15 kts 12 kts 13,300 @ 12 kts
4,547

20
20
20
20

LST

200
200
200
200

4b1
450*
450*

SI
Landing Ship, Tank

190

LST-1
LST-1153

(127)
(2)

328
382

50
54

11'
13'

12 kts | 9 kts
13 kts
9 kts

LSM-1
LSMR-188
Catskill

(159)
(48) I
(2)
(3)
(25)
(70)
(1)
(98)1
(125)
(7)
(11)

204
204
454
458
159
159
159
158
119
174
174

35
35
70
60
24
24
24
24
33
23
23

7'
8'
20'
20'
6'
6'
6'
6'
4'
8'
8'

13 kts
13 kts
20 kts
20 kts
14 kts
14 kts
14 kts
14 kts
8 kts
20 kts
20 kts

(4)

185

33

9'

15 kts

21,000 @
12,263 @

9 kts I 1,625
9 kts I 2,324

14
17

I
127
180

500*
500"

4-10T

15

18
18
22
4
4

3
3
1

4-35T, 2-10T, 6-5T**

200

4
4
2

1,200

**

LSM
LSMR
LSV

SOsage
Landing Ship, Flotilla Flagship
Landing Ship, Infantry, Large
Landing Ship, Infantry, Mortar
Landing Ship, Support, Large
Landing Ship, Utility
Submarine Chaser (173') Control
Escort, (180'),

RD 7248(C)

Control

I LSFF
LSFF-367
LSIL
LSIL-351
I LSIM ILSIL
LSSL
LSSL-1
LSU
LSU-501
PCC IPCC-289
PCC-463
PCEC

PCEC-873

12 kts
12 kts
|
|
12
12
12
12
7
115
15

kts
kts
kts
kts
kts
kts
kts

12 kts

4,00 @ 12 kts
3,000 @ 12 kts

8,000
8,000
8,000
5,500
1,200

@
@
@
@
@

12
12
12
12
7

kts
kts
kts
kts
kts

520
6
840
5,177
4,626
234
2091 91
233
-

51
800"
800
-200

75
-

2501 158
315
315

--

150

*Includes using cots, only 54 regular bunks.

*Arneb-AKA

56 has 1-60T boom.

|
**I
I
I(Open
I 5,6401
5,640*
5,640*1
5,640*1
I
I
I
I
13,000 110,000
17,800 145,000
I

I_

2
2
2-30T, 6-10T
1 I1-35T, 8-10T, 6-5T
2-5T
2-5T

2-35T
2-35T
2-35T
2-35T

1-3T crawler crane

2-7%T

1-30T
1-30T

I
I

11,400

2
2
2
2

1
1
11
1

3
4

14
14

1
I

SI
Landing Ship, Medium
Landing Ship, Medium (Rocket)
Landing Ship, Vehicle

NOTES
*Varies depending on size of Naval Staff embarked.
**Limited number of vehicles and essential equipment.

I
Submarine Cargo Vessel

Cargo Booms
4-10T
4-10T

30,000

LCPR
2
2

165
*
*

2,900

20,500

9,740
9,740

82,750 |
82,750

I
I
1,800I

-II-

640

Chart No. 4-A-2b

*Surface

**1 LVT in hanger plus 8-LCR 10, 2-LCR 7, 1-4 man rubber boat-8 outboard
engines for LR 10.
*Surface
**2-LCR 7, 1-4 man rubber boat.
well
)I(w/Pearl Harbor Deck
)I(w/2temp.decks)
Typical
3-LSU (Combat Loaded)l(18 LCM (combat loaded )I(
92 LVT
or
or
* or
load characteristics
18-LCM (Combat Loaded)l( 23 LVT or 27 DUKW )]( 108 DUKW )
or 41 LVT
*Cargo Capacity shown is that of 3 combat loaded LSU or 18 LCM.
*Loading shown is that required to permit ships to beach. Amphibian vehicles may he carried
in addition. Pontoon causeways, pontoon barges and LSU may be carried in addition but must
be launched prior to beaching.

*44 DUKW-LVT cannot be carried.

*21 LVT and 31 DUKW or 1800 troops w/o vehicles.

directly to the beach with the possible elimination of the

rendezvous area (as referred to in
waves form in the transport area,

The assault

FM 60-10).

possibly out of sight of

land and move directly to the beach past control vessels actFurther dispersion

ing as check points and lines of departure.

is

obtained by increasing the size of the transport group

circels and distance between theme.

To obtain speed, control,

and maneuverability,

it

is

envisioned that the Tank-Infantry team will be landed in the

assault by Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel,
Mechanized,

Landing Craft,

and under the most ideal conditions,

Ship, Utility and Landing Ships,

for each of these vessels is

Medium,

by Landing

The maximum speed

approximately 10 knots.

In discussing the shipping requirements for landing

an Armored Division in

assault, we will deal with both present

standard and proposed landing craft.

A discussion of each of

the landing craft considered usable in the assault phase of

the Armored Division landing followvs.
Landing Craft,

Mechanized (LCM-6)

This vessel was designed during World War II

one M-4 medium tank or 68,000 pounds of supplies.

to land
It

is

not

suitable for landing a modern medium tank of the M-46 or

47 type; it

is

capable,

however,

ing Armored Division loads :

1 Light Tank M-24
1 Loaded Half Track

of landing any of the follow-

4 Loaded iton
2 Loaded

Trucks

-ton Trucks with trailers.

Landing Craft,

Mechanized (LSM-8)

The latest developments in tank landing craft are a

series of LCM-8's known as "H1",

"

and "U".

and the one showing the most promise is

The most radical

the LCM (8H).

It

is

a scow-

bowed craft with a ramp; very similar in appearance to the LCMi-6 but
much larger.
feet.

Its length over all is

The LCM (8H)

is

capable of carrying and beaching a 70 ton

load at a speed of 10,7 knots.

or two M-4A3E8 medium tanks,
have actually been carried in
considered "full load."
it

is

90 feet with a beam of 21

It

can carry two TD-24 angle dozers

or one M-26 medium tank.

test.

These loads

Two M-4A3E8 medium tanks are

The main feature of this vessel is

that

provided with retractable caterpillar treads which enable

it to crawl over bars and land high up on the beach.

using these traction units is
the "8"

65 feet per minute.

Its speed

The ramps of all

series of LCM's are fixed so that embarked tanks can fire

their main armament to the front and flanks.

by test, it

is

Although not proven

expected that a Landing Ship Dock will carry seven

LCM (8H)Is.
The LCM (8W)
capable

and LCM (8V)

are similar in

that they are

of carrying a 70 ton load (one tank, embarked well

astern in the well deck to preserve'.tim) at a speed of 10 knots.

They differ in hull shape,

one being V-shaped,

shaped, and do not have the traction mechanism.

the other W-

WHEELHOUSE

2-20MM

WINCH

."0

ORE W

(9
V-'--J
STERN

fT

-I
HArCH

SEC/LWN-

,/f)SN/PS

IPOR'TABLtE

yL.J
- 00

SEC/ON

RO

LANDING SHIP? UTILITY

COCKPITP
77E RINGS

0'

---

tO'

--

186"

SLINC SPACIA16

LANDING CR~AFT

-MCHANIZED

AVIT
DO

Their over all length is

70 feet compared with the H's 90

feet,

giving a template loading figure of nine aboard an

LSD

The Landing Ship, Dock at present seems to be the only

practical way of transporting these craft because of their size

and lifting weights (56 tons for the "V"

and '"W" and 110,5 tons

for the "H",

Landing Craft, Mechanized are considered appropriate
for landing tanks on histile shores under fire.

'Current Navy

doctrine prefers the use of these craft rather than dealing with
the greater ocean going shipping problem incurred when handling
tanks fitted with "one way" flotation devices.

It

is

expected

that LCM-6 and LCM-8 will land the tanks and reconnaissance
units, fromn

-Hour to H plus 60,

and,

of

course,

percentage of them can be used more than once,

a certain

depending upon

losses.
Ship, Utility (LSU)
(Formerly known as LOT-5).

A somewhat larger vessel

than the LCM, this vessel is capable of beaching a load of

150 tons,

or three medium tanks.

vulnerability,

it

is

Because of its

greater

expected that this vessel will be used

for landing the Armor of the floating re serve and supply

vehicles.

Under the most ideal beach and surf conditions and

light to moderate resistance,

waves.

it

could be used for assault

Typical loads for the LSU are

3 Medium Tanks M-46 or 47
9 Loaded 2 -ton Trucks

9 Loaded Half Tracks

This ship can also be loaded at sea from Landing Ship.,
Tank by lashing the LSU to the open ramp of the TST and opening its

stern gate.

Thus,

any vehicle aboard the LST can be

driven aboard the LSU and taken to the beach.

would be useful in

This technique

landing reserve tanks "on call."

Its. ability

to be used in this fashion and as a lighter to unload transports

and cargo ships makes it
phase.

most valuable in the supply build up

It is normally carried long distances aboard LSD's or

in special launching racks on LST's.

LANDING

SHIP,

I DIUi (LSM)

Although similar in capacity and use to the LSU, the

LSM is

a larger vessel with accomodations

definitely a sea going vessel.

500 miles.

It

is

for troops.

It

is

Its speed is 13 knots; range

capable of. carrying 165 tons of cargo or

three medium tanks;

other typical loads would be

6 Motor Gun Carriage I, -37

9 Loaded 22-ton Trucks.
Many of these have been converted to support ships by the
addition of multiple rocket launching racks.
Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 7

The largest ocean going ship that is

beach and land tanks over a bow ramp.

designed to

Its enclosed tank

deck will hold 10 medium tanks or 500 tons for beaching

purposes.

Total pay load is

this load precludes beaching.

1,900 tons, but the draft with

Its speed loaded is

9 knots.

04 Vit
/-4GCM/-0M

23'9",r-/4' ELE VAr-OR (OLD rrPE)

J/'6
"X
9' RAMP HArcH

WHEErL HOUSE

LCT (f)

40

MM

20

MM

40

MM

20

MM

20

OR

(6)

fsT

OFF

E PS

20

MESS

CP_

O o

N.

40

MM

20

OFF/ ERs

MA/

c o_

VV

20

O in
O
MM

00
";

/-40 MM
M
,2-20

SINGLE

MM

O
C7

MM

~o

VENTS

20

c1

ra

MM

-0

20

MM

LANDING SHIP TANK

0'

25"
-s-STORESY

203 6
-GALLEY---

-.

EN/GINE

HATCH' OV/R

LANDING SHIP MDIUM

It

can carry 350 tens of vehicles

(no tanks)

or cargo as a,

deck load or one LSU in a launching cradle or two LCM(6)'s

Pontoon causeway sections and barges may be carried also but
must be launched prior to beaching.

It

bulk of the Armored Division support,

is

envisioned that the

logistical, and reserve

elements would-be carried aboard LST's,

Landing Craft, Vehicle,
This vessel is

Personnel (LCVP)

designed to land 36 dismounted troops

of 8,100 pounds of cargo.

The initial

waves of Armored Inf-

antry (without carriers) will be landed in this type craft.

Other typical loads are
1

-ton Truck and Trailer

1 3/4-ton Truck
The normal operating procedure for the ocean going
shipping is

to preload the LCMts and LSU's and carry them

aboard Landing Ships,

loaded LCM(6)'s,
(8)s,.

Dock (LSD's),

3 loaded LSL's,

The LCVP 1 s are carried in

An LSD can carry 14

and seven to 9 loaded LCM

davits or stacked on the

deck on the same transports (APAts and AKAts)

that carry the

infantry and are loaded in the transport area off shore from
the hostile beach.

An APA (Haskall Class) carries 1,581

troops and 22 LCVP's

tons of cargo,

an AKI

(Arcturus Class)

carriers 1500

172 troops and 15 LCVP's.

Standard amphibious practice for landing direct support

artillery is

to use amphibious 2-:ton trucks,

DUETs,

The

DUiKWXs are preloaded with towed artillery pieces and are launched from an LST as an "on call" wave and unloaded by an A-Frame

Is

Pi;

Ii>

8~

Thiff'

BEAC~I

iL9Lli
LP

led~~~~

Li11i

I8I'

:6

Fes,'

ill7~

i]t[6.

M-I1

'

TisTI
jpiLCV?
6LCM6

Is iS S

}LCM8H

LLTL
t IL

SLST

Chart
94

ad winh. on the DUTWat.

The Armored Field Artillery of the

Armored Division will be landed later directly cn the beach

from LST s.

It

is

envisioned that Air support, Naval gunfire

and 4.2 mortars will provide sufficient fire support until the
above can be accomplished safely.
The problem of reefs and/or obstacles remains.
envision it

being solved by landing UDT's

We

and/of

engineer breaching teams depending upon the obstacle to be

cleared prior to the arrival of the tank-infantry teams of the
first

wave.

These breaching teams could be landed under cover

of darkness or by stealth from Perch class submarine Transports

which will carry 115 troops, an'
boats,

LVT,

and eight 10-man rubber

complete with outboard rmotors if

needed.

EXPLANATION OF CHART 2
1.

The first

wave contains four armored infantry rifle platoons

and two medium tank platoons.

This represents the assault rifle

platoons and attached tank platoons of two armored infantry rifle

companies (dismounted).

They are transported in

8 ICVP's

and 10 LCM (8S)'s.

2,

The second wave contains the remainder of both assault

armored infantry companies in 6 LVBPts.

3.

The third wave contains the other two rifle companies,

8mm

mortar platoon and command group of the armored infantry battalion,

The only vehicles of the armored infantry battalion brought ashore
up to now are the command half track and two 4-ton trucks.

This

wave is

4,

composed of 18 LCVP's and one LCM-6,

The fourth wave cantains the balance of the assault tank

company and two reconnaissance platoons (mounted) -- one organic

to the armored infantry battalion, the other organic to the same
tank battalion that provided the tank company.
of the reconnaissance platoons are in
tanks and half track are in 6 LCM-6's.

The

-ton trucks

10 LCVPs while their light

There are also seven LSM

(81I) s in this wave.

5.

The fifth wave,

contains a 4.2 mortar platoon with trans.

portation and extra ammunition in

64

8 LCVPts,

The next three waves are "on call" waves,

A battalion of towed 105

(a)

consisting of

nm artillery in DUIe's

and one company of AAA (SP)

(b)

A company of medium tanks

(c)

The half tracks of the armored infantry battalion

loaded with ammunition and ration re-supply for their respective

Those waves would be called in by radio in the order

squads.

and at a time specified by Armored Infantry Battalion Commanding Officer.

ing LSU's.
if

not,

7,

It

These last three waves are all

It

is

hoped that the LST's can be beached on call;

use of the 9 LSU's as lighters is

is

aboard LSTts carry-

contemplated..

realized that a large portion of these vessels are

not filled to absolute capacity.

tactical integrity of units and it

This is
is

done to preserve

believed that remaining

space aboard craft will be taken up by extra ammunition,

party elements would accompany waves 4 and 5.

Shore

Their vessels

are not shown,

8,

The total ocean going transportation required to move the

armored battalion landing team represented here is

estimated

to be:
9 Landing Ships,

Tank

3 Landing Ships, Dock

1 APA, Attack Transport

NOTES CHAPTER 5
Reith, George CDR. U.S.N., Member, Joint Amphibious
Board.
Interviewed at U,S.N.,B., Little Creek, Virginia,
February, 1952.
2U.S. -Army, FM 60-5 Amphibious Operations ,Battalion
in Assault Landing. Washington 25, D.C., 11
p 280
3

Naval Amphibious Test and Evaluation Unit, "Report

of Beaching and Retracting Tests of Experimental LCIMs and
LCVP's,.
Amphibious Training Command, U,S, Atlantic Fleet,
U.S.N.AB., Little Creek, Virginia, 1952
4

Peatross, Oscar F., 4Lt Col., MS.M.C., Amphibious

Instructor, The Armored School, Interviewed at Fort Knox,
Kentucky, December, 1951,
5

LCDR,, U.S.N,, Member of Joint

,"i,
Bridwell,
Amphibious Board,
Interviewed at Naval Amphibious Base,
Little Creek; Virginia, February, .1952,
5

in

U.S. Army, FM 605 Amphibious Operations,Battalion

assault Lanin
6

Washington 25

7 1bid

Ibid

7I' id

97.

Appenix
i

9 Ib id.

CHAPTER 6
AM~PHIB IOU S TRiAINING
The ultimate goal of the armored division in the
amphibious assault landing is

to develop tank-infantry teams

in which the individual members kniow not only their own jobs
These

but also how to function with other members of the team.

teams may be as small as an infantry squad with one tank or as

large as an infantry battalion supported by a tank company.

The

infantry must be trained to protect tanks from enemy antitank

measures during the reorganization after the landing.
manders

of the coabined arms teams must be selected carefully,

because they will initially

teams if

The com-

have complete control of their

committed prior to reorganization of the assault units

ashore.
The discussion of amphibious training herein is based on
the following premises:
1.

All individuals must have completed tactical

training in land warfare and technical training in the operation

and care of organic weapons and equipment.
2.

That the navy will use its

present amphibious

training center for the armored divisions and provide special

courses,

conduct shore training,

supervise and assist in

ship-

board training.
3.

.To prepare individuals,

form their as signedpfunctions

in

units and staffs to per-

a coqrdinated amphibious

assault landingi

The training must develop individual and

unit proficiency for the unified aggressive assault against

an enemy held beach by the tank-infantry team.
In order to clearly specify what type of training,
special or otherviise, troops of the armored division must have
in order to make an assault landing on hostile shores, we
must first

attempt to determine what type of craft or vehicles

they would make the assault landing in.

If

the requirements

are to swim tanks across the water in a ship-to-shore movement it

would also be required that the vehicle must be able

to fire its

main armament while afloat.

To date no major

power accepts the present DD (Duplex Drive) device on armor

inasmuch as the equipment prohibits the use of the main armament
of the tank while afloat.

If

porting one or more tanks,

were utilized then it

landing craft, capable of transis

deemod

necessary that the craft be so constructed that the tanks could

fire their main armament over the bow ramps.
Doctrine and techniques as set forth in Field Manuals
17-34, 60-5 and 60-10 clearly outline the necessary training
if

landing craft are used in the landin.g.

would and could be cut down because

present equipment was used.

The training time

of this especially if

In the event more modern and larger

landing craft (as outlined in

preceding chapters) are so con-

structed and are available then trainining problems would still

be much simpler.

However,

if the training phase leans towards

the use of amphibious type tanks, then the training problems

100

become much more acute and individual and unit training time
would have to be increased twofold.
Even though landing craft or tanks were used, the
individual training would certainly cover the same subjects.
All units of the armored division, especially the main assault
forces,

tank and armored infantry battalions, would be given

the same individual training and schooling.

It

is

recognized

that specialists from all units would attend specialists courses

at amphibious training cetters.

The individual training for

units of the division would include;

1.

Technique of embarkation

2.

Requirements of troop life aboard ship and

naval customs
3.

Survival at sea

4.

Technique of debarkation

5.

Conduct during the ship-to-shore movement

6.

Method of assaulting the hostile beach.

Prior

to conducting water exercises all personnel must undergo training in

survival methods,

procedure of using life belts and all

should have a basic knotwledge of how to swim,

Individual crew members,

drivers,

and maintenance

sections of all units within the armored division will receive

training in

the proper method of waterproofing of wheeled and

track vehioles

It is

possible that the teams from TTU (Troop

Training Units) from amphibious training centers will conduct

such training at the division's hmme station,

101

At the same time

the Amphibious Training Command,

U.S. Atlantic and Pacific

Fleets are conducting waterproofing courses that are open to

army personnel as individuals or for an entire unit.

Like

courses are conducted by the Amphibious Training Commands

for corrmunication personnel and intelligence personnel.
The training schedules at present in effect in the
armored division should be augmented by many subjects embracing
the amphibious movement,
appropriate Field

The training schedule as outlined in

JManuals seems adequate for the basic training

of the individual; however,

for this more specialized use of

the personnel and vehicles of the armored division, the training schedule would have to include many subjects of amphibious
warfare.,
it

is

Returning to our previous statement of the fact that

possible for a landing to be made in landing craft or by

the swinming tank,. we still

ing schedule to fit

must be ready to change the train-

either case.

Subjects necessary for either

type of training that must be included within the training

schedule are:
1..

LANDING CRAPT AND LANDING SHIPS

a.. Physical training,. swimmiing
b..

Introduction to naval -- landing crafts '& landing

awhips

c.

Boat:team organization

d.. Debarkation techniques

e... Troop life aboard ship.
f:.

Medical treatment and evacuation

102

2,.

ST'IP-TO.'SHORE MOVEM4ENT OF TANKS

a.

Physical training, swimming

b.

Amphibious ship types

c.

Driving water,

Driving water, formation, day and night

e.

Combat firing, water

f.

Abandon tank exercises

g.

Navigation on water

individual, clay and night

Much detailed training would have to be spent on that

portion of the training schedule if

tanks were used rather than

landing craft to land the armored division.

The problems are

ably put forth in this extract from the Report by the Supreme
Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in

the Operations

in Europe of the A.E.F. to 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945,

Page 22:

It was, moreover, not possible in every beach to swim

in the amphibious DD tanks upon which we relied to provide fire support for the infantry clearing the beach
exits.
These were launched at SWORD, UTAH and OMRHA
beaches and, although late, reached land at the two
formnr; at OMA k however, all but two or three foundered
in the heavy seas,..,
Unit training for the tank and armored infantry battalions
may begin at the home station and continue at an amphibious traini
ing center unless additional facilities such as adequate landing
craft and a beach area are available near the home station.
Unit training includes instruction in

ship-to-shore movements,

boat discipline and assault landing tactics and techniques.

Most important the instruction includes the organization,
composition and formation of tank-infantry teams to further
include-2
103

1.. The formation and tactics of assault waves

2.

Boat drills

3.

Reduction of beach defense

4,

Air support

5,

Naval gunfire support

Formations used by the amphibious teams are similar

to those employed on land in unit training:

line formations

of platoon or company strength for the initial assault wave

or succeeding waves; column formation of platoons and companies
abreast for the initial wave or succeeding waves; and an
echelon or wedge formation

, Platoon and company training should

be conducted until all members of the teams are thoroughly

familiar with the various assault landing formations.
training phase concerning formations must be

.so

Each unit

conducted that

the situation on the hostile shore and the surf would make it
necessary to attack in various types of formations.

Control

craft with suitable radios could conduct the phase and through
the radio so chance the situation on shore so that the wave
commander could change his formation.

Familiarization of the

different types of formations should be conducted by sand tableand mock-up drills prior to the actual training in the water.
Control through radios and arm signals is an important fact and
will have to be continually stressed throughout the training.
The main landing and the advance inland is the final
part of unit training and emphasis must be. placed on the integration of the tank infantry teams and coordination of all

104

participating and supporting elements.

The tank-infantry

teams are organized and trained to reduce enemy installations

in the immediate beachhead area~

The characteristics

of the

available landing craft and naval ships may affect the composition of these teams.

The landing exercises permit a check

on the status of training of the teams'

For the initial

phase of waterborne training the team

commanders will have to conditimon the members of the combined

arms team to the continual hazards until each can overcome the
natural fear of becoming trapped in a swamped landing craft or
sinking tank,

Exercises should be conducted near the shore and

escort craft should accompany each of the teams for salvage

and emergency rescue.
Commanders and key staff officers would be schooled
in amphibious doctrine so that they can prepare their plans
properly and assist in the preparatinn of joint armor and infantry plans.

Staff training for amphibious operations is

completed before unit training is

is

started.

tVhen the division

ready to start unit training the staffs prepare and super-

vise the training exercises.

Command post exercises are an

important part of staff training.

should include :
1,

Operation orders

2.

Administrative orders

3.

Embarkation orders

4.

Debarkation orders

105

Further staff instructions

5.

Approach schedules

6,

Loading diagrams

7,

Naval gunfire plans

8.

Shore party plans

Selected staff officers should receive special instructions

in the principles of loading and the necessary coordination
and the details of planning the combat loading and priority
for unloading of the type of ships on which their units are
to be transported,

The special instruction includes:

1.

Loading diagrams

2,

Consolidated unit personnel and tonnage tables.

3.

Vehicle debarkation priority tables

Loading plans should c .nformr

in

o the actual assault landing

order to lend realism to the landing exercises.

Upon completion of the unit training,

landing exercises

should be conducted for assault teams of battalion size and

larger,

The purposes of these exercises are to test the plans

and to effect the necessary coordination to ensure the success

of the landings.

The area selected for these exercises should

be a logical site for landing on a hostile shore.

The shore

line selected should offer no hazardous underwater formations

nor strong offshore currents... Areas where live ammunition can
be fired are highly desirable.

The exercises should include:

1.

Combat loading of troops and vehicles

2.

Voyage to exercise area with concurrent briefing

of the tank-infantry teams..

1.06

3.

Assembly and organization of landing waves in the

rendezvous area and movement to the line of departure.

4.

Assault landing

5.

Movement inland by the tank-infantry teams

6,

Landing under naval gunfire and air support

7,

Final ocitique

Other factors of importance to the teams and the division as

a whole during the landing exercises are:
1.

Methods of control and communications

2.

Methods of recovery of vehicles in

3.

Continuous maintenance of vehicles and equipment

4.

Medical treatment and evacuation during the ship-

the water

to-shore movement.
The amphibious Training Command, U.S.

Atlantic Fleet,

located at Little Creek, Norfold, Virginia and U.S. Pacific

Fleet, Coronedo,

California conducts various amphibious train-

ing courses for navy, air forces and army personnel.

To attend

courses army personnel request quotas through OCAFF.

It

is

deemed advisable that officer personnel assigned to specialist

duties within the armored division be sent to these courses.

The general Amphibious Communications course is

for all

phases of joint communications applicable in

designed

amphibious

warfare, and to familiarize communication officers with the

operation and use of communications equipment used in amphibious
operations,

including waterproofing.

107

Instruction will also

include ship-to-shore phases, familiarization with tactical

air control parties and shore fire control parties,
as communications methods,

techniques,

and practices in amphibious warfare.

doctrines,

as well

organization,

Similar courses are con-

ducted for enlisted communication personnel.

The Naval Gunfire Spotters and AssistantSpotters course
prepares troop officers and senior noncomissioned officers as
naval gunfire spotters for duty in troop units.

This course

includes map and aerial photograph reading; naval gunfire

communications procedures,

equipment and nets; elementary fire

control for gunfire support; extensive conduct of fire; a

brief review of the tactical employment of field artillery
and close air support; and the technique of executing naval
gunfire support.

A like course is

designed for staff officers

to prepare them for duty with gunfire support groups, troop

divisions and higher echelons in the fields of naval gunfire
support and the coordination of the supporting arcs.
Courses available at the Amphibious Training Command
for composite groups of United States armed forces that personnel
of the armored division could attend are:
1,. Troop amphibious staff planning course

2;

Signal waterproofing course

3.

1Wheeled

vehicle waterproofing course

108

In the event an armored division was selected to engage

in amphibious training and exercises it seems logical from time,
space, material and equipment involved from both the army and
navy that only elements of the division would be actually
trained at one time...,. Qoe battalion reinforced or elements
of a combat command.

This would involve moving the unit or

units selected to a previously designated coastal area with

suitable terrain for onshore and offshore armored operations.
Because of the large amount of equipment and number of vehicles
that would have to be:oved to the coast, it is anticipated that
the amphibious training center would have the necessary vehicles,
equipment and landing craft on hand for the training period.
Much of the training could be completed at the amored division's
home station.

However, because of the magnitude and importance

of the ship-to-shore movement training phase, training for

assault teams and staff personnel, would have to be conducted
on the water typical of that the division would be facing in the
event they were to make an amphibious landing.

Control,

communications and importance of realism in the ship-to-shore

movement are important enough that this training should not be
simulated if at .all possible.
Conclusion
To properly determine the type of special training the
armored division must hate in order to make an amphibious landing, the conclusions reached in preceding chapters regarding
new equipment must be studied.

109

With present equipment in the

hands of the troops, there is

no doubt at all that training

doctrines and training equipment used in World War II would

again have to be used.

It

is

always important to remember

that the reproduction of actual conditions is

basic in

the

education of troops.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 6

1Report of combined C nference on Armor, United
States - United Kingdom - Canada. (Fort Monroe,
Virginia 17-24 March 1949, Brigadier General Bruce
C Clarke), p 11
2Catalo of Amphibious Training 1951 (Amphibious
Training Command, U.S. Atlantic Fleet), p 21-32
3 Amphibious

Operations, Reiiment in Assault Land-

in s FM 60-10 (Department, of the Army, January

1952), Chapter 3 and 4.

110

CHAPTER 7
CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
Conclusions made as a result of this study are of
necessity based on some indefinite factors,
be made on the basis of what is

Assumptions must

presently known,

Past per-

formances cannot be relied upon since, as has been pointed out,

an entire armored division was not employed as a landing force
in World War II
tested.

and the present organization is

New armored equipment is

being developed and per-

formance tests have not been completed.

is

Amphibious equipment

being produced to handle the heavier loads.

is still being tested.

not combat

This equipment

Atomic weapons are being produced

that will greatly affect all future operations.

of war have not changed, however,

The princiiles

and can provide the basis

for some conclusions.

The authors believe the arm-ored division of today
could profitably be employed as an assault landing force and
will have a place in
the future.

large scale amphibious operations of

The division is

not expected to replace the

infantry division as the normal landing force, but rather,

will be employed as a part of the corps as a complementary
organization to the infantry division as in all other operations.

Normal terrain limitations will apply possibly to

a greater degree than in

other operations but the opportunity

for surprise cannot be overlooked4

..
Surprie .must be sought throughout the action by
every means and by every echelon of command.
Surprise may
be produced by...,, by *ariations in the means and methods
employed in combat, by rapidity and. power of execution;
and by the utilization of terrain which appears to impose great difficulties.,,
The armored division is
operations in

not suitable for prolonged

a small beachhead area and missions assigned to

the division must be those that utilize to the utmost the

characteristics

of mobility, heavy firepower and shock action.

The division might be employed in conjunction with

airborne forces dropped on critical objectives inland from the
beach area.

The employment of the division to effect the

linkup would permit the use of airborne forces at a greater

distance from the beach than has been possible in
ations and result in

past oper-

a more rapid expansion of the beachhead.

The armored division employed in

a secondary land-

ing as an enveloping force could force the rapid expansion of

the main beachhead by conducting a surprise attack on the
flank or rear of the enemy opposing the main landing.
The early seizure of major ports and airfields is
essential to the rapid buildup of supplies and reinforcements
for large:invading forces.
for the armored division.

Such a mission would be suitable

'i

The development of atomic weapons byp-ote

a.--

xemi es can be expected to force changes in the techniques

employed in furure operations.

The c a.centration of great

numbers of ships and ladding craft in a re1aiely

small

transport area such as was used in World War II will be impossible in

the face of an atomic threat.

A much greater

dispersion of forces will be required and the transport area

moved further offshore;

The result will be increased problems

of control for the landing force both afloat and ashore.

The

possibility of assault forces being landed on the wrong beaches

and being widely separated will be greatly increased.
cases it

In some

may be desirable to employ a highly mobile armored

unit as the landing force to provide armor protection for the

assault troops in the movement to the beach to insure prompt
reorganization ashore, and to insure the rapid expansion of
the beachhead.

If

the enemy has the capability of employing

atomic weapons against an invading force the concentration of

large numbers of dismounted troops in

a small beachhead could

be disastrous.
ORGANIZATION FOR LANDING
The successful accomplishment of anMyo

the missions

outlined above would depend upon the degree of surprise obtainedi

n the operation and the speed of execution.

These

requirements are not peculiar to this type operation alone

nor to the armored division but arc required to a greater
degree than in many other operations.
the speed required,

In order to obtain

special attention must be given to the

organization and training of the division shore party as

well as the combat engineers required for the improvement
of the beaches.

Suitable attachments -would berequired to

113

perform the following functions:

1.

Embarkation of troops, .equipment, and supplies.

2.

Debarkation and landing of troops and equipment.

3.

Conduct of initial

4.

Control of naval gunfire support.

5.

Discharge of cargo from assault shipping.

6.

Operation and tactical use of amphibious vehicles.

assault operations ashore.

The attachments required to perform these functions

would depend upon the mission, enemy forces and disposition,
nature of the beaches and types of assault craft available.
Suitable attachments for the division might include the following:
1.

Division shore party.

2.

One or more combat engineer battalions.

3,

Naval gunfire ocntrol personnel.'

4.

Tactical air control parties.

5.

Two or more amphibious truck canpanies

6.

One or more amphibious tank battalions.

7.

One or more amphibious tractor battalions

8.

One or more chemical mortor battalion s.

9.

One or more artillery battalions.

(DUKW).

Units must be assigned to combat commands as required

to perform the assigned missions,
personnel and equipment,

to provide dispersion of

and to allow independent operation

of the combat commands for a limited time.

command organization might be as follows:

A typical combat

Two armored infantry batt4lions

One medium tank battalion
One armored field artillery battalion
One armored engineer company
One reconnaissance. company
One antiaircraft artillery battery
One armored signal company or detachment
One armored ordnance company or detachment
One military police platoon
One armored medical company
Combat command shore party
Tactical air control. parties
Quartermaster detachment
FOR AT ION
The formation adopted by the division for the assault
landing will be governed by the mission and the distance to
the objective.

Missions requiring the division to make the

assault landing and to seize an objective at some distance

from the beach will require the landing to be made in
column of combat commands.

The division' could land on a

comparatively narrow front with the leading combat command

organized infantry heavy to establish the beachhead and protect the landing of other elements.

The following combat

conmmands would be' permitted freedom of action to assemble

rapidly and pass through the leading combat command to seize
the distant objective.

Disadvantages of this formation are

115

that a greater period of time would be required to land the

division at a time when speed is essential and during this
time the force would be concentrated in

a small beachhead.

Missions requiring a limited objective attack or

seizure of close-in terrain features would permit the division
to attack with two combat commands abreast in the initial
assault.

Such a formation would speed the landing of the

division elements and allow greater dispersion of vehicles

and personnel in the beachhead.

In this formation forces

would bemore widely dispersed on the beach perimeter and only

a small portion of the units would be uncommitted.

This

formation limites the flexibility of the division and would

be effective against light resistance.
CO1NCLUSION
This concept of employment does not differ from the
published doctrine for amphibious operations and the general
principles for employment

of the armored division,

Basically,

the question of successfully employing the armored division

as an assault landing force depends upon the availability of
suitable shipping and the selection of proper missions that
utilize the .outstanding characteristics

of the division.

power of this unit must be exploited to the fullest in

ope rat ions.

116

The

future

NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7

FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations,
August 1949, Washington, D.C.

117

APPENDIX I

Troop List,. Task Force Red *

CCB,. 1st Armored Division
8 November 1942
Brigadier General Olvier,. Commanding
Headquarters CCB
Detachment,

141st Armored Signal Company

Detachment,

Headquarters 13th Armored Regiment

Reconnaissance,

13th Armored Regiment (1-

platoon)

1st Battalion, 1st Armored Regiment (Reinforced)

2nd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced)
2nd Battalion, 13th Armored Regiment (Reinforced)
27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced)
Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (-1 platoon -1 squad)
Detachment, Company E, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion
Maintenance Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-Detachment)
Service Company, 13th Armored Regiment (-Detachment)
Company B, 47th .Armored Medical Battalion (-Detachment)
Company B, 1st Armored Supply Battalion (-1 platoon)
2nd Battalion, 591st Engineer Boat Regiment (-Company F)
106th Separate CA Battalion (AA) (-Battery D)

*From Field Order #1, feadquarters CCB,

Division, 11 October 1942.

118

1st Armored

APPENDIX II
Troop List, Task Force Green *
CCB, Ist

Armored Division

8 .November 1942
Colonel Robinette,

Cormmanding

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 13th Armored Regiment

(-Detachment)
1st Battalion, 13 Armored Regiment
1st Platoon, Reconnaissance Company,

13th Armored Regiment

1st Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment (Reinforced)

Battery C, 27th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Reinforced)
Company C, 701st TD Battalion
Battery D, 106th C A Battalion (AA)
Company F,

591st Engineer Boat Regiment

Detachment, 141st Armored Signal Company

Detachment,

Company B,

47th Armored Medical Battalion

Detachment,

Company E,

16th Armored Engineer Battalion

One Platoon, Company A,

inforced)

15th Armored Engineer Battalion (Re-

One Platoon, Company B, 16th Armored Engineer Battalion (less

one squad)

* From Field Order #l,

Armored Division, 11 Oct 1942.

Headquarters CCB,

1st

APPENDIX III
Troop List, CCA,

2nd Armored Division *

Operation HUSKY
10 June 1943
Brigadier General Maurice Rose,

Commanding

Headquarters and Headquarters Company, CCA.

66th Armored Regiment
41st Armored Infantry Regiment (less

1st Battalion)

14th Armored FA Battalion

Company B,

82nd Reconnaissance Battalion

Company A,

17th Armored Engineer Battalion

Company B, 48th A rmored Medical Battalion

Company C, Division Maintenance Battalion
Detachment, 142nd Armored Signal Company

* From the 2nd Armored Division in the Sicilian

Campaign, Committee 34, Advance Class 1949-1950,
(Fort Knox: 1950),

120

APPENDIX IV
Armored Division T/0 & E 17
(Abstract) 8 October 1948.
--------------- .......

Entire Division-

Division Headquarters --Medical Detachment

---------------------

Infantry Battalions (4)

Tank Battalions

-----------------.

---------------------

(4)--------------------------

Heavy (1)----------------------------------

15973
189
7

1089
677
757

Medium (3)---------Combat Command, Hq & Hq Co (2)---------------

113

Reserve Command, Hq & Hq Co (1)--------------

111

Division Trains, Hq & Hq Co------------------

100

Field Artillery ----------------------------Reconnaissance Battalion -------------------Engineer Battalion --------------------------

3755
829
1095

Medium Battalion ----------------------------

424

Ordnance Battalion -------------------------

737

Signal Company --------- ------------------

374

Military Poliec Company --------------------

188

Division Headquarters Company ---------------

166

Band -----------------------------------------

70

Replacement

41

Company ----------------------

Principal Armament
Rifle,

cal.

- -

30

Auto Rifle, Cal,

.30

- --

- --

- -- -

50

Mortars,

60 mm

- - - -- - - - - -

Mortars,

81 mm

- - ---

- - -

AT Rocket Launchers - - -Rifle, 75 m - - - - -

motors twin 40 mm

Tank,

light -

Carriage,

-473

--

- - --

- -.

--

-- ---

20

691

- - -

--

--

51

- - --

354

- -

--

167

32

--

32

315

58

----

motor:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

105 rmiHowitzer155 mm Howitzer

--

- -

- -

- - - - - - -

armored utility

Vehicles, all types

(except boats and planes)
(Less combat types)

- -

- - -

- - - --

122

-- -

54
18

- - - - - - - -

Carrier, HT, 81 mm mortar

Vehicle,

- ---

---

6938

- - - -

- -

Carriage,

- - - - -

- - - - - -

motor multiple gun- -

3200

- .
-. -

Carriage,

mediu

---

- - - - - -

MG, cal,

Tank,

- - - -

- -

30

-----

cal. .30 - - -

Carbine,

MG, cal

--

12
-

:636

- - - - - - -4764
-

------ 3607

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"After

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(Available at Documents SectionThe Armored School

IF 169),

125

Headquarters, 3rd Battalion, 6th Armored Infantry Regiment,

1st Armored Division,
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(Available
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12 6

FM 315, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores.

U.S. A.-my.
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Washihgton,

U.S. Ary. FM 60-10, Regiment in Assault Landing.

Il.S. Printing Officer, 1952.

Washington,

U.S. Srmy.

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, 1949.
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Marine Corps School.

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0perationil

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1942.
------"Report of. Subcommittee on Automotive Equipment to
25- iay 1945.
Ordnance Technical Committee.

127