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In the 20th century, existentialism and postmodernism represented dramatic departures

from previously prominent modernist ideologies. In order to determine what contributions these
theories, as well as queer theory, could make toward establishing gender equality in western
culture, it is important to first consider the previous basis of western culture, which still defines
much of the underpinnings of society today. Specifically, before looking at how more recently
established systems might counter inequality, it must be seen how previous systems created and
enforced those inequalities in the first place. In the realm of modernist theories, any argument
justifying gender inequality can be essentially distilled into one of three cases. The first of these
cases is that there is some inherent and distinct quality of males as opposed to females that
makes any resulting inequality only 'reasonable'. This, for example, is the category that most of
Freud's ideas would fall into, as most of their justification for gender inequality follows directly
from the presence or lack of a penis. The second case is that while there may not be any
inherently distinct qualities based on gender that would justify inequality, a certain level of
inequality is only 'natural'. Locke falls into this category almost accidentally while trying to
avoid the first; much as with their ideas on rights, their emphasis on reason leads to their being
forced to resort to the authority of a divine figure. The third case is perhaps the most insidious:
the argument that while males and females are treated differently in terms of societal roles and
expectations, regardless of whether the reason for these gender roles existing is based on reason,
is based on nature, or is arbitrary, these gender roles do not in and of themselves constitute
inequality. This is likely the argument most prominent in society today. As such, is it clear that an
opposing theory's ability to contribute toward gender equality in western culture is heavily
dependent on its ability to counter these three ideas.

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Existentialism is quick to counter the first of these ideas. As one of the central concepts of
existentialism is that existence precedes essence, it is fundamentally clear that any inequality
between genders cannot be based on essence. Similarly, one of the basic ideas of existentialism
counters the third case by arguing that any actions in accordance with previously defined gender
roles would be acting in 'bad faith' (MacIntyre, 29). While this argument that individuals have in
some sense a responsibility to challenge gender roles (as well as other roles which they may be
assigned) may seem to be a powerful point in existentialism's favor, it is dampened somewhat by
the fact that the definition of 'bad faith' is so broad as to be almost meaningless. For instance,
consider the role 'nonconformist'. If any action that would conform to a role is in 'bad faith', then
all actions must be in 'bad faith' because all actions that don't conform to any other role must
conform to the role 'nonconformist'. However, this may actually be beneficial in terms of
existentialism's ability to counter the third case of arguments justifying inequality; if it were
always more in 'bad faith' to conform to gender roles, gender roles would simply cycle through
over the course of a few generations, as the next generation would always act in contrast to the
gender roles defined by the previous generation. While these rotating gender roles might be equal
between genders on average, it seems fair to say that there would likely be inequality at any
given time. Conveniently, though, the 'bad faith' duality actually resolves this problem; at any
given point, an action either conforming to a role or specifically not conforming to a role is
equally in 'bad faith', so it stands to reason that roles, including gender roles, should have no
influence over an individual's actions, which dovetails nicely with the existentialist idea of
complete freedom of will. The second set of arguments, however, is where existentialism
becomes rather murky. While Sartre makes a valiant attempt to show God as a logical

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impossibility (MacIntyre, 28), their proof rests on the concept that God is an entity that still
makes decisions as time goes on in our world, which does not rule out the possibility of a divine
entity in the 'clockmaker' sense. If this divine entity created the universe as we know it and exists
in the usual sense only outside it, there is no contradiction in this entity being 'for-itself' in the
universe of their own existence and 'in-itself' in our universe, leaving the possibility open that
this entity created this universe with certain ideas of what is 'natural' in place, permanent and
complete. This might be considered merely a loophole if not for Sartre's worrying tendency to
place females as 'in-itself'; the justification for this is unclear, but while it would contradict basic
existentialist ideas for this inequality to be based on essence or societal roles, it would not
necessarily be inconsistent for Sartre to see this as 'natural' not based on human nature, but
rather on some idea of what society 'should be'. While de Beauvoir does some damage control by
portraying objectification of women as a cultural artifact and a result of societal conditioning, it's
worth noting that they do this not by countering the second argument directly from within
existentialism but by questioning its relevance entirely. By stating that 'woman' is prescriptive
rather than descriptive and that one is not born a woman (Spelman, 66), de Beauvoir is in effect
stating that gender itself is an aspect of essence, not existence, and that, in turn, gender itself is a
role. As such, the same argument outlined above in response to the third case applies as actions
conforming to gender and actions actively countering gender are equally in 'bad faith', the logical
conclusion is that gender should have no influence over any decision-making. While this is a
powerful conclusion that in some respects counters all justifications of inequality from an
existentialist perspective, it dismisses the influence of the current state of society and
subconscious bias in decision-making Sartre dismisses the concept of the subconscious entirely

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(Hampshire, 61) and it is unclear whether this leap is justifiable and therefore whether acting in
accordance with these existentialist principles will actually bring about a gender-equal society
from a currently unequal society.
While the second case of arguments justifying inequality is the case that existentialism
has the most difficulty dismissing, postmodernism throws it out practically immediately. By
simply stating that nothing is 'natural', the entire second case has no foundation. In much the
same way, by stating that essentialism is flawed, postmodernism dismisses the possibility of any
differences between genders being fundamental or essential and thereby eliminates the first case
of arguments supporting inequality. For postmodernism, the third case is where things become
complicated, which is inconvenient given that the third case is quite influential in today's society.
The issue, however, arises from a much different part of the argument than in other theories.
First, postmodernism labels gender roles as social constructs. As these gender roles are creating
difference based on gender, the postmodern conclusion is that this inherently creates inequality.
The issue is that from a postmodern perspective, an 'equal' system and an 'unequal' system are
both simply systems and as such there is no grounds within postmodernism to claim one as
'better' than the other, because any such claim would be based on a flawed and subjective notion
of morality. In fact, as it is easier to recognize the limitations based on context within a system
with which one is familiar, postmodernism can be said to some extent to incentivize maintaining
current systems so that all participants have a consistent frame of reference from which to judge
the limits of knowledge and the associated narratives. Thus, on first glance, it seems that while
postmodernism produces effective counters to arguments supporting inequality, it cannot itself
support equality unless it already exists in the society in question. However, it may simply be

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that a step back is required. Consider that the relevant aspect of postmodern theory to whether
systems should be maintained can be essentially stated as It is beneficial to all individuals
involved to understand the systems in which they are operating. Beneficial is admittedly a
vague term here, but it seems straightforward to say that if two of said systems produce
contradictory narratives, this is detrimental to this understanding and therefore detrimental to
society as a whole. In the master narrative of western culture today, equality is highly valued, yet
according to postmodernism, the lesser narratives of difference create inequalities. The most
effective way to resolve this dissonance from a postmodern perspective and foster mutual
understanding of the systems under which we operate is to replace these narratives of difference,
including gender, with narratives of differance, which would not contain the inherent inequalities
of difference (Sands and Nuccio, 491). It's worth mentioning that while it might seem that the
idea that narratives of difference inherently create inequalities exists only within postmodernism,
this idea is actually more ingrained in western culture than it might appear. Years before Derrida
established the idea of differance, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously handed down the
decidedly postmodern verdict that separate is inherently unequal, which is essentially the same
idea given the near-synonymity of 'separation' and 'differentiation'. However, separation on basis
of gender is ubiquitous in western culture today, which from this perspective seems a striking
inconsistency. With this in mind, postmodernism can contribute toward establishing gender
equality in western culture not from the perspective that the resulting system would be 'better',
but rather that the resulting system would be more internally consistent, which in turn is
beneficial for everyone associated with it. As recognizing the systems and narratives one is
currently operating under is key in postmodernism, simply acting in a gender-neutral manner is

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not enough as it would be in existentialism as this would not address the current inequalities
from this postmodern perspective, there is a direct impetus to transition from gender inequality to
gender equality, given that the master narrative of the society involved values equality highly.
Considering the applicability of postmodernism to gender as shown above, it is
unsurprising that a more official attempt has already been made to approach gender from a
postmodern perspective. Whether queer theory succeeds in this attempt is another matter
entirely; in particular, it is unclear from a postmodern perspective whether the system of
discourse created by queer theory actually aligns properly with postmodernism. Consider, for
example, the distinction between cisgender and genderqueer. As the two terms are opposites by
definition, this is a difference relationship, not a differance relationship, and therefore inherently
creates inequality. By its own supporting theory, queer theory with this terminology merely shifts
the problematic binary without actually resolving the inequality in a fundamental way.
Continuing the postmodern look at the language involved in queer theory, consider the pronouns
used. While most queer theorists add a third pronoun for anyone outside the gender binary,
relatively few eschew the use of 'he' and 'she' entirely, even when referring to individuals whose
genders they do not know, apparently unaware of the hypocrisy this creates. As the most
convenient examples, Preves uses 'her/his' to refer to a person of unknown gender in an article
about how terrible it is that people are shoehorned into the gender binary (Preves, 15). Piontek
uses female terms seven times in one paragraph to refer to an individual they met once at a
corner store in order to relate their confusion about the gender of Piontek's friend (Piontek, 67).
Apparently, Piontek is content to refer to them by the gender they were currently performing
even though one of the main points of the article is that any gender can perform as any gender,

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and even though their gender has no impact on the story. Piontek repeats the same issue several
pages later when referring to an overconfident audience member watching a Maury Povich Show
episode featuring people in drag, apparently feeling the need to point out three times that this
audience member was absolutely and without a doubt male (Piontek, 70), simply based on their
appearance. Luckily Piontek, unlike this audience member or the counter store clerk, is flawless
at determining gender! If gender is a regulatory fiction as Piontek claims in the same article
(Piontek, 80), why are they so intent to define people by it? To illustrate the point further,
consider a philosophy by which all people are considered 'good' or 'evil'. If the goal is to confront
the fact that 'good' and 'evil' are flawed, subjective, and unequal concepts, the solution is not to
add a category of people called 'neutral' and call everyone who seems pretty good 'good',
everyone who seems pretty evil 'evil', and everybody else 'neutral'. That solves nothing, and that
is precisely what queer theory has done in maintaining the use of gendered terms. Even while
trying to show gender as a differance, the terminology betrays a difference, simply one that is
ternary rather than binary. According to queer theory's own postmodern basis, far from
confronting and eliminating the inequality between genders created by the gender binary, this
only establishes more relationships of difference and therefore more inequalities. In essence,
where queer theory aligns with postmodernism, it can be safely said to support gender equality,
but where it differs, the case becomes much more difficult.
Having considered existentialism, postmodernism, and queer theory, it is probably
unsurprising that I would consider postmodernism to have the most to offer in support of gender
equality. While existentialism has the valuable idea that existence precedes essence, it requires
some unintuitive trains of logic to arrive at some of the other necessary conclusions for gender

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equality, and in fact winds up being most convincing when it leans toward postmodernism with
the idea that all actions are taken with regard to a role and are not necessarily dependent on any
past actions, as well as de Beauvoir's reformulation of gender itself as one of these roles. In
addition, due to existentialism's focus on essential freedom of will and dismissal of the
subconscious, there is no actual motivation for a society to move from an unequal state to an
equal one while there is no 'reason' for inequality to exist, there is similarly no 'reason' why
society should eliminate it. While postmodernism may initially seem to have a similar problem,
it must be remembered that according to postmodernism, postmodernism itself must be
considered within the current societal context, and this provides the necessary impetus to adjust
systems until they are internally consistent, which in western culture would include reaching
gender equality. Though queer theory is intended as an application of postmodern ideas to
gender, its inconsistencies between its postmodern basis and aspects of its application, notably
including the terminology it uses, relegate it as an ineffective attempt at applying new and useful
ideas, not unlike the theories of Ulrichs or Freud. As both other theories thus considered have
significant flaws and are at their best when they approach postmodernism, while postmodernism,
within the current societal context, meets all necessary criteria, I would support postmodernism
as having the most to offer in support of gender equality.