Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
This eBook contains two volumes. Each volume has its own page numbering scheme, consisting
of a volume number and a page number, separated by a colon.
For example, to go to page vi of Volume 1, type V1:vi in the "page #" box at the top of the
screen and click "Go." To go to page 7 of Volume 2, type V2:7 and so forth.
http://avaxhome.ws/blogs/ChrisRedfield
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
Multidisciplinary Perspectives
Volume 1: History, Culture, and the Humanities
1 2 3 4 5
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface: Extending Our Knowledge of Consciousness
Charles T. Tart
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
vii
ix
1
23
45
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
89
vi
Contents
Chapter 8
159
Chapter 9
181
203
229
255
277
327
355
377
379
381
385
Acknowledgments
We want to acknowledge rst the forebears of these books, the men and
women who across many thousands of years have descended into dark
caves, led community rituals, and explored consciousness-altering plants
in order to encounter anew the world and their selves. We recognize our
pioneers in Plato in the West, Pantanjali in the East, and other exemplars
of rst-rate intellects who laid the groundwork for integrating the insights
of alterations of consciousness into our views of reality. Among the founders of modern psychology and anthropology there were notables such as
William James and Andrew Lang who articulated and incorporated alterations of consciousness into their theories of human mind and behavior.
Even during the decades-long exile of consciousness by behaviorism,
some brave souls dared to engage in research on altered states, among
them Stanley Krippner, Arnold Ludwig, Robert Ornstein, and Jerome
Singer in psychology, E. E. Evans-Wentz, Erika Bourguignon, Michael
Harner, Joseph Long, and Charles Laughlin in anthropology, and Albert
Hofmann in pharmacology. Among those who helped to point out the
importance of studying alterations of consciousness as a basic element of
human experience, the leading gure in establishing them as a legitimate
area of scientic inquiry was Charles T. Tart, an erstwhile engineering student turned psychologist.
Our two volumes are dedicated to these and the many other pioneers
of inquiry into consciousness who provided the foundations for the perspectives developed here. We thank Debbie Carvalko, the senior acquisitions editor who made Altering Consciousness possible, and our many
contributors, without whom these volumes would not have seen the light
of day. We especially would like to thank Julie Beischel, Cheryl Fracasso,
viii
Acknowledgments
David E. Nichols, and Moshe Sluhovsky, who came to the rescue when it
looked as if we might not be able to include some important topics.
We are also very fortunate to have been the recipients of the generosity
of Anna Alexandra Gruen, who gave us permission to use the extraordinary images of Remedios Varo in our covers, and of Judith Go mez del
Campo, who made it happen.
Dedications
Michael dedicates these volumes to the next generation of investigators
who will take the foundations of a multidisciplinary science of altered consciousness described here and produce a more comprehensive
paradigm for understanding these inherent aspects and potentials
of human nature.
Etzel dedicates Altering Consciousness to:
My dear departed, Ma (May Buelna de Cardena), Blueberry, and Ninnifer, whose living presence will accompany me to my dying breath.
And to my beloved princesa holandesa Sophie:
. . . somos mas que dos piezas de rompecabezas, le dijo la arena al
mar, somos algo nuevo y distinto.
Ive been a psychologist for almost half a century now and I often think of
this story when I look at our collective research efforts. Some major keys
to houses of the mind, to domains of consciousness, seem to be nearby,
in dark, messy, taboo, or methodologically ambiguous places, but we can
do such nice, scientically rigorous studies here in the light cast by ordinary consciousness. Most of our colleagues are here in the lamplight of
Preface
Preface
xi
xii
Preface
doing studies of the effects of LSD and psilocybin, and I was an occasional
participant. Go into one of those alleys, pick up a key or two, and go
through some doors. Some of those doors did indeed lead to Freudian
basements, and I got some vivid, gut-wrenching education in aspects of
psychopathology (in me, no less!) of which textbook learning was a pale
shadow. And some of those doors led to places of light and apparent
knowledge that was way, way brighter and clearer than what the streetlamp of ordinary consciousness cast on the consensus consciousness sidewalk, and I got some powerful glimpses of the potential heights of human
experience as well as the depths. I wrote about what I learned from psychedelic experiences some years later (Tart, 1983).
My California postdoc was with Ernest Hilgard, another former American
Psychological Association president, and a real gentleman and scholar. His
laboratory at Stanford was devoted to doing hypnosis research thoroughly
and carefully, systematically exploring one of those dark alleys, as it were,
and Hilgard and colleagues work considerably advanced the eld. Some
of it was like the bulk of mainstream psychological research, 10 percent
changes in, say, hypnotizability with age. Other parts of it were standardized and routine, you got used to them, but really incredible. I spend
10 minutes hypnotizing a talented student with a standard procedure,
for example, reading a script really, and a few minutes later I tell him for
a minute that he cant smell anything, all sense of smell is gone, and then
I tell him, See, you cant smell, Ill hold a bottle of something with an odor
under your nose, you take a good sniff to see that you cant smell anything. What I hold 1 inch under his nostrils is a bottle of household
ammonia. He takes a deep sniff and shows no reaction! I ask if he smelled
anything, he says no. Be very careful if you try this at home: The smell is not
only powerful, its quite painful!
All this from talking to someone for a few minutes, reading a standardized script, no special hypnotic powers or the like on my part . . . For really talented volunteers, we used chemical lab ammonia that was 10 times
as strong.
My years of hypnosis research also repeatedly exposed me to the blindness commitment to particular methodological approaches could bring. In
my 2 years with Hilgard, for instance, a big question in the eld was
whether hypnosis was something special, an altered state of consciousness
(ASC), or just various degrees of ordinary suggestibility without any special alteration of consciousness. A partial but straightforward approach
to studying this was to either hypnotize volunteers or not and then give
them a standardized suggestibility test: Would the hypnotized people be
more suggestible? A colleague and I found considerable bias in doing such
Preface
xiii
xiv
Preface
Preface
well aware that dreams and hypnosis were part of the much larger spectrum of signicant qualitative changes in the way consciousness could
function, ASCs, and I felt a strong need to understand that larger spectrum
if I was to understand the more specialized work I was doing. Toward that
end, I published my Altered States of Consciousness: A Book of Readings
anthology in 1969 (Tart, 1969) to give researchers and students a look at
this wider spectrum. I knew about these variations of consciousness from
wide reading, but most people didnt. There wasnt that much research
material to begin with, and it was widely scattered, a lot in places most
psychologists would never come across it, such as the basic discovery
material on lucid dreams that originally appeared in the Proceedings of the
Society for Psychical Research (van Eeden, 1913).
In the ASC book, I reprinted several articles each about general aspects
of ASCs, the hypnagogic state, dream consciousness, meditation, hypnosis, minor psychedelics like marijuana and major psychedelics like LSD,
mescaline and psilocybin, and some beginning psychophysiological studies of ASCs. But, as I said, in spite of intensive effort in searching widely in
the literature, there often wasnt much to nd. For instance, I boasted in
my introduction to the ASC section on meditation that I was reprinting
two thirds of the English language research literature on meditation. This
sounded impressive until you realized I had only been able to nd a total
of three articles.
Amusingly but usefully, a few years after publishing the ASC book, the
same thing happened to meditation as had happened with dreams while
I was a graduate student. No one would admit to cultural biases, but, as
I mentioned earlier, we scientic psychologists knew all that meditation
and spiritual stuff was delusional and probably psychotic, crazy practices
done by little people who sat cross-legged in the mud. And then an article
was published in that so-prestigious journal Science (Wallace, 1970) that
showed there were physiological correlates of meditation. All of a sudden,
politically speaking, just like with dreams, meditation became real and a
legitimate topic of research. Now there are more than a thousand research
studies of meditation, although most are, from my perspective, still too
elementary, showing meditation is good for relieving stress-related problems but not yet really addressing the deeper psychological and spiritual
issues it was designed to shed light on.
Returning to my Altered States anthology, its publication was timely
and it became a bestseller for a scientic book, often serving as the textbook for courses on ASCs that now could be taught since they had a text,
and helping to stimulate research in some areas. The Altered States book is
more than 40 years old now, though, and Im very pleased these two
xv
xvi
Preface
volumes will replace it with much more extensive, sophisticated, and upto-date material. New research after the publication of ASCs has been
uneven, though.
For example, one of the most promising lines, research on the psychological and transpersonal effects of psychedelic drugs and their therapeutic value when used properly, had been showing great promise, although it
was still in its infancy. Such research was essentially stopped by the hysteria over drugs and the so-called war on drugs in the 70s. Studies biased
toward showing negative effects of psychedelics, which could justify the
governments position, got funded. In terms of long-term benet, studies
of physiological aspects of psychedelics were funded to some extent, and
the incredible power of LSD to produce major changes in consciousness
in such minute, microgram doses has been credited with stimulating our
whole new era of brain chemistry research.
Our materialistic climate in science, of course, has longed privileged
physiologically oriented research over psychology per se, and while Ive
always valued physical and physiological ndings and contributed a little
to them myself (Tart, 1963, 1967b), I regret the effect it has had on making more phenomenologically oriented, psychological research a poor
stepchild. As I said above, I dont subscribe to the bias that anything
physical or physiological is automatically more important, real, and scientic than the psychological, and I wish my colleagues were more sensitive to the assumptions and biases in a too-materialistic approach. Indeed,
I sometimes tease my physical science colleagues by changing the usual
distinction between the hard and soft sciences by talking about the
hard and easy sciences. The physical sciences are easy; what happens
is pretty independent of the nature and mood of the scientists doing the
research, but psychology is hard because of all the biases that can creep
in. Subjects are smart, sensitive problem solvers, and many psychologists have unrecognized hopes, fears, and biases of their own that participants pick up on, to complicate things. In the 70s it looked like we were
going to really tackle problems of experimenter bias (Rosenthal, 1963,
1966) and demand characteristics (Orne, 1962), but interest quickly disappeared. I would argue it was repressed, as we have too much investment
in our status of being objective scientists, but thats too broad an issue to
go off into here, except to note that being in ASCs will sometimes make
ones biases clearand if we want to think about possible parapsychological contributions to experimenter effects, it gets really complex (Tart,
2010a).
One of my last major contributionsperhaps a mistake, perhaps
prematureto ASC research was my proposal for the creation of
Preface
xvii
xviii
Preface
I called the book States of Consciousness, which was a mistake, as being so like Altered
States of Consciousness, people confused them and assumed theyd already read it. Friends
have teased me ever since that, in accordance with the common custom with sequels of
lms, I should have called it Son of Altered States, or Altered States Strikes Back . . . . ;-)
Preface
consciousness, changed their functioning, and had what I considered useful analyses of general principles for inducing and maintaining altered
states. It did not catch on, though, ignored in the desire for simplicity
and/or the hope that physiologists would soon explain consciousness
and all its aspects in terms of brain functioning. Its all a matter of how
activated the basal X is sort of thing. As our knowledge of consciousness
gets more sophisticated, perhaps my systems approach will prove useful,
perhaps not. At any rate, that systems approach and my proposal for
developing state-specic sciences are probably my nal conceptual contributions to consciousness studies, as I expect to devote the rest of my
career to promoting the idea of developing evidence-based spiritualities
(Tart, 2010b, in press).
So, dear reader, I expect much new richness in our understanding of
consciousness and ASCs from the contributors to these two volumes
and from you. Weve made some great discoveries in the bright lamplight
of ordinary consciousness, and were ready to venture further into the
darker byways and lanes, the hidden houses of the mind, where Im certain some important discoveries await, discoveries that will complement
and greatly broaden ordinary consciousness psychology. And we might
discover that being in our ordinary state of mind (what Ive called consensus consciousness to remind us that its a product of socialization, not just
natural) is indeed, as in the old story, a kind of tipsiness, of intoxication
with beliefs and norms that is not the whole picture of reality it believes
itself to be.
References
Aserinsky, E. K. N. (1953). Regularly occurring periods of eye motility and concomitant phenomena during sleep. Science, 118, 273274.
Hastings, A., Hutton, M., Braud, W., Bennett, C., Berk, I., Boynton, T., Dawn, C.,
Ferguson, E., Goldman, A., Greene, E., Hewett, M., Lind, V., McLellan, K., &
Steinbach-Humphrey, S. (2002). Psychomanteum research: Experiences and
effects on bereavement. Omega: Journal of Death and Dying, 45, 211227.
Malcolm, N. (1959). Dreaming. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Moody, R. (1992). Family reunions: Visionary encounters with the departed in a
modern-day psychomanteum. Journal of Near-Death Studies, 11, 83121.
Murphy, G. M., & Murphy, L. B. (1968). Asian psychology. New York: Basic
Books.
Orne, M. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With
particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. American
Psychologist, 17, 776783.
xix
xx
Preface
CHAPTER 1
Altering Consciousness:
Setting Up the Stage1
Etzel Cardena
Whats in a Name?
The two volumes of Altering Consciousness cast a wide net across various
disciplines and evaluate the role that altered states of consciousness
(ASC)2 and the procedures to induce them have played, and continue to
play, in human history. Disputing the bias that ASC is a topic of concern
only to drug-addled youngsters or exotic cultures, the contributors to
these volumes show that we cannot have a full understanding of human
culture and our biological heritage without considering spontaneous and
induced alterations of consciousness.
There is no denying that researching consciousness is no longer the
academic death knell that it used to be some years ago, but the area has
been mostly one dimensional, or perhaps two dimensional if we add
studies on sleep and dreams, and most of the current discussions about
consciousness revolve around philosophical or neuroscientic issues of
waking consciousness and perhaps a few pathological states while maintaining a safe distance from the implications of ASC to the nature of
consciousness and our apprehension of reality. These volumes aim to
address that imbalance.
Current discussions of consciousness have mostly ignored the fact that
we transit among different states of consciousness even while being
awake, that these states exhibit differing congurations of cognition,
emotion, physiology, and behavior, and that what is postulated about one
state may not apply to others. As I have argued elsewhere (Cardena, 2009),
1
This chapter beneted from the lucid and loving suggestions of Sophie Reijman.
The standard abbreviation in this volume for altered states of consciousness both in singular and plural is ASC. Also note that to help cross-reference other relevant chapters in
the two-volume set there are editorial square brackets [ ] throughout the chapters.
Altering Consciousness
at least in some respects the Western world has not added much to the
contributions made by Socrates and Plato in this area more than 2,000 years
ago [see Ustinova, this volume]. Socrates maintained that the beginning of
wisdom depends on dening ones terms and, from that perspective, the
study of consciousness in general has been fairly unwise. One of the most
confusing aspects in the literature on consciousness is that different concepts
of the term are used often without any seeming awareness of their distinctions (cf. Natsoulas, 1983). Thus, writers may speak about the problem of
consciousness when, in fact, there are many problems, including the hard
problem of the relationship between qualia and neurological processes, but
also the integration of different sources of information into an experiential
unity, personal identity across time, and so on (Natsoulas, 1981). Lack of
agreement as to what different authors actually mean when using the term consciousness seems to be more the rule than the exception, but there is nothing
to prevent discussion and organized research into aspects of consciousness
denoted by a given, specic usage of that term (Velmans, 2009, p. 142).
Throughout these volumes we will be using the terms altering consciousness (which emphasizes not only altered phenomenology but also the
procedures to bring it about), altered consciousness, and altered states of
consciousness because they have become the most recognizable and used
cognates. At the same time, I agree with Bunges (1980) warning that to
speak literally of states of consciousness reies consciousness as an entity
whereas it is the creature (human or otherwise) who experiences these
variations. A different criticism of the ASC term (Rock & Krippner, 2007) is
that it confuses the basic sense of consciousness as being aware of something
with the phenomenal eld of the episode of consciousness; they propose
instead that it would be more appropriate to speak of altered pattern of
phenomenal properties [see also Beischel, Rock, & Krippner, this volume].
Although I am sympathetic to their analysis, their suggestion disregards a
long historical precedent (cf. Natsoulas, 1983) and is unlikely to substitute
at this point for the easier-on-the-tongue ASC. Also, although it has not
gained traction in this context, a phrase such as modalities of experiencing
would be a closer indication that we are dealing with an ever-changing
dynamic event rather than a static one (James, 1890). With these caveats in
mind, we will continue to use the term ASC for conveniences sake.
Ludwig described an ASC as
any mental state(s), induced by various physiological, psychological, or
pharmacological maneuvers or agents, which can be recognized subjectively by the individual himself (or by an objective observer of the
Altering Consciousness
Tart further elaborated this concept, describing a discrete state of consciousness as a unique, dynamic pattern or conguration of psychological
structures, an active system of psychological subsystems that although
showing some variations remains overall the same (1975, p. 5). He further
went on to state that a discrete altered state of consciousness would be a
qualitatively different state from the persons ordinary, baseline state. This
distinction was developed in the concept of anomalous experiences
(Cardena, Lynn, & Krippner, 2000), but ASC and anomalous experiences
are not synonymous concepts because although some anomalous experiences constitute the baseline state for some individuals (e.g., strong synesthetic experiences for synesthetes), they occur only, if at all, during an
ASC for the rest of us. Furthermore, anomalous experience is also used for
experiences that although not necessarily occurring in an ASC may nonetheless go against the current sociocultural norm such as experiences of
putative telepathy in a Western culture.
An alternative to ASC as a qualitative shift in an overall organization of
consciousness was offered by Fischer (1986), who proposed a cartography
of states of consciousness along a continuum of sympathetic/parasympathetic
intensity. Although this was a good rst step, Fischers understanding of
sympathetic/parasympathetic interactions is simplistic (cf. Berntson,
Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993) and has had limited inuence in the eld [but
see Winkelman, this volume], whereas Tarts has had a much broader inuence on the theory and evaluation of ASC (e.g., Farthing, 1992; Pekala &
Cardena, 2000).
Despite its popularity, there is little doubt that Tarts denition of an
ASC is difcult to operationalize. For instance, what constitutes a
dynamic pattern or conguration, how much can a system vary and still
remain a recognizable system and, relatedly, what constitutes enough of a
deviation of the baseline state? Furthermore, if we base the denition on
the individuals experience, how can we study states such as coma in
which s/he may not even be able to report any experience (if there is one;
see Noirhomme & Laureys, Volume 2). In their recent Altered State Theory
of Hypnosis, Kallio and Revonsuo (2003) sought to address these problems
and provide a new way of conceptualizing an ASC. However, their proposals are neither new nor do they solve the problem. They write that a state of
consciousness refers to background mechanisms outside the phenomenal
Altering Consciousness
contents of consciousness that are inside the brain and modulate or realize
these contents (p. 141). Leaving aside their arguable (cf. Kelly et al., 2007;
Presti, and Beauregard, Volume 2) a priori materialistic position that consciousness is by denition caused by brain mechanisms (see below), what
they propose is nothing new. Their background mechanisms could be
easily exchanged for dynamic pattern, and Tart (1975) distinguished
decades ago between the (phenomenal) contents of consciousness and
states of consciousness. Kallio and Revonsuo also reiterate the earlier,
although not credited, position (Natsoulas, 1983) that ASC create phenomenal contents of consciousness that misrepresent or create delusional
beliefs of the surrounding world and oneself (pp. 141142). This type
of nave realism is questionable (cf. Hoffman, 2009), and it completely
ignores one of the most interesting facts about hypnosis and similar procedures, namely that, up to an extent, committing to that delusional belief
may bring about experiential and physiological changes that no longer
make it delusional (Cardena & Beard, 1996). Furthermore, it assumes
that mystical and other states are delusional by denition, although that
is very much an open question (Wulff, 2000; see also Geels, this volume,
Beauregard, and Windt, Volume 2). The notion that the ordinary state
of consciousness is not at least partly delusional or incomplete is another
questionable assumption (Hoffman, 2009; Tart, 1975; see also Shear,
Volume 2). Mishara and Schwartz (Volume 2) propose a phenomenologically grounded approach to this issue in which ASC provide alternatives
to the natural but naive realism. This position, to me, is less biased and
more promising than that argued by Kallio and Revonsuo.
Kallio and Revonsuo (2003) also irt with a type physicalist theory of
ASC (p. 134) but prudently conclude that much more needs to be known
about the relationship between phenomenal experience and brain states
before such a view can be advocated. As Velmans (2009) points out in
reference to Dennett but also applicable to their approach, dening consciousness as a brain function (or assuming that ordinary consciousness
is the state that provides us the best description of all of reality) begs the
question and brings about an unjustied premature closure.
A different terminological problem in ASC is that authors often fail to
specify what it is they are talking about. Let us take for instance a term often
used in the literature, trance (and also trance-like). It is often used to refer to
some nebulous and unspecied ASC, for instance the trance after a hypnotic
induction, or while listening to a beautiful piece of music, or while experiencing being possessed by another entity, or while becoming unresponsive
to others, or while fainting, and so on. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED)
described six different senses of trance, and many authors use the term to
Altering Consciousness
avoid having to actually dene what it is that they are describing either in
this or in other cultures (Cardena & Krippner, 2010). A similar point can
be made about the term ecstasy, which may denote an intense emotional
or visual experience, and/or a sensation of being lifted out of ones body!
To avoid these confusions, we have asked contributors to describe what
they mean experientially (and at times neurophysiologically) with the terms
they use. This does not mean, of course, that a concept may not involve
different dimensions. For instance, the concept of absorption includes
important variations such as whether this process refers to a narrow or
expanded consciousness and whether the focus is internal or external
(Tellegen, 1992). Nonetheless, we need to establish the empirical basis for
possible variations within a phenomenon rather than assuming them by at
or hiding them behind some vague concept.
Classifying ASC
Although some Eastern traditions developed sophisticated classications
of meditative states (Goleman, 1988; see Maliszewski et al., Shear, and
Zarrilli, this volume), such was by and large not the case in the West, where
an etiological rather than a phenomenological approach became dominant.
An important exception is perhaps the rst systematic categorization of
alterations of consciousness developed by Plato (as discussed by his teacher
Socrates) in his Phaedrus (1961), where he postulated four different types of
manias, or states in which humans could be affected by a divinely inspired
form of madness: prophetic (the ability to see into the future, as in the
sibyls of the oracles in Greece), poetic (providing inspiration for artistic
and other forms of creation), initiatory (relevant to spiritual rituals), and
erotic (centered on transcendent love).
When the Christian tradition became dominant, it generally questioned
any form of direct experience of the divine and deemed it far more important to discern the putative provenance of the alterations of consciousness,
whether God or the Devil [see Sluhovsky, this volume]. Probably it was
not until the discussion of mesmeric/hypnotic depth levels during the the
18th and 19th centuries that a more descriptive classication of states of
consciousness was attempted in the West [see Cardena & Alvarado, this
volume]. By the end of the 19th century, a study of multiple consciousness,
dissociation, hypnosis, mediumship, and related phenomena was central to
the birth of clinical psychology (Ellenberger, 1970).
The early part of the 20th century was auspicious for the study of alterations of consciousness, not always cast within psychopathology. Probably
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
(Lanius et al., 2010). Nor do I agree with my coeditor that all ASC can be
neatly arranged into four modes [see Winkelman, this volume], one of
which is characterized by neurophysiological integration and synchronicity. In fact, as Noirhomme and Laureys show [see Volume 2], some of
the most synchronous brain states involve seizures and comas, and we
have evidence that mystical-type reports are related to reduced, not
increased, synchronicity (Cardena, Lehmann, Jonsson, Terhune, & Faber,
2007). I do agree with my coeditor, however, that a neurophenomenological approach matching careful phenomenological descriptions with neural functioning (cf. Lutz & Thompson, 2003) is very promising, as long
as it is not confused with the contemporary neurolatry in which clear
conceptualization takes second place to just nding some kind of increase
in neural activity somehow connected to some type of experience, disregarding a clear description of the state of consciousness evaluated and
the limitations of brain imaging (see Sanders, 2009). Whichever classication we eventually arrive at should be conceptually clear and offer justice
to the complexity of both mental and brain events. Hobson (2008) offers
promising insights in his careful comparison of waking and dreaming consciousness, although his three-variable model (AIM: activation, source of
input, and neuromodulation) is probably not yet complex enough for a
comprehensive taxonomy of ASC.
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
transitions and changes even within the ordinary baseline waking state
(cf. Kunzendorf & Wallace, 2000), as there are in ASC. For instance, among
some very highly hypnotizable individuals, distinct patterns seem to emerge
spontaneously during hypnosis: At the beginning, subtle alterations in their
physical body, followed by experiences of being in a different phenomenal
place than their physical body, culminating with experiences of being in a
dreamlike reality and/or transcendental experiences such as merging with
a light or complete emptiness, experiences that are parallel to those reported
by some deep meditators (Cardena, 2005; Davidson & Goleman, 1977).
Another important but under-researched topic is Tarts notion (1975)
that the transition between states of consciousness is characterized by transient cognitive and physiological disorganization. Observations of different
phenomena such as the transition from waking to sleep (Foulkes & Vogel,
1965), the changes between different alters in individuals with dissociative
identity disorder, erstwhile known as multiple personality (Putnam,
1988), and those between an ordinary or a spirit possessed-identity
(Cardena, 1989), support Tarts proposal. Shamanistic healers also describe
that their transition into an ASC becomes much smoother and more controllable with time (e.g., Cardena, 1991, Winkelman, this volume). The
dynamic properties of such transitions can be evaluated neurophysiologically according to both small changes within a state (i.e., EEG microstates;
Vaitl et al., 2005) and longer and more impactful transitions between states
(e.g., from being awake to going under anesthesia or going to sleep).
Besides transient alterations of consciousness, Western and Eastern
traditions have long posited more permanent changes in consciousness
under such terms as reaching enlightenment, sainthood, or kundalini. Such
change may come after long-term meditative or philosophical practice
(cf. Bakan, Merkur, & Weiss, 2009), or quite fortuitously (e.g., WrenLewis, 1988). Robert Forman has called a permanent or semipermanent
change a dualistic mystical state (Forman, 1999; also Geels, and Shear, this
volume). We need additional systematic inquiry into long-term effects of
ASC related to near-death, mystical, and drug experiences, and others
(cf. Cardena et al., 2000; Tart, 1991), along the lines of neurophysiological and psychological research on meditation (e.g., Cahn & Polich,
2006; Easterlin & Cardena, 19981999).
10
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
suggestible to hypnosis at different times of the day (see Wallace & Fisher,
2000), so biological cycles should also be a variable to consider [see Kokoszka
& Wallace, Volume 2].
11
12
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
Introducing Volume 1
Volume 1 provides an overview of the history of altered consciousness,
before covering cultural aspects and the humanities. Although Western
academic literature is predominant, some chapters provide an overview
of alterations of consciousness in non-Western settings and groups. It is
tting that the most inuential contemporary author on AC since William
James, Charles T. Tart, open the volumes with a preface in which he
describes how impoverished the psychological study of the topic was
before he stormed the academic bastion with his research and publications. I follow with this introduction in which I set the stage for the volumes that follow, trying to clarify unnecessary conceptual obfuscations
and calling for research on the topic that respects its complexity and does
not give short shrift to individual differences or the ever-changing nature
of conscious experience. The next introductory chapter is by Michael
Winkelman, who introduces his Integrative Model of Consciousness,
which ambitiously aims to integrate evolutionary, neurophysiological,
and anthropological views on a model of ASC.
The historical section opens with a scholarship tour de force by Yulia
Ustinova, who covers an enormous historical and geographical terrain
from prehistory to late antiquity. She includes her fascinating account of
how caves have been associated with the induction of ASC not only among
prehistoric groups but also among the classical Greeks (Ustinova, 2009).
The next contribution is by Moshe Sluhovsky who, following his
acclaimed book (2007), surveys the Western medieval mental landscape,
underlining how some of the best minds of their time tried to make sense
of the unusual alterations of consciousness and behavior they observed,
trying to discern whether their source was divine or diabolic. Besides the
mostly spontaneous phenomena studied by Sluhovsky, the Medieval Ages
also included a serious study of a number of techniques that would currently fall under the umbrella of meditation (Baier, 2009).
Although the Age of Enlightenment diminished the overbearing
inuence of the Church, the discernment problem did not go away but
underwent a transformation so that ASC tied to mesmerism/hypnosis and
13
14
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
15
16
Altering Consciousness
References
Bakan, D. (1973). On method. Toward a reconstruction of psychological inquiry. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Bakan, D., Merkur, D., & Weiss, D. S. (2009). Maimonides cure of souls. Medieval
precursor of psychoanalysis. Albany: SUNY Press.
Barber, T. X. (1976). Advances in altered states of consciousness & human potentialities. New York: Psychological Dimensions.
Baier, K. (2009). Meditation and contemplation in high to late medieval
Europe. In E. Franco (Ed.), Yogic perception, meditation and altered states of
sterreichische Akademie der Wissenconsciousness (pp. 321345). Vienna: O
schaftern.
Berntson, G. G., Cacioppo, J. T., & Quigley, K. S. (1993). Cardiac psychophysiology and autonomic space in humans: Empirical perspectives and conceptual
implications. Psychological Bulletin, 114, 296322.
Bourguignon, E., & Evascu, T. (1977). Altered states of consciousness within a
general evolutionary perspective: A holocultural analysis. Behavior Science
Research, 12, 199216.
Bunge, M. (1980). The mindbody problem: A psychobiological approach. New York:
Pergamon Press.
Altering Consciousness
Cahn, B. R., & Polich, J. (2006). Meditation states and traits: EEG, ERP, and neuroimaging studies. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 180211.
Cardena, E. (1989). The varieties of possession experience. Association for the
Anthropological Study of Consciousness Quarterly, 5(23), 117.
Cardena, E. (1991). Max Beauvoir. An island in an ocean of spirits. In R. I. Heinze
(Ed.), Shamans of the XXth Century (pp. 2732). New York: Irvington.
Cardena, E. (1994). The domain of dissociation. In S. J. Lynn & J. W. Rhue
(Eds.), Dissociation: Clinical and theoretical perspectives (pp. 1531). New York:
Guilford.
Carden a, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and
physically active. International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 53,
3759.
Cardena, E. (2009). Beyond Plato? Toward a science of alterations of consciousness. In C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, & L. Coly (Eds.), Utrecht II: Charting the future
of parapsychology (pp. 305322). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Cardena, E., & Beard, J. (1996). Truthful trickery: Shamanism, acting and reality.
Performance Research, 1, 3139.
Cardena, E., & Krippner, S. (2010). Culture and hypnosis. In S. J. Lynn & I. Kirsch
(Eds.), Handbook of clinical hypnosis (2nd ed.) (pp. 743771). Washington, D.C.:
American Psychological Association.
Cardena, E., Lehmann, D., Jonsson, P., Terhune, D., & Faber, P. (2007). The neurophenomenology of hypnosis. Proceedings of the 50th Annual Convention of the
Parapsychological Association, 1730.
Cardena, E., Lynn, S. J., & Krippner, S. (Eds.). (2000). Varieties of anomalous
experience: Examining the scientic evidence. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Cardena, E., Maldonado, J., van der Hart, O., & Spiegel, D. (2009). Hypnosis. In
E. Foa, T. Keane, & M. Friedman (Eds.), Effective treatments for PTSD (2nd ed),
(pp. 427457). New York: Guilford.
Cardena, E., & Terhune, D. (2008). A distinct personality trait? The relationship
between hypnotizability, absorption, self-transcendence, and mental boundaries.
Proceedings of the 51st Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association, 6173.
Cloninger, C. R., Przybeck, T. R., & Svrakic, D. M. (1993). The tridimensional
personality questionnaire: U.S. normative data. Psychological Reports, 69,
10471057.
Cortazar, J. (1972). La prosa del observatorio. Retrieved August 20, 2010, from
www.literatura.org/Cortazar/prosa.html.
Davidson, R. J., & Goleman, D. J. (1977). The role of attention in meditation
and hypnosis: A psychobiological perspective on transformations of consciousness. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 25,
291308.
Deutsch, D. (1988). A musical paradox. Music Perception, 3, 275280.
17
18
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
19
20
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
Wren-Lewis, J. (1988). The darkness of God: A personal report of consciousnesstransformation through an encounter with death. Journal of Humanistic Psychology,
28, 105122.
Wulff, D. M. (2000). Mystical experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S. Krippner
(Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience (pp. 397440). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Zaehner, R. C. (1973). Zen, drugs & mysticism. New York: Pantheon.
Zinberg, N. E. (Ed.). (1977). Alternate states of consciousness. Glencoe, IL: Free
Press.
21
CHAPTER 2
24
Altering Consciousness
might legitimately claim that we still do not have a science of altered consciousness.
Scientic elds, as conceptualized by the historian and philosopher of
science Thomas Kuhn (1970) in his now classic The Structure of Scientic
Revolutions, have regular features called paradigms that guide research
and provide general modes of explanation. In his Postscript1969 Kuhn
(1970, p. 175) claried his concepts of paradigm, emphasizing two levels
of use, which he distinguished with new terms:
1) the disciplinary matrix, the common beliefs, values, and techniques of a group
of scientists that provides the universally accepted concepts and practices of
the eld and frameworks for most research; and
2) exemplars, an element of the disciplinary matrix, dened as concrete models
used for solutions to research problems.
25
26
Altering Consciousness
27
28
Altering Consciousness
transcendental, a set of signicant human conditions that must be understood with respect to their own intrinsic properties. Tarts (1972) concept
of state-specic sciences foreshadowed the perspective suggested below
that characterizes AC in epistemological terms, as specic forms of knowing (also see Winkelman, 2010).
To understand altered consciousness requires a framework that goes
beyond personal signicance and baseline or waking consciousness.The
neurophenomenological approach proposes a conceptualization of altered
consciousness in relationship to several biologically based functional
modes of operation that we share with other organisms.
Modes of Consciousness
Similarities in manifestations of waking, deep sleep, and dreams across
species and cultures reect common underlying biological structures.
These biologically structured foundations are discussed as modes of consciousness. A mode of consciousness is a biologically based functional system of organismic operation that reects conditions of homeostatic
balance among brain subsystems to meet global organismic needs (see
Winkelman, 2010, for discussion and details). Different modes of consciousness are revealed in the congruencies in the primary daily patterns
of variation in behavior and experiences of humans and other animals.
We share with other animals the daily cycles of sleep and waking, with
homologous brain structures responsible for these patterns. Similarly,
humans share the dream mode of consciousness with most mammals.
Their presence in other animals indicates the transcendent nature of these
human modes of consciousness. In addition, humans experience altered
consciousness, conceptualized here as the integrative mode of consciousness. Although learning and cultural factors produce variance in these
modes of consciousness in humans, their similar patterns crossculturally (and across species) reect underlying biological functions and
organismic functions and needs:
Waking: learning, adaptation, and food and other survival needs;
Deep sleep: recuperative functions, regeneration, and growth;
Dreaming (REM sleep): memory integration and consolidation and psychosocial
adaptation; and
Integrative: psychodynamic growth and social and psychological integration.
These modes are so basic to organismic operation that they are functionally wired in multiple ways into brain structures, as illustrated in the brains
29
30
Altering Consciousness
reected in their production by a wide variety of natural agents (i.e., psychedelic drugs) and ritual procedures (i.e., trauma, extreme fasting, and
exertion) that elicit these brain wave patterns.
This paradigm of integrative consciousness originates in the work of
Mandell (1980), who suggested that physiological mechanisms underlying transcendent states are based in a common neurochemical
pathway-involving the temporal lobe. Many agents and procedures result
in a loss of serotonin inhibition to the hippocampal cells, producing an
increase in cell activity and the manifestation of hippocampal-septal
slow-wave EEG activity (alpha, delta, and especially theta) that imposes a
synchronous slow-wave pattern across the lobes. Mandell suggested that
the neurobiological basis underlying transcendent states, including their
ineffable and religious components, involves a biogenic aminetemporal-lobe limbic neurology . . . the mesolimbic serotonergic pathway
that extends from the median raphe nucleus in the mesencephalon, coexistent with part of the mesencephalic reticular formation regulating arousal
. . . to the septum and hippocampus (pp. 381, 390). This produces hypersynchronous discharges across the hippocampal-septal-reticular-raphe
circuit, which links the R(reptilian) complex and paleomammalian brain.
Agents and procedures that invoke this pattern include hallucinogens,
amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana, polypeptide opiates, long-distance running, hunger, thirst, sleep loss, auditory stimuli such as drumming and
chanting, sensory deprivation, dream states, meditation, and a variety of
psychophysiological imbalances or sensitivities resulting from injury,
trauma, disease, or hereditarily transmitted nervous system conditions (see
Winkelman, 2010, for review).
The underlying psychobiology of many forms of AC involves this
response based in the serotonergic connections between the limbic system
and brain stem regions [see Presti and various chapters on psychoactive
drugs, Volume 2]. While dopamine mechanisms are also involved, serotonin has a signicant role as a neuromodulator that regulates the activities
of many other neurotransmitter systems.Mandell proposed that the hippocampus is the focal point of the mechanisms that reduce the inhibitory
serotonin regulation of temporal lobe limbic function. The loss of inhibitory regulation by serotonin results in a reduction or loss of the gating
of emotional response and an enhancement of dopamine circuitry. This
loss of gating combined with hippocampal-septal-discharges results
in an emotional ooding or ecstasy (cf. Mandell 1980, p. 400). The
hippocampal-septal system is an association area involved in the formation and the mediation of memory and emotions. The synchronous patterns originating in the hippocampal-septal-reticular raphe circuits
31
32
Altering Consciousness
The downregulation of certain mental faculties from conscious awareness involves a subtraction of certain faculties or experiences, with a variety of different modules capable of being down-regulated, reducing
awareness to a lower condition within the hierarchy of conscious states.
Greater alterations of consciousness, such as those experienced in dreaming or out-of-body experiences (OBE), involve a greater amount of downregulation of prefrontal mediated capacities [see Dieguez & Blanke, Volume 2]. The different kinds of prefrontal capacities and different degrees
of deregulation provide for a variety of phenomenological alterations to
consciousness. The different agents and activities that lead to this dyseregulation do so in distinct ways that produce unique phenomenological
characteristics of religious experiences. Dietrich proposes that these different forms of hypofrontality involve a general principle of a hierarchical
and progressive disengagement with the more sophisticated cognitive
skills and levels of consciousness involving self-awareness and planning
(e.g., self-reection, sense of time, planning) being compromised rst, followed by lower-level systems. The dysregulation of the PFC allows a number of unusual self-experiences related to our more ancient brain
functions. Dietrich (2003) proposed that the lack of engagement of the
PFC results in the lack of certain frontal qualitieswillful action, selfawareness, the deliberate direction of attention, abstract and creative
thought, and planning. However, many alterations of consciousness, notably the shamanic soul journey and many meditative states, have those
properties, requiring explanation of how these capacities persist.
33
34
Altering Consciousness
Hypnosis as Dissociation
Selection for a biological disposition to these highly focused internal
states of awareness and limbicfrontal integration characterized by theta
wave discharge patterns is illustrated by hypnosis (Crawford, 1994).
Highly hypnotizable people have attentional ltering mechanisms that
provide a concentration with a simultaneous dissociation of some cognitive features [see Cardena & Alvarado, this volume]. Crawford proposed
that hypnosis and its enhanced attention reect an interaction between
subcortical and cortical brain mechanisms that enable highly hypnotizable
people to sustain attention as well as disattention. A consequence of the
highly hypnotizable individuals more efcient frontal limbic attentional
systems is the ability to disattend to extraneous stimuli, known as cognitive inhibition, which is associated with enhanced theta-wave production.
35
36
Altering Consciousness
37
38
Altering Consciousness
Conclusions
Explaining AC requires neurophenomenological approaches that link
biological functions and structures to the cultural processes producing
experience. These neurophenomenological approaches (e.g., Laughlin,
McManus, & dAquili, 1992; Winkelman, 2010) illustrate that alterations
of consciousness engage special forms of knowing. A prominent manifestation of altered consciousness involves imagetic representations known
as a presentational symbolism (Hunt, 1995). This system of visual symbolism provides knowledgeone might even say wisdombeyond that of
our rational language-based consciousness, exemplied in the out-ofbody experiences of shamans. Altered consciousness reects this early
References
Alkire, M., & Miller, J. (2005). General anesthesia and the neural correlates of
consciousness. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 229244.
Allison, R., & Schwarz, T. (1999). Minds in many pieces: Revealing the spiritual side
of multiple personality. Los Osos, CA: CIE Publishing.
Bourguignon, E. (1968). Cross-cultural study of dissociational states. Columbus:
Ohio State University Press.
Cahn, B., & Polich, J. (2006). Meditation states and traits: EEG, ERP and neuroimaging. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 180211.
Cardena, E., & Gleaves, D. H. (2003). Dissociative disorders: Phantoms of the
self. In S. M. Turner & M. Hersen (Eds.), Adult psychopathology and diagnosis
(4th ed., pp. 473503). New York: Wiley.
Comstock, C. (1991). The inner self helper and concepts of inner guidance. Dissociation, 4(3), 165177.
Crawford, H. (1994). Brain dynamics and hypnosis: Attentional and disattentional processes. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis,
42, 204232.
Cummings, J. L. (1993). Frontal-subcortical circuits and human behavior.
Archives of Neurology, 50, 873880.
dAquili, E., & Newberg, A. (1999). The mystical mind: Probing the biology of religious experience. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Dietrich, A. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness:
The transient hypofrontality hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition, 12,
231256.
Frecska, E., & Luna, E. (2006). Neuro-ontological interpretation of spiritual
experiences. Neuropsychopharmacologia Hungarica VIII, 3, 143153.
Fries, P. (2009). Neuronal gamma-band synchronization as a fundamental process in cortical computation. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 32, 209224.
Graham, R. (1990). Physiological psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Hebert, R., Lehmann, D., Tan, G., Travis, F., & Arenander, A. (2005). Enhanced
EEG alpha-time domain phase synchrony during transcendental meditation:
Implications for cortical integration theory.Signal Processing, 85, 22132232.
39
40
Altering Consciousness
Hobson, J. (2005). Sleep is of the brain, by the brain and for the brain. Nature,
437, 12541256.
Hunt, H. (1995). On the nature of consciousness. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Jamieson, G. (2007). Previews and prospects for the cognitive neuroscience of
hypnosis and conscious states. In G. Jamieson (Ed.), Hypnosis and conscious
states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective (pp. 114). Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Jamieson, G., & Woody, E. (2007). Dissociated control as a paradigm for
cognitive neuroscience research and theorizing in hypnosis. In G. Jamieson
(Ed.), Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective
(pp. 111131). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1970). The structure of scientic revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, T. (1977). The essential tension. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laughlin, C., McManus, J., & dAquili, E. (1992). Brain, symbol, and experience.
Toward a neurophenomenology of consciousness. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Lehmann, D., Faber, P., Achermann, P., Jeanmonod, D., Gianotti, L., & Pissagalli, D. (2001). EEG brain sources of EEG gamma frequency during volitionally meditation-induced, altered states of consciousness, and experience of the
self. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 108, 111121.
Lutz, A., Greischar, L., Rawlings, N., Richard, M., & Davidson, R. (2004). Longterm meditators self-induced high-amplitude gamma synchronization during
mental practice. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101, 16369
16373.
MacLean, P. (1990). The triune brain in evolution. New York: Plenum.
Mandell, A. (1980). Toward a psychobiology of transcendence: God in the brain.
In D. Davidson & R. Davidson (Eds.), The psychobiology of consciousness
(pp. 379464). New York: Plenum.
Popper, K. (1972). Objective knowledge: An evolutionary approach. Oxford, UK:
Clarendon Press.
Ratsch, C. (2005). The encyclopedia of psychoactive plants: Ethnopharmacology and
its applications (Trans. J. Baker). Rochester, VT: Park Street Press. (Originally
published 1998, Enzyklopadie der psychoaktiven Panzen. Aarau, Switzerland:
AT Verlag.)
Ray, W. (2007). The experience of agency and hypnosis from an evolutionary
perspective. In G. Jamieson (Ed.), Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive
neuroscience perspective (pp. 223240). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Sar, V., & Ozturk, E. (2007). Functional dissociation of the self: A sociocognitive
approach to trauma and dissociation. Journal of Trauma and Dissociation, 8(4),
6989.
Schultes, E., & Hofmann, A. (1979). Plants of the gods. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Seligman, R., & Kirmayer, L. (2008). Dissociative experience and cultural neuroscience: Narrative, metaphor and mechanism. Medicine & Psychiatry, 32,
3164.
Siegel, R. K. (2005). Intoxication: The universal drive for mind-altering substances.
Rochester, VT: Park Street Press.
Takahashi, T., Murata, T., Hamada, T., Omori, M., Kosaka, H., Kikuchi, M.,
Yoshida, H., & Wada, Y. (2005). Changes in EEG and autonomic nervous system activity during meditation and their association with personality traits.
International Journal of Psychophysiology, 55, 199207.
Tart, C. (1972). States of consciousness and state-specic sciences. Science, 176,
12031210.
Tart, C. (1975). States of consciousness. New York: Dutton.
Tart, C. (1977). Putting the pieces together: A conceptual framework for understanding discrete states of consciousness. In N. Zinberg (Ed.), Alternate states
of consciousness (pp. 158219). New York: Free Press.
Taylor, E., Murphy, M., & Donovan, S. (1997). The physical and psychological
effects of meditation: A review of contemporary research with a comprehensive bibliography: 19311996. Sausalito, CA: Institute of Noetic Sciences.
Vialatte, F., Bakardjian, H., Prasad, R., & Cichocki, A. (2009). EEG paroxysmal
gamma waves during Bhramari Pranayama: A yoga breathing technique. Consciousness and Cognition 18, 977988.
Vollenweider, F. (1998). Recent advances and concepts in the search for biological correlates of hallucinogen-induced altered states of consciousness. Heffter
Review of Psychedelic Research, 1, 2132.
Winkelman, M. (1992). Shamans, priests, and witches. A cross-cultural study of
magico-religious practitioners. Anthropological Research Papers #44. Tempe:
Arizona State University.
Winkelman, M. (2000). Shamanism: The neural ecology of consciousness and healing.
Westport, CT: Bergin and Garvey.
Winkelman, M. (2010). Shamanism: A biopsychosocial paradigm of consciousness
and healing. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
Woody, E., & Szechtman, H. (2007). To see feelingly: Emotion, motivation and
hypnosis. In G. Jamieson (Ed.), Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive
neuroscience perspective (pp. 141256). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
41
PART I
Historical Perspectives
CHAPTER 3
Consciousness Alteration
Practices in the West
from Prehistory to Late
Antiquity
Yulia Ustinova
Preliminary Remarks
In discussion of any personal experience, the account of the experience is
crucial. In the absence of rst-hand reports, a researcher may employ a
witnesss testimony. When studying the distant past, we usually have none
of these. Prehistory covers the period before the invention of writing.
Processes and events in prehistory can be determined on the basis of
archaeological evidence, while explanatory models provided by other
disciplines, such as anthropology, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology, can broaden our understanding. Nonetheless, prehistoric humans
remain essentially mute, and their practices and experiences can only be
reconstructed with various degrees of probability. The invention of writing changes the situation, of course, but less dramatically than one would
wish. Texts from the Ancient Near East seldom focus on alterations of consciousness, and this meager information is often open to contradictory
interpretations. Even in a richly documented epoch, such as Classical
Antiquity, personal accounts of alteration of consciousness are very rare,
and we are dependent on abundant second-hand descriptions and passing
references concerning manipulation of consciousness.
Although ancient sources on altered states of consciousness in prehistory
and even in antiquity differ substantially from the records available by means
of modern science, this evidence is of crucial importance. Modern science
with its experimental approach exists only since the 16th century, and
46
Altering Consciousness
Prehistory
Palaeolithic mind is notoriously elusive, even more so its transient
alterations. In the absence of a single recorded word, Stone Age people
can communicate with us by means of their art. Its most fascinating genre
is represented by paintings and engravings that were created in the depth
of subterranean caverns, featuring mostly animals and mysterious signs
and very rarely depicting humanlike gures (Figure 3.1). Many of these
murals are breathtakingly beautiful, for instance the panels in the famous
caves of Lascaux (ca. 17,000 before present) and Chauvet (ca. 30,000
before present) in France and Altamira (ca. 14,000 before present) in
Spain (Beltran, 1999; Chauvet, Brunel Deschamps, & Hillaire, 1995;
Lorblanchet, 1995; Ruspoli, 1986). What motivated a human being, Homo
sapiens like us, to clamber down, encumbered with lamps and pigments,
hundreds of meters into an enormously long and frightening cave, in
order to depict there animals and enigmatic signs? Using observations of
existing communities who create rock art, the San in southern Africa and
the Indians of the far west of North America, as well as neuropsychological
studies of various methods of manipulation of consciousness, D. LewisWilliams (2002) convincingly demonstrates that it was imagery of altered
states of consciousness that led the prehistoric painters to image making in
the depth of the caves. He argues that signs depicted inside many caves,
whether zigzags, grids, or dots, are modeled on geometric percepts that
often emerge at the outset of altered states of consciousness (entoptic or
phosphene forms). Proceeding further toward full-edged hallucinations,
Figure 3.1 Portion of a panel in the cave Les Trois Fre`res, ca 15,000 before present.
Lewis-Williams, 2002, ill. 44, p. 195. Reproduced by a kind permission of J. Clottes
47
48
Altering Consciousness
Figure 3.2
the author.
49
50
Altering Consciousness
Figure 3.3 Fragments of the Tuleilat Ghassul frescoes: 15: elements of the Star
fresco; 6: mask from the Room of the bird; 7: mask from the Star fresco. Drawing
by Y. Sokolovskaya, after Mallon, Koeppel, and Neuville, 1934, frontispiece and pl. 68.
The rst wine was perhaps produced by dates. Vine (Vitis vinifera) seems to
have been cultivated there by the end of the Neolithic period, and archaeological nds from Mesopotamia and Egypt illustrate brewing and drinking
of beer (Rudgley, 1993, p. 31; Sherratt, 1997, pp. 389419).2
Mind-altering agents in prehistoric societies were almost exclusively
used in religious contexts, as both archaeological record and comparative
anthropological material demonstrate. Medical and recreational uses
became divorced from the ritual only recently, when the modern distinction between sacred and secular emerged (Merlin, 2003, pp. 295296;
Sherratt, 1997, pp. 405407). In any case, there is no doubt that prehistoric humans manipulated their minds by use of psychoactive substances.
It is most probable that they also employed other techniques, such as sensory deprivation, and it is likely that experiences induced by various methods of alteration of consciousness are reected in the prehistoric art.
Protohistory
Protohistoric peoples differ from many other nonliterate societies in
the fact that the modern scholar does not nd them entirely silent. For instance, Iranian-speaking nomads and seminomads living in the Black Sea
area and Central Asia were neighbors, trade partners, enemies, or allies
of the Greeks, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, and other literate peoples.
These peoples left texts that supply precious information on the lifestyle of
the barbarians, including their practices of consciousness alteration.
Herodotus, who wrote in the 5th century BCE, describes (4, 7375) a
strange Scythian habit: They construct a tent, make a pit in its centre, put
red-hot stones into it, throw hemp seeds on the stones, and howl in joy in
the steam. Herodotus interpreted this custom as a purication rite, performed
after funerals. Although he did not recognize the role of hemp as hallucinogen,
he faithfully recorded the technique. His account was corroborated when copper censers with hemp seeds, as well as stones and poles, were discovered in
burial mounds, dated to the 5th century BCE, erected in Siberia by another
subgroup of the Scythians and exceptionally well preserved because of the
perpetual frost (Rudenko, 1970). It is clear that various Iranian-speaking peoples used hallucinogens in their religious ceremonies, and Scythians of Europe
and Asia employed hemp, Cannabis sativa, as a psychoactive substance.
As to alcohol, the Celts and the Germans drank beer. The rst indisputable evidence of mead in temperate Europe dates to the rst millennium
2
However, A. Sherratt (1997, pp. 389419) infers drinking other kinds of intoxicating
beverages from the proliferation of ritual pots, especially beakers, in later Neolithic Europe.
51
52
Altering Consciousness
BCE. At the same time, colonial contacts with the Classical world brought
wine to Gaul, Spain, and Scythia (Sherratt, 1997, pp. 394396).
Although some experts assume that Sumerian and Assyrian texts contain references to
opium (e.g. Kapoor, 1995, pp. 14; Stuart, 2004, p. 77), others are much more cautious
in their reading (Krikorian, 1975). There is no unequivocal evidence on the use of opium
in these cultures.
4
The incisions show that the capsules were deprived of the sap in order to obtain the opiates.
although these methods seem to have played a minor role in these civilizations. Noteworthy are 18th century BCE Mari texts recording divine
messages delivered by male and female prophets, referred to either as
ecstatics or respondents. The former seemed to act spontaneously, as if
possessed by the spirits, whereas the latter were perhaps able to control
the spirits in order to obtain their message [other authors such as Rouget,
however, use enthusiasm to describe spirit possession (see also below) and
ecstasy to describe out-of-the-boy and visionary experiences].The mode of
revelation and the prophets lifestyle usually remain obscure, but in some
cases the behavior of the diviner is described as bizarre. In Neo-Assyrian
sources, frenzied prophets are mostly women and occasionally transgender
individuals, engaged in the cult of Ishtar, who proclaim the divine
words (Bottero, 1974, pp. 8993; Durand, 1997; Haldar, 1945, pp. 2129;
Nissinen, 2000; Overholt, 1986).
In ancient Israel of the monarchical period (ca. 1000586 BCE),5 in
contrast to other Near Eastern cultures, inspired prophecy, which was
considered directly communicated by a deity, played a prominent role.
The Old Testament prophet or seer is an intermediary between the human
and divine worlds; he is sometimes called man of god and described as
dreamer of dreams, and the experience is usually referred to as vision
(Grabbe, 1995, pp. 8284, 108112; Haldar, 1945, pp. 108126; Huffmon,
2000, pp. 6369; Wilson, 1980).6 It is noteworthy that the latter ability is
attested to not only by the text of the Bible, heavily edited during the postexilic
period, but also by an inscription discovered at Deir Alla in Jordan, datable
to 840760 BCE, which states in its rst line that the pagan prophet
Balaam has seen the gods (van Kooten & van Ruiten, 2008). Although
groups of ecstatics, known as sons of the prophets or bands of prophets,
experienced collective alterations of consciousness (e.g. 1 Samuel 10: 5, 10;
19: 20, King James Version), normally the seer attained illumination individually. The revelation could comprise mental pictures of the future or
sights of the other world, such as encounters with divine councils, heavenly
armies, and awesome god-sent apparitions. Such gures as Samuel, Elijah,
and Elisha, combining the characteristics of sages, sorcerers, medicine
men, and seers, may be classied as belonging to the shamanistic type:
According to Kings 1 and 2, they multiplied oil, our, and other substances,
called re or water from the heavens, puried lands, healed leprosy, and
5
The historical books of the Old Testament received their denite form only after the
Babylonian exile; hence the ongoing debate on the accuracy of the data on early prophecy.
6
Female prophets are exceptional, but seem to perform in the same manner as male seers
(Huldah in 2 Kings 22. 1120; 2 Chronicles 34. 2228).
53
54
Altering Consciousness
performed the supreme feat of resurrecting the dead (Aune, 1983, p. 83,
8687; Grabbe, 1995, p. 149). Elishas demise was no less miraculous than
his life: He was taken to heaven by a ery whirlwind (2 Kings 2: 11). It seems
that some prophets were capable of reaching out-of-body states at will:
Elisha followed in spirit his servant, and Ezekiel claimed that a spirit seized
him and carried away (2 Kings 5: 26; Ezekiel 3: 12). The revelatory ASC of
these men of god could be spontaneous and uncontrolled or deliberately
induced by various methods, such as rhythmical music, dancing, and even
use of hallucinogens (e.g., 1 Samuel 10: 5; 1 Kings 20: 36; 2 Kings 3: 15;
Zechariah 13: 6; 4 Ezra 14: 39). Their behavior was so manifestly anomalous
that hostile sources branded them as mad (Jeremiah 29: 26; Hosea 9: 7; 2
Kings 9: 11).7
While the deeds of the Old Testament prophets were deemed worthy
of record, their subjective experiences usually remain concealed. We are
fortunate to have detailed accounts of Ezekiels multiple harrowing visions
of unearthly force, among them the following overwhelming experience
(Ezekiel 13):
The word of the Lord came expressly unto Ezekiel the priest . . . and the
hand of the Lord was there upon him. And I looked, and behold, a whirlwind came out of the north, a great cloud, and a re unfolding itself . . . Also
out of the midst thereof came the likeness of four living creatures. And . . .
they had the likeness of a man . . . And when they went, I heard the noise
of their wings, like the noise of great waters, as the voice of the Almighty,
the voice of speech . . . And above the rmament that was over their heads
was the likeness of a throne, as the appearance of a sapphire stone: and upon
the likeness of the throne was the likeness as the appearance of a man above
upon it . . . This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of the Lord.
And when I saw it, I fell upon my face, and I heard a voice of one that spake.
And he said unto me, Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak
unto thee. And the spirit entered into me when he spake unto me, and set
me upon my feet, that I heard him that spake unto me . . . He said unto
me, Son of man, eat that thou ndest; eat this roll, and go speak unto the
house of Israel . . . Then did I eat it; and it was in my mouth as honey for
sweetness . . . Moreover he said unto me, Son of man, all my words that I
shall speak unto thee receive in thine heart, and hear with thine ears . . .
Then the spirit took me up, and I heard behind me a voice of a great rushing, saying, Blessed be the glory of the Lord from his place. I heard also the
noise of the wings of the living creatures that touched one another . . . So
the spirit lifted me up, and took me away, and I went in bitterness, in the
7
Cf. Sauls stripping off his clothes (1 Samuel 19. 224); Isaiah remaining naked for three
years (Isaiah 20. 3); Ezekiels austerities and magic (Ezekiel 45).
heat of my spirit; but the hand of the Lord was strong upon me. Then I
came to them of the captivity at Tel-abib . . . and remained there astonished
among them seven days.
Ancient Greece9
In ancient Greece, certain forms of anomalous behavior, considered to
be inspired by supernatural forces, were actively sought, whereas others
were dismissed as negative and abhorred. Our greatest blessings come
to us by way of madness, provided it is given us by divine gift, says
Socrates in Platos Phaedrus (244A). In contrast, other kinds of madness
were expunged, either by purications or other religious means, or by
more rational methods. Plato further explains that the divine madness is
produced by a divinely wrought change in our customary social norms
(Phaedrus 265A) and states that there are four types of god-induced frenzy
or mania: prophetic, initiatory, poetic, and erotic (Dodds, 1973, p. 64).
Following Plato, we will survey some most remarkable cases of different
kinds of madness. In Greece, prophecy inspired directly by a divinity was
8
9
55
56
Altering Consciousness
that drinking from the sacred pool at Claros inspires wonderful oracles
but shortens the life of the drinker (Pliny, Natural History 2. 232; Iamblichus, On the mysteries 3. 11). The life-shortening factor was most probably
not the sacred water alone but the way of life of the medium.
In contrast, in many oracular centers inquirers received the response directly
from the deity, who appeared to them in a dream or in a revelation. We are fortunate to have a unique account of an experience in such a sanctuary. Trophonius, whose oracle was in Lebadeia (Central Greece), was believed to have
vanished there beneath the earth and to live in a cave under a hill as an
oracular god. The oracle in Lebadeia already existed by the 6th century BCE
(Bonnechere, 2003; Schachter, 19811994, Volume 3; Ustinova, 2002).
The descent to Trophonius is described in detail by Pausanias, who
wrote his Description of Greece about 140 CE (Pausanias 9. 39). The preparation for the consultation took several days and included not only preliminary sacrices but also secluded lodging in a small building, cold baths,
prayers, special diet, and sexual abstinence, as well as music and dancing.
Only when well-prepared for the tremendous experience, that is,
exhausted, tense with anticipation, and disposed to hallucinating, did the
petitioner descend to Trophonius cave. The symbolism of the sanctuary
was that of the netherworld: At night two boys, personifying Hermes, the
conductor of the souls to realm of the dead, led the person to the oracular
cave. The prophetic sanctum was most probably an articial circular hole,
several meters deep: The inquirer lay on the ground, and then he was
swiftly drawn into another hole, as if by an eddy. The inner space was perhaps a small recess at the bottom of the larger grotto, where only the feet of
the people entered, while they remained stretched out on the oor (Bonnechere, 2003, pp. 159163). In fact, the image of the whirl could derive from
the vortex experienced by the inquirers at the beginning of their prophetic
ASC, induced by the immersion into the dark coolness of the grotto.10
Immediately after the stay in the underground cave, the inquirer took a seat
on the chair of the goddess of Memory and recounted his experience to the
10
For a different reconstruction of the layout of the prophetic grotto see: Rosenberger,
2001, pp. 3738, g. 2.
A feeling of passage through a rotating dark space dened by the experiencer as tunnel,
cave, corridor, well, spiral, vessel, or swirl, is characteristic of the initial stages of ASC. This
experience is frequently reported by participants in laboratory experiments investigating
the effects of stress and various hallucinogens, and often appears in anthropological
accounts of altered states of consciousness as experienced by shamans and other religious
practitioners (Harner, 1990, pp. 2830; Siegel & Jarvik 1975; Merkur, 1989, pp. 136
137). Reclining position, like the one assumed by the consulters at the Trophonium, can
also trigger visions (Siegel, 1980, p. 925).
57
58
Altering Consciousness
priests. Only after this procedure was the suppliant, semiconscious and
paralyzed with terror, allowed to be taken away by his relatives.
The suppliants experience in this sanctuary is described in a dialogue entitled The Daimonion of Socrates by Plutarch, philosopher, biographer, and priest
at Delphi, who lived ca. 50120 CE. This is a fascinating account of the communication of a young Athenian named Timarchus, who spent 2 nights and a
day in the cave, in a world beyond normal experience (590B592F):
He said that on descending into the oracular crypt his rst experience was of
profound darkness; next . . . he lay a long time not clearly aware whether he
was awake or dreaming. It did seem to him, however, that at the same
moment he heard a crash and was struck on the head, and that the sutures
parted and released his soul. As it withdrew and mingled joyfully with air
that was translucent and pure, it felt . . . that now, after long being cramped,
it had again found relief . . . ; and next it faintly caught the whir of something
revolving overhead with a pleasant sound . . . He saw islands illuminated by
one another with soft re, taking on now one colour, now another . . . All this
he viewed with enjoyment of the spectacle. But looking down he saw a great
abyss . . . most terrible and deep it was . . . After an interval someone he did
not see addressed him: Timarchus, what would you have to explain?
Everything, he answered . . .
Nay, the voice replied, in the higher regions we others have but little
part . . . ; but you may, if you wish, inquire into the portion of Persephone
[the Netherworld] . . . Of these matters . . . you will have better knowledge
. . . in the third month from now; for the present, depart.
. . . Once more [Timarchus] felt a sharp pain in his head, as though it
had been violently compressed, and he lost all recognition and awareness
of what was going on around him; but he presently recovered and saw that
he was lying in the crypt of Trophonius near the entrance, at the very spot
he had rst laid himself down. . . .When he had come back to Athens and
died in the third month, as the voice had foretold, we were amazed . . .
and philosophical ideas. The variance in the kind of hallucinations experienced in Trophoniuss cave was known to Pausanias (9. 39. 11), who
observes that inside the prophetic chamber different inquirers learn the
future in different ways, sometimes by sight and at other times by hearing.
To achieve this ASC, the suppliant did not need other inuences
besides his being alone in awe-inspiring surroundings, isolated from the
world, its fresh air, light, sounds, human society, and other distractions.
Even if we assume that at the sanctuary of Trophonius inquirers who did
not appear likely candidates for surrender to ASC were segregated at the
stage of preliminary ceremonies, their number remained limited. Cases
of alteration of suppliants consciousness and ensuing reports of divine
revelations must have been common enough to allow institutions like this
oracular center to operate smoothly.
Regrettably, Plutarchs detailed account of the revelations experienced
in the cave of Trophonius is the exception to the rule; testimony on other
oracular centers consists of indirect allusions or brief hints as to ASC experienced by inquirers or personnel. However, we do know that entering
caves regularly occurs as a major requirement for a prophetic seance, both
in established cults and in the activities of individual seers. The evidence
on Trophonius oracular shrine suggests that under similar conditions,
namely cultic preparations, isolation inside a cave, and religious awe,
ancient Greek suppliants would have attained similar experiences and
interpreted them in a similar way (Ustinova 2009a; 2009b, pp. 53155.).
Initiatory madness, according to Plato, provides release from physical
ailment and troubles of the world: By purications and sacred rites, he
who has this madness is made safe for the present and the after time,
and for him who is rightly possessed of madness a release from present ills
is found (Phaedrus 244E). People engaged in these rites were called mystai
(singular, mystes), hence the English word mystery. These cults were individual and voluntary. In contrast to most cults in the Greek city-state,
which were focused on a group, from family to civic community, mystery
rites were about the individual only and inuenced his or her attitude to
life and death.
In the cause of the central ceremony, a great secret, unknown to the
public at large, was imparted to the mystai. The details of the eyeopening, life-changing disclosure of the ultimate secret were not to be
divulged; therefore, ancient authors provided but circumspect allusions
to mystery rites. In modern literature, Greek mysteries are usually
included in the category of initiations or passage rites, both terms designating rites that focus on introduction of a novice into a group of those
who already possess exclusive knowledge (Burkert, 1987).
59
60
Altering Consciousness
pious people; he observes the crowd of people living at this very time uninitiated and unpuried, who are driven together and trample each other in
deep mud and darkness, and continue in their fear of death, their evils
and their disbelief in the good things in the other world. Then in accordance with nature the soul stays engaged with the body in close union
thereafter.
61
62
Altering Consciousness
Figure 3.4 Raging maenad. Wine cup by Brygos painter, Athens, 490 BCE.
Drawing by Y. Sokolovskaya, after Beazley, 1963, p. 371, No. 15.
his or her usual identity, becomes one with the god and is called bacchos
(Graf & Johnston, 2007; Jeanmaire, 1970; Seaford, 2006).
Both men and women participated in mystery rites in honor of Dionysus,
and in several places only married women were admitted. The rites included
sacrices, wine drinking, and dancing to intoxicating tunes that inspired
breaking the regular norms of behavior and reached their climax at the
revelation of the main mystery. Scenes of initiations, preserved on works
of art, depict the initiate, head veiled, being led toward another gure, who
is about to disclose the great secret, a basket lled with fruit (a symbol of
fertility), among which a huge phallus rises (Figure 3.5). Preparation
and alteration of the state of consciousness, referred to by Aristotle, were
necessary to ensure that viewing trivial objects like this basket produced
the sensation of a direct encounter with the divine, imparting exclusive
knowledge that elevated the initiate to his new blessed state.
63
64
Altering Consciousness
For Socrates, in order to reach the ultimate truth, the mind of a mortal
must cease to be merely human and mingle with the divine. To attain the
superhuman wisdom, the soul must be liberated from its connection with
the body. He says in the Phaedo that in order to transcend the limits of
incarnate knowledge, the philosopher must terminate his worldly existence, and only then is he able to reach the real divine postcarnate knowledge (Cornford, 1952, p. 58; Morgan, 1990, pp. 5579).
The Greeks knew several ways to liberate their souls from the constraints of the body and still remain alive. Some mystics claimed that they
could release their souls at will; independent of the body, the soul could
achieve superhuman knowledge. Others attained states of intense concentration by means of meditation-like techniques. Ordinary people on the
verge of death reported out-of-body experiences involving the feeling of
their souls ight. Possession by a deity, divinely inspired madness,
enabled temporary abandonment of the human self and transformed an
individual into a medium, uttering words coming from the deity rather
than from the mortal mind. The variance in the ability to attain ASC was
not unknown to the Greeks. Plato notes: Many bear the Bacchic rod,
but few are Bacchants (Phaedo 69D).11
11
For mystics and out-of-body experiences, see Ustinova, 2009b, pp. 177217.
65
66
Altering Consciousness
At the climax of the Isiac initiation, the votary was alone with the Alone,
to use the phrase of Plotinus, a philosopher and mystic (Witt, 1971, p. 160).
The initiate experienced voluntary death and eternal salvation, an ineffable
communion with the divine, that produced a profound and elevating effect
(Apuleius, Metamorphoses 11. 2125). Apuleiuss description of the initiates
intense happiness in front of Isiss statue, in the innermost place in her temple, attests to spirituality imbued with a sensuous element. This experience,
which could be incited by the sublimation of eros, developed into a genuine
mystic union with Isis, a radiant all-encompassing joy (Grifths, 1986,
p. 59). Achieved as a result of the solitary vigil, it came from within the
initiates mind, which means that the Isiac initiation closely approximated
the revelations attained by individual seers or sages.
The earliest evidence of hypnotic-type techniques seems to date from
the third century CE. The Demotic Magical Papyrus discovered in Egypt
contains a description of a curious divinatory technique, based perhaps
on a state conducive to revelations (Watereld, 2003, p. 43):
You take a new lamp . . . and lay it . . . on a new brick, and you take a boy
and seat him upon another new brick, his face being turned to the lamp,
and you close his eyes and recite these things that are (written) above down
into the boys head seven times. You make him open his eyes. You say to
him, Do you see the light? When he says to you: I see the light in the
ame of the lamp, you . . . ask him concerning everything that you wish
after reciting the invocation . . . (column 16; Grifth & Thompson, 1904,
pp. 112113)
lived the best life and come to identify with the divine; and set rm in it I
have come to that actuality setting myself above all else in the realm of Intellect. Then after that rest in the divine, when I have come down from Intellect to discursive reasoning, I am puzzled how I ever come down, and how
my soul has come to be in the body when it is what it has shown itself to be
in itself, even when it is in the body.
Conclusions
Since the Stone Age, human beings have manipulated their consciousness. There is little doubt that psychotropic plants were used in the Neolithic period, and it is most probable that this and other methods of
consciousness alteration, such as sensory deprivation, auditory driving,
and extensive motor behavior were employed even earlier, during the
Palaeolithic. With the invention of writing and subsequent development
of literature, descriptions of individual experiences of divine revelations,
out-of-body states, and related practices made their appearance. Ancient
Greeks went farther and began to expound altered states of consciousness
as a complex world view, basing their approach on the belief that human
ability to attain the ultimate truth is limited by nature, and only liberation
from the restraint of the mortal esh can allow a glimpse into the realm of
the absolute. These ideas persisted till late antiquity and were further
developed by the adherents of syncretistic cults and philosophical schools
12
However, on its way to the absolute, Plotinuss soul is exalted above the beauty, Ennead
6. 9. 911.
67
68
Altering Consciousness
References
Assmann, J., & Bommas, M. (Eds.). (2002). Agyptische mysterien? [Egyptian mysteries?] Munster: Fink (Wilhelm).
Aune, D. E. (1983). Prophecy in early Christianity and the ancient Mediterranean
world. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.
Bahn, P. G. (1998). The Cambridge illustrated history of prehistoric art. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Beazley, J. D. (1963). Attic red-gure vase-painters. Oxford: Claredon Press.
Beltran, A. (Ed.). (1999). The cave of Altamira. New York: H. N. Abrams.
Bonnechere, P. (2003). Trophonios de Lebadee. Leiden: Brill.
Bottero, J. (1974). Symptomes, signes, ecritures [Symptoms, signs, writings].
In J.-P. Vernant (Ed.), Divination et rationalite [Divination and rationality]
(pp. 70197). Paris: Seoul.
Bowden, H. (2005). Classical Athens and the Delphic oracle. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Burkert, W. (1987). Ancient mystery cults. Cambridge, MA-London: Harvard University Press.
Burkert, W. (2005). Mantik in Griechenland [Divination in Greece]. In Thesaurus
Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum [Thesaurus of Ancient Cults and Rites] (Vol. 3,
pp. 151). Los Angeles: Getty.
Chadwick, N. K. (1942). Poetry and prophesy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Chauvet, J.-M., Brunel Deschamps, E., & Hillaire, C. (1995). La grotte Chauvet
[The cave of Chauvet]. Paris: Seuil.
Clinton, K. (1992). Myth and cult: The iconography of Eleusinian mysteries. Stockholm: P. Astroms Forlag.
Clottes, J., & Lewis-Williams, D. (1996). The shamans of prehistory. Trance and
magic in the painted caves. New York: Harry N. Abrams.
Cole, S. G. (2003). Landscapes of Dionysos and Elysian Fields. In M. B. Cosmopoulos (Ed.), Greek mysteries (pp. 193217). London-New York: Routledge.
Compton, T. M. (2006). Victim of the muses: Poet as scapegoat, warrior and hero in
Greco-Roman and Indo-European myth and history. Washington, DC: Center
for Hellenic Studies.
Conard, N. J., Malina, M., & Munzel, S. C. (2009). New utes document the earliest musical tradition in southwestern Germany. Nature, 460, 737740.
Cornford, F. M. (1952). Principium sapientiae. The origins of Greek philosophical
thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cosmopoulos, M. B. (Ed.). (2003). Greek mysteries. London-New York: Routledge.
DErrico, F., Henshilwood, C., Lawson, G., Vanhaeren, M., Tillier, A.-M., Soressi,
M., & Julien, M. (2003). Archaeological evidence for the emergence of language, symbolism, and musicAn alternative multidisciplinary perspective.
Journal of World Prehistory, 17, 170.
Delatte, A. (1934). Les conceptions de lenthousiasme chez les philosophes presocratiques [Conceptions of enthusiasm in the pre-Socratic philosophers]. Paris:
Les Belles Lettres.
Dillon, J. (1992). Plotinus at work on Platonism. Greece and Rome, 39, 189204.
Dodds, E. R. (1973). The Greeks and the irrational. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London:
University of California Press.
Dunand, F. (2000). Isis me`re des dieux [Isis the mother of gods]. Paris: Errance.
Durand, J.-M. (1997). Les propheties des textes de Mari [Prophecy in Mari texts].
In J.-G. Heintz (Ed.), Oracles et propheties dans lantiquite [Oracles and prophecy in Antiquity] (pp. 115134). Paris: De Boccard.
Emboden, W. (1978). The sacred narcotic lily of the Nile: Nymphaea caerulea.
Economic Botany, 32, 395407.
Emboden, W. (1979). Narcotic plants. New York: Collier Books.
Flower, M. A. (2008). The seer in ancient Greece. Berkeley-Los Angeles: University
of California Press.
Garnkel, J. (2003). Dancing at the dawn of agriculture. Austin: University of Texas
Press.
Gilead, I. (2002). Religio-magic behavior in the Chalcolothic period of Palestine.
In E. D. Oren & S. Ahituv (Eds.), Aharon Kempinski memorial volume. Studies in
archaeology and related disciplines (pp. 103128). Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press.
Grabbe, L. L. (1995). Priests, prophets, diviners, sages. A socio-historical study of religious specialists in ancient Israel. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.
Graf, F., & Johnston, S. I. (2007). Ritual texts for the afterlife. Orpheus and the Bacchic gold leaves. London-New York: Routledge.
Greyson, B. (2000). Near-death experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S.
Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 315352). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Grifth, F. L., & Thompson, H. (1904). The demotic magical papyrus of London and
Leiden. London: H. Grevel.
Grifths, J. G. (1975). Apuleius of Madauros. The Isis-Book. Leiden: Brill.
Grifths, J. G. (1986). The great Egyptian cults of oecumenical spiritual signicance. In A. H. Armstrong (Ed.), Classical Mediterranean spirituality (pp. 3965).
New York: Crossroad.
Haldar, A. (1945). Associations of cult prophets among the ancient Semites. Uppsala,
Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksells.
Harner, M. (1990). The way of the shaman. San Francisco: Harper.
Heintz, J.-G. (Ed.). (1997). Oracles et propheties dans lAntiquite [Oracles and
prophecy in Antiquity]. Paris: De Boccard.
69
70
Altering Consciousness
71
72
Altering Consciousness
Van Kooten, G. H., & van Ruiten, J. (Eds.). (2008). The prestige of the pagan prophet
Balaam in Judaism, early Christianity and Islam. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.
Vernant, J.-P. (Ed.). (1974). Divination et rationalite [Divination and rationality].
Paris: Seuil.
Wallis, R. T. (1972). Neoplatonism. London: Duckworth.
Watereld, R. (2003). Hidden depths: The story of hypnosis. London: Routledge.
Whitley, D. S. (2009). Cave paintings and the human spirit. The origin of creativity
and belief. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Wilson, R. W. (1980). Prophecy and society in ancient Israel. Philadelphia: Fortress
Press.
Witt, R. E. (1971). Isis in the ancient world. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
CHAPTER 4
74
Altering Consciousness
exactly, is the location of the self and of consciousness within the body and
where does the alteration of the self take place? The mindbody nexus in the
Western tradition, starting, in fact, even prior to the Christian era, blurred
the boundaries between the inner and the outer parts of the self. The human
body was understood to be porous, and external forces could act internally
just as much as internal processes shaped the outer body.
Fragmented and inconclusive evidence from different peripheral corners
of Europe documents the possible existence of pre-Christian shamanistic
traditions throughout the continent. Although their exact congurations
differed according to local traditions and circumstances, they all shared a
few characteristics. From Greenland and Iceland to Siberia, from Lapland
to the Balkans and Sicily, some individuals were recognized as vessels who
had unique powers to transmit messages from deities and from the dead
to the community or to one of its members, or, alternatively, to deliver
the communitys or an individuals requests to the divine powers (Pocs,
1999; Pocs, 2005, with very detailed bibliography; but see also de Blecourt,
2007). These professional spiritual leaders (healers, mediums, shamans)
used dream divination, hydromancy, crystal gazing, induced yawning, and
trance states as divinatory techniques (Buchholz, 2005; Tuczay, 2005). A
trance state in this context has been dened as a psychobiological condition
that enables the surrendering of the body to external entities and the fall into
catalepsy (immobility), and it was understood as a precondition for a communicative act (Crapanzano, 1987, p. 14). The interaction with the deity
or the dead was usually construed either as mostly an imaginal journey of
the shamans soul to the realm of the divine or of the deceased ancestors
(i.e., the shamanic magical ight), or, less often, as a penetration of his or
her soul by a supernatural entity (i.e., spirit possession; see Cardena,
1996, and Winkelman, 1992, for further discussions of this distinction).
Although most European shamans practiced alone and in secrecy, in some
parts of Europe entire groups of practitioners (males as well as females) participated in a collective alteration of consciousness. Using incantations,
dancing (Tarantism), recitations, and maybe hallucinatory drugs, they
waged battles against malevolent entities. These battles of the good people
against enemiesevil or night spirits, donne di fuori (women from outside),
Mistresses of the Night, and otherswere assumed to heal individuals,
overcome malecium, and save the crops and guarantee fertility (Ginzburg,
1966, 1991; Henningsen, 1990; Pizza, 1996, 1998; William of Auvergne,
1674, p. 1066). While folklorists and ethnographers have catalogued and
differentiated among distinct types of such alterations of consciousness, it
is important to keep in mind a number of caveats. First, their morphological
differences notwithstanding, the cosmological framework of all of these
75
76
Altering Consciousness
resulted from the control (whose exact nature was open to debate) of
demonic entities over the self. Although in cases of a unitive mystical experience with the divine only the spirit itself determined the length of the
experience, a demonic possession necessitated an intervention by healing
professionals (saints, charismatic gures, or both lay and religious exorcists), whose intervention terminated the possession.
In this chapter, I trace some historical transformations of the Christian
idiom of spirit possession. The sense of change over time sometimes gets
lost in anthropological and ethnopsychiatric discussions of ASC that too
often assume stable conceptual notions of the interactions among humans
and divine or diabolic entities. The two forms of alteration of consciousness I discuss, however, went through a major historical reconguration.
They had separate and distinct histories from the early Christian period
until about the 13th century. From then on, they started to resemble each
other morphologically more and more (Caciola, 2000, 2003; Elliott,
2004; Newman, 1985). As Nancy Caciola rightly pointed out: We can . . .
legitimately speak of two kinds of spirit possession existing in the Middle
Agesone malign and one benignthat were outwardly indistinguishable
from one another (Caciola, 2000, 272). This growing similarity between
two phenomena that were theologically very different, even antithetical,
and that occupied the extreme ends of the malevolencebenevolence spectrum, troubled theologians and threatened the stability of presumed clear
distinctions between the realms in which God and Satan can act and
among the forms possessions could take. The confusion, in turn, led, by
the later part of the period under discussion (the 16th and 17th centuries),
to new denitions of both divine and demonic possessions, to new techniques of discerning the differences between them, and then to processes
of legitimazing or delegitimazing of specic forms of ASC and the individuals who experienced them.
Divine Possession
Following St. Augustine, the medieval Christian tradition recognized
three experiences of union with the divine. Spiritual experience is more
excellent than the corporeal, and intellectual is more excellent than spiritual
(Augustine, 1982, p. 213). In intellectual mystical experiences, the mystic
acquires an inward presence of the divine independently of any sensory
form. Spiritual experiences involve imaginary hearing or seeing things with
the spiritual (as opposed to the bodily) senses (imaginations). Finally, corporeal experiences are perceived through the body and its real senses. An intellectual unitive experience is the most reliable, while spiritual and corporeal
77
78
Altering Consciousness
Diabolic Possession
Unlike divine possession, the techniques of which could be learned (but
it is worth repeating, demanded an infusion of the divine spirit to actually
occur), diabolic possession in the Christian tradition was never self-induced.
It was always regarded as an undesired intrusion and always necessitated an
intervention by healing experts who could expel the demonic spirit from the
possessed body. Here, too, there was no consensus among medieval and
early modern theologians and other experts concerning the exact nature,
origins, and conguration of this malign ASC. Individuals could be possessed by either revenants (souls returning from the realm of the dead),
Satan himself, or other (lesser) demonic agents; they could remain possessed
for many years or only for a short while; they could manifest their possession
in purely physical symptoms, purely psychological symptoms, or both;
and they could be relieved of their possession by a local lay or religious
professional (exorcist), by the charisma of a saint (dead or alive), or only by
79
80
Altering Consciousness
81
82
Altering Consciousness
Exorcism
Divine possession, as we pointed out, was induced by God, and only
God determined its length. But malignant spirits, who possessed a body with
Gods permission as a result of satanic wickedness, could and should be
expelled. Christ cast out possessing demons by the power of his command,
but his disciples no longer enjoyed this power, and they expelled demons
by invoking Christs name (Mark 16.17; Matthew 8.16, 10.1). Throughout
the Middle Ages, numerous traditions coexisted in the Christian West
concerning exorcism. Within the religious hierarchy, both charismatic
saints (both males and females) and ordained exorcists expelled demons
from possessed bodies. Alongside them, many lay individuals also
employed supernatural powers to cast out demons. It is extremely difcult
to generalize about these healers sources of authority. Some gained their
power through esoteric knowledge passed to them from relatives (usually
mothers or other female relatives). Others acquired exorcismal powers
because they were the third, fth, or seventh sons of fathers who were
themselves third, fth, or seventh sons in their lineage. Some acquired reputation as exorcists because they were born on Good Friday or Christmas
Day, others because they were born with the caul (Del Rio, 2000, p. 50;
Ginzburg, 1966; Sluhovsky, 2007, 3949).
The rituals used to expel demons also varied. Living charismatic gures,
whether they were religious or lay, often followed the tradition and invoked
Christ, but at times their mere presence in a place was enough to cleanse a
possessed body (Brigitta of Sweden 1990, p. 8; Il primo processo per San
Filippo Neri, 19571963, 1:100, 156157, 214215, 401; 2:75, 136139,
142143, 170171, 268; 3:290291; Vita sanctae Genovefae, 44). Cult practitioners in saints shrines usually invoked both Christ and the local saint,
who had been herself or himself renowned in her or his own lifetime for
performing successful exorcisms. Professional religious exorcists followed
prescribed rites and formulas, which varied from place to place, and both
they and lay exorcists used a combination of Christian prayers, saints relics,
fumigations, incantations, herbs, and a mixture of amulets and other paraliturgical and magical techniques. Making the sign of the Cross over the possessed body was a common and successful technique, as were reading
citations from the Bible, reciting names of demons and forcing them to
reveal their names, recalling the Christian myth of creation, Incarnation,
Crucixion, and redemption, and, at times, using physical violence against
the demon (Maggi, 2001; Sluhovsky, 2007, pp. 3670).
The need to systematize exorcismal practices arose only in the early
16th century as part of the Catholic Churchs ongoing battle against superstitious beliefs and practices. Many techniques that had been tolerated by
the church and often used by clerical exorcists themselves were now
deemed to be unauthorized, superstitious, and at times even criminal. A
rst effort to compile an authorized Catholic rite of exorcism was initiated
by Pope Leo X in 1513, and in the last quarter of the 16th century the
Franciscan exorcist Girolamo Menghi authored ve books in which he
offered practicing exorcists a collection of legitimate rites. These books
were then incorporated into the massive compendium the Thesaurus exorcismorum of 1608. Hundreds of other guides circulated in the early modern
Catholic world, and even the publication of the Rituale Romanum of 1614
did not put an end to the spread of alternative variations. What all these
books had in common was a demarcation of the boundaries between
authorized and unauthorized techniques of exorcism and between purely
physical aliments and diabolic possession, and a growing attention to the
uncertainty of all symptoms, both physical and psychological (Libellus
ad Leonem X, 1723, c. 688; Thesaurus exorcismorum, 1608). At the same
time that the curative aspect of exorcism was being codied for the rst
time, an equally or maybe more important process was going on. With
the clericalization of exorcism that, I argue, started in the 15th and 16th
centuries, exorcism acquired an additional meaning. Clerical exorcism
was now also used as a technique that enabled clerics to discern possessing
spirits. Thus, for example, when the 16th century Spaniard Teresa of Avila
was rst experiencing her mystical visions, her father confessor
83
84
Altering Consciousness
Summary
At the center of my chapter is the argument that, although both
divinely and demonically inspired forms of altered states of consciousness
have always existed in the Christian West, it is important to note the historical changes these idioms went through and to contextualize these
transformations within their precise historical settings. Divine possession,
as we have seen, broke away from the conned walls of male monastic
communities in the twelfth and 13th centuries and reshaped Christian
mysticism, prayer, and mens and womens access to the divine. New theology of contemplation and new practices popularized and democratized
possession by the divine spirit, while affective, imaginary, and sensory
techniques enabled unlearned but nonetheless spiritually inclined individuals, including women, to pursue new forms of religiosity and alteration of consciousness.
Possession by demonic entities also witnessed a transformation in the
later Middle Ages. Its symptoms, which in the past had been mostly physical,
now became psychological. And with this change, a new set of quandaries
arose: How could demonic entities possess the soul, which is supposed to
be immune to their penetration? Who is to decide that a person is possessed
when she does not exhibit the traditional physical symptoms of diabolic
possession? How does one discern possessing spirits? The fact that both
divine and demonic possession were assumed now to take place within
the human soul and that both led to alterations in consciousness that were
morphologically similar created a theological, conceptual, and philosophical confusion. Unsurprisingly, then, the churchs attempt to redraw the
boundaries between divine and diabolic possession went hand in hand
with its systematic effort to delegitimize most forms of affective mysticism.
Among the means it employed to pursue this goal was the old technique of
exorcism. Just as the discernment of possessing spirits was a new technique
that shifted power from the laity to the clergy, the new employment of
exorcism as a probative mechanism restricted its own use to religiously
trained exorcists.
Both forms of spirit possession have continued, however, to exist. Even
after the restriction on some forms of female contemplative experiences
that could lead to unity with the divine and annihilation of the self, and
even after new and stringent rules for the authentication of mystical experiences were codied, some women continued to be recognized as true
mystics and had their divine possessions authenticated (Bergamo, 1992;
Vidal, 2006). Similarly, Christian believers continue to this day to become
possessed by evil spirits. The etiology of demonic possession is restricted
nowadays to very precise types of mental illness, and the Catholic
Church demands that a diagnosis of mental illness is ruled out by medical
and psychological experts before a denition of diabolic possession is
advanced (De Exorcismis, 1998). The Catholic Church, in other words,
still maintains the 2000-year-old Christian tradition of dening alteration
of consciousness through encounter with possessing spirits.
References
Anderson, W. L. (2002). Free spirits, presumptuous women, and false prophets: The
discernment of spirits in the later Middle Ages. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of
Chicago.
Augustine of Hippo. (1982). The literal meaning of Genesis: books 712. J. H. Taylor
(Trans.). New York: Ancient Christian Writers.
Bergamo, M. (1992). Les sciences des saints [The inquiries of mystics]. Grenoble: J.
Millon.
Bocher, O. (1972). Christus exorcista: Damonismus und taufe im neuen testament
[Christ the exorcist: Demonism and the devil in the New Testament]. Stuttgart:
Kohlhamer.
Brigitta of Sweden. (1990). Life and selected revelations. M. T. Harris (Ed.). New
York: Paulist Press.
Buchholz, P. (2005). Shamanism in medieval Scandinavian literature. In
G. Klaniczay & E. Pocs (Eds.), Communicating with the spirits (pp. 234246).
Budapest: Central European University Press.
Bynum, C. W. (1987). Holy feast, holy fast: The religious signicance of food to medieval women. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Caciola, N. (2000). Mystics, demoniacs, and the physiology of spirit possession in
medieval Europe. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 42, 268306.
85
86
Altering Consciousness
Caciola, N. (2003). Discerning spirits: Divine and demonic possession in the Middle
Ages. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Cardena, E. (1996). Just oating on the sky. A comparison of shamanic and
hypnotic phenomenology. In R. Quekelbherge & D. Eigner (Eds.), 6th Jahrbuch fur Transkulturelle Medizin und Psychotherapie [6th yearbook of crosscultural medicine and psychotherapy] (pp. 367380). Berlin: Verlag fur Wissenschaft und Bildung.
Clowde of unknowyng. (1944). In P. Hodgson (Ed.), The cloud of unknowing and
related treatises. London: Oxford University Press.
Crapanzano, V. (1987). Spirit possession. In M. Eliade (Ed.), Encyclopaedia of religion 14 (pp. 1219). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
De Blecourt, W. (2007). The return of the sabbat: Mental archaeologies, conjectural histories or political mythologies? In J. Barry & O. Davies (Eds.), Witchcraft historiography (pp. 123145). Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Del Rio, M. (2000). Investigations into magic. P. G. Maxwell-Stuart (Ed.), Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
De Martino, E. (1959). Sud e magia [The south and its magic]. Milan: Feltrinelli.
Di Agresti, D. (1980). Sviluppi della riforma monastica Savonaroliana [Developments in the Savonarolan monastic reform]. Florence: Olschki.
Elliott, D. (1997) The physiology of rapture and female spirituality. In P. Biller &
A. J. Minnis (Eds.), Medieval theology and the natural body (pp. 141173). Bury
St. Edmunds: St. Edmundsbury Press.
Elliott, D. (1999). Fallen bodies: Pollution, sexuality, and demonology in the middle
ages. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Elliott, D. (2004). Proving woman: Female spirituality and inquisitional culture in the
later Middle Ages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
De Exorcismis et supplicationibus Quibusdam [Of exorcisms and certain supplications]. (1998). Vatican City: Typis Vaticanis.
Ginzburg, C. (1966). I benandanti [The night battles]. Turin: Einaudi.
Ginzburg, C. (1991). Ecstasies: Deciphering the witches Sabbath. New York: Pantheon.
Henningsen, G. (1990). The ladies from outside: An archaic pattern of the
witches Sabbath. In B. Ankarloo & G. Henningsen (Eds.), Early modern
European witchcraft: Centers and peripheries (pp. 191215). Oxford: Clarendon.
Il primo processo per san Filippo Neri [The canonization process of saint Filippo
Neri]. (19571963). G. I. della Rocchetta and N. Vian. (Eds.). 4 vols. Vatican
City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana.
Kelly, H. A. (1974). The devil, demonology, and witchcraft: The development of Christian
beliefs in evil spirits. New York: Doubleday.
Langton, E. (1949). Essentials of demonology. A study of Jewish and Christian
doctrine: Its origin and development. London: Epworth Press.
Libellus ad Leonem X. (1723). In Annales camaldulenses ordinis Sancti Benedicti
[Annals of the order of Camaldoli] (Vol. 9). Venice: J.-B. Pasquali.
Maggi, A. (2001). Satans rhetoric: A study of Renaissance demonology. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
87
88
Altering Consciousness
CHAPTER 5
90
Altering Consciousness
91
92
Altering Consciousness
Figure 5.1
Hypnotic Somnambulism
Although Mesmerism as a theory came into disrepute following the
reports by the commissions, the idea of animal magnetism as a physical
agent persisted longer than it is generally realized (Alvarado, 2009). A student of Mesmer, A. M. J. Chastenet, Marquis de Puysegur (17511825),
would introduce changes in practice that are the true predecessors of contemporary hypnotic practice. When he treated the peasant Victor Race for
a lung condition, Puysegur noticed that he did not go into a mesmeric crisis (perhaps because he did not have any models as to how he should
behave and/or perhaps because he might have been delirious) but instead
seemed to be experiencing and acting as if he were in a dream, which he
could not recall once he seemed to come out of that state as if waking
up. This and similar manifestations were called somnambulism, which
means carrying out complex acts in a sleeplike state. This presumed association between mesmeric phenomena and sleep would be retained in the
later term hypnos, which refers to the Greek god of sleep.
Puysegur and other contemporary practitioners also noted a number of
potential parapsychological phenomena, for instance, that patients in the
state of magnetic somnambulism reputedly knew the cause of their own
and others diseases and were able to indicate the means of healing them
(Chastenet de Puysegur, 1820, p. 1). Crabtree (1993) has listed for us
various described alterations in consciousness: a sleepwalking kind of
consciousness, a different reservoir of knowledge and memory during that
state, loss of the sense of identity, suggestibility to the mesmerists communications, heightened memory, alterations in the senses, apparent insensibility to pain, and a special rapport with the magnetizer. Crabtree
(1988) has also documented copious sources that describe potential psi
phenomena during the magnetic state, including the apparent communication of the sensations or behaviors of the magnetizer to the magnetized
without any known sensory or logical links (community of sensation and
of muscular action), telepathy, becoming mesmerized at a distance without sensory or logical intermediation, clairvoyance of remote (in time
and place) events and of medical conditions, and awareness of spiritual
things and beings (see also Dingwall, 19671968).
93
94
Altering Consciousness
Many, but not all, of these observations might be explained by unconscious sensory leakage, inferences, and similar ordinary mechanisms, but
carefully described cases such as Pierre Janets (18591947) patient
Mme. B (the pseudonym of Le onie Leboulanger; Janet, 1885/1968a,
1886/1968b) or the extraordinary displays while mesmerized of the
brothers Didier cannot be so easily explained away (cf. Gauld, 1992).
Thus, the conclusion by Dingwall (19671968) regarding a possible connection between psi phenomena and hypnosis that [A]n attitude of suspended judgment both as regards the past and the present is perhaps the
most judicial (V. 1, p. 297) is not far fetched, especially when controlled
psi experiments generally suggest that hypnosis may be a context that
facilitates psi phenomena (Cardena, 2010).
In the early 19th century, Carl Alexander Ferdinand Kluge (17821844)
categorized six levels or degrees of the phenomenology of magnetic somnambulism: waking state with increased warmth, half-sleep, inner darkness
(sleep proper and insensitivity), inner clarity (perception through the body),
self-contemplation (the ability to accurately see ones body and those of
others), and universal clarity (perception unconstrained by time or space).
He maintained that only a few people, such as the famous seeress of Prevorst,
could attain the last three degrees (Kluge, 1811; see also Ellenberger, 1970,
pp. 7880). Current research on hypnotic phenomena has partly validated
this categorization in the sense that only a minority of individuals (i.e., highly
hypnotizables) spontaneously report transcendent experiences, and only
when they feel that they are in self-evaluated very deep hypnosis, whereas
they experience mostly body sensation and image changes during light hypnosis and disembodied and imaginal experiences during middle hypnosis
(Cardena, 2005; Cardena, Lehmann, Jonsson, Terhune, & Faber, 2007).
Other authors recorded interesting somnambulistic manifestations in
their mesmeric participants. In France, the mesmerist Joseph Philippe
Francois Deleuze (17531835) wrote in his book Histoire Critique du Magnetisme Animal that somnambulists could recover the recollection of
things that were forgotten during wakefulness (Deleuze, 1813, p. 176).
Also, events taking place during somnambulism were forgotten when the
person was in his or her normal state, which Deleuze believed was an indication that the two states are unfamiliar to one another, and that there
were two separate beings (p. 176). He mentioned a case in which a
woman in the somnambulistic state was opposed to the desire of her normal self to work in the theatre. Answering a question during her somnambulistic state about why she wanted to be in the theatre, she said, It is not
me, it is her . . . she is mad (p. 177).
Nowadays, hypnosis research has generally found that when controlling for implicit and explicit suggestions, amnesia is not a typical outcome of a hypnotic induction (e.g., Laurence & Perry, 1988). Gurney
(1884) also mentioned two hypnotic states, an alert and a deep hypnotic
one. He believed that the identication of these states was difcult
because
(E)ach state admits of many degrees and the characteristics of either of them
may be only slightly or only very transiently presented; and in the second
place, unless special means are adopted, it is very easy to mistake the
alert state for normal waking, and the deep state for sleep. (Gurney,
1884, p. 62)
95
96
Altering Consciousness
. . . As to the voice, I have never seen one person in the true magnetic sleep,
who did not speak in a tone quite distinct from the ordinary voice of the
sleeper . . . softer and more gentle, well corresponding to the elevated and
mild expression of the face . . . For the sleeper, in the magnetic state, has a
consciousness quite separate and distinct from his ordinary consciousness.
He is, in fact, if not a different individual, yet the same individual in a
different and distinct phase of his being; and that phase, a higher one.
(pp. 8082)
Mediumship
Besides putative exceptional powers, some of the anomalous experiences reported by gifted participants during magnetic/hypnotic sessions
2
Even before mesmerism, there have been discussions of such phenomena as alternate
consciousnesses and psychogenic amnesia (Gauld, 1992), and from early mesmerism
onward it was proposed that mesmeric andlaterhypnotic techniques provided access
to one or more selves that manifest different characteristics from the normal, waking self
or identity (Crabtree, 1993; Ellenberger, 1970). Thus, the clinical phenomena that were
rst discussed under the umbrella of such terms as hysteria, double or multiple personality
and, more recently, dissociative identity disorder became associated with hypnotic phenomena and techniques. This is evident, for instance, in the works of Pierre Janet
(1889), Breuer and Freud (1895/1955), and many other pioneers of clinical psychology
and psychiatry (Ellenberger, 1970; see also Spiegel & Cardena, 1991). The relationship
between hypnosis, suggestion, and identity multiplicity has been contentious. Sufce it
to say here that although some authors have criticized the reality of identity multiplicity
or fragmentation as mere cultural creation or, worse, iatrogenic suggestion, research has
overwhelmingly shown a relationship between dissociation (including identity fragmentation), exposure to trauma, and hypnotic capacity (for a review, see Cardena & Gleaves,
2007), although this relationship seems to occur only in a subgroup of highly hypnotizable
individuals (Terhune, Cardena, & Lindgren, 2011).
97
98
Altering Consciousness
mentioned contact with angels and departed spirits, and there were some
who interpreted these literally (Billot, 1839; Cahagnet, 1851; cf. Gauld,
1992, p. 3). One such mesmeric subject was an English woman called
Emma. According to the report:
Emma . . . began to speak frequently of spiritual objects and beings. I soon
perceived, that one being, under whose inuence she seemed to be, and of
whom she frequently spoke, had been most nearly related to me, while in this
world, but she had departed this life for about ten years when the rst of these
trances occurred. Emma always says that this lady . . . helps her in all serious
cases of illness, and the like, but not in mere secular, or triing cases.
(Haddock, 1851, p. 187)
99
100
Altering Consciousness
For our purposes, the paranormality or not of some of these communications is not relevant, although skeptical accounts have not explained
away successfully the most spectacular and well-researched cases of some
mediums, among them Leonora E. Piper (18571950) and Gladys
Osborne Leonard (18811968; for overviews see Sage, 1904; Smith,
1964). Consequently, we focus on other aspects of their mediumship.
Mrs. Piper showed a variety of alterations of consciousness and corresponding phenomena (Sidgwick, 1915). Psychical researcher Richard
Hodgson (18551905) observed what he described as an initial stage in
which Mrs. Piper was dreamily conscious of the sitter, and dreamily conscious of spirits (Hodgson, 1898, p. 397). This was followed by a fuller
and clearer consciousnesswe may call it her subliminal consciousness
which is in direct relation . . . not so much with our ordinary physical
world as with another world (p. 397). Then came a state in which he
thought the subliminal consciousness (i.e., the subconscious mind) withdraws completely from the control of her body and takes her supraliminal
consciousness (i.e., the conscious mind) with it (p. 398). At the end it
seemed to Hodgson that Mrs. Piper returned to her normal consciousness
in a reverse order of the previous states. Hodgson wrote:
But in passing out of trance, the stages are usually of longer duration than
when she enters it. She frequently repeats statements apparently made to her
by the communicators while she is in the purely subliminal stage, as
though she was a spirit controlling her body but not in full possession of it,
and, after her supraliminal consciousness has begun to surge up into view, she
frequently has visions apparently of the distant or departing communicators.
(pp. 400401)
101
102
Altering Consciousness
of many classes of phenomena which occur in sane subjects without entering the normal waking consciousness or forming part of the habitual chain
of memory (Myers, 1890, p. 437). Myers saw mediumship as one of several
psychological processes that illustrated the idea that the subliminal mind
communicated with the supraliminal (or conscious) mind through a variety
of automatism using sensory and motor means (e.g., hallucinations, speaking; Myers, 1884, 1885, 1889). Regardless of the differences between Janet
and Myers, their work on mediumship shows that the phenomenon was
part of the development of the constructs of the subconscious mind and of
dissociation, a position that mediumship shared with hysteria and hypnosis, among other phenomena.
Regarding multiplicity, he wrote: It must be admitted . . . that in certain persons, at least, the total possible consciousness may be split into parts
which coexist but mutually ignore each other, and share the objects of knowledge between them (1890, Vol. 1, p. 206).
In the Principles, besides automatism he also discussed hypnotism,
imagination, the mindbody problem (his discussion against jumping
103
104
Altering Consciousness
But even before his treatise on religious experience, in his 1896 Lowell
lectures he had discussed dreams, hypnosis, automatism, hysteria,
multiple personality (nowadays dissociative identity disorder), and a
number of other alterations of consciousness (Taylor, 1983).
Besides Myers and James, many if not most of the pioneers in clinical
psychology/psychiatry at the end of the 19th century and beginning of
the 20th were very much involved in the study of altered consciousness.
To give just some examples, besides his foundational work on dissociation, Pierre Janet (1926) provided a thorough account of various ASC of
some of his patients including Madeleine, whom he treated for 22 years
and who experienced mystical transports and other intense emotional
events. The Swiss professor of psychology Theodore Flournoy (1854
1920) gave a detailed case analysis of the medium Hele`ne Smith (1861
1929, pseudonym of Catherine Elise Muller) who, among other things,
experienced visiting the planet Mars (Flournoy, 1900). He described the
creative abilities of the subconscious, particularly as it was expressed
via mediumship. His work is also an exemplar of the inuence of the
psychosocial environment on subconscious creations, including the
effects of suggestion and surrounding beliefs, topics of much concern
in the study of hysteria and hypnosis during the late 19th century
(Alvarado, 1991).
In Italy, psychiatrist Enrico Morselli (18521929) argued that mediums were persons showing an
anomalous psychic constitution, or, at least, on the extreme gradation of the
scale of normal variability regarding the coalescence of the psychic elements. In mediums this coalescence is . . . labile to the extreme . . . with a
facility for personal disaggregation. (Morselli, 1908, Vol. 1, p. 93)
105
106
Altering Consciousness
There were also exceptions within academia such as the short-lived but
extraordinarily fruitful research by Clark L. Hull (18841952; 1933) of
hypnosis, although it was clear that even he was primarily interested in
behavior rather than consciousness. After the impressive efforts of both
the Society for Psychical Research and the American Society for Psychical
Research, Joseph Banks Rhine (18951980) led an impressive program
of investigation of parapsychological phenomena at Duke University,
although, perhaps because of his original training in botany, he did not
seem to be as interested in the alterations of consciousness that have long
been associated with them (cf. Alvarado, 1998).
With regard to the neurosciences, some of the most eminent minds
during the rst half of the 20th century devoted considerable time to
researching altered consciousness. Santiago Ramon y Cajal (18521934),
1906 Nobel prizewinner and a towering gure for his work on the neuron,
did research on hypnosis, mediumship, and parapsychological phenomena, although unfortunately a book he had written on the subject got lost
during the Spanish Civil War (Sala et al., 2008). Hans Berger (18731941)
created the EEG to try to obtain an objective measurement of possible
telepathic communications, which his sister seemed to experience when
he had an unexpected and serious accident (Millet, 2001). Charles Richet
(18501935), another Nobel laureate for his work on physiology, devoted
a substantial part of his life to research hypnosis, mediumship, and psi
phenomena (Alvarado, 2008).
We will also mention briey a tendency outside of both the academic
and clinical spheres (some therapists such as C. G. Jung were clearly inuenced by a non-academic visionary tradition). For lack of an accepted
name, we can refer to it as the goal to radically change or expand ones
ordinary state of consciousness. Although some religious and esoteric
practices such as alchemy have had this goal (Cavendish, 1967), the
period covered by this paper also includes other attempts, some of them
still inuential, to expand or awaken or, to paraphrase William Blakes
(17571827) line, cleanse the doors of perception. This cleansing typically includes questioning the absolute value of rationality and the givenness of reality as presented by the senses, an idea present in Plato and
recurrent throughout history and in various places such as American transcendentalism. To achieve this goal, various esoteric traditions have
advanced practices to alter ones state of consciousness and, at times, to
derange the senses to use the phrase of the French poet Arthur Rimbaud
(18541891; cf. Cavendish, 1967).
Besides the use of psychoactive drugs, covered in other chapters, it is
worth mentioning other proposals to achieve this altered consciousness.
References
Ahern, G. (2009). Sun at midnight. Cambridge: James Clarke.
Aleman, A., & Lari, F. (2008). Hallucinations: The science of idiosyncratic perception. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Alvarado, C. S. (1991). Iatrogenesis and dissociation: A historical note. Dissociation, 4, 3638.
Alvarado, C. S. (1998). ESP and altered states of consciousness: An overview of
conceptual and research trends. Journal of Parapsychology, 62, 2763.
Alvarado, C. S. (2004). On the centenary of Frederic W. H. Myerss Human personality and its survival of bodily death. Journal of Parapsychology, 68, 343.
Alvarado, C. S. (2008). Aspects of the history of parapsychology: II. Charles
Richets (18501935) work in psychical research. Parapsychology Foundation
Lyceum. Retrieved June 28, 2010, from http://www.pyceum.org/447.html.
Alvarado, C. S. (2009). Late nineteenth and early twentieth century discussions of
animal magnetism. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis,
57, 366381.
Alvarado, C. S., Machado, F. R., Zangari, W., & Zingrone, N. L. (2007). Perspectivas historicas da inuencia da mediunidade na construcao de ideias psicologicas e psiquiatricas [Historical perspectives on the inuence of mediumship in
the construction of psychological and psychiatric ideas]. Revista de Psiquiatria
Clnica, 34(supp. 1), 4253.
Bakan, D., Merkur, D., & Weiss, D. S. (2009). Maimonides cure of souls: Medieval
precursor of psychoanalysis. Albany: State University of New York Press.
107
108
Altering Consciousness
Cooper, R. (1867). Spiritual experiences, including seven months with the brothers
Davenport. London: L. Heywood.
Crabtree, A. (1988). Animal magnetism, early hypnotism, and psychical research
17661925: An annotated bibliography. New York: Kraus International.
Crabtree, A. (1993). From Mesmer to Freud: Magnetic sleep and the roots of psychological healing. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Darnton, R. (1968). Mesmerism and the end of enlightenment in France. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
De Certeau, M. (2000). The possession at Loudun (Michael B. Smith, Trans.)
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Deleuze, J. P. F. (1813). Histoire critique du magnetisme animal [Critical history of
animal magnetism]. Paris: Mame.
De Morgan, S. (1863). From matter to spirit. London: Longman, Green, Longman,
Roberts & Green.
Dingwall, E. J. (Ed.). (19671968). Abnormal hypnotic phenomena: A survey of
nineteenth-century case, (4 Vols.). London: J. & A. Churchill.
Dodds, E. R. (1973). The Greeks and the irrational. Berkeley-Los Angeles-London:
University of California Press. (Original work published 1951).
Edelman, N. (1995). Voyantes, guerisseusses et visionnaires en France 17851914
[Seers, healers and visionaries in France 17851914]. Paris: Albin Michel.
Edmonds, J. W., & Dexter, G. T. (1853). Spiritualism (Vol. 1). New York: Partridge &
Brittan.
Edmonds, J. W., & Dexter, G. T. (1855). Spiritualism (Vol. 2). New York: Partridge &
Brittan.
Ellenberger, H. F. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious. New York: Basic Books.
Ellenberger, H. F. (1991). The story of Helene Preiswek: A critical study with new
documents. History of Psychiatry, 2, 4152.
Esdaile, J. (1846). Mesmerism in India, and its practical application in surgery and
medicine. London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans.
Faireld, F. G. (1875). Ten years with spiritual mediums. New York: D. Appleton.
Flournoy, T. (1900). From India to the planet Mars: A study of a case of somnambulism. New York: Harper & Brothers.
Freud, S. (1923). A seventeenth-century demonological neurosis. The standard edition of
the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 19). London: Hogarth Press.
Freud, S. (1936). A disturbance of memory on the Acropolis. The standard edition of
the complete psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 22). London: Hogarth
Press.
Frigerio, A. (1989). Levels of possession awareness in Afro-Brazilian religions. Association for the Anthropological Study of Consciousness Quarterly, 5(23), 511.
Garrett, C. (1987). Spirit possession and popular religion. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Gauld, A. (1968). The founders of psychical research. New York: Schocken.
Gauld, A. (1992). A history of hypnotism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
109
110
Altering Consciousness
Laurence, J. R., & Perry, C. (1988). Hypnosis, will & memory: A psycho-legal
history. New York: Guilford.
Mesmer, F. A. (1779). Memoire sur la decouverte du magnetisme animal [Memories
on the discovery of animal magnetism]. Geneve: P. Fr. Didot le jeune, Librairie
Imprimeur de monsieur.
Metraux, A. (1955). Dramatic elements in ritual possession. Diogenes, 11, 1836.
Millett, D. (2001). Hans Berger: From psychic energy to the EEG. Perspectives in Biology
and Medicine, 44, 522542.
Moreira-Almeida, A., Lotufo Neto, F., & Carden a, E. (2008). Comparison
between Brazilian spiritist mediumship and dissociative identity disorder.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 196, 420424.
Morselli, E. (1908). Psicologia e spiritismo: Impressioni e note critiche sui fenomeni
medianici di Eusapia Paladino [Psychology and spiritism: Impressions and
critical notes on the mediumnistic phenomena of Eusapia Palladino] (2 vols.).
Turin: Fratelli Bocca.
Myers, F. W. H. (1884). On a telepathic explanation of some socalled spiritualistic phenomena: Part I. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 2,
217237.
Myers, F. W. H. (1885). Automatic writing.II. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 3, 163.
Myers, F. W. H. (1889). Automatic writing.IV.The daemon of Socrates. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 5, 522547.
Myers, F. W. H. (1890). A record of observations of certain phenomena of
trance (1). Introduction. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 6,
436442.
Myers, F. W. H. (1892). The subliminal consciousness: Chapter I. General characteristics of subliminal messages. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research, 7, 298327.
Myers, F. W. H. (1903). Human personality and its survival of bodily death (2 vols.).
London: Longmans, Green.
Oesterreich, T. K. (1974). Possession and exorcism among primitive races, in
antiquity, the Middle Ages, and modern times. New York: Causeway. (Original
work published 1921).
Pattie, F. A. (1994). Mesmer and animal magnetism: A chapter in the history of medicine. Hamilton, NY: Edmonston.
Paulet, J. J. (1784). Mesmer justie [Mesmer justied] (new ed.). Constance,
Switzerland: n.p.
Peter, B. (2005). Gassners exorcismnot Mesmers magnetismis the real predecessor of modern hypnosis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, 53, 112.
Podmore, F. (1902). Modern spiritualism: A history and a criticism (2 vols.).
London: Methuen.
Rosen, G. (1969). Madness in society: Chapters in the historical sociology of mental
illness. New York: Harper.
111
112
Altering Consciousness
Sage, M. (1904). Mrs. Piper and the Society for Psychical Research. New York:
Scott-Thaw.
Sala, J., Cardena, E., Holgado, M. C., Anez, C., Perez, P., Perinan, R., & Capafons,
A. (2008). The contributions of Ramon y Cajal and other Spanish authors
to hypnosis. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 56,
361372.
Sardou, V. (1858). Des habitations de la plane`te Jupiter [On the housing in the
planet Jupiter]. Revue spirite, 1, 223232.
Sidgwick, E. (1915). A contribution to the study of the psychology of Mrs. Pipers
trance phenomena. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 28, 1657.
Smith, S. (1964). The mediumship of Mrs. Leonard. New Hyde Park, NY: University
Books.
Society for Psychical Research. (1882). Objects of the society. Proceedings of the
Society for Psychical Research, 1, 14.
Spicer, H. (1853). Sights and sounds: The mystery of the day. London: Thomas
Bosworth.
Spiegel, D., & Cardena, E. (1991). Disintegrated experience: The dissociative
disorders revisited. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 366378.
Sudre, R. (1926). Introduction a` la metapsychique humaine. Paris: Payot.
Tanner, A. (1910). Studies in spiritism. New York: D. Appleton.
Tart, C. T. (1986). Waking up: Overcoming the obstacles to human potential. Boston:
New Science Library.
Taylor, E. (1983). William James on exceptional mental states. The 1896 Lowell
lectures. New York: Scribner.
Terhune, D. B., Cardena, E., & Lindgren, M. (2011). Dissociative tendencies and
individual differences in high hypnotic suggestibility. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry,
16, 113135.
Troubridge, U. L. (1922). The modus operandi in so-called mediumistic trance.
Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research, 32, 344378.
Van Ommeren, M. V., Sharma, B., Komproe, I., Sharma, G. K., Cardena, E., de
Jong, J. T., Poudyal, B., & Makaju, R. (2001). Trauma and loss as determinants
of medically unexplained epidemic illness in a Bhutanese refugee camp.
Psychological Medicine, 31, 12591267.
Zacharias, G. (1980). The satanic cult. London: Allen & Unwin.
CHAPTER 6
114
Altering Consciousness
Ludwig also delineated an assortment of general characteristics associated with ASC: alterations in discursive thinking, emotional expression,
signicance or meaning, subjective time, body image perception, a sense
of ineffability, reduced volitional control, hypersuggestibility, and rejuvenation. Nevertheless, one limitation of Ludwigs denition is that it
neglected to operationalize a sufcient deviation in subjective experience
(1966, p. 225). Further, the general norms considered to be indicative of
ordinary waking consciousness were not elucidated. Indeed, the general
norms for one individual or culture might differ considerably relative to
the general norms of another individual or culture.
Research from the 1960s was covered in psychologist Charles Tarts
seminal volume Altered States of Consciousness, which reected the burgeoning multidisciplinary interest in the eld of altering consciousness.
Tart (1969a) dened an altered state as a qualitative shift in his pattern
of mental functioning, that is, he feels not just a quantitative shift (more
or less alert, more or less visual imagery, sharper or duller, etc.), but also
that some quality or qualities of his mental processes (e.g., perception of
time, uctuations in body image) are different (p. 1). The usefulness of
his denition is limited, however, because he neglected to stipulate how
prominent the qualitative shift must be, or how many qualities of ones
mental processes must be different, in order for an altered state to be
inferred. Tarts volume also illustrated the importance of the psychophysiology of ASC and exemplied a wide range of phenomenal experiences
(e.g., hypnagogic states, dreams, meditation, hypnosis, psychedelic
drug use).
Out-of-Body Experiences
During an out-of-body experience (OBE), an individual experiences
him- or herself outside of the physical body, often oating or traveling
away from the body. The prevalence of OBEs ranges from 10% to more
than 80% depending on the population in question (e.g., general, students, certain personality types, groups with parapsychological interests).
115
116
Altering Consciousness
The early study of ASC suffered some degree of denitional fuzziness, though some efforts at operationalization, including the LintonLangs questionnaire (Linton & Langs, 1962) were attempted. At that
stage, the necessary and sufcient conditions for ASC to be inferred had
not been formulated, but ASC including out-of-body experiences had
begun to move out of the realm of exotica and into the laboratory.
The 1970s
Honing Denitions
In 1972, psychologist Stanley Krippner extended previous denitions
of ASC by comparing the changes that occur during ASC to the individuals
normal state rather than the comparison to general norms that Ludwig
(1966) made. Krippner proposed the following characterization: a mental
state which can be subjectively recognized by an individual (or by an
objective observer of the individual) as representing a difference in
psychological functioning from the individuals normal alert state
(1972, p. 1). While ostensibly resolving previous problems associated
with operationalizing the qualier sufcient, Krippners denition
neglected to operationalize mental state and normal alert state. In addition,
it failed to specify whether changes in the pattern and/or the intensity of
psychological functioning are different.
In response to terminological problems regarding states of consciousness, in 1975, Tart proposed the term discrete states of consciousness
(d-SoC), which he dened as a unique conguration or system of psychological structures or subsystems . . . that maintains its integrity or identity
as a recognizable system in spite of variations in input from the environment and in spite of various (small) changes in the subsystems (p. 62).
According to Tart, psychological structures include, for example, sensory
qualities and body image (i.e., content of consciousness). It is evident
that Tart is suggesting that a d-SoC is not a process (i.e., conscious awareness) that renders a system of psychological structures (content) recognizable but rather the actual system of psychological structures (content)
that is rendered recognizable. Thus, when Tart afxes the qualiers
discrete state of and state of to the concept of consciousness, he confuses
consciousness with its content (i.e., a recognizable system of psychological
structures).
Expanding Methods
Tart continued to advocate for the systematic investigation of ASC in
1972 when he proposed that the fundamental principles of the scientic
method could be utilized to address ASC using what he termed statespecic sciences (SSS), which would provide
a group of highly skilled, dedicated, and trained practitioners able to
achieve certain [states of consciousness (SoCs)], and able to agree with
one another that they have attained a common state. While in that SoC,
they might then investigate other areas of interest, whether these be totally
internal phenomena of that given state, the interaction of that state with
external, physical reality, or people in other SoCs. (p. 1206)
He also emphasized that the creation of SSS neither validates nor invalidates the activities of normal consciousness sciences . . . [It] means only
that certain kinds of phenomena may be handled more adequately within
these potential new sciences (p. 1207). Tart later rened his suggestion
by proposing that ASC could be studied on their own terms as statespecic perceptions and logics (1998, p. 103). For example, ordinary
waking states operate according to the logic of binary and linear segmentation (i.e., duality and temporality, respectively), whereas ASC such as
samadhi ostensibly do not. Tart emphasized that the methods of essential
science (observation, theorizing, prediction, communication/consensual
validation) can be applied from within various SoCs and ASCs to generate
117
118
Altering Consciousness
Psychedelics
Although it can be argued that the use of psychedelicor mindexpandingdrugs peaked during the 1960s, the majority of research on
these substances occurred during that as well as the following decade and
included studies of marijuana (e.g., Tart, 1971), psilocybin (e.g., Leary,
19671968), and lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD; e.g., Houston, 1969).
The most interesting ndings from studies of marijuana intoxication
demonstrated contradictions between the subjective experiences of the
user and objective reality. It was shown that experiences of increased
visual acuity (Moskowitz, Sharma, & Shapero, 1972), tactile sensitivity
(Milstein, MacCannell, Karr, & Clark, 1974), sensory abilities (Roth,
Tinklenberg, & Kopell, 1976), and perceptions of others emotions
(Clopton, Janowsky, Clopton, Judd, & Huey, 1979) were not reected in
related objective measures. In addition, researchers in the 1970s demonstrated marijuanas effects on attention, memory, perception of time, creativity, driving ability, cognition, and mood (reviewed in Farthing, 1992).
During this decade, Siegel (e.g., 1977) performed controlled research
on the form, color, movement, and actions of visual hallucinations produced by psychoactive substances including LSD, psilocybin, marijuana,
and mescaline by using an image classication system that participants
were trained to use to describe their experiences. Siegel and Jarvik
(1975) proposed that the same mechanism is involved in the production
of visual hallucinations by different hallucinogens (as well as other situations such as migraines) because of the similarities in the content of the
hallucinations regardless of the substance involved.
Near-Death Experiences
A global sensation, the publication of physician Raymond Moodys
book Life After Life (1975) rst brought the unique altered state that
Moody called a near-death experience (NDE), the subjective experience
of surviving clinical death, into light. Moody described 150 cases and recognized 15 commonly recurring elements of NDEs (e.g., ineffability, a
brilliant light, an out-of-body experience, a tunnel, feelings of quiet and
peace, meeting others, and a border or limit) but noted that both the
Other Inquiries
The experimental approach to ASC was extended in the early 1970s
when Jean Houston and Robert Masters (1972) developed the Altered
States of Consciousness Induction Device (ASCID) to induce religioustype experiences in a laboratory setting. The ASCID is a metal swing or
pendulum in which the subject stands upright, supported by broad bands
of canvas and wearing blindfold goggles (p. 310). Participants were more
likely to report that their experiences were religious if they were spiritual
growth seekers with a readiness or need for such an experience. Positive
aftereffects from the ASCID included improved family relationships and
a sense of continuing growth by one theologian participant (Houston &
Masters, 1972).
Another unique alteration in consciousness that garnered attention in
the 1970s was spirit possession, which involves a voluntary or involuntary
dissociative state in which the individuals personality is substituted by
that of purported spirits (Bourguignon, 1976). In possession trance, alterations of consciousness occur in which the possessing entities may speak
and engage in other observable behaviors (Bourguignon, 1976). Possession trance is a state welcomed by trance mediums who, during readings,
freely turn over control of their bodies to spirit guides, deceased loved
ones, or other friendly entities for a prescribed purpose and length of
time, as well as being embraced by other individuals engaged in certain
religious or secular practices.
Perhaps the form of altered consciousness that people experience most
often, dreaming was examined extensively during the 1970s. Though the
association between the rapid eye movement (REM) periods of sleep and
dreaming was rst noted by Aserinsky and Kleitman in 1953, the physiological parameters of dreaming were more thoroughly investigated during
the 1960s and 70s. For example, Dement (1976) noted specic brain
119
120
Altering Consciousness
wave and respiration patterns during REM periods. The content of dreams
was also studied during this decade. Snyder (1970) and colleagues collected more than 600 dream reports from roughly 50 college and medical
students and concluded that dreaming consciousness is a remarkably
faithful replica of waking life (p. 133) containing environments, objects,
and people similar to those experienced during waking consciousness.
In addition, Van de Castle (1971) found cross-cultural differences in
dream content and Winget, Kramer, and Whitman (1972) noted that
differences in gender, age, and socioeconomic status were also associated
with differences in content.
Mapping Consciousness
The development of various cartographies of consciousness that
emphasized an empirical domain was another notable feature of the
1970s. These included Ken Wilbers spectrum of consciousness, which consisted of various levels (e.g., ego, existential, Mind). Wilbers (1974, 1975,
1977) model argues that Eastern metaphysics and Western psychology are
not incompatible; rather, they address different states within the spectrum
of consciousness (e.g., Freudian psychoanalysis is useful for addressing
the Shadow level while Eastern psychologies relate to the level of
Mind).
In 1975, psychiatrist Stanlislav Grof published his seminal work
Realms of the Human Unconscious, which outlined a cartography of the
human psyche derived from his research on LSD psychotherapy. Grofs
cartography proposed spatial and/or temporal expansion of consciousness
within and beyond Einsteinian space-time, as well as psychoid experiences
where mind/matter duality ostensibly collapses (e.g., in instances of putative psychokinesis).
Psychiatrist Roland Fischer (1971, 1972, 1976) also formulated a cartography of ASC on a perceptionmeditation continuum that emphasizes
differences between ergotropic and trophotropic arousal. Ergotropic arousal
refers to hyperaroused states such as shamanic journeying experiences
while trophotropic arousal denotes hypoaroused states such as zazen or
samadhi meditation (Fischer, 1971).
In contrast to these cartographies of consciousness, which described
an empirical reality to ASC, this decade also accommodated several constructivist perspectives. This involved philosophers of religion addressing
the epistemology of ASC, especially mystical experiences. The key elements of the constructivist position were distilled in Steven Katzs inuential edited volume Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (1978). The
contributors argued that mystical experience is conceptually and linguistically shaped by the experients religious beliefs and values. Katzs position may be termed incomplete constructivism because he suggested that
not all aspects of mystical experience are shaped by ones religious tradition. In contrast, Gimello (1978) advocated hard or complete constructivism
in which mystical experience is entirely determined by the experients
religio-cultural-linguistic framework.
Summary
The 1980s
Mystical States
During the 1980s, philosophers of religion continued to reect on ASC
and substantiated the decontextualist position, as exemplied in Robert
Formans 1986 article Pure Consciousness Events and Mysticism (c.f.,
Almond, 1982; Kessler, & Prigge, 1982). Forman dened a pure consciousness event (PCE) as a waking state of consciousness devoid of phenomenological content. A substantial body of evidence in the form of introspective
accounts was produced to support the contention that the PCE exists
cross-culturally. For example, Bucknell (1989) asserted that the third
non-material jhana encountered during Buddhist meditative practice is
consistent with the introvertive mystical experience in which both the
thought-stream and sensory input have ceased, leaving zero mental content (p. 19).
The 1980s also witnessed a resurgence of anthropologically inspired
studies of consciousness, exemplied in the neoshamanic practices that
were becoming rather popular amongst westerners. For example, in a
seminal study published in 1980, Peters and Price-Williams examined
the ethnographic literature pertaining to 42 different cultures and delineated several transcultural factors indicative of shamanic ecstasy including
mastery or control with respect to both the entrance and duration of the
altered state, the ability to communicate with spectators, and postevent
memory (p. 397). In later research, Noll (1983) used a state-specic
121
122
Altering Consciousness
Empirical Attitudes
Empirical approaches to ASC continued to be developed in other areas
in the 1980s and were exemplied by clinical psychologist Ronald Pekala,
who extended research regarding ASC with quantitative instruments that
permitted operationalization of ASC (Pekala, 1985; Pekala & Levine,
19821983). The rst version of this instrument (the Phenomenology of
Consciousness Questionnaire) was revised into the Phenomenology of
Consciousness Inventory (PCI; Pekala & Kumar, 1986), a 53-item questionnaire that quanties 12 major dimensions (altered state, rationality,
positive affect, arousal, self-awareness, memory, inward absorbed attention, negative affect, altered experience, volitional control, vivid imagery,
and internal dialogue) and 14 minor dimensions (joy, sexual excitement,
love, anger, sadness, fear, body image, time sense, perception, meaning,
visual imagery amount, vividness, direction of attention, and absorption;
Pekala, Wenger, & Levine, 1985). The PCI builds on the theoretical foundations of earlier consciousness researchers in operationalizing three different states of consciousness (SoCs): identity or I-states that exhibit
nonsignicantly different phenomenological intensity and pattern parameters (Pekala, 1991, p. 231); discrete or D-states that exhibit a signicantly different intensity and pattern relative to another SoC; and
discrete altered or A-states, which are D-states that exhibit signicantly
higher altered-state-of-awareness intensity ratings relative to another SoC.
In 1985, Dittrich and his colleagues developed the APZ-OAV Questionnaire (Abnormer Psychischer Zustand refers to altered or abnormal mental states) to quantify ASC induced by hallucinogens and other stimuli
(e.g., sensory deprivation; Dittrich, von Arx, & Staub, 1985). This 66-item
questionnaire consists of three subscales: (1) oceanic boundlessness measures a positive state that may include depersonalization, ethereal happiness, and grandiosity; (2) dread of ego dissolution measures a state
involving thought disorder, ego disintegration, and paranoia; and (3)
visionary restructuralization measures a state comprising illusions, hallucinations, and synesthetic phenomena. The validity of these three dimensions is supported by the results of the International Study on Altered
States of Consciousness (Dittrich, 1998), which sampled more than one
thousand participants from six countries. Other notable quantitative
instruments that ostensibly measure constructs related to altered consciousness include Friedmans (1983) Self-Expansiveness Level Form
(SELF) and Mathes, Zevon, Roter, and Joergers (1982) Peak Experiences
Scale (PES).
Lucid Dreaming
Lucid dreaming, ones experience of being aware that one is dreaming,
gained notoriety in the 1980s. Snyder and Gackenbach (1988) found that
the majority of U.S. adults have had at least one lucid dream. The phenomenology of lucid dreams differs from that of nonlucid dreams in that
the former usually contain more auditory and kinesthetic imagery, more
control over the direction of the dream, and fewer dream characters
(Gackenbach, 1988). Perhaps the most intriguing research done on this
topic was performed by investigators at Stanford University and involved
participants able to voluntarily enter into the lucid dream state and consciously alter their eye movements (LaBerge, Nagel, Dement, & Zarcone,
1981), respiration rates (LaBerge & Dement, 1982), and level of sexual
arousal (LaBerge, Greenleaf, & Kedzierski, 1983), which were simultaneously tracked by the researchers. Tholey (1988) later proposed that lucid
dreaming could serve as a clinically relevant tool for personal integration
because resistance to frightening characters or situations is limited; the
dreamer can focus on individuals, places, times, or situations of relevance;
and the dream ego can recognize and then alter certain aspects of the
personality.
Hallucinations
The scientic paradigm shift continued to be demonstrated in the
1980s through the surge of research on hallucinations that, until that time,
were generally viewed from a psychopathological standpoint rather than
in terms of psychological processes known to be responsible for normal
123
124
Altering Consciousness
The 1980s were characterized by the development of more operationalized psychophenomenological approaches to experimentally investigate
whether an altered state effect had been induced and to empirically differentiate among ASC using quantitative instruments and anthropological
approaches. Furthermore, specic states including lucid dreaming and
hallucinations were investigated.
The 1990s
Meditation
Although research from prior decades investigating meditation (i.e., a
procedure used to intentionally control ones attention for the purpose of
achieving a short- or long-term benet) focused on the perceptual (e.g.,
Brown, Forte, Rich, & Epstein, 19821983; Walsh, 1978), emotional
Experimental Approaches
During the 1990s, psychologists began investigating shamanic phenomena using experimental rather than anthropological methodologies. For
example, Wright (1991) found that a shamanic drumming group reported
numerous shifts in mental functioning (e.g., changes in time sense, affect,
and imagery vividness) relative to baseline. Maxeld (1994) reported experimental evidence suggesting that shamanic drumming facilitates theta activity that, in turn, promotes the production of ASC. In another study,
Woodside, Kumar, and Pekala (1997) reported that trance postures and
monotonous drumming were associated with a myriad of phenomenological effects (e.g., self-awareness and absorption) compared to baseline. However, Woodside et al. concluded that their results were indicative of a
discrete state of consciousness rather than an altered state of consciousness.
In 1994, psychiatrist Rick Strassman and his team published preliminary data regarding a 126-item quantitative instrument (i.e., the Hallucinogen Rating Scale; HRS) that they developed to assess the subjective
effects of hallucinogenic drugs (Strassman et al., 1994). The HRS items
were derived from interviews with 19 N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT)
users and were organized according to the following six predetermined
clinical clusters: (1) somaesthesia, (2) affect, (3) perception, (4) cognition,
(5) volition, and (6) intensity. Strassman and his colleagues (1994)
discovered varying patterns of visual hallucinations, bodily dissociation,
125
126
Altering Consciousness
During the 1990s, researchers formulated techniques to further investigate the phenomenological diversity of ASCs and experimental methodologies were applied in a variety of new contexts (e.g., meditation,
shamanic drumming, hallucinogenic drugs).
127
128
Altering Consciousness
Reformatting Terms
In a recent series of theoretical essays, Rock and Krippner (2007a,
2007b, 2011) have argued that denitions of the term consciousness clearly
differentiate: (1) consciousness (i.e., awareness) from (2) the content of
consciousness (i.e., phenomenology, e.g., visual imagery, affect, time
sense), whereas denitions of [altered] states of consciousness (e.g.,
Krippner, 1972; Ludwig, 1966; Tart, 1969a) confuse consciousness with
its content. That is to say, Tart, Ludwig, and Krippner asserted that ASC
refers to shifts or deviations in the content of consciousness rather than
consciousness itself. Rock and Krippner further argued that this confusion
is avoided if the term altered pattern of phenomenal properties replaces
altered states of consciousness. This change would then compel reconceptualizing the eld of altering consciousness as altering phenomenology and have
numerous implications for future research. Paradigm shifts are necessary
for any eld of inquiry to retain its vitality and, therefore, avoid succumbing to stasis. Perhaps reconceptualizing altering consciousness as altering phenomenology will serve to revitalize this eld as we enter the second
decade of the new millennium.
Summary
During the rst decade in the new century, altered states including
hypnosis, mediumship, and hallucinogenic drug use continued to be
investigated with a multiplicity of methods and in increasingly complex
ways. In addition, the terms used to describe consciousness and its
changes have been called into question and alternatives suggested.
Concluding Remarks
The previous 50 years of consciousness research have witnessed signicant changes in the denitions, methods, and theories that investigators have used to address ASC. As members of the general public
continue to intentionally engage in, experiment with, and embrace altered
states personally (e.g., through meditation, psychedelic drugs, lucid
dreaming, and hypnosis) or simply endorse these states as interested
observers concerned with learning about them through books, articles,
and television shows, academics and researchers will ideally keep investigating these and other similar phenomena using open minds, sound methods, and varied approaches.
References
Almond, P. (1982). Mystical experience and religious doctrine. New York: Mouton.
Alvarado, C. (2000). Out-of-body experiences. In E. Carden a, S. J. Lynn,
& S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic
evidence (pp. 183218). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Anand, B., Chhina, G., & Singh, B. (1961). Some aspects of electroencephalographic studies in yogis. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology,
13, 452456.
Aserinsky, E., & Kleitman, N. (1953). Regularly occurring periods of eye motility
and concomitant phenomena during sleep. Science, 118, 273274.
Banquet, J. P. (1973). Spectral analysis of the EEG in meditation. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 35, 143151.
Baruss, I. (2003). Alterations of consciousness: An empirical analysis for social scientists. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Bentall, R. P. (2000). Hallucinatory experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, &
S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 85120). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Blanke, O., & Arzy, S. (2005). The out-of-body experience: Disturbed selfprocessing at the temporo-parietal junction. The Neuroscientist, 11, 1624.
Bourguignon, E. (1976). Possession. San Francisco: Chandler & Sharp.
129
130
Altering Consciousness
Brown, D. P., & Engler, J. (1986). The stages of mindfulness meditation: A validation study. Part II: Discussion. In K. Wilber, J. Engler, & P. Brown (Eds.),
Transformations of consciousness: Conventional and contemplative perspectives on
development (pp. 191218). Boston: Shambhala/New Science Library.
Brown, D., Forte, M., Rich, P., & Epstein, G. (19821983). Phenomenological
differences among self-hypnosis, mindfulness meditation, and imaging. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 2, 291309.
Bucknell, R. (1989). Buddhist meditation and mystical experience. Paper presented
to the 14th Annual Conference of the Australian Association for the Study of
Religions, Perth, Australia.
Cami, J., Farre, M., Mas, M., Roset, P. N., Poudevida, S., Mas, A., San, L., & de la
Torre, R. (2000). Human pharmacology of 3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (ecstasy): Psychomotor performance and subjective effects. Journal of
Clinical Psychopharmacology, 20, 455466.
Cardena, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and physically active. International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 53, 3759.
Cardena, E., Lehmann, D., Jonsson, P., Terhune, D., & Faber, P. (2007). The
neurophenomenology of hypnosis. Proceedings of the 50th Annual Convention
of the Parapsychological Association, 1730.
Cardena, E., Lynn, S. J., & Krippner, S. (2000). Varieties of anomalous experience:
Examining the scientic evidence. Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Cardena, E., Van Duijl, M., Weiner, L., & Terhune, D. (2009). Possession/trance
phenomena. In P. F. Dell & J. A. ONeil (Eds.), Dissociation and the dissociative
disorders: DSM-V and beyond (pp. 171181). New York: Routledge.
Carter, D. M., Mackinnon, A., Howard, S., Zeegers, T., & Copolov, D. (1995).
The development and reliability of the Mental Health Research Institute
Unusual Perceptions Schedule (MUPS): An instrument to record auditory hallucinatory experiences. Schizophrenia Research, 16, 157165.
Chapman, L. J., & Chapman, J. P. (1980). Scales for rating psychotic and
psychotic-like experiences as continua. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 6, 477489.
Clopton, P. L., Janowsky, D. S., Clopton, J. M., Judd, L. L., & Huey, L. (1979).
Marijuana and the perception of affect. Psychopharmacology, 61, 203206.
Dement, W. C. (1976). Some must watch while some must sleep. New York: Norton.
Dittrich, A. (1998). The standardized psychometric assessment of altered states of
consciousness (ASCs) in humans. Pharmacopsychiatry, 31, 8084.
Dittrich, A., von Arx, S., & Staub, S. (1985). International study on altered states
of consciousness (ISASC). German Journal of Psychology, 9, 319339.
Farthing, G. W. (1992). The psychology of consciousness. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Fischer, R. (1971). A cartography of ecstatic and meditative states. Science, 174,
897904.
Fischer, R. (1972). On creative, psychotic and ecstatic states. In J. White (Ed.),
The highest state of consciousness (pp. 175194). New York: Anchor Books.
Fischer, R. (1976). Transformations of consciousness II. The perceptionmeditation continuum. Connia Psychiatrica, 19, 123.
Forman, R. (1986). Pure consciousness events and mysticism. Sophia, 25, 4958.
Friedman, H. (1983). The Self-Expansiveness Level Form: A conceptualization
and measurement of a transpersonal construct. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 15, 3750.
Gackenbach, J. (1988). The psychological content of lucid versus nonlucid
dreams. In J. Gackenbach & S. LaBerge (Eds.), Conscious mind, sleeping brain:
Perspectives on lucid dreaming (pp. 181220). New York: Plenum.
Gifford-May, D., & Thompson, N. (1994). Deep states of meditation: Phenomenological reports of experience. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 26, 117138.
Gimello, R. (1978). Mysticism and meditation. In S. T. Katz (Ed.), Mysticism and
philosophical analysis (pp. 17099). London: Sheldon Press.
Gouzoulis-Mayfrank, E., Heekeren, K., Neukirch, A., Stoll, M., Stock, C., Obradovic,
M., & Kovar, K.-A. (2005). Psychological effects of (s)-ketamine and
N,N-Dimethyltryptamine (DMT): A double-blind, cross-over study in healthy volunteers. Pharmacopsychiatry, 38, 301311.
Grifths, R., Richards, W., McCann, U., & Jesse, R. (2006). Psilocybin can occasion mystical-type experiences having substantial and sustained personal
meaning and spiritual signicance. Psychopharmacology, 187, 268283.
Grof, S. (1975). Realms of the human unconscious: Observations from LSD research.
New York: Viking Press.
Holden, J. M., Greyson, B., & James, D. (2009). The handbook of near-death experiences: Thirty years of investigation. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Houston, J. (1969). Phenomenology of the psychedelic experience. In R. E. Hicks
& P. J. Fink (Eds.), Psychedelic drugs. New York: Grune & Stratton.
Houston, J., & Masters, R. E. L. (1972). The experimental induction of religioustype experiences. In J. White (Ed.), The highest state of consciousness (pp. 303
321). New York: Anchor Books.
Katz, S. T. (1978). Language, epistemology, and mysticism. In S. T. Katz (Ed.),
Mysticism and philosophical analysis (pp. 2274). London: Sheldon Press.
Kay, S. R., Opler, L. A., & Fiszbein, A. (1988). Reliability and validity of the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale for schizophrenics. Psychiatry Research, 23,
276286.
Kessler, G., & Prigge, N. (1982). Is mystical experience everywhere the same?
Sophia, 21, 3955.
Krippner, S. (1972). Altered states of consciousness. In J. White (Ed.), The highest
state of consciousness (pp. 15). Garden City, NJ: Doubleday.
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientic revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
LaBerge, S., & Dement, W. C. (1982). Voluntary control of respiration during
REM sleep. Sleep Research, 11, 107.
LaBerge, S., Greenleaf, W., & Kedzierski, B. (1983). Physiological responses to
dreamed sexual activity during lucid REM sleep. Psychophysiology, 20, 454455.
131
132
Altering Consciousness
LaBerge, S., Nagel, L., Dement, W., & Zarcone, V. (1981). Lucid dreaming veried by volitional communication during REM sleep. Perceptual and Motor
Skills, 52, 727732.
Launay, G., & Slade, P. D. (1981). The measurement of hallucinatory predisposition in male and female prisoners. Personality and Individual Differences, 2,
221234.
Leary, T. (19671968). The religious experience: Its production and interpretation. Journal of Psychedelic Drugs, 1, 323.
Lilly, J. C. (1972). The center of the cyclone: An autobiography of inner space. New
York: Julian Press.
Linton, H. B., & Langs, R. J. (1962). Subjective reactions to lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25). Archives of General Psychiatry, 6, 352368.
Lofwall, M. R., Grifths, R. R., & Mintzer, M. Z. (2006). Cognitive and subjective
acute dose effects of intramuscular ketamine in healthy adults. Experimental
and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 14, 439449.
Ludwig, A. M. (1966). Altered states of consciousness. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 15, 225234.
Lutz, A., Slagter, H. A., Dunne, J. D., & Davidson, R. J. (2008). Attention regulation and monitoring in meditation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12, 163169.
Lutz, A., & Thompson, E. (2003), Neurophenomenology: Integrating subjective
experience and brain dynamics in the neuroscience of consciousness. Journal
of Consciousness Studies, 10, 3152.
Mathes, E. W., Zevon, M. A., Roter, P. M., & Joerger, S. M. (1982). Peak experience tendencies: Scale development and theory testing. Journal of Humanistic
Psychology, 22, 92108.
Maupin, E. W. (1965). Individual differences in response to a Zen meditation
exercise. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 29, 139145.
Maxeld, M. (1994). The journey of the drum. ReVision, 16, 157163.
Milstein, S. L., MacCannell, K. L., Karr, G., & Clark, S. (1974). Marijuanaproduced changes in cutaneous sensitivity and affect: Users and non-users.
Pharmacology, Biochemistry, and Behavior, 2, 367374.
Moody, R. A. (1975). Life after life. New York: Bantam Books.
Moskowitz, H., Sharma, S., & Shapero, M. (1972). A comparison of the effects of
marihuana and alcohol on visual functions. In M. F. Lewis (Ed.), Current
research in marihuana (pp. 129150). New York: Academic.
Noll, R. (1983). Shamanism and schizophrenia: A state specic approach to the
schizophrenia metaphor of shamanic states. American Ethnologist, 10, 443459.
Noll, R. (1985). Mental imagery cultivation as a cultural phenomenon: The role of
visions in shamanism. Current Anthropology, 26, 443461.
Oakley, D. A., & Halligan, P. W. (2009). Hypnotic suggestion and cognitive
neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 264270.
Osis, K. (1979). Insiders view of the OBE: A questionnaire study. In W. G. Roll (Ed.),
Research in parapsychology 1978 (pp. 5052). Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
Osis, K., Bokert, E., & Carlson, M. L. (1973). Dimensions of the meditative experience. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 5, 109135.
Pekala, R. J. (1985). A psychophenomenological approach to mapping and diagramming states of consciousness. Journal of Religion and Psychical Research,
8, 199214.
Pekala, R. J. (1987). The phenomenology of meditation. In M. A. West (Ed.), The
psychology of meditation (pp. 5980). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Pekala, R. J. (1991). Quantifying consciousness: An empirical approach. New York:
Plenum.
Pekala, R. J., & Kumar, V. K. (1986). The differential organization of the structures of consciousness during hypnosis and a baseline condition. Journal of
Mind and Behavior, 7, 515540.
Pekala, R. J., & Levine, R. L. (19821983). Quantifying states of consciousness
via an empirical-phenomenological approach. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality: The Scientic Study of Consciousness, 2, 5171.
Pekala, R. J., Wenger, C. F., & Levine, R. L. (1985). Individual differences in phenomenological experience: States of consciousness as a function of absorption.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 125132.
Peters, L. (1989). Shamanism: Phenomenology of a spiritual discipline. Journal of
Transpersonal Psychology, 21, 115137.
Peters, L., & Price-Williams, D. (1980). Towards an experiential analysis of shamanism. American Ethnologist, 1, 397418.
Riba, J., Valle, M., Urbano, G., Yritia, M., Morte, A., & Barbanoj, M. J. (2003).
Human pharmacology of ayahuasca: Subjective and cardiovascular effects,
monoamine metabolite excretion, and pharmacokinetics. Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 306, 7383.
Rock, A. J., & Beischel, J. (2008). Quantitative analysis of mediums conscious
experiences during a discarnate reading versus a control task: A pilot study.
Australian Journal of Parapsychology, 8, 157179.
Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2007a). Does the concept of altered states of consciousness rest on a mistake? International Journal of Transpersonal Studies,
26, 3340.
Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2007b). Shamanism and the confusion of consciousness with phenomenological content. North American Journal of Psychology, 9,
485500.
Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2011). States of consciousness redened as patterns
of phenomenal properties: An experimental application. In D. Cvetkovic
& I. Cosic (Eds.), States of consciousness: Experimental insights into meditation,
waking, sleep and dreams. New York: Springer.
Romme, M., & Escher, A. (1989). Hearing voices. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 15, 209216.
Roth, W. T., Tinklenberg, J., & Kopell, B. (1976). Subjective benets and drawbacks of marihuana and alcohol. In S. Cohen & R. C. Stillman (Eds.), The
therapeutic potential of marihuana (pp. 255269). New York: Plenum.
133
134
Altering Consciousness
Saklani, A. (1988). Preliminary tests for psi-ability in shamans of Garhwal Himalaya. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 55, 6070.
Shor, R. E., & Orne, E. C. (1962). Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility,
Form A. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Siegel, R. K. (1977). Hallucinations. Scientic American, 237, 132140.
Siegel, R. K., & Jarvick, M. E. (1975). Drug-induced hallucinations in animals
and man. In R. K. Siegel & L. J. West (Eds.), Hallucinations: Behavior, experience
and theory (pp. 81162). New York: Wiley.
Silverman, J. (1969). Shamans and acute schizophrenia. American Anthropologist,
69, 2131.
Slade, P. D., & Bentall, R. P. (1988). Sensory deception: A scientic analysis of hallucination. London: Croom-Helm.
Snyder, F. (1970). The phenomenology of dreaming. In L. Madow & L. H. Snow
(Eds.), The psychodynamic implications of the physiological studies on dreams
(pp. 124151). Springeld, IL: Charles C. Thomas.
Snyder, T. J., & Gackenbach, J. (1988). Individual differences associated with
lucid dreaming. In J. Gackenbach & S. LaBerge (Eds.), Conscious mind, sleeping
brain: Perspectives on lucid dreaming (pp. 221260). New York: Plenum.
Spanos, N. P., Radtke, H. L., Hodgins, D. C., Bertrand, L. D., Stam, H.,
& Dubreuil, D. L. (1983). The Carleton University Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale: Stability, reliability, and relationships with expectancies and hypnotic
experiences. Psychological Reports, 53, 555563.
Strassman, R. J., Qualls, C. R., Uhlenhuth, E. H., & Kellner, R. (1994). Doseresponse study of N,N-dimethyltryptamine in humans: II Subjective effects
and preliminary results of a new rating scale. Archives of General Psychiatry,
51, 98108.
Tart, C. T. (1967). A second psychophysiological study of out-of-the body experiences in a gifted subject. International Journal of Parapsychology, 9, 251258.
Tart, C. T. (1969a). Introduction. In C. T. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness
(pp. 17). New York: Wiley.
Tart, C. T. (1969b). A further psychophysiological study of out-of-the body experiences in a gifted subject. Proceedings of the Parapsychological Association, 6,
4344.
Tart, C. T. (1971). On being stoned: A psychological study of marijuana intoxication.
Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books.
Tart, C. T. (1972). States of consciousness and state-specic sciences. Science,
176, 12031210.
Tart, C. T. (1975). States of consciousness. New York: Dutton.
Tart, C. T. (1979). Measuring the depth of an altered state of consciousness, with
particular reference to self-report scales of hypnotic depth. In E. Fromm &
R. E. Shor (Eds.), Hypnosis: Developments in research and new perspectives
(2nd ed., pp. 567601). New York: Aldine.
135
PART II
Cultural Perspectives
CHAPTER 7
140
Altering Consciousness
This chapter will describe important experiences, states of consciousness, levels of consciousness, and real-world effects emphasized by these
traditions, relate them to features of meditation procedures, and offer
reections from the perspective of ongoing scientic research.
Experiences
II. The major Eastern traditions focusing on developing higher states of
consciousness all hold that meditation, when successful, can enable the
activity of the mind to settle down and disappear entirely so that its fundamental inner nature, independent of all the contents of ordinary awareness, can be experienced with clarity. Different traditions may interpret
the experience differently, according to their different theories, but there
is wide agreement that the experience is fundamentally important, for it
is said to enliven our true inner nature and help free it to express itself naturally and fulllingly throughout life. Gaining the experience is also said
to enhance psychological and physiological integration and functioning
and to have all sorts of benecial effects, including liberation of our natural tendencies for compassion and helpfulness and enhanced performance
in all areas of life. And most important for our present discussion, it is said
to be the basis of growth of a unique higher state of consciousness referred
to as liberation or enlightenment, the overarching goal of all the major
meditation traditions.
The experience itself is extraordinarily simple. Indeed, it appears to be
the logical ultimate of simplicity. For it has nothing in it allno perception of objects, no colors or sounds, no feelings or emotions, no thoughts.
This of course is not easy to imagine. In fact, it is impossible to imagine. For
if anything we can imagine were in it, it would not be this completely
empty experience. What is the experience like? By all accounts it is not like
anything at all. Just itself. Yet it is different from unconsciousness. For
unlike unconsciousness, when one comes out of the experience, one can
remember it. What is it remembered as? Not as anything at all. Just itself.
Some traditions, such as Yoga and Vedanta, call the experience pure
consciousness inasmuch as it appears to be consciousness itself, that is,
what remains when everything one is conscious of has been removed from
consciousness. Buddhist traditions generally refer to it as emptiness,
reecting the fact that it is empty of everything that can be imagined.
Vedanta also refers to it as Being, since all that can be said about it when
one emerges seems to be that it was. Many Buddhists also often refer to it
as nonbeing, since there seems to be nothing there. Zen Buddhists refer
to it in all of these ways, reecting both the usefulness and inadequacy of
all these terms. All the traditions naturally link the terms used to their preferred metaphysical beliefs. But all questions of metaphysics and terminology aside, in tradition after tradition all over the world, the descriptions
make it clear that what is being referred to appears to be completely empty
of empirical content, so empty, in fact, that it does not even contain the
internal perceptual manifold or space in which such content could
appear.
The standard descriptions of the experience can easily seem incomprehensible to people who have never had it. So they may often try to explain
them away as empty words, reecting little more than the preconceptions
of people committed to metaphysical traditions and their terminology.
People who have had the experience, however, nd the above sorts of
descriptions quite natural, regardless of their backgrounds, metaphysical
or not. Indeed, anyone with much familiarity with the topic is likely to
know, or at least know about, people who had the experience spontaneously and only later became drawn to some meditation tradition or other
after they learned that it seemed to describe the experience they had
already had.
Laboratory studies of meditators also give us good reason to take the
above sorts of experiential reports seriously. Meditation traditions have
reported for centuries that the experience is accompanied by signicant
reduction of metabolic activity, including most conspicuously complete
cessation of respiration. This is found in many Indian traditions, including, for example, the Yoga Sutras, the canonical text of Yoga. It is found
in ancient Taoist texts. The association is so standard that Chinese Zen
even uses the expression breath stops as a name for the experience itself.
Laboratory studies of people practicing traditional meditation procedures
now provide objective, scientically signicant corroboration of such
reports. Studies of people practicing the Transcendental Meditation (TM)
technique from Advaita Vedanta, for example, show extremely high correlation between reported instances of the experience and cessation of perceptible respiratory activity, as reported in the traditional literature. They
also report that the O2 and CO2 levels in the blood remain unchanged
during these episodes of respiratory suspension, consistent with the traditional accounts of reduction of metabolic activity. They also have found
other physiological parameters unknown to prescientic observers, such
as high frontal alpha EEG coherence, correlated with this and closely
related meditative experiences. (e.g., Travis et al., 2010; Travis & Wallace,
1997)
The application of these ndings to the question of whether traditional
sorts of descriptions of the pure consciousness/emptiness experience
141
142
Altering Consciousness
This is not to say that reports that are false and/or simply confused cannot also occur.
Meditation traditions have accordingly devised various protocols to separate valid from
invalid reports. To minimize the risk of their being thwarted, these protocols are generally
not a matter of public record and will not be discussed here.
143
144
Altering Consciousness
From the perspective of our ordinary waking state experience, these six
experiences, lled with such things as expansion of self, rened perception, bliss, universal love, and unity with all of nature, are all quite
remarkable. They are precisely the kinds of things that often attract people, especially in the West, to meditation in the rst place.
The rst thing that we can note is that all of these higher states of consciousness are dened in terms of the relation of pure consciousness/emptiness to all the other contents of our awareness. In the rst of these states,
pure consciousness/emptiness is experienced alone by itself. And this
experience is widely held to be the precondition of recognizing the experiential nature of consciousness itself, as contrasted with the all the other
things we experience, in the rst place. That this should be the case
should not be surprising. Our attention is normally drawn to what is
changing in experience. This is a psychological truism, and information
145
146
Altering Consciousness
screen but direct expressions of its nature. But for our purposes it will be
enough simply to recognize the typical descriptions of the phenomenological nature of HS3, where everything, internal and external alike, is perceived as emerging from the same pure consciousness/emptiness that one
experiences in HS1. With this, the whole universe, oneself included, is
perceived as a single unied existence.3
We should note here, however, that while major nondual traditions
such as Zen Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta clearly emphasize all the
higher states as described above, nondual traditions such as Yoga and
Dvaita Vedanta argue that one could never in fact perceive the single
ground of everything, despite how things might appear to an advanced
experiencer. For even if pure consciousness can (and should) be experienced as the ground of different individuals awareness, this does not
imply that the pure consciousness experienced by each has the same
source, any more than pure water drawn from two different wells has to
come from the same aquifer. Theravada Buddhism rejects the notion that
the emptiness an advanced practitioner can recognize everywhere represents a fundamental ground either of oneself or the universe as a whole,
for they reject the notion of such a ground in the rst place. Nevertheless,
all questions of metaphysical interpretations aside, there is wide agreement among the major traditions that the above higher states (or variations
extremely close to them), dened phenomenologically, not only exist but
also represent important advanced stages of spiritual growth.4
V. The above higher states map is rather abstract. So to ll it out somewhat, let us return to the experiences described earlier. The descriptions
3
consist of four pairs of examples drawn from Zen and TM. The rst pair
(E1 and E2) consists of examples of pure consciousness/emptiness; the
second (E3 and E4) consists of examples of what is often called expansion
of self; the third (E5 and E6) consists of examples of rened aesthetic and
expanded affective perception; and the fourth (E7 and E8) consists of
examples of perceptions of a deep unity with all of nature. The relation
of the rst pair of experiences (E1 and E2) to the higher states map is
transparent: both experiences, as already noted, are examples of pure
consciousness/emptiness by itself, the rst higher state described by
the map. The relation of the other pairs to the map, however, will need
some explanation.
The second pair, for example, states
E3. A thousand new sensations are bombarding my senses, a thousand
new paths are opening before me . . . a warm love pervade[s] my whole
being, because I know that I am not just my little self but a great big
miraculous Self. My constant thought is to have everybody share this deep
satisfaction. (Zen)
E4. Then I knew that my little me had become big Me . . . I felt like I had
been reborn into the purity and innocence of a new-born child, yet I felt
wise, like a person who had lived for a long time. My inner awareness is
immovable, stable, integrated, exible and condent. I am no longer
dependent on changing circumstances, friendships, or activities for an
inner stability peace and fulllment. (TM)
147
148
Altering Consciousness
We should note that Theravada Buddhism, emphasizing the Buddhist doctrine of noself, eschews such talk about Self. However East-Asian Mahayana Buddhism, referring
to the Mahaparisamadhi Sutra they take to be preserved in Tibet and China but lost in India
and South-Asia, regularly asserts that the no-self doctrine is a preliminary one that
Buddha said was to be superseded (for sufciently advanced practitioners) by a doctrine
of transcendental Self of the sort described above. Thus the above terminology, although
consistent with Mahayana, is inconsistent with Theravada. Terminology aside, however,
they all appear to have the experiences described above.
recognize for example that inconsistent claims about the contents and
implications of experiences often arise from the fact that different states
of consciousness are being referred to. It can also help us see that seemingly unrelated descriptions can often actually reect the same higher
state. Sorting things out in this way is not always easy, of course, since
experiential accounts are often formulated in and/or alluded to in very different ways in different traditions and cultures. Still, with the above map
otherwise obscure relationships can often become transparent. Thus, for
example, it is easy to see that the following account of a disciples experience, written by Shankara, the 8th-century Advaita Vedanta Master, refers
to the maps highest state, HS3.
I dwell within all beings as the Atman [Self], pure consciousness, the
ground of all phenomena, internal and external. I am both the enjoyer
and that which is enjoyed. In the days of my ignorance, I used to think of
these as being separate from myself. Now I know that I am all. (Shankara,
1970, p. 105)
On its own, the assertion the sound rain is the sermon you are giving
might simply seem to be a typical Zen enigma. But Butsugens meaning
becomes clear when he follows the above remark with the story of Genshs
(another famous Zen master) responding to a monks warning shout of
Tiger! by shouting back,
It is you who are the tiger!
Tiger, rain, you, everything . . . all one thing. Thats how it seems in the
maps highest state. For, D. T. Suzuki, commenting on the above text,
adds, here all the worlds in the ten quarters are [experienced here as]
your whole body (p. 6).
The maps phenomenological categories can thus, in short, be used to
identify state-specic structural features of diverse types of experiences,
149
150
Altering Consciousness
The best-known examples of this, of course, are the traditional disputes between Theravada
and Mahayana.
7
Portions of this section have been adapted from Shear, in Walach and Schmidt, in press.
8
Technically this is identiable as the deepest stratum of L3. For ease of expression, and to
emphasize its importance, however, it will be referred to here as a separate level (L4)
rather than the deepest stratum of L3.
We are all familiar with the rst two levels, senses and discursive
thinking. The phenomenological nature of the rst level, the senses,
needs no special explanation. The second level, discursive thinking, is
where thinking in words, as in ordinary internal discourse, takes place.
The third level, discriminative intellect, is more abstract. It is said to
underlie the activity of discursive thinking and intelligent activity in general. Without it, we would not be able to distinguish different sensory
objects, recognize that words are particular kinds of objects, or even
understand that words relate to other things, much less relate to them
meaningfully. As abstract as this level is, however, its existence can be recognized experientially in the preverbal thinking of the kinds ordinary people sometimes, and highly creative people often, report.
The deeper levels are less likely to be familiar. All of them lie outside the
ordinary range of experience. They are all highly abstract. And they are
usually rst experienced clearly only as a result of meditation. Level L4,
pure individuality or ego, at rst may appear to be completely empty
and thus seem to be the experience of pure consciousness/emptiness we
have been discussing. For it is completely devoid of all sensations, thoughts,
images, and other localized phenomenal objectsall the kinds of things, in
other words, that we are ordinarily aware of. This can occur after the activity
of the more supercial levels has settled in meditation and their phenomenal objects have disappeared, while one nevertheless remains awake. It is
in effect experience of the space of mindthe phenomenological manifold. Traditionally the experience is likened to that of being a disembodied
observer in the midst of vast emptiness. Thus, in the language of Vedanta,
one is said to hold ones individuality in a void of abstract fullness,
steady like a lamp in a windless place.9
This experience might easily be confused with that of pure consciousness/
emptiness discussed above. But unlike the experience of pure consciousness/
emptiness, this experience is not completely empty, phenomenologically
speaking. For the sense of being a disembodied observer or minds eye
in the midst of vast emptiness makes it clear that it still contains the Iit
structure of ordinary experience, even if the it has been reduced so far
towards nothingness that nothing but the emptiness of the phenomenal
manifold remains to be experienced. In the middle of the experience, one
does not think Ah, emptiness, since this would be a thought, and there
9
The above terminology is from the tradition of Advaita Vedanta, as in Maharishi, 1967.
Compare also the rst of the tree experiences in the following from the Zen tradition:
[inner] space becomes the object of consciousness, followed by an awareness of
objectless innity, and then by absorption into a void which has nothingness as its object
(Austin, 1998, p. 474).
151
152
Altering Consciousness
are no thoughts or other phenomenal objects here. But the empty structure
can be remembered, and recognized conceptually, when one returns to
more ordinary levels of awareness. It can also be remembered as permeated
by abstract undifferentiated objectless bliss.
Level L5, pure bliss (or pure positive affect), is even more abstract. For
here there is no longer any sense even of being an observer or having a
vantage point. Thus even the empty subjectobject duality of L4 is no longer
present. All that remains is abstract bliss or well-being itselfhappiness
beyond the superlative, as the Bhagavad Gita, canonical to most Indian
traditions, puts it.
Level L6, pure consciousness (pure emptiness), is simply the pure
consciousness/emptiness we have been discussing, the logical ultimate of
abstraction.
VIII. The basic link between the levels and states maps is straightforward: The pure consciousness/emptiness of the deepest level, L6, of the
levels map is the same pure consciousness/emptiness central to the denitions of all the states described by the higher states map. The rst higher
state HS1 amounts to experiencing this deepest level by itself. The second
higher state HS2 amounts to experiencing it as a stable component of ones
awareness in general. The third higher state HS3 amounts to experiencing
everything in terms of its nature. And so far as the traditions that focus on
these higher states are concerned, the central function of meditation is to
enable attention to settle down through all the levels of inner awareness
until the deepest level is rst experienced and then enlivened throughout
all of ones awareness in the appropriate ways.
The same process of moving attention from the surface levels through
the intermediate levels to the deepest level and back again also is found
to enliven the intermediate levels as well. Which particular levels are enlivened to what degree is highly variable and depends on such things as the
particular techniques practiced and the nature and degree of development
of individual meditators. But it is a widely reported effect. And it is not
hard to recognize in some of the experiences we described earlier.
Repeated experience of the deep bliss-lled level L5, for example, is
often followed by experiences of aesthetic beauty and expansive love such
as those described in
E5. I noticed a totally new feeling of softness and sweetness develop. There
were days when I felt my heart melting as if I could take everything in creation into myself and cherish it with the greatest love. Often I would have
long periods of the day when everything I saw seemed to be glowing with
divine radiance. (TM)
E3 . . . a warm love pervade[s] my whole being, because I know that I am
not just my little self but a great big miraculous Self. My constant thought
is to have everybody share this deep satisfaction. (Zen)
And the same kind of perceptual renement is naturally evident in experiences such as the following, characteristic of the highest state of the states
map.
E7. It also seems that every object contains all sizes of waves, all in some kind
of synchrony. Yet underlying that, there is no movement or uctuation. (TM)
E8. The least act, such as eating or scratching an arm, is not at all simple. It
is merely a visible moment in a network of causes and effects reaching forward into Unknowingness and back into an innity of Silence where individual consciousness cannot even enter. (Zen)
The above examples should be enough to give an idea, at least in principle, of how the states and levels maps have traditionally been used both
to help understand meditation-related experiences and to evaluate the
degree of development of meditators.
Practical Effects
IX. In culture after culture, it is taken for granted that access to the deeper
levels of awareness and development of higher states of consciousness
153
154
Altering Consciousness
and the goal are as different as a boat and the shore it should take one to.
Ancient texts and modern teachers alike often make it clear that they do
not think of the goal in terms of withdrawal from life but as the basis for
maximum success in it.
The traditions we have been discussing are often quite explicit about
this. It is a theme in many Zen stories. It is expressed in the BhagavadGitas injunction that we should become established in pure consciousness as the basis for performing action (yogastah kurukarmani). The fact
that this injunction is given to a warrior on the battleeld, where performance is a life-and-death matter, is especially telling. The same theme is
a well-known feature of the Zen and Taoist martial arts that have had
ample timeand the highest motiveto determine what really does and
does not really work in practice. And, moving from battle to high culture,
throughout much of Asia practices designed to produce higher states are
integrated into the training in artistic disciplines such as poetry, calligraphy, painting, and dance, both because of the efciency in action and
the creativity, rened perception, deep positive affect, and intimacy with
nature they are thought to produce. 10 Comparable ideas have been
reected in well-known Taoist texts and stories about artisans as well as
artists and warriors since the time of Laotse and Chuangtse.
As valuable as such purported external effects of higher states might
be, the major meditation traditions all consider them secondary to the
internal psychological ones. These include such things as psychological
stability, happiness, joy, creativity, freedom from dysfunctional cravings,
and liberation of our natural tendencies to be concerned for the welfare
of othersall features of what psychologists today often refer to as selfactualization.
XI. How seriously should we take such claims? All of them, internal as
well as external, are just the kinds of things that modern scientic protocols are designed to examine.11 And in recent decades, thousands of studies have been conducted on the psychological, physiological, and
10
Compare, for example, D. T. Suzukis fascinating Zen and Japanese Culture (Suzuki,
1970).
11
Claims about fantastic abilities such as being able to become invisible, walk on water,
change ones size at will, and so forth, are also often found. Texts such as the Yoga Sutras
even list techniques intended to develop them in the service of enlivening subtler levels
of awareness and helping the nervous system become fully integrated. Such texts also contain strong warnings, however, that it is all too easy to become attached to such abilities
and distracted from the goal of enlightenment. In the absence of credible scientic evidence for such abilities, however, we need not deal with them here.
155
156
Altering Consciousness
The two preceding paragraphs were adapted from the Introduction to Shear, 2006,
p. xvi.
insist that it is likely to be years, and others hold that only very few people
have the ability to gain them at all.
Perhaps because the topic is relatively new to modern Western culture, people nevertheless have often tended to lump all meditation procedures together and think of them as more or less equivalent. This has led
to signicant errors in interpreting the existing research. One has been to
take the many conicting outcomes on given variables as implying that
meditation (conceived generically) has no signicant effect at all. An
opposite error has been to assume that results found for one procedure
can simply be presumed to be produced by other procedures as well.
Both of these mistakes are of course methodologically unsound. They
are also unfortunate. The rst diminishes interest in further research.
The second has often led people to begin to practice particular procedures on the basis of results reported for some other procedure and, not
nding the expected result, to become disillusioned and reject meditation
in general.
What is needed is a concerted, nuanced research program to determine
which procedures produce what experiences and states on what subpopulations and over what time frames. Only then will we know how practical
the idea of gaining the remarkable experiences, states, and effects we have
been discussing really is.
References
Austin, J. H. (1998). Zen and the brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kapleau, P. (Ed.). (1972). The three pillars of Zen. Boston: Beacon Press.
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. (1967). The Bhagavad-Gita: A new translation and commentary. Baltimore: Penguin Books.
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi. (1977). Creating an ideal society. West Germany: MERU
Press.
Shankara. (1970). Shankaras crest jewel of discrimination (translated by Swami
Prabhavananda & C. Isherwood). New York: Mentor Books.
Shear, J. (Ed.). (2006). Introduction to The experience of meditation. St. Paul, MN:
Paragon House.
Shear, J. (in press). Meditation as rst-person methodology: Real promiseand
problems. In H. Walach & S. Schmidt (Eds.), Meditation: Neuroscientic
approaches and philosophical explanations. New York: Springer.
Shear, J., & Mukherjee, S. P. (Eds.). (2006). Consciousness: A deeper scientic
search. Kolkata, India: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture.
Suzuki, D. T. (1970). Zen and Japanese culture. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Suzuki, D. T. (1971). What is Zen? New York: Harper and Row.
157
158
Altering Consciousness
Travis, F. T., Haaga, D. H., Hagelin, J., Tanner, M., Arenander, A., Nidich, S.,
Gaylord-King, C., Grosswald, S., Rainforth, M., & Schneider, R. (2010). A
self-referral default brain state: Patterns of coherence, power, and eLORETA
sources during eyes-closed rest and the transcendental meditation practice.
Cognitive Processes, 11, 2130.
Travis, F. T., & Wallace, R. K. (1997). Autonomic patterns during respiratory
suspensions: Possible markers of transcendental consciousness. Psychophysiology, 34, 3946.
CHAPTER 8
160
Altering Consciousness
reassembling each person with new capacities and powers that empowered the shaman as a wounded healer.
Eliades suggestion that shamanism was a worldwide phenomenon,
sharing common characteristics and functions in diverse cultures, was
reinforced by a subsequent generation of researchers (Halifax, 1979;
Harner, 1982; Hultkrantz, 1978) who emphasized additional features of
shamanism such as: occurring in hunter-gatherer societies; serious illness
as part of the selection process; a calling by the spirits; a death/rebirth
experience; a deliberate vision quest for spirit contact; the capacity to y;
a special relationship to animal spirits involving transformation into an
animal; and the potential for malevolent use of power to cause sickness
or death. These intuitive and impressionistic approaches to shamanism
have led to the assimilation of many different types of practitioners under
the label of shamanism. Uncertainty regarding the empirical status of shamans and their characteristics has persisted because of the relative recency
of formal cross-cultural studies.
161
162
Altering Consciousness
Shamanistic Healers
In addition to the shamans, other types of religious practitioners
(shaman/healers, mediums, and many healers) also shared the core characteristic of shamanism suggested by Eliade (1964), namely altering consciousness in community rituals to interact with spiritual entities.
Furthermore, they also all engage in divination and healing rituals. These
common features that they share with shamans led Winkelman (1990)
to propose the inclusive term shamanistic healers. Shamanistic healers
represent a human universal; every society has religious healing practitioners who have a central concern with ritual procedures for altering consciousness. Shamanistic healers also share other central characteristics:
spiritual interpretations of therapeutic processes; the utilization of spirit
entities as projective mechanisms for representing the unconscious; symbolic and ritual restoration of social relations; and removal of illness attributed to spirits or other humans.
163
164
Altering Consciousness
165
166
Altering Consciousness
capacities directly related to shamanism because the features of psychedelicinduced experiences are directly related to shamanism, such as:
providing access to a spiritual world;
producing an experience of the separation of ones soul or spirit from the body;
activating powers within and outside of the person, including the sense of the
presence of spirits and their incorporation into ones body;
establishing relationships with animals;
inducing an experience of transformation into an animal;
provoking an ego death and transformation or rebirth;
providing information through visions;
producing healing; and
inducing an enhancement of social cohesion
(Winkelman, 2010).
The worldwide association of plant drugs that profoundly alter consciousness with shamanistic activities points to their intrinsic relationships
involving the innate properties of our neurotransmission systems and
altered consciousness. Spiritual traditions worldwide consider these exogenous sources of neurotransmitter substances to be the origin of deities
and the reason for their spiritual and consciousness-transforming practices. These principles of altered consciousness are at the core of many,
perhaps all spiritual traditions; consequently, we must address the nature
of spirituality and altered consciousness in terms of the brain effects of the
variety of agents and activities that provoke these experiences. The phenomenological similarities of drug (psilocybin) and natural mystical experiences illustrated by Grifths and co-workers (2006) double-masked
study tell us that there are common substrates in the brain and neurotransmitters that underlie experiences of altered consciousness, irrespective of their origins or interpretations.
Understanding the relationships among natural and drug-induced alterations of consciousness requires an evolutionary perspective that reveals
endogenous mechanisms reecting ancient evolutionary adaptations. These
adaptations enhanced our ability to utilize exogenous sources of neurotransmitter substances and to more fully exploit the advantages of altered consciousness involving effects on behavior, emotions, and cognition.
167
168
Altering Consciousness
169
170
Altering Consciousness
Shamans are typically expected to be celibate before and after their ceremonies, a restriction that may be imposed for years during training.
These restrictions appear to have physiological bases associated with the
physiological dynamics of both sexual orgasm and ecstatic altered states
of consciousness (Davidson, 1980). Sexual activity requires a simultaneous increase in the activity of both the sympathetic and parasympathetic
nervous systems. When a peak of sexual excitation is achieved, the sympathetic system collapses, exhausted, and the parasympathetic state becomes
dominant. Shamanic practices induce similar patterns of excitation to collapse, a sympathetic activation followed by a parasympathetic dominant
state. Prior sexual activity could be expected to preclude as profound a
parasympathetic collapse. Consequently, sexual prohibitions can be seen
as functional in facilitating more powerful alterations of consciousness.
This is not, however the only dynamic of the relationship of sex to the
alteration of consciousness [see Maliszewski et al., Volume 2].
Extreme Exertion and Physical Stress
171
172
Altering Consciousness
The soul journey involves the capacity to take perspectives of others, manifested in seeing ones own body as it would appear from anothers perspective. The taking of the role of the other toward ones self provides for
forms of awareness in a visual-spatial mode operating independent of the
constraints of the physical body/world. This body-based sense of knowing
is the most fundamental form of information processing of the body.
173
174
Altering Consciousness
that this capacity for mental time travel primarily evolved for anticipating
future events, reecting selection for mental processing of future predictions and decision-making.
175
176
Altering Consciousness
contrasting their irrationality with the rationality of science. The methodologies were etic, using the outsiders point of view, and generally
emetic, rejecting altogether the validity of the shamanic worldview. Consequently, the methodologies employed were descriptive and at best second hand, describing the experiences of the other, but without sharing
their experiences as a fundamental part of the research approach. The values assumed in this etic approach were those of materialist science,
rejecting the validity of the alternative view of the world exposed by shamanism. An exemplar of this approach can be found in Silvermans
(1967) article that characterized shamanism as a form of psychosis.
The anthropological engagement with shamanism gave rise to a diversity of new paradigms for understanding shamanism, the most important
of these being emic, attempting to convey the shamanic others world
view. Harners (1982) approach is explicitly emic in the sense that it
accepts the indigenous views of reality of spirits, viewing the indigenous
worldviews as a legitimate metaphysic. The methodologies are explicitly
experiential, emphasizing shamanic journeying and clairvoyance/seeing
as fundamental tools [see Luke, Volume 2]. The value system explicitly
rejects modern rationalism and science as inadequate to explain shamanism, instead preferring glosses of foreign concepts and the Western spiritual traditions as better frameworks for understanding shamanism. The
exemplars of this emic approach are epitomized in shamanic workshops
that provide the Westerner with the tools for beginning a journey into this
alternate reality.
My paradigmatic approach or disciplinary matrix to understanding
consciousness in general and shamanism in particular is neurophenomenological, based in an explicit effort to relate biological processes to phenomenological experience. Its metaphysic is idealist in the sense that it
recognizes that all experiences, including those of the physical world and
biological processes, are constructed, the product of the symbolic mind. It
accepts the extraordinary experiences of consciousness and shamanism as
symbolically real, withholding judgment regarding their ultimate ontological reality. The neurophenomenological approach requires plural methodologies, attempting to nd a ground to mediate the biological realities of
the brain and the phenomenological experiences of altered consciousness.
It expands the value orientations of materialist science in valuing the experiences of altered consciousness as primary data which an integrated science
of consciousness requires. The exemplars of this neurophenomenological
framework are epitomized in the biological modes of altered consciousness
that attempt to explain their phenomenological qualities and functional
characteristics in terms of the alteration of brain functions.
References
Appenzeller, O. (1987). The autonomic nervous system and fatigue. Functional
Neurology, 2, 473485.
Arzy, S., Molnar-Szakacs, I., & Blanke, O. (2008). Self in time: Imagined selflocation inuences neural activity related to mental time travel. Journal of
Neuroscience, 28, 65026507.
Bachner-Melman, R., Dina, C., Zohar, A., Constantini, N., Lerer, E., Hoch, S., &
Ebstein, R. (2005). AVPR1a and SLC6A4 gene polymorphisms are associated
with creative dance performance. PLoS Genetics, 1(3), e42.
Berman, M. (2008a). The shamanic themes in Armenian folktales. Newcastle, UK:
Cambridge Scholars.
Berman, M. (2008b). The shamanic themes in Chechen folktales. Newcastle, UK:
Cambridge Scholars.
Blanke, O., & Mohr, C. (2005). Out-of-body experiences, heautoscopy, and
autoscopic hallucination brain research. Brain Research Reviews, 50(1), 184
199.
Blanke, O., Mohr, C., Michel, C., Pascual-Leone, A., Brugger, P., & Seeck, M.
(2005). Linking out-of-body experience and self processing to mental own
body imagery at the temporoparietal junction. Journal of Neuroscience, 25,
550557.
Brereton, D. (2000). Dreaming, adaptation, and consciousness: The social mapping hypothesis. Ethos, 28, 379409.
Cardena, E. (1996). Just oating on the sky. A comparison of shamanic and
hypnotic phenomenology. In R. Quekelbherge & D. Eigner (Eds.),
6th Jahrbuch fur Transkulturelle Medizin und Psychotherapie [6th Yearbook of
cross-cultural medicine and psychotherapy] (pp. 367380). Berlin, Germany:
Verlag fur Wissenschaft und Bildung.
Cardena, E., & Krippner, S. (2010). The cultural context of hypnosis. In S. J.
Lynn, J. W. Rhue, & I. Kirsch (Eds.), Handbook of clinical hypnosis (2nd ed.,
pp. 743771). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Cross, I., & Morley, I. (2009). The evolution of music: Theories, denitions and the
nature of the evidence. In S. Malloch & C. Trevarthen (Eds.), Communicative
177
178
Altering Consciousness
musicality: Exploring the basis of human companionship (pp. 6181). Oxford, UK:
Oxford University Press.
Crowe, B. (2004). Music and soul making toward a new theory of music therapy.
Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.
Davidson, J. (1980). The psychobiology of sexual experience. In J. Davidson &
R. Davidson (Eds.), The psychobiology of consciousness (pp. 271332). New
York: Plenum.
Dietrich, A., & McDaniel, W. (2004). Endocannabinoids and exercise. British
Journal of Sports Medicine, 38, 536541.
Dissanayake, E. (2009). Root, leaf, blossom or bole: Concerning the origin and
adaptive function of musicality. In S. Malloch & C. Trevarthen (Eds.), Communicative musicality: Exploring the basis of human companionship (pp. 1730).
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Eliade, M. (1964). Shamanism: Archaic techniques of ecstasy. New York: Pantheon
Books. (Original work published as Le Chamanisme et les techniques archaques
de lextase, 1951)
Fessler, D. (2002). Starvation, serotonin, and symbolism: A psychobiocultural
perspective on stigmata. Mind and Society, 3, 8196.
Freeman, W. (1995). Societies of brains. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Freeman, W. (2000a). A neurobiological role of music in social bonding. In N.
Wallin, B. Merker, & S. Brown (Eds.), The origins of music (pp. 411424).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Freeman, W. (2000b). How brains make up their minds. New York: Columbia University Press.
Gackenbach, J., & LaBerge, S. (Eds.). (1988). Conscious mind, sleeping brain: New
perspectives on lucid dreaming. New York: Plenum.
Graham, R. (1990). Physiological psychology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
Grifths, R. R., Richards, W. A., McCann, U., & Jesse, R. (2006). Psilocybin can
occasion mystical-type experiences having substantial, sustained personal
meaning and spiritual signicance. Psychopharmacology, 187, 268283.
Halifax, J. (1979). Shamanic voices. New York: E. P. Dutton.
Harner, M. (1982). The way of the shaman. New York: Bantam Books.
Hultkrantz, A. (1978). Ecological and phenomenological aspects of shamanism. In
V. Dioszegi & M. Hoppal (Eds.), Shamanism in Siberia (pp. 2758). Budapest,
Hungary: Akademiai Kiado.
Hunt, H. (1995). On the nature of consciousness. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Laughlin, C., McManus, J., & dAquili, E. (1992). Brain, symbol, and experience: Toward
a neurophenomenology of consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lynn, C. D. (2005). Adaptive and maladaptive dissociation: An epidemiological
and anthropological comparison and proposition for an expanded dissociation
model. Anthropology of Consciousness, 16(2), 1650.
MacLean, P. (1990). The triune brain in evolution. New York: Plenum.
179
180
Altering Consciousness
CHAPTER 9
182
Altering Consciousness
age group will be your brothers and sisters, their mothers will be your
mothers, and so on. One or more other clans will be your afnes (inlaws) and you and your siblings will marry someone from an afnal clan.
Radcliffe-Brown (1931, p. 97), studying kinship in Australia, found that
classicatory siblings have almost identical personalities. Mauss (1925/
1967) notes that, in clan-based societies, individuals are identied with
groups, groups themselves are regarded as persons, the gifts they
exchange are perceived as continuous with the giver, and clan chiefs are
conated with their people, including dead ancestors and as-yet-unborn
children. This expansion of the concept of personhood can take a form
that Johansen (1954, p. 36) called the kinship I. For example, a Maori
chief may relate the history and myths of his people using the rst person
singular pronoun throughout: referring to his ancestors not as they but
as I and to mythic culture heroes such as Maui not as he but as I.
The economic systems of clan-based societies take the form of gift
exchange (Mauss, 1925/1967). Egalitarian societies (those without formal
leaders or social hierarchy) generally exchange like for like. If I give you a
pig with a patch over one eye, then, after a suitably respectful delay, you
must give me a pig with a patch over one eye. This must be a different
pig; to give my own pig back to me would be a deeply insulting rejection
of my gift. More complex and hierarchical societies have competitive
exchange systems in which gifts are supposedly given in a spirit of generosity and respect, but the covert intent is self-promotion and the humiliation, degradation, or ruin of your rivals. The monster child (Mauss,
1925/1967) of gift exchange is the potlatch system of northwest coastal
America. A chief would invite his rivals to a feast, at which honored
guests would be forced to witness an orgy of wealth destruction. This
would oblige them, at some future date, to reciprocate with an even more
reckless destruction of their own wealth. Failure to full ones obligations
in this relentless system would lead to loss of face, dishonor, and, ultimately, social exclusion.
Just as classicatory kinship involves inated self-perceptions, so gift
exchange is associated with fragmentation of the self. Leenhardt (1949/
1979), for example, notes that Melanesians appear to have no coherent
ego; rather, selfhood is dened in terms of multiple exchange relationships, as the hub of a wheel is dened by its spokes. Each relationship
casts the person in a different role with a different set of attributes and attitudes. Because gifts are regarded as continuous with the giver, persons are
further conceived as partible (Strathern, 1988).
Moreover, the useless trade goods exchanged in competitive systems
are regarded as persons in their own right (Mauss, 1925/1967). They
183
184
Altering Consciousness
have personal names, are believed to have human-like minds and emotions, and are held to be capable of articulate speech. The belief that
non-human agents and objects have humanlike minds and motives is
known as animism. The fact that gifts are regarded as persons suggests
some linkage between animism and gift exchange.
Animism commonly incorporates another belief known as perspectivism (Viveiros de Castro, 1998). That is, nonhuman agents not only have
humanlike personalities but also perceive themselves and the world from
a human perspective. For example, a jaguar lapping the blood of its prey
sees itself as a human drinking manioc beer; a vulture eating rotten meat
sees maggots as grilled sh. And, just as animals see themselves as human,
they see humans as animals, and such perceptions depend on relations of
carnivory. Jaguars and spirits eat humans, so they perceive us as whitelipped peccaries (animals that humans eat). Conversely, white-lipped peccaries see humans as jaguars or spirits. Further, the way animals, spirits,
and humans see each other is not thought of as a matter of appearance versus reality: All these conicting perceptions are realities. All beings live in
a multitude of parallel universes, playing a different role in each, determined by the entity whose perspective creates that particular universe.
Signicantly, other humans, including afnes, are seen as animal, and
it seems likely that perspectivism is interlinked with the perspectival relationships of classicatory kinship (Viveiros de Castro, 1999): My kin will
see me as human while my afnes will see me as animal; and since
sex is equated with eating, these perceptions likewise depend on relations of carnivory. Incest equates with cannibalism and both are
regarded as abhorrent.
Paradoxically, perspectival worldviews frequently include the belief
that animals are actually humans wearing animal suits. This belief persists
in hunting communities that regularly butcher meat, so it would seem that
animal costume transforms the human all the way through to the bones.
When a human dons an animal mask or costume in ritual, this is not
thought to conceal a human identity, but to create an animal one. A perennial fear in people with such beliefs is of meeting an animal in human
form. If the animal greets the person, and the personmistaking the animal for a humanresponds, then the person will be instantly transformed
into an animal of that species (Viveiros de Castro, 1998). Shape-shifting is
not regarded as something miraculous but as an accident waiting to happen. For people with such beliefs, there is no essential body. Selfhood is
perceived as profoundly unstable and readily transformed by a simple
change of appearance or attitude.
In sum, I have so far suggested that the emergence of large-scale cooperation in humans required formal systems of expanded kinship and
reciprocity and that such systems in clan-based societies are commonly
associated with inated, fragmented, and mutable selfhood as well as culturally obfuscated views of reality. This raises the question of how these
alterations in perception, belief, and experience are accomplished.
It would be a mistake to suppose that cultural beliefs and attitudes are
transmitted from one generation to the next entirely or even mainly by word
of mouth. The whole way of life of a people conditions the sentiments and perceptions of its members. The anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu (1972/1977), for
example, has shown that merely to walk through a Kabuli house is an object
lesson in gender relations. The mans room, where he greets and entertains visitors, is raised above the level of the rest of the house. His chair is beside the
replace, with his gun, signifying his importance, leaning nearby. The womans kitchen is down a few steps and continuous with the place where animals
are stabled. Among the Sambia in New Guinea, women and men move
through the village along separate paths. Sambian houses are divided into a
mans space and a womans. If a woman trespasses in a mans space or on a
male path, she will pollute her husband or other men, causing them to fall sick
or die, and would be regarded as a thoroughly bad woman (Herdt, 1987).
One important factor that distinguishes humans from other animals
and seems likely to inuence self-perceptions is sexual modesty, which
appears to be a cultural universal (Knight, 1991). A male chimpanzee,
desiring to mate with a female, need only show his erect penis to indicate
his interest. This would not be acceptable in any known human society, at
least not in public. Though nudity may be obligatory in certain ceremonial
or sacred contexts, human genitals are normally concealedeven in the
heat of the Kalahari Desert, where the Bushmen do not wear clothes for
comfort. Occasionally genitals may be emphasized, as in New Guinea,
where men wear penis sheaths, or in the Ida festival, where men wear articial vaginas on their heads (Gell, 1975), but they are never displayed in
the natural manner of chimpanzees.
No other species systematically alters the sensory qualities of bodies in
so many culturally variable and ingenious ways as Homo sapiens (Power,
2010; Whitehead, 2010), including dress, coiffure, jewellery, cosmetics,
body paint, soap, perfume, tattooing, cicatrization (making patterns of
welts on the esh by tiny knife cuts), and frank mutilation. Many of these
alterations of the body are accomplished in or for ritual, and ritual is a
major institutional means of altering consciousness. Rituals are sacred performances, commonly involving song, dance, pantomime, and the
185
186
Altering Consciousness
187
188
Altering Consciousness
status or rank are removed. The novitiates may be stripped naked, painted
with mud or black pigment, and declared to be invisible. In calendrical
rites, on the other hand, there is commonly a Saturnalian inversion of
the normative order, with the humble temporarily elevated to dominate
the powerful. Or again, if cannibalism is regarded as abhorrent in the
everyday world, it becomes a sacrament during ritualwhether real cannibalism, as among the Avatip in New Guinea (Harrison, 1993), or
make-believe cannibalism, as in Christian communion. The same can
apply to incest. Among the Eskimos, the whole of the winter was regarded
as ritual time. Married partners were separated, and sexual intercourse
took place between incestuous couples (Rasmusson, 1976).
Victor Turner (1969) coined the term anti-structure to describe the
transitional topsy-turveydom of the liminal phase of ritual. However, he
pointed out that in secular Western societies, where ritual participation
is no longer mandated by awesome spiritual potencies, the antistructural functions of religion have been taken over by the subjunctive
what if ? of leisure activities: entertainment, recreation, and the cultural
arts (Turner, 1982). Without such anti-structural episodes, Turner
believed, postindustrial societies could not continue to function. The
theory of anti-structure holds that human life alternates between the structural role play of everyday life and the anti-structural role play of ritual or
recreational activity. Furthermore, conicts created by the inevitable contradictions within social structure cause friction, disputes, and social
dramas, increasing entropy within the system. Anti-structural phases are
necessary to maintain, repair, and reinvigorate human social orders. Also,
when shifting circumstances require adaptive change in the normative system, anti-structural processes are again required; they are the source of
new culture.
Transformation and revitalization may be the principal functions of
ASC, which frequently show a striking parallel to van Genneps three ritual phases. Sleep, for example, is bracketed by hypnagogic and hypnopompic experiences. Several authors (Bateson, 1955; Huizinga, 1955;
Jennings, 1995; Schechner, 1977; Turner, 1982; Winnicott, 1974) have
noted that childhood play, in line with van Genneps transformative phase
of ritual, takes place in a transitional space where the rules or demands
of everyday reality are suspended. They also note that this is essential to
enculturation. Childhood itself might be regarded as a transitional
spacean extended period of irresponsibility in which children,
shielded from the demands of adult society and survival, are free to
explore and expand their own developmental possibilities and the affordances of the society and culture into which they have been born.
All social play requires a shift in perception. For example, a play ght
should not be confused with a real ght. Make-believe play in particular
is dependent on dissociation, since two views of reality, one perceived
and the other invented, must not be confused (Leslie, 1987). A child pretending that stones are sweets should not swallow the stones, mistaking
them for sweets. Without dissociative ability, pretend play could hardly
have evolved as it has. Perhaps the most signal achievement of human
beings has been the discovery of institutional means of inducing collective
anti-structural states, exploiting our innate powers of make-believe, dissociation, and suggestibility in the service of large-scale cooperation [see
Cardena & Alvarado, this volume].
189
190
Altering Consciousness
191
192
Altering Consciousness
Rank (1932/1989, p. 368) described creativity as an assumptions breaking process, and Michael Apter (2008) advanced a psychological parallel
to Turners theory. In his reversal theory, Apter contrasts goal-directed
thought (telic) with playful, self-motivated, thought (paratelic) and points
out that the former cannot arrive at anything new because linear reasoning
always remains trapped within its own premises. Playful thought, in
contrast, conates categorical oppositions and follows multiple nonrational paths, leading to serendipitous discoveries and novel ideas and
concepts that could never have been predicted from a habitual set of xed
assumptions. Great ideas are never products of logic, but come out of the
blue when not thinking purposefully at all, famous examples being
Archimedes in his bath, Kekule in his reverie, and Newton seeing an apple
fall. Dreaming and daydreaming may be the most valuable work a scientist
ever does.
Ongoing social change is not necessarily noticed as such by group members, who may think they are being faithful to a primordial template
ordained in the mythic past by their revered ancestors (cf. Morphy, 1989).
However, quite dramatic changes do occur, and these too always depend
on ASC. Among shamanic peoples, all new ideasnew songs, dances,
cures, technologies, and customsare given to an individual in visions,
dream visitations, or ritual trance states (Biesele, 1993; Jennings, 1995,
pp. 139, 176178; Roseman, 1991, pp. 5279; Stephen, 1979). A striking
case occurred among a group of Temiar aborigines who happened
to live close to the edge of the rainforest, where they came into frequent
contact with Malays. Following an inuenza epidemic, crop failure, and
worsening relations with Malays, who disapproved of the Temiars nonIslamic lifestyle, a highly respected healer received in a dream a new song
and dance known as Chinchem, along with an entire system of reforms,
including avoidance of eating pork and covering womens breasts in public
(Noone, 1939). The result was a considerable improvement in relations and
trading opportunities with their Malay neighbors.
Colonialism commonly involves severe tension between immigrant
and indigenous populations. One recurring response to a colonial presence is the appearance of a cargo cult, most commonly in Melanesia and
Micronesia, but also in South America and elsewhere (Burridge, 1960;
Lawrence, 1964; Worsley, 1970). Typically, a charismatic prophet
receives a revelatory vision or message from the sacred world that informs
him that the cargos of wonderful goods delivered to the colonists are
actually gifts from the ancestors, intended for their indigenous descendents or for all people to share equally but cunningly appropriated by the
superior magic and greed of the foreigners. The aim of the cult is to get
the ancestors to realize what is going on and redirect the cargo to the
proper beneciaries. One way of doing this is to copy the colonial magic,
which might include such potent rituals as taking afternoon tea.
Cargo cult activity in the Pacic increased greatly during and after
World War II, when vast quantities of military goods and supplies passed
through the islands. In the earliest cargo cults, the faithful would build
wooden jetties where the ancestral ships could dock, but recent cults built
airstrips, control towers, wooden headphones and radios with bamboo
aerials, and decoy aeroplanes made out of timber, palm thatch, and
bark, bound with vines (Burridge, 1960). They mimicked the landing signals used by ground staff and at night lit signal res and torches to mark
out the landing strip, all to attract the expected ood of riches from their
bountiful ancestors.
Quite dramatic alterations of consciousness are common in cargo cults.
Participants whirl, shake, dance, chant, foam at the mouth, or couple promiscuously in a frenzied attempt to attract the desired cargo (Burridge,
1960). The Vailala Madness, one of the earliest well-documented cargo
cults, gained its name from the behavior of its followers, which included
speaking in tongues, ts of shaking, and similar phenomena (Worsley,
1970).
Although the beliefs of cargo cultists are clearly based on a cultural
misperception, their motivations are human universals: demands for recognition, dignity, equality, and justice. People who have a traditional
ideology of giving and sharing cannot understand why White people,
who have so much when they have so little, show no impulse to redress
this inequity in a manner perceived as normal and human. Burridge
(1960), following his own eldwork in Melanesia, believed that cargo
cults might provide useful insights into more dramatic social upheavals
such as the French and Russian revolutions.
Cargo cults exemplify a broader class of messianic, millenarian, or
nativistic movements, having much in common with the Ghost Dance
cults of North American and prophetic movements in Africa (Burridge,
1960). Jack Wilson (formerly Wavoka) has left us his own account of the
vision in which he was given the Ghost Dance (Mooney, 1896). Wilson
met God face to face in Heaven. There he saw his ancestors enjoying their
favorite pastimes and a beautiful land lled with game. God instructed
him on what to teach his people. They must love each other, work hard,
and live in peace with Whites. They must not steal, lie, or ght and must
forego the self-mutilation associated with mourning the dead. Wilson
was convinced that if all Indians observed Gods teachings and performed
the 5-day Ghost Dance at the prescribed intervals, there would be no
193
194
Altering Consciousness
disease or old age, and the dead would be reunited with the living. The
entire Earth would be renewed, swept clean, and lled with food, happiness, and love.
As the Ghost Dance spread widely across the American West, some
interpretations acquired a more militant character, notably with the introduction of the Ghost Shirts. These garments, often decorated with birds,
turtles, stars, and other spiritually important motifs, were believed to render the wearer bulletproof. Despite the peaceful nature of Jack Wilsons
original message, the crazy dancing spread alarm among U.S. authorities, which culminated in the massacre of more than 200 Lakota Sioux
at Wounded Knee in 1890 (Brown, 1970).
An earlier nativistic movement among the Iroquois, led by the Seneca
prophet Handsome Lake, inuenced Anthony Wallaces (1956) theory of
revitalization movements, which he dened as a deliberate, organized,
conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying
culture (p. 265). Wallace, based on cross-cultural studies, theorized that
these politico-religious movements are responses to severe stress caused
by colonial, racial, or class oppression. They are usually founded by a spiritually inspired prophet or charismatic leader who predicts an imminent
transformation of the world order, elimination of oppression, restoration
of traditional values, and freedom from want. In Wallaces view, all the
higher religions, including Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, originated as revitalization movements.
Egalitarian societies, by denition, lack leaders and resist any attempt
by one person to dominate others (Erdel & Whiten, 1994; Katz, 1982;
Jennings, 1995), although respected healersthose perceived as having
outstanding abilities to deal with spiritual agenciesmight be thought of
as charismatic and can initiate social change, as in the Temiar case
reported by Noone (1939). Max Weber (1978, p. 242) dened charisma,
which he regarded as a chaotic phenomenon devoid of purpose or meaning, as a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he
is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural,
superhuman or at least specically exceptional powers or qualities. Emile
Durkheim took the contrary view that charisma is not some property of an
extraordinary individual but rather is projected onto an individual by his
or her followers. Theatrical theories such as Durkheims make charisma
a two-way relationship; the audience bestows the role onto the leader, and
the leader acts the part accordingly. The power that the charismatic individual appears to exert is the result of collective effervescence, a state
of transcendent excitement that occurs whenever people are put into
closer and more active relations with one another (Durkheim, 1912/
Final Thoughts
In this chapter, I have reviewed some of the evidence that the plasticity
of the human mind, its capacity for both enduring and transient alterations of consciousness, is a core prerequisite for human social and cultural
functioning. While discussing long-term changes in consciousness, however, I did not speculate about the kind of consciousness we might have
195
196
Altering Consciousness
if not changed by culture. The fact that so many ASC are experienced as
numinous, noetic, and spiritual is particularly intriguing. Did human religiousness evolve genetically, is it a product of culture, or is there perhaps a
third alternative? Genealogical evidence (Horrobin, 1998) implicates some
genetic inuence on religiousness, while research in epileptic patients suggests that religious ideation may be hard wired in the temporal lobes
(Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998, 175177, 179188, 285n286n).
Some cultural and cognitive anthropologists have proposed that religion
might be explained by a genetically evolved symbolic module (Sperber,
1994), neurognostic processes (Laughlin et al., 1992) or a hominid
mimetic controller (Winkelman, 2002). Social anthropologists, on the
other hand, are more inclined to adopt the Durkheimian view that ritual
is the necessary precursor of human culture, including religion. Different
again are those scientists who (often covertly) hold spiritual beliefs
(Baruss, 2008). For them, spirit has a much more profound ontological
status. Such divergent views, however, may not be mutually incompatible.
When observing Ndembu initiation rites, Victor Turner (1969) noted
that, after all signs of personal distinction had been removed, and following a series of painful and humbling ordeals, the novitiates entered a state
of intimate unity which he called communitas, in contrast to the normative
state of everyday living which he called societas. The communitas state suggested to him a solution to an apparent paradox. Why is it, he asked, that
people claim to discover truth in the world of artice and pretence created by ritual (1982, p. 114) or by theatre and art (pp. 115116)? The
answer, he suggested, is that the actor dons a mask to expose the false
mask of societas. Anti-structural genres cut through the hypocrisy of culture. The structured world of everyday life is itself articial, but the
truth experienced by artists, mystics, and others is some kind of bedrock
reality. This cannot be a cultural product. Turner (1982, pp. 113114)
cites Burridge (1979) on the protoindividual that can become apparent
in ritual liminality, and, in his earlier work (1969, p. 128), claims that,
in the productions of prophets and artists, we may catch glimpses of that
unused evolutionary potential in mankind which has not yet been externalised and xed in structure. Ritually induced communitas is a spontaneous phenomenon, not something scripted into the traditional formalities
of ritual. The suspension of societas enables people to experience something for themselves, not something they have acquired from their ancestors by cultural transmission. It is a discovery rather than an invention.
Elsewhere, however, he implies that it is not genetically determined
either. Turner (1969, p. 128) avers that communitas, even though it surely
involves a release of instinctual energies, cannot be reduced to anything
197
198
Altering Consciousness
References
Anonymous (Maddox, Sir J.). (1981). A book for burning? Nature, 293(5830),
245246.
Apter, M. J. (2008). Reversal theory: Victor Turner and the experience of ritual. In
C. Whitehead (Ed.), The origin of consciousness in the social world (pp. 184
203). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Baruss, I. (2008). Beliefs about consciousness and reality: Clarication of the confusion concerning consciousness. In C. Whitehead (Ed.), The origin of consciousness in the social world (pp. 277292). Exeter: Imprint Academic.
Bates, L. A., Lee, P. C., Njiraini, S., Poole, J. H., Sayialel, K., Sayialel, S., Moss, C.
J., & Byrne, R. W. (2008). Do elephants show empathy? In C. Whitehead
(Ed.), The origin of consciousness in the social world (pp. 204225). Exeter:
Imprint Academic.
Bateson, G. (1955). A theory of play and fantasy. Psychiatric Research Reports, 1,
1323.
Biesele, M. (1993). Women like meat: The folklore and foraging ideology of the Kalahari Ju/hoan. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Witwatersrand University Press/
Indiana University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. R. Nice (Trans.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1972)
Bourguignon, E. (1973). Religion, altered states of consciousness, and social change.
Columbus: Ohio State University Press.
Brown, D. (1970). Bury my heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian history of the American West. London: Pan.
Brown, P. (1991). The hypnotic brain: Hypnotherapy and social communication. New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Burridge, K. (1960). Mambu: A Melanesian millennium. London: Methuen.
Burridge, K. (1979). Someone, no one: An essay on individuality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cardena, E., Terhune, D., Loof, A., & Buratti, S. (2009). Hypnotic experience is
related to emotional contagion. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 57, 3346.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1974). Flow: Studies of enjoyment. Chicago: University of
Chicago PHS Grant Report.
Durkheim, E. (1965). The elementary forms of the religious life. New York: Free
Press. (Original work published 1912)
Erdal, D., & Whiten, A. (1994). On human egalitarianism: An evolutionary product of Machiavellian status escalation? Current Anthropology, 35(2), 175178.
Furst, P. T. (1977). The roots and continuities of shamanism. In A. T. Brodzky
(Ed.), Stones, bones and skin: Ritual and shamanic art (pp. 128). Toronto:
Society for Art Publication.
Gell, A. (1975). Metamorphosis of the cassowaries. London: Athlone Press.
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behaviour I and II.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 116, 1752.
Hardy, Sir A. (1979). The spiritual nature of man. Oxford: Clarendon.
Harrison, S. (1993). The masks of war. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Herdt, G. H. (1987). Guardians of the utes: Idioms of masculinity. New York:
Columbia University Press.
Horrobin, D. F. (1998). Schizophrenia: The illness that made us human. Medical
Hypotheses; 50, 269288.
Huizinga, J. (1955). Homo ludens: A study of the play element in culture. Boston:
Beacon Press.
James, W. (1985). The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature.
London: Penguin Classics. (Original work published 1902)
199
200
Altering Consciousness
Jennings, S. (1995). Theatre, ritual and transformation: The Senoi Temiars. London:
Routledge.
Johansen, J. P. (1954). The Maori and his religion. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
Kapferer, B. (1991). A celebration of demons: Exorcism and the aesthetics of healing in
Sri Lanka. Providence, RI, & Oxford: Berg; Washington DC: Smithsonian
Institution Press.
Katz, R. (1982), Boiling energy: Community healing among the Kalahari !Kung. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Knight, C. (1991), Blood relations: Menstruation and the origins of culture. New
Haven & London: Yale University Press.
Krippner, S. (1999). The varieties of dissociative experience: A transpersonal,
postmodern model. International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 18,
81101.
Laughlin, C. D., McManus, J., & dAquili, E. G. (1992). Brain, symbol and experience: Toward a neurophenomenology of human consciousness. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Lawrence, D. H. (1936). The social basis of consciousness, by Trigant Burrow. In
E. D. McDonald (Ed.), Phoenix: The posthumous papers of D. H. Lawrence
(pp. 377382). London: William Heinemann.
Lawrence, P. (1964). Road belong cargo: A study of the cargo movement in the
Southern Nadang District of New Guinea. Manchester: Manchester University
Press.
Leenhardt, M. (1979). Do Kamo: Person and myth in the Melanesian world. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1949)
Leslie, A. (1987). Pretense and representation: The origins of theory of mind.
Psychological Review, 94, 412426.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1969). The elementary structures of kinship. London: Eyre &
Spottiswoode. (Original work published 1949)
Lewis, I. M. (1989). Ecstatic religion. London: Routledge.
Mauss, M. (1967). The gift: Forms and functions of exchange in archaic societies.
(Trans. W. D. Halls). London: Norton/Routledge. (Original work published
1925)
Mead, G. H. (1974). Mind, self and society. C. W. Morris (Ed.). Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. (Original work published 1934)
Mooney, J. (1896). The Ghost Dance religion and the Sioux outbreak of 1890. Part 2
of 14th Annual Report, Bureau of Ethnology (pp. 6411136). Washington:
Government Printing Ofce.
Morphy, H. (1989). From dull to brilliant: The aesthetics of spiritual power
among Yolngu. Man (NS), 24, 2141.
Napier, A. D. (1985). Masks, transformation, and paradox. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Noone, H. D. (1939). Chinchem: A study of the role of dream experience in
culture-contact amongst the Temiar Senoi of Malaya. Man, April, 57.
Otto, R. (1926). The idea of the holy: An inquiry into the non-rational factor in the
idea of the divine. Trans. J. W. Harvey. Whitesh, MT: Kessinger. (Original
work published 1917)
Power, C. (2010). Cosmetics, identity and consciousness. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 17(78), 7394.
Radcliffe-Brown, A. R. (1931). The social organization of Australian tribes. Oceania
Monographs 1. Melbourne: Macmillan.
Ramachandran, V. S., & Blakeslee, S. (1998). Phantoms in the brain: Probing the
mysteries of the human mind. New York: William Morrow.
Rank, O. (1989). Art and artist: Creative urge and personality development. Trans.
C. Atkinson. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1932)
Rasmussen, K. (1976). Intellectual culture of the Iglulik Eskimos. New York: AMS
Press.
Ravindra, R. (2004). The gospel of John in the light of Indian mysticism. Rochester,
VT: Inner Traditions.
Ravindra, R. (2005). Knowing through the mind and knowing with the mind. In
Reconstructing Consciousness, Mind and Being. 9th Annual Conference of the
Consciousness and Experiential Psychology Section of the British Psychological Association, Oxford, 18 September.
Roseman, M. (1991). Healing sounds from the Malaysian rainforest: Temiar music
and medicine. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Schechner, R. (1977). Ritual, play and performance. New York: Seabury Press.
Sperber, D. (1975). Rethinking symbolism. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Sperber, D. (1994). The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain
specicity in cognition and culture. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stephen, M. (1979). Dreams of change: The innovative role of altered states of
consciousness in traditional Melanesian religion. Oceania, 50, 322.
Strathern, M. (1988). The gender of the gift: Problems with women and problems with
society in Melanesia. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Sutton-Smith, B. (1972). Games of order and disorder. In Forms of symbolic inversion. Symposium of the American Anthropological Association, Toronto,
1 December.
Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quarterly Review of
Biology, 46, 3557.
Turner, V. (1969). The ritual process. London: Penguin.
Turner, V. (1982). From ritual to theatre: The human seriousness of play. New York:
PAJ Publications.
Van Gennep, A. L. (1960). The rite of passage. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. (Original work published 1909)
Viveiros de Castro, E. (1998). Cosmological deixis and Amerindian perspectivism. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute; 4(3), 469488.
201
202
Altering Consciousness
CHAPTER 10
*Portions of this chapter are adapted from Neotrance and the Psychedelic Festival by
Graham St John. Published in Dancecult: Journal of Electronic Dance Music Culture, 1(1),
3564, 2009.
204
Altering Consciousness
Among whom gure Sri Aurobindo (whose work provided the inspiration for the founding of the California Institute of Integral Studies), George Burr Leonard, who coined the
term human potential movement, Michael Murphy, cofounder of the Esalen Institute in
Big Sur and Integral Transformative Practice (with Burr Leonard), and Ken Wilber,
who articulated integral theory and founded the Integral Institute.
movement, what Henri Bergson (1944 [1907]) called the life-force and
what has generally been regarded as universal consciousness could be
accessed and reafrmed through chosen activities in the phenomenal
world like Transcendental Meditation, dance, and travel to places of spiritual signicance. Radical immanence was practiced and cosmic consciousness achieved in alternative subcultural lifestyle trends exemplied by the
followers of the Grateful Dead, members of the Rainbow Family of Living
Light, and, later, Burners, those inhabitants of the annual Burning Man
Festival in Nevadas Black Rock Desert, who Gilmore (2010, p. 96) indicates are performing a spirituality that is fundamentally experiential.
One of the chief ingredients in this development was LSD-25, the compound discovered in the late 1930s by Sandoz chemist Albert Hofmann.
With Hofmann as its unwitting midwife, this potent mind-altering substance (acid) was crucial to the birth of the psychedelic (mindmanifesting) movement and its aesthetic legacy (psychedelia), whose
artistic expressions had, by the 1970s, permeated popular Western culture. LSD is a curious story, for it is, in its spectacular amplication of
divergent predispositions, a neutral agent [see Nichols & Chemel, Volume
2]. The truth of this statement is well documented by Martin Lee and
Bruce Shlain (1985), who illustrate that, over the course of the Cold
War, the CIA explored LSDs power as a tool for mind control, coveting
its potential utility to alter consciousness (to produce an exploitable alteration of personality) to secure state interests and funded a nationwide
network of psychiatrists and other operatives for whom LSD was a psychotomimetic (psychosis-mimicking) drug. For hippies, LSD was
hailed as a chief means to enhance an already altered worldview that had
percolated among those for whom the imperialist United States of
America was the primary cause of discontent and target of disavowal.
That is, psychedelics were enabling those already seeking alternative pathways to turn on to higher states of consciousness of the kind conveyed in
the writings of Aldous Huxley. In The Doors of Perception (1954) (usually
published with Heaven and Hell: 1956), and Island (1962), Huxley
endorsed the view that mescaline and other psychedelics were integral to
mystical experience in the modern era. Railing against a culture of conformity and acquiescence in the shadow of the mushroom cloud, newly
circulating psychoactives were considered the shortest and most effective
route to cosmic consciousness yet: an atomic blast of consciousness for
an atomic age. Following on from the nitrous oxide-fuelled insights
of William James in The Varieties of the Religious Experience (1902) and
Bergsons understanding of the mind as a reducing valve articulated in
his Creative Evolution (1944 [1907]), Huxley divined that psychedelics
205
206
Altering Consciousness
enabled users to turn off the perceptual screens and lters that typically blind one to the Other World accessed by saints, seers, mystics,
and prophets throughout history [see Geels, this volume; Beauregard,
Volume 2]. He thus acknowledged the psychophysiological basis of these
universal visionary mind states that were no less real and could be
achieved without fasting or a lifetime of meditational training.
Although Huxley saw the necessity for consciousness evolution with
the assistance of LSD, as Jay Stevens illustrates in Storming Heaven
(1989), the artistic, economic, and political elite was at odds with the likes
of visionary poet Allen Ginsberg and maverick psychologist Timothy
Leary, who used the mass media to promote LSD and facilitate consciousness change. For Leary, who would develop a model (the Eighth Circuit
Model of Consciousness) in which psychedelics were integral to the evolution of consciousness (Leary, 1977), cosmic consciousness was not to be
restricted to elites. Together with ex-Harvard colleagues Richard Alpert
(aka Ram Dass) and Ralph Metzner, Leary produced an instruction
manual for consciousness expansion modeled on the Tibetan Book of the
Dead and inspired by a sojourn to India. As The Psychedelic Experience
(Leary, Metzner, & Alpert, 1964) conveyed, LSD was congured as a kind
of program for ego-death. As a manual that attempted to sequentialize the
psychedelic experience such that a predictably enlightened outcome
might be achieved, the manual was, in part, a programmatic counterpoint
to the contemporaneous efforts of the celebrated author of One Flew Over
the Cuckoos Nest, Ken Kesey, whose Merry Pranksters orchestrated the
mid-1960s west coast Acid Tests. Enabling collective states of entrancement, the Acid Tests were a kind of freak rite of passage, the outcome
of which held a degree of uncertaintynot unlike later rave and trance
events. On the front lines of psychedelia, Kesey and his collaborators were
change agents for whom consciousness alterants enhanced existing views,
much the same way that LSD amplied the psychotic disposition of
Charles Manson and his family, or armed various individuals and
revolutionary cells associated with the Weather Underground.
One of the critical moments in the birth of this movement was the
Gathering of the Tribes for a Human Be-in. Emerging out of the impulse
toward cultural transformation building in San Franciscos HaightAshbury district in the mid-1960s, this momentous event, in which more
than 20,000 people participated, was held in Golden Gate Park on January 14, 1967. It was the nadir of the Summer of Love, and editor of the
San Francisco Oracle Allen Cohen promoted the event as a meeting of the
minds, namely the Berkeley radicals and the Haight-Ashbury hippies
(Perry, 1984, p. 122)in other words, the diverse membership of an
207
208
Altering Consciousness
of Timewave Zero (McKenna & McKenna, 1993). Although the East had
been a popular destination among post-1960s spiritual seekers in the
wake of Leary, the McKennas expedition illustrated how the lore, practice, artifacts, and psychotropes of Amerindian cultures have inuenced
those desiring departure from core Western values and practice. The popularity of the McKennas ideas also demonstrated the appeal of the shaman
as anarchist. An advocate of what Des Tramacchi (2006) has called selfshamanism, with his mesmerizing Irish brogue, wit, and charm, Terence
McKenna would become a draw-card within the world psychedelic community from the 1980s through to his early death in 2000. In one inspired
mid-1990s presentation, he inveighed that our world is endangered by
the absence of good ideas . . . of consciousness, and that the objective
of the psychedelic experience was to participate in the redemption of
the human spirit, charging neoshamanic experimentalists to bring back
a small piece of the picture and contribute it to the building of the new
paradigm.
had red revelation is discussed by John Markoff (2005), and Fred Turner
(2006) argues that digital utopianism is rooted in the psychedelic
counterculture via Stewart Brands Whole Earth network and its retooling
of technologies from LSD to computers in the quest for consciousness,
wholeness, and liberation. Although computer-mediated utopianism
would take form in multiplayer role-playing games that found an exemplar in Second Life, perhaps the crowning achievement of DiY (do-ityourself) techno-utopianism is the Burning Man Festival that, in a massive
transmutation of the utopian subjunctivity (something that is imagined or
at least has not happened yet) native to virtual reality, or perhaps more
accurately the metaverse (the term used by Neal Stephenson in his
1992 science ction novel Snow Crash), is annually rebooted on the hard
white canvas of the Black Rock Desert, Nevada (Gilmore & Van Proyen,
2005).
The countercultural approach to new information technologies was far
more complementary to its idealism than is often recognized. Although
many embraced Jacques Elluls interpretation in The Technological Society
(1964) of an essentially Manichean technology or mistrusted the dehumanizing and centralizing technocratic bureaucracy railed against by
Theodore Roszak in The Making of a Counter Culture (1968), as Turner
conveys, with countercultural appropriation of cybernetic and ecological
discourse, the mythology of the personal and communally empowering
computer evolved into a romantic/transcendentalist embrace of machines
of loving grace. Indeed, the repurposing of cyber, chemical, and communications technologies was intended to inaugurate a New Consciousness
post-1960s. Lifestyles characterized as better living through circuitry
constituted a simultaneous phenomenological detournement of life under
capital and a quest for an alternate world. Thus, here, altering consciousness would be implicit to altering social, cultural, and political structures.
But although Web 2.0 applications and technologies such as web
applications, social networking sites, wikis, and blogs have facilitated
interactive information sharing as well as user-centered design and
collaboration, neoliberal globalization and state power have given rise
to a digital divide and Internet surveillance, circumstances undermining
the digital utopia. Criticism has also come from virtual reality pioneer
Jaren Lanier. Earlier forecasting the revolutionary impact of the World
Wide Web, Lanier (2010) grew to criticize what he called the digital
Maoism associated with the likes of Wikipedia, Facebook, and Twitter
and other virtual communities that are elevating the wisdom of
mobs and computer algorithms over the intelligence and judgment of
individuals.
209
210
Altering Consciousness
211
212
Altering Consciousness
of personal space reappear; smiley faces give way to sour expression and
participants become connoisseurs of poisons, mix n matching toxins to
approximate the old high (Reynolds, 1997, pp. 8687). And moral panic
concerning youth consumption of illicit consciousness alterants within
these contexts has triggered potentially draconian legislation such as the
RAVE Act (2003) in the United States, whose architects were apparently
Reducing Americas Vulnerability to Ecstasy.
In the history of rave, the raising or expanding of consciousness is as
important as its relinquishment in trance. Through the 1990s and the following decade, techno-rave culture offered upgrades on the techniques of
the human potential movement whose holistic practices had become consistent with utopian, ascensionist, and evolutionary fantasies implicated in
the cybernetic revolution. As a form of body transcendence, mind releasing, and self-awakening alongside meditation and yoga, certain forms
of raving appeared to be integral to an ongoing consciousness revolution,
a praxis in the repertoire of techniques of self-realization. The crowning
achievements in this development are what have been known as consciousness clubs or intentional parties, exemplied by Fraser Clarks
London club Megatripolis, one of the earliest postrave conscious parties
(see St John, 2009a, Chapter 4). In 1995, Clark opened the short-lived
club Megatripolis West in San Francisco, the location tting given that
the city hosted the original tribal gathering model. With events promoted
as Hyperdelic Carnivals, Cyborganic Be-Ins, and the Digital Be-In
(Hill, 1999), in the early 1990s San Francisco held status as a nexus for
conscious raving. By 1997, something of a global be-in had manifested
as the Earthdance International festival. Promoted as the Global Dance
Party for Peace, Earthdance is a synchronized global dance festival that
began as a Free Tibet movement fundraiser and by 2010 was being held
in more than 300 locations in more than 50 countries with participating
events giving at least 50% of their prots to charities specically addressing peace, relief efforts, environment, and world youth.
the ecstatic and conscious pursuits of the 1960s, infused with the independent remixological practice endogenous to electronic music production and performance, harnessing the communication capabilities of the
Internet, and evolving a multimedia psychedelic arts scene, psytrance is
an EDMC whose larger international festivals are among the most culturally diverse music and dance events globally. From the 1960s, Goa
became an experimental outpost for middle-class dropouts seeking experience through transcendent states of subjectivity characterized across the
decades by disciplinary practice, ecstatic pleasure, and visionary states. A
place where charas (handmade hashish) remained legal until the mid1970s, Goa became a laboratory of what Davis (2004) identies as spiritual hedonism: an experience at the crossroads of the erotic/immanent
and cognitive/transcendent. With freaks undertaking, as Anthony
DAndrea (2007) points out, the simultaneous horizontal (geo-spatial)
and vertical (spiritual-psychedelic) journey from home/rational states,
Goa was populated by self-exiled Westerners for whom travel to the
Orient facilitated escape from the cage of Occidental rationality, enabling
a mystical Orientation eventually packaged as trance tourism. Early Full
Moon beach parties were spearheaded by California expatriate DJ Goa
Gil, who became a sadhu (ascetic holy person) and advocated recreating ancient tribal ritual for the twenty rst century. In his critique
of Goa trance, Arun Saldanha (2007) argues that White freaks have been
able to experience tribal ritual to the exclusion of brown-skinned natives.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the experimental traveler-enclave fermented
a distinct Goa trance sound and sensibility that would be transported
around the world. Goa trance labels, albums, and events emerging in the
mid-1990s would promote and package the trance experience as a transcendent journey adopting Oriental imagery and iconography to assist
the journey. With the Goa aesthetic transportable, enthusiasts on the dance
oor could consume the Goa experience, be exposed to the mystique, and
access the metaphysical lore without ever having set foot in India.
Over the next decade, as the genre exploded into various subgenres,
scenes, and aesthetics, psytrance made an impact across western Europe,
Israel, North America, Australia, Japan, South Africa, and elsewhere, gaining popularity more recently in Russia, Brazil, and Mexico.
In this period, psytrance would become fertile ground for the appropriation of symbols and praxis of Amerindian cultures, especially regarding consciousness alteration via the use of native herbs and their
chemical analogues. From the United States to Germany and Australia
and indeed among Brazilians, Mexicans, and Chileans of Portuguese
and Spanish decent, countercultural participants have long found
213
214
Altering Consciousness
Also known as diviners sage, Salvia divinorum has a long and continuing tradition of use
by indigenous Mazatec in Oaxaca, Mexico, where is it used by shamans to facilitate visionary states of consciousness during curing or divination sessions and is also used to treat ailments.
215
216
Altering Consciousness
the Dance Temple, Booms main dance oor is a stage for the performance
of a freak persona. Accommodating the creative recombination of aesthetics, undisciplined embodiment, and psychosomatic states, Boom is a
freak theatre, a staging ground for what Victor Turner had called the subjunctive mood (Turner, 1984, p. 21), an experimental state or atmosphere where occupants (wearing outts with theriomorphic [animallike], anime, superhero, mythical, and extraterrestrial themes, adopting
stylized glyphs printed on clothing, badges, and personalized patches,
and through innovative dance moves) indulge in alternate personas [see
Whitehead, this volume]. Participants are illuminated under UV lights,
caught in lasers, distorted by hypnagogic projections as they commit to
the acrobatics of re staff, glow-poi twirling, and club juggling. And in
dreadlocked and shaven-hair aesthetics, multiple piercings, dermal
anchors, tattoos, and other body modications popularized in accordance
with a modern primitive aesthetic (Vale & Juno, 1989), they become
freaks on display. The queering of gender is also not uncommon,
with females perfecting androgynous appearances and males adopting
effeminate styles. Although the Temple is a context permitting participants
to freak their bodies, it is also a context for self-immolation in the furnace
of dance. With up to 40,000 bodies from more than 80 countries
connected through persistent rhythms, intense consumption, body modications, and self-abandonment, Boom orchestrates the individual participants connection to a subterranean carnivalesque body.
The psychedelic festival enables new modes of identication
through altered conditions of consciousness that are interpreted via
narrative frameworks and folk themes apparent in vocal samples from
various media sources (e.g., cinema, TV, documentaries, and radio)
used in music production and in event decor and fashion. The main
themes I have explored include the gures of the alien, the monster,
and the indigene, who, from their various outer, abject, and ancient
positions afford gnosis to disenchanted moderns. In the former, as
chiey expressed in the context of Goa (or cosmic) trance, the inner
journey is facilitated by the sound apocalypse of self-discovery as analogized in the encounter with extraterrestrial aliens (St John, 2011c). Hosted
within the subgenre of dark trance (or darkpsy), monsters, especially the
living-dead zombie poached from horror cinema, burlesque the unpredictably re/animated condition of the trance dance oor (St John, 2011d).
And, throughout the psytrance development, indigenes are embraced in
the search for knowledge, consciousness, and re-enchantment (St John,
2012). In their adoption of a shifting assemblage of dress options, body
modications, hairstyles, adornments, and inscriptions, psytrance
217
218
Altering Consciousness
From the rst edition of the in-Village publication, the liminal zine Pathways.
219
220
Altering Consciousness
References
Baldini, C. (2010). Dionysus returns: Tuscan trancers and Euripides The
Bacchae. In G. St John (Ed.), The local scenes and global culture of psytrance
(pp. 170185). New York: Routledge.
Bergson, H. (1944 [1907]). Creative evolution. New York: Random House.
Bey, H. (1991). TAZ: The temporary autonomous zoneontological anarchy and
poetic terrorism. New York: Autonomedia.
Burroughs, W. S., & Ginsberg, A. (1963). The Yage letters. San Francisco: City
Lights Books.
Cohen, E. (2008). What is spirit possession? Dening, comparing, and explaining
two possession forms. Ethnos, 73(1), 101126.
DAndrea, A. (2007). Global nomads: Techno and new age as transnational countercultures in Ibiza and Goa. New York: Routledge.
Davis, E. (1998). Techgnosis: Myth, magic, mysticism in the age of information. New
York: Harmony Books.
Davis, E. (2004). Hedonic tantra: Golden Goas trance transmission. In G. St John
(Ed.), Rave culture and religion (pp. 256272). London: Routledge.
Davis, E. (2008). The festival is a seed. Pathways: Liminal Zine, (2), 5054.
Davis, E. (2009). Aya avatar: Drink the jungle juice. Retrieved January 3, 2011,
from http://www.techgnosis.com/chunkshow-single.php?chunk=chunkfrom2010-01-06-2204-0.txt.
Ellul, J. (1964). The technological society ( J. Wilkinson, Trans.). New York:
Knopf.
Forte, R. (1997). Entheogens and the future of religion. San Francisco, CA: Council
on Spiritual Practices.
Fritz, J. (1999). Rave culture: An insiders overview. Victoria, B.C.: Smallfry Press.
Gauthier, F. (2004). Rapturous ruptures: The instituant religious experience
of rave. In G. St John (Ed.), Rave culture and religion (pp. 6584). London:
Routledge.
Gauthier, F. (2005). Orpheus and the underground: Raves and implicit religion
from interpretation to critique. Implicit Religion, 8(3), 217265.
Gerard, M. (2004). Selecting ritual: DJs, dancers and liminality in underground
dance music. In G. St John (Ed.), Rave culture and religion (pp. 167184). London:
Routledge.
Gibson, W. (1984). Neuromancer. New York: Ace Books.
Gilmore, L. (2010). Theater in a crowded re: Ritual and spirituality at Burning Man.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gilmore, L, & Van Proyen (2005). AfterBurn: Reections on Burning Man. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Goffman, K. (2004). Counterculture through the ages. New York: Villard Books.
Gore, G. (1997). Trance, dance and tribalism in rave culture. In H. Thomas (Ed.),
Dance in the city (pp. 7383). London: MacMillan Press.
Hemment, D. (1996). E is for ekstasis. New Formations, 31, 2338.
221
222
Altering Consciousness
Hill, D. (1999). Mobile anarchy: The house movement, shamanism and community. In T. Lyttle (Ed.), Psychedelics reimagined (pp. 95106). New York:
Autonomedia.
Hutson, S. R. (2000). The rave: Spiritual healing in modern western subcultures.
Anthropological Quarterly, 73(1), 3549.
Huxley, A. (1954; 1956). The doors of perception. Heaven and hell. New York:
Harper & Brothers.
Huxley, A. (1962). Island. New York: Bantam Books.
James, W. (1902). The varieties of the religious experience: A study in human nature.
London: Longmans, Green, and Co.
Johnson, P. C. (1995). Shamanism from Ecuador to Chicago: A case study in New
Age ritual appropriation. Religion, 25(2), 163178.
Kehoe, A. (1990). Primal Gaia: Primitivists and plastic medicine men. In J. Clifton
(Ed.), The invented Indian: Cultural ctions and government policies (pp. 193209).
New Brunswick: Transaction.
Kripal, J. (2007). Esalen: America and the religion of no religion. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Lachman, G. (2003). A secret history of consciousness. Great Barrington, MA:
Lindisfarne Books.
Landau, J. (2004). The esh of raving: Merleau-Ponty and the experience of ecstasy.
In G. St John (Ed.), Rave culture and religion (pp. 107124). London: Routledge.
Lanier, J. (2010). You are not a gadget: A manifesto. New York: Knopf.
Leary, T, Metzner, R., & Alpert, R. (1964). The psychedelic experience: A manual
based on the Tibetan Book of the Dead. New York: University Books.
Leary, T. (1977). Exo-psychology: A manual on the use of the human nervous system
according to the instructions of the manufacturers. Los Angeles: Starseed/Peace
Press.
Leary, T, Horowitz, M., & Marshall, V.. (1994). Chaos & cyber culture. Berkeley,
CA: Ronin.
Lee, M., & Shlain, B. (1985). Acid dreams: The CIA, LSD, and the sixties rebellion.
New York: Grove Press.
Luckman, S. (2003). Going bush and nding ones tribe: Raving, escape and the
bush doof. Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies, 17(3), 315330.
Markoff, J. (2005). What the Dormouse said: How the sixties counterculture shaped
the personal computer industry. New York: Viking.
McKenna, T. (1991). The archaic revival: Speculations on psychedelic mushrooms, the
Amazon, virtual reality, UFOs, evolution, shamanism, the rebirth of the goddess,
and the end of history. San Francisco: Harper.
McKenna, T. (1992). Food of the gods: The search for the original tree of knowledge
A radical history of plants, drugs, and human evolution. New York: Bantam Books.
McKenna, T. (1993). True hallucinations: Being an account of the authors extraordinary adventures in the devils paradise. San Francisco: Harper.
McKenna, T., & McKenna, D. (1993). The invisible landscape: Mind, hallucinogens,
and the I Ching. New York: Harper Collins.
223
224
Altering Consciousness
St John, G. (2011a). The vibe of the exiles: Aliens, afropsychedelia and psytrance.
In T. C. van Veen (Ed.), Afrofuturism: Interstellar transmissions from remix culture. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
St John, G. (2011b). The 2012 movement, visionary arts and psytrance culture.
In J. Gelfer (Ed.), 2012: Decoding the countercultural apocalypse. London: Equinox.
St John, G. (2011c). Aliens are us: Space travel, neo-mysticism and psytrance.
In A. Possamai (Ed.), Handbook of hyper-real spiritualities. Leiden, The
Netherlands: Brill.
St John, G. (2011d). Rave from the grave: Dark trance and the return of the dead.
In C. James Rushton & C. Moreman (Ed.), Theyre us: Zombies and humanity.
Jefferson, NC: McFarland
St John, G. (2012). Global tribe: Technology, spirituality and psytrance. London:
Equinox.
Saldanha, Arun. 2007. Psychedelic white: Goa trance and the viscosity of race.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Saunders, N., & Doblin, R. (1996). Ecstasy: Dance, trance, and transformation.
Oakland, California: Quick American Archives.
Stephenson, N. (1992) Snow crash. New York: Bantam.
Stevens, J. (1989). Storming heaven: LSD and the American dream. London: Paladin.
Strassman, R. (2001). DMTThe spirit molecule: A doctors revolutionary research
into the biology of near-death and mystical experiences. Rochester, VT: Park Street
Press.
Strassman, R. (with Slawek Wojtowicz, Luis Eduardo Luna, & Ede Frecska).
(2008). Inner paths to outer space: Journeys to alien worlds through psychedelics
and other spiritual technologies. Rochester, VT: Park Street Press.
Sylvan, R. (2002). Traces of the spirit: The religious dimensions of popular music. New
York: New York University Press.
Sylvan, R. (2005). Trance formation: The spiritual and religious dimensions of global
rave culture. New York: Routledge.
Takahashi, M. (2004). The natural high: Altered states, ashbacks and neural
tuning at raves. In G. St John (Ed.), Rave culture and religion (pp. 145164).
New York: Routledge.
Takahashi, M. (2005). Spirituality through the science of sound: The DJ as technoshaman in rave culture. In M. J. Gilmour (Ed.), Call me the seeker: Listening to
religion in popular music (pp. 239266). London: Continuum.
Taves, A. (1999). Fits, trances, & visions: Experiencing religion and explaining experience from Wesley to James. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Till, R. (2009). Possession trance ritual in electronic dance music culture:
A popular ritual technology for reenchantment. In C. Deacy (Ed.), Exploring
religion and the sacred in a media age (pp. 169187). Aldershot: Ashgate.
Tramacchi, D. (2000). Field tripping: Psychedelic communitas and ritual in the
Australian bush. Journal of Contemporary Religion, 15(2), 201213.
225
PART III
The Humanities
CHAPTER 11
Altered Consciousness
in Philosophy
Jennifer M. Windt
Altered consciousness (AC) or altered states of consciousness (ASC) have
been discussed throughout the history of philosophy and in different
philosophical subdisciplines. This chapter is an introduction to some of
the major philosophical problems raised by AC. My discussion of these
problems is selective rather than exhaustive, both in terms of the types of
alterations discussed and the questions asked, with a focus on Western
philosophy and specically epistemology, philosophy of perception, philosophy of mind, and the history of ideas. My aim is mainly descriptive,
explaining the various philosophical problems related to AC and the solutions proposed in the literature, illustrating their strengths and weaknesses, and pointing out their interconnections as well as directions for
future research. I will also illustrate my own position on these matters.
Because the concept of ASC has already been discussed in this volume
[see Cardena, this volume], I do not develop my own denition here. The
examples discussed in this chapter range from those typically regarded as
ASC such as dreams, out-of-body experiences (OBEs), mystical experiences, and meditative states, to illusions and hallucinations, which according
to some researchers should not be regarded as ASC (Revonsuo, Kallio, &
Sikka, 2009). I include these examples in my discussion because their
comparison with standard wakefulness is philosophically informative,
especially in the philosophical discussion on perception (see section 2).
Finally, pathological ASC are often similar to spontaneous or experimentally induced ASC in important respects. Therefore, my discussion of
ASC includes both pathological and nonpathological cases.
230
Altering Consciousness
given moment. This allows Descartes to apply his radical doubt to all
beliefs derived from sensory perception, including his beliefs about the
external world as well as his own body.
The dream problem recurs in the Sixth Meditation, where Descartes
employs two strategies to reconcile the possibility of knowledge with the
deceptive nature of dreams. First, he now realizes that there is indeed a
considerable difference between dreaming and wakefulness: Dreams are
not connected to the events of waking life and are prone to sudden
changes. He concludes that he
ought to reject all the doubts of those bygone days, as hyperbolical and
ridiculous, especially the general uncertainty respecting sleep, which I
could not distinguish from the waking state: for I now nd a very marked
difference between the two states. (Descartes 1996, VI.24).
Descartess concession to Hobbes that a dreamer cannot really connect the contents of
their dream with the ideas of past events, although they can dream that they are making
the connection (Hobbes, 19751999) contradicts this point, as this would mean that
rational thought is not, after all, recognizable in the dream state.
231
232
Altering Consciousness
Early dream research supported the view that dreams are typically
single-minded and lack attempts at rational thought (Rechtschaffen,
1978). However, it is becoming increasingly clear that cognitive activities
such as thinking and speaking occur relatively frequently not only in lucid
dreams (in which the dreamer knows that she is currently dreaming and
can often voluntarily control the dream; see LaBerge & Gackenbach,
2000) but also in nonlucid ones (Kahn & Hobson, 2005; Meier, 1993).
Prelucid dreams, in which the dreamer wonders whether she is dreaming
but concludes that she is not, are particularly interesting because they
present evidence that reasoning itself can go astray in dreams (Brooks &
Vogelsong, 1999; for a philosophical discussion, see Windt & Metzinger,
2007). In dreams, one can have the impression of engaging in rational
thought or remembering something about ones waking life and be completely wrong. Just as genuine instances of reasoning and remembering
occur in dreams, so do instances of mock reasoning and mock memories,
in which the dreamer merely has the impression of being rational. The
phenomenology of knowing, thinking, and remembering seems to be particularly vulnerable to this type of corruption in the dream state, showing
that the mere availability of cognitive capacities says nothing about their
reliability. In many dreams, the evidence of reason is mere phenomenal
evidence, without epistemic value. This, in turn, invites a deeper epistemological problem: Even though rational thought is possible in dreams,
it may not be recognizable. If this analysis is correct, this presents an additional obstacle against solving the problem of dream skepticism and suggests that the threat posed by dreaming may be more extensive than
Descartes believed. If we cannot distinguish between real reasoning and
mock reasoning, we once more cannot rule out that we are dreaming at
any given moment. Moreover, dreaming would not only render sensory
knowledge of the external world dubitable but would also question ones
ability to recognize whether ones current reasoning is reliable.2
In sum, the problem appears to be that once one takes the possibility of
dream deception seriously, it becomes virtually insoluble, and indeed Descartess exposition of the problem has proven to be much more inuential
than his proposed solution. One thing that makes Cartesian dream
skepticism so compelling is its appeal to everyday experience. This is a
type of deception most people have experienced and thus can identify
2
One could attempt to deate this by saying that if one only dreams that one reasons, one
also only dreams that one is deceived; see for instance Sosa, 2007. However, this still
means that one cant tell the difference between real and dream reasoning and so does
not solve the problem.
with. Indeed, Descartess theoretical position about dreaming in the Meditations may have been inspired by several dreams he had himself as a
young man (Hacking, 2002). False awakenings (realistic dreams of waking
up) are another example of how dreams can give rise to feelings of confusion and uncertainty to the point of generating philosophical doubt. Bertrand Russell (1948, p. 186) wrote that
It may be said that, though when dreaming I may think that I am awake, when
I wake up I know that I am awake. But I do not see how we are to have any
such certainty; I have frequently dreamt that I woke up; in fact once, after
ether, I dreamt it about a hundred times in the course of one dream. [ . . . ]
I do not believe that I am now dreaming, but I cannot prove that I am not.
233
234
Altering Consciousness
account both for the occurrence of hallucinations and the seeming openness of perception. Crane (2005) reconstructs the argument from hallucination as follows (see also Smith, 2002):
i. It seems possible for someone to have an experiencea hallucinationwhich
is subjectively indistinguishable from a genuine perception but where there is
no mind-independent object being perceived.
ii. The perception and the subjectively indistinguishable hallucination are experiences of essentially the same kind.
iii. Therefore it cannot be that the essence of the perception depends on the
objects being experienced, since essentially the same kind of experience can
occur in the absence of the objects.
iv. Therefore the ordinary conception of perceptual experiencewhich treats
experience as dependent on the mind-independent objects around uscannot be correct.
currently realize that they are dreaming and are able to use this knowledge
to engage in dream control.
There are several problems for intentionalist theories of perception.
First, there is the question of how to explain the possibility of misrepresentation. To understand how representation is possible, we rst have to
understand how misrepresentation is possible. According to Dretske
(1994), for instance, interesting cases of misrepresentation stem from the
nonderived representational capacities of the system in question and
require a certain threshold of complexity.
Another problem for representational theories is that it is controversial
whether the qualitative aspects of phenomenal states can really be captured in terms of representational content. For pain experiences, for instance, there may be something over and above that which the pain
sensation is directed at, namely the sheer ickiness of pain. Many philosophers think this is something for which no representational analysis is
available (Block, 1997; Peacocke, 1983; Shoemaker, 1990; but see Tye, 2000).
A more general objection is that intentionalism fails to explain the apparent openness of perception (McDowell, 1987). If the phenomenal
character of perception is determined by representational content, how
does this explain the subjective experience of having direct and unmediated perceptual access to the world? Presentational content (Metzinger,
2003) may be a solution to this problem. Perceptual presence itself can
be described as a representational property by representing the object of
perception as present. From the third-person perspective, this representational property says nothing about the actual presence of such mindindependent objects: The experience could also be a hallucination. The
third premise of the argument from hallucination equivocates phenomenal and epistemological readings of experience: Phenomenal sameness
is not sufcient for sameness on the third-person, epistemological level
of description, and in this latter sense, hallucination and genuine perception are not the same kinds of experience. Presentational content thus provides a new way of conceptualizing the difference between perceptual and
belief states in terms of different forms of representational content. Beliefs
are experienced as representations. In thinking, you are always aware of
the construction process and know that your thoughts are not constrained
by the actual state of the environment but could be wrong. Unlike
thoughts, perceptual states have not only representational but also presentational content. This is why perceptual states, unlike belief states, are
experienced as providing immediate access to the world even when they
do not, as in hallucination and dreams.
235
236
Altering Consciousness
Disjunctivism
Unlike the intentional or representational theory, disjunctivism tries to
uphold the commonplace, nave realistic view of perception (Byrne &
Logue, 2009). To do so, it denies the common kind assumption (Martin,
2004), according to which hallucinations and genuine perception are fundamentally the same kind of mental event. The disjunctivist will argue,
rst, that subjective indistinguishability does not sufce for belonging to
the same common kind. Subjective indistinguishability is all that hallucinations and genuine perception have in common. Their most fundamental
common description is merely disjunctive: My experience of seeing the
ocean is either a genuine perception of the ocean or a hallucination of the
ocean. Nonetheless, each disjunct belongs to a more fundamental kind,
namely perception or hallucination, and there is no more fundamental
way of describing what they have in common.
What the disjunctivist has to explain, then, is the subjective indistinguishability between hallucinations and genuine perception. Martin
(2009) does this by introducing the distinction between how things seem
epistemically and how they seem phenomenally. Hallucinations and perceptions are epistemically indistinguishable, because the person undergoing them is unable to tell whether he is hallucinating or perceiving.
But it does not follow that hallucinations and genuine perception also
have the same phenomenal character. Whereas the phenomenal character
of genuine perception is determined by the perceptible properties of
mind-independent objects, no such characterization is available for hallucinations, because no such objects exist. Hence, the two can be regarded
as radically different types of states that are merely yoked together by
the subjective report and their epistemic indistinguishability (Martin,
2009, p. 96).
A central advantage of this view is the claim that perception is exactly
what it naively and pretheoretically seems to be, namely a way of gaining
direct access to the objects of perception. A positive account of hallucinations, however, is not the main goal of disjunctivism, and most disjunctivists focus on saying what hallucinations are not rather than what they
are (Dancy, 1995). Some disjunctivists even claim that it is not like anything to hallucinate, a view that contradicts the commonplace view of hallucination (Smith, 2002).
However, there are exceptions. Fish (2008, 2009) attempts to give a
positive account of hallucinations that integrates empirical ndings on
hallucinations. Fish (2008) explains hallucinations by saying that they
seem to feel the same as genuine perception because they are epistemically
237
238
Altering Consciousness
Of course, empirical research results supporting the phenomenal similarity between hallucinations and perception could also increase the bite of the problem. This would be
the case if all or even some dreams can be conceptualized as global, multimodal hallucinations with the same phenomenal character as waking experience. It is interesting to
note, however, that dreams are not typically discussed in the context of the problem of
perception.
239
240
Altering Consciousness
241
242
Altering Consciousness
plausible (Windt, 2010). If it is true that dreams often lack a detailed body
representation including body parts, this may help elucidate the relationship between bodily experiences and their functional and neurophysiological correlates. It also suggests that the experience of fully embodied
selfhood can be dissociated from other levels of self-related processing
such as cognition, as in lucid dreams.
Finally, Revonsuos (2000, 2006) work on consciousness gives a particularly prominent role to dreams. Going beyond the contrastive analysis
between dreaming and standard waking consciousness (Windt & Noreika,
in press), he suggests that dreaming reveals consciousness in a very special,
pure, and isolated form (Revonsuo, 2006, p. 75) and thus can be used as a
theoretical and research model of consciousness. Dreaming depicts consciousness rst and foremost as a subjective world-for-me (Revonsuo,
2006, p. 75) and may not only reveal the universal features of conscious
experience but also help investigate the neural correlates of consciousness
independently of the potentially confounding factors of sensory input and
motor output. Moreover, because dreams can be seen as ofine simulations
of waking consciousness, this means that consciousness itself is essentially a
process of simulation: [ . . . ] not only are dreams experiences but, in a way,
all experiences are dreams (Revonsuo, 2006, p. 55). Dreaming thus gives
rise to the virtual reality metaphor of conscious experience.
The modeling approach is controversial, and other researchers have
suggested that dreaming can be regarded as a model of the positive symptoms of psychosis, both on the phenomenal and the neurophysiological
levels of description, and differs in important ways from standard wakefulness (Hobson, 1999; see Windt & Noreika, in press, for a critical discussion). Nonetheless, Revonsuos approach is interesting, because it not
only shows how ASC can be used to inform a philosophical theory of consciousness and the self but also suggests that the use of altered consciousness as a model of standard wake states might lead to testable predictions.
Another theme that has been discussed in the context of pure consciousness is meditative states. Neurophenomenology (Lutz & Thompson,
2003; Varela, 1996) attempts to bring together aspects of Husserlian phenomenology with cognitive neuroscience. By training participants in introspective practice, the precision of rst-person reports is supposed to be
enhanced and their integration with empirical research results thereby
facilitated (Thompson, 2006). A core idea is that meditative practice,
which has a long tradition in Eastern culture, exemplies such a disciplined rst-person approach (for a review of meditative practices from a
neuroscience perspective, see Lutz, Slagter, Dunne, & Davidson, 2008).
243
244
Altering Consciousness
The interesting point here is that trained meditators are seen as experts
regarding not just meditative states but conscious experience itself and
are considered as scientic collaborators rather than only experimental
participants. As in the discussion on dreaming as a model of waking
consciousness, however, it is an open question whether insights from
meditation research can actually be generalized to standard waking
consciousness [see Shear, this volume].
The idea that ASC could be a source of knowledge and insight nicely
complements the epistemological problem of dream skepticism discussed above, and there is a tension in the literature on altered consciousness between viewing ASC as higher states of consciousness or,
conversely, as pathological conditions, the latter point predominating in
the psychological literature since the 19th century (Aleman & Lari,
2008) [see Lukoff, Volume 2]. Rather than viewing them as opposites,
the close conceptual relationship between madness, deeper forms of
insight, and prophecies of divine origin was already highlighted by Plato
in the Phaedrus. At the same time, the popular notion of ASC as conveying
heightened insight has always provoked philosophical skepticism. Aristotle
(2008) criticized the widespread trust of his contemporaries in prophetic
dreams, commenting that the only way in which dreams could foretell
future events was by coincidence and that this type of experience was
most likely to befall commonplace persons and not the most intelligent
[cf. Luke, Volume 2].
This theme was taken up by Locke in the Essay Concerning Human
Understanding. The main goal of his chapter on enthusiasm is to show that
revelation, by itself, is not reliable, as one can never be sure that it is a
genuine revelation rather than a product of enthusiasm:
Immediate revelation being a much easier way for men to establish their opinions, and regulate their conduct, than the tedious and not always successful
labour of strict reasoning, it is no wonder, that some have been very apt to
pretend to revelation [ . . . ]. Their minds being thus prepared, whatever
groundless opinion comes to settle itself strongly upon their fancies is an illumination from the spirit of God, and presently of divine authority [ . . . ].
(Locke, 1997, IV. XIX, 5, 6)
The point is that the mere strength of ones persuasions is not enough
to justify revelation; without outward signs to convince one of the truth of
ones persuasions, or without their withstanding the test of reason,
245
246
Altering Consciousness
247
248
Altering Consciousness
In addition to OBEs, the notion of the separability of mind and body may
have also been fed by nocturnal dreams. Although dreams often lack the
strong emotional impact and extremely realistic quality of OBEs, it may be
this more pedestrian character that commends them for the widespread
belief in the soul. Though often more impressive and impactful, OBEs are
comparatively rare, whereas most people are at least occasionally able to
recall dreams. This means that the protoconcept of the soul can truly appeal
to everyones rst-person experience of having glimpsed a world beyond the
real one and having left their physical body behind during sleep.
Of course, it is important to point out that such theories about the origin of beliefs in old hags or theoretical positions such as mindbody dualism say nothing about the epistemological status of these beliefs, nor do
they support any ontological conclusions. They explain the intuitive
appeal of such beliefs and maybe even our proneness to develop corresponding philosophical theories. At the same time, showing that such
experiences as OBEs can be explained in neurophysiological terms
and can even be induced experimentally through electrical stimulation
cannot, from a strictly logical point of view, disconrm the existence of a
soul that is separable from the body (see Metzinger, 2005). But of course,
having an experience of a certain type, no matter how convincing, also
does not support ontological statements about the actual existence of a
soul, as little as it licenses one to infer the actual existence of old hags or
vicious incubi.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Thomas Metzinger and Sebastian Dieguez for
helpful comments on an earlier draft. This chapter was supported by the
Barbara-Wengeler Foundation and the Volkswagen Foundation.
References
Aleman, A., & Lari, F. (2008). Hallucinations. The science of idiosyncratic perception. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Aristotle (2008). On phrophesying by dreams. Translated by J. I. Beare. Retrieved
from http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/prophesying.html [15.1.2011]
249
250
Altering Consciousness
251
252
Altering Consciousness
Nudds, M. (2009). Recent work in perception: Nave realism and its opponents.
Analysis, 69, 334346.
Peacocke, C. (1983). Sense and content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Putnam, H. (1981). Brains in a vat. In: H. Putnam, Reason, truth and history
(pp. 121). Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ramachandran, V. S., & Hirstein, W. (1998). The perception of phantom limbs:
The D. O. Hebb lecture. Brain, 9, 16031630.
Rechtschaffen, A. (1978). The single-mindedness and isolation of dreams. Sleep,
1, 97109.
Revonsuo, A. (2000). Prospects for a scientic research program on consciousness. In T. Metzinger (Ed.), Neural correlates of consciousness; Empirical and
conceptual questions (pp. 5775). Cambridge, London: MIT Press
Revonsuo, A. (2006). Inner presence. Consciousness as a biological phenomenon.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Revonsuo, A., Kallio, S., & Sikka, P. (2009). What is an altered state of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology, 22, 187204.
Russell, B. (1948). Human knowledge. Its scope and limits. London: George Allen
and Unwin LTD.
Ryle, G. (2000). The concept of mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Schenck, C. H. (2005). Paradox lost. Midnight in the battleground of sleep and
dreams. Minneapolis, MN: Extreme Nights.
Shoemaker, S. (1990). Qualities and qualia: Whats in the mind? Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 50 (Supplement), 109131.
Siegel, S. (2008). The epistemic conception of hallucination. In A. Haddock & F.
MacPherson (Eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, action, knowledge (pp. 205224).
Oxford: Oxford University Press
Smith, A. D. (2002). The problem of perception. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reective knowledge. Oxford &
New York: Oxford University Press.
Stephens, G., & Graham, G. (2000). When self-consciousness breaks. Alien voices
and inserted thoughts. Cambridge, MA, & London: MIT Press.
Stroud, B. (1984). The signicance of philosophical scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon.
Thompson, E. (2006). Neurophenomenology and contemplative experience. In
P. Clayton (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of science and religion (pp. 226235).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tsakiris, M., & Haggard, P. (2005). The rubber hand illusion revisited: Visuotactile integration and self-attribution. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human
Perception and Performance, 31, 8091.
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, color and content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Van de Castle, R. L. (1994). Our dreaming mind. New York: Ballantine Books.
Varela, F. (1996). Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard
problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 330350.
253
254
Altering Consciousness
Williams, B. (1978). Descartes: The project of pure enquiry. London & New York:
Routledge.
Windt, J. M. (2010). The immersive spatiotemporal hallucination model of
dreaming. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9, 295316.
Windt, J. M., & Metzinger, T. (2007). The philosophy of dreaming and selfconsciousness: What happens to the experiential subject during the dream
state? In D. Barrett & P. McNamara (Eds.), The new science of dreaming (Vol.
3, pp. 193247). Westport, CT, and London: Praeger Perspectives/Greenwood Press.
Windt, J. M., & Noreika, V. (in press). The contrastive analysis of dreaming and
wakefulness: A novel approach. Consciousness and Cognition.
CHAPTER 12
256
Altering Consciousness
257
258
Altering Consciousness
one can therefore study (1) the experiential dimension, (2) the consequences of the mystical experience in the life of the individual, (3) different rituals or mystical exercises, (4) the intellectual aspect, that is, how the
mystic interprets his or her experience, and, nally (5) the ideological
dimension, that is, the religious tradition to which the mystic possibly
belongs. We will now have a closer look at these ve dimensions, with
an emphasis on the experiential dimension.
Mystical experience is the core of mysticism, at least from a psychological perspective. It has an enormous motivational potential, for example by
changing peoples lives or by being the incentive for the mystic to continue
on the long and arduous path of spiritual transformation. A fundamental
question, often debated in scholarly studies of mysticism, is whether socalled revelatory experiences, visions, and voices, should be included in
the study of mysticism. The classical study of Walter Stace excludes them
from the category of mystical experiences because they have the character
of sensuous imagery, whereas mystical experiences are nonsensuous
(Stace, 1960, p. 49; see also Wainwright, 1981, p. 1ff ). Another reason,
according to Stace, is that mystics themselves regard them as less important or even as an obstacle to spiritual maturity. However, neglecting
visions for this reason would be just as inappropriate as if a psychologist
neglected dreams for the dubious reason that the client regards them as
trivial or meaningless (see Moore, 1978, p. 119f ).
This prevalent attitude is the probable explanation of why there are so
few psychological studies of religious visions, which appear to be more
common among women than men. One of the major studies in this eld
is the monumental work of the Swedish scholar Ernst Arbman (1963,
1968, 1970), which denitely places religious visions in the study of mysticism. He even goes as far as to state: Mysticism may be said to be tantamount to visionary-ecstatic religious practice or religiosity (1963,
p. 547). In this chapter, visions and voices will be included. The examples
presented below do not appear within a Christian context, but the history
of Christianity is rife with visionary experience (e.g., Christian, 1981; Dinzelbacher, 1981; Zimdars-Swartz, 1991).
Religious visions belong to the category of kataphatic experiences, usually expressed in the language of personal relations. A second category is
called apophatic experiences, expressed for example in the impersonal language of innity. The two categories are not mutually exclusive. The
abstract or impersonal God of Jewish mysticism, called Eyn Sof (without
end) or Ayin (nothingness) is apophatic, while the outow from this
abstract principle, the 10 Sephirot, is described in kataphatic terms
(Wisdom, Understanding, Love, etc.). The great Muslim mystic Ibn
There are many examples of experiences that could be regarded as mystical in a profane context (Laski, 1961; Maslow, 1964). The direct, nonrational encounter with a higher reality underlines the fact that most
people report that the experience comes suddenly and that they were both
surprised and overwhelmed by it. The dimension of unity appears to be
one of the most common characteristics of the mystical experience of the
apophatic type. According to Walter T. Stace, this is the one basic, essential, nuclear characteristic, from which most of the others inevitably follow (1960, p. 110). Although the experience itself may last only
minutes, life may never be the same again. After these transforming
minutes, the mystic usually reevaluates his or her life, dividing it into a
before and an after.
We are now touching upon the second dimension of mysticism, the
consequential one. The sense of the presence of God or the ground of being
leaves no person unaffected. A visionary experience of, for example, light
or of Jesus or the Virgin Mary may lead to a radical change in life. In my
studies of visions in contemporary Sweden (Geels, 1996, 2003a), some
of the informants nished their secular jobs and started a spiritual career.
Some of them studied theology and became priests in the Swedish church.
Quite another type of consequence is the fact that an overwhelming vision
259
260
Altering Consciousness
creates order in chaos. Some of my informants were on the verge of committing suicide (Geels, 2008) [see Lukoff, Volume 2].
The third dimension of mysticism, of special relevance to the psychologist of religion, is related to behavior: the ritual dimension. Here the reference is to different techniques used in order to reach beyond the world
of multiplicity. In the great mystical traditions, there exists a variety of
techniques: isolation, meditation, contemplation, different types of prayer,
mystical weeping, and techniques of visualization. Through contemplative
devotion, attention (kavvanah), and meditative prayer, the Jewish mystic
approaches the divine; Teresa of Avila describes the seven stages of prayer
in her Interior Castle. A special type of repetitive prayer occurs not only in
the Greek Orthodox tradition (the Jesus prayer) but also in Pure Land
Buddhism in Japan, as well as in mystical Islam, where dervishes monotonously repeat the prayer La ilaha illa llah (there is no god but God) and
other divine names.
The fourth dimension is the intellectual one, the cognitive processing of
the mystic as presented in his or her texts. An apparent paradox is the fact
that although most mystics declare that the experience is ineffable, they
nevertheless devote considerable time to its description and systematic
analysis.
Intellectual processing is closely related to the ideological dimension, or
the tradition to which the mystic belongs such as branches of the Jewish
Kabbalah, the Su tradition, Zen, Vedanta, and so forth. These traditions
not only inuence the experiences itself, they also color the descriptions
presented by the mystics. What kind of relation does the mystic have to
the religious tradition that he or she belongs to? Within their religious traditions, mystics not infrequently are regarded as radicals, drawing on the
profound consequences of their personal, intense, transforming experiences. In some cases this leads to serious disputes with representatives of
orthodoxy. The martyrdom of al-Hallaj in Islam, executed in Baghdad
(922) for his extravagant utterances, is well known. He was far from the
only mystic who was accused of heresy, especially during the period up
to al-Ghazzali (d. 1111), when Susm reached consolidation with the
orthodox Muslim faith. Jewish Kabbalists have always been regarded with
a certain suspicion, and Chassidim have been condemned on several occasions (Scholem, 1954/1971, 1974). In the context of Christianity, the
German Meister Eckhart and the Dutch Jan van Ruusbroec had to defend
themselves for uttering certain phrases that were seriously suspected of
being pantheistic. A number of Eckharts statements were condemned in
a bull in 1329, a year after his death. Cases like those mentioned above
were probably in the mind of W. R. Inge, who in one of his last studies
on mysticism, after nearly half a century of research, wrote that institutionalism and mysticism have always been uneasy bedfellows (1947/
1969, p. 21). We should not forget, however, that most mystics within
the great religions of the world do their utmost to be loyal and faithful
interpreters of their own tradition.
261
262
Altering Consciousness
Forman, the foremost proponent of the alternative called deconstructivism. Just like his colleague, Forman gathered a great number of scholars,
most of them philosophers of religion, who supported him. In his introductory essay, Forman convincingly criticizes the constructivist approach,
stating that the history of mysticism is rife with cases in which expectations, models, previously acquired concepts, and so on, were deeply
and radically disconrmed (Forman 1990: 19f ).
Forman presents a number of arguments, all refuting what he calls the
conservative stand of constructivism. First, there are examples of
untrained and uninitiated neophytes who have mystical experiences,
which only in the course of time, months, or years later, were religiously
interpreted. Forman mentions published reports of Richard M. Bucke
(1901) and the more recent book of Bernadette Roberts (1982). In another
study, he refers to interviews with a Zen Master who mentioned that he
had his rst mystical experiences 5 years before he took up Zen Buddhism
or meditation of any kind. His experience led him to explore Zen, not the
other way around, as the constructivist would have it (Forman, 1998b,
p. 6). In addition to these cases, Forman presents interview data, collected
by himself, and examples of classical mystics, who most often report being
surprised over their experiences (1990, p. 19f). Constructivism, Forman
concludes, cannot account for the existence of reports of so-called pure
consciousness events (PCEs), dened as wakeful contentless consciousness, the existence of which has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt (1990, p. 21).
The position of Forman and others really reminds us of the older perennialist view, the idea that there is a common core in all mysticism. Forman gives this view a psychophysiological twist by suggesting a perennial
psychology, a common structureconsciousness itselfthat is not created by culture but comes with the machinery of being human. We all
have an innate capacity to get in touch with this nonconceptual dimension. The title of his second edited volume, The Innate Capacity, points at
this human aspect. In consciousness itself and in the way it encounters
the world intentionally, we may have something that transcends cultures
and eras (Forman, 1998b, p. 27f) Instead of emphasizing common
denominators in mystical philosophy, Forman strikes a blow for similar
psychological processes, uniting an 8th-century Korean with a 14thcentury Dominican friar (Forman probably refers to Meister Eckhart, of
whom he has written an insightful study, published 1991) and contemporary meditators.
From a psychological point of view, the paradigms mentioned above
are not incompatible. The constructivist approach is a truism. A humans
263
264
Altering Consciousness
265
266
Altering Consciousness
faeces, and when I vomited there was blood. He nally came to a doctor,
who gave him 1 more month to live. Why do you drug addicts always
come too late? the doctor wondered. Reidar then decided to inject a nal
dose of heroin and climbed up on the highest bridge in Gothenburg, ready
to jump. How long had he been standing there? Hundreds of cars stopped
in order to see what was going on. A police ofcer tried to talk to him,
using a megaphone, while simultaneously trying to reach for Reidar. At
this desperate moment he both heard and saw Jesus:
In front of me I saw the outline of a face. Was I hallucinating again? But the
outline became clearer. I did not see clear features, but I saw that there was
a crown of thorns on top of the head and that the hair was curly and shining
gold. It sort of radiated light from it, and I saw two hands, the palms of
which were wounded, stretched out to me. And I heard a voice, so soft
and fatherly loving, as I have never heard before. Reidar, Reidar, I heard.
You have tried everything in life. You have lost everything. There is nothing more left. The only thing you look forward to is to take your life. If
you decide to do that, you will be lost eternally and there will be no
memory of you. But you have forgotten to count with me. Put what is left
of your life in my hands and I will heal and save you.
Reidar does not know how he managed to climb down from the
bridge. From that moment on, his life became organized. About 18 months
later he married, and had two children. Reidar still visits prisons, but now
as a pastor, preaching the gospel of Jesus.
Bearing the model of personality in mind, a few general remarks on the
psychology of visionary experience can be given. The acute crisis prior to
the vision activates the synthetic function, which uses autosymbolic representations as a psychological process that is most suited for its goal: homeostasis, equilibrium. The result is a religious vision, establishing order in a
chaotic system. In other words, religious visions can be understood as autosymbolic representations of intrapsychic conicts, a dynamic process
chosen by the synthetic function in order to establish homeostasis. It is
striking that the content of the informants visions t so well into their situations of disorder. The religious visions immediately establish order in chaos.
The vision not only shapes the crisis, it solves it as well. Religious visions, or
object representations like Jesus, Muhammad, the Goddess Kali, or Angels,
are symbolic representations of order instead of chaos.1
1
A similar model has been proposed by Arieti (1976), who suggested a creative integration
of primary and secondary thinking, leading to a magic synthesis in what he calls the
tertiary process.
267
268
Altering Consciousness
Case Study II: Encounter with Jesus in the DormitoryGertrud of Helfta (12561301)
In Germany, southwest of Magdeburg, stood a Benedictine convent in
a little place called Helfta. The convent was founded in 1229 and is known
for having been the residence of several of the most important female mystics in Germany. One of them was Gertrud, later known as Gertrud the
Great of Helfta. One of her main occupations was writing, especially on
mystical themes, both in Latin and German.
We know very little about Gertruds early life (see Marnau, 1993). It is
highly conceivable that she was placed in the convent when her parents died
when she was 5 years old. In the convent, she received an excellent education. The nuns studied not only great church fathers such as Augustine but
also important contemporary authors such as the Victorines and Cistercian
masters.
In her autobiographical writings, we nd some information about
Gertruds conversion and spiritual experiences. Just like many other
mystics, she divided her life into a before and an after, referring to her
conversion. In Gertruds case, this means that her routine life in a Christian
convent now was altered into a totally God-centered life. Gertrud was
25 years old when she had a visionary encounter with Jesus in a youthful
gure, about 16 years of age, handsome and gracious.2 The time and place
of her vision are important. She was in the dormitory, as dusk was falling.
Gertrud had been worried for about a month. An older nun had just
entered the room, and Gertrud bowed her head in veneration and respect,
as is the custom. When she looked up again, she saw the youthful gure.
Courteously and in a gentle voice, he spoke to her. Why are you so sad?
2
The following account is based on Gertrud of Helfta, The Herald of Divine Love, book II,
translated by M. Winkworth (1993, pp. 94ff).
Gertrud became known as a humble and wise woman, often visited for
spiritual guidance. Her spirituality centers around the concept of love,
Gods love to mankindHe loved us rstand, as a result of this gift,
269
270
Altering Consciousness
our love to God. But her writings are focused on the second person of the
Trinity. God is love and Jesus is Gertruds spouse. Inuenced by the Song
of Songs, the Book of Esther, and the language of human love, Gertrud
describes her spiritual experiences, sometimes in unvarnished erotic language. The bridegroom prefers to be alone with his bride, in the nuptial
chamber, where they can delight one another with the charm of intimate
converse and tender embraces (in Marnau, 1993: 32f; see also 28ff ).
In her later writings, Gertrud did not ascribe her spiritual experiences
such great importance. The more positive, tangible, cataphatic character
of her descriptions altered into a more abstract, apophatic language. Could
it be that one no longer is aware of ones beloved in the kiss of embrace?
Instead of using such tangible words, Gertrud prefers to speak about a
sense of intimate, inspiring presence, a presence also to be experienced
in events of everyday lifein different religious acts, in the sacraments,
and in particular in holy communion (see Marnau, 1993, p. 40ff ).
Bridal mysticism belongs to the marks of medieval spirituality. Jesus as
a young man appeared to her in a troublesome life situation, but she does
not mention the nature of her trouble. We will have to assume that she
was a child of her time, inuenced by what has been called the new mysticism (McGinn, 1998). It involved lively visualizations of the life of Jesus,
especially the Passion. Considering these circumstances, it comes as no
surprise that Gertruds trouble found a solution in a vision of Jesus.
According to the proposed model of interpretation, the vision can be
described as an autosymbolic representation of her need of consolation.
The content of the vision is clearly related to the spirituality of her time:
bridal mysticism and visualization as a main spiritual exercise.
colleague, working in the same eld. The two scholars worked with two
totally different approaches. They could not communicate.
Our theoretical model can shed more light on the experience of anger.
The one-pointedness of meditative practice, focusing for example on ones
breathing, means that the adaptive functions of the ego structure are partly
shut down or inhibited. This means two things. First, the mediating functions weaken, they cannot adequately regulate the balance between the
unconscious id and the superego. Second, this in turn means a weakening
of defences. In such a state, the green light has been given for the constant
pressure of the unconscious id towards the ego.4 Metaphorically speaking,
when the defensive forces are absent, and when there is no one in the
observation tower (the adaptive functions), and the negotiators rest (the
mediating functions), then foreign powers (unconscious needs) can
invade the landscape. In the case of Frank, it concerns a strong emotion,
suppressed for years. Other emotions can, of course, also be actualized.
In addition, meditative practice can also lead to creative solutions. A state
of receptivity allows for other cognitive processes to break through, for
example associative processes, so needed in creativity.
Now, does this model also have a heuristic value when it comes to the
so-called pure consciousness event? Yes, I think so. These experiences do
occur spontaneously, as Robert K. C. Forman has shown in his books. In
such cases, they are retrospectively interpreted. In most cases, however,
they are reported by so-called classical mystics in the great mystical traditions. We again touch upon the concept of mystical death. A denition of
this state of consciousness has been given by the Swedish scholar Ernst
Arbman, who laid the foundations for a cross-cultural study of mystical
death,5 quoting primarily Christian mystics. Arbman denes mystical
death as:
the deep absorption in the object of belief which completely wipes out the
mystics waking consciousness or mental life, the whole of his normal
human self, but at the same time makes him go through an incomprehensible inner transformation corresponding to his highest religious and ethical strivings and ideals.
Here I am using the word ego in the classical psychoanalytical sense, as a component in
Freuds structural model of personality. It is not to be equalled with the ego structure,
which comprises all functions and representations of the personality.
5
See e.g. Arbman 1968, pp. 37ff, 133189, and 379ff. Unfortunately, the monumental
work of Arbman in three volumes did not receive the international attention it deserves.
271
272
Altering Consciousness
Arbman not only describes what Forman depicts as the pure consciousness event, he also mentions the other side of the picture: the transformed self, perfect man (Susm) or the true human being (Meister
Eckhart), or whatever that state has been called in the mystical traditions.
However, Arbman did not present a psychological interpretation of mystical death. With the aid of the organismic model of the ego structure, as
presented above, we can explain it. Mystics in different traditions do
describe mystical death and spiritual transformation as the goals of the
mystical life. In order to reach these goals, they use a whole range of spiritual exercises or techniques. These techniques usually aim at a narrowing
of the eld of awareness through meditation, prayer, isolation, or a combination of them. In terms of our model, these techniques lead to an
inhibition not only of the egos adaptive functions but also of its defensive
and mediating functions. This is a process of extinction or annihilation,
resulting also in the inhibition of our inner representations and the experience of the I as an active agent. Most of us are aware of the fact that
we do things best when we are not aware of doing them. The mystic
describes a similar process, but more radical, and in a religious context.
But the experience of no-self (Roberts, 1982) does not mean that
the whole ego-structure has been inhibited. The experience of nothing
(Meister Eckhart uses the medieval German word niht) is also a something
(medieval German iht). From a scholarly perspective, Stace (1960) mentioned the vacuum-plenum paradox. This concept agrees with Eckharts
distinction between iht and niht, or Saint John of the Crosss speech about
nada (nothing, a contentless state) and todo (everything, the transformed
personality).
If we return to the paradigms as described above, the conclusion is
that Formans position can be fruitfully combined with the constructivist
view as defended by Katz. Humans construct most of the time, but
during exercises in for example relaxation or meditation, religiously
motivated or not, we do our best to deconstruct. When we are successful
and reach the goal of our strivings, the ground or perhaps counterpoint of our personality, we will eventually return to the world of phenomenaand reconstruct. The world will then not be the same. Even
though Zen Buddhists can say things like before enlightenment I chop
wood and fetch water; after enlightenment I chop wood and fetch
water, underlining the continuity of spiritual development, they also
mean to say that the enlightened person touches the dead trees and lo!
They come into bloom.
References
Addas, C. (1993). Quest for the red sulphur. The life of Ibn Arabi. Cambridge:
Islamic Texts Society.
Arbman, E. (1963). Ecstasy or religious trance. Volume I: Vision and ecstasy. Stockholm:
Scandinavian University Books.
Arbman, E. (1968). Ecstasy or religious trance. Volume II: Essence and forms of
ecstasy. Stockholm: Scandinavian University Books.
Arbman, E. (1970). Ecstasy or religious trance. Volume III: Ecstasy and psychopathological states. Stockholm: Scandinavian University Press.
Arieti, S. (1976). Creativity: The magic synthesis. New York: Basic Books.
Bucke, R. M. (1901). Cosmic consciousness: A study in the evolution of the human
mind. New York: Dutton.
Cardena, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and physically active. International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 53, 3759.
Cardena, E., & Terhune, D. (2008). A distinct personality state? The relationship
between hypnotizability, absorption, self-transcendence, and mental boundaries. Proceedings of the 51st Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association, 6173.
Chittick, W. C. (1989). The su path of knowledge. Albany: SUNY Press.
Christian, W. A. (1981). Apparitions in late medieval and renaissance Spain. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Clark, W. H. (1958). The psychology of religion: An introduction to religious experience and behavior. New York: MacMillan.
Dan, J. (2002). The heart and the fountain. An anthology of Jewish mystical experiences. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deikman, A. (1971). Bimodal consciousness. Archives of General Psychiatry, 25,
481489.
Deikman, A. (1976). Bimodal consciousness and the mystical experience. In
P. Lee (Ed.), Symposium on consciousness (pp. 6788). New York: Viking.
Dinzelbacher, P. (1981). Vision und visionslitteratur im Mittelalter (Visions and literature on visions in the Middle Ages). Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann.
Ellwood, R. S. (1980). Mysticism and religion. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Epstein, M. (1988). The deconstruction of the self: Ego and egolessness in Buddhist insight meditation. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 20(1), 6169.
Ernst, C. W. (1998). The Shambhala guide to Susm. Boston/London: Shambhala.
Fanning, S. (2001). Mystics of the Christian tradition. London/New York: Routledge.
Fingarette, H. (1963). The self in transformation. New York: Basic Books.
Forman, R. K. C. (1990). The problem of pure consciousness. Mysticism and philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Forman, R. K. C. (1991). Meister Eckhart. The mystic as theologian. Rockport, MA:
Element Books.
273
274
Altering Consciousness
275
276
Altering Consciousness
CHAPTER 13
278
Altering Consciousness
Carrolls three-layer taxonomy comprised the ordinary state, which precludes the admission of the fantastic, the liminal eerie state in which there is consciousness of both
quotidian reality and the otherworldly, and the trance state in which only the extraordinary world is perceived.
Colored Inklings
From its earliest days, writing has been part of the human quest to express
our being, and it is striking that the earliest writings tell stories of the
development of conscious awareness and the fear of that consciousness
ending at the moment of death. In the Epic of Gilgamesh, a tale inscribed
on stone tablets a thousand years before the Iliad and the Bible, the poet
tells of how Enkidu the wild man makes love to Shamhat the harlot priestess for 6 days and 7 nights, an event that awakens his consciousness as a
human being rather than an animal, for now he had reason, and wide
understanding (George, 2003). Similarly, in the Bible (Genesis 3:3),
Adam and Eve partake of the forbidden fruit, their eyes are opened, and
they realize that they are nakedanother story of sudden consciousness
and self-awareness, but followed in this instance by shame, a selfconscious emotion indicating the underlying presence of Theory of Mind
Ancient scriptures may not give accurate accounts of the evolution of the
species Homo sapiens, but perhaps they can shed more light on our awakening into conscious awareness.
The creation of literature has been long thought to involve other, nonordinary states of mind. In the Ion, Plato suggests that poetry is art of
divine madness, or inspiration. The Muse speaks and the poet is only
her mouthpiece; the authorial voice is not that of the normal person but
mysterious and other. Yet in The Philosophy of Composition (1846), Edgar
Allan Poe poured cold water on this notion of writers composing in a species of ne frenzyan ecstatic intuition, pointing instead to the elaborate and vacillating crudities of thought . . . at the cautious selections and
rejectionsat the painful erasures and interpolations . . . which, in
ninety-nine cases out of the hundred, constitute the properties of the literary histrio. Nevertheless, Freud returns to the idea of the writer operating
outside a normative state of consciousness in his 1907 lecture Creative
Writers and Day-Dreaming. For Freud, there is an analogy between the
activity of literary creation and the world of daydreams, play, and fantasy
279
280
Altering Consciousness
Colored Inklings
281
282
Altering Consciousness
Colored Inklings
the telling of tales, and I will tell you one that ts the time . . . Drugs have
played a substantial role in shaping literary creation.
In the East, numerous folktales from the Middle East and Central Asia
make reference to hashish; it makes its appearance in the Thousand and
One Nights, and 13th-century Su poets praise its meanings and the state
of illumination it can bring about (Boon, 2002, p. 127). From the West,
both Chaucer and William Shakespeare mention drugs in their works, and
of particular interest is Shakespeares mention in Sonnet 76 of Invention
in a noted weed. Thackeray (1999) argues that Shakespeares use of the
term weed is not only a veiled reference to hemp but also a reference to
the perception that the use of hallucinogenic compounds was a source of
inspiration for the invention of verse. In Sonnet 38, Shakespeare appeals
for a Tenth Muse in addition to the nine classical Muses as sources of
inspiration, and it is suggested that this Tenth Muse was cannabis. Thackeray et al. (2001) claim to have found further support for this theory, with
the chemical analysis of organic residues in clay pipes from StratfordUpon-Avon in England uncovering chemical indications of cannabis.
Shakespeare may or may not have been a stoner, but in the early19th-century Romantic period, an explosion of drug use certainly erupted
among writers. This phenomenon was perhaps most famously recorded
by the essayist Thomas De Quincey in his largely autobiographical Confessions of an English Opium-Eater (1821/1994), in which he gives an account
of his early life and the growth and effects of his opium addiction. In a
foreshadowing of Freuds thoughts on literary creativity and dreams, De
Quincey notes that the main phenomenon by which opium expressed
itself to him permanently, and the sole phenomenon that was communicable, lay in the dreams and the peculiar dream scenery that followed its
use: Here is the briefest possible abstract of the total caseThe nal
object of the whole record lay in the dreams. For the sake of those the
entire narrative arose (De Quincey, 1821/1994, p. 168). Romantic poets
Percy Bysshe Shelley, William Wordsworth, Lord Byron, and John Keats
all produced works while under the inuence of opium and laudanum, a
mixture of alcohol and opium derivatives, easily available without prescription. When Samuel Taylor Coleridge invited a friend to come for a
visit, he coaxed him to bring along some drugs and I will give a fair trial
to opium, henbane, and nepenthe . . . By the bye, he added, I have
always considered Homers account of nepenthe as a banging lie2 (cited
in Ebin, 1965, p. 103). Opium excited Coleridges fascination with the
2
A pun perhaps on the word Bhanga preparation of cannabis used in India and
Pakistan.
283
284
Altering Consciousness
Of course the use of drugs was not conned solely to English writers;
19th-century French writers such as Theophile Gautier, Arthur Rimbaud,
Colored Inklings
285
286
Altering Consciousness
I have always been a poor visualizer. Words, even the pregnant words of
poets, do not evoke pictures in my mind. No hypnagogic visions greet me
on the verge of sleep. When I recall something, the memory does not
present itself to me as a vividly seen event or object . . . . To those in whom
the faculty of visualization is strong my inner world must seem curiously
drab, limited and uninteresting. (p. 5)
Colored Inklings
It has been argued that alcohol can give writers condence by helping
overcome a form of literary stage fright caused by doubts about their
ability to write (Goodwin, 1988, p. 186). Yet this is far from being a
risk-free strategy. Ernest Hemingway, a conrmed alcoholic, once dubbed
alcohol the Giant Killer of American Letters, and it is perhaps signicant
that ve of the rst seven American-born writers awarded the Nobel Prize
for literature had problems with alcohol: Sinclair Lewis, Eugene ONeill,
William Faulkner, Ernest Hemingway, and John Steinbeck (Oyebode,
2009). Thankfully, other addiction-free methods for altering consciousness were conveniently available.
287
288
Altering Consciousness
Colored Inklings
difcult to dene (Breton, 1924/2005a, p. 729) and noted that in 1919, his
attention had been called to the more or less fragmentary sentences that
arise from unknown origins when sleep is near. Considering these fragments with their remarkable imagery to be rst-rate poetic material, he
and others began to contemplate how to induce such material into existence
by voluntary means.
Breton and Soupaults publication Les Champs magnetiques (1920) was
his rst attempt. Before sitting down to write, both men tried to empty
their minds of any conscious internal stimulation or external distraction
and assumed as passive a state as possible to concentrate the mind on
itself, awaiting the poetic phrases of an inner voice. When those phrases,
came they immediately copied them down onto paper. At the end of the
rst day of this experiment, they had about 50 sheets of writing conveying
a very special sense of the picturesque. Explicitly stating that the source
of this magical dictation was the unconscious, Breton noted its elusiveness and its tendency to ee at the slightest intrusion from the outside
world (Breton, 1922/2005b).
Automatic writing (or psychography) is itself surprisingly difcult to
dene in a satisfactory manner, but it is generally considered to be the production of scripts that do not arise from the conscious thoughts of the
writer. Considered by some to be evidence of spirit communication or
incidents of thought transference (i.e., telepathy), alternatively, some psychologists and psychiatrists have considered automatic writing as a pathologic disturbance indicating evidence of an untoward splitting or
dissociation of the personality. Breton also held some reservations about
its employment; his own immoderate use of it had led to some disturbing
hallucinatory experiences, and at times he detected the intrusion of conscious elements that defeated the purpose of the experiment.
Following Freud, the surrealists made a regular practice of recording
dreams for interpretation, but these too were suspect and susceptible to
the failings of memory. Rene Crevel proposed hypnosis as a solution; he
had been taught techniques of inducing an ASC or hypnotic sleep by a
spiritualist medium, a certain Madam D., and had been impressed by the
results. Although rejecting the principles of spiritualism outright and
denying the possibility of communication with the dead, the surrealists
were nevertheless fascinated by the mental phenomena involved. They
determined to hold a seance. The proper conditions were created: darkness and silence in the room with a chain of hands across the table. Breton
and two friends watched as Crevel entered a hypnotic state and began a
declamatory diction, with sighs and the sing-song stressing of words and
slurring of others. On awakening, Crevel reportedly had no recollection
289
290
Altering Consciousness
of what he had said, and the experiment was repeated without him. This
time Robert Desnos, who had previously believed himself to be impervious to hypnosis,4 let his head drop onto his arms and began scratching
the table compulsively. On awakening of his own volition, he was
unaware of his behavior; however, the scratching was interpreted as indicating the desire to write. At the next session, in similar circumstances,
Desnos was provided with pencil and paper and, without moving his
head, began to write; interrogated by the others, he answered with cryptic
phrases and drawings (Breton, 2005a).
So began an extraordinary outbreak of altered states among the surrealists, an epoque des sommeils. Hypnosis, dreams, and automatisms seemed
different paths converging on the ancient realm of visionaries and savages,
poets and prophets, but events soon began to take a disquieting turn.
Desnos could no longer be easily recalled from the fantastic otherworld.
He sank at will into weird ASC, purported to be in telepathic communication with artist Marcel Duchamp in New York, and, in a t of apparent
somnambulism, chased a colleague with a knife intending to kill him. In
a similar condition, Crevel was found leading 10 men and women into
an attempt at collective suicide by hanging.5 The domain of the marvellous
had become a state of possession and the experiment was called to a halt.
However, lessons had been learned from these years of exploration, and in
Manifesto of Surrealism (1924/2005b), Breton posited the existence of a
surrealite in which the contradictory states of dream and reality would
one day be resolved and proclaimed an approach to literature that deed
logic and satised the basic human yearning for the marvellous (Browder,
1967). The Manifesto also contained a certain number of practical recipes,
entitled Secrets of the Magic Surrealist Art, such as the following instructions for composition (Breton, 1924/2005a, p. 731):
After you have settled yourself in a place as favorable as possible to the concentration of your mind upon itself, have writing materials brought to you.
Put yourself in as passive, or receptive, a state of mind as you can. Forget
about your genius, your talents, and the talents of everyone else. Keep
reminding yourself that literature is one of the saddest roads that leads to
everything. Write quickly, without any preconceived subject, fast enough
so that you will not remember what youre writing and be tempted to reread
Breton records that Desnos had frustrated two public hypnotists (Messrs Donato and
Benevol) several days previously.
5
An echo of the grisly events of Crevels fourteenth year, when his father hanged himself
during a dinner party and the guests and the child were called in to look at the body.
Colored Inklings
what you have written. The rst sentence will come spontaneously, so compelling is the truth that with every passing second there is a sentence
unknown to our consciousness which is only crying out to be heard. It is
somewhat of a problem to form an opinion about the next sentence; it
doubtless partakes both of our conscious activity and of the other, if one
agrees that the fact of having written the rst entails a minimum of perception. This should be of no importance to you, however; to a large extent, this
is what is most interesting and intriguing about the Surrealist game. The fact
still remains that punctuation no doubt resists the absolute continuity of the
ow with which we are concerned, although it may seem as necessary as the
arrangement of knots in a vibrating cord. Go on as long as you like. Put your
trust in the inexhaustible nature of the murmur . . .
The French surrealists were not alone in their experiments with hypnosis,
dreams, and automatic writing. In previous decades, Irish writers in the
circle surrounding the visionary poet George William Russell (AE) had
learned from him meditative techniques to access ASC and used these to
assist with their writing, although in their case it was with distinctly more
supernaturalistic overtones. Writers as diverse as W. B. Yeats, the duo
Somerville and Ross, and James Cousins were variously involved in mysticism, spiritualism, Theosophy, and ceremonial magic; automatic writing
mediums Hester Dowden, Eileen Garrett, and Geraldine Cummins were
also features of the Anglo-Irish literary scene (Cousins, 2008). James
Joyce, with his disdain for the mystical overtones of the Celtic Twilight
(which he punningly referred to as the cultic toilette), was a notable
exception, but nevertheless his stream-of-consciousness style of writing
owes something to this milieu. Geraldine Cummins, who had enjoyed
some success as a playwright before achieving fame as one of the most prodigious automatic writing mediums, described the experience of such
apparently spirit-directed communications in terms that might have
sounded familiar to the French surrealists and yet harks back to the
concept of ancient poets listening for their muse:
I am in a condition of half-sleep, a kind of dream-state that yet, in its peculiar way, has more illumination than ones waking state. I have at times distinctly the sensation of a dreamer who has no conscious creative control
over the ideas that are being formulated in words. I am a mere listener,
and through my stillness and passivity I lend my aid to the stranger who
is speaking. It is hard to put such a psychological condition into words.
I have the consciousness that my brain is being used by a stranger all the
time. It is just as if an endless telegram is being tapped out on it. (Cummins,
1955, pp. 144145)
291
292
Altering Consciousness
To produce the writing, she would sit at a table, cover her eyes with her
left hand and concentrate on stillness. She would then fall into what
was described as a light trance or dream state. Her hand would then begin
to write. Usually, her spirit control (a rather imperious entity called
Astor) would make some introductory remarks and announce that
another entity was waiting to speak. Because of her ASC, and also because
of the speed at which the writing was produced, an assistant would sit
beside her and remove each sheet of paper as it was lled and quickly lift
her hand to the top of the new page, where the writing would continue
without break or punctuation. It is claimed that in one sitting, Cummins
wrote 2,000 words in 75 minutes, whereas her normal compositions were
laboriously put together, perhaps 800 words in 7 or 8 hours.
Although Cummins laid some claim to her own modest abilities as a
hypnotist, she noted the more remarkable hypnotic aptitude of her Dublin
contemporary, W. B. Yeats (Cummins, 1951). Moving on from his youthful n de sie`cle experimentation with hashish and mescaline and despite
early misgivings with regard to hypnosis, Yeats had become somewhat of
an expert in altered states and their practical applications for the poet in
achieving inspiration. The inuence of hypnotic techniques in Yeatss
writing is particularly apparent, with the use of subtle rhythm and repetition deliberately employed as a hypnotist might use the recurring ash of a
bright object or a soothing pass of the hands to subordinate sense to the
narcotic repetition of sound (Hoare, 1937, p. 98). In more recent decades,
an analysis of the poetic techniques productive of the trance-inductive
effect was conducted by Snyder and Shor (1983). These were found to
be: freedom from abruptness, marked regularity of soothing rhythm,
refrain and frequent repetition, ornamented harmonious rhythm to x
attention, vagueness of imagery, and fatiguing obscurities. In his poetic
work, Yeats might be said to be master of all of these, yet not everyone
was completely convinced of his hypnotic powers. When Max Beerbohm
met the poet, he reported the pleasure was somewhat mixed, remarking,
I always felt rather uncomfortable, as though I had submitted myself to
a mesmerist who somehow didnt mesmerise me (cited in Epstein, 2007).
In Per Amica Silentia Lunae (1918/1959, pp. 343346), Yeats also
makes reference to his adaptation of druidic rites, and in an article entitled
Irish Witch Doctors (1900/1993, p. 266), he revealed his knowledge of the
Irish bardic practice of imbas forosnai (great science that enlightens), a rite
that involved both incantation and sensory deprivation. Kept rather more
private, at least during Yeatss lifetime, was his collaboration with his
mediumistic wife George, rst through automatic writing and then
through a succession of hypnotic sleeps during which messages were
Colored Inklings
James Joyces Finnegans Wake (1939/2000) provides a literary exception as it both begins
and ends in the middle of the same fragmented sentence with the famous invocation of the
river Liffey: riverrun, past Eve and Adams, from swerve of shore to bend of bay, brings us
by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs. The river, consciousness and the narrative are circular and cyclical, potentially ever-repeating.
293
294
Altering Consciousness
darkened room, utterly absorbed in his brilliant work. Jorge Luis Borges
took this metaphor of the literary double to its furthest, yet most personal,
point when in a piece called Borges and I he went so far as to split
himselfBorgesin two.
The other one, the one called Borges, is the one things happen to. I walk
through the streets of Buenos Aires and stop for a moment, perhaps
mechanically now, to look at the arch of an entrance hall and the grillwork
on the gate; I know of Borges from the mail and see his name on a list
of professors or in a biographical dictionary. I like hourglasses, maps,
18th-century typography, the taste of coffee and the prose of Stevenson;
he shares these preferences, but in a vain way that turns them into the
attributes of an actor. It would be an exaggeration to say that ours is a hostile relationship; I live, let myself go on living, so that Borges may contrive
his literature, and this literature justies me. It is no effort for me to confess
that he has achieved some valid pages, but those pages cannot save me, perhaps because what is good belongs to no one, not even to him, but rather to
the language and to tradition. Besides, I am destined to perish, denitively,
and only some instant of myself can survive in him. Little by little, I am giving over everything to him, though I am quite aware of his perverse custom
of falsifying and magnifying things . . . I shall remain in Borges, not in
myself . . . I do not know which one of us has written this page. (Borges,
1964, pp. 246247)
It has been argued that writing serves to further the cause of skepticism
and critical thinking because spells and incantation are dependent, at least
in part, upon the unitary identity of the speaker and spoken fora unity
writing disrupts (Goody, 1977). Max Weber memorably remarked upon
the progressive disenchantment of the world, but a powerful countercurrent to the forces of rationality is also evident (Landy & Saler, 2009),
and the sense of wonder engendered by religion and myth in earlier times
has not disappeared. In their explorations of multiplicity and fractured
identity, it seems that Yeats, Merrill, and Borges created strategies for
enacting a literary re-enchantment.
Conclusions
The sheer variety of consciousness-altering techniques employed by
such a diversity of authors across the ages may lead one to the tempting
conclusion that the method of achieving an altered state is less important
than the fact that such a state can be accessed and yet there is a paradox.
In achieving the ASC that lift writers beyond their habitual state; apart
Colored Inklings
from the perils of addiction, there is also the risk of loss of control and the
will to write. The production of literature requires the clear direction of
will and pure perseverance in producing text, and so in many ways the
creation of literature is not so much an art as sheer craft. Producing
something beautiful is not easy. A line may take hours, and yet unless it
seems effortless, then all the labor comes to nothing (Yeats, 1903/2000,
pp. 6465).
Yet moving beyond the requirements of artice and endeavor, good
writing demands something more from the artist. Literature is redeemed
from triviality by the fact that it does not just describe the world around us,
quotidian realities or the catalogues of information that might be found
in encyclopedias, but because it engages with all the conditions to which
the human spirit can come. All good writers express the state of their
souls, even (and perhaps especially) if that soul is in a state of damnation
(Chesterton, 1911/2008). Literature is an interim report from the consciousness of artists (Rushdie, 1991) and from their forays into altered
states, writers have sent back dispatches from the furthest edges of conscious experience, but the work does not end there. Literature can itself
induce ASC. The psychic dissolution of space that occurs when we read,
the experience of being neither here nor there, the liminal state between
the inside of a book and the outside world simultaneously inside and outside, dissolving both by mixing them together (de Certeau, 1995, p. 159)
can be extended to the point where through artistic form of language, frail
humanity, subject to death, becomes capable of accessing, experiencing,
and being something of an entirely different nature, something not subject
to death (Grossman, 2009). A description that seems perilously close to
St. Augustines description of God.7
Writing in the rst century BCE, the Roman lyric poet Horace closed
his third book of odes with the poem conventionally entitled The Poets
Immortal Fame. In it he makes the claim that I shall not altogether die,
but a mighty part of me shall escape the death-goddess. On and on shall
I grow, ever fresh with the glory of after time. This implicit likening of literary achievement to spiritual transcendence and immortality is one of the
most extravagant claims that Western culture has made for such an
achievement (Braden & Taylor, 2000, p. 96). But more than two millennia
later, rather than mere boast, the claim seems almost modest.
O most high and most near, most secret, yet most present . . . wholly everywhere, and
nowhere in space (Confessions, Book VI).
295
296
Altering Consciousness
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my thanks to the Perrott-Warrick Fund, administered by Trinity College, Cambridge, for their nancial support and to
the late Professor David Fontana for his wise and inspirational guidance
and his luminous integrity. This work is dedicated to his memory.
References
Artaud, A. (1988). The peyote dance. In S. Sontag (Ed.), Antonin Artaud, selected
writings. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Original work published
1936)
Atwood, M. (2002). Negotiating with the dead; A writer on writing. New York:
Anchor Books.
Bear, D. M., & Fedio, P. (1977). Quantitative analysis of interictal behavior in
temporal lobe epilepsy. Archives of Neurology, 34, 454467.
Blake, W. (1790), The marriage of heaven and hell.Retrieved14 January 2011
from http://www.blakearchive.org/exist/blake/archive/work.xq?workid=mhh.
Boon, M. (2002). The road of excess: A history of writers on drugs. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Borges, J. L. (1964). Labyrinths: Selected stories and other writings. New York: New
Directions.
Braden, G., & Taylor, A. B. (2000). Ovid, Petrarch and Shakespeares sonnets. In
A. B. Taylor (Ed.), Shakespeares Ovid: The Metamorphoses in the plays and
poems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Breton, A. (2005a). Manifesto of surrealism. In L. S. Rainey (Ed.), Modernism: An anthology (pp. 718741). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Original work published 1924).
Breton, A. (2005b). The mediums enter. In L. S. Rainey (Ed.), Modernism; An
anthology (pp. 742745). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Original work published
1922).
Breton, A., & Soupault, P. (1971). Les champs magnetiques [The Magnetic elds].
Paris: Gallimard. (Original work published 1920).
Browder, C. (1967). Andre Breton: Arbiter of surrealism. Geneva: Droze.
Browning, R. (1994). The poems of Robert Browning. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth
Classics.
Carroll L. (1865). Alices adventures in wonderland. London: Macmillan.
Carroll, L. (1871). Through the looking-glass, and what Alice found there. London:
Macmillan.
Carroll, L. (1893). Sylvie and Bruno concluded. New York: Macmillan.
Castaneda, C. (1968). The teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui way of knowledge. New
York: Ballantine Books.
Chesterton.G. K. (2008). Appreciations and criticisms of the work of Charles Dickens.
Middlesex: Echo Library. (Original work published 1821).
Colored Inklings
297
298
Altering Consciousness
Haney, W. S. (2002). Culture and consciousness: Literature regained. London: Associated University Presses.
Hardman, C. E. (2007). He may be lying but what he says is true: The sacred
tradition of Don Juan as reported by Carlos Castaneda, anthropologist, trickster, guru, allegorist. In J. R. Lewis & O. Hammer (Ed.), The invention of sacred
tradition (pp. 3855). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1971). Poetry, language and thought. New York: Harper Row.
Hoare, D. M. (1937). The works of Morris and of Yeats in relation to early saga
literature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Huxley, A. (2004). The doors of perception. New York: Vintage Books. (Original
work published 1954)
James, H. (1893). The private life. Retrieved 14 January 2011 from http://
www.henryjames.org.uk/prival/home.htm.
James, W. (1890). Principles of psychology. New York: Holt.
Jung, C. (1933). Modern man in search of a soul. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Joyce, J. (2000). Finnegans Wake. London: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1939).
Landsborough, D. (1987). St. Paul and temporal lobe epilepsy. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry, 50, 659664.
Landy, J., & Saler, M. (2009). The re-enchantment of the world: Secular magic in a
rational age. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Leary, T. (1983), Flashbacks, an autobiography. Los Angeles: JP Tarcher.
Lings, M. (1983). Muhammad: His life based on the earliest sources. Rochester, VT:
Inner Traditions.
Maddox, B. (1999). Georges ghosts: A new life of W. B. Yeats. London: Picador.
Mandel, A. (1980). Toward a psychobiology of transcendence: God in the brain.
In J. Davidson & R. Davidson (Eds.), The psychobiology of consciousness
(pp. 379464). New York: Plenum Press.
McGuinness, M. (1998). Hypnotherapy and writers block. Author, 104(4), 158.
Mendez, M. F. (2005). Hypergraphia for poetry in an epileptic patient. Journal of
Neuropsychiatry Clinical Neurosciences, 17, 560561.
Merrill, J. (1992). The changing light at Sandover: A poem. New York: Knopf.
De Mille, R. (1976). Castanedas journey. Santa Barbara, CA: Capra Press.
Mitchell, S. W. (1896). Remarks on the effects of Anhelonium [sic] lewinii (the
mescal button). British Medical Journal, 16251629.
Moore, V. (1954). The unicorn: William Butler Yeats search for reality. New York:
Macmillan.
Oyebode, F. (2009). Mindreading: Literature and psychiatry. London: Royal College of Psychiatrists.
Pascal, B. (1660/2007). Pensees. Sioux Falls: NuVision Publications.
Plant, S. (1999). Writing on drugs. London: Faber & Faber.
Plato (380 BCE). Ion Retrieved 14 January 2011 from http://classics.mit.edu/
Plato/ion.html.
Colored Inklings
299
300
Altering Consciousness
CHAPTER 14
Altered Consciousness
in Performance:
West and East
Phillip B. Zarrilli
Altered Consciousness in Performance
This essay addresses the complex question of altered (or alternate) states
of consciousness (ASC) in performance. Given the clear limitations of a
strictly materialist account of mind/brain/consciousness and the denitional problems surrounding consciousness (Austin, 1998; Block, 1995,
1997, p. 227; Carden a, 2009; Di Benedetto, 2010; Nunn, 2009), for
purposes of this essay, I assume that there are ordinary states of consciousness (or modes of conscious awareness) and that there are transition or
borderline experiences between and among these ordinary states of consciousness (Austin, 1998; Tart, 1975b). Cardena (2009) explains how
we transit between and within these states of consciousness and that
such states organize experience, cognition, physiology, and behavior.
In addition to ordinary states of consciousness and their borderlands,
I also assume that there are what Austin describes as extraordinary discrete
alternate states of consciousness that are rare, highly valued, distinct states
that represent a sharp break from other states of perception or intuition
(1998, pp. 306307), and within which new logics and new ways of
perceiving are experienced (Tart, 1975b, p. 28). This essay selectively
addresses some of the complex patterns of alternate consciousness
assumed in specic approaches to performer training and performance,
patterns that reect systemic logics, ways of perceiving and experiencing
assumed to be different from ordinary consciousness and that may lead to
a transformation of consciousness.
302
Altering Consciousness
What Is Performance?
Derived from the Middle English verb parformen, performen, performance is the act or process of enactment, of bringing something to completion. In the eld of contemporary performance studies (Schechner,
2006), performance refers to a broad spectrum of human activities including discrete genres where an act or process is brought to completionritual/shamanic performancesaesthetic performances across a range of
activities including contemporary mind-altering, participatory secular
festivals such as the Burning Man Festival (Bowditch, 2010; Di Benedetto,
2010); [see St John, this volume]; performances in everyday life (Goffman,
1959); embodied practices such as sports, martial arts, yoga, and other contemporary forms of body work; the use of drama techniques in applied/
therapeutic contexts (Woods, 2009); forms of imaginative play (Huizinga,
1970; Winnicott, 1971); and contemporary mediated performances, among
others. In this essay, I focus on discrete types of live performance (ritual/
shamanic and aesthetic performances) and embodied practices used to train
performers today.
Ritual/shamanic and aesthetic performances are usually framed or set
off from daily life in some way as a time out of time. They possess a
structure and performance score shaped by performance conventions. A
performance score consists of all the specic tasks/actions that constitute
the visual, auditory, enacted, tactile elements made available in the performance by the performer(s) for the audience/participants. (In improvisatory performance, the score may be a set of rules that delimit and
shape what it is possible for the performer to do.) When enacting a score,
the performer embodies and deploys an optimal mode of embodied consciousness, a state that may be described as an extraordinary discrete ASC.
Well-established genres of ritual/shamanic and aesthetic performance
often have processes of initiation, training, or apprenticeship through
which the performer is initiated, achieves virtuosic performance skills,
and attains the ability to actualize the extraordinary ASC necessary for a
successful performance. Although there are underlying biological commonalities to the states of awareness/consciousness discussed here, the
nature of altered consciousness in performance is also shaped by cultural,
contextual, aesthetic, and religio-philosophical factors. Depending on the cultural and historical context, the performers optimal mode of embodied consciousness may or may not be self-consciously articulated or reected upon.
Given the highly reexive nature of aesthetic theatres and the desire of
actors to create virtuosic performances, not surprisingly actors and critics
across a broad spectrum of historical periods and genres have reected
on the nature and training of the actor or on the aesthetic principles that
inform artistry and audience reception (see Cole & Chinoy, 1970, on
Western acting; Hare, 2008, on Japanese noh; Ghosh, 1967, and Zarrilli,
2000, on the Natyasastra in India).
303
304
Altering Consciousness
305
306
Altering Consciousness
307
308
Altering Consciousness
Although the origins of all theatre are not in ritual or shamanic performances, in a few instances it may be argued with a certain degree of historical certainty that there is a direct relationship between early forms of
ritual/shamanic practice and the development of a specic genre of aesthetic theatre that emerged, in part, from these earlier practices. The clearest example is Japanese noh theatre, discussed below.
on diet and behavior. These practices are understood to act on both the
physical (sthula sarira) and subtle body (suksma sarira) most often identied with Kundalini-Tantric yoga.
As early as the Rig Veda (1200 BCE), ascetic practices (tapas) are mentioned. The earliest use of the specic term yoga is in the Katha Upanisad,
where the term means the steady control of the senses, which, along with
the cessation of mental activity, leads to the supreme state (Flood, 1996,
p. 95). Yogas psychophysical/spiritual practices have therefore never been
conned to any particular sectarian afliation or social form (Flood,
1996, p. 94). As a consequence, both yoga philosophy and practices are
ubiquitous throughout Southern Asia (Feuerstein, 1980; Varenne, 1976;
White, 1996), and inform all modes of embodied practice including
Indian wrestling/martial arts and moving-meditation practices such as
the Tibetan trul khor (magic circle), as well as the visual, plastic, and performing arts.
From the earliest stages of its development, yoga developed as a practical pathway toward the transformation of consciousness (and self) and
spiritual release (moksa) through renunciation by withdrawal from the
world and the cycles of rebirth. Some yogic pathways provide a systematic
attempt to control both the wayward body and the potentially overwhelming senses/emotions that can create disequilibrium in daily life. Rigorous
practice therefore can lead to a sense of detachment (vairagya) through
which the yogin withdraws completely from daily life and its activities
and is understood to achieve a state of kalalita where s/he transcends time.
However, yoga philosophy and its practices have also informed and
been adapted by non-renunciants, those who keep both feet rmly in the
spatio-temporal world. Traditionally, this included Indias martial artists
in the service of rulers and a wide variety of performing artists who lived
and acted in/upon the world. Performers were expected to bring pleasure
and aesthetic joy both to the diverse gods of the Hindu pantheon and to
those they were serving and entertaining.
In contrast to the yoga practitioner-as-renunciant who withdraws from
everyday life, for practitioners of psychophysical disciplines such as martial and performing artists, psychophysical techniques quiet the ego and
the emotions so that the practitioners bodymind is transformed into an
alternative, nonordinary consciousness better able to act within his or
her respective sociocultural domain. Within the martial arts tradition of
Indias Dhanur Veda (the science of archery), the yogic paradigm is a
leitmotif in the earliest extant text (Agni Purana) dating from the 8th century (Pant, 1978, pp. 35). Circumscribed by rituals, the martial practitioners training progresses from preliminary body postures through
309
310
Altering Consciousness
it did not displace Shinto; rather, Buddhas and kami were and are often
worshipped side by side. In addition, contact with China also brought
the inuence of Daoism and Confucianism.
The centrality of supernatural beings and ghosts and the traces of shamanic practices in the early development of noh theatre is seen in mugen
nohphantasmal or dream dramas (Ortolani, 1984, 1995). It was under
the leadership of Kanami (13331384) and his son Zeami Motokiyo
(13631443) that noh evolved into a unique form of Japanese theatre
and drama. In phantasmal noh, the shite (doer/central performer) often
appears as a restless female spirit who remembers a past event through a
dream or unsettling memory, encounters the waki (sideman/secondary performer, usually a wandering Buddhist priest) who reveals what is troubling
her, and is pacied or transformed in some way. Inspired by a chapter in
The Tale of Genji, Lady Aoi (c. 15th century as revised by Zeami) enacts the
story of the mortally ill and pregnant wife of Prince Genji, Princess Aoi, represented on stage by an elaborate folded robe in the middle of the polished
wooden oor. She has been possessed by the angry, restless spirit of Lady
Rokujo, Genjis former mistress, whose living spirit leaves her body when
she sleeps. A female shaman performs a ritual to call forth the spirit possessing Lady Aoi. At the far end of the bridgeway (hashigakari), the curtain is
lifted by stage attendants, and from the green room emerges the spirit of
Lady Rokujo, performed by a male actor in an exquisitely carved female
mask. Lady Rokujo eventually reveals her true identity:
In this moral world ephemeral as lightning,
I should hate nobody,
nor should my life be one of sorrow.
When ever did my spirit begin to wander?
Who do you think this person is
who appears before you now
drawn by the sound of the catalpa bow!
I am the vengeful spirit of Lady Rokujo.
(Goff, 1991, p. 135)
Since the female shaman only has sufcient power to call forth but not
exorcise this invading spirit, a male Buddhist mountain priest (yamabushi)
is summoned to perform the exorcism. At the conclusion of the play, her
restless spirit is pacied.
Although phantasmal noh dramatically enacts such transformation
scenes, the actor-dancers state of consciousness in performance has been
shaped by Zeamis concerns with the development of the performers
311
312
Altering Consciousness
313
314
Altering Consciousness
315
316
Altering Consciousness
early in his career provided a necessary structure for the performers inner
search where theatre became a means rather than an end (Wolford,
1998, p. 85). Since 1986, Grotowski focused on art as vehicle, carried out
as a practical research program at the Workcenter of Jerzy Grotowski and
Thomas Richards in Pontedera, Italy. Grotowski described the work as
focused on actions related to very ancient songs which traditionally served
ritual purposes, and so can have a direct impact onso to saythe head,
the heart and the body of the doers (Wolford, 1988, p. 87). Grotowski also
described the work as a type of yoga, noting that while, in one sense, Art as
vehicle is very much concerned with elements of performance craft, the
interior goal of the work is analogous to that which is sought in meditative
disciplines (p. 88). This work is autotelic, focusing on the experience of
the doers. It becomes a tool by means of which the human being can undertake a work on her/himself (Wolford, 1998, p. 88).
317
318
Altering Consciousness
319
320
Altering Consciousness
Figure 14.1 TOLD BY THE WIND. Structure 5: Male and Female Figures
move point/counterpoint within the earth square.
(Photo courtesy of Ace McCarron.)
it draws on phantasmal Japanese noh dramas, Oto Shogos theatre of quietude, and the minimal work of Samuel Beckett. It is a fragmentary performance piece consisting of 10 structures, described by critics as hypnotic,
a meditation, dreamlike. Throughout the performance, a Female and a
Male Figure are onstage but never make direct visual contact. There is no
dialogue per se, but Male Figure delivers fragments of suggestive text during
4 of the structures. Female Figure occasionally mouths words that either
remain unsaid or are barely whispered and remain inaudible. Male Figures
intermittent spoken text is delivered during approximately 11 minutes of
the total running time. Except for the barely audible white noise in the
background throughout the performance, there are lengthy periods in
which no overt and little inadvertent sound is made by the actors.
In the rst structure, the two actors are discovered onstage: Female
Figure is seated in the center stage-left chair, and Male Figure is seated
in the upstage-right chair at a writing desk looking out the window frame
in front of him, suspended in air. Their backs are to each other. Between
them is a square of earth on a diagonal surrounded by evergreen branches.
In silence, for approximately 3 minutes the two gures only make subtle,
321
322
Altering Consciousness
is woven in the moment. Optimally, this process of embodied, aural attunement absorbs and re-directs our energy and awareness in a process of taking in, searching, and questioning . . . We are still but not frozen; rather,
each of us is animated from the inside-out by constantly being active and
reactive. Our performative engagement with deep listening may be
described as opening a space of possibility within us as performers/stagegures. (see Zarrilli, in press b)
References
Austin, J. H. (1998). Zen and the brain: Toward an understanding of meditation and
consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Besmer, F. E. (1983). Horses, musicians, & gods: The Hausa cult of possession-trance.
Zaria, Nigeria: Ahmado Bello University Press.
Blackmore, S. (2003). Consciousness: An introduction. Milton Park, Abingdon, UK.:
Hodder Education.
Blair, R. (2008). The actor, image, and action: Acting and cognitive neuroscience.
London: Routledge.
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 18, 227287.
Block, N. (1997). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. In N. Block,
O. Flanagan, & G. Guzeldere (Eds.), The nature of consciousness (pp. 375415).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bowditch, R. (2010). On the edge of utopia: Performance and ritual at Burning Man.
Calcutta: Seagull Press.
Byckling, L. (2005, November 1113). Unpublished printed notes in lecture
handout, Theatre of the Future? Michael Chekhov and 21st Century Performance, delivered at a conference convened at Dartington Hall, UK.
Cardena, E. (1986). The magical ight: Shamanism and theatre. In R. I. Heinze
(Ed.), Proceedings of the Third International Conference on the Study of Shamanism
and Alternate Modes of Healing (pp. 291304). San Rafael, CA: St. Sabina
Center.
Cardena, E. (2009). Beyond Plato? Toward a science of alterations of consciousness. In C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, & L. Coly (Eds.), Utrecht II: Charting the future
of parapsychology (pp. 305322). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Cardena, E., & Cousins, W. E. (2010). From artice to actuality: Ritual, shamanism, hypnosis and healing. In J. Weinhold & G. Samuel (Eds.), The varieties of
ritual experience. Section in A. Michaels et al. (Eds.), Ritual dynamics and the science of ritual, Volume II: Body, performance, agency and experience (pp. 315329).
Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
323
324
Altering Consciousness
325
326
Altering Consciousness
CHAPTER 15
Altered Consciousness
and Modern Art
Mark Levy
Plato noted in the Phadreus that poetic creation is a form of divinely
inspired madness along with other manias including the erotic and the
prophetic. As Etzel Cardena has noted,
It could be argued that we have not gone further than Platos classication
of the manias . . . Socrates states that when individuals are not in their
usual senses, (which we could interpret as being in an ASC [altered state
of consciousness]), they may have important and useful insights into
reality. (Cardena, 2009, p. 313)
328
Altering Consciousness
and by modern artists as a lighter, less charged term than possession with
its implications of spirit mediumship. Inspiration, along with possession,
however, is mostly involuntary and artists, including Salieri in Amadeus,
have agonized when it does not occur. In this chapter, I will discuss only
a few of the artists and works of art that involve altered consciousness
other than possession where the artist experiences being taken over by
another entity. There are a small but signicant number of visual artists
from the early 19th century to the present, the period that denes Modern
Art and Postmodern Art for most art historians, who have not waited for
inspiration but have consciously cultivated ASC to achieve important
and useful insights into reality (Cardena, 2009, p. 313). These artists
have used dreaming, psychedelics, drumming, ritual, and meditation to
induce ASC. Their styles or formal languages are mostly avant-garde,
reecting the experimental art of their respective periods, and
typically do not imitate the styles of traditional religious or tribal art.
There is also artwork inuenced by entopic and similar phenomena or
produced through hypnotic techniques. In regard to the former, under
certain conditions when light meets the eye, it can render objects within
the eye visible, producing oaters, blue elds, bowtie or hour glass patterns, images of retinal blood vessels, and the like. In an ASC, individuals
may be more susceptible to these phenomena than under normal conditions, but entopic phenomena have not been of interest to most professional artists and have not had a direct or even indirect impact on the
avant-garde stylistic imagery of modern art. Nor have hypnotic states been
a matter of concern for most professional artists, although they have
received serious attention by Ana Eva Iribas and others (Iribas-Rudn,
2009).
In general, I would like to make a distinction in this article between
two forms of the cultivation of ASC: shamanic states of consciousness
(SSC) and meditative states of consciousness. It is a broad and uid distinction and sometimes it overlaps, as in the cases of Vincent van Gogh
and Alex Grey. For the most part, the SSC that I will be talking about here
is the shamanic journey or soul ight that is induced by drumming, psychedelic substances, or dreaming. The shaman experiences that his or her
soul leaves the body and goes to the upper and lower world of nonordinary reality and then returns with information for the spiritual and therapeutic benet of the community [see Winkelman, this volume].
Roger Walsh in the Spirit of Shamanism (1990) has proposed that SSC
are usually accompanied by rapid heartbeat, mental excitation, reduced
awareness of ones surroundings, and positive or negative emotions. On
the other hand, the calming of the mind and emotions and acute
awareness of ones surroundings in multiple dimensions usually accompanies meditative states. Art induced by shamanic methods is different than
art engendered by meditative states. Usually, in shamanic art there is profusion and/or succession of dreamlike images that may embody shape
shifting, dislocations of time and space, connections with power animals
and other spirit allies, and so forth. In art induced by meditation, there
is often a reduction of imagery and sometimes no imagery, as in the genre
of metaphysical abstraction. Through both meditative techniques and shamanic techniques of induction, however, it is possible to see light lines or
energy lines.
It is important to note here that I am making this broad distinction
between art induced by meditative states and SSC as an art historian,
artist, and a serious practitioner of both meditative and shamanic techniques of induction for more than three decades, not a scientist who has
systematically veried the results through research. In this article, Vincent
van Gogh, Salvador Dal, Remedios Varo, Alex Grey, Joseph Beuys, and
Sha Sha Higby are examples of modern artists who employ shamanic techniques of induction, whereas Kasmir Malevich, Agnes Martin, Robert
Irwin, and Jamie Brunson are meditators. I have chosen these artists as
representatives of some of the broad range of styles and approaches within
these two general categories of altered states. For a more thorough analysis
that included more artists, see my books, Technicians of Ecstasy: Shamanism
and the Modern Artist (1993) and Void/in Art (2005).
329
330
Altering Consciousness
Figure 15.1 The Starry Night, 1889, Vincent van Gogh, Museum of Modern
Art, New York, oil on canvas, 73.792.1 cm. (Drawing of The Starry Night by Malka
Helfman for this article)
And even the sober Martin Heidegger, in his essay The Origin of the
Work of Art, said that van Goghs painting of peasant shoes is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth. This
entity emerges into the unconcealedness of its being (Heidegger, 1964,
pp. 665666). For Huxley and Heidegger, van Gogh had somehow gotten
beyond the normal realm of mediated perception that hides the essence of
things. For me, van Gogh was able to embody what the Chinese would call
the chi or the energy body of a thing.
The chi body is a felt quality of aliveness that cannot be apprehended
through normal perception. It is hard to describe verbally, although many
viewers experience it in the presence of a van Gogh painting and even a
reproduction. The chi body becomes more exaggerated and hence readily
noticeable and describable in van Goghs later work such as Starry Night,
1889 (Figure 15.1), in which he depicts this landscape as a wavy eld of
incandescent and interconnected energy or light lines in varying intensities
and congurations. To see the world as a universal matrix of interconnected
vibrating lines is shamanic seeing that goes beyond normal sensory apprehension to reveal another level of reality. Of course, there are other levels
of meaning in Starry Night, including a representation of the village of
St. Remy or Nuenen, and symbols, such as the combined image of the sun
and moon, which have engendered much scholarly interpretation.
In the painting Squid and Turtle Dreaming (1972) (Figure 15.2) by the
Australian aboriginal artist and shaman Liwukang Burkutlatjpi (born
1927), we observe cross-hatchings representing a similar net of interwoven energy lines that may be invisible except in an ASC. This is the primordial matrix of the Dreamings, the original creators who wove the fabric of
existence at the beginning of the Dreamtime, which signies both this primordial time of creation and nonordinary reality. Like Starry Night, Squid
and Turtle Dreaming is replete with many levels of meaning, but the most signicant aspect of these two paintings is the energy transmitted from the
painted lines. An aboriginal friend of mine, on seeing a reproduction of Squid
and Turtle Dreaming, remarked, when I feel these lines my gut is happy.
The light lines in the Aboriginal painting are also the product of prolonged looking. It is an aspect of the strong eye technique that was rst
mentioned by the anthropologist A. P. Elkin in his pioneering work on
aboriginal shamanism, Aboriginal Men of High Degree (1945). Although
Elkin only relates the strong eye to the aboriginal shamans ability to
see spirits, several different aboriginal informants who did not wish to be
quoted have elaborated it to me. The strong eye practice entails standing
in a particular pose while trying to maintain nonfocused attention on a
landscape over an extended period of time. Nonfocused attention causes
331
332
Altering Consciousness
Figure 15.2 Squid and Turtle Dreaming, 1972, Liwukang Burkutlatjpi, ochre on
bark, 92 52cm, South Australian Museum (Drawing of Squid and Turtle Dreaming by Malka Helfman for this article)
diminution of the internal dialoguethe projections that overlay experiencebringing about seeing instead of looking, a technique goes far
beyond normal vision. The experience of energy lines is also common in
advanced forms of meditation such as Kundalini. In deep meditation,
opaque objects are seen to dissolve into energy lines that radiate from the
Figure 15.3 Theologue, 1986, Alex Grey, acrylic on linen, 152.4 457.2 cm.
(Drawing of Theologue by Malka Helfman for this article)
chakras along the central spinal channel. On a still more profound level of
meditation, however, these lines further dissolve into a continuous eld of
formless vibrating energy.
Alex Grey (born 1953) has attempted to depict the energy lines of the
penultimate stages of Kundalini meditation in Theologue (1986) (Figure
15.3), which he describes as:
During deep meditation, I entered a state where all energy systems in my
body were completely aligned and owing: it was in this state that I imagined Theologuethe Union of Human and Divine Consciousness Weaving
the Fabric of Space and Time in Which the Self and the Surroundings are
Embedded. (Grey, 1990, p. 93)
In Theologue, Grey shows a yogi in the full lotus posture with the hands in
dhyana mudra, the position of complete meditative absorption. A grid of
energy lines issues from his glowing subtle body system of chakras and
nadis connections between the chakras. Superimposed on the lines are
ames symbolizing the re of the Kundalini shakti (energy), and in the
far distance are semitransparent mountains that appear to both simultaneously emerge and dissolve from the grid. As Grey explains, I was seeing
both the perceptual grid of my mind on which space and time are woven,
and the universal mind which was both the source and the weaving loom.
At this moment, faintly, Himalayan mountains appeared (Grey, 1990, pp.
9495). He conded to me that this deep meditation that enabled him to
see the light lines was an LSD trip but that subsequently he was able to
eventually reach a similar level of experience through Tibetan meditation
techniques.
333
334
Altering Consciousness
Dreaming in shamanic cultures is considered to be soul ight, a journey into nonordinary reality and through which the shaman retrieves
information for the community. There are several techniques that promote
shamanic dreaming, including dream incubation and lucid dreaming
the ability to become reectively conscious of the dream without waking
up. Simply recording dreaming in artwork, in a journal, or among friends
is a way of remembering dreams and was promoted by the Surrealists. Salvador Dal (19041989), for example, would always have paper and pencil by his bedside and even a canvas and brushes in easel where he would
record images from his dreams of the night. For the lm Un Chien Andalou
(1929), a collaborative effort with the avant-garde lmmaker Louis
Bunuel, he and Dal shared their dreams of the night before in the morning and then tried to realize them during the day in their lm.
For The Persistence of Memory (1931) (Figure 15.4), one of his bestknown paintings during his Surrealist period, Dal developed a precise
and detailed style of realism in which he meticulously recorded the information from a dream or a recurrent series of dreams of a landscape with
ants crawling on the surface of limp watches. According to Dal,
This ambition was shared with other Surrealist painters of the dream, such
as Remedios Varo, Leonora Carrington, Rene Magritte, and Max Ernst. For
these Surrealists, dreams were as real as or more real than ordinary reality.
Indeed, there is a hyperlucidity and intensity in Dals style that, in conjunction with the content, transports the viewer to a timeless realm of nonordinary reality. The numinosity of Dals painted realm in The Persistence of
Memory recalls shamanic places of power that I have experienced in shamanic journeys and dreams and to my mind accounts for the continuous
ongoing attention given to this painting since its creation.
Remedios Varos painting is also replete with numinous places from
nonordinary reality but has a broader range of shamanic themes than
Dals, including dismemberments in nonordinary reality and other initiatory references, dreams within dreams, visitations from animal and other
spirits allies, journeys to the upper and lower world, shape shifting, and
so forth [the covers for both volumes include reproductions of Varos
works]. Like Dals, Varos style is very precise; her father was an engineer
who made meticulous drawings of hydraulic systems and she trained at
the San Fernando Academy of Fine Arts in Madrid, which offered a rigorous academic curriculum emphasizing drawing and composition. She was
not merely interested in recording the dream, however, unlike the other
academic Surrealists painters, including Dal, who also trained at the
San Fernando Academy.
In The Encounter (1962) (Figure 15.5), Varo shows a woman meeting
an owl gurea probable shamanic power ally. Simultaneously, two
other possible allies, a human face and a bird, appear in her belly
and leg regions. Fariba Bogzaran, an expert on art and dreaming, argues,
Whether she painted these images before or after having this dream
remains a mystery. If she was not painting her dreams, could it be
that she was dreaming her paintings? (Bogzaran, 2008, p. 173). Perhaps
Varos artwork is the product of waking dream, a kind of shamanic
journey in an ASC akin to what C. G. Jung called the active imagination?
It is known that Varo worked actively with night dreams, so it is likely
that she had big dreams with shamanic content. Bogzaran notes
that she was part of a dream group that included her friends, the painter
Leonora Carrington and Eva Sulzer, who shared each others night
335
336
Altering Consciousness
Figure 15.5 The Encounter, 1962, Remedios Varo, Private Collection, vinyl
paint on cardboard, 64 44 cm (Drawing of The Encounter by Malka Helfman
for this article)
dreams. Varos The Fern Cat (1957) makes reference to one of Sulzers
dreams. With Leonora Carrington, Varo even concocted various exotic
dishes in her kitchen to ward off bad dreams!
Performance art, which I shall dene as live multimedia art by artists
who are mostly oriented toward the visual arts, emerged as a genre beginning in the early 20th century among the Dadaists and the Futurists and
has been greatly expanded by contemporary artists. Although much of performance art is purely secular, a signicant number of artists have in effect
created sacred ritual dramas that compare to traditional performance
art genres. Indeed, in genres such as the Wayang Kulit (the shadow puppet
play) in Indonesia, the Noh performance in Japan, the masquerades in
Africa, and so forth, performers use percussion, repetitive gestures, chanting, and the like to move themselves and their audiences from ordinary to
nonordinary states of reality. In the Wayang, for example, the audience
and the performers may enter into an ASC and experience being transported to the magical spirit realm of the puppets for healing and insights
into the future. As I discuss in Wayang Kulit: Indonesias Shadow Puppet
Plays as a Model for Performance (1989), this puppet play functions as a
sacred ritual.
Figure 15.6 How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare, November 26, 1965, Joseph
Beuys, photograph of the performance at the Galerie Alfred Schmela, Dusseldorf
337
338
Altering Consciousness
During the Second World War, as tail gunner for a Stuka plane, Joseph
Beuys (19211986), was shot down in the Crimea and rescued by a group
of Tartar nomads, who wrapped him in fat and felt to preserve his body
heat. These actions saved his life. Later, Beuys recognized that his neardeath experience was a shamanic initiation and his role was to be an
artist/shaman.
So when I appear as a kind of shamanistic gure or allude to if, I do it to
stress my belief in other priorities, and the need to come up with a completely different plan for working with substances. For instance in places
like universities, where everyone speaks so rationally, it is necessary for a
kind of enchanter to appear, Beuys exclaimed. (Tisdall, 1979, p. 23)
By the mere fact of donning it [the hat], or manipulating the objects that
deputize for it, the shaman transcends profane space and prepares to
enter into contact with the spirit world. Usually this preparation is almost
a concrete introduction into that world: for the costume is donned
after many preliminaries and just on the eve of shamanic trance. (Eliade,
1964, p. 147)
For the most part, Beuys performances involved the use of repetitive gestures and/or sounds over a lengthy time period, presumably putting both
him and his audience in an ASC. In How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare
(Figure15.6), at the Galerie Alfred Schmela (in Dusseldorf, on November 26, 1965), Beuys rhythmically tapped the iron sole attached to his
shoe on the hard stone oor as he walked around the gallery gesticulating
in front of his pictures. This tapping may have induced a sonic ASC since
his explanations to the hare, lasting some 3 hours, were mute. Beuys
explained that How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare was
a complex tableau about the problem of language, and about the problems
of thought, of human consciousness and the consciousness of animals. This
is placed in an extreme position because this is not just an animal but also a
dead animal. Even this dead animal has a special power to reproduce . . .
even a dead animal preserves more powers of intuition that some human
beings with their stubborn rationality. (Tisdall, 1979, pp. 103, 105)
The hare was important in the context of this performance as a countervailing force to rationality because of its relationship to the earth and fertility. Moreover, Beuys applied a mask of honey and gold to his head that
symbolized his transformation and moving out of the realm of reasona
necessary prerequisite to understanding the hares language.
Using honey on my head, argued Beuys, I am naturally doing something
that is concerned with thought. The human capacity is not to give honey,
but to thinkto produce ideas. In this way the deathlike character of
thought is made living again. Honey is doubtlessly a living substance.
Human thought can also be living. (Adriani, Konnerts, & Thomas, 1979,
p. 32)
Shamans often converse in ASC with their power animals and the animals
respond using body language or sounds or taking the shamans to places of
power in nonordinary reality. In the shamanic worldview, animals have
339
340
Altering Consciousness
Figure 15.7 I like America and America Likes Me, May 1974, Joseph Beuys, photograph of the perfomance at the Rene Block Gallery in New York
wisdom and can convey this wisdom by nonverbal means if asked in the
proper ritual way.
In another performance, I Like America and America Likes Me (Figure
15.7), May 1974, at the Rene Block Gallery in New York, Beuys communicated for 7 days with a live coyote that had just been taken from the wilderness. Beuys said about this work,
I believe I made contact with the psychological trauma point of the United
States energy constellation; the whole American trauma with the Indian,
the Red man . . . You could say that a reckoning has to be made with the
coyote, and only then can the trauma be lifted. (Adriani et al., 1979, p. 28)
Beuys knew that for the American Indian, especially the Pueblo Indians, the
coyote is one of the most powerful animalsa trickster that symbolizes
their own marginal status in American society. Beuys also believed that the
tendency of White Americans to reduce native cultures to marginality
extended beyond the boundaries of the United States to other cultures and
that the Vietnam war was a direct result of this attitude. To emphasize the
trauma of American relationships with the Indians, which is a form of sickness, Beuys was taken directly from the airport to the gallery in an ambulance, completely wrapped in felt. Over the next 7 days, Beuys repeated
over and over a series of complex rituals with the coyote accompanied by
sounds made by Beuys by hitting a metal triangle attached to his waist.
Some witnesses attest that a deep level of communication took place
between Beuys and the coyote, which greatly moved them.
Sha Sha Higby (born 1952) spent several years studying traditional
performance genres in Asia, although she transforms the ancient languages of these genres into her own unique and contemporary language.
In 1972 she stayed in Japan for 1 year, absorbing ideas from the Japanese
Noh and Butohan extremely slow, primordial, and visceral form of
dance that emerged in Japan following the Second World and in which
Figure 15.8 Clouds of Tea, December 2009, Sha Sha Higby, at Live Oak Theatre,
Berkeley (Photograph of costume, permission and image courtesy of the artist)
341
342
Altering Consciousness
the performers are almost naked [see Zarrilli, this volume]. From 1977 to
1982, she was in Indonesia studying various forms of Javanese puppetry.
In the rst stage of Higbys artistic process, she takes between 6 months to
a year to create a costume made of a wide variety of materials including shells,
carved wood, sticks, twigs, feathers, rhinestones, paper, silk, gold leaf,
ceramic pieces, ber, leather, water buffalo hides, glass spine as a supporting
mechanism, and so forth. The masks alone involve the application of 50 coats
of lacquer consisting of powdered eggshells and glue. These techniques are
largely the result of her apprenticeship with a master Japanese mask maker
for Noh in Kyoto. Although the masks are highly rened, the equally wellcrafted costumes are much more earthy and organic. Mask and costume,
however, mesh together into a funky latticework of abstract shapes that can
include puppets as Higby moves. As she is almost completely absorbed by
the mask and the costumea kind of wearable environment, in the words of
one criticshe is transformed into a primordial being or soul from the lower
world, manipulating puppets as if they were humans (Zimmer, 1986, p. 6).
Her performances also involve gradually entering and/or shedding the
costumea ritual metaphor for birth, death, and metamorphosis that occurs
in both the ordinary realm and the nonordinary realm in an ASC (Figure
15.8). This is produced by extremely slow movements and the repetitive
effects of the music written and performed by her husband, Albert Goldman.
A fairly recent performance of Higbys, Folded Under a Stone Sleeping, accompanied by her husbands music, can be seen on YouTube at http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=oF66U4EGfy0. Notwithstanding the slow
unfolding of Higbys work, the viewer is greeted by succession of otherworldly images that seem to be in a constant state of metamorphosis like
those in a shamanic journey.
however, there are very few references to Malevichs meditation practice in his
own voluminous writings. One clue in his writing is his desire to purify his
senses and transform himself into a zero (Malevich, 1969, p. 119).
Malevich was the founder of the early 20th-century art movement
known as Suprematism, which means the supremacy of pure sensations
over both perceptions and feelings. Malevich described The Black Square
(1915), a monochromatic black square on a white ground, as follows:
the square- sensation, the white eld, the Void beyond sensation
(Herbert, 1964, p. 96). In this pioneering work of metaphysical abstraction, there are just the sensations embodied in the minimal color, texture,
and geometrical elements, of the rough matte texture of the black square
superimposed on the more rened surface of the white background. For
343
344
Altering Consciousness
Malevich, The Black Square was the new icon of the time that he hoped would
replace the traditional Russian icon in the upper corner of a room. Malevich
was well aware that there are no traditional [Russian] icons in which the
Saint is a zero (Douglas, 1975, p. 128). The Black Square is the embodiment
of the absolute, the formless Void that Malevich probably apprehended in a
state of samadhi (see Shear, this volume). If anyone has comprehended
the absolute he has encountered Nothing, wrote Malevich (1969, p. 224).
In Suprematist Composition, White on White (1918) (Figure 15.9), a white
square tilted on a diagonal ground, Malevich goes even further in approximating the experience of the void in samadhi. The sensation of black on white is
much stronger than the sensation of white on white, where sensation is more
rareed.
To be sure, the opportunity for Malevich to obtain knowledge of
Eastern philosophy and meditation practices in Russia during the early
20th century was limited. Agnes Martin (19122004) had much more of
Eastern philosophy available to her in translation during the second half
of the 20th century. In a letter to the British art historian Daniel Clarke,
Martin wrote,
My greatest spiritual inspiration came from the Chinese spiritual teachers,
especially Lao Tzu . . . My next strongest inuence is the Sixth patriarch
[of Zen Buddhism] Hui Neng . . . I have also read and been inspired by
the sutras of the other Buddhist masters and Chuang Tzu who was very
wise and amusing. (Clarke, 1988, p. 231)
Figure 15.10 The Rose, 1964, Agnes Martin, oil, red and black pencil, sizing on
canvas, Art Gallery of Ontario, 180.34 180.34 cm (Drawing of The Rose by
Malka Helfman for this article)
the mind, said Martin in a lm interview (Lance, 2003). For many years,
she lived alone on a mesa near Cuba, New Mexico, where she built her
own adobe buildings and lived without electricity, running water, or a
telephone. The nearest house was 6 miles away. I became as wise as a
Chinese hermit, she said (in Simon, 1996, p. 89). To discover conscious
mind in a world where intellect is held valuable requires solitude, quite a
lot of solitude (Martin, 1992, p. 117).
Martins goal was to nd an abstract vehicle to convey the essence of
pure mind in painting. The subject of painting therefore is not in the
objective world: Not nature but the dissolution of nature (Martin,
1992, p. 117). She wrote that her artistic paradigm was two late Tang
345
346
Altering Consciousness
dishes, one with a ower image, one emptythe empty form goes all the
way to heaven (Martin, 1992, p. 35).
Beginning in Martins painting in the early 1960s, the empty form that
goes all the way to heaven was a grid of thin imperfectly straight horizontal
and vertical lines on a at monochromatic surface (Figure 15.10). In the
major part of Martins oeuvre, the tiny rectangles created by the intersecting lines are in Martins words non hieratic and non-relational . . . holding
every part of the surface in perfect equilibrium (in Haskell, 1992, p. 142).
Also, as Martin maintained, in art as in reality, the plurality of varied and
similar forms annihilates the existence as forms as entities. Similar forms
do not show contrast but are in equivalent opposition. Therefore they
annihilate themselves more completely in their plurality (Michelson,
1967, p. 46). Moreover, the little rectangles also counterbalance the
square formats of the paintings, in effect erasing the overall grid.
My formats, Martin pointed out, are square but the grids never are absolutely square, they are rectangles a little bit off the square, making a sort of
contradiction, a dissonance, though I didnt set out to do it that way. When
I cover the surface with rectangles, it lightens the weight of the square,
destroys its power. (in Alloway, 1973, p. 62)
Figure 15.11
as the deserts of New Mexico. These elds open and expand the mind of
the viewer in preparation for the experience of the Void. While this kind
of expansion does not happen in the Shri Yantra diagram, it occurs in Chinese landscape painting and Zen gardens, where an attempt is made to
create the illusion of innite space. Also, unlike the Shri Yantra diagram,
the space anterior to the grids in Martins works is not empty but is carefully painted, giving her work a presence not found in the Shri Yantra.
Of course, the Shri Yantra is primarily a diagram to assist the meditative
process and is only secondarily a work of art.
Critics have compared Martins pale elds to a Taoist womb matrix,
but for me Martins spatial elds are an approximation of the etheric or
chi body of Taoism that connects to the uncovered block, the ultimate
Void matrix of Taoism, but is not this matrix. In Taoism, the energy or
347
348
Altering Consciousness
Figure 15.12 Untitled, disk, Robert Irwin, 1968, Acrylic Lacquer on Plastic,
San Francisco Museum of Modern Art, 134.62 132.62 60.96 cm (Drawing
of Untitled by Malka Helfman for this article)
349
350
Altering Consciousness
The experience of the subtle body realm as it moves into the Void body, at
the very edge of the senses, is an exquisite visual spectacle in continual
metamorphosis, and the forms, which are indistinguishable from the qualities of the paint and paint application, mirror the experience of this realm.
Brunson has developed a highly rened paint formula including a mix of
oil paint, alkyd medium, and rened beeswax on canvas stretched over
panels to create the deliquescent saturations of the surface that are the distinguishing elements of her work. Brunson rightly argues that the [painting] process demands a level of consciousness and presence that reects
the engagement that meditation practice similarly demands (Brunson,
2010). Brunsons paintings are the product of the overlap between meditation and shamanic seeing as an underlying web of energy is revealed. In
the Veils, this display of energy is not manifest in actual lines but evanescent, amorphous skeins of paint that seem to pulse in and out of the surface of the painting. In meditation, the Kundalini adept becomes aware
of the spanda or vibration of the subtle body and links this vibration to
the spanda of primordial Void. An allusion to this linkage is an element
of the Veils, although this series, like Brunsons other bodies of work, also
functions as an open-ended metaphor that allows for multiple associations. In the Lattices, such as Braid (Figure 15.14), lines are more noticeable as microcosmic cellular forms coalesce into tubes reminiscent of the
internal channels of energy, particularly the central and side channels that
go up the spine and become noticeable to the Kundalini adept as she
wakes up the subtle body through pranayama.
351
352
Altering Consciousness
Figure 15.14 Braid, Jamie Brunson, oil and alkyd on paper, Andrea Schwartz
Gallery, 57.15 57 22.5 cm (Permission and image courtesy of the artist)
Conclusions
The tendency of visual works in the period from the nineteenth to the
twenty-rst century has been to celebrate the idea of art for arts sake, culminating in the notion of postmodernist play. Artworks from this period
have also reected popular culture, political ideologies, and the angstridden zeitgeist of the modern and postmodern eras. The artists in this
chapter, however, are exceptional mainly because they offer a respite from
the materialist xation on ordinary reality that characterizes much of this
period of art history. There are many more artists who are involved in
shamanic practice and meditation than I have been able to mention here.
Hopefully we are now at the beginning of a groundswell of meaningful
spiritual paradigms that will characterize twenty-rst-century art.
References
Adriani, G., Konnertz, W., & Thomas, K. (1979). Joseph Beuys: Life and work.
(P. Leah, trans.). Woodbury, CT: Barron.
Alloway, L. (1973). Agnes Martin. Artforum, 11, 3236.
Bogzaran, F. (2008). Dreams of alchemy. Five keys to the secret world of Remedios
Varo. Mexico City: Artes de Mexico.
Brunson, J. (2010). Statement. Retrieved January 17, 2010, from http://www
.jamiebrunson.com/paintings/lattices.html.
Cardena, E. (2009). Beyond Plato?: Toward a science of alterations of consciousness. In C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, & L. Coly (Eds.), Utrecht II: Charting the future
of parapsychology (pp. 305322). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Clarke. D. (1988). The inuence of Oriental thought on postwar American painting
and sculpture. New York: Garland.
Dal, S. (1969). Conversations with Dali. (J. Neugroschel, trans.). New York: Dutton.
Douglas, C. (1975). Suprematism: The sensible dimension. Russian Review, 34,
266281.
Douglas, C. (1989). Beyond reason: Malevich, Matiushin and their circle. The
spiritual in art: Abstract painting (18901955). New York: Abbeville.
Eliade, M. (1964). Shamanism: Archaic techniques of ecstasy. (W. Trask, trans.)
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Elkin, A. P. (1945). Aboriginal men of high degree. New York: St. Martins.
Grey, A. (1990). Sacred mirrors. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International.
Haskell, B. (1992). Agnes Martin. New York: Whitney Museum of American
Art.
Heidegger, M. (1964). In R. Hofstater & R. Kuhns (Eds.), Philosophies of art and
beauty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Herbert, R. (1964). Modern artists on art. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Huxley, A. (1963). The doors of perception and heaven and hell. New York: Harper
and Row.
Iribas-Rudn, A. (2009, June 1114). Hypnosis in contemporary art. Poster presented at the international conference Toward a Science of Consciousness
2009. Investigating Inner Experience. Brain, Mind, Technology. Hong Kong.
Levy, M. (1989). Wayang Kulit: Indonesias shadow puppet plays as a model for
performance. High Performance, 46, 3852.
Levy, M. (1993). Technicians of ecstasy: Shamanism and the modern artist. Putney,
VT: Bramble.
Levy, M. (2005). Void/in art. Putney, VT: Bramble
Malevich, K. (1969). Essays on art. T. Andersson (Ed.; X. Gloweacki & A. McMillan,
trans). Copenhagen: Borden.
Malinowski, B. (1935). Coral gardens and their magic, Vol. II (pp. 213222). New
York: American Book.
Martin, A. (1992). Writings/Shriften. Winterthur, Switzerland: Editions Canz.
Michelson, A. (1967). Agnes Martin: Recent paintings. Artforum, 5, 4647.
353
354
Altering Consciousness
Rilke, R. (1948). Letters: 19101926. (J. Green & H. Norton, trans.). New York:
W. W. Norton.
Simon, J. (1996). Perfection of the mind: An interview with Agnes Martin. Art in
America, 84, 8284, 124.
Smith, R. (1975). Reviews: Agnes Martin. Artforum, 13, 7273.
Stone, I. (1967). Dear Theo. New York: New American Library.
Tisdall, C. (1979). Joseph Beuys. New York: Guggenheim Museum.
Walsh, R. (1990). The spirit of shamanism. Los Angeles: Tarcher.
Weschler, L. (1982). Seeing is forgetting the name of the thing one sees. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Zimmer, E. (1986, October 24). Higby dances out of this world. Los Angeles
Herald Examiner, p. 6.
CHAPTER 16
Introduction
In this chapter, I will summarize the literature on how music and altered
states of consciousness (ASC) are connected. Essential aspects include
induction and expression of emotions and rhythmic body movements to
music and how an altered experience of music is connected to states of
altered temporality. Winkelman (2000) stressed the human capacity for
experiencing ASC as a fundamental biological function. Studies on brain
functions of altered music experience and temporality (Fachner, 2006b,
2009; Shanon, 2001) convey the natural bases of these phenomena, which
have been utilized in shamanistic practice for ages. As Rouget suggested:
To shamanize, in other words to sing and dance, is as much a corporeal
technique as a spiritual exercise. Insofar as he is at the same time singer,
instrumentalist, and dancer, the shaman, among all practitioners of trance,
should be seen as the one who by far makes the most complete use of
music. (Rouget, 1985, p. 319)
356
Altering Consciousness
Table 16.1
Ecstasy
Trance
Immobility
Movement
Silence
Noise
Solitude
In company
No crisis
Crisis
Sensory deprivation
Sensory overstimulation
Recollection
Amnesia
Hallucination
No hallucination
357
358
Altering Consciousness
2004; Fachner, 1998, 2007; Hanser, 2009), the core of which are a variety
of techniques such as drumming, dance, and music to alter consciousness.
The question of how music induces ASC remains unsolved in discussions
of the effect of music in music therapy and psychology (Ruud, 2001). The
effects of music in settings with a goal-directed therapeutic intervention
are based on models of modern music therapy (there are at least ve major
models) and accordingly are a reection of practice-related issues
(Aldridge, 1996). Whether the music itself has certain healing properties
or whether the therapeutic relationship in music is effective is an ongoing
discussion in music therapy research reecting paradigmatic discourse of
biomedical and social science approaches in medicine: Is it the medicine
or the person that administers it that provides help (Fachner, 2007)? In
our topic here, we may also ask if it is the music itself that has certain
properties that per se induce ASC and healing or if music just accompanies
rituals that intend to induce ASC [see Mishara & Schwartz, Volume 2].
359
360
Altering Consciousness
not only the sound, but the therapist via the sound who affects the client,
and the client re-inuences the therapist with his responses (Strobel,
1988, p. 121).
361
362
Altering Consciousness
parallel to differing parts of the music that were of high subjective valence
for the listeners. This occurrence was not locked to specic parts of the
music; there was no straight connection of strong emotions to musical boundaries like returning chorus, a sudden change of musical registers, and so
forth. This study illustrates how music functions as a catalyst of strong emotions that may lead to trancing (Penman & Becker, 2009, p. 64).
Physiological reactions (chills) are connected to reward circuits in the
brain. They intensify the personal experience and mediate the meaning
of the musical events, which are time-locked in their occurrence with specic moments inherent in the preferred or beloved music but are not necessarily locked to specic musical elements such as certain keys,
harmonies, tempos, or loudness.
The Role of Music in Evolution and Information Transfer and Social Bonding
Matussek (2001) proposes that the cultural matrix and the physiological effects of music complement each other functionally to produce a state
of amnesia and a willingness to assimilate new information. Freeman
(2000) proposes that music and dance were related to the cultural evolution of human behavior and forms of social bonding. He saw connections
in the cultural transmission of knowledge during ASC caused by chemical
and behavioral forms of induction. Alterations of consciousness produced
in this manner served to break through habits and beliefs about reality and
increase alertness for new and more complex information. In times of primarily oral information transfer, memorization techniques were required
to stimulate all senses for storing and processing that information. Musical
abilities in particular seemed to be important for an effective transfer of
knowledge.
Human musical expressive abilities evolved as a prelinguistic communication medium (Cross & Woodruff, 2009) and a framework prior to
language that was utilized for communicating context-sensitive and complex emotional codings in an ongoing symbolic frame of reference in
group interactions. Winkelman (2002, p. 78) stressed psychoemotional
group bonding processes engaged by chanting, an affective vocalization
and rhythmic medium that played a central role in human cognitive evolution through engaging biological competences that create empathy, group
solidarity, and cohesion. Vocalizations communicate affective states and
may mark territorial claims. Chanting provides a communication medium
prior to speech, extending forms of affective vocalizations shared with
other primates as well. The difference in musical expression in humans
and animals involves referential symbolism and classication of musical
It is a known fact from hypnosis research that there are personalities that
are more hypnotizable and susceptible to hypnosis than others. Therefore,
psychometric tools such as the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (Shor & Orne, 1963) have been developed to preselect such individuals
and to measure the depth of hypnosis reached (Meszaros et al., 2002). However, it seems that different personality traits and physiological constitutions
may also have their root in genetic differences [see Cardena & Alvarado, this
volume; Granqvist, Reijman, & Cardena, Volume 2].
The genetic bases concerning dance were reported by BachnerMelman and collaborators (2005), who found that professional dancers
363
364
Altering Consciousness
(as compared to athletes and a control group) had greater facility for serotonin transport and vasopressin response (serotonin is a neurotransmitter
that regulates blood pressure in the vessels [see Nichols & Chemel, Volume 2], and the arginine vasopressin receptor 1a regulates vasoconstriction/expansion due to specic amino acid activity). The different
interplay of serotonin transporters and vasopressin receptors may enhance
dancers social communication skills, courtship, and spiritual facets
(p. 394) as dancers compared to athletes and control group had higher
scores on the Tellegen Absorption Scale and the Reward Dependence Factor
of Cloningers Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire. Serotonin activity
in particular is linked to ASC, and
Altered serotonin levels in carriers of the SLC6A4 promoter region allele
might predispose such individuals to a greater ability for imagery and attention to stimuli (especially to musical stimuli) that we hypothesize may provide part of the hard wiring that talented and devoted individuals need to
perform in an art form that combines a unique combination of both musical
and physical skills. (p. 399)
365
366
Altering Consciousness
367
368
Altering Consciousness
Globus et al. (1978) and Iannone et al. (2006) have shown that loudness scaling is state
dependent and can be pharmacologically altered.
To summarize, an altered temporality results in a different metric scaling of sensory events in the musical time-space and has an impact on perceptual and attentional processes (Fachner, 2000, 2009, 2011). Thus, we
may expect that, if the information in the time course of music rituals
becomes meaningful for the listener or performer, the brain will offer various strategies to zoom into specic parts of the music in order to process
basic musical features, such as pitch, timbre, and pulse, as well as
higher-level musical features, such as tonality, meter, and form, focused
in a state of hypofrontality or enhanced sensory perception.
Dietrich (2003, 2004) describes the function of frontal cortex in ASC, proposing that hypofrontality (a reduction of frontal cortex activity) results in a
ooding of information in the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex. This results in
a state of consciousness primarily concerned with reception and processing
of sensory information, with less activity in the frontal and more activity in
the posterior parts of the brain, namely in the temporal, parietal, and occipital
areas. Further, in hypofrontal states, the perceptual, sensual bottom-up
processing of the brain dominates the limited capacity of the working memory
system located in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. From a perspective of
hierarchically organized functional neuroanatonomy, this area involving
working memory, temporal integration, and sustained and directed attention
(Dietrich, 2004) is functionally changed during ASC in order to process an
increased amount of sensual information, which may only be possible in an
altered temporality and focus of attention. As the memory buffer reaches his
limit, we may forget the ingredients of complexity experienced in ASC.
Aldridge (1989a) states that we are patterned frequencies in a matrix
of time who improvise their identity out of a personal set found within
the situational settings in which we are located. The experience of time is
kairological (from the Greek kairos, a god of the right moment to decide),
which signies personal, individual time, and also a chronological structure oriented to the geophysical concept of time as conventional time by
the clock. Kairological time emerges from personal perception of time
and time intervals and signies the right time for doing something, deciding, or acting in the here and now (Aldridge, 1996). Anticipation of what
is coming up next and what is needed to be perceived is surely of vital
interest for humans so that it is not only important in terms of where to
place attention, but also when (Eagleman et al., 2005, p. 10,370).
Conclusion
Music and ASC are connected in various ways. One of the most
determining inuences seems to be the context, the personal set and
369
370
Altering Consciousness
of ASC and altered temporality and might help to understand ASC processes in vivo.
Cognitive processing of music changes its modes of awareness on
musical elements during ASC. Rhythm, pitch, loudness, and timbre and
their sound staging in the perceptive eld of a person seem to culminate
in a certain sound which, corresponding to the cultural cognitive matrix,
induces ASC (Fachner, 2006a). Rouget (1985) proposed that music features such as repetition, long duration, monotony, volume, and density
do not provide clear causal explanations for ASC induction, but the connection of time and space perception alteration resulting from music is
important (Christensen, 1996). Therefore, rhythm remains the target of
discussion for music-related ASC induction.
References
Aaronson, B. (1999). Dancing our way out of class through funk, techno or rave.
Peace Review, 11, 231236.
Aigen, K. (1994). The roots of music therapy: Towards an indigenous research paradigm. UMI Dissertation Services, Ann Arbor, MI.
Aldridge, D. (1989a). A phenomenological comparison of the organisation of
music and the self. Arts in Psychotherapy, 16(2), 9197.
Aldridge, D. (1989b). Music, communication and medicine: Discussion paper.
Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 82, 743746.
Aldridge, D. (1996). Music therapy and research in medicine: From out of the silence.
London: Jessica Kingsley.
Aldridge, D. (2006). Music, consciousness and altered states. In D. Aldridge &
J. Fachner (Eds.), Music and altered states: Consciousnes, transcendence, therapy
and addictions (pp. 914). London: Jessica Kingsley.
Aldridge, D., & Fachner, J. (Eds.). (2006). Music and altered states: Consciousness,
transcendence, therapy and addictions. London: Jessica Kingsley.
Bachner-Melman, R., Dina, C., Zohar, A. H., Constantini, N., Lerer, E., Hoch, S.,
et al. (2005). AVPR1a and SLC6A4 gene polymorphisms are associated with
creative dance performance. Public Library of Science Genetics, 1, 394403.
Becker, J. (1994). Music and trance. Leonardo Music Journal, 4, 4151.
Blood, A. J., & Zatorre, R. J. (2001). Intensely pleasurable responses to music correlate with activity in brain regions implicated in reward and emotion. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America, 98,
11,81811,823.
Bonny, H. (1980). GIM Therapy: Past, present and future implications (GIM Monograph Vol. 3). Salina, KS: Bonny Foundation.
Brown, S., Merker, B., & Wallin, N. L. (2000). An introduction to evolutionary
musicology. In N. L. Wallin, B. Merker, & S. Brown (Eds.), The origins of music
(pp. 324). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
371
372
Altering Consciousness
Buhusi, C. V., & Meck, W. H. (2005). What makes us tick? Functional and neural
mechanisms of interval timing. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 755765.
Cardena, E. (2009). Beyond Plato? Toward a science of alterations of consciousness. In C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, & L. Coly (Eds.), Utrecht II: Charting the future
of parapsychology (pp. 305322). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Christensen, E. (1996). The musical timespace. A theory of music listening. Aalborg,
Denmark: Aalborg University Press.
Cousto, H. (1995). Vom Urkult zur Kultur: Drogen und Techno [From ancient
cult to cultureDrugs and techno] (1st ed.). Solothurn, Switzerland: Nachtschatten.
Cross, I., & Woodruff, G. E. (2009). Music as a communicative medium. In
R. Botha & C. Knight (Eds.), The prehistory of language (pp. 113144). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Crowe, B. J. (2004). Music and soulmaking: Toward a new theory of music therapy.
Lanham, MD: Scarecrow.
De Rios, M. D., & Janiger, O. (2003). LSD, spirituality, and the creative process.
Rochester, VT: Park Street.
Dietrich, A. (2003). Functional neuroanatomy of altered states of consciousness: The
transient hypofrontality hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 231256.
Dietrich, A. (2004). Neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the experience of
ow. Consciousness and Cognition, 13, 746761.
Eagleman, D. M., Tse, P. U., Buonomano, D., Janssen, P., Nobre, A. C., & Holcombe, A. O. (2005). Time and the brain: How subjective time relates to neural time. Journal of Neuroscience, 25, 1036910371.
Eliade, M. (1964). Shamanism: Archaic techniques of ecstasy (Rev. and enl. ed.).
New York: Bollingen Foundation.
Fachner, J. (1998). A look at the basics of communication from the stance of
music therapy. In C. E. Gottschalk-Battschkus & C. Ratsch (Eds.), Ethnotherapies (1st ed., Vol. 14, pp. 209214). Berlin: Verlag fu r Wissenschaft und
Bildung Amand Aglaster Berlin.
Fachner, J. (2000). Cannabis, Musik und ein veranderter metrischer Bezugsrahmen
[Cannabis, music and a changed metric frame of reference]. In H. Rosing &
T. Phleps (Eds.), Populare Musik im kulturwissenschaftlichen Diskurs [Popular
music in the discourse of cultural studies] (Vol. 25/26, pp. 107122). Karben,
Germany: CODA.
Fachner, J. (2006a). Music and altered states of consciousness: An overview. In
D. Aldridge & J. Fachner (Eds.), Music and altered states: Consciousness, transcendence, therapy and addictions (pp. 1537). London: Jessica Kingsley.
Fachner, J. (2006b). Music and drug induced altered states. In D. Aldridge &
J. Fachner (Eds.), Music and altered states: Consciousness, transcendence, therapy
and addictions (pp. 8296). London: Jessica Kingsley.
Fachner, J. (2007). Wanderer between worldsAnthropological perspectives on
healing rituals and music. Music Therapy Today, 8, 166195. Retrieved 11th
January 2011 from http://www.musictherapytoday.com.
Fachner, J. (2009). Out of time? Music, consciousness states and neuropharmacological mechanisms of an altered temporality. Paper presented at the 7th Triennial
Conference of European Society for the Cognitive Sciences of Music, 16-20
August at University of Jyvaskyla, Finland . Retrieved 11th January 2011 from
http://urn./URN:NBN::jyu-2009411245
Fachner, J. (2011). Drugs, altered states, and musical consciousness: Reframing
time and space. In E. Clarke & D. Clarke (Eds.), Music and consciousness (in
Press). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Freeman, W. (2000). A neurobiological role of music in social bonding. In N. L.
Wallin, B. Merker & S. Brown (Eds.), The origins of music (pp. 411424).
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Globus, G. G., Cohen, H. B., Kramer, J. C., Elliot, H. W., & Sharp, R. (1978).
Effects of marihuana induced altered state of consciousness on auditory perception. Journal of Psychedelic Drugs, 10, 7176.
Goldstein, A. (1980). Thrills in response to music and other stimuli. Physiological
Psychology, 8, 126129.
Haerlin, P. (1998). The use of music instruments in psychotherapy in order to
alter states of consciousness. Psychotherapeut, 43, 238242.
Hanser, S. B. (2009). From ancient to integrative medicine: Models for music
therapy. Music and Medicine, 1, 8796.
Hess, P., Fachner, J., & Rittner, S. (2009). Verandertes Wachbewusstsein [Altered
Waking Consciousness]. In H. H. Decker-Voigt, P. Knill, & E. Weymann
(Eds.), Lexikon Musiktherapie (pp. 550557). Gottingen, Germany: Hogrefe.
Hutson, S. R. (2000). The rave: Spiritual healing in modern western subcultures.
Anthropology Quarterly, 73, 3549.
Iannone, M., Bulotta, S., Paolino, D., Zito, M., Gratteri, S., Costanzo, F., et al.
(2006). Electrocortical effects of MDMA are potentiated by acoustic stimulation in rats. BMC Neuroscience, 7(1), 13.
Katz, R., & De Rios, M. D. (1971). Whisteling in Peruvian ayahuasca healing sessions. Journal of American Folklore, 84, 320327.
Kohlmetz, C., Kopiez, R., & Altenmuller, E. (2003). Stability of motor programs
during a state of meditation: Electrocortical activity in a pianist playing Vexations
by Erik Satie continuously for 28 hours. Psychology of Music, 31(2), 173186.
Kopiez, R., Bangert, M., Goebl, W., & Altenmuller, E. (2003). Tempo and loudness analysis of a continuous 28-hour performance of Erik Saties composition
Vexations. Journal for New Music Research, 32, 243258.
Kreutz, G., Ott, U., Teichmann, D., Osawa, P., & Vaitl, D. (2008). Using music to
induce emotions: Inuences of musical preference and absorption. Psychology
of Music, 36, 101126.
Levitin, D. (2008). This is your brain on music. London: Atlantic Books.
Ludwig, A. M. (1966). Altered states of consciousness. Archives of General Psychiatry, 15, 225234.
Mathew, R. J., Wilson, W. H., Turkington, T. G., Hawk, T. C., Coleman, R. E.,
DeGrado, T. R., et al. (2002). Time course of tetrahydrocannabinol-induced
373
374
Altering Consciousness
Poppel, E. (2000). Grenzen des Bewusstseins. Wie kommen wir zur Zeit und wie
entsteht Wirklichkeit? [Limits of consciousness. How do we get to time and
how is reality contructed?] Frankfurt a. Main: Insel.
Rammsayer, T. H. (1999). Neuropharmacological evidence for different timing
mechanisms in humans. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 52B(3),
273286.
Rill, B. (2006). Rave, communitas, and embodied idealism. Music Therapy Today,
7(3), 648661. Retrieved 11th January 2011 from http://www.music
therapytoday.com
Rittner, S., Fachner, J., & Hess, P. (2009). Trance. In H. H. Decker-Voigt, P. Knill,
& E. Weymann (Eds.), Lexikon Musiktherapie (pp. 538541). Go ttingen,
Germany: Hogrefe.
Rouget, G. (1985). Music and trance. A theory of the relations between music and possession. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Ruud, E. (2001). Music therapyHistory and cultural contexts. Voices, 1(3).
Retrieved 11th January 2011 from https://normt.uib.no/index.php/voices/
article/view/66/53
Shanon, B. (2001). Altered temporality. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 3558.
Shor, R. E., & Orne, E. C. (1963). Norms on the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, Form A. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, 11, 3947.
Snodgrass, M., & Lynn, S. J. (1989). Music absorption and hypnotizability.
International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 37, 4154.
Sohngen, O. (1967). Theologie der Musik [Theology of music]. Kassel, Germany:
Stauda.
Strobel, W. (1988). SoundTranceHealing. Musiktherapeutische Umschau, 9,
119139.
Timmermann, T. (2009). Ethnologische Aspekte in der Musiktherapie [Ethnological aspects of music therapy]. In H. H. Decker-Voigt & E. Weymann (Eds.),
Lexikon Musiktherapie (2nd ed., pp. 123126). Gottingen, Germany: Hogrefe.
Turow, G. (2005). Auditory driving as a ritual technology: A review and analysis.
Unpublished Religious Studies Honors Thesis, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.
Vaitl, D., Birbaumer, N., Gruzelier, J., Jamieson, G. A., Kotchoubey, B., Kubler, A.,
et al. (2005). Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness. Psychological
Bulletin, 131, 98127.
Wallin, N. L., Merker, B., & Brown, S. (2000). The origins of music. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Weir, D. (1996). Trance: From magic to technology. Ann Arbor, MI: Trans Media.
Winkelman, M. (2000). Shamanism: The neuroecology of conscioussness and healing.
Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.
Winkelman, M. (2002). Shamanism and cognitive evolution. Cambridge Archeological Journal, 12, 71101.
Winkelman, M. J. (1986). Trance states: A theoretical model and cross-cultural
analysis. Ethos, 14, 174203.
375
376
Altering Consciousness
Wittmann, M., Carter, O., Hasler, F., Cahn, B. R., Grimberg, U., Spring, P., et al.
(2007). Effects of psilocybin on time perception and temporal control of
behaviour in humans. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 21, 5064.
Wright, P. (1991). Rhythmic drumming in contemporary shamanism and its relationship to auditory driving and risk of seizure precipitation in epileptics.
Anthropology of Consciousness 2(34): 714.
Yacubian, J., & Buchel, C. (2009). The genetic basis of individual differences in
reward processing and the link to addictive behavior. In J.-C. Dreher &
L. Tremblay (Eds.), Handbook of reward and decision making (pp. 345360).
Burlington, VT: Academic Press.
Zingrone, N. L., Alvarado, C. S., & Cardena, E. (2010). Out-of-body experiences
and physical body activity and posture: Responses from a survey conducted in
Scotland. Journal of Mental and Nervous Disease, 198, 163165.
Advisory Board
Stanley Krippner, Ph.D., is Alan Watts Professor of Psychology at Saybrook University in San Francisco, California. In 2002 he received the
American Psychological Associations Award for Distinguished Contributions to the International Advancement of Psychology as well as the Award
for Distinguished Contributions for Professional Hypnosis from the
Society of Psychological Hypnosis. In 2010, three of his co-edited books
were published: Perchance to Dream: The Frontiers of Dream Psychology;
Mysterious Minds: The Neurobiology of Mediums, Mystics, and Other Remarkable People; and Debating Psychic Experience: Human Potential or Human
Illusion. In 2010, an updated edition of his co-authored book Haunted by
Combat: Understanding PTSD in War Veterans, was published. Dr. Krippner
is a past president of the International Association for the Study of Dreams
(from which he received its Lifetime Achievement award) and the Parapsychological Association (which gave him its Outstanding Career Award).
Robert Turner worked on MRI with Peter Manseld at the University of Nottingham, 19841988. Between 1988 and 1993, at the NIH he developed the
neuroscience techniques of diffusion weighted MRI and BOLD functional
MRI. In 1994 he moved to London as cofounder of the Functional Imaging
Laboratory. In 2006 he joined the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive
and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, as Director of Neurophysics.
Max Velmans is currently Emeritus Professor of Psychology, Goldsmiths,
University of London and has been involved in consciousness studies for
around 30 years. His main research focus is integrating work on the philosophy, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology of consciousness,
and he has around 100 publications in this area. His book Understanding
380
Advisory Board
Carlos S. Alvarado, Ph.D., is scholar in residence at Atlantic University, assistant professor of Research at the University of Virginia, and Research
Faculty at the Institute of Transpersonal Psychology. His research work
has centered on out-of-body experiences and the history of parapsychology. Alvarado is the recipient of the Parapsychological Associations
2010 Outstanding Career Award.
Julie Beischel, Ph.D., is director of research at the Windbridge Institute for
Applied Research in Human Potential. She received her doctorate in pharmacology and toxicology (minor: microbiology and immunology) in 2003
from the University of Arizona. She is a member of the Society for Scientic
Exploration and the Parapsychological Association.
Wendy E. Cousins, Ph.D., is a graduate of Queens University Belfast and
Course Director for postgraduate programmes in Health & Well-being at
the University of Ulster, Northern Ireland. She is a Chartered Psychologist
and a member of the Transpersonal and the Consciousness & Experiential
Psychology Sections of the British Psychological Society.
Jorg C. Fachner, Ph.D., is senior research fellow at the Finnish Centre of
Excellence in Interdisciplinary Music Research at University of Jyvaskyla,
Finland. Dr. Fachner has authored a doctoral thesis (2001) on cannabis,
EEG, and music perception, and various publications on music and
altered states, music therapy, addictions, drug culture, and the social
pharmacology of music.
Antoon Geels, Ph.D., trained in history of religions and specialized in psychology of religion, in which he now holds a chair at Lund University,
Sweden. He is also an honorary professor in the psychology of
382
383
Index
386
Index
induction procedures, 78; integration,
30; mediumship, 97103; modern art,
32754; and music, 35671; in
performance, 3012; mystical
experience, 24448; new millennium
research, 12629; 1960s research,
11416, 204; 1970s research, 11621;
1980s research, 12124; 1990s
research, 12426; perception, 23338;
performance research, 3034;
phenomenal/access consciousness,
31920; physical science anomalies,
27; pre-Christian European shamanism,
7476; prehistoric practices,
4651; principal functions, 188;
proto-historic practices, 5152;
recent publications, 11314; religious
experiences (REs), 18991; religious
literature, 28082; religious mysticism,
25572; ritual/aesthetic performances,
3057; Roman Empire practices,
6567; scientic status, 2425;
shamanism, 15963, 16577, 190;
social change, 19297; study of, 1113;
techno-rave/DiY consciousness, 203,
21012; temporary alterations,
18689; terminology, 25, 11415;
trance/psytrance, 21220; transition
states, 9; 20th-century survey, 1027;
universal manifestation, 23,
24; written works/literature, 27879,
28294
Altered States of Consciousness (Tart), 115
Altered States of Consciousness Induction
Device (ASCID), 119
Altering phenomenology, 128
Alvarado, Carlos, 14
Amadeus, 327, 328
American Psychological Association
(APA), ASC publications, 114
American Society for Psychical Research,
J. B. Rhine, 106
American transcendentalism, expansion
of consciousness, 106
Amnesia: dissociation in, 36;
hypnotic induction, 95
Amundsen, Reidar, vision
of Jesus, 26668
387
Index
Baudelaire, Charles, 257; narcotic use,
28485
Beerbohm, Max, 292
Being, Vedanta tradition, 140
Beischel, Julie, 14
Berger, Hans, ACS research, 106
Bergson, Henri: life-force, 2045;
reducing valve, 205
Berlioz, Hector, 15
Bertrand, Alexandre, 95
Beuys, Joseph, shamanic techniques, 329,
337f, 338, 33941, 340f
Bey, Hakim, 21011
Bhagavad-Gita, pure consciousness, 155
Bible, spirit possessions in, 79
Biological cycles, and ASC, 1011
Black Square, The (Malevich), 34344
Blake, William, 285 n.3; perception, 106
Block, Ned, 319
Body, SMT, 23941, 242
Book of Revelations, 281
Boom Festival, counterculture, 203,
21516, 21920
Borges, Jorge Luis, 14; literary
double, 294
Borges and I (Borges), 294
Bourdieu, Pierre, Kabuli gender
relations, 185
Bourguignon, Erika, institutionalized
ASC, 190
Braid (Brunson), 35, 352f
Brain: and dancing, 364; information
processing, 367; literacy skills, 277;
musical stimulation, 36061, 362,
36465; mystical roots, 256; shamanic,
175; time perception, 368
Breath stops, 141
Breton, Andre, 28889, 29091
Breuer, Joseph, 105
Bridal mysticism, 269, 270
Bright light, initiation rites, 60, 65
Browning, Robert, 288
Brunson, Jamie, meditative induction,
329, 35051
Bucke, Richard Maurice, 204; mystical
experience, 262
Buddhism: East-Asian ASC experience,
139; in Japan, 31011; mystical
388
Index
Clinical psychology, and denitions of
ASC, 5, 6
Cloud of Tea (Higby), 341f
Clowde of Unknowyng, The, spiritual
exercises, 7778
Cognitive neuroscience, actors
experience, 304
Cohen, Allen, 2067
Cohen, Emma, 217
Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, narcotic use,
28384, 285
Collective effervescence, 194, 195
Comford, Francis, Cambridge
anthropologist, 307
Communication: and mediumship,
98100; prelinguistic, 36263
Communitas states, Ndembu rite, 19697;
and permanence, 198
Comstock, C., 37
Confessions of an English Opium-Eater
(De Quincey), 283
Consciousness: brain mechanisms, 3032;
culturally variant, 182; derivation of,
355; and dreams, 243; Eastern
tradition, 140, 144; expansion of, 106;
in transit states, 301; mapping research,
12021; meditative states, 24344;
modes of, 2930; 1980s research,
12122; noh performance ideal, 312;
phenomenal/access, 319; recent
publications, 11314, 115;
reformatting terms, 128; techniques of
experience, 204; term, 2; 20th-century
research, 106; written works/literature,
27879
Consciousness at large, 103
Consciousness clubs, 212
Consortium of Collective
Consciousness, 219
Constructivism, and mystical experience,
12021, 26164
Contemporary counterculture, 1960s
legacy, 2045
Control techniques, acting, 317
Corporal mystical experience, 7677
Cortazar, Julio, 16
Cosmic consciousness, 204
Counterculture, psychedelics, 2058
389
Index
Delusional belief, 4
Democritus, on poetic inspiration, 63
Demotic Magical Papyrus, Egypt, 66
Dere`gelment de tous les sens (Rimbaud), 14
Descartes, Rene: dream skepticism,
23031, 23334; philosophy of, 89
Description of Greece, Pausanias, 57
Desnos, Robert, 290
Dexter, George T., 9899, 100
Diabolic spirit possession, 76, 7980
Dialectics of utopia, 219
Didyma, mantic preparations, 56
Dietrich, A., 32, 33
Digital Maoism, 209
Digital utopianism, 2089
Dionysiac mysteries, 60, 6163, 62f, 63f
Direct realism, philosophy of
perception, 233
Disciplinary matrix, paradigm
elements, 25
Discrete state of consciousness, 3
Discriminative intellect, Eastern tradition,
150, 151
Discursive thinking, Eastern tradition,
150, 151
Disjunctivism, mental states, 23637
Disk series (Irwin), 348
Dissociation, 8, 34; dened, 36; and
integration, 37; make-believe, 189; and
mediumship, 101, 102; shamanism,
16465
Dissociative identity disorder, and
hypnosis, 97 n.2
Divergent concepts, social sciences, 25
Divine madness, 55
Divine spirit possession, 75, 7678
DiY consciousness, early counterculture,
203, 209, 21012
Don Juan (Byron), 257
Donne di fuori, 74
Doors of Perception, The (Huxley), 205,
28586, 330
Dopamine, 31
Double consciousness, acting, 303, 320
Double personality, and hypnosis, 97 n.2
Dowden, Hester, 291
Dracula (Stoker), 288
Dream incubation, shamanism, 159
390
Index
Empirical research, 1980s instruments,
12223
Emptiness: Buddhist experience, 140,
142; Eastern ASC states, 14445
Encounter, The (Varo), 335
Enlightenment, 9
Enlivenment, Eastern tradition, 154
Entheogen drugs, 24
Entheogenic Reformation, 207, 214
Enthousiasmos, Greek divine
possession, 56
Enthusiasm, spirit possession, 53
Entrainment, dened, 358
Epic of Gilgamesh, 279
Epistemology, ASC issues, 230
Epoques des sommeils, 290
Ergotropic arousal, 120
Ernst, Max, surrealist painter, 335
Ersatz-death, Ancient Greek mystery
rites, 60
Esalen Institute, 204 n.1
Esdaile, James, 97
Essay Concerning Human Understanding
(Locke), 245
Executive possession, 217
Exemplars, paradigm elements, 25
Exertion, shamanism, 171
Exogenous neurotransmitters,
shamanism, 16566
Exorcism, 8284
Exorcism, animal magnetism, 91
Experimental metaphysics, and
mediumship, 98
Extrovertive mystical experience (EME),
146 n.4
Eyn Sof (without end), 258
Ezekiels visions, 5455
Fachner, Jorg, 15
Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,
The (Poe), 288
Farthing, G. William, consciousness,
113
Fasting, shamanism, 170
Father Hell, 91
Faulkner, William, 287
Feedback loops, cortico-striato-thalamocortical, 32
391
Index
Ghost Shirts, 194
Gibson, William, 208
Gift (le don), Afro-Caribbean religions, 90
Gift exchange, clan-based society, 18384
Gil, DJ Goa, 213
Ginsberg, Allen, LSD, 206
Global Dance Party for Peace, 212
God-mysticism, 256
Goldman, Albert, 342
Gore, Georgina, on raves, 217
Great Awakening, religious movement, 90
Green, John, 316
Gregory, William, 95, 9697
Grey, Alexander, shamanic induction
techniques, 329, 333f, 333
Grof, Stanlislav, unconscious, 120
Grotowski, Jerzy, actor training, 314,
31516, 318
Guardia, Helena, 15
Gurdjieff, George, I., 330; The Work,
107
Gurney, Edmund, 102; hypnosis, 9596
Hallucination: dened, 124; hypnagogic
state, 247; 1980s research, 12324;
phenomenology of, 102; philosophy of
perception, 23338; selfhood, 240, 241
Hallucinogen Rating Scale (HRS),
research, 12526, 127
Hallucinogenic drugs, new millennium
research, 12627
Handbook of Near-Death Experiences, The
(Holden et al.), 119
Handsome Lake, Iroquois revival, 194
Hard/complete constructivism, 121
Hardy, Alister, REs studies, 18990
Harrison, Jane Ellen, 307
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic
Susceptibility, 363
Hashish Club, members of, 28485
Hataphatic experience, religious
visions, 258
Hatha yoga, 3089
Heidegger, Martin, 279, 331
Hemingway, Ernest, 287
Hemp seeds: Neolithic sites, 50; Scythian
funeral rites, 51
Henosis, unit, 67
Herbert, R., 33
Hermann, Max, theater as event, 3034
Herodotus, Scythian funeral rite, 51
Higby, Sha Sha, shamanic techniques,
329, 34142
Highly hypnotizable people, 8, 9,
14, 34, 35
Hippies, counterculture, 204
Hippocampus, 31
Histoire Critique du Magnetisme Animal
(Deleuze), 94
Hobbes, Thomas, on dream
skepticism, 231
Hobson, J. A., 7
Hodgson, Richard, 1001
Hoffman, D. D., 11
Hofmann, Albert, 205
Homer, 282
Hood, Ralph W., REEM, 256
Horace, 295
Houston, Jean, ASCID, 119
How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare
(Beuys), 337f, 339
Hughes, Ted, 14
Hui Neng, 344
Hull, Clark L., 106
Human Personality and Its Survival of Bodily
Death (Myers), 102
Human Personality, Myerss articles, 103
Human potential movement, 204 n.1
Humans, bodily alterations, 18586
Hunter-gatherer societies,
shamanism, 162
Huxley, Aldous: on knowledge, 244;
on psychedelics, 2056, 25657,
28586; on van Gogh
painting, 330
Hyperfrontal states, sensory
processing, 369
Hypergraphia, 281, 282
Hypnos, god of sleep, 93
Hypnosis, 4, 6, 7, 8; dened, 127; as
dissociation, 3435; literary trope,
28788; and mediumship, 9798; and
music, 360, 363; propensity, 10; and
psi phenomena, 94; and psychiatric
diagnosis, 97 n.2; shamanism, 164;
social contagion, 186; standardized
392
Index
instruments, 127; 20th-century
research, 106
Hypnotic sleep, 28990
Hypnotic somnambulism, 9397
Hypnotic state of consciousness, 7;
investigation of, 95
Hypnotic susceptibility, 35
Hysteria, and hypnosis, 97 n.2
I Like America and America Likes Me
(Beuys), 340f
Ibn al-Arabi, 25859
Ideological revolutions, 27
Illusions: philosophy of perception, 233;
selfhood, 24041
Imbas forosnai, 292
Incarnate knowledge, Socrates on, 64
Incomplete constructivism, 121
Incorporation phase, rituals, 187
Incubus experience, hypnagogic state, 247
India, performance tradition, 310
Induction procedures, and ASC, 6, 78
Inge, W. R., mysticism, 26061
Initiation rites, Greek mystery cults,
5961
Innate Capacity, The (Forman), 262
Inner self helper, 37
Inspiration, romantic poets, 32728
Integral Institute, 204 n.1
Integral Transformative Practice, 204 n.1
Integrative mode of consciousness, 13, 23,
28, 29; biological bases, 3032;
characteristics, 38
Intellectual mystical experience, 76
Intentionalism, mental states,
23435, 237
Interior Castle (Teresa of Avila), 260
International Study on Altered States of
Consciousness (Dittrich), 123
Interpretation, individual differences, 10
Introvertive mystical experience
(IME), 146 n.4
Intruder experience, hypnagogic
state, 247
Intrusion and intervention, diabolic
possession, 78
Ion (Plato), 279
Iribas, Ana Eva, 328
393
Index
Kirmayer, L., 36
Kluge, Carl Alexander Ferdinand,
magnetic somnambulism, 94
Koestler, Arthur, 287
Kolanad, Gitanjali, 310
Kramer, Hilton, 348
Krippner, Stanley, 14; ASC denition, 116
Kubla Khan (Coleridge), 284
Kuhn, Thomas, 25, 26, 27; ASC
paradigms, 113
Kundalini, 9
LAnnee dernie`re a` Marienbad (lm), 15
LAutomatisme Psychologique (Janet), 101
La Prosa del Observatoria (Cortazar), 16
Landau, James, 211
Lanier, Jaren, 209
Las Ruinas Circulares (Borges), 14
Lascaux caves, 46
Lattices (Brunson), 351
Laughlin, C., 24
Laureys, Steven, 7
Lawrence, D. H., 19798
Lay individuals, exorcism, 82
Leary, Timothy, LSD, 206, 207, 208
Leboulanger, Leonie, 94
Lee, Martin, 205
Leibniz, Baruch: perennialism, 244;
philosophy of, 89
Leonard, George Burr, 204 n.1
Leonard, Gladys Osborne, medium,
100, 101
Les Champs magnetiques (Breton/Soupault),
289
Letters to a Candid Inquirer, on Animal
Magnetism (Gregory), 95
Leuner, Hans-Carl, 265
Levy, Mark, 14
Lewis, Sinclair, 287
Lewis-Davis, D. 46, 47
Life After Life (Moody), 118
Life crisis rites, rituals, 187
Life-force, 2045
Lilly, John C., 118
Liminal phase, rituals, 18788
Liminal Village, Boom Festival, 21920
Lineage clans, kinship systems, 18283
Literacy, invention of, 277
394
Index
Maya yoga, 308
McKenna, Dennis, 2078
McKenna, Terence, 2078
McManus, J., 24
Mead, Europe, 5152
Mediating function, ego, 264
Mediation: brain dynamics, 3334; and
procedures, 8
Medically unexplained epidemic illness,
Mesmer, 9192
Meditation: art induction, 329; Eastern
practices, 15657; Eastern tradition,
140, 14142; ego-psychological model,
27071; new millennium research,
128; 1990s research, 12425;
psychology of religion, 256; states
classication, 5
Meditations (Descartes), 230, 231
Meditative states, consciousness, 24344
Medium, performance, 305
Mediums, 100, 104, 105; new millennium
research, 12728
Mediumship: dened, 98; early study of,
97103, 104, 105; and spiritualism,
9899; 20th-century research, 106
Meister Eckhart: God-mysticism, 256;
mystical dimensions, 260
Memory, literacy skills, 277
Menghi, Girolamo, exorcist, 83
Mental Health Research Institute Unusual
Perceptions Schedule (MUPS), 124
Mental vortex, 57 n.10, 65
Merkabah literature, Sholem, 55 n.8
Merrill, James, 293
Mescaline, literary bohemia, 28586
Mesmer, Franz Anton; animal magnetism,
9093, 92f; literary inuence,
28788
Mesmerism, 9093, 92f, 97 n.2; literary
trope, 28793
Mesmerism (Browning), 288
Mesmerism in India (Esdaile), 97
Messiaen, Olivier, 15
Metamorphoses (Apuleius), 65, 66
Metaverse, 209
Methodists, emergence of, 90
Metzner, Ralph, 206
Mimetic controller, 196
395
Index
260; and knowledge, 24448;
personality model, 264; religious
dimension, 25859; ritual dimension,
258, 260; scientic studies, 26164
Mysticism: dened, 255, 257; 1980s
research, 121; psychology of religion,
25556; religious case studies, 26672;
types of experience, 25657. See also
Religious mysticism
Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis
(Katz), 12021
Nave realism, philosophy of
perception, 233
Nangyar, Usha, 310
Narcotics, in literary sources,
28287
Nature mysticism, 25656
Near-death experiences (NDE), 1970s
research, 11819
Neotrance, 215
Neurobiology, metric timekeeping, 366
Neurognostic process, 196
Neuromancer (Gibson), 208
Neurophenomenological approach, 7, 29,
38; shamanism, 17677
Neuroscience: and ACS research, 106;
new millennium research, 128
Neurotransmitters: shamanism, 16566;
time perception, 368
Newberg, A., 34
Nibbana (extinction), 263
Nirvana yoga, 308
Noetic states, 189
Noh theater, performance art, 31112,
337; Sha Sha Higby, 34142
Noirhomme, Quentin, 7
Noland, Christopher, 16
Nonbeing, Buddhist tradition, 140
Numinous character, awe/wonder, 189
Nunez, Nicolas, 15; actor training, 314,
31718
ONeill, Eugene, 287
OReilly, Kaite, performance score, 320
Odyssey (Homer), 60, 282283
Old Testament prophets, shamanistic
type, 5354
396
Index
Phaedrus (Plato), 55, 59, 61, 63, 64, 245,
327
Phantasms of the Living (Gurney, Myers, &
Podmore), 102
Phantom limbs, 239
Phenomenal consciousness, performance,
319
Phenomenology of Consciousness
Inventory (PCI), 122
Philosophia perennis, 204
Philosophy: consciousness/self, 23844;
epistemological concerns, 23033;
mysticism/knowledge, 24448; sensory
perception, 23338
Philosophy of Composition, The (Poe), 279
Physical stress, shamanism, 171
Piper, Leonora, medium, 1001, 105
Pituitary cyclase-activating polypeptide
precursor (PACAP), 165
Placebo effect, shamanism, 164
Plath, Sylvia, 14
Plato, 2, 5, 11, 55; deep knowledge, 245;
expansion of consciousness, 106; on
initiatory madness, 59; on poetic
inspiration, 63; on poetry, 279, 327
Plotinus, on out-of-body experience,
6667
Plutarch, mystery rites, 58, 59, 6061
Poe, Edgar Allan, 279; multiple identities,
293; psychic displacement, 288
Poets Immortal Fame, The (Horace), 295
Poetic inspiration, divine madness, 63
Poetry, Language and Thought (Heidegger),
279
Polanski, Roman, 15
Polyphasic void cultures, ASC, 24
Polyphasic, 181
Popper, Karl, 27
Possession: animal magnetism, 91; and
dissociation, 37
Possession trance: movement, 35757,
364; 1970s research, 119; REs, 19091
Postconstructivism, mystical
experience, 261
Posttraumatic stress disorder, 7
Potlatch system, gift exchange, 183
Pre-Christian European shamanism,
7476
397
Index
Psytrance, early counterculture, 21215,
21819
Pure bliss, Eastern tradition, 150, 15253
Pure consciousness: Eastern ASC states,
14445; Eastern experience, 140, 142;
Eastern tradition, 150, 152
Pure consciousness event (PCE), 121;
dened, 262; personality model, 264,
271, 272
Pure individuality (ego), Eastern tradition,
150, 15152
Putnam, F. W., 12
Quran, revelation of, 28081
Race, Victor, 93
Radical behaviorism, 6
Rainbow Serpent Festival (Australia), 219
Raja yoga, 342
Ramon y Cajal, Santiago, ACS research,
106
Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep:
daydreaming, 187; 1970s research,
11920; self-consciousness, 24243;
and shamanism, 17172
Rapture, affective transcendence, 77
Rationality, philosophical exploration, 89
RAVE Act (2003), 212
Rave culture, techno-music, 358
Raves, critiques, 21718
Ravindra, Ravi, 198
Reality, and consciousness, 11
Realms of the Human Unconscious
(Grof), 120
Reason, in dreams, 232
Reciprocal altruism, 182
Religion: ve dimensions, 25761;
mystical dimension, 255; and
mysticism, 255; and origin of writing,
280; psychology of, 25556; and
shamanist practices, 16162;
stoned-ape theory, 207
Religious context, prehistoric psychoactive
substance use, 51
Religious Experience Episodes Measure
(REEM), 256
Religious experiences (REs), biological
basis, 196; and social structure, 18991
398
Index
Rock, Adam, 14
Rock art, existing communities, 46
Roman Empire, 46; practices, 6567
Romantic poets: genius notion, 327;
narcotic use, 28384; psychic
displacement, 288
Roszak, Theodore, 209
Rouget, G., 53; on music, 355, 356
Rubber-hand illusion (RHI), 239
Rules, society, 182
Rushkoff, Douglas, 208
Russell, George William, 291
Russell, Ken, 6, 15
Sacred texts, revelation of, 280
Sacred, Durkheims view, 195
Saints shrines, exorcism, 83
Saldanha, Arun, 213
Samadhi meditation, hypoarousal, 120
Samadhi, SSS, 117
Saman, 305
San, southern Africa, 46
Sar, V., 36
Sardou, Victorien, 99
Satanic/demonic agent possession, 78;
physical signs, 79, 80
Satie, Erik, 365
Schieffelin, E. L., 3056
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 278
Schwartz, T., 37
Scientic revolution, paradigm shifts, 26
Scriabin, Alexander, 15
Secular sacredness, actor training,
31415
Seeress of Prevost, 94
Self: and consciousness in Western
Christian tradition, 7374; Eastern
traditions, 14748, 148 n.5; SMT
model, 23842
Self-consciousness, SMT, 24142
Self-Expansiveness Level Form
(SELF), 123
Self-identication, conceptualist distinction, 240
Self-localization, conceptualist distinction,
240
Self-model theory (SMT), subjectivity,
23842
Self-representation, ego-psychological
model, 265
Self-shamanism, 208
Self-transcendence, 10
Seligman, R., 36
Senses, Eastern tradition, 150, 151
Sensory perception: ASC threats, 233;
Descartes, 23031; intentionalism/
representationalism, 23435
Separation phase, rituals, 187
Serotonin, 31; in dancers, 364
Sexual abstinence, shamanism, 17071
Sexual modesty, cultural universal, 185
Shakers, emergence of, 90
Shakespeare, William, drug
references, 283
Shakespearian Criticism (Coleridge), 284
Shaman, term, 159, 162, 305
Shamanic states of consciousness (SSC),
physiological symptoms, 32829
Shamanic trance, REs, 190, 191
Shamanism: biological foundations, 164;
classic 15961; cross-cultural features,
16062; dened, 159; healers, 163;
music use, 355; 1980s research,
12122; 1990s research, 125; soul
journey, 33
Shamanism (Eliade), 160, 33839
Shankara: ASC state, 149; soul
mysticism, 256
Shape-shifting, perspectival worldview,
184
Shapland, Jo, performance score, 320, 322
Shear, Jonathan, 14
Shelley, Mary, narcotic use, 284
Shelley, Percy Bysshe: narcotic use, 283;
psychic displacement, 288
Sherratt, A., intoxicating beverages, 51 n.2
Shinto religion, 31011
Shlain, Bruce, 205
Shri Yantra diagram, 346, 347f, 347
Sidgwick, Eleanor, 105
Sights and Sounds (Spicer), 99
Sleep and dream research, 1
Sleep/wake cycle, 29
Slow-wave brain pattern, agents, 31
Sluhovsky, Moshe, 13
Smith, Hele`ne, medium, 104
399
Index
Social bonding, and music, 362
Social contagion, and hypnosis, 186
Social Darwinism, Cambridge
anthropologists, 307
Social drama, 191
Social play, shift in perception, 189
Society, rules, 182
Society for Psychical Research (SPR),
102, 106
Sociological self, and psychological self,
3637
Socrates, 2, 5, 55; postcarnate
knowledge, 64
Somnambulism: dened, 93;
investigations of, 9395; and modern
spiritualism, 98
Soul, folk-phenomenological concept, 248
Soul ight: shamanism, 159, 160, 17275;
visual artists, 328, 334
Soul-mysticism, 256
Speaking in tongues (glossolalia),
Afro-Caribbean religions, 90
Spectrum of consciousness, 120
Spicer, Henry, 99
Spiral motifs, Neolithic period, 48, 49f
Spirit of Shamanism (Walsh), 328
Spirit possession, 74; as dissociation, 34,
3637; diabolic, 76, 7980;
discernment, 8082; divine, 75, 7678;
exorcism, 8284; 1970s research, 119;
performance, 3056
Spirits, shamanism, 160
Spiritual experiences, and social
structure, 189
Spiritual mystical experience, 7677
Spiritual technologies, contemporary
counterculture, 203
Spiritualism (Edmonds/Dexter), 98, 99
Spiritualization, demonic possession,
80, 82
Squid and Turtle Dreaming (Burkutlatjpi),
331, 332f
St. Augustine, on union with the
divine, 76
St. John, Graham, 14
St. Vituss dances, 91
Stace, Walter T.: mystical experiences, 146
n.4, 258, 259; perennialism, 261
400
Index
Takahashi, Melanie, 217
Tale of Genji, Lady Aoi, The, 311
Taller de Investigaciones Teatrales, 15, 317
Tantric meditation, 346
Taoism: Agnes Martins paintings,
34748; mystical dimension, 255;
practices, 156
Tart, Charles Theodore, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13,
28, 29; on automaticity, 107; 1960s
research, 115, 116; 1970s research,
11718
Tatsumi, Hijikata, 318
Teaching of Don Juan, The (Castaneda), 286
Technicians of Ecstasy (Levy), 329
Techniques of ecstasy, 160
Technological Society, The (Ellul), 209
Techno-rave culture, early counterculture,
203, 21012
Techno-tribes, contemporary
counterculture, 203
Telepathic communication, 20th-century
research, 106
Tellegen Absorption Scale, 364
Temporal lobe, and hypergraphia, 28182
Teresa of Avila, 8384, 260
Theater: origins of, 3078; performance
event, 3034
Theater Research Workshop
(TRW), 31718
Theatrical theories, 194
Theogony (Hesiod), 63
Theologue (Grey), 333, 333f
Theosophists, cosmic consciousness, 204
Theravada Buddhism: ASC states, 146,
148 n.5; mystical dimension, 255;
practices, 156
Theta slow-wave brain waves, 23, 30, 31;
in meditation, 33
Thomas Aquinas, divine/demonic
possession, 79
Thomas of Cantimpre, 79
Thousand and One Nights, 283
Three-variable (AIM) model (Hobson), 7
Timarchus, at Trophonius, 58
Time paradoxon, 367
Time, and music, 356, 36769
Told by the Wind, 32023, 321f
Tomczyk, Stanislawa, medium, 101
401
Index
van Gogh, Vincent, shamanic induction
techniques, 32931, 330f
Van Ruusbroec, Jan, 260
Varieties of Anomalous Experience (Cardena
et al.), 114
Varieties of Religious Experience (James),
104, 205, 256
Varo, Remedios, 15; shamanic induction
techniques, 329, 330, 33536, 336f
Vasopressin receptors, in dancers, 364
Vedanta tradition, ASC experience, 139,
140, 141
Vedic literature, and language, 278
Veils (Brunson), 351
Velmans, M., 4
Vexations (Satie), 365
Via negative, union with divine, 77
Virtual reality, early counterculture, 203,
2089
Visions: ego-psychological model,
26670; mystical experience, 258
Visual artists: cultivation of ASC, 328;
meditative states, 328; shamanistic
consciousness, 328
Visual hallucinations, 1970s research, 117
Visuospatial rst-person perspective
(1PP), selfhood, 240, 241, 242
Void/in Art (Levy), 329
Vollenweider, Franz, 32
Voltaire, philosophy of, 89
Waking consciousness, 1, 11, 29
Wallace, Anthony, revitalization
movements, 194
Walsh, Roger, 126, 328
Warnings (lavertissement), Afro-Caribbean
religions, 90
Wasson, Robert Gordon, 207
Wayang Kulit, performance art, 337
Weapon of the weak, 191
Wearable environment, 342
Weber, Max, charisma, 194
Weschler, Lawrence, 348
Western Christian tradition: demonic
possession, 7980; divine possession,
7678; exorcism, 8284; self and
consciousness, 7374
Western pre-Christian shamanism, 7476
Altering Consciousness
Altering Consciousness
Multidisciplinary Perspectives
Volume 2: Biological and Psychological Perspectives
1 2 3 4 5
Contents
Acknowledgments
Preface
Kenneth S. Pope
Introduction
Etzel Cardena
vii
ix
xiii
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
3
21
43
Chapter 4
63
Chapter 5
85
Chapter 6
Chapter 7
121
147
vi
Contents
Chapter 8
Chapter 9
189
Altering Consciousness Through Sexual Activity
Michael Maliszewski, Barbara Vaughan, Stanley Krippner,
Gregory Holler, and Cheryl Fracasso
211
237
263
279
301
355
375
377
379
385
Acknowledgments
We want to acknowledge rst the forebears of these books, the men and
women who across many thousands of years have descended into dark
caves, led community rituals, and explored consciousness-altering plants
in order to encounter anew the world and their selves. We recognize our
pioneers in Plato in the West, Pantanjali in the East, and other exemplars
of rst-rate intellects who laid the groundwork for integrating the insights
of alterations of consciousness into our views of reality. Among the founders of modern psychology and anthropology there were notables such as
William James and Andrew Lang who articulated and incorporated alterations of consciousness into their theories of human mind and behavior.
Even during the decades-long exile of consciousness by behaviorism,
some brave souls dared to engage in research on altered states, among
them Stanley Krippner, Arnold Ludwig, Robert Ornstein, and Jerome
Singer in psychology, E. E. Evans-Wentz, Erika Bourguignon, Michael
Harner, Joseph Long, and Charles Laughlin in anthropology, and Albert
Hofmann in pharmacology. Among those who helped to point out the
importance of studying alterations of consciousness as a basic element of
human experience, the leading gure in establishing them as a legitimate
area of scientic inquiry was Charles T. Tart, an erstwhile engineering
student turned psychologist.
Our two volumes are dedicated to these and the many other pioneers
of inquiry into consciousness who provided the foundations for the perspectives developed here. We thank Debbie Carvalko, the senior acquisitions editor who made Altering Consciousness possible, and our many
contributors, without whom these volumes would not have seen the light
of day. We especially would like to thank Julie Beischel, Cheryl Fracasso,
viii
Acknowledgments
David E. Nichols, and Moshe Sluhovsky, who came to the rescue when it
looked as if we might not be able to include some important topics.
We are also very fortunate to have been the recipients of the generosity
of Anna Alexandra Gruen, who gave us permission to use the extraordinary images of Remedios Varo in our covers, and of Judith Go mez del
Campo, who made it happen.
Dedications
Michael dedicates these volumes to the next generation of investigators
who will take the foundations of a multidisciplinary science of altered consciousness described here and produce a more comprehensive
paradigm for understanding these inherent aspects and potentials
of human nature.
Etzel dedicates Altering Consciousness to:
My dear departed, Ma (May Buelna de Cardena), Blueberry, and Ninnifer, whose living presence will accompany me to my dying breath.
And to my beloved princesa holandesa Sophie:
. . . somos mas que dos piezas de rompecabezas, le dijo la arena al
mar, somos algo nuevo y distinto.
Preface
Kenneth S. Pope
This book is a remarkable achievement, bringing together what is known
in a eld that has been fragmented, marked by tful starts and stops,
and often misunderstood. The editors and authors demonstrate courage
and a unique intelligence in creating this resource. The volume moves us
forward in our understanding, expanding our vistas.
Why have we as scientists, clinicians, and scholars had such a difcult
time approaching the biological and psychological study of altering and
altered states of consciousness? This preface seemed a good opportunity
to suggest a few possibilities.
Science loves that which can be precisely measured. Scientic journals
pour forth numbers representing behaviors, doses, distances, durations,
weights, speeds, and other measurables. But consciousness challenges us
to dene it in any precise, useful, noncircular way. The stream of consciousness as it occurs in real life and is actually experienced has been
elusive for novelists as well as scientists. Virginia Woolf (2005) wrote that
Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous
halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of
consciousness to the end (p. 899).
As if this were not hazy enough to evoke pity and fearnot to say a
prompt rejection from many editors of scientic journalsWilliam James
acknowledged additional layers of complexity when he described his use
of nitrous oxide to push the semi-transparent envelope and alter his
consciousness:
One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my impression
of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking
consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of
consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the lmiest of screens,
there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go
through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite
stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, denite
types of mentality which probably somewhere have their eld of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be nal
which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How
Preface
This lack of formulas and maps has often served as a Do Not Enter sign for
conventional scientic investigation. During one period, human consciousness itself seemed to almost cease to exist as a research topic for
U.S. psychologists. As Roger Brown (1958) wrote: In 1913 John Watson
mercifully closed the bloodshot inner eye of American psychology. With
great relief the profession trained its exteroceptors on the laboratory
animal (p. 93).
Yet another problem in understanding altered states of consciousness
has been the struggle to answer the question: Altered from what? What
is normal waking consciousness? What may be normal for some may
be altered (from normal) for others. What has appeared in the popular
arts and other media as exotic altered states of consciousness may represent normative traits or enduring states for many.
The search for an objective, neutral denition and description of an
inherently subjective phenomenon is made even more daunting because
each attempt represents a specic point of view. In Through the Looking
Glass: No Wonderland Yet! (The Reciprocal Relationship Between Methodology and Models of Reality), Rhoda Unger (1983) wrote, Description
is always from someones point of view and hence is always evaluative.
A third source of complexity and misunderstandings can be found in an
altered state of Ungers statement quoted above: Description is always from
a cultural context and hence is always evaluative, drawing on that cultures
evaluative assumptions and approaches. We tend to be aware of cultural contexts, inuences, assumptions, and approaches when we read descriptions
from cultures not our own. We are far more apt to overlook cultural factors
when they spring from our own culture. In theory we all know that our
culture can profoundly inuence how we view, understand, and describe a
phenomenon. But in practice, all of us trip up at least some of the time.
A remarkable book, The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down: A Hmong
Child, Her American Doctors, and the Collision of Two Cultures (Fadiman,
1997), illustrates the potential costs of overlooking the inuences of culture and context on everyone involved. The book describes the efforts of
a California hospital staff and a Laotian refugee family to help a Hmong
child whose American doctors had diagnosed her with epilepsy. Everyone
involved had the best of intentions and worked hard to help the girl, but a
Preface
A fourth factor that may have led some to turn away from this area is anxiety or fear evoked by the stereotype of perceived danger linked to various
methods of altering consciousness. Some of the substancessuch as 3,4Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (also known as MDMA or ecstasy)
used to alter consciousness can have signicantly negative consequences
under some conditions and have been criminalized in some jurisdictions.
It is worth noting, however, that a randomized, controlled pilot study,
reported during the writing of this preface, demonstrates that MDMAassisted psychotherapy with close follow-up monitoring and support can
be used with acceptable and short-lived side effects in a carefully screened
group of subjects with chronic, treatment-resistant PTSD (Mithoefer,
Wagner, Mithoefer, Ilsa, & Doblin, 2010).
The area may also frighten some as dangerous to a scientic or academic career. For them, the career trajectory of Harvard psychologists
Timothy Leary and Richard Alpert is not a fascinating journey of exploration and discovery but a cautionary tale. Academic pioneers in exploring
various hallucinogens rst hand, Leary and Alpert traveled to Cuernavaca
to take psilocybin and were among the members of the Harvard Psilocybin
Project. Leary said that a few hours of using psilocybin taught him more
about his brain and its potential than he had learned in a decade and a half
of studying psychology and conducting traditional psychological research
(Ram Das: Fierce Grace, 2003). Harvard red both Leary and Alpert, who
later became Ram Dass, in 1963.
Finally, consciousness-altering substances may seem dangerous for
their perceived potential to control human behavior. Aldous Huxley
explored this theme in Brave New World (2006a; see also 2006b). The
novel presents a government that uses the hallucinogen soma to control
the citizens. The novels presentation of a consciousness-altering substance as dangerous gains force in light of Huxleys own courageous exploration of consciousness-altering substances to open the doors of
perception (see, e.g., Huxley, 2009).
xi
xii
Preface
These are only a few possible reasons that scientists, clinicians, and
scholars have avoided, discounted, neglected, or misunderstood this area.
My impulse to be more comprehensive in listing and exploring these barriers to understanding is immediately doused by my belief that no one
ever bought a book to read the preface.
References
Brown, R. (1958). Words and things. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
Fadiman, A. (1997). The spirit catches you and you fall down: A Hmong child, her American
doctors, and the collision of two cultures. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Huxley, A. (2006a). Brave new world. New York: Harper Perennial Modern
Classics. (Originally published 1932).
Huxley, A. (2006b). Brave new world revisited. New York: Harper Perennial
Modern Classics. (Originally published 1958).
Huxley, A. (2009). Doors of perception. Heaven and hell. New York: Harper Perennial
Modern Classics. (Originally published 1954).
James, W. (2008). Varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature. Rockville,
MD: ARC Manor. (Originally published 1902).
Mithoefer, M. C., Wagner, M. T., Mithoefer, A. T., Ilsa, J., & Doblin, R. (2010). The
safety and efcacy of 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine-assisted psychotherapy in subjects with chronic, treatment-resistant posttraumatic stress
disorder: The rst randomized controlled pilot study. Journal of Psychopharmacology. Retrieved August 15, 2010, from http://jop.sagepub.com/content/early/
2010/07/14/0269881110378371.full.pdf+html.
Ram Dass: Fierce grace. (2003). DVD directed by Mickey Lemle; produced by
Bobby Squires, Buddy Squires, Mickey Lemle, Jessica Brackman, & Linda K.
Moroney. New York: Zeitgeist Films.
Unger, R. K. (1983). Through the looking glass: No wonderland yet! (The reciprocal relationship between methodology and models of reality). Psychology of
Women Quarterly, 8(1), 932.
Woolf, V. (2005). Modern ction. In L. Rainy (Ed.), Modernism: An anthology
(pp. 897901). Carleton, Victoria, Australia: Blackwell Publishing. (Originally
published 1919).
Introduction
Etzel Cardena
In the preface to this volume, Ken Pope, not only a foremost ethicist in
psychology but also a pioneer in the study of consciousness (e.g., Pope
& Singer, 1978) and a very compassionate person, offers his perspective
on various reasons why the study of such a central phenomenon as altered
states of consciousness (ASC) has been almost completely ignored by psychology and related disciplines.
Setting some of the foundations for the biological processes underlying
ASC, Andrzej Kokoszka and Benjamin Wallace discuss the various biological rhythms that may affect consciousness, including a possible continuation of the sleep and dream cycle throughout the day. Also
foundational is David Prestis chapter on neurochemistry and altered consciousness in which, after giving their proper due to neurochemical
impulses, he calls for an expansion of what he calls the standard model
(following the terminology in physics) to understand the relationship
between consciousness and biological processes.
After these general introductions, Fred Previc focuses on the dopaminergic network of the nervous system and how it gives rise to experiences
of distant space and time that may underlie shamanic and other alterations
of consciousness characterized by a sense of being in a different plane of
reality. Mario Beauregard concentrates on transcendent experiences and
proposes a sophisticated model of their connection to brain sites and functions. Calling for a neurophenomenological approach to the study of ASC
(see also Cardena, 2009), he suggests that transcendence can be associated
with different mechanisms (e.g., hyper- or hypoactivation of the prefrontal
cortex) and networks of brain functions rather than just specic areas (e.g.,
the temporal lobe) or mechanisms (e.g., hypofrontality).
The next four chapters deal with powerful psychoactive drugs in some
way or other. Erudite and comprehensive overviews of biopharmacological and psychological aspects of the ubiquitous psychedelic agent DMT
and of the culture-transforming substance LSD are authored by Zevic
1
The standard abbreviation in this volume for altered states of consciousness both in
singular and plural is ASC. Also note that to help cross-reference relevant chapters in the
two-volume set there are editorial square brackets [ ] throughout the volume.
xiv
Introduction
Introduction
xv
xvi
Introduction
References
Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous
retroactive inuences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 100, 407425.
Cardena, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and physically active. International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 53, 3759.
Cardena, E. (2009). Beyond Plato? Toward a science of alterations of consciousness. In C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, & L. Coly (Eds.), Utrecht II: Charting the future
of parapsychology (pp. 305322). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Dietrich, A., & McDaniel, W. (2004). Endocannabinoids and exercise. British
Journal of Sports Medicine, 38, 536541.
Jones, P. (2004). Ultrarunners and chance encounters with absolute unitary
being. Anthropology of Consciousness, 15, 3950.
Morgan, W. P. (1993). Hypnosis and sport psychology. In J. W. Rhue, S. J. Lynn, &
I. Kirsch (Eds.), Handbook of clinical hypnosis (pp. 649670). Washington, DC:
American Psychological Association.
Pope, K. S., & Singer, J. L. (Eds.). (1978) The stream of consciousness. New York:
Plenum.
Roethke, T. (1961). The collected poems of Theodor Roethke. New York: Doubleday.
Storm, L., Tressoldi, P. E., & Di Risio, L. (2010). Meta-analysis of free-response
studies, 19922008: Assessing the noise reduction model in parapsychology.
Psychological Bulletin, 136, 471485.
Vaitl, D., Birbaumer, N., Gruzelier, J., Jamieson, G., Kotchoubey, B., Kubler,
A., Lehmann, D., Miltner, W. H. R., Ott, U., Putz, P., Sammer, G., Strauch,
I., Strehl, U., Wackermann, J., & Weiss, T. (2005). Psychobiology of altered
states of consciousness. Psychological Bulletin, 131, 98127.
PART I
Biological Perspectives
CHAPTER 1
Altering Consciousness
Biological Rhythms That Can Inuence States and Altered States of Consciousness
Infradian Rhythms
Infradian rhythms include many slow rhythms with periods of approximately 1 month (e.g., menstrual cycles) or longer (e.g., seasonal depression or seasonal affective disorderSAD). The impact of seasons of the
year on some peoples state of mind is obvious. For example, the beginning
of winter is associated with a diminished mood for engaging in activity and
a general decrease in energy. Spring is associated with increased energy
and an improved mood for engaging in all types of activities. In addition,
spring appears to be associated with increased sexual desire that affects
the reproductive cycle of many animals, synchronized by changes in the
amount of daylight (Prendergast, 2005).
Unfortunately, this issue has received little attention with respect to
impact of increased daylight on sexual activity and birth rate in humans.
However, it has been reported that the highest sperm count among men
is found in the spring, and the lowest is found in the summer (Gyllenborg
et al., 1999). Also, seasonal differences in the frequency of suicide attempts
have been found among men. Spring and summer were found to be the
times of highest frequency for those between the ages of 15 to 34, and for
those over 65. And Valtonen, Suominen, and coworkers (2006) reported
that suicide attempts for those suffering from mood disorders peaked
during autumn and were lowest during the winter. However, it is worth
mentioning that these studies were conducted in Finland, where the day/
night cycles differ from other parts of the world. It would be interesting
to see if these results could be replicated in other countries.
Circadian Rhythms
The sleep/wake cycle falls into this category. The result of this extensively researched cycle indicates that it is approximately 24 hours in length
and it is inuenced by two separate processes. The rst is an endogenous,
biological clock that drives this cycle. The second is sleep propensity as
determined by ones history of sleep and wakefulness periods and the
duration of previous sleep episodes. These two interactive processes
determine sleep at night and wakefulness during daytime hours (PandiPeruamal et al., 2009).
Changes in the secretion of some hormones (e.g., cortisol as secreted
by the adrenal gland and related to reactions to stress, shift work, and long
journeys that disturb rhythms responsible for adaptation to the environment and normal functioning such as jet lag; see Rosmond, Dallman, &
Bjorntorp, 1998) are also inuenced by circadian rhythms. Similarly,
some neurotransmitters are inuenced by circadian rhythms (e.g., melatonin as secreted by the pineal gland; Benlouci et al., 2005, considered the
zeitgeber for regulating time of different functions including sleep and
wakefulness).
Ultradian Rhythms
The REM (rapid eye movements)/NREM (non-REM) cycle is the most
documented ultradian rhythm, lasting approximately 90 minutes (Hobson,
2001). Sleep usually ensues with a loss of awareness of the environment.
However, an individual may preserve reective consciousness and experience visual imagery, described as the rst stage of NREM sleep (Hobson,
2001). During this period, level of activation decreases and that, in turn,
alters the state of consciousness, which leads to the next NREM stage. In
Stage 2 NREM, thalamocortical transmission of external and internal signals
are blocked, and larger brain waves and quick bursts of activity are present.
In Stage 3 NREM, brain waves are slow and quite large. At this point, it is
difcult to awaken the sleeper. It usually takes several minutes and the
sleeper experiences confusion and disorientation with a strong tendency to
fall sleep again. Finally, in Stage 4 NREM (where it is also difcult to awaken
Altering Consciousness
Figure 1.1
the sleeper), the brain waves are quite large and produce a slow, jagged EEG
pattern (see Figure 1.1) [see Noirhomme & Laureys, this volume].
Following the completion of the four NREM stages (in order), there is a
staircase-like return to Stage 3, then Stage 2, and Stage 1. This then sets
the scenario for the appearance of the rst REM stage. It is characterized
by an increase in brain wave activity, approximating that which occurs
during wakefulness. This is accompanied by horizontal eye movements
under the eyelids (Dement & Kleitman, 1957) and vivid dreams. During
the night, REM stages have a tendency to become longer and more intense.
Many sleepers report having the impression that they are awake. Further,
there are reports of hallucinoid dreaming after awakening in this stage
(Lavie, 1992). The sleepers thought processes may seem logical, but only
in a dream situation, without insight as to his or her true state of mind or
consciousness.
More recently, the sleep/wake cycles and REM/NREM cycles have been
explained in terms of the AIM model of consciousness (Hobson, 2007).
Altering Consciousness
Theoretical Explanation
The previously described rhythms are naturally occurring and associated with normal psychobiological functioning. However, their impact on
states of consciousness is more complex, especially if they can cause or be
associated with ASC. The assessment of the impact of biological rhythms
on states of consciousness depends on the accepted denition of consciousness and its altered states (Wallace, Kokoszka, & Turosky, 1993). Unfortunately, there is no commonly accepted denition of consciousness. For
pragmatic reasons, we will limit our denition to deal only with biological
rhythms from a meta-theoretical point of view. In doing so, we wish to consider the following issues and questions: (a) When are rhythmic changes
experienced and/or recognized as altered states of consciousness? (b) What
is the nature of biologically produced states of consciousness versus those
induced by other means? (c) Which theoretical concepts have the strongest
support for explaining variability in states of consciousness?
10
Altering Consciousness
Figure 1.2
Recording from the left frontal lobe during stages of wakefulness and sleep.
(Winkelman, 2010): (1) waking consciousness, (2) deep sleep, (3) REM
(rapid eye movement) sleep (dreaming), and (4) a spiritual, transpersonal,
or transcendental consciousness, referred to as integrative consciousness.
However, if one accepts the view that consciousness is the processing
of information at various levels of awareness (Wallace & Fisher, 2003),
then ASC are characterized by mental processes that are higher or lower
than normal. The organization of these mental processes was previously
discussed, and they have been elaborated upon by Kokoszka (2007).
They have also been mapped by Clark (1993) in a general tool to plot
mental states. However, his complex model is anchored on a number of
competing theoretical models rather than on descriptive categories.
Although one might argue that the model proposed by Kokoszka (2007)
suffers from some of the same problems, a multidimensional scaling to
classify alterations in consciousness may be fruitful (see Cardena, 2009).
And regardless of the potential weakness of the model approach, it is clear
that changes in consciousness from variations in biological rhythms are
not usually related to changes in the organization of mental processes.
11
12
Altering Consciousness
13
14
Altering Consciousness
15
16
Altering Consciousness
2009). The most common of these are various sleep disturbances such as:
jet lag (which affects individuals traveling across a number of time zones);
shift work variation (where individuals switch between day work hours
and night work hours, or vice versa); the delayed sleep phase syndrome
(DSPS), which affects the normal time of sleep onset and offset and a peak
period of alertness occurs during the middle of the night; the advanced
sleep phase syndrome (ASPS), which results in difculty in staying awake
in the evening and staying asleep in the morning; and the non24-hour
sleepwake syndrome, which causes sleep to occur later and later each
day, resulting in a continuously moving peak alertness time.
Conclusions
Variations in states and altered states of consciousness resulting from
biological rhythms are well documented, and such variations are considered
to be normal. We discussed a number of different types of rhythms including those labeled infradian, ultradian, and circadian. Their role in behavior
and behavioral disorders requires considerably more investigation.
Research on them in wakefulness is difcult, but it is incumbent on science
to study their complexity and the produced interactions that occur between
internal rhythms, external environmental cues, personality characteristics,
and general life events. By continuing to study biological rhythms, science
may eventually be able to answer many questions about various sleep disorders, mood disorders, and states and altered states of consciousness.
References
Bakan, P. (1969). Hypnotizability, laterality of eye movements, and functional
brain asymmetry. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 28, 927932.
Benloucif, S., Guico, M. J., Reid, K. J., Wolfe, L. F., Lhermite-Baleriaux, M., &
Zee, P. C. (2005). Stability of melatonin and temperature as circadian phase
markers and their relation to sleep times in humans. Journal of Biological
Rhythms, 20, 178188.
Brandenberger, G., Simon, C., & Follenius, M. (1987). Nightday differences in the
ultradian rhythmicity of plasma rennin activity. Life Sciences, 40, 23252330.
Cardena, E. (2009). Beyond Plato? Toward a science of alterations of consciousness. In C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, & L. Coly (Eds.), Utrecht II: Charting the future
of parapsychology (pp. 305322). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Cardena, E., Lynn, S. J., & Krippner, S. (Eds.). (2000). Varieties of anomalous
experience: Examining the scientic evidence. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Carmichael, M. S., Warburton, V. L., Dixen, J., & Davidson, J. M. (1994). Relationship among cardiovascular, muscular, and oxytocin responses during
human sexual activity. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 23, 5979.
Clark, A. (1993). Sensory qualities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Csikszentmihalyi, M., & Csikszentmihalyi, I. S. (1992). Optimal experience:
Psychological studies of ow in consciousness. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Dement, W. C., & Kleitman, N. (1957). Cyclic variations in EEG during sleep
and their relation to eye movement, body motility, and dreaming. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 9, 673690.
Dillbeck, M. C., & Orme-Johnson, D. (1987). Physiological differences between
transcendental meditation and rest. American Psychologist, 42, 879881.
Dirlich, G., Zulley, J., & Schultz, H. (1977). The temporal pattern of REM sleep
rhythm. In International Society for Chronobiology, XII international conference
proceedings (pp. 483493). Milan: Il Ponte.
Duchniewska, K., & Kokoszka, A. (2003). The protective mechanisms of the
basic restactivity cycle as an indirect manifestation of this rhythm in waking:
Preliminary report. International Journal of Neuroscience, 113, 153163.
Erickson, M., & Rossi, E. (1979). Hypnotherapy: An exploratory casebook. New
York: Irvington.
Erickson, M., Rossi, E., & Rossi, I. (1976). Hypnotic realities. New York: Irvington.
Geretz, J., Lavie, P. (1983). Biological rhythms in arousal indices: A potential confounding effect in EEG biofeedback. Psychophysiology, 20, 690695.
Globus, G. G. (1966). Rapid eye movement cycle in real time. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 15, 654659.
Gopher, D., & Lavie, P. (1980). Short-term rhythms in the performance of simple
motor tasks. Journal of Motor Behavior, 12, 207209.
Grilly, D. M. (2005). Drugs and human behavior (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and
Bacon.
Gyllenborg, J., Skakkebaek, N. E., Nielsen, N. C., Keiding, N., & Giwercman, A.
(1999). Secular and seasonal changes in semen quality among young Danish
men: A statistical analysis of semen samples from 1927 donor candidates
during 19771995. International Journal of Andrology, 22, 2836.
Hobson, J. A. (2001). The dream drugstore: Chemically altered states of consciousness. Cambridge, MA: Bradford.
Hobson, J. A. (2007). States of consciousness; normal and abnormal variations. In
P. D. Zelazko, M. Moscovitch, & E. Thompson (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook
of consciousness (pp. 435444). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, E. G. (2008). The thalamus. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Klein, R., & Armitage, R. (1979). Rhythm in human performance: 1 1/2 hour
oscillation in cognitive style. Science, 204, 13261328.
Kleitman, N. (1963). Sleep and wakefulness (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Kleitman, N. (1982). Basic restactivity cycle22 years latter. Sleep, 4, 311317.
17
18
Altering Consciousness
Mealey, L., & Carman, G. J. (1978). REM sleep across 52 consecutive nights of a
restricted sleep-wake regimen. Sleep Research, 7, 309.
Merica, H., & Fortune, R. (2004). State transitions between wake and sleep, and
within the ultradian cycle, with focus on the link to neuronal activity. Sleep
Medicine Reviews, 8, 473485.
Morgan, D. R. (1996). Sleep secrets for shiftworkers and people with off-beat schedules. Duluth, MN: Whole Person Associates.
Okawa, M., Matousek, M., Petersen, I. (1984). Spontaneous vigilance uctuation
in the daytime. Psychophysiology, 21, 207211.
Okudaira, N., Kripke, D. F., & Webster, J. B. (1984). No basic restactivity cycle
in head, wrist or ankle. Physiology and Behavior, 32, 843845.
Orr, W. C., Hoffman, H. J., & Hegges, F. W. (1974). Ultradian rhythms in
extended performance. Aerospace Medicine, 45, 9951000.
Pandi-Perumal, S. R., Moscovitch, A., Srinivasan, V., Spence, D. W., Cardinali,
D. P., & Brown, G. M. (2009). Bidirectional communication between sleep
and circadian rhythms and its implications for depression: Lessons from agomelatine. Progress in Neurobiology, 88, 264271.
Prendergast, B. J. (2005). Internalization of seasonal time. Hormones and Behavior,
48, 503511.
Rosmond, R., Dallman, M. F., & Bjorntorp, P. (1998). Stress-related cortisol
secretion in men: Relationships with abdominal obesity and endocrine, metabolic, and hemodynamic abnormalities. Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and
Metabolism, 83, 18531859.
Rossi, E. (1986.) Altered states of consciousness in everyday life: The ultradian
rhythms. In B. Wolman & M. Ullman (Eds.), Handbook of states of consciousness
(pp. 97132). New York: Van Reinhold Nostrand.
Rossi, E. L. (1991). The twenty-minute break: Reduce stress, maximize performance,
and improve health and emotional well-being using the new science of ultradian
rhythms. Universal City, CA: Tarcher.
Shor, R. E., & Orne, E. C. (1962). Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility:
Form A. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Springer, S. P., & Deutsch, G. (1997). Left brain/right brain:Perspectives from cognitive neuroscience (5th ed). New York: Freeman.
Stein, P. K., Lundequam, E. J., Clauw, D., Freedland, K. E., Carney, R. M., &
Domitrovich, P. P. (2006, August 30). Circadian and ultradian rhythms in cardiac
autonomic modulation. Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society Magazine, 1,
429432.
Sterman, M. B. (1985). The basic rest activity cycle revisited: Some new perspectives. Experimental Brain Research, Supplementum, 12, 186200.
Suedfeld, P. (1980). Restricted environmental stimulation: Research and clinical
applications. New York: Wiley Interscience.
Valtonen, H. M., Suominen, K., Mantere, O., Leppamaki, S., Arvilommi, P., &
Isometsa, E. (2006). Prospective study of risk factors for attempted suicide
among patients with bipolar disorders. Bipolar Disorders, 8, 576-585.
19
20
Altering Consciousness
Wallace, B. (1990). Imagery vividness, hypnotic susceptibility, and the perception of fragmented stimuli. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58,
354359.
Wallace, B. (1993). Day persons, night persons, and variability in hypnotic susceptibility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 827833.
Wallace, B., & Fisher, L. E. (2000). Biological rhythms and individual differences
in consciousness. In R. G. Kunzendorf & B. Wallace (Eds.), Individual differences in conscious experience (pp. 337349). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Wallace, B., & Fisher, L. E. (2003). Consciousness and behavior (4th ed. reprint).
Prospect Height, IL: Waveland Press.
Wallace, B., & Kokoszka, A. (1995). Fluctuations in hypnotic susceptibility and
imaging ability over a 16-hour period. International Journal of Clinical and
Experimental Hypnosis, 43, 2033.
Wallace, B., Kokoszka, A., & Turosky, D. (1993). Historical and contemporary
thoughts on consciousness and its altered states. In J. Brzezinski, S. Di Nuovo,
T. Marek, & T. Maruszewski (Eds.), Creativity and consciousness: Philosophical
and psychological dimensions. Poznan studies in the philosophy of the sciences and
the humanities (Vol. 31, pp. 232253). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Wallace, B., Turosky, D. L., & Kokoszka, A. (1992). Variability in the assessment
of imagery vividness. Journal of Mental Imagery, 16, 221230.
Winkelman, M. (2010). Shamanism: A biopsychosocial paradigm of consciousness
and healing. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO Publishers.
Zubek, J. P. (Ed.). (1969). Sensory deprivation: Fifteen years of research. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
CHAPTER 2
22
Altering Consciousness
James thus appreciated that chemical substances can have powerful effects
on the body and on the mind (such substances are called drugs). For
example, in his discussion of time perception in The Principles of Psychology, James speaks to the remarkable effects of Cannabis:
In hashish-intoxication there is a curious increase in the apparent
time-perspective. We utter a sentence, and ere the end is reached the beginning seems already to date from indenitely long ago. We enter a short
street, and it is as if we should never get to the end of it. (James, 1890,
pp. 639640)
Even to this day, these effects have not been sufciently studied to glean
what insights into the nature of our perception of time might be provided.
Twenty years later, when James delivered the Gifford Lectures in Natural
Philosophy and Religion at the University of Edinburgh, the insights gained
from his experiences with nitrous oxide remained of great import. His comments on this remain one of the most eloquent passages ever written about
altered consciousness:
One conclusion was forced upon my mind at that time, and my impression
of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that our normal waking
consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special type of
consciousness, while all about it, parted from it by the lmiest of screens,
there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go
through life without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite
stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness, denite
types of mentality which probably somewhere have their application and
adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can be nal which
23
24
Altering Consciousness
William James very clearly appreciated that to better understand the mind
and its relation to the body, any and all phenomena of relevance to these
questions ought to be investigated. How could one hope to understand
the nature of mind and how could one hope to adequately address the
mindbody problem without taking very seriously the investigation of
such profound altered states of consciousness (ASC)? And the powerful
effects of certain drugs on mental processes also suggest there is something
profoundly chemical about the brain and the brainmind connection.
25
Figure 2.1 Chemical synapse in action. A nerve impulse propagates along the
axon via the opening and closing of voltage-gated sodium and potassium ionchannel proteins. When the impulse reaches the axon terminal, storage vesicles
containing neurotransmitter molecules are induced to fuse with the boundary
membrane of the axon and release neurotransmitter molecules into the synaptic
cleft. Neurotransmitters rapidly diffuse throughout the cleft and interact with
receptor proteins on the postsynaptic neuron, the presynaptic axon terminal, or
other nearby neurons or glial cells (not shown). Reuptake transporters rapidly
remove neurotransmitter molecules from the cleft. These transporter proteins
are located on the presynaptic axon terminal and may also be located on the postsynaptic dendrite and on nearby glial cells. In many situations, and in particular
for the neurotransmitter glutamic acid, local reuptake rapidly and efciently
removes neurotransmitter from the synaptic cleft. In some situations, in particular for some of the monoamine neurotransmitters, reuptake may not take place
in the local region of the synaptic cleft, allowing the released neurotransmitter
to diffuse away and have effects distributed over a larger region of the brain (socalled volume conduction).
component proteins. These component proteins then move within the cell
and interact with other specic effector proteins, altering the activity of
proteins with which they interact. Several detailed scenarios have been
described for GPCRs, including the ability of specic activated Gproteins to do one of the following things: interact with adenylate cyclase
enzyme and stimulate or inhibit the synthesis of intracellular cAMP (cyclic
27
28
Altering Consciousness
29
30
Altering Consciousness
cells, however, send their axons throughout large parts of the cerebral
cortex and other parts of the brain and these neurotransmitters thus have
an impact on billions of neurons. At many locations, these transmitters
likely operate via so-called volume conduction, wherein the reuptake of
the transmitter does not occur in the very local region of release, allowing
the transmitter to diffuse more widely and have effects on many different
target cells (Descarries & Mechawar, 2000).
Several dozen additional molecules are presently known to function as
neurotransmitters in the human brain. Among them are acetylcholine, glycine, adenosine, adenosine triphosphate, nitric oxide, endocannabinoids
such as anandamide and 2-arachidonylglycerol (2AG), more than a dozen
different opioid peptides or endorphins, substance P, oxytocin, vasopressin,
and other neuropeptides. Dimethyltryptamine (DMT), tryptamine, octopamine and other so-called trace amines may also function as neurotransmitters in the human brain (Jacob & Presti, 2005; Premont, Gainetdinov,
& Caron, 2001).
The dominant receptors for glutamate and GABA are of the ionotropic
type, allowing glutamate and GABA to have rapid excitatory and inhibitory
effects on neuronal activity. Acetylcholine (acting at the nicotinic acetylcholine receptor), serotonin (acting at the 5HT3 receptor), ATP acting at purine
2X receptors, and glycine are the other neurotransmitters presently known
to have ionotropic receptors. In addition to their ionotropic effects, glutamate, GABA, and ATP also act at GPCRs. Muscarinic acetylcholine receptors
and all the serotonin receptors other than 5HT3 are GPCRs. All other known
neurotransmitter receptorsdopamine, norepinephrine, histamine, adenosine, opioid, cannabinoid, and so forthare GPCRs. Thus, the effects of
many neurotransmitters, as well as drugs that act via these neurotransmitter
receptors, can have rapid effects on neuronal excitability, as well as longerterm modulatory effects on excitability, metabolism, gene transcription,
and synaptic connectivity.
31
32
Altering Consciousness
33
34
Altering Consciousness
from west-central Africa, containing ibogaine; and peyote, San Pedro, and
other cacti from the Americas, containing mescaline (Schultes, Hofmann,
& Ratsch, 2001)
One of the most famous psychedelic chemicals is LSD, lysergic acid
diethylamide, rst made by Albert Hofmann (19062008) in 1938 as
one of a series of chemical derivatives of ergotamine isolated from ergot
fungus. He remade it again in 1943 and at that time discovered its potent
psychoactive effects. Hofmann quickly appreciated that he had discovered
something very profound (Hofmann, 2005). In the 1940s people were not
thinking of the brain as a neurochemical system. That a tiny amount of
chemical could have such a stunning impact on consciousness was a pivotal event in the early development of biological psychiatry and of molecular neuroscience. The effects of LSD on consciousness, the identication of
signaling actions of serotonin, and the similarity of molecular structure
between serotonin and a portion of the LSD molecule led to the rst speculations on relating brain chemistry and mental illness (Nichols & Nichols,
2008; Woolley & Shaw, 1954).
The primary neurochemical action of LSD and other classical psychedelics like psilocin, DMT, and mescaline is believed to be as an agonist
at 5HT2A receptors (Nichols, 2004; Vollenweider et al., 1998). These
GPCR serotonin receptors are widely distributed throughout the brain
and large numbers are found on the dendrites of cortical pyramidal cells.
Many appear to be located extrasynaptically, consistent with the idea that
some of the effects of serotonin on cortical activity are mediated by volume
conduction (Nichols & Nichols, 2008). Other serotonin receptor subtypes, especially 5HT2C and 5HT1A, may also play signicant roles in the
actions of psychedelics. Dopamine receptors and trace amine receptors,
as well as other neurotransmitter receptors, are also likely to be involved
in the effects of psychedelic substances on the brain.
Although the consciousness-altering effects of various classical psychedelics (LSD, psilocin, DMT, mescaline, etc.) have a great deal in common,
there are also many subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle differences. Eventually it may be possible to connect the subjective signatures of different
psychedelic drugs to their differing neurochemical effects in the brain.
For example, serotonin and other agonists at the 5HT2A receptor activate
two different intracellular signaling pathways: phospholipase C (producing IP3 and DAG as intracellular messengers) and phospholipase A2 (producing AA as an intracellular messenger). The relative activation of these
two pathways varies widely among different agonists at the 5HT2A receptor (for example: serotonin, LSD, psilocin, 5-methoxy-DMT, etc.; Nichols,
2004). The implications of this are presently unknown, and it may well be
35
36
Altering Consciousness
our actions, emotions, thoughts, and perceptions. Yet the ultimate link connecting mental experience with physical properties of the brain remains a
deep mystery, in many ways as much so now as centuries ago.
37
38
Altering Consciousness
References
Beque, J.-C., Imad, M., Mladenovic, L., Gingrich, J. A., & Andrade, R. (2007).
Mechanism of the 5-hydroxytryptamine 2A receptor-mediated facilitation of
synaptic activity in prefrontal cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 104, 98709875.
Blood, B. P. (1874). The anaesthetic revelation and the gist of philosophy. http://books
.google.com/books?id=oBgQAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA3&lpg=PA3&dq=blood
+anaesthetic+revelation+and+the+gist+of+philosophy&source=bl&ots=n4w6
SD4FCz&sig=rCslTTf4xNSspMaZD_OTUcDcRAU&hl=en&ei=zuswTYLZB4TG
sAOw17CDBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CDcQ6
AEwBA#v=onepage&q&f=false.
Cardena, E., Lynn, S. J., & Krippner, S. (Eds.). (2000). Varieties of anomalous
experience: Examining the scientic evidence. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind: In search of a fundamental theory. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Chevaleyre, V., Takahashi, K. A., & Castillo, P. E. (2006). Endocannabinoidmediated synaptic plasticity in the CNS. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 29, 3776.
Descarries, L., & Mechawar, N. (2000). Ultrastructural evidence for diffuse transmission by monoamine and acetylcholine neurons of the central nervous
system. Progress in Brain Research, 125, 2747.
Emmanouil, D. E., & Quock, R. M. (2007). Advances in understanding the
actions of nitrous oxide. Anesthesia Progress, 54, 918.
Franks, N. P. (2008). General anesthesia: From molecular targets to neuronal
pathways of sleep and arousal. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 9, 370386.
39
40
Altering Consciousness
Rosenblum, B., & Kuttner, F. (2006). Quantum enigma: Physics encounters consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
Roth, B. L., Baner, K., Westkaemper, R., Siebert, D., Rice, K. C., Steinberg, S.,
Ernsberger, P., & Rothman, R. B. (2002). Salvinorin A: A potent naturally
occurring nonnitrogenous kappa opioid selective agonist. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences USA, 99, 11,93411,939.
Schultes, R. E., Hofmann, A., & Ratsch, C. (2001). Plants of the gods: Their sacred,
healing, and hallucinogenic powers. Rochester, VT: Healing Arts. (Originally
published in 1979).
Searle J. (2000). Consciousness. Annual Reviews of Neuroscience, 23, 557578.
Sperry, R. W. (1980). Mindbrain interaction: Mentalism, yes; dualism, no.
Neuroscience, 5, 195206.
Stapp, H. P. (2007). Mindful universe: Quantum mechanics and the participating
observer. Berlin: Springer.
Stapp, H. P. (2009). Mind, matter and quantum mechanics (3rd ed.). Berlin:
Springer.
Valdes, L. J. III. (1994). Salvia divinorum and the unique diterpene hallucinogen,
salvinorin (divinorin) A. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 26, 277283.
Vollenweider, F. X., Vollenweider-Scherpenhuyzen, M. F. I., Babler, A., Vogel, H.,
& Hell, D. (1998). Psilocybin induces schizophrenia-like psychosis in humans
via a serotonin-2 agonist action. NeuroReport, 9, 38973902.
Wallace, B. A. (2006). The attention revolution: Unlocking the power of the focused
mind. Boston: Wisdom.
Wangyal, T. (1998). The Tibetan yogas of dream and sleep. Ithaca: Snow Lion.
Woolley, D. W., & Shaw, E. (1954). A biochemical and pharmacological suggestion about certain mental disorders. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences USA, 40, 228231.
41
CHAPTER 3
44
Altering Consciousness
45
46
Altering Consciousness
47
48
Altering Consciousness
49
50
Altering Consciousness
hallucinations and even psychosis (Corlett et al., 2009), and it has been
speculated that prolonged periods of time spent in darkened caves may have
helped inspire some shamanic prehistoric rock art (Lewis-Williams &
Dowson, 1988; Whitley, 2008).
Another widely used route to the shamanic ecstatic experience is the use
of hallucinogens. Over one hundred such drugs are known to be used by
shamans, typically from plant or fungus extracts. Because of their use in religious rituals, these have been variously termed food of the gods, plants of
the gods, or entheogens (see Perry, 2002, for a review). The hallucinogens
used by shamans across the world affect a large number of neurotransmitter
systems, principally cholinergic and serotonergic ones. Psilocybin, obtained
from mushrooms and currently used in North American and some Oceanic
shamanic rituals, is known to mimic the action of LSD on serotonin receptors, as does mescaline from the peyote cactus (also used by Mexican and
North American shamans; see Perry, 2002). Extracts from sacred vine species used by North and South American natives such as Virola, Turbina,
and the soul vine Banisteriopsis, the source of the powerful hallucinogen
ayahuasca, are also believed to have mostly serotonergic effects (Perry,
2002; Previc, 2006) [see also Mishor, McKenna, & Callaway, this volume].
Anticholinergic drugs used in rituals mostly act at the muscarinic cholinergic synapse, although some also act on nicotinic receptors. Scopolamine
(from the Datura plants used by Navajo shamans in the southwestern
United States) and atropine (widely used around the world both in
hunter-gatherer cultures as well as in ancient and even medieval civilizations) are two of the most powerful muscarinic drugs with hallucinogenic
properties. Ibogaine, an antiglutamatergic and partial opiate agonist derived
from the root bark of the Iboga plant, is used by West African shamans in
initiation and other religious rituals. Salvinorin A, derived from the sage
plant Saliva divinorum and used by shamans in Mexico, is a kappa-opioid
agonist that has a high afnity for the dopamine D2 receptor (Seeman
et al., 2009). The Amaritia muscaria mushroom, found in the shade of birch
and other trees in northern arboreal forests and used by Siberian shamans,
has as its main psychoactive ingredient muscimol, which acts like other
benzodiazepines at GABA receptor sites (Perry, 2002) and is one of the
various drugs hypothesized to be the soma of the ancient Vedic texts.
Marijuana, derived from the cannabis sativa plant, was believed to have been
used extensively by shamans in China and central Asia (Perry, 2002). Interestingly, no plant species that mainly and directly stimulates dopamine is
known to be used by modern shamans for its hallucinogenic properties,
although ancient Egyptian and Mayan priests are believed to have made use
of the water lily (nymphaea; Emboden, 1989), which contains apomorphine.
51
52
Altering Consciousness
mystical effects that left a profound mark on the participants, even leading
some to describe those effects as the most profound experience of their
lives (Grifths et al., 2006). However, even in the controlled and supportive environment of the latter study, 31% of participants experienced negative side effects such as fear and anxiety after ingesting the hallucinogen
(Grifths et al., 2006). That individuals would engage in prolonged activities or in many cases suffer psychological and physical stress or danger to
achieve the ecstatic experience and the supernatural knowledge supposedly gained is consistent with the capability of other dopaminergic extrapersonal endeavors (e.g., ghting in the name of abstract concepts, working
for years in solitude to achieve scientic breakthroughs, etc.) to override
peripersonal and bodily needs (Previc, 2009).
53
54
Altering Consciousness
cingulate gyrus, a structure activated in numerous studies during meditation (see Previc, 2006), has in humans markedly increased in size and
number of large dopaminergic spindle neurons relative to apes (Allman
et al., 2001). Although a recent study showed there is no fundamental
increase in dopamine neuronal density in human prefrontal cortex relative
to that of the chimpanzee, some subtle axonal changes were noted
(Raghanti et al., 2008a). However, there is even less evidence for evolutionary expansions/changes from chimpanzee to humans in glutamatergic,
cholinergic, and serotonergic systems (Perry & Perry, 1995; Raghanti
et al., 2008b, c; Rapoport, 1990). Although changes in gene sequencing of
dopaminergic as well as serotonergic, opioid, and other receptors has been
documented in humans as compared to apes, Preuss (2006) points out that
such sequencing differences are difcult to correlate with any specic
behavioral changes.
Previc (1999, 2009) argues that elevation of dopamine levels in humans
occurred in two major stages: (1) the emergence of Homo habilis around
2 million years ago; and (2) the emergence of fully modern humans around
80,000 years ago (80 kya) in Southern Africa. Homo habilis was the rst
hominid species to engage in extensive stone tool making and to be specialized for endurance activities such as running, as evidenced by changes in
the skeletal anatomy and foot (Bramble & Lieberman, 2004). The enhanced
endurance capabilities and tools would have allowed Homo habilis to travel
large distances to scavenge or engage in other activities to procure meat,
which is believed on the basis of dentation and archaeological evidence to
have been part of its diet (Previc, 1999). Meat would have provided Homo
habilis with a rich source of tyrosine, the precursor to dopamine, and dopamine would correspondingly have improved thermal tolerance and endurance capability (Gilbert, 1995; Previc, 1999). The second major increase
in dopamine leading to modern human behavior occurred more than
100,000 years after the establishment of the modern human anatomy and
gene pool and therefore may be ascribed to epigenetic factors. The most
likely of these factors was an improved diet (including marine fauna rich
in essential amino acids and iodine that boost dopamine transmission)
and a rise in human longevity and population (Previc, 2009). The rst
unambiguous evidence of modern human intelligence circa 80 kya is manifested in manufacturing artifacts (e.g., carved bone tools, pyrolithic blades),
elaborate lithic geometric designs, and decorative beads and ochre-colored
ornaments found at Blombos Cave, Klasies River, and other sites along the
coast of South Africa (Brown et al., 2009; Henshilwood et al., 2001; Jacobs
& Roberts, 2009).
The python is marked by a large number of intentionally made cuts; evidence of burned
spears, dated to 77 kya years ago, is located in a pit below (http://news.nationalgeographic
.com/news/2006/12/061222-python-ritual.html). Sheila Coulson, one of the archaeologists
excavating Rhino Cave, even speculates that nearby rooms once may have been occupied by
shamans, but this is unsupported by any physical evidence.
55
56
Altering Consciousness
Conclusion
Most or all altered states of reality involve a triumph of extrapersonal
over peripersonal activity and are accompanied by elevated dopamine in
the ventral corticiolimbic regions of the brain, especially in the left hemisphere. The ecstatic experience, created either by behavioral practices or
hallucinogenic drugs and manifested in soul ights, out-of-body journeys,
and other phenomena, is a cardinal feature of shamanism. Shamanistic
practices and drugs designed to invoke the ecstatic experience increase
dopaminergic and parasympathetic activity and would be largely lacking
in purpose without an expanded appreciation and consciousness of distant space and time provided by dopaminergic systems in the brain.
Hence, the evolution of the dopaminergic mind, providing the capability
of abstract, symbolic, and distant concepts and believed to have reached
its modern status no more than 80 kya, appears to have been the major
impetus for the rise of shamanic consciousness.
References
Allen, T. E., & Agus, B. (1968). Hyperventilation leading to hallucinations.
American Journal of Psychiatry, 125, 632637.
Allman, J. M., Hakeem, A., Erwin, J. M., Nimchinsky, E., & Hof, P. (2001). The
anterior cingulate cortex. The evolution of an interface between emotion and
cognition. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 935, 107117.
Behar, D. M., Villems, R., Soodyall, H., Blue-Smith, J., Pereira, L., Metspalu, E.,
Scozzari, R., Makkan, H., Tzur, S., et al. (2008). The dawn of human matrilineal diversity. American Journal of Human Genetics, 82, 11301140.
Berger, B., Gaspar, P., & Verney, C. (1991). Dopaminergic innervation of the cerebral cortex: Unexpected differences between rodents and primates. Trends in
Neurosciences, 14, 2127.
Blanke, O., & Arzy, S. (2005). The out-of-body experience: Disturbed selfprocessing at the temporo-parietal junction. Neuroscientist, 11, 1624.
Bramble, D. M., & Lieberman, D. E. (2004). Endurance running and the evolution of Homo. Nature, 432, 345352.
Broglio, A., De Stefani, M., Gurioli, F., Pallecchi, P., Giachi, G., Higham, T., &
Brock, F. (2009). Lart aurignacien dans la decoration de la Grotte de Fumane.
LAnthropologie, 113, 753761.
Brown, K. S., Marean, C. W., Herries, A. I. R., Jacobs, A., Tribolo, C., Braun, D.,
Roberts, D. L., Meyer, M. C., & Bernatchez, J. (2009). Fire as an engineering
tool of early modern humans. Science, 325, 859862.
Cardena, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and physically active. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 53, 3759.
Carlson, K. M., & Wagner, G. C. (2005). Effects of phencyclidine on schedulecontrolled responding following neurotoxic lesions of the striatum. Life Science, 77, 372285.
Corlett, P. R., Frith, C. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2009). From drugs to deprivation: A
Baysian framework for understanding models of psychosis. Psychopharmacology, 206, 515530.
Cousins, D., & Huffman, M. A. (2002). Medicinal properties in the diet of gorillas: An ethno-pharmacological analysis. African Study Monographs, 23, 6589.
DeClerck, C. H., Boone, C., & De Brabander, B. (2006). On feeling in control: A
biological theory for individual differences in control perception. Brain and
Cognition, 62, 143176.
Emboden, W. (1989). The sacred journey in dynastic Egypt: Shamanistic trance
in the context of the narcotic water lily and the mandrake. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 21, 6175.
Fantegrossi, W. E., Woods, J. H., & Winger, G. (2004). Transient reinforcing
effects of phenylisopropylamine and indolealkylamine hallucinogens in rhesus
monkeys. Behavioral Pharmacology, 15, 149157.
Fischer, R., Hill, R., Thatcher, K., & Scheib, J. (1970). Psilocybin-induced contraction of nearby space. Agents and Actions, 1, 190197.
Gilbert, C. (1995). Optimal physical performance in athletes: Key roles of dopamine in a specic neurotransmitter/hormonal mechanism. Mechanisms of Ageing and Development, 84, 83102.
Girard, T. A., Martius, D. L., & Cheyne, J. A. (2007). Mental representation of
space: Insights from an oblique distribution of hallucinations. Neuropsychologia, 45, 12571269.
Goff, D. C., Brotman, A. W., Kindlon, D., Waites, M., & Amico, E. (1991). The
delusion of possession in chronically psychotic patients. Journal of Nervous
and Mental Disease, 179, 567571.
57
58
Altering Consciousness
Gouzoulis-Mayfrank, E., Habermeyer, E., Hermle, L., Steinmeyer, A., Kunert, H.,
& Sass, H. (1998). Hallucinogenic drug-induced states resemble acute endogenous psychoses: Results of an empirical study. European Psychiatry, 13, 399406.
Grifths, R. R., Richards, W. A., McCann, U., & Jesse, R. (2006). Psilocybin can
occasion mystical-type experiences having substantial, sustained personal
meaning and spiritual signicance. Psychopharmacology, 187, 268283.
Harris, C. D. (2005). Neurophysiology of sleep and wakefulness. Respiratory Care
Clinics of North America, 11, 567586.
Heikkinen, A. E., Moykkynen, T. P., & Korpi, E. R. (2009). Long-lasting modulation of glutamatergic transmission in VTA dopamine neurons after a single
dose of benzodiazepine agonists. Neuropsychopharmacology, 34, 290298.
Henry, B. L., Minassian, A., Paulus, M. P., Geyer, M. A., & Perry, W. J. (2010). Heart
rate variability in bipolar mania and schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 44, 168176.
Henshilwood, C. S., dErrico, F., Marean, C. W., Milo, R. G., & Yates, R. (2001).
An early bone tool industry from the Middle Stone Age at Blombos Cave,
South Africa: Implications for the origins of modern human behaviour, symbolism and language. Journal of Human Evolution, 41, 631678.
Hunt, H. T. (1982). Forms of dreaming. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 54, 559563.
Jacobs, Z., & Roberts, R. J. (2009). Catalysts for Stone Age innovations: What
might have triggered two short-lived bursts of technological and behavioral
innovation in southern Africa during the Middle Stone Age? Integrative and
Communicative Biology, 2, 191193.
Kapur, S., & Remington, G. (1996). Serotonindopamine interaction and its
relevance to schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 153, 466476.
Keith, V. A., Mansbach, R. S., & Geyer, M. A. (1991). Failure of haloperidol to
block the effects of phencyclidine and dizocilpine on prepulse inhibition of
startle. Biological Psychiatry, 30, 557566.
Kjaer, T. W., Bertelsen, C., Piccini, P., Brooks, D., Alving, J., & Lou, H. C. (2002).
Increased dopamine tone during meditation-induced change of consciousness. Cognitive Brain Research, 13, 255259.
Krippner, S. C. (2002). Conicting perspectives on shamans and shamanism:
Points and counterpoints. American Psychologist, 57, 962977.
Krus, D., Resnick, O., & Raskin, M. (1966). Apparent eye-level test. Archives of
General Psychiatry, 14, 419427.
Kyllonen, P. C., & Christal, R. E. (1990). Reasoning ability is (little more than)
working-memory capacity?! Intelligence, 14, 389433.
Lewis-Williams, J. D., & Dowson, T. A. (1988). The signs of all times: Entoptic
phenomena in Upper Paleolithic art. Current Anthropology, 29, 201245.
Luzi, S., Morrison, P. D., Powell, J., di Forti, M., & Murray, R. M. (2008). What is
the mechanism whereby cannabis use increases risk of psychosis? Neurotoxicology Research, 14, 105112.
Mandell, A. J. (1980). Toward a psychobiology of transcendence: God in the
brain. In J. M. Davidson & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), The psychobiology of consciousness (pp. 379464). New York: Plenum.
Markowitz, J. S., Rames, L. J., Reeves, N., & Thomas, S. G. (1997). Zolpidem and
hallucinations. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 29, 300301.
Mellars, P. (2006). Why did modern human populations disperse from Africa ca.
60,000 years ago? A new model. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
103, 93819386.
Pahnke, W. N. (1969). Psychedelic drugs and mystical experience. International
Psychiatry Clinics, 5, 149162.
Paulig, M., & Mentrup, H. (2001). Charles Bonnets syndrome: Complete remission of complex visual hallucinations treated by gabapentin. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 70, 813814.
Perry, E. K. (2002). Plants of the gods. In E. K. Perry, H. Ashton, & A. Young
(Eds.), Neurochemistry of consciousness: Neurotransmitters in mind. Advances in
Consciousness Research, 36, 205225.
Perry, E. K., & Perry, R. H. (1995). Acetylcholine and hallucinations: Diseaserelated compared to drug-related alterations in human consciousness. Brain
and Cognition, 28, 240258.
Preuss, T. M. (2006). Whos afraid of Homo sapiens? Journal of Biomedical Discovery and Collaboration, 29, 17.
Previc, F. H. (1998). The neuropsychology of 3-D space. Psychological Bulletin,
124, 123164.
Previc, F. H. (1999). Dopamine and the origins of human intelligence. Brain and
Cognition, 41, 299350.
Previc, F. H. (2006). The role of the extrapersonal brain systems in religious activity. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 500539.
Previc, F. H. (2009). The dopaminergic mind in human evolution and history. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Rabiner, E. A. (2007). Imaging of striatal dopamine release elicited with NMDA
antagonists: Is there anything there to be seen? Journal of Psychopharmacology,
20, 16.
Raghanti, M. A., Stimpson, C. D., Marcinkiewicz, J. L., Erwin, J. M., Hof, P. R.,
& Sherwood, C. C. (2008a). Cortical dopaminergic innervation among
humans, chimpanzees, and macaque monkeys: A comparative study. Neuroscience, 155, 203220.
Raghanti, M. A., Stimpson, C. D., Marcinkiewicz, J. L., Erwin, J. M., Hof, P. R.,
& Sherwood, C. C. (2008b). Cholinergic innervation of the frontal cortex:
Differences among humans, chimpanzees, and macaque monkeys. Journal of
Comparative Neurology, 506, 409424.
Raghanti, M. A., Stimpson, C. D., Marcinkiewicz, J. L., Erwin, J. M., Hof, P. R.,
& Sherwood, C. C. (2008c). Differences in cortical serotonergic innervation
among humans, chimpanzees, and macaque monkeys: A comparative study.
Cerebral Cortex, 18, 584597.
Rapoport, S. I. (1990). Integrated phylogeny of the primate brain, with
special reference to humans and their diseases. Brain Research Reviews, 15,
267294.
59
60
Altering Consciousness
Samorini, G. (2002). Animals and psychedelics: The natural world and the instinct to
alter consciousness. South Paris, ME: Park Street Press.
Schlemmer, R. F., Jr., Narasimhachari, N., & Davis, J. M. (1980). Dose-dependent
behavioural changes induced by apomorphine in selected members of a primate
social colony. Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmacology, 32, 285289.
Schmauss, C., & Emrich, H. M. (1985). Dopamine and the action of opiates: A
reevaluation of the dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia. With special consideration of the role of endogenous opioids in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry, 20, 12111231.
Schmauss, C., Yassouridis, A., & Emrich H. M. (1987). Antipsychotic effect of
buprenorphine in schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 144, 13401342.
Schmidt, D. (1996). Syncopes and seizures. Current Opinion in Neurology, 9, 7881.
Seeman, P., Guan, H.-C., & Hirbec, H. (2009). Dopamine D2 High receptors
stimulated by phencyclidines, lysergic acid diethylamide, salvinorin A, and
modanil. Synapse, 63, 698704.
Siegel, R. K., Brewster, J. M., & Jarvik, M. E. (1974). An observational study of
hallucinogen-induced behavior in unrestrained Macaca mulatta. Psychopharmacologia, 40, 211223.
Sierra, M., & Berrios, G. E. (1998). Depersonalization: Neurobiological perspectives. Biological Psychiatry, 44, 898908.
Solms, M. (2000). Dreaming and REM sleep are controlled by different brain
mechanisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 8431121.
Tebecis, A. K., & Provins, K. A. (1975). Hypnosis and eye movements. Biological
Psychology, 3, 3147.
Valladas, H., Clottes, J., Geneste, J. M., Garcia, M. A., Arnold, M., Cachier, H.,
& Tisnerat-Laborde, N. (2001). Palaeolithic paintings. Evolution of prehistoric
cave art. Nature, 413, 479.
Volkow, N. D., Tomasi, D., Wang, G. J., Telang, F., Fowler, J. S., Wang, R. L.,
Logan, J., Wong, C., Jayne, M., & Swanson, J. M. (2009). Hyperstimulation
of striatal D2 receptors with sleep deprivation: Implications for cognitive
impairment. Neuroimage, 45, 12321240.
Vollenweider, F. X., & Geyer, M. A. (2001). A systems model of altered consciousness: Integrating natural and drug-induced psychoses. Brain Research
Bulletin, 56, 495507.
Vollenweider, F. X., Vontobel, P., Oye, I., Hell, D., & Leenders, K. L. (2000).
Effects of (S)-ketamine on striatal dopamine: A [11C]raclopride PET study of
a model psychosis in humans. Psychiatry Research, 34, 3543.
Welch, E. B., & Thompson, D. F. (1997). Opiate antagonists for the treatment of
schizophrenia. Journal of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapy, 19, 279283.
Whitley, D. S. (2008). Cave paintings and the human spirit. The origin of creativity
and belief. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
Winkelman, M. (1990). Shaman and other magico-religious healers: A crosscultural study or their origins, nature and social transformations. Ethos, 18,
308352.
61
CHAPTER 4
Transcendent Experiences
and Brain Mechanisms
Mario Beauregard
Introduction
The past decade has witnessed an increasing interest in understanding the
brain mechanisms mediating transcendent experiences (TEs). These experiences extend or lie beyond the limits of ordinary experience. Mystical experiences represent one particularly interesting type of TEs. Characterized by
altered or expanded consciousness, mystical experiences relate to a fundamental dimension of human existence and are frequently reported across
all cultures and religious/spiritual traditions (Hardy, 1975; Hay, 1990).
For James (1902), the main characteristics of a mystical experience are: (1)
ineffability: the quality of eluding any adequate account in words; (2) noetic
quality: it is experienced as a state of deep knowledge or insight unknown to
the discursive intellect; (3) transiency: this experience cannot be sustained
for long; (4) passivity: the feeling that, after the experience sets in, one is
no longer in control and is perhaps even in the grasp of a superior power
or presence. According to Stace (1960), mystical experiences involve the
apprehension of an ultimate nonsensuous unity in all things, a oneness or
a One into which neither the senses nor the reason can penetrate. Stace distinguishes between extrovertive and introvertive mystical experiences: In
extrovertive experience, nature, art, music, or mundane objects facilitate
mystical consciousness and are transgured by awareness of the One; in
introvertive experience, the One is found at the bottom of the human self.
Stace further proposes that the main aspects of mystical experiences are:
(1) the disappearance of all the mental objects of ordinary consciousness
and the emergence of a unitary or pure consciousness; (2) a sense of objectivity or reality; (3) feelings of peace, bliss, and joy; (4) the feeling of having
64
Altering Consciousness
Role of the Temporal Lobe and the Limbic System in Transcendent Experiences
Temporal Lobe Epilepsy
Clinical observations suggest an association between temporal-lobe
epilepsy (TLE) and TEs during (ictal), after (postictal), and in between
(interictal) seizures (Devinsky & Lai, 2008). Howden (18721873) rst
observed a man who had a religious conversion after a generalized seizure
in which he experienced being transported to Heaven. Afterward,
Mabille (1899) described a patient who, following a seizure, reported that
God had given him a mission to bring law to the world. A few years later,
Spratling (1904) reported a religious aura or a premonitory period of
hours or several days associated with religiosity in 52 of 1,325 patients
with epilepsy (4%). Boven (1919) described the case of a 14-year-old
boy who, after a seizure, recounted having seen God and the angels.
More recently, Dewhurst and Beard (1970) reported six patients with
TLE who underwent sudden and often lasting religious conversions in the
postictal period. Some of these patients had prior or active psychiatric
disorders. There was an obvious temporal relationship between conversion
and rst seizure or increased seizure frequency in 5 patients. Studies have
shown that between 0.4 percent and 3.1 percent of TLE patients had ictal
TEs, while postictal TEs occurred in 2.2 percent of patients with TLE. Ictal
TEs occur most often in patients with right TLE, whereas there is a
predominance of postictal and interictal TEs in TLE patients with bilateral
seizure foci. Of note, many of the epilepsy-related religious conversion
experiences occur postictally (Devinsky & Lai, 2008).
From an experiential perspective, ictal religious experiences during
seizures can be accompanied by intense emotions of Gods presence, the
sense of being connected to the innite (Alajouanine, 1963), hallucinations of Gods voice (Hansen & Brodtkorb, 2003), visual hallucination of
a religious gure (Karagulla & Robertson, 1955), or repetition of a religious phrase (Ozkara et al., 2004). It has been suggested that some of
the greatest religious gures in history (e.g., Saint Paul, Muhammad, Joan
of Arc, Joseph Smith) probably suffered form TLE (Saver & Rabin, 1997).
Naito and Matsui (1988) described an elderly woman whose seizures
were characterized by joyful visions of God. Interictal electroencephalography (EEG) revealed spike discharges in the left anterior and middle temporal areas during sleep. Morgan (1990) reported the case of a patient
whose seizures were associated with feelings of ineffable contentment
and fulllment, visualizing a bright light recognized as the source of
knowledge, and sometimes visualizing a bearded young man resembling
Jesus Christ. A computed axial tomography (CAT) scan displayed a right
anterior temporal astrocytoma. Following anterior temporal lobectomy,
the ecstatic seizures vanished. Along the same lines, Picard and Craig
(2009) described the case of a 64-year-old right-handed woman who has
had epileptic seizures with an ecstatic aura. During her ecstatic epileptic
seizures, she reported experiencing immense joy above physical sensations as well as unimaginable harmony with life, the world and the All.
Cerebral MRI showed a meningioma in the left temporal pole region. An
interictal EEG revealed left anterior temporofrontal epileptiform activity.
Ogata and Miyakawa (1998) examined 234 Japanese epileptic patients
for ictus-related religious experiences. Three (1.3%) patients were found
to have had such experiences. All 3 cases had TLE with postictal psychosis
and interictal experiences with hyperreligiosity. Patients who had ictusrelated or interictal religious experiences did not believe only in Buddhism
(a traditional religion in Japan) but rather in a combination of Buddhism
and Shintoism, new Christian sects, contemporary Japanese religions,
and/or other folk beliefs. Interestingly, the content of their religious experiences was related to their religious beliefs. This nding emphasizes the
importance of considering psychological factors (such as beliefs) in addition to neurobiological aspects when the relationship between epilepsy
and religion/spirituality is discussed.
65
66
Altering Consciousness
67
68
Altering Consciousness
Two-thirds of the participants reported a sensed presence under the inuence of the electromagnetic elds, but 33 percent of the control (shameld) group reported a sensed presence too. In other words, Persinger and
Healey (2002) found that twice as many participants reported a sensed presence under the inuence of the electromagnetic eld as those who reported
one without an electromagnetic eld. About half of these participants stated
that they felt someone else in the chamber. Another approximate half of the
group described a sentient being who moved when they tried to focus attention upon the presence. About one-third of participants attributed the presence to a deceased member of the family or to some cultural equivalent of a
spirit guide. In the study, those who had received stimulation over the
right hemisphere or both hemispheres reported more unusual phenomena
than those who had received stimulation over the left hemisphere. Persinger
and Healey (2002) concluded that the experience of a sensed presence can
be manipulated by experiment, and that such an experience may be the
source for phenomena attributed to visitations by spiritual entities.
A research team at Uppsala University in Sweden, headed by Granqvist
(Granqvist et al., 2005), mirrored Persingers experiment by testing 89
undergraduate students, some of whom were exposed to the electromagnetic elds and some of whom were not. Using Persingers equipment,
the Swedish researchers could not reproduce his key results. They attributed their ndings to the fact that they ensured that neither the participants nor the experimenters interacting with them had any idea who was
being exposed to the electromagnetic elds.
Granqvist and colleagues made sure that their experiment was double
masked by using two experimenters for each trial. The rst experimenter,
who was not told about the purpose of the study, interacted with the participants. The second experimenter switched electromagnetic elds off or
on without advising either the rst experimenter or the participant. So if
the volunteer had not already been told that a TE was likely at Granqvists
laboratory, the study experimenters were not in a position to provide that
clue. Study participants included undergraduate theology students as well
as psychology students. Neither group was asked for prior information on
spiritual or paranormal experiences, nor was any participant told that
there was a sham-eld (control) condition. Rather, volunteers were told
only that the study investigated the inuence of weak electromagnetic
elds on experiences and feeling states. Personality characteristics that
might predispose a person to report an unusual experience were used as
predictors for which participants would report one. These characteristics
included absorption (the ability to become completely absorbed in an
69
70
Altering Consciousness
71
72
Altering Consciousness
romantic love (Bartels & Zeki, 2000), and maternal love (Bartels & Zeki,
2004). Concerning the brainstem, there is some empirical support for the
view that certain brainstem nuclei map the organisms internal state during
emotion (Damasio, 1999). Given this, it is conceivable that the activation in
the left brainstem was linked to the somatovisceral changes associated with
the feelings of joy and unconditional love. As for the insula, this cerebral
structure is richly interconnected with regions involved in autonomic regulation (Cechetto, 1994). It contains a topographical representation of inputs
from visceral, olfactory, gustatory, visual, auditory, and somatosensory
areas and is thought to integrate representations of external sensory experience and internal somatic state (Augustine, 1996). The insula has been
found to be activated in several studies of emotional processing and appears
to support a representation of somatic and visceral responses accessible to
consciousness (Critchley, Wien, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004; Damasio, 1999). It is plausible that the left insular activation noted in our study
was related to the representation of the somatovisceral reactions associated
with the feelings of joy and unconditional love.
In addition, we suggested that the left medial prefrontal cortical activation was linked with conscious awareness of those feelings. Indeed, the
results of functional neuroimaging studies indicate that the medial prefrontal cortex is involved in the metacognitive representation of ones
own emotional state (Lane & Nadel, 2000). This prefrontal area receives
sensory information from the body and the external environment via the
orbitofrontal cortex and is heavily interconnected with limbic structures
such as the amygdala, ventral striatum, hypothalamus, midbrain periaqueductal gray region, and brainstem nuclei (Barbas, 1993; Carmichael &
Price, 1995). In other respects, brain imaging ndings (Lane, Fink, Chau,
& Dolan, 1997; Lane, Reiman, et al., 1998) support the view that the activation of the left dorsal anterior cingulate cortex reected that aspect of
emotional awareness associated with the interoceptive detection of emotional signals during the mystical condition. This cortical region projects
strongly to the visceral regulation areas in the hypothalamus and midbrain
periaqueductal gray (Ongur, Ferry, & Price, 2003). Regarding the medial
orbitofrontal cortex, there is mounting evidence that this prefrontal cortical region codes for subjective pleasantness (Kringelbach, ODoherty,
Rolls, & Andrews, 2003). The medial orbitofrontal cortex has been found
to be activated with regard to the pleasantness of the taste or smell of
stimuli (de Araujo, Rolls, Kringelbach, McGlone, & Phillips, 2003; Rolls,
Kringelbach, & de Araujo, 2003) or music (Blood & Zatorre, 2001).
It has reciprocal connections with the cingulate and insular cortices
73
74
Altering Consciousness
75
76
Altering Consciousness
If it burst, it would kill her. But attempting to drain and repair it might kill
her too. Her doctor offered no chance of survival using conventional
procedures. Reynolds heard about neurosurgeon Robert Spetzler at the
Barrow Neurological Institute in Phoenix, Arizona. He was a specialist
and pioneer in a rare and dangerous technique called hypothermic cardiac
arrest, or Operation Standstill. He would take her body down to a temperature so low that she was clinically dead, but then bring her back to a normal temperature before irreversible damage set in. At a low temperature,
the swollen vessels that burst at the high temperatures needed to sustain
human life become soft. Then they can be operated upon with less risk.
Furthermore, the cooled brain can survive longer without oxygen, though
it obviously cannot function in that state. So for all practical purposes,
Reynolds would actually be clinically dead during the surgery. But if she
didnt agree to it, she would soon be dead anyway with no hope of return.
So she consented.
As the surgery began, her heart and breathing ceased, the blood was
completely drained from her head and her EEG brain waves attened into
total silence (indicating no cerebral activityduring a cardiac arrest, the
brains electrical activity disappears after about 10 seconds, cf. Clute &
Levy, 1990). Her brain stem became unresponsive (her eyes had been
taped shut and her ears had been blocked by molded ear speakers), and
her temperature fell to 15 C. When all of Reynoldss vital signs were
stopped, the surgeon began to cut through her skull with a surgical saw.
She reported later that at that point, she felt herself pop outside her body
and hover above the operating table. From her out-of-body position, she
could see the doctors working on her lifeless body. She described, with
considerable accuracy for a person who knew nothing of surgical practice,
the Midas Rex bone saw used to open skulls. Reynolds also heard and
reported later what was happening during the operation and what the
nurses in the operating room had said. At a certain point, she became conscious of oating out of the operating room and traveling down a tunnel
with a light. Deceased relatives and friends were waiting at the end of this
tunnel, including her long-dead grandmother. She entered the presence of
a brilliant, wonderfully warm and loving Light and sensed that her soul
was part of God and that everything in existence was created from the
Light (the breathing of God) (Sabom, 1998).
The anecdotal case of Pam Reynolds strongly challenges the physicalist
doctrine in regard to the mindbrain problem. This case suggests that
mental processes and events can be experienced at the moment that the
brain seemingly no longer functions (as evidenced by a at EEG) during
a period of clinical death. This case also suggests that TEs can occur when
the brain is not functioning, that is, these experiences are not necessarily
delusions created by a defective brain. In other words, it would be possible for humans to experience a transcendent reality during an altered
state of consciousness in which perception, cognition, identity, and emotion function independently from the brain. This raises the possibility that
when a TE happens while the brain is fully functional, the neural correlates of this experience indicate that the brain is de facto connecting with
a transcendent level of reality. Solid scientic research is required to tackle
this fascinating issue. It should be noted that since Pam Reynolds did not
die, there were likely residual brain processes not detectable by EEG that
persisted during the clinical death period at sufcient levels so as to permit
return to normal brain functioning after the standstill operation. Yet it is
difcult to see how the brain could generate higher mental functions in
the absence of cortical and brainstem activity. Scientic research is clearly
needed to investigate the possibility that a functioning brain may not be
essential to higher mental functions and TEs. It is noteworthy that NDEs
are reported by approximately 15 percent of cardiac arrest survivors
(Greyson, 2003; Parnia, Waller, Yeates, & Fenwick, 2001; van Lommel,
van Wees, Meyers, & Elfferich, 2001).
More than a century ago, William James (1898) proposed that the
brain may serve a permissive/transmissive/expressive function rather than
a productive one in terms of the mental events and experiences it allows
(just as a prismwhich is not the source of the lightchanges incoming
white light to form the colored spectrum). Following James, Henri Bergson (1914) and Aldous Huxley (1954) speculated that the brain acts as a
lter or reducing valve by blocking out much of and allowing registration
and expression of only a narrow band of perceivable reality. Bergson and
Huxley believed that over the course of evolution, the brain has been
trained to eliminate most of those perceptions that do not directly aid
our everyday survival. This outlook implies that the brain normally limits
the human capacity to have a TE. A signicant alteration of the electrical
and chemical activity of the brain would be necessary for the occurrence
of a TE (Beauregard & OLeary, 2007).
77
78
Altering Consciousness
Vollenweider (1994) posited that cortico-striatal pathways exert a modulatory inuence on thalamic gating (or ltering) of sensory information from
the body and environment to the cortex (Vollenweider, 1994). According
to this stance, thalamic gating decits should result in sensory overload
with excessive processing of exteroceptive and interoceptive stimuli. Additionally, Vollenweider and Geyer (2001) hypothesized that serotonergic
psychedelics (e.g., psilocybin) produce an overloading inundation of the
cortex [see Nichols & Chemel, this volume]. This increased ow of information may cause the sensory ooding, cognitive fragmentation, and ego
dissolution noted in altered states of consciousness induced by these
drugs. The fact that serotonergic hallucinogens produce a marked activation of the prefrontal cortex (hyperfrontality) as well as other overlapping
changes in cortical, striatal, and thalamic regions (Vollenweider, Leenders,
et al., 1997) is consistent with this viewpoint. Taking a stand against this
hypothesis, Dietrich (2003) postulated that alterations of consciousness
implicate a temporary down-regulation of higher-level brain functions of
the prefrontal cortex (PFC; hypofrontality) and other cortical regions. In
line with such a view, Newberg et al. (2001) proposed that functional
deafferentation (cutting off) of input into the posterior superior parietal
lobule, a cerebral structure involved in the creation of a three-dimensional
body image in space, could produce a sense of pure space and obliteration
of the self-other distinction [see Previc, this volume].
The neuroimaging studies reviewed in this chapter provide empirical
support to both these outlooks (hyper- vs. hypoactivation of the prefrontal
cortex and other cerebral structures). Indeed, the results of these studies
indicate that altered states of consciousness and TEs can be correlated
with either activation or inhibition of various cortical and subcortical
brain regions. These results also suggest that several brain areas and networks mediate the main features of these experiences (e.g., perceptual,
cognitive, emotional, spiritual). This conclusion should not come as a surprise given that TEs are complex and multidimensional, that is, they
implicate changes in perception, self-awareness, cognition, and emotion.
It is important to note that TEs can be triggered in many different ways
and can be quite distinct from an experiential perspective (e.g., a state of
cosmic consciousness induced by LSD-25 vs. an encounter with a Being
of Light during sensory deprivation). It is highly probable that phenomenologically different TEs are mediated by distinct neuroelectrical, neurochemical, and neurometabolical substrates. In other words, many different
neurophysiological mechanisms may support TEs. Future neuroimaging
studies are awaited to conrm this view. Correlating subjective (rst-person,
phenomenological) data and objective (third-person, neurophysiological)
References
Alajouanine, T. (1963). Dostoiewskis epilepsy. Brain, 86, 209218.
Augustine, J. R. (1996). Circuitry and functional aspects of the insular lobe in primates including humans. Brain Research Reviews, 22, 229244.
Azari, N. P., Nickel, J., Wunderlich, G., Niedeggen, M., Hefter, H., Tellmann, L.,
et al. (2001). Neural correlates of religious experience. European Journal of
Neuroscience, 13, 16491652.
Barbas, H. (1993). Organization of cortical afferent input to the orbitofrontal area
in the rhesus monkey. Neuroscience, 56, 841864.
Bartels, A., & Zeki, S. (2000). The neural basis of romantic love. NeuroReport, 11,
38293834.
Bartels, A., & Zeki, S. (2004). The neural correlates of maternal and romantic
love. Neuroimage, 21, 11551166.
Bear, D., & Fedio, P. (1977). Quantitative analysis of interictal behavior in temporal lobe epilepsy. Archives of Neurology, 34, 454467.
Beauregard, M., & OLeary, D. (2007). The spiritual brain. New York: Harper Collins.
Beauregard, M., & Paquette, V. (2006). Neural correlates of a mystical experience
in Carmelite nuns. Neuroscience Letters, 405, 186190.
79
80
Altering Consciousness
Beauregard, M., & Paquette, V. (2008). EEG activity in Carmelite nuns during a
mystical experience. Neuroscience Letters, 444, 14.
Bergson, H. (1914). Presidential address. Proceedings of the Society for Psychical
Research, 27, 157175.
Blood, A., & Zatorre, R. (2001). Intensely pleasurable responses to music correlate with activity in brain regions implicated in reward and emotion. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 98, 11,81811,823.
Boven, W. (1919). Religiosite et epilepsie[Religiosity and epilepsy]. Schweiz
Archives of Neurological Psychiatry, 4, 153169.
Cardena, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and physically active. International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 53, 3759.
Carmichael, S. T., & Price, J. L. (1995). Limbic connections of the orbital and
medial prefrontal cortex in macaque monkeys. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 363, 615641.
Cavada, C., Company, T., Tejedor, J., Cruz-Rizzolo, R. J., & Reinoso-Suarez, F.
(2000). The anatomical connections of the macaque monkey orbitofrontal cortex, a review. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 220242.
Cechetto, D. F. (1994). Identication of a cortical site for stress-induced cardiovascular dysfunction. Integrative Physiological and Behavioral Science, 29, 362373.
Cloninger, C. R., Przybeck, T. R., Svrakic, D. M., & Wetzel, R. D. (1994). The Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI): A guide to its development and use.
St. Louis, MO: Center for Psychobiology of Personality, Washington University.
Clute, H. L., & Levy, W. J. (1990) Electroencephalographic changes during brief
cardiac arrest in humans. Anesthesiology, 73, 821825.
Critchley, H. D., Wien, S., Rotshtein, P., Ohman, A., & Dolan, R. J. (2004). Neural
systems supporting interoceptive awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 7, 189195.
Damasio, A. R. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making
of consciousness. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Damasio, A. R., Grabowski, T. J., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Ponto, L. L., Parvizi,
J., et al. (2000). Subcortical and cortical brain activity during the feeling of
self-generated emotions. Nature Neuroscience, 3, 10491056.
Damasio, A. R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1991). Somatic markers and the guidance of behaviour. In H. Levin, H. Eisenberg, & A. Benton (Eds.), Frontal lobe
function and dysfunction (pp. 217228). New York: Oxford University Press.
de Araujo, I. E., Rolls, E. T., Kringelbach, M. L., McGlone, F., & Phillips, N. (2003).
Taste-olfactory convergence, and the representation of the pleasantness of avour, in the human brain. European Journal of Neuroscience, 18, 20592068.
Decety, J. (1996). Do imagined and executed actions share the same neural substrate? Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 8793.
Devinsky, O., & Lai, G. (2008). Spirituality and religion in epilepsy. Epilepsy and
Behavior, 12, 636643.
Dewhurst, K., & Beard, A. W. (1970). Sudden religious conversions in temporal
lobe epilepsy. British Journal of Psychiatry, 117, 497507.
81
82
Altering Consciousness
Lane, R. D., Reiman, E. M., Axelrod, B., Yun, L. S., Holmes, A., & Schwartz, G. E.
(1998). Neural correlates of levels of emotional awareness. Evidence of an
interaction between emotion and attention in the anterior cingulate cortex.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 525535.
Levin, J., & Steele, L. (2005). The transcendent experience: Conceptual, theoretical, and epidemiological perspectives. Explore, 1, 89101.
Lutz, A., & Thompson, E. (2003). Neurophenomenology. Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 10, 3152.
Mabille, H. (1899). Hallucinations religieuses dans lepilepsie [Religious hallucinations in epilepsy]. Annales Medicopsychologiques, 910, 7681.
Miller, B. L., Seeley, W. W., Mychack, P., Rosen, H. J., Mena, I., & Boone, K.
(2001). Neuroanatomy of the self: Evidence from patients with frontotemporal
dementia. Neurology, 57, 817821.
Morgan, H. (1990). Dostoevskys epilepsy: A case report and comparison. Surgical
Neurology, 33, 413416.
Naito, H., & Matsui, N. (1988). Temporal lobe epilepsy with ictal ecstatic state
and interictal behavior of hypergraphia. Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases,
176, 123124.
Neggers, S. F., Van der Lubbe, R. H., Ramsey, N. F., & Postma, A. (2006). Interactions between ego- and allocentric neuronal representations of space. Neuroimage, 31, 320331.
Newberg, A., dAquili, E., & Rause, V. (2001). Why God wont go away. New York:
Ballantine Books.
Newberg, A., & Lee, B. Y. (2005). The neuroscientic study of religious and spiritual phenomena: Or why God doesnt use biostatistics. Zygon, 40, 469489.
Newberg, A., Pourdehnad, M., Alavi, A., & dAquili, E. G. (2003). Cerebral blood
ow during meditative prayer: Preliminary ndings and methodological
issues. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 97, 625630.
Newberg, A. B., Wintering, N. A., Morgan, D., & Waldman, M. R. (2006). The
measurement of regional cerebral blood ow during glossolalia: A preliminary
SPECT study. Psychiatry Research, 148, 6771.
Ogata, A., & Miyakawa, T. (1998). Religious experiences in epileptic patients
with a focus on ictus-related episodes. Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience,
52, 321325.
Ongur, D., Ferry, A. T., & Price, J. L. (2003). Architectonic subdivision of the
human orbital and medial prefrontal cortex. Journal of Comparative Neurology,
460, 425449.
Ozkara, C., Sary, H., Hanoglu, L., Yeni, N., Aydogdu, I., & Ozyurt, E. (2004).
Ictal kissing and religious speech in a patient with right temporal lobe epilepsy. Epileptic Disorders, 6, 241245.
Parnia, S., Waller, D. G., Yeates, R., & Fenwick, P. (2001). A qualitative and
quantitative study of the incidence, features and aetiology of near death experiences in cardiac arrest survivors. Resuscitation, 48, 149156.
Persinger, M. A. (1983). Religious and mystical experiences as artefacts of temporal lobe function: A general hypothesis. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 57, 1255
1262.
Persinger, M. A., & Healey, F. (2002). Experimental facilitation of the sensed
presence: Possible intercalation between the hemispheres induced by complex
magnetic elds. Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 190, 533541.
Picard, F., & Craig, A. D. (2009). Ecstatic epileptic seizures: A potential window
on the neural basis for human self-awareness. Epilepsy and Behavior, 16, 539
546.
Roberts, J. K., & Guberman, A. (1989). Religion and epilepsy. Psychiatry Journal
University of Ottawa, 14, 282286.
Rolls, E. T., Kringelbach, M. L., & de Araujo, I. E. (2003). Different representations of pleasant and unpleasant odours in the human brain. European Journal
of Neuroscience, 18, 695703.
Ruby, P., & Decety, J. (2003). What you believe versus what you think they
believe: A neuroimaging study of conceptual perspective-taking. European
Journal of Neuroscience, 17, 24752480.
Sabom, M. (1998). Light and death: One doctors fascinating account of near-death
experiences. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan.
Saver, J. L., & Rabin, J. (1997). The neural substrates of religious experience.
Journal of Neuropsychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience, 9, 498510.
Spiegel, H., Aronson, M., Fleiss, J. L., & Haber, J. (1976). Psychometric analysis
of the Hypnotic Induction Prole. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 24, 300315.
Spilka, B., & McIntosh, D. N. (1995). Attribution theory and religious experience. In R. W. Hood (Ed.), Handbook of religious experience (pp. 421445).
Birmingham, AL: Religious Education Press.
Spratling, W. P. (1904). Epilepsy and its treatment. Philadelphia: WB Saunders.
Stace, W. T. (1960). Mysticism and philosophy. New York: Macmillan.
Tononi, G., & Edelman, G. M. (1998). Consciousness and the integration of
information in the brain. Advances in Neurology, 77, 245279.
Tucker, D. M., Novelly, R. A., & Walker, P. J. (1987). Hyperreligiosity in temporal lobe epilepsy: Redening the relationship. Journal of Nervous and Mental
Diseases, 175, 181184.
Urgesi, C., Aglioti, S. M., Skrap, M., & Fabbro, F. (2010). The spiritual brain:
Selective cortical lesions modulate human self-transcendence. Neuron, 65,
309319.
van Lommel, P., van Wees, R., Meyers, V., & Elfferich, I. (2001). Near-death
experience in survivors of cardiac arrest: A prospective study in the Netherlands.
Lancet, 358, 20392045.
Varela, F. J., Lachaux, J.-P., Rodriguez, E., & Martinerie, J. (2001). The brainweb:
Phase synchronization and large-scale integration. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 229239.
83
84
Altering Consciousness
Vollenweider, F. X. (1994). Evidence for a cortical-subcortical dysbalance of sensory information processing during altered states of consciousness using PET
and FDG. In: A. Pletscher & D. Ladewig (Eds.), 50 Years of LSD: State of the
art and perspectives of hallucinogens (pp. 6786). London: Parthenon.
Vollenweider, F. X., & Geyer, M. A. (2001). A systems model of altered consciousness: Integrating natural and drug-induced psychoses. Brain Research
Bulletin, 56, 495507.
Vollenweider, F. X., Leenders, K. L., Scharfetter, C., Maguire, P., Stadelmann, O.,
& Angst, J. (1997). Positron emission tomography and uorodeoxyglucose
studies of metabolic hyperfrontality and psychopathology in the psilocybin
model of psychosis. Neuropsychopharmacology, 16, 357372.
Waldron, J. L. (1998). The life impact of transcendent experiences with a pronounced quality of noesis. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 30, 103134.
Waxman, S. G., & Geschwind, N. (1975). The interictal behavior syndrome of
temporal lobe epilepsy. Archives of General Psychiatry, 32, 15801586.
Willmore, L. J., Heilman, K. M., Fennell, E., & Pinnas, R. M. (1980). Effect of
chronic seizures on religiosity. Transactions of the American Neurological Association, 105, 8587.
Wuerfel, J., Krishnamoorthy, E. S., Brown, R. J., Lemieux, L., Koepp, M., Tebartz
van Elst, L., et al. (2004). Religiosity is associated with hippocampal but not
amygdala volumes in patients with refractory epilepsy. Journal of Neurology
Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 75, 640642.
CHAPTER 5
86
Altering Consciousness
Table 5.1 DMT and Ayahuasca Timeline. Signicant events and milestones in
the human discovery and utilization of DMT and the Ayahuasca beverage
Date
Entry
ca. 20,000
15,000 BCE
Entry
1493
1737
1851
1858
1930s
1931
1945
1946
1955
April 1956
88
Entry
several minutes he begins to experience psychedelic effects
and realizes they are similar to those that have been
described for LSD and mescaline.
19561970
1961
1962
1965
1967
1968
19701971
1972
1980s
1980
89
90
Altering Consciousness
Entry
conrmed for the rst time by Jeremy Bigwood, through
his ingesting of a capsule containing DMT mixed with the
harmala alkaloid harmaline.
1980present
1990s
1990
1993
snuff used by the natives of the Orinoco River basin in Colombia and
Venezuela. Considering these and other pieces of evidence, it may be concluded that DMT-containing plants have been insufated by humans in
the New World for a very long time.
The earliest European references to the New World use of orally
ingested beverages that most probably contained DMT are found in the
writings of Jesuits traveling in the Amazon basin and its surrounding
regions. These Jesuit accounts are typically disparaging and even fearful;
one from 1737, for example, describes an intoxicating potion ingested
for divinatory and other purposes and called ayahuasca, which deprives
one of his senses and, at times, of his life (Rudgley, 1998, p. 26). The
term Ayahuasca refers to what is known today to be a powerful DMTcontaining beverage and also identies a key plant in this decoction,
the Malpighiaceaous woody liana Banisteriopsis caapi (Spruce ex Griseb.)
Morton (Figure 5.1).
Scientic Investigations
The story of the modern scientic discovery of DMT begins with various
19th-century explorers and botanists conducting eldwork in the Amazon
region. In 1851, an English botanist, Richard Spruce, encountered a similar
version of the Ayahuasca brew. In this case it was prepared by the Tukano
peoples of the Rio Uapes in Brazil and was known to them as caapi. Spruce
proceeded to collect owering specimens from the plant, which was later
named Banisteriopsis caapi (Schultes, 1982). Modern chemists would show
much later that this vine was not the DMT-containing component but rather
provided another alkaloid necessary to make DMT orally active. The rst
published phenomenological reports of the Ayahuasca experience belong
to the Ecuadorian geographer Manuel Villavicencio, who in 1858 gave an
account of visions of great cities, lofty towers, and beasts of prey that
he experienced after consuming the drink (Villavicencio, 1858).
In 1931, the Canadian chemist Richard Manske was investigating
chemicals occurring in the poisonous North American strawberry shrub.
91
92
Altering Consciousness
He modied tryptamine in order to synthesize several derivatives as standards to analyze the phytochemistry of this shrub. One of these derivatives
was new to modern science, N,N-dimethyltryptamine, or DMT for short.
As far as is known, DMT was synthesized, analyzed, and subsequently
placed into storage as a reference compound; nobody yet suspected its
psychedelic properties (Strassman, 2001). Arguably the rst solid clue to
the psychoactivity of DMT came in 1946, when the Brazilian chemist Goncalves de Lima (1946) published ndings about his extraction of DMT
(which he named nigerine) from the root bark of the South American
tree Mimosa hostilis Benth. The bark was used in Brazil to prepare a
psychoactive brew called jurema. DMT, however, comprised only one of
several alkaloids identied in M. hostilis, and Goncalves de Lima could
not say with certainty which one/s were the psychoactive ingredient/s.
Nine years later, Fish, Johnson, and Horning also extracted DMT from a
plant, this time the aforementioned A. peregrina (although then classied
under the genus Piptadenia instead of the modern classication of Anadenanthera); like Goncalves, however, they could not say with certainty that
DMT was the active psychedelic component. Subsequently, the presence
of DMT, 5-MeO-DMT, 5-MeO-N-methyltryptamine, and bufotenine were
reported in various species of Phalaris grasses.
In the early 1950s, Stephen Szara, a Hungarian chemist and psychiatrist
with a keen interest in psychoactives, sought to obtain a quantity of the
newly publicized drug LSD-25 from its manufacturer, the Swiss company
Sandoz Laboratories. Presumably because he was working from behind
the Iron Curtain, Sandoz denied Szaras request and refused to send him a
sample. Intent on pursuing his investigations of consciousness-modifying
compounds and following clues contained in the few existing reports about
DMT, Szara synthesized this chemical in his own laboratory. In April of
1956, he gave himself what was probably the rst ever intramuscular injection of the drug, self-administering 75 mg of DMT. Within several minutes
he began to experience bodily feelings and visual sensations similar to those
that others had described for LSD and mescaline [see Nichols & Chemel,
this volume]. He wrote, I got very, very excited. It was obvious this was
the secret (Szara, 1989, p. 239). This secret was the realization that orally
administered DMT (at least up to the 150 mg total dose Szara had earlier
ingested separately) had no psychoactive effects whatsoever. Instead, the
drug had to be injected to manifest its psychedelic actions (S. Szara, personal communication, February 2010).
Since that experiment, other scientists went on to study the chemical
properties, pharmacological actions, and psychedelic effects of DMT in
laboratories in many parts of the world. A literature search reveals that
Endogenous DMT
Interwoven with the history of the modern discovery of DMT, and
unique to it and its analogues, is the story of its detection in the human
body. In the early 1960s, scientists demonstrated the presence of bufotenine and 5-MeO-DMT in human urine. In a short communication to the
journal Nature, Franzen and Gross (1965) reported the presence of DMT
and bufotenine, amongst other tryptamines, in human urine and blood.
By 1972, the enzymes required to convert tryptamine to DMT had been
positively identied in the human brain (Saavedra & Axelrod, 1972).
These studies revealed that a powerful psychedelic, which had been used
by humans for millennia for the modication of consciousness, was also
naturally present in the healthy human body.
93
94
Altering Consciousness
be told, an epiphany beyond our wildest dreams. Here is the realm of that
which is stranger than we can suppose.
Phenomenological facets that may undergo radical changes during a psychedelic experience include the overall atmosphere of the experience; affect
(emotions); bodily feeling; sensory perception (including auditory, tactile,
and visual modalities); ideation (philosophical thoughts or insights about
oneself and the universe); the spiritual facet (including religious and noetic
sentiments); and consciousness (relating to personal identity, the relationship between oneself and the world, and the experience of time; Shanon,
2002). The following descriptions of the possible phenomenologies of a
DMT trip and an Ayahuasca experience are based on personal encounters,
trip reports written by users, and the published academic literature,
including Shanon (2002) and Strassman (2001).
95
96
Altering Consciousness
Figure 5.2
Erowid.org)
consists of two methyl groups (CH3) attached to the aliphatic nitrogen (N)
of a tryptamine backbone. Tryptamine itself is built around an indole ring,
a structure consisting of a six-carbon benzene ring fused to a ve-carbon,
nitrogen-containing pyrrole ring (Table 5.2). DMT varies only slightly in
its structure from the neurotransmitter serotonin, which lacks the two
extra methyl groups and has an additional hydroxyl group at position 5
on the indole ring. DMT is also very similar in its molecular structure
to three other psychedelic tryptamines; bufotenine, 5-MeO-DMT, and
psilocin (4-hydroxy-DMT). Bufotenine and 5-MeO-DMT contain an additional hydroxy and methoxy group, respectively, at position 5 on the
indole ring. By contrast, psilocin, an orally active psychedelic agent produced by many species of Psilocybe, or magic mushrooms, and also in
closely related genera, contains a hydroxy group on position 4 of the
indole ring (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Important Psychoactive Tryptamines. Chemical structures and typical threshold dosages for DMT, bufotenine, 5-MeODMT and psilocin. These psychoactive dimethyl-tryptamines closely resemble the neurotransmitter serotonin in their molecular
structures and bind primarily to serotonergic (5-HT) receptors to exert their effects. All except psilocin occur naturally in the bodies
of mammals, including humans; psilocin (along with psilocybin, its more stable precursor) is found mainly in the fungal kingdom and
is the only dimethyl-tryptamine conclusively shown to be orally active.
Average Threshold Dosage for Visionary Effects (unless otherwise
specied, all doses are in mg and refer to the freebase compound)
Name
Chemical Structure
Oral Administration
Serotonin
(5-hydroxytryptamine)
DMT
(N,Ndimethyltryptamine)
0.5/kg body-weight in
combination with MAOI
1020
510
0.2 salt/kg
body-weight
(Continued)
Chemical Structure
Oral Administration
48
40
4?
5-MeO-DMT
(5-methoxy-DMT)
0.1/kg body-weight in
combination with MAOI
25
510
98
Bufotenine
(5-hydroxy-DMT)
Chemical Structure
Oral Administration
2030 of the
phosphorylated prodrug form, psilocybin
99
100
Altering Consciousness
Occurrence in Nature
The widespread occurrence of DMT in nature, in contrast to many
other plant-based psychedelics, is remarkable. It is present on all continents except (as far as is known) Antarctica and is found in both the plant
and animal kingdoms. To date its presence has not been reported in fungi
or in prokaryotic organisms. An extensive discussion of plant families,
genera, and species that contain DMT may be found in Shulgin and Shulgin
(1997). Examples include reed canary grass (Phalaris arundinacea L.), the
bamboo-like giant cane (Arundo donax Georgi), numerous species of the
genus Acacia, several species of the genus Virola, Psychotria viridis Ruz &
Pavon (Figure 5.3; a plant belonging to the coffee family and the leaves of
which are typically used as a source of DMT for Ayahuasca), and Diplopterys
cabrerana (Cuatrec.) B. Gates (a Malpighiaceaous liana used as another
DMT-containing plant additive in the northwest Amazon). DMT and several
of its analogues have also been identied as endogenous neurochemicals
produced by rabbits, mice, rats, and humans. Indeed, DMT and the biochemical machinery required for its synthesis have been detected in all mammals investigated for its presence to date.
The DMT analogues bufotenine, 5-MeO-DMT, and psilocin are found,
along with DMT itself, in many of the aforementioned species and are also
produced in a number of other interesting plants and animals. The magic
mushrooms found in the genus Psilocybe, for example, almost all contain
both psilocin and psilocybin (once in the body, the latter is rapidly metabolized to yield the former). Bufotenine, and in some cases 5-MeO-DMT, is
found in many species of toads (the word bufotenine itself is derived from
the genus name Bufo, or the true toads).
Figure 5.3 Psychotria viridis leaves, a typical source of DMT for the Ayahuasca
brew. The vine growing amongst the psychotria leaves is the Banisteriopsis caapi
liana (PHOTO LOCATION: Nucleo Samauma near Sao Paulo, Brazil. CREDIT:
J.C. Callaway)
Oral Consumption of DMT: The Harmala Alkaloids and Monoamine Oxidase Inhibition
Orally ingested DMT presents a special case, as DMT on its own is not
orally active. This is because the drug is rapidly metabolized by the enzyme
monoamine oxidase (MAO), which breaks down endogenous monoamines
(the neurotransmitters serotonin, dopamine, adrenaline, and noradrenaline). MAO in general exists as two isozymes: MAO-A and MAO-B. It is
101
102
Altering Consciousness
Hypertensive Crisis
A common misconception regarding the use of harmala alkaloids is that
foods containing tyramine (such as red wine, broad beans, hard cheeses,
and other fermented products) are contraindicated, as their consumption
together with MAOIs may lead to a hypertensive crisis. An excess of tyramine in the body may indeed lead to this condition; however, tyramine is
degraded primarily by MAO-B, while the harmala alkaloids inhibit primarily the A-isoform of this enzyme (MAO-A). Following the consumption
of Ayahuasca, the peak plasma concentration of harmine in blood may typically reach 0.5 mol/L (Callaway et al., 1996). Yet a recent study indicated
that the concentration required for harmine to inhibit half the activity of
MAO-B (its IC50) may be on the order of 20 mol/L (Samoylenko et al.,
2010); this is about 40 times greater than the typical plasma level. Therefore, there is no in vitro or other empirical evidence to support the current
cultural myth that consumption of Ayahuasca in conjunction with
tyramine-rich foods can, in and of itself, lead to a hypertensive crisis.
103
104
Altering Consciousness
interact with this receptor, especially at endogenous or low exogenous levels, to modulate emotional states. Second, researchers have more recently
proposed DMT to be the rst endogenous agonist for the sigma-1 receptor, which is also a nonserotonergic receptor that is found in various areas
of the brain (Fontanilla et al., 2009).
The majority of pharmacological studies so far on DMT have sought to
determine the mechanisms underlying its psychoactivity through its direct
actions on known neurotransmitter receptors. Some studies, however,
suggest that DMT may also act through more indirect pathways that affect
neuronal function. A few reports have suggested that DMT and/or its analogues (including bufotenine and 5-MeO-DMT) act as SSRIs (Nagai, Nonaka,
& Kamimura, 2007). A recent cell-based study, however, has proposed
that DMT is not such a reuptake blocker but rather is itself transported
(in competition with serotonin) into the cell and also packaged for later
release. This mechanism has been proposed to explain how very low levels
of endogenous DMT might still activate the sigma-1 receptor, but is as yet
only speculative (Cozzi et al., 2009).
It is currently unknown specically what neurochemical interactions
are required to elicit the unique consciousness-modifying effects of DMT
or any other psychedelic, how this vivid mental content becomes conscious, or even why our species has the capacity for such an experience
in the rst place. Whatever the intricacies involved in the CNS interactions
between DMT, neurotransmitters, and their receptors, additional knowledge of these variables can only constitute the rst stages in understanding
and explaining how a molecule mediates its psychedelic actions. Further
stages involve an anatomical and systems-level explanation; exactly where
in the brain does DMT bind to these receptors, and which neural pathways and circuits does it thereby modulate? As is the case with other psychedelics, the answers to these questions are still in their formative stages.
The serotonin-rich raphe nuclei of the brainstem, the locus coeruleus of
the pons (also located within the brainstem), and the cerebral cortex have
all been implicated as sites through which serotonergic psychedelics may
mediate their effects (Aghajanian & Marek, 1999). DMT-specic research
of this type in humans, however, has yet to be conducted. In the future,
modern imaging technologies, newer and more sensitive pharmacological
techniques (compared to those utilized in the 1950s and 60s), and
modern genetics and bioinformatics technologies are all likely to yield
new and valuable insights regarding the mechanisms by which DMT
modies consciousness.
105
106
Altering Consciousness
Function
DMT may be classied as a neurotransmitter in its own right, considering that it is a normal constituent of mammalian brains and according to
criteria such as its potential synthesis by neurons, storage in vesicles and
removal by specic metabolic processes. Some of the earliest speculations
regarding the role of DMT in the human body did not concern normal,
healthy functions but rather pathology in the form of psychoses. Osmond
and Smythies (1952) proposed a transmethylation hypothesis, suggesting that endogenous schizotoxins may be responsible for the socalled positive symptoms seen in schizophrenia and other forms of psychosis. At the time, psychedelics were commonly referred to as psychotomimetics or psychotogenscompounds that either mimicked or
created psychoses respectively. The subsequent discovery of DMT as an
endogenous psychedelic agent aroused strong speculation about its potential role as a schizotoxin; however, despite early reports that claimed
differences in the presence and metabolism of DMT in schizophrenics
compared to controls, further studies proved contradictory, and in some
cases the differences between patient and control groups were statistically
insignicant (Callaway, 1996).
In the healthy human, DMT may be involved in the production of the
dream visions that are experienced during rapid-eye-movement sleep
(REMS; Callaway, 1988). The periodic nature of REMS suggests that dreaming may be the result of a metabolic cycle involving serotonin, melatonin,
and other endogenous tryptophan products that include pinoline (an
endogenous SSRI and a weak MAOI) and DMT. As the eyes are closed and
the amount of light falling onto the retina is reduced, sleep-inducing
enzymatic activity is increased in the pineal and, accordingly, more melatonin produced. As the brain descends deeper into sleep, pinoline and DMT
production may also be increased. Rising levels of pinoline and DMT, in a
manner reminiscent of the mechanisms facilitated by Ayahuasca, eventually
trigger the REM phase and its associated dream visions. A negative feedback
mechanism involving pinoline, by virtue of its ability to inhibit the reuptake
of serotonin, subsequently increases synaptic serotonin levels in the brain.
This increased serotonin concentration induces the sleep cycle to move in
the opposite direction, toward a lighter sleep or to waking. This model
could be tested by monitoring the blood serum and/or cerebrospinal uid
concentrations of these tryptophan metabolites throughout the circadian
cycle, with an expectation of higher DMT and pinoline concentrations
during sleep, particularly during the REM phases of sleep.
107
108
Altering Consciousness
109
110
Altering Consciousness
111
112
Altering Consciousness
Ayahuasca shaman is to enter the spirit realm and bring useful knowledge
back to the ordinary world, where it is subsequently applied. Knowledge
is typically expressed through song (which constitutes an integral part of
most Ayahuasca ceremonies), narrative, artistic expression with geometric
designs, fragrances, and other means.
Ayahuasca is considered by vegetalistas (those who use these plants for
such purposes) to be especially important for the diagnosis and treatment
of illness. On a physical level, the beverage typically induces strong vomiting, tremors, and occasionally diarrhea, and accordingly has been called
by the Spanish name la purga: the purge. This effect is thought to clear
the body of toxins and other undesirable substances and, far from being
considered an unfortunate side effect, is often an important part of the
healing process. The role of Ayahuasca in healing, however, is considered
to go far deeper than its purely physical actions. Use of the brew is
intrinsically linked to an indigenous worldview that considers illness to
be the result of processes occurring within an ordinarily unseen spirit
world. In this sense, illness may result from someone ring a magical dart
at the victim or through the loss of ones soul for various reasons. In such
cases, the effects of Ayahuasca reveal these underlying realities. The psychedelic state induced by the brew supposedly allows the practitioner to
manipulate causal factors and inuence outcomes in this spirit realm,
thereby effecting change in the ordinary physical world of the patient
and/or the community (McKenna, Luna, & Towers, 1995).
Daime and a Protestant version in the UDV. Umbanda and other African
elements have been incorporated to form the Barquinha practice of this
ancient technology.
Beginning in the 1960s, DMT began to make its way into mainstream
modern awareness. Some sources initially referred to it as the businessmans trip because of its relatively short-lived and thus convenient effects
compared to other psychedelics (enabling one, in theory, to take a DMT
journey during a lunch break at work). In the 1980s, through public talks
and written publications, Terence and Dennis McKenna played an instrumental role in raising awareness of DMT, Ayahuasca, and other psychoactive tryptamines in modern Western cultures.
Both in the past and today, although not as popular as LSD or
psilocybin-containing mushrooms, nor as readily available or as convenient to use, DMT continues to constitute an important technology for the
modication of human consciousness. The most common method of
administration is by smoking the crystalline form of the drug as the freebase through an enclosed glass pipe. Recently, reports have emerged of a
smoking preparation called changa, which consists of DMT mixed together
with a MAOI-containing plant and various other herbs, and is therefore
akin to a smoked form of Ayahuasca. This contemporary observation provides further evidence that such technology continues to evolve now that
it has escaped from South America and been transmitted to other cultures [see St John, Volume 1].
The last couple of decades have witnessed an increased interest in
Ayahuasca from the modern world, particularly in its use as a tool for personal healing and insight. This interest has given rise to the phenomenon
of Ayahuasca tourism and, more generally, drug tourism, the practice
of Westerners visiting South American countries, especially Peru, Colombia, and Brazil, to participate in both urban and rural psychoactive ceremonies that are run by Mestizos (persons of mixed Amerindian and
European ancestry). The modern encounters with DMT in an urban setting, along with the use of Ayahuasca in either a traditional or syncretic
context, have also inspired distinct genres of visual art (such as the works
of Alex Grey) and music [see Levy, Volume 1].
Ayahuasca has recently been utilized in a fusion of traditional and
modern contexts to treat a number of physical, psychological, and psychosomatic illnesses. One such application has been the treatment of alcohol
and other drug addictions. The success in the use of the brew, itself shown
to be nonaddictive, in this context supports the idea that psychedelics, as
visionary tools for self-exploration and healing, are an underexplored area
for both scientists and therapists alike. One example of Ayahuasca usage
113
114
Altering Consciousness
Conclusion
Jonathan Ott (1994) was one of the rst modern researchers to appreciate and emphasize the fact that DMT, obtained from a wide variety of plant
species, has been utilized by culturally diverse and apparently unconnected
groups of people, spread over a wide time span and large geographical
areas, for the modication of human consciousness. This utilization constituted a central feature of those indigenous cultures and cosmologies and
apparently dates back thousands of years. In the modern world, in the space
of a few short decades, the drug has taken its place as a powerful and
115
116
Altering Consciousness
References
Aghajanian, G., & Marek, G. (1999). Serotonin and hallucinogens. Neuropsychopharmacology, 21(2), 1623.
Aschero, C., & Yacobaccio, H. (1994). 20 anos despues: Inca Cueva 7 reinterpretado
(20 years later: Inca Cueva 7 reinterpreted). Paper presented at the Resumenes
del XI Congreso Nacional de Arqueologa Argentina, San Rafael, Argentina.
Callaway, J. (1988). A proposed mechanism for the visions of dream sleep. Medical Hypotheses, 26, 119124.
Callaway, J. (1996). DMTs in the human brain. Yearbook for ethnomedicine, 4, 4554.
Callaway, J., Brito, G., & Neves, E. (2005). Phytochemical analyses of Banisteriopsis caapi and Psychotria viridis. Journal of Psychoactive Drugs, 37, 145150.
Callaway, J., Raymon, L., Hearn, W., McKenna, D., Grob, C., Brito, G., et al.
(1996). Quantitation of N,N-dimethyltryptamine and harmala alkaloids in
human plasma after oral dosing with ayahuasca. Journal of Analytical Toxicology, 20, 492497.
Cozzi, N., Gopalakrishnan, A., Anderson, L., Feih, J., Shulgin, A., Daley, P., et al.
(2009). Dimethyltryptamine and other hallucinogenic tryptamines exhibit
substrate behavior at the serotonin uptake transporter and the vesicle monoamine transporter. Journal of Neural Transmission, 116, 15911599.
DeKorne, J. (1994). Psychedelic shamanism: The cultivation, preparation and shamanic use of psychotropic plants. Port Townsend, WA: Loompanics Unlimited.
Deliganis, A., Pierce, P., & Peroutka, S. (1991). Differential interactions of dimethyltryptamine (DMT) with 5-HT1A and 5-HT2 receptors. Biochemical Pharmacology, 41, 17391744.
Distel, F., & Alicia, A. (1980). Hallazgo de pipas en complejos preceramicos del
borde de la Puna Jujena (Republica Argentina) y el empleo de alucinogenos
por parte de las mismas culturas [Finding of pipes in preceramics places at
the edge of Puna Jujena (Argentina) and the use of halucinogens by those cultures]. Estudios Arqueologicos, 5, 5575.
Fontanilla, D., Johannessen, M., Hajipour, A., Cozzi, N., Jackson, M., & Ruoho,
A. (2009). The hallucinogen N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT) is an endogenous sigma-1 receptor regulator. Science, 323(5916), 934937.
Franzen, F., & Gross, H. (1965). Tryptamine, N,N-dimethyltryptamine, N,Ndimethyl-5-hydroxytryptamine and 5-methoxytryptamine in human blood
and urine. Nature, 206(988), 1052.
Glennon, R., Titeler, M., & McKenney, J. (1984). Evidence for 5-HT2 involvement in the mechanism of action of hallucinogenic agents. Life Sciences, 35,
25052511.
Goncalves de Lima, O. (1946). Observacoes sobre o vinho de Jurema utilizado
pelos indios Pancaru de Tacaratu (Pernambuco) [Observations on the vinho
de Jurema used by the Pancaru Indians of Tacaratu (Pernambuco)]. Ariquivos
do Instituto de Pesquisas Agronomicas, 4, 4580.
Hassan, I. (1967). Some folk uses of Peganum harmala in India and Pakistan. Economic Botany, 21, 284284.
Jacob, M., & Presti, D. (2005). Endogenous psychoactive tryptamines reconsidered: An anxiolytic role for dimethyltryptamine. Medical Hypotheses, 64,
930937.
Keiser, M. J., Setola, V., Irwin, J. J., Laggner, C., Abbas, A. I., Hufeisen, S. J., et al.
(2009). Predicting new molecular targets for known drugs. Nature, 462(7270),
175181.
117
118
Altering Consciousness
Luna, L. (1984). The concept of plants as teachers among four mestizo shamans
of Iquitos, northeastern Peru. Journal of Ethnopharmacology, 11, 135156.
Luna, L. (1986). Vegetalismo. Shamanism among the mestizo population of the Peruvian Amazon. Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis.
Mabit, J. (2002). Blending traditions: Using indigenous medicinal knowledge to
treat drug addiction. MAPS Newsletter, 12(2), 2532.
McKenna, D., Luna, L., & Towers, G. (1995). Biodynamic constituents in Ayahuasca admixture plants: An uninvestigated folk pharmacopoeia. In S. von
Reis & R. Schultes (Eds.), Ethnobotany: Evolution of a discipline (pp. 349361).
Portland, OR: Dioscorides Press.
McKenna, D., Repke, D., Lo, L., & Peroutka, S. (1990). Differential interactions
of indolealkylamines with 5-hydroxytryptamine receptor subtypes. Neuropharmacology, 29, 193198.
McKenna, T. (1990). Partial transcription of a taped workshop with ethnobotanist, shamanologist, and psychedelico, Terence McKenna. Time and Mind.
Retrieved January, 2010 from http://deoxy.org/timemind.htm.
McKenna, T. (1992). Food of the gods. The search for the original tree of knowledge.
London: Rider.
Nagai, F., Nonaka, R., & Satoh Hisashi Kamimura, K. (2007). The effects of nonmedically used psychoactive drugs on monoamine neurotransmission in rat
brain. European Journal of Pharmacology, 559, 132137.
Ogalde, J., Arriaza, B., & Soto, E. (2009). Identication of psychoactive alkaloids
in ancient Andean human hair by gas chromatography/mass spectrometry.
Journal of Archaeological Science, 36, 467472.
Osmond, H., & Smythies, J. (1952). Schizophrenia: A new approach. British Journal
of Psychiatry, 98, 309315.
Ott, J. (1994). Ayahuasca analogues: Pangaean entheogens. Kennewick, WA: Natural Products Company.
Plotkin, M. (1994). Tales of a shamans apprentice: An ethnobotanist searches for new
medicines in the Amazon rain forest. New York: Penguin Books.
Rudgley, R. (1998). The encyclopedia of psychoactive substances. New York: Thomas
Dunne Books.
Saavedra, J., & Axelrod, J. (1972). Psychotomimetic N-methylated tryptamines:
Formation in brain in vivo and in vitro. Science, 175(4028), 13651366.
Samoylenko, V., Rahman, M., Tekwani, B., Tripathi, L., Wang, Y., Khan, S., et al.
(2010). Banisteriopsis caapi, a unique combination of MAO inhibitory and antioxidative constituents for the activities relevant to neurodegenerative disorders
and Parkinsons disease. Journal of Ethnopharmacology, 127, 357367.
Schultes, R. (1982). The beta-carboline hallucinogens of South America. Journal
of Psychoactive Drugs, 14, 205219.
Schultes, R., Hofmann, A., & Ratsch, C. (1979). Plants of the gods. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Schultes, R., & Raffauf, R. (1992). Vine of the soul. Medicine men, their plants and
rituals in the Colombian Amazonia. Oracle, AZ: Synergetic Press.
Shanon, B. (2002). The antipodes of the mind: Charting the phenomenology of the ayahuasca experience. Great Britain: Oxford University Press.
Shulgin, A., & Shulgin, A. (1997). Tihkal: The continuation. Berkeley, CA: Transform Press.
Smith, R., Canton, H., Barrett, R., & Sanders-Bush, E. (1998). Agonist properties
of N,N-dimethyltryptamine at serotonin 5-HT2A and 5-HT2C receptors. Pharmacology Biochemistry and Behavior, 61, 323330.
Spruce, R. (1873). On some remarkable narcotics of the Amazon Valley and
Orinoco. August Geographic Review, 1(55), 184193.
Strassman, R. (1996). Human psychopharmacology of N,N-dimethyltryptamine.
Behavioural Brain Research, 73, 121124.
Strassman, R. (2001). DMT: The spirit molecule. Rochester, VT: Park Street Press.
Szara, S. (1989). The social chemistry of discovery: The DMT story. Social Pharmacology, 3, 237248.
Torres, C. (1996). Archaeological evidence for the antiquity of psychoactive plant
use in the Central Andes. Annali dei Musei Civici-Rovereto, 11, 291326.
Torres, C., & Repke, D. (2006). Anadenanthera: Visionary plant of ancient South
America. Binghamton, UK: Haworth Press.
Torres, C., Repke, D., Chan, K., McKenna, D., Llagostera, A., & Schultes, R.
(1991). Snuff powders from pre-Hispanic San Pedro de Atacama: Chemical
and contextual analysis. Current Anthropology, 32, 640649.
Villavicencio, M. (1858). Geografa de la Republica del Ecuador [Geography of
Ecuador]. New York: Craighead.
119
CHAPTER 6
Psychedelic/Hallucinogenic Agents
Lets rst dene the materials we intend to discuss. These substances
are generally known by the catchall name hallucinogens, but they also have
been referred to as psychedelic, psychotomimetic, and more recently entheogenic, generally taken to mean mind manifesting, mimicking psychosis,
and generating the god within, respectively. We shall use these terms
122
Altering Consciousness
interchangeably. The denition of these substances that best sets the stage
for the ensuing discussion appeared in perhaps the most authoritative
overall reference book on pharmacology, known popularly as Goodman
and Gilman. There one reads
the feature that distinguishes psychedelic agents from other classes of drugs
is their capacity reliably to induce or compel states of altered perception,
thought, and feeling that are not (or cannot be) experienced otherwise
except in dreams or at times of religious exaltation. (Jaffe, 1985, pp. 563
564)
123
124
Altering Consciousness
125
126
Altering Consciousness
127
128
Altering Consciousness
We have spent some time attempting to convey the idea that it is possible for psychedelics to alter ones perception of reality, and that during
the experience we may not perceive it is anything other than completely
real. A visionary or transcendental state must be perceived as completely
real for it to be considered authentic. It is important to accept this premise
because if a transcendent or religious experience did not have the quality
of seeming completely real, it would be perceived as illusion or hallucination and would have no lasting impact.
Transcendental or visionary states have the quality of being ineffable;
there is no language that can adequately convey the richness of the experience. Similarly, psychedelics can produce a powerful and profound sense
that something ominous or momentous is about to occur or is occurring,
producing awe and amazement. These descriptors are the same as those
we might nd attached to a visionary experience and resemble Rudolph
Ottos numinous (Otto, 1958). We propose that a feeling of portentousness is a product of frontal cortical activity. It is only in humans where
reection and introspection can occur, and conscious decisions made to
carry out specic behaviors. The rationale for making complex decisions
will be based on subjective comparisons of the predicted outcomes of different choices and a ranking of the acceptability of those outcomes in the
context of ones value systems. Some choices will have more profound
implications than others, and it is only through our understanding of
those consequences that we make such decisions.
Therefore, if we assume that the ability to place experiential events into
Freedmans continuum, ranging from the banal to the profound, results
from comparisons derived through cortical functions, it would seem logical that attaching to an experience a sense of portentousness (a descriptor that must lie at the extreme end of the ranking system) must derive
from processes that involve the frontal cortex.
With this brief background on how psychedelics modify perceptions
and feelings, the question begs to be asked: But how do they do that?
We shall now proceed to a discussion of how such experiences might be
produced by the interaction between psychedelic molecules and certain
brain systems.
129
130
Altering Consciousness
Early experiments found that LSD potently suppressed the ring of cells in
the dorsal raphe nucleus (Aghajanian, Foote, & Sheard, 1968, 1970;
Aghajanian, Haigler, & Bloom, 1972). Other tryptamine hallucinogens
also inhibit dorsal raphe cell ring (Aghajanian et al., 1970; Aghajanian &
Haigler, 1975; deMontigny & Aghajanian, 1977). Thus, Aghajanian and
Haigler (1975) hypothesized that this suppressant effect on raphe cells
might be the basis for hallucinogen action. This idea was attractive
because raphe cells send serotonergic projections throughout the forebrain and are the source of serotonin afferents in the prefrontal cortex
(Moore, Halaris, & Jones, 1978).
These ideas had relevance to an early study reported by Torda (1968).
She recorded EEGs and obtained dream records from two volunteers
during 11 consecutive nights. During control nights, participants received
10-minute intravenous saline infusions, which started 30 minutes after
the onset of their third REM episode. On alternate nights, they received
intravenous infusion of 5 mcg per minute of LSD. Volunteers were awakened during their fourth and fth REM episodes and asked to report what
was on their minds. In all cases, they reported that they were dreaming.
On control nights, the average latency to the fourth REM period and
dreaming was about 90 minutes, but with LSD infusion, the latency to this
REM episode was shortened to 10 to 19 minutes.
Problems soon developed with the raphe cell suppression hypothesis,
however, largely because phenethylamine hallucinogens such as mescaline lacked this effect (Aghajanian, Foote, & Sheard, 1970; Haigler &
Aghajanian, 1973). Furthermore, the nonhallucinogenic ergoline lisuride
also potently suppressed raphe cell ring (Rogawski & Aghajanian,
1979). This hypothesis was, therefore, not tenable. Although suppression
of raphe cell ring may not be the primary mechanism of action for hallucinogens, it is probably an important component. Raphe cells release serotonin into the cortex, and any change in ring rate would alter cortical
serotonergic tone. The main effect of physiologically released serotonin
in the prefrontal cortex is to inhibit pyramidal cells (Puig, Artigas, &
Celada, 2005). Thus, a reduction in the rate of raphe cell ring would lead
to increased excitability of cortical pyramidal cells.
Today there seems to be a fairly clear consensus that the key site for hallucinogen action is a particular type of serotonin receptor known as the
5-HT2A subtype (reviewed in Nichols, 1997; Aghajanian & Marek, 1999a;
Nichols, 2004). This conclusion was largely developed by correlation of
rat behavioral responses to hallucinogens with their afnities and efcacies
at the 5-HT2 receptor (Glennon, Titeler, & McKenney, 1984; Glennon,
Young, & Rosecrans, 1983; Titeler, Lyon, & Glennon, 1988). More
131
132
Altering Consciousness
compelling evidence for this conclusion has been provided by two clinical
studies that demonstrated that the hallucinogenic effects of psilocybin could
be blocked by preadministration of 5-HT2A-selective antagonists (Carter
et al., & Vollenweider, 2005; Vollenweider, Vollenweider-Scherpenhuyzen,
Babler, Vogel, & Hell, 1998).
An explanation for low-dose visual effects produced by psychedelics
may lie in the high expression of 5-HT2A receptors in primate primary visual cortex (V1; Watakabe et al., 2009). Effects of 5-HT2A agonists on V1
neurons would lead to corruption of visual processing.
Most recent attention on the action of hallucinogens has focused on the
frontal cortex. Numerous anatomical localization studies demonstrated
that 5-HT2A receptors are expressed most highly in cortical regions of
mammals (e.g., McKenna & Saavedra, 1987; Pazos, Cortes, & Palacios,
1985; Pazos, Probst, & Palacios, 1987). In the rat prefrontal cortex, these
receptors were primarily localized to pyramidal and local circuit interneurons (Miner, Backstrom, Sanders-Bush, & Sesack, 2003). Interestingly,
5-HT2A receptors also were expressed on the surface of dendritic neuronal
outgrowths in regions that did not form direct synaptic junctions, suggesting that serotonin may exert at least some of its actions through volume transmission mechanisms. Based on their results as well as previous
data, Miner and coworkers (2003) proposed that cortical 5-HT innervation is largely nonjunctional and that the entire cortical volume may be
within reach of this neurotransmitter. Thus, some of the physiological
actions of 5-HT in the cortex may be constantly exerted, with more or less
efcacy, at the various 5-HT receptors expressed in the region, providing
widespread, global, and/or sustained inuence in the neocortex.
In vivo PET imaging of 5-HT2A receptors has shown highest density in
the anterior cingulate, followed by the parietal, orbitofrontal, temporal,
occipital, and frontal cortices (van Dyck et al. 2000). Of these areas, the
anterior cingulate appears to be a key site, at least in rats. Microinjections
of LSD into the anterior cingulate of rats trained to discriminate the effects
of LSD from saline led to complete substitution for the LSD cue (Gresch,
Barrett, Sanders-Bush, & Smith, 2007). Systemic administration of a
5-HT2A receptor antagonist completely blocked this discrimination.
Hallucinogens also enhance the release of the excitatory neurotransmitter glutamate in the cortex. Some controversy still centers, however, on the
details of the mechanism whereby hallucinogens increase cortical glutamate. It was initially believed that the glutamate was released from thalamic
afferents to the cortex. Lambe and Aghajanian (2001) proposed an indirect
role for 5-HT2A receptor-modulated glutamate release that involved the
release of a retrograde messenger. Such a substance could be produced as
133
134
Altering Consciousness
hallucinogens such as LSD and psilocin also have high afnity for 5-HT1A
receptors and suppress raphe cell ring through direct activation of somatodendritic 5-HT1A receptors in the raphe. Hallucinogenic phenethylamines such as mescaline or DOI lack activity at 5-HT1A receptors and
thus have no effect when infused directly into the raphe (Penington,
1996). When given systemically, however, they also suppress raphe cell
ring and decrease extracellular 5-HT in the frontal cortex (Wright, Garratt, & Marsden, 1990). Inhibition of raphe cell ring by phenethylamine
hallucinogens may be mediated by stimulation of 5-HT2A receptors that
activate inhibitory GABAergic interneurons in the raphe, thus indirectly
inhibiting raphe cell ring (Liu, Jolas, & Aghajanian, 2000).
LC neurons display slow irregular ring during quiet wakefulness but
change to sustained activation if the organism becomes stressed or excited.
LC ring also decreases markedly during slow-wave sleep and virtually
ceases during REM sleep (e.g., Page & Valentino, 1994). In response to
novel or behaviorally relevant stimuli, however, LC neurons display transient activation and burst ring (Aston-Jones & Bloom, 1981; Grant,
Aston-Jones, & Redmond, 1988; Sara & Segal, 1991; Vankov, HerveMinvielle, & Sara, 1995). Administration of LSD, mescaline, or phenethylamine hallucinogens to anesthetized rats decreased spontaneous activity
of LC cells but enhanced activation of LC neurons evoked by sensory
stimuli (Aghajanian, 1980; Rasmussen & Aghajanian, 1986). Chiang and
Aston-Jones (1993) have proposed that systemic administration of 5-HT2A
agonists suppresses LC ring indirectly, by tonic activation of an inhibitory
GABAergic input to the LC, and proposed that the facilitating effect on
sensory inputs was mediated through glutamate receptors in the LC. Thus,
hallucinogens enhance stimuli-driven activity of LC cells, which in turn
causes release of NE onto a1 receptors expressed on cortical cells.
Sometimes described as a novelty detector, the LC has been viewed as
enhancing the signal-to-noise ratio in modulating postsynaptic activity
throughout the brain. The suppression of basal activity concomitantly with
enhanced responding to external sensory stimuli would amplify this effect
(see Marek & Aghajanian, 1998, and references therein). Thus, effects of
hallucinogens on LC neurons might suggest that sensory events ordinarily
not considered unusual could be perceived as having increased novelty.
Indeed, it is well known that under the inuence of hallucinogens, ordinary
objects can seem new or novel, as if being seen for the rst time.
5-HT2A and a1-adrenergic receptors have a similar regional and laminar
distribution in the cortex, with heaviest expression in layer Va (Marek &
Aghajanian, 1999), and activation of either 5-HT2A or a1-adrenergic receptors modulates cortical pyramidal cells and interneurons in a parallel fashion
135
136
Altering Consciousness
(Marek & Aghajanian, 1994, 1996, 1999), leading to increased cortical cell
excitability.
Dopaminergic projections from the VTA to the prefrontal cortex also
may be involved in controlling membrane potential states that dene assemblies of excitable pyramidal neurons in the cortex (Lewis & ODonnell,
2000). Stimulation of the VTA with trains of stimuli resembling burst ring
evoked a long-lasting transition of pyramidal cells to the up state, an
effect that was blocked by a D1 dopamine receptor antagonist (Lewis &
ODonnell, 2000). The VTA receives 5-HT afferents from the raphe and,
important to this discussion, VTA dendrites express 5-HT2A immunoreactivity and tyrosine hydroxylase colocalization (Doherty & Pickel, 2000).
Nocjar, Roth, and Pehek (2002) also found that 5-HT2A receptors were
colocalized, in part, to tyrosine hydroxylase-containing cells throughout
all subnuclei of the VTA. Thus, hallucinogens also have stimulating effects
on dopaminergic cells in the VTA, leading to alterations in extracellular
dopamine in cortical elds.
Thus, psychedelic drugs have a multifaceted pharmacology, acting
directly on 5-HT2A receptors in cortical pyramidal cells to excite them
while at the same time acting on cells in the DRN, the LC, and the VTA,
all of which send monoamine projections to the cortex that ultimately lead
to increased excitability of cortical cells. 5-HT 2A receptors also can
positively modulate glutamatergic transmission in the prefrontal cortex
(Aghajanian & Marek, 1997; Beique et al., 2007; Ceglia et al., 2004;
Scruggs, Patel, Bubser, & Deutch, 2000).
Cortical cell function is also modulated by interneurons, where GABAmediated inhibition determines the spread of cortical activation by sculpting precise activity patterns (Llina s et al., 2005). As is the case with
pyramidal cells, GABA interneurons consist of at least two populations,
one of which expresses 5-HT2A receptors and the other, 5-HT1A receptors.
When the DRN is stimulated, however, the majority of responses elicited
in GABAergic fast-spiking interneurons (FSi) are inhibitions. Manipulations of FSi activity modulate the amplitude of gamma waves (Cardin
et al., 2009), allowing the serotonergic system to nely tune the amplitude
of gamma oscillations during cognitive tasks.
How does this information all t together in a model of hallucinogen
effects on cortical function? Although the functional circuitry of the cortex
is not yet well understood, results by Sanchez-Vives and McCormick
(2000) from experiments using ferret prefrontal cortical slices have suggested that the basic operation of cortical networks is the generation of
self-maintained depolarized states that are tightly regulated through interaction with local GABAergic neurons and intrinsic membrane
137
138
Altering Consciousness
the signal-to-noise ratio. Noise could then predominate over stimulusspecic activity, with relay cells being recruited into thalamocortical circuits without receiving adequate sensory input. The combination of
increased thalamic relay cell excitability and reticular thalamic nucleus
dysfunction could lead to activation of thalamocortical circuits and the
formation of coherent assemblies of thalamocortical oscillations that
would be independent of afferent sensory inputs, potentially giving rise
to underconstrained perception, such as hallucinations or dream imagery
(Behrendt, 2003).
Conclusions
Although we may not yet be able to dene the underlying functional
basis for consciousness, we can say that psychedelics perturb key brain
structures that inform us about our world, tell us when to pay attention,
and interpret what is real. Psychedelics activate very ancient brain systems
that project to all of the forebrain structures that are involved in memory
and feeling; they sensitize systems that tell us when something is novel.
The mind is truly one of the last great frontiers of science. It is a genuine tragedy that hallucinogens cannot be more easily used in research to
help elucidate the neurochemical basis of consciousness. Coupled with
measures of subjective states, cognitive tests, and new brain scanning
technologies, hallucinogens could be extremely powerful tools to help us
understand who we are and how that identity is tied to the functions of
our brains. As a modern society, we must be open to the possibilities
139
140
Altering Consciousness
References
Aaronson, B. S., & Osmond, H. (1970). Psychedelics: The uses and implications of
hallucinogenic drugs. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.
Aghajanian, G. K. (1980). Mescaline and LSD facilitate the activation of locus
coeruleus neurons by peripheral stimuli. Brain Research, 186, 492498.
Aghajanian, G. K., Foote, W. E., & Sheard, M. H. (1968). Lysergic acid diethylamide: Sensitive neuronal units in the midbrain raphe. Science, 161, 706708.
Aghajanian, G. K., Foote, W. E., & Sheard, M. H. (1970). Action of psychotogenic drugs on single midbrain raphe neurons. Journal of Pharmacology and
Experimental Therapy, 171, 178187.
Aghajanian, G. K., & Haigler, H. J. (1975). Hallucinogenic indoleamines: Preferential action upon presynaptic serotonin receptors. Psychopharmacology Communication, 1, 619629.
Aghajanian, G. K., Haigler, H. J., & Bloom, F. E. (1972). Lysergic acid diethylamide and serotonin: Direct actions on serotonin-containing neurons in rat
brain. Life Science International, 11, 615622.
Aghajanian, G. K., & Marek, G. J. (1997). Serotonin induces excitatory postsynaptic potentials in apical dendrites of neocortical pyramidal cells. Neuropharmacology, 36, 589599.
Aghajanian, G. K., & Marek, G. J. (1999a). Serotonin and hallucinogens. Neuropsychopharmacology, 21, 16S23S.
Aghajanian, G. K., & Marek, G. J. (1999b). Serotonin, via 5-HT2A receptors,
increases EPSCs in layer V pyramidal cells of prefrontal cortex by an asynchronous mode of glutamate release. Brain Research, 825, 161171.
Amargos-Bosch, M., Bortolozzi, A., Puig, M. V., Serrats, J., Adell, A., Celada, P., et al.
(2004). Co-expression and in vivo interaction of serotonin1A and serotonin2A
receptors in pyramidal neurons of prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 14, 281299.
Araneda, R., & Andrade, R. (1991). 5-Hydroxytryptamine2 and 5-hydroxytryptamine 1A receptors mediate opposing responses on membrane excitability in
rat association cortex. Neuroscience, 40, 399412.
Asanuma, C. (1992). Noradrenergic innervation of the thalamic reticular nucleus:
A light and electron microscopic immunohistochemical study in rats. Journal
of Comparative Neurology, 319, 299311.
Ashby, C. R. Jr., Edwards, E., & Wang, R. Y. (1994). Electrophysiological evidence
for a functional interaction between 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A receptors in the rat
medial prefrontal cortex: An iontophoretic study. Synapse, 17, 173181.
141
142
Altering Consciousness
receptors: A comparative iontophoretic study with LSD and serotonin. Neuropharmacology, 16, 811818.
Destexhe, A., Contreras, D., & Steriade, M. (1999). Spatiotemporal analysis of
local eld potentials and unit discharges in cat cerebral cortex during natural
wake and sleep states. Journal of Neuroscience, 19, 45954608.
Dittrich, A. (1998). The standardized psychometric assessment of altered states of
consciousness (ASCs) in humans. Pharmacopsychiatry, 31(Suppl. 2), 8084.
Doherty, M. D., & Pickel, V. M. (2000). Ultrastructural localization of the serotonin2A receptor in dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area. Brain
Research, 864, 176185.
Fox, R. (1967). Is LSD of value in treating alcoholics? In H. A. Abramson (Ed.),
The use of LSD in psychotherapy and alcoholism (pp. 477495). New York:
Bobbs-Merrill.
Freedman, D. X. (1968). On the use and abuse of LSD. Archives of General Psychiatry, 18, 330347.
Glennon, R. A., Titeler, M., & McKenney, J. D. (1984). Evidence for 5-HT2
involvement in the mechanism of action of hallucinogenic agents. Life Science,
35, 25052511.
Glennon, R. A., Young, R., & Rosecrans, J. A. (1983). Antagonism of the effects of
the hallucinogen DOM and the purported 5-HT agonist quipazine by 5-HT2
antagonists. European Journal of Pharmacology, 91, 189196.
Grant, S. J., Aston-Jones, G., & Redmond, D. E., Jr. (1988). Responses of primate
locus coeruleus neurons to simple and complex sensory stimuli. Brain Research
Bulletin, 21, 401410.
Gray, C. M., & Singer, W. (1989). Stimulus-specic neuronal oscillations in orientation columns of cat visual cortex. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences U S A, 86, 16981702.
Gresch, P. J., Barrett, R. J., Sanders-Bush, E., & Smith, R. L. (2007). 5-Hydroxytryptamine (serotonin) 2A receptors in rat anterior cingulate cortex mediate
the discriminative stimulus properties of d-lysergic acid diethylamide. Journal
of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 320, 662669.
Grifths, R., Richards, W., McCann, U., & Jesse, R. (2006). Psilocybin can occasion mystical-type experiences having substantial and sustained personal
meaning and spiritual signicance. Psychopharmacology, 187, 268283.
Grinspoon, L., & Bakalar, J. B. (1979). Psychedelic drugs reconsidered. New York:
Basic Books.
Grob, C. S., Danforth, A. L., Chopra, G. S., Hagerty, M., McKay, C. R., Halberstadt,
A. L., & Greer, G. R. (2011). A pilot study of psilocybin treatment for anxiety in
advanced-stage cancer patients. Archives of General Psychiatry, 68, 7178.
Grof, S., & Grof, C. (1980). Beyond death: The gates of consciousness. London:
Thames and Hudson.
Haider, B., Duque, A., Hasenstaub, A. R., & McCormick, D. A. (2006). Neocortical network activity in vivo is generated through a dynamic balance of excitation and inhibition. Journal of Neuroscience, 26, 45354545.
Haigler, H. J., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1973). Mescaline and LSD: Direct and indirect effects on serotonin-containing neurons in brain. European Journal of Pharmacology, 21, 5360.
Hobson, J. A. (2009). REM sleep and dreaming: Towards a theory of protoconsciousness. Nature Reviews of Neuroscience, 10, 803813.
Hunt, H. T., & Chefurka, C. M. (1976). A test of the psychedelic model of altered
states of consciousness. The role of introspective sensitization in eliciting
unusual subjective reports. Archives of General Psychiatry, 33, 867876.
Izhikevich, E. M., & Edelman, G. M. (2008). Large-scale model of mammalian
thalamocortical systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105,
35923598.
Jaffe, J. H. (1985). Drug addiction and drug abuse. In A. G. Gilman, L. S. Goodman, T. W. Rall, & F. Murad (Eds.), Goodman and Gilmans The pharmacological
basis of therapeutics (7th ed., pp. 532581). New York: Macmillan.
Lambe, E. K., & Aghajanian, G. K. (2001). The role of Kv1.2-containing potassium channels in serotonin-induced glutamate release from thalamocortical
terminals in rat frontal cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 21, 99559963.
Lewis, B. L., & ODonnell, P. (2000). Ventral tegmental area afferents to the prefrontal cortex maintain membrane potential up states in pyramidal neurons
via D1 dopamine receptors. Cerebral Cortex, 10, 11681175.
Liu, R., Jolas, T., & Aghajanian, G. (2000). Serotonin 5-HT(2) receptors activate
local GABA inhibitory inputs to serotonergic neurons of the dorsal raphe
nucleus. Brain Research, 873, 3445.
Llinas, R., & Ribary, U. (2001). Consciousness and the brain. The thalamocortical dialogue in health and disease. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
929, 166175.
Llinas, R., Ribary, U., Contreras, D., & Pedroarena, C. (1998). The neuronal basis
for consciousness. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society London B Biological Sciences, 353, 18411849.
Llinas, R., Urbano, F. J., Leznik, E., Ramirez, R. R., & van Marle, H. J. (2005).
Rhythmic and dysrhythmic thalamocortical dynamics: GABA systems and the
edge effect. Trends in Neuroscience, 28, 325333.
Marek, G. J., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1994). Excitation of interneurons in piriform
cortex by 5-hydroxytryptamine: Blockade by MDL 100,907, a highly selective
5-HT2A receptor antagonist. European Journal of Pharmacology, 259, 137141.
Marek, G. J., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1996). Alpha 1B-adrenoceptor-mediated excitation of piriform cortical interneurons. European Journal of Pharmacology, 305,
95100.
Marek, G. J., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1998). Indoleamine and the phenethylamine
hallucinogens: Mechanisms of psychotomimetic action. Drug and Alcohol
Dependence, 51, 189198.
Marek, G. J., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1999). 5-HT2A receptor or a1-adrenoceptor activation induces excitatory postsynaptic currents in layer V pyramidal cells of the
medial prefrontal cortex. European Journal of Pharmacology, 367, 197206.
143
144
Altering Consciousness
Massimini, M., Ferrarelli, F., Huber, R., Esser, S. K., Singh, H., & Tononi, G.
(2005). Breakdown of cortical effective connectivity during sleep. Science,
309, 22282232.
McCormick, D. A., & Bal, T. (1997). Sleep and arousal: Thalamocortical mechanisms. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 20, 185215.
McKenna, D. J., & Saavedra, J. M. (1987). Autoradiography of LSD and 2,5-dimethoxyphenylisopropylamine psychotomimetics demonstrates regional, specic
cross-displacement in the rat brain. European Journal of Pharmacology, 142,
313315.
Miner, L. A., Backstrom, J. R., Sanders-Bush, E., & Sesack, S. R. (2003). Ultrastructural localization of serotonin2A receptors in the middle layers of the rat
prelimbic prefrontal cortex. Neuroscience, 116, 107117.
Monti, J. M., & Jantos, H. (2008). The roles of dopamine and serotonin, and of
their receptors, in regulating sleep and waking. Progress in Brain Research,
172, 625646.
Moore, R. Y., Halaris, A. E., & Jones, B. E. (1978). Serotonin neurons of the midbrain raphe: Ascending projections. Journal of Comparative Neurology, 180,
417438.
Mukovski, M., Chauvette, S., Timofeev, I., & Volgushev, M. (2007). Detection of
active and silent states in neocortical neurons from the eld potential signal
during slow-wave sleep. Cerebral Cortex, 17, 400414.
Nichols, D. E. (1997). Role of serotoninergic neurons and 5-HT receptors in the action
of hallucinogens. In H. G. Baumgarten & M. Gothert (Eds.), Serotoninergic neurons
and 5-HT receptors in the CNS (pp. 563585). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
Nichols, D. E. (2004). Hallucinogens. Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 101, 131181.
Nocjar, C., Roth, B. L., & Pehek, E. A. (2002). Localization of 5-HT(2A) receptors
on dopamine cells in subnuclei of the midbrain A10 cell group. Neuroscience,
111, 163176.
Noyes, R., Jr. (1980). Attitude change following near-death experiences. Psychiatry, 43, 234242.
Otto, R. (1958). The idea of the holy; an inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea
of the divine and its relation to the rational (J. W. Harvey, trans.). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Page, M. E., & Valentino, R. J. (1994). Locus coeruleus activation by physiological challenges. Brain Research Bulletin, 35, 557560.
Pahnke, W. N. (1963). Drugs and mysticism. An analysis of the relationship between
psychedelic drugs and the mystical consciousness. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University).
Pahnke, W. N., & Richards, W. A. (1969). Implications of LSD and experimental
mysticism. In C. T. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness (pp. 399428). New
York: Wiley.
Pazos, A., Cortes, R., & Palacios, J. M. (1985). Quantitative autoradiographic
mapping of serotonin receptors in the rat brain. II. Serotonin-2 receptors.
Brain Research, 346, 231249.
Pazos, A., Probst, A., & Palacios, J. M. (1987). Serotonin receptors in the human
brainIV. Autoradiographic mapping of serotonin-2 receptors. Neuroscience,
21, 123139.
Penington, N. J. (1996). Actions of methoxylated amphetamine hallucinogens on
serotonergic neurons of the brain. Progress in Neuropsychopharmacology and
Biological Psychiatry, 20, 951965.
Plum, F. (1991). Coma and related global disturbances of the human conscious
state. In A. Peters & E. G. Jones (Eds.), Normal and altered states of function
(pp. 359425). New York: Plenum.
Puig, M. V., Artigas, F., & Celada, P. (2005). Modulation of the activity of
pyramidal neurons in rat prefrontal cortex by raphe stimulation in vivo:
Involvement of serotonin and GABA. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 114.
Puig, M. V., Celada, P., az-Mataix, L., & Artigas, F. (2003). In vivo modulation of the
activity of pyramidal neurons in the rat medial prefrontal cortex by 5-HT2A
receptors: Relationship to thalamocortical afferents. Cerebral Cortex, 13, 870882.
Puig, M. V., Watakabe, A., Ushimaru, M., Yamamori, T., & Kawaguchi, Y.
(2010). Serotonin modulates fast-spiking interneuron and synchronous activity in the rat prefrontal cortex through 5-HT1A and 5-HT2A Receptors. Journal
of Neuroscience, 30, 22112222.
Rasmussen, K., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1986). Effect of hallucinogens on spontaneous and sensory-evoked locus coeruleus unit activity in the rat: Reversal by
selective 5-HT2 antagonists. Brain Research, 385, 395400.
Ribary, U., Ioannides, A. A., Singh, K. D., Hasson, R., Bolton, J. P., Lado, F., et al.
(1991). Magnetic eld tomography of coherent thalamocortical 40-Hz oscillations
in humans. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences U S A, 88, 11,03711,041.
Rogawski, M. A., & Aghajanian, G. K. (1979). Response of central monoaminergic neurons to lisuride: Comparison with LSD. Life Science, 24, 12891297.
Sanchez-Vives, M. V., & McCormick, D. A. (2000). Cellular and network mechanisms of rhythmic recurrent activity in neocortex. Nature Neuroscience, 3,
10271034.
Santana, N., Bortolozzi, A., Serrats, J., Mengod, G., & Artigas, F. (2004). Expression of serotonin1A and serotonin2A receptors in pyramidal and GABAergic
neurons of the rat prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 14, 11001109.
Sara, S. J., & Segal, M. (1991). Plasticity of sensory responses of locus coeruleus
neurons in the behaving rat: Implications for cognition. Progress in Brain
Research, 88, 571585.
Schultes, R. E., & Hofmann, A. (1992). Plants of the gods: Their sacred, healing, and
hallucinogenic powers. Rochester, VT: Healing Arts Press.
Scruggs, J. L., Patel, S., Bubser, M., & Deutch, A. Y. (2000). DOI-induced activation of the cortex: Dependence on 5-HT2A heteroceptors on thalamocortical
glutamatergic neurons. Journal of Neuroscience, 20, 88468852.
Seth, A. K., Izhikevich, E., Reeke, G. N., & Edelman, G. M. (2006). Theories and
measures of consciousness: An extended framework. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences U S A, 103, 10,79910,804.
145
146
Altering Consciousness
Sherman, S. M., & Guillery, R. W. (1996). Functional organization of thalamocortical relays. Journal of Neurophysiology, 76, 13671395.
Smith, H. (1964). Do drugs have religious import? Journal of Philosophy, 61, 517530.
Smythies, J. (1997). The functional neuroanatomy of awareness: With a focus on
the role of various anatomical systems in the control of intermodal attention.
Consciousness and Cognition, 6, 455481.
Steriade, M., Contreras, D., Amzica, F., & Timofeev, I. (1996). Synchronization
of fast (3040 Hz) spontaneous oscillations in intrathalamic and thalamocortical networks. Journal of Neuroscience, 16, 27882808.
Titeler, M., Lyon, R. A., & Glennon, R. A. (1988). Radioligand binding evidence
implicates the brain 5-HT2 receptor as a site of action for LSD and phenylisopropylamine hallucinogens. Psychopharmacology Berlin, 94, 213216.
Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC
Neuroscience, 5, 42.
Torda, C. (1968). Contribution to serotonin theory of dreaming (LSD infusion).
N.Y. State Journal of Medicine, 68, 11351138.
Van Dyck, C. H., Tan, P.-Z., Baldwin, R. M., Amici, L. A., Garg, P. K., Ng, C. K.,
Soufer, R., Charney, D. S., & Innis, R. B. (2000). PET quantication of 5HT2A receptors in the human brain: A constant infusion paradigm with [18F]
altanserin. Journal of Nuclear Medicine, 41, 234241.
Vankov, A., Herve-Minvielle, A., & Sara, S. J. (1995). Response to novelty and
its rapid habituation in locus coeruleus neurons of the freely exploring rat.
European Journal of Neuroscience, 7, 11801187.
Vollenweider, F. X., & Geyer, M. A. (2001). A systems model of altered consciousness: Integrating natural and drug-induced psychoses. Brain Research
Bulletin, 56, 495507.
Vollenweider, F. X., Leenders, K. L., Scharfetter, C., Maguire, P., Stadelmann, O., &
Angst, J. (1997). Positron emission tomography and uorodeoxyglucose studies
of metabolic hyperfrontality and psychopathology in the psilocybin model of
psychosis. Neuropsychopharmacology, 16, 357372.
Vollenweider, F. X., Vollenweider-Scherpenhuyzen, M. F., Babler, A., Vogel, H., &
Hell, D. (1998). Psilocybin induces schizophrenia-like psychosis in humans via
a serotonin-2 agonist action. NeuroReport, 9, 38973902.
Watakabe, A., Komatsu, Y., Sadakane, O., Shimegi, S., Takahata, T., Higo, N.,
et al. (2009). Enriched expression of serotonin 1B and 2A receptor genes in
macaque visual cortex and their bidirectional modulatory effects on neuronal
responses. Cerebral Cortex, 19, 19151928.
Wright, I. K., Garratt, J. C., & Marsden, C. A. (1990). Effects of a selective 5-HT2
agonist, DOI, on 5-HT neuronal ring in the dorsal raphe nucleus and 5-HT
release and metabolism in the frontal cortex. Br.J Pharmacol, 99, 221222.
CHAPTER 7
148
Altering Consciousness
The earliest evidence of peyote use comes from two archaeological sites, one
in the Lower Pecos region of southwest Texas and the other a rock shelter
near Coahuila, Mexico. The rock shelter specimens have a radiocarbon date
to 6,000 B.C.E.1 Further evidence of possible peyote use in the Lower Pecos
River Region is suggested by stylized themes found on rock art that have
been interpreted as representing visionary peyote experiences these indigenous people felt compelled to reproduce (Boyd & Dering, 1996).
There is a strong link between desert dwelling hunter-gatherers, their
knowledge and use of peyote, and the migrations of people and trade
in peyote that reached beyond the Chihuahuan desert (Sahagu n,
19501969). At the time Spaniards arrived in Mexico, the ritual use of
peyote had spread to a wide range of indigenous peoples, including agriculturalists in Central Mexico such as Aztecs, Tarascans, and Tlaxcalans
(Stewart, 1987, p. 17). Peyote was seen by the Spanish clergy as a diabolical plant, evoking hallucinations that came from the blasphemous world
of the devil himself. Priests prepared a catechism to be used when conducting confessions with Indians: Hast thou eaten the esh of man? Hast
thou eaten the peyote? Do you suck the blood of others? Do you adorn
with owers places where idols are kept? (Taylor, 1944, pp. 176177).
Efforts to eradicate peyote use were integral to the Catholic Churchs campaign to destroy indigenous religion and forever change the worldview of
these peoples, a task they never entirely accomplished. Peyote use survived and continues to provide to some indigenous groups an intrinsic
connection between native religious tenets and phenomenological experiences induced by this mescaline-containing plant. The Native American
Church with its chapters and its afliates, the most prominent being the
Native American Church of Oklahoma, the Native American Church of
North America, and the Native American Church of Navajoland, boasts
1
Furst (1989) provides a radiocarbon date of 5,000 B.C. for a string of dried peyotes found in
a rock shelter in the Chihuahua desert of west Texas. Further dating of ancient peyote come
from two archaeological specimens in the collection of the Witte Museum in San Antonio,
Texas, of the dried tops of peyote presumably found in Shumla Cave No. 5 along the Rio
Grande in Texas. These specimens have been dated through thin-layer chromatography
and gas chromatographymass spectrometry to 5,700 years ago (El-Seedi et al., 2005).
Peyote specimens from Shumla Caves and Shelter CM-79 near Cuatro Cienegas in Coahuila,
Mexico, have been radiocarbon dated to 5,195 years BP and 835 BP, respectively, Interestingly, peyote specimens from the Shumala Caves have been discovered to be composed of
a mixture of peyote with other plant material and appear to have been intentionally made
as peyote efgies (Terry et al., 2006). Martin Terry, Department of Biology at Sul Ross University, is carrying out a populations genetics study on peyote growing from south and west
Texas into northern Mexico (personal communication, June 26, 2010).
149
150
Altering Consciousness
Auditory sensations such as sounds of the wind, music, and song, along
with voices, are amplied and are perceived differently. These are the sensations experienced by a shaman renowned for his musical abilities as a
violin player,
For about the rst hour I dont feel anything. Then my voice will start to feel
strange and I wont understand very well what people are speaking. Then I
will have a very strong urge to play music, so I will play my violin. I will listen to music coming out of the air, pure air. Then Ill be feeling that the air
is coming down, like a cloud that is being lowered onto the earth. Soon Ill
be able to hear anything very close and clear, but Ill hear things differently
than they normally sound. (Valadez, 1986, p. 21)
Olfactory and gustatory senses are also affected by peyote inebriation, as are
experiences that enhance the sense of touch to ones skin. Personal accounts
from Huichols and Native American Church members of their experiences
while in ceremony include the stimulation of memories that arise from the
smell of burning copal in the case of the Huichol, and cedar, in Native
American Church meetings. The olfactory system includes neuromodulators
2
151
152
Altering Consciousness
Altogether, these physiological sensations make the experiences unforgettably distinctive and profound. As we have seen within Huichol and Native
American Church traditions, when peyote is consumed within a ritualized
context and under the guidance of a religious specialist, the experiences
can be so exceptionally out of the ordinary that they are life transforming.
Experiences from hallucinogen-producing substances under supportive
conditions within western culture can also evoke experiences that have
been reported to be so personally meaningful and spiritually signicant that
participants carry memories of these mystic experiences with them more
than a year after they occurred (Grifths et al., 2008).
153
154
Altering Consciousness
Neal Benowitz, Professor of Medicine, Psychiatry and Biopharmaceutical Sciences, University of California, San Francisco, has been carrying out extensive studies for more than
20 years on the effects of tobacco on the human system.
their mountain homelands on the journey to the peyote desert. They must
confess their sexual transgressions to the entire group as the leading shaman
ties knots in a cord made from plant bers for every name a pilgrim mentions. Standing in front of the re, the shaman passes this knotted cord over
each individuals body and then throws it into the re. A ritual name is given
to each pilgrim, marking his or her entrance into another reality, a change
from mundane to sacred time. Together the pilgrims are unied for the
entire journey and for subsequent peyote ceremonies until the season
changes and the agricultural cycle begins.
Physical and psychological preparations ready Huichols for their
peyote experiences. Everyone fasts throughout the pilgrimage, eating only
small amounts of food and drinking little water only late in the day or
early evening. Most pilgrimages take place anywhere from December to
March, one of the coldest and windiest times of the year in the desert.
These environmental factors also contribute to changes in the neurochemistry in the brain that inuence sensory perceptions. The desert is a dry,
dusty landscape with thorny shrubs, agaves, and cacti; one must walk
with great caution to avoid serious injury in this environment. Firewood
is scarce and the nights can be bitterly cold. The day can be extremely
bright from the sun or bitingly windy from sandstorms. The alteration of
consciousness through fasting and exposure to the desert elements prepares the pilgrims physically and psychologically for a transformative
experience. The leading shamans help guide the pilgrims on their journey.
As previously noted, tobacco is used judiciously to regulate the peyote
experience. Sometimes other plants are ingested along with the peyote.
Upon the direction of a shaman, some eat slices of a barrel cactus they call
maxa kwaxi along with peyote. It is eaten so that one does not become too
empeyotado. Slices of Ariocarpus retusus are sometimes consumed with
peyote, as are the grated pieces of the yellow root of the plant uxa, (Mahonia
trifoliolata) used for face painting (Bauml, Voss, & Collings, 1990).4
4
This species of barrel cactus belongs to either the genus Ferocactus or Echinocactus and is
commonly referred to as visnaga (James A. Bauml, personal communication, September 12,
1994). To date, no botanical identication or chemical analysis has been reported for this
particular species. However, Alexander Shulgin (personal communication, December 29,
1995) informed me that in the appendix of his cactus species tabulation he notes that other
varieties of cactus including Echinocactus caespitosus, Echinocactus horizontalis, Echinocactus
polycephalus, and Echinocactus texensis show positive tests for isoquinoline and phenethylamine alkaloids. Several Huichols have discussed with Bauml and me these desertdwelling plants and their personal experiences when ingesting them with peyote. More
research is needed to fully understand the depth of plant knowledge Huichols have regarding the environment in Wirikuta and the effects that are achieved by using admixture
plants with peyote.
155
156
Altering Consciousness
157
158
Altering Consciousness
These peyote visions powerfully manifest Huichol core symbols, providing vivid experiences to individuals in which they actually interact with
their gods and participate in cosmological realms that structure Huichol
collective worldview. Such profound experiences reverberate at the core
of ones existence; individuals become cognizant that these entities exist
in dimensions one can access through peyote and in dreams. Eventually,
they become an integral part of ones waking reality.
It is crucial to understand that the animal experiments did not precisely replicate the
dose/response of peyote consumption, nor its effects on a human mother and her fetus.
Peyote contains many more alkaloids besides mescaline. Additionally, human beings ingest
peyote, they do not inject it. Differentiating factors also exist between research animals and
human beings, the dosage of mescaline administered, and the stage of fetal development.
In only one laboratory experiment congenital malformations of the fetus were found; this
was with hamsters that were injected with a large dose on the eighth day of pregnancy
(Greber, 1967)
159
160
Altering Consciousness
much, and that 50% of newborns sleep time is REM sleep, is because REM
provides the stimulation necessary for central nervous system development in young infants. Some believe that REM sleep provides stimulation
that the infant does not get from the environment because it spends little
time in an alert state (Berk, 2006, p. 130; DiPietro, Hoddgson, Costigan,
& Hilton, 1996; de Weerd & van den Bossche, 2003). The earlier the
stimulation, the better the childs central nervous system will develop,
including cognitive abilities, reex abilities, musical abilities, and so
forth.6 Thus, peyote consumed by the mother may have a stimulating
effect on the baby.
Some Huichol women allege that the fetus can denitely feel the effects
of peyote; after a quiet period, fetuses can become very active and move in
the womb. Some women say that the baby is dancing inside. As for communication between mother and fetus, one female shaman who specializes
in fertility and childbirth explained,
The baby naturally is much purer than others, the gods are helping it, like
the re and the deer, like the shaman who blesses the re and blesses the
sun . . . for this reason when the mother eats peyote she knows everything
that is happening and the baby knows, too.
One man, speaking for his wife said, When a pregnant woman eats
peyote, she and her baby get drunk with the peyote. My wife said that
when this happened to her, the baby got real quiet. He claried that the
two do communicate, not with words but through their thoughts, telepathically.
My wife said that when this happened to her that she and the baby went up
to the sky, to Niwetuka (the goddess who cares for the souls). The baby is
still inside the mothers womb, but its iyari goes to Niwetuka. The mothers
iyari goes there, too.
Afterward, he said, when the effects of the peyote had worn off, the iyari of
the fetus returns to its place in the womb and that of the mother returns to
her body.
Another female shaman told of her sisters peyote experience in the
eighth month of her pregnancy.
At rst it hurts. Then the baby inside is real quiet. Then it moves around a
lot. The baby is empeyotado also but does not know how to communicate
well. My sister said that when she was pregnant and empeyotada that
although the baby was inside of her she saw it right in front of her eyes.
She didnt talk with the baby. She communicated with the gods to see that
everything was all right, that the baby was formed well and there was nothing wrong with it.
The children of female shamans may receive more peyote than children of
women who are not. Shamans tend to consume more peyote than others.
One shaman shared her peyote experience in Wirikuta when she was
2 months pregnant with her son.
(In Wirikuta) I thought we would eat a lot of peyote, to see what we could
encounter to learn more about our customs. So I ate eight large peyote, and
the peyote was strong, I got dizzy and then empeyotada. I never thought that
I was pregnant. Kauyumarie (the deer messenger) appeared like a person,
and told me how I was feeling . . . He was talking to me from his heart . . .
I think that Kauyumarie was talking to (my son in my womb). I didnt think
the baby would be a boy. Afterwards the shamans said that he was given to
me in Wirikuta by the gods, with our goddess Uili Uvi, the mother of
peyote, so that our customs will not be lost . . . That is why he was born,
why they gave him to me in Wirikuta, with me eating peyote, thats why
he is peyote. I think he is peyote. He likes to eat peyote a lot . . . thats
how (some) are born.
161
162
Altering Consciousness
peyote-related perinatal experiences could inuence cognitive development and enable individuals access to dimensions of human consciousness generally unchartered in Western culture. Given the fact that
Huichols, like their ancestors, have been practicing their peyote traditions
for thousands of years, consuming this cactus does not appear to be a maladaptive trait. Huichols themselves say that their peyote customs come
from their gods and are orchestrated by the wise old shamans; the health
and well-being of their people and the fate of their children lie in the
hands of the ancient ones.
A female shaman explained it this way:
I always like to eat peyote. It doesnt matter if I am pregnant . . . If I feel well
I like to eat it. There in Wirikuta the people pray to the gods and for some
the gods give them the prize, (a child) that has the design of a shaman . . . a
clearer of elds . . . or a deer hunter . . . Thats how they are born, I think
that it happens like this because it is a custom that will never be lost.
Conclusion
Western science has much to learn from cultures such as the Huichols,
who, over the centuries, have acquired an intimate knowledge of peyote
and its effects. They have developed and ne-tuned an elaborate worldview that provides members with tools, rituals, set, and setting to explore
and advance their understanding of consciousness and human existence.
The introduction of peyote to babies while in the womb or as children
may create distinct pathways in their cognitive development. Exposure
to peyote and its psychoactive principles when young enables Huichols
to perceive the world through a variety of lenses. Through their peyote
customs, Huichols gain a strong sense of cultural identity that lasts
throughout their lifetimes, an identity that is well informed about consciousness and modied states of experiencing internally and externally
the many dimensions of the universe that surrounds them.
References
Anderson, E. F. (1996). Peyote: The divine cactus. Tucson: University of Arizona
Press.
Bauml, J. A., Voss, G., & Collings, P. (1990). Short communications, uxa identied. Journal of Ethnobiology, 10, 99101.
Berk, L. E. (2006). Child development. Boston: Pearson Education.
Boyd, C. E., & Dering, J. P. (1996). Medicinal and hallucinogenic plants identied in the sediments and pictographs of the Lower Pecos, Texas archaic.
Antiquity, 7, 256275.
Bruhn, J. G., El-Seedi, H. R., Stephanson, N., Beck, O., & Shulgin, A. T. (2008).
Short communication, ecstasy analogues found in cacti. Journal of Psychoactive
Drugs, 40, 219222.
Cardena, E. (2009). Beyond Plato? Toward a science of alterations of consciousness. In C. A. Roe, W. Kramer, & L. Coly (Eds.), Utrecht II: Charting the future
of parapsychology (pp. 305322). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
de Weerd, A. W., & van den Bossche, A. S. (2003). The development of sleep
during the rst months of life. Sleep Medicine Reviews, 7, 179191.
DiPietro, J. A., Hoddgson, D. M., Costigan, K. A., & Hilton, S. C. (1996). Fetal
neurobehavioral development. Child Development, 67, 25532567.
Eger, S. (1978). Huichol womens art. In K. Berin (Ed.), Art of the Huichol Indians
(pp. 3553). New York: Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco/Harry
N. Abrams.
El-Seedi, H., De Smet, P. A., Beck, O., Possnert, G., & Bruhn, J. G. (2005). Prehistoric peyote use: Alkaloid analysis and radiocarbon dating of archaeological
specimens of Lophophora from Texas. Journal of Ethnopharmacology, 101,
238242.
Furst, P. T. (1969). To nd our life: The peyote hunt of the Huichols of Mexico
[Video]. Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Media Division.
Furst, P. T. (1972). To nd our life: Peyote among the Huichol Indians of Mexico.
In P. T. Furst (Ed.), Flesh of the gods: The ritual use of hallucinogens (pp. 136184).
New York: Praeger.
Furst. P. T. (1989). Review of Peyote religion: A history, by Omer Stewart. American
Ethnologist, 16, 386387.
Greber, W. (1967). Congenital malformations induced by mescaline, lysergic acid
diethylamide, and bromolysergic acid in the hamster. Science, 157, 265266.
Grifths, R. R., Richards. W. A., Johnson, M. W., McCann, U. D., & Jesse, R.
(2008). Mystical-type experiences occasioned by psilocybin mediate the attribution of personal meaning and spiritual signicance 14 months later. Journal
of Psychopharmacology, 22, 621632.
Grof. S. (1988a). Human survival and consciousness evolution (M. L. Valier, Ed.).
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Grof, S. (1988b). The adventure of self-discovery: Dimensions of consciousness and
new perspectives in psychotherapy. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Halpern, J. H., Sewell, A. R., Hudson, J. I., Yurgelun-Todd, D., & Pope, H. G. Jr.
(2005). Psychological and cognitive effects of long-term peyote use among
Native Americans. Biological Psychiatry, 58, 624631.
Herz, R. S., & Engen, T. (1996). Odor memory: Review and analysis. Psychonomic
Bulletin and Review, 3, 300313.
Horowitz, M. J. (1978). Image formation and cognition. Appleton-Century-Crofts
and Fleschner.
163
164
Altering Consciousness
Jones, G. M., Sahakian, B. J., Levy, R., Warburton, D. M., & Gray, J. A. (1992).
Effects of acute subcutaneous nicotine on attention, information processing and
short-term memory in Alzheimers disease. Psychopharmacology, 108, 485494.
MacLean, P. D. (1990). The triune brain in evolution: Role in paleocerebral functions.
New York: Plenum.
Maickel, R. P., & Snodgras, W. R. (1973). Psychochemical factors in maternal
fetal distribution of drugs. Toxicology and Applied Pharmacology, 26, 218230.
Mandell, A. (1977). The neurochemistry of religious insight and ecstasy. In
K. Berin (Ed.), Art of the Huichol Indians (pp. 7181). New York: Fine Arts Museums of San Francisco/Harry N. Abrams.
McCleary, J. A., Sypherd, P. S., & Walkington, D. L. (1960). Antibiotic activity of
an extract of peyote Lophorphora williamsii (Lemaire) Coulter. Economic Botany,
14, 247249.
Morens, D. M., Grandinetti, A., Reed, L., White, L. R., & Ross, G. W. (1995).
Cigarette smoking and protection from Parkinsons disease: False association
or etiologic clue? Neurology, 45, 10411051.
Myerhoff, B. G. (1974). Peyote hunt: The sacred journey of the Huichol Indians.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Reichel-Dolmatoff, G. (1978). Beyond the Milky Way: Hallucinatory imagery of the
Tukano Indians. L. A. UCLA Latin American Studies Volume 42, University of
California, Los Angeles.
de Sahagun, B. (19501969). Florentine Codex: A general history of the things of
New Spain (C. E. Dibble and A. J. Anderson, trans.). Salt Lake City: University
of Utah Press and School of American Research, Santa Fe.
Schaefer, S. B. (1996). The crossing of the souls: Peyote, perception, and meaning
among the Huichol Indians. In S. B. Schaefer & P. T. Furst (Eds.), People of the
peyote: Huichol Indian history, religion and survival (pp. 138168). Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
Schultes, R. E. (1938). The appeal of peyote (Lophphora williamsii) as a medicine.
American Anthropologist, 40, 698725.
Shah, N. S., Neely, A. E., Shah, K. R., & Lawrence, R. S. (1973). Placental transfer
and tissue distribution of Mescaline-14C in the mouse. Journal of Pharmacology
and Experimental Therapeutics, 182, 489493.
Shulgin, A. T., & Perry, W. E. (2002). The simple plant isoquinolines. Berkeley, CA:
Transform Press.
Siegel, R., & Jarvick, M. (1975). Drug-induced hallucinations in animals and
man. In R. Siegel & L. West (Eds.), Hallucinations: Behavior, experience and
theory (pp. 81161). New York: Wiley.
Snyder, S. (1996). Drugs and the brain. New York: Scientic American Library.
Stewart, O. C. (1987). Peyote religion: A history. Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press.
Taska, R. J., & Schoolar, J. C. (1972). Placental transfer and fetal distribution of
Mescaline-14C in monkeys. Journal of Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics, 182, 427432.
Taylor, N. (1944). Come and expel the green pain. Scientic Monthly, 58, 174184.
Terry, M., Steelman, K., Guilderson, D., Dering, P., & Rowe, M. (2006). Lower
Pecos and Coahuila peyote: New radiocarbon dates. Journal of Archaeological
Science, 33, 176184.
Thurston, L. (1997). Entopic imagery in people and their art. M.A. thesis, N.Y. University. Retrieved July 3, 2010, from http://home.comcast.net/~markk2000/
thurston/thesis.html
Valadez, S. (1986) Dreams and visions from the gods: An interview with Ulu
Temay, Huichol shaman. Shamans Drum, 6, 1823.
West, L. J. (1962). A general theory of hallucinations and dreams. In L. J. West
(Ed.), Hallucinations (pp. 275291). New York: Grune & Stratton.
Wilson, D. A. (2006). Learning to smell: Olfactory perception from neurobiology to
behavior. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Winkelman, M. (1996). Psychointegrator plants: Their roles in human culture
and health. Yearbook of Cross-Cultural Medicine and Psychotherapy, 5, 953.
165
CHAPTER 8
168
Altering Consciousness
are taking, but for some the risks do not deter the addictive impulses. For
example, the recognized horrors of the addictive experience are ignored
by the user in the repeated search for the noted pleasurable effects associated with the high of a cocaine rush. To the outsider, the drug-intoxicated
users do not always seem to be in pleasurable states. People who try drugs
often rst get dizzy or sick, some even vomit. Users have to learn to like their
intoxicated states of consciousness (Becker, 1963). Some writers1 have
described the addicts dramatic indifference toward everything but his or
her favorite drug and refer to the paradox of addiction: Intoxication is not
an euphoric or pleasurable state anymore (Diekhoff, 1982; Plant 1999).
Consequently, some cultivate highly polytoxicomanic daily consumption
patterns of stimulants to work and depressants to relax, a typical feature of
modern societies. Consumption of drugs and their effects on consciousness
are at the core of one of the most serious problems of modern societies, that
of addictions.
Several artists (see Volume 1) have described their experiences with drugs and addiction.
William Burroughs, Aleister Crowley, Thomas de Quincey, Eric Clapton, and Keith
Richards, to name just a few, have used drugs for inspiration and were known for their
excessive consumption (Diekhoff, 1982; Fachner, 2006; Plant, 1999; Shapiro, 2003).
169
170
Altering Consciousness
171
172
Altering Consciousness
2000). Acceptance and use of a certain psychotropic substance in a population, a subcultural group, an occupational group, and so forth involve
learned behaviors determined by personal characteristics and sociocultural factors (Becker, 1963; Blatter, 2007). Expectations shape personal
behavior and experiences, and drug use involves signicant others that
facilitate access and participate in producing the experience. Use, abuse,
and addiction are seen as phenomena of conformance to a behavior that is
(sub)culturally accepted and assisted (Becker, 1963). Even the felt effects
of consumption are culturally formed (Blatter, 2000, 2007).
Individual and cultural variations in responses to drugs reect total
drug effects, how the physiological effects of substances are mediated by
personal, social, and cultural inuences. Helman (1994) makes the distinction between macro and micro context effects. Macro context drug
effects involve inuences from the sociocultural system; these include
social, political, economic, and moral factors and inuences from family,
other users, advertising, and sales processes. These are illustrated by the
greater effectiveness of brand-name analgesics over unlabeled sources of
the same drug (Moerman, 2000). Micro context effects are reected in
set and setting inuences. These involve the expectations of the recipient, including attitudes, knowledge, and cognitive preferences of the person (the set as in mindset) and the social and physical context (setting)
of the drug consumption or medication. These psychodynamic effects are
investigated as part of placebo effects, where nonpharmacological factors
include arbitrary drug attributes such as color and shape, the physical setting in which the drug is administered, and the prescribers characteristics
such as status and personality. The nding that drug effects, addiction,
and dependence are situationally, socially, and culturally determined
questions the disease view of addiction (Peele, 1985, p. 128). Nonbiological factors, such as personality, cognitive and developmental factors, cultural, social, situational, and ritualistic aspects, inuence the reaction to
drugs (Blatter, 2007). Situational factors reect a reality of desire, that
drug effects cannot be separated from the situation in which the drug is
taken. The rituals that accompany use and addiction are important elements in continued use and show the important ritualistic aspect of use
and dependence.
173
174
Altering Consciousness
175
176
Altering Consciousness
177
178
Altering Consciousness
in the reward system, as does cannabis use (Mechoulam, Hanus, & Martin,
1994). Other substances like cocaine, amphetamines, and MDMA also
lead primarily to increased release of dopamine in the reward system.
Following dopaminergic release, endorphins are also released in the reward
system.
Psychoactive substances, as well as physical stimuli or behavioral patterns perceived as pleasurable, have reinforcing properties that can be
ascribed to the neuronal reward system. The complex systems of neurotransmitters interacting with the nervous system to arouse euphoria are
not yet satisfactorily understood. The reward system theory postulates that
reaching pleasurable or euphoric states is the major goal of drug users and
addicts; further, that emotional assessment of occurrences leads to the
preference for states that are perceived as pleasant by the nervous system.
Psychoactive drugs as well as specic behavioral patterns can activate the
rewarding system and are therefore used to close the cycle of motivationsearch-fulllment (Emrich & Schneider, 2006). Eating chocolate or a
refreshing drink with some sugar, as well as various other activities, can
also activate the reward system (Small, Zatorre, Dagher, Evans, & JonesGotman, 2001).
179
180
Altering Consciousness
(top-down) data take place (Emrich & Schneider, 2006). Within this context, there are two possibilities to develop addiction:
a. Drugs with a relative solid internal assessment (like opiates) are to a large
extent independent of situational cues. They have a hermetic or closed,
context-independent, and immediate effect on pain and tension while acting on the primary mesolimbic centers of assessment and induce pleasurable states with the accordant reinforcement properties, independent of
contextual or situational cues.
b. Drugs with a contextual bonding and assessment (like cannabis and
hallucinogens) are more situational in their effect. Emotions and perceptions mediated by the hippocampal comparator systems modulate the
drug effect much more than drugs with a solid internal assessment
(Emrich & Schneider, 2006, p. 16).
There are differences in the degree and frequency of striving and fullling rewarding bodily activations. If the frequency of events becomes very
high, as observed in lab rats that could not resist acting to receive the next
electrical activation of their reward centers, then the body is in danger,
whether it is from an overdose of sugar and cacao, 3 liters of whisky, or
a big dopamine release in getting the next big share from a complex nancial deal. The nancial crisis in 2008 suggests that those who were making
big money exhibited the same pattern of loss of control and irresponsibility as addicted drug users. Neuro-economical research has shown that
expecting to make monetary prot and being able to possess expensive
cultural objects such as expensive sports cars induces a strong activation
in the reward system, namely in the ventral striatum, nucleus accumbens,
and orbitofrontal cortex (Elliott, Newman, Longe, & Deakin, 2003; Erk,
Spitzer, Wunderlich, Galley, & Walter, 2002; Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser,
& Hommer, 2000), areas that inuence decision-making processes by
valencing expected rewards and their intensity. This illustrates a fundamental feature of addiction, its relationship to some extrinsic system of
reward and evaluation.
181
182
Altering Consciousness
References
Aberle, D. (1966). The Peyote religion among the Navaho. Chicago: Aldine.
Alcoholics Anonymous (1976). Alcoholics Anonymous. New York: AA World
Services.
Alcoholics Anonymous (1987). Twelve steps and twelve traditions. New York:
AA World Services.
Ammon-Treiber, S., Mayer, P., & Hollt, V. (2006). Pharmakologische Aspekte
der Opiatabhangigkeit [Pharamacological aspects of opiate addiction]. In H.
M. Emrich & U. Schneider (Eds.), Facetten der Sucht. Von der Neurobiologie
zur Anthropologie [Facets of addiction. From neurobiology to anthropology],
(pp. 5163). Frankfurt, Germany: Peter Lang.
Becker, H. S. (1963). Outsiders: Studies in the sociology of deviance. New York: Free
Press.
Berridge, K. C., & Kringelbach, M. L. (2008). Affective neuroscience of pleasure:
Reward in humans and animals. Psychopharmacology, 199, 457480.
183
184
Altering Consciousness
185
186
Altering Consciousness
187
CHAPTER 9
Introduction
The topic of human sexuality has held a prominent position throughout history. A variety of different perspectives has been applied to the understanding of sexual behaviors, including psychobiology (Davidson, 1980; Passie
et al., 2005), phenomenological and existential psychology (Kockelmans,
1987; Koestenbaum, 1974; Valle, 1998), and humanistic and transpersonal
psychologies (Boorstein, 1996, 1997; Frankl, 1966, 1978; Friedman, 1992;
Hart & Tomlinson, 1970; Holbrook, 2008; Kleinplatz, 2001a; Wade, 2004;
Washburn, 1994). In human sexuality research, contributions of content,
method, and approach from humanistic psychology (Farber, Brink, &
Raskin, 1996; Kirschenbaum & Henderson, 1989; Maslow, 1987; May,
1969; Rowan, 1988) as well as experiential orientations (Kleinplatz, 1998,
2001b; Wade, 2004) have enriched our understanding of the human aspect
of sexual activity. Historical surveys of sexual behavior have revealed
the ubiquity of the human preoccupation with sex both substantially
and historically (de Riencort, 1974; Lewinsohn, 1958; Sussman, 1976;
190
Altering Consciousness
Taylor, 1953). To a great extent, the degree to which the different patterns
of sexuality were either accepted or condemned has reected specic
cultural beliefs that were adhered to within a given time and setting (e.g.,
Bloch, 1933; Jensen, 1976; Sussman, 1976).
There is a great deal of material that supports the cultural relativity of
sexual practices and beliefs in our culture today (e.g., Gould, 1976). A
review of the historical trends and contemporary attitudes held toward
sexuality quickly illustrates the developmental sequences that have led to
the current state of sexual expression, be it behavioral or attitudinal, in
many parts of the world (e.g., Brecher, 1976; Sussman, 1976). Present cultural trends demonstrate many social changes, and there is little question
that these changes have an impact on the ways we view or conceptualize
sexual behavior. New scientic discoveries, changes in the legal statutes
concerning sexual behavior, and humanitys increased awareness of its
own psychological nature have all contributed to the growing demands
for new modes and perspectives of sexual expression. To this day, there
is considerable ongoing research in human sexuality, most notably in the
areas of physiology (Guyton & Hall, 2000) and biochemistry (Haselton,
2006). Unfortunately, in the process of rening empirical strategies in
biological research, the trend toward further elucidating the psychological
and phenomenological dimensions of sexuality has been largely ignored.
Given this state of affairs, some of us undertook a research study in the
early 1980s to explore this area of study. To put this work in perspective, a
review of writings in this area will be briey discussed, highlighting both
phenomenological and psychophysiological perspectives. These include
the works of Rudolph Von Urban (1949, 1958), Marghanita Laski
(1961), Andrew Greeley (1977), Charles Tart (1978), Julian Davidson
(1980), Jenny Wade (2004), Torsten Passie and colleagues (2003, 2004,
2005), and Lisbeth Jane Holbrook (2008). A brief overview of sexual
activity as an altered state of consciousness (Davidson, 1980, Tart, 1975)
will be presented, including views from early psychological theories
(Freud, 1905, 1933; Reich, 1980/1933), and a synopsis of sexual practices
found in some Hindu tantric, Buddhist tantric, and Taoist traditions.
experiences couples had with each other through what he called differences
in bioelectrical potentials that were exchanged during sexual union (Von
Urban, 1949). Among the phenomena reported were enhanced visual and
tactile sensations, shifts in emotional states, and intense feelings of ecstasy.
Later, Von Urban outlined specic procedures that people could use during
sexual intercourse to achieve these experiences, a method he referred to as
karezza. In the course of his clinical work, he offered these techniques to
his clients. Von Urban was the rst person to record very small numbers
of detailed descriptions of peoples experiences in this area. Unfortunately,
his writings (Von Urban, 1949, 1958) did not attract much attention.
Marghanita Laskis contribution to this area was to survey individual
descriptions of ecstasy and to isolate those events that triggered these
experiences (Laski, 1961). Among the triggers in her group of participants
(18 women and 8 men), she found that sexual love was the most important factor responsible for inducing ecstatic states within a signicant percentage of her research participants. Ecstasies triggered by sexual love
were characterized by strong feelings of release or renewal, a decrease in
feelings of indifference and of ones self-identity, and a comparatively
low gain of feelings of knowledge. Unfortunately, her study had a number
of drawbacks: It included only a small number of research participants
and they were not randomly selected for her study; her analyses were
largely descriptive rather than quantitative; and the self-reports given by
her participants lacked specic details or descriptions of the experiences.
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, Laski must be credited with at least
exploring this neglected area of study.
A third set of studies in this area was conducted by Andrew M. Greeley
and William C. McCready involving some 2,300 research participants
(Greeley, 1977). These investigators explored the relationship between
(a) marital condition and satisfaction and (b) three types of mystical experiences: those triggered by lovemaking, childbirth, and a third variety that
was termed a light experience. Greeley and McCready found that 6 percent of their sample reported experiencing ecstasy only during lovemaking, while 1 percent of their sample reported visualizing lights while also
experiencing ecstasy during lovemaking. The largest group of people
reported having these lovemaking experiences were married (the majority
of them happily married), although unmarried men more often reported
having ecstatic experiences than unmarried women. Unfortunately, this
study had a number of limitations: The limited number of people reporting their ecstatic experience, the lack of detail concerning the nature of
the experiences reported, and methodological issues concerning the validity and reliability of the respondents reports.
191
192
Altering Consciousness
Wilhelm Reich
Wilhelm Reich expanded on Freuds concept that the ego is bodybased (i.e., based on erogenous zones), and portrayed psychological
defense mechanisms as both internal cognitive processes and external manifestations that he referred to as body armoring (Reich, 1980/1933). Reich
described body armoring as chronic muscle tensions that protect the ego
from being overwhelmed with unacceptable feelings (cited in Friedman,
2005, p. 1) and considered that through therapeutic touch and other means
a liberation of the natural orgasmic reex could be achieved.
193
194
Altering Consciousness
all of which tend to disrupt the normal state of consciousness and stop the
internal dialogue that is a condition of its maintenance. Major physiological
changes that operate here include vasomotor and muscular events and,
generally, strong autonomic nervous system activation, which resemble
destabilizing events for many other ASCs. The capacity to let go of inhibition and self consciousness is necessary to some extent for orgasm, as it
seems to be for mystical (and other) ASCs. (p. 293)
195
196
Altering Consciousness
197
198
Altering Consciousness
Hindu Tantra
Tantra is a spiritual practice associated with achieving enlightenment
and transcendent states through the use of rituals, art, meditation, visualization, mantras, breathing techniques, yogic postures, and sexual asanas
(Johari, 1986; Padoux, 1981). According to Johari (1986), both Hindu
and Buddhist Tantra are believed to have originated from India in the
7th century as a rebellion against prevailing Hindu beliefs that limited or
forbid the practice of sex, although its origins and main goals are still
debated among scholars. Both of these traditions emphasize the importance of female deities (e.g., sakti), engage in the ritualistic use of meat,
wine, and meditation to unify with the chosen deity, and use mantra,
mandalas, and symbolic speech and diagrams. Although spiritual beliefs
for each tradition are slightly different, both have the goal of attaining
enlightenment through the use of these practices.
The ritual in Hindu tantrism that used sexual intimacy as a vehicle for
achieving transcendence was known as maithuna. Maithuna was employed
to hasten the awakening of kundalini. Kundalini referred to the female
energy existing in latent form. The goal was to awaken this energy to unite
with Siva, the Pure Consciousness pervading the universe (Mookerjee,
1991). Through yogic techniques, this energy is raised up along a central
channel or nadi through six centers (cakras) of the body to the crown of
the head, leading to a state of liberation and transcendence. A detailed
description of the esoteric physiology involved in these practices
appeared in Eliade (1969) and specic features of the maithuna ritual
appeared in Bharati (1965) and Marglin (1980).
Within this practice, there are a number of interrelated goals that may
be achieved. These include raising the kundalini, experiencing liberation,
experiencing the divinity of the act, and so on. Eventually, there is no need
to have sexual intercourse with a physical woman. One can visualize having intercourse with a woman, visualize the union of Shiva and Sakti and
the topmost cakra, imagine the kundalini rising and piercing the cakras,
or visualize the union through use of symbolic (geometric) gures.
Tibetan Buddhism
Within Tibetan scholarship, there has been the question of whether or
not taking a consort is a metaphorical, visualized practice or a concrete ritual (see Maliszewski, 1993). To this end, descriptions of the esoteric
physiology appear in Gyatso (1982) and a somewhat disguised description
of the sexual process can be found in Mullin (1981). Within Tibetan
Buddhism, nearly one fth of the practices involve use of a human consort. Voidness and compassion must be experienced before the sexual ritual; otherwise it remains on the level of an ordinary couple practicing
yoga. A monk must rst practice visualization of a consort (male and
female together) alone in meditation. Signicantly, it is important to note
that the experience emerging from use of a consort is much more
advanced than full realization of the Void (Maliszewski, 1993).
As with Hindu tantra, there is an emphasis placed upon directing energy
into the central channel transversing the spine. Directing of the prana in to
the central channel (avadhuti) depends upon internal and external circumstances. When one reaches this level of practice, one is close to the attainment of Buddhahood. The man must refrain from ejaculation. Seminal
uid is directed up the central channel instead of outward. If the yogi
releases, he needs to begin all over again: retake initiations, purify himself,
and perform all the preliminaries. The state of mind achieved through the
ritual is maintained after the practice, the physical union serving as a
boost. The term given to this mind state is the great union beyond learning (mislobpai zung jug). According to Tibetan doctrine, the nal goal of
Buddhahood cannot be achieved without this practice (Maliszewski, 1993).
199
200
Altering Consciousness
201
202
Altering Consciousness
have access to their answers (p. 44). The respondents in the present
inquiry completed their questionnaires anonymously.
Goldbergs initial modication of the MMPI (Goldberg, 1965) consists
of 210 test items derived from the original MMPI. Its basic purpose is to
establish an index for discriminating neurotic and psychotic MMPI proles. Furthermore, it also serves the purpose of indicating the general level
of maladjustment. The original MMPI (consisting of more than 500 test
items) was far too time consuming to employ in the study, and this was
the central reason for deciding to utilize the Goldberg Index. In addition,
to disguise the connotations associated with clinical evaluations, the
Goldberg variant was termed simply the Self-Rating Behavioral Inventory
(SRBI). This test has been found to be effective in classifying proles diagnostically (see Graham, 1987). Several Goldberg indices were later developed, discriminating psychiatric from sociopathic and normal from
deviant (non-normal) proles (terminology used by Goldberg, 1972).
This investigation used all three indices.
Experimental Design
The design of this study was a survey conducted (a) for the purpose of
eliminating those test items from the questionnaire that people do not experience or that they have difculty understanding; (b) to test the reliability and
validity of the PDOSEI, Form I; and (c) to provide preliminary pilot information as to the types of sexual experiences reported by a sample of people in
the United States (Maliszewski, Vaughan, Krippner, & Holler, 2008).
The PDOSEI, Form I, and three validity scales were administered in a
counterbalanced order to 98 participants (41 males, 57 females) recruited
from friends, professional colleagues, and personal acquaintances of
the principal researchers. All respondents in the study were told that the
objectives of the study were to determine the types of experiences people
have during sexual intercourse and elucidate personality factors that may
inuence or determine the nature of such experiences. Demographic variables included age, marital status, education, and income.
Data Analyses
A number of the items within the scales of the PDOSEI, Form I, are
presented in terms of the frequency with which they were experienced
as well as at different stages or periods during sexual intercourse. Descriptive and inferential statistics were calculated. Pearson r scores were calculated to determine the degree of interrelatedness among items of the sexual
response cycle for the entire sample, as well as by gender. Reliability coefcients were derived by correlating items within the questionnaire with
retest correlations ranging from .12 (p < .05) to .69 (p < .01). The test
retest reliability coefcients were signicant. As for validity, participants
scores for the Marlowe-Crowne scale (1964) indicated limited impact of
the social desirability factor on test responses. For the Goldberg indices,
mean scores similarly fell at lower levels for neurotic vs. psychotic and
normal vs. deviant, indicating that the participant pool did not consist of
individuals with severe psychiatric problems despite their endorsing
reports of nonordinary states of consciousness.
Results
For all four stages, arousal through postlude, females scores were
higher than males scores. Females mean scores ranged from .14 to .20,
while males mean scores varied from .12 to .18. The maximum mean
scores were in the orgasm stage (mean .19) and the minimum were in
the arousal stage (.13). Correlations among the stages differed for arousal
and the other three stages. Correlation between arousal and other stages
was moderate, with values varying from mean 0.51 to 0.58. Correlation
of amplication stage with the two following stages (i.e., arousal and
orgasm) was higher (r .86 and .83, respectively), and so was correlation
of orgasm with postlude (r .83). The correlation pattern of the 41 male
participants was similar. However, there was one noticeable difference
for the 57 females. Correlation between arousal and other stages was considerably lower than for men. Correlations among other stages were similar to males. This suggests that ecstatic states and transcendent
experiences among women were less strongly related to similar experiences during the preliminary arousal state than they were among males. In
other words, a males experience of ecstasy may have been more closely
related to similar feelings during arousal than occurred for females.
Furthermore, results from components and parameters of the sexual
alterations of consciousness showed that the highest level of agreement as
evinced by highest mean values for males was found on items related to the
alteration of consciousness being different from sleep (mean 0.74), that
while entering this alteration of consciousness respondents were physiologically aroused (i.e., sexually aroused; mean 0.70) and that this state is different from drowsiness (mean 0.67). As was the case for males, for females,
the highest level of agreement was found on the item related to the alteration
of consciousness being different from sleep (mean 0.73). The next highest
scores for females were found on the item stating that while in the waking
203
204
Altering Consciousness
state, you nd that you are physiologically aroused (i.e., sexually aroused;
mean 0.68), and entering a sexual state of consciousness, you nd that
you are physiologically aroused (i.e., sexually aroused; mean 0.67). Of
the paired differences between males and females, the most signicant differences were found on questions related to ecstatic states or transcendent experiences being triggered by vaginal and anal stimulation.
Additionally, for the question related to entering into an ASC during
sexual intercourse that is experienced as being distinct from the normal
waking state, males had a mean score of 0.40 and females had a score of
0.54. Thus, females had higher levels of agreement than males. When
examining at what point during the sexual response cycle respondents
tended to experience an alteration of consciousness, males and females
reported that this tended to occur during the arousal phase (Maliszewski,
et al. 2008).
Results from the present inquiry showed that both males (70%) and
females (86%) had experienced ecstatic states and transcendent experiences
during sexual intimacy. In the case of the transpersonal component, a high
percentage of both males and females reported experiencing a sense of unity
with their partner while simultaneously maintaining their personal identities.
This pattern was consistent across all ecstatic experience and transcendent
state items for all four phases of the sexual response cycle. Although females
tended to have slightly more frequent levels of arousal, amplication,
orgasm, and postlude than males, these differences were not signicant.
When examining the intercorrelations of the phases of the sexual
response cycle for variables related to transpersonal and ecstatic states,
statistically signicant ndings were revealed across all four phases of
the sexual response cycle, which suggests a positive interrelationship
along the continuum of sexual responses for both males and females. This
interrelationship posits that high levels of sexual response in one phase of
the sexual response cycle predict high levels of response in other phases as
well. For males, arousal was most strongly correlated with amplication,
whereas for females arousal and postlude had the highest correlation.
Males may have utilized arousal and its subsequent amplication to tap
into transcendent experiences more than females, who may have relied
on the coalescence of feelings triggered by arousal then expressed more
deeply during postcoital musings, which may have been used to access
transcendent and ecstatic experiences. The association between arousal
and amplication and the fact that they are sequential in the sexual
response cycle may provide insight into the pattern through which males
experience transcendent and ecstatic experiences. To the extent that
females scores appear to associate arousal and postlude with ecstatic states
Summary
Most sex researchers acknowledge that sexual experiences and other
factors associated with sexuality are ultimately mental events. However,
205
206
Altering Consciousness
most empirical studies and literature surveys have largely ignored this
issue. To date, there have been few serious attempts directed to a comprehensive exploration of the psychological, cultural, and spiritual dimensions of human sexual experience, ironically in areas that concern
peoples motives for engaging in sexual relations in the rst place. We have
provided a cursory overview of surveys, pilot studies, conceptual writings,
and other essays that have provided some preliminary details as to the
nature of consciousness and sexual experience. So long as the phenomenological dimensions of human sexuality are ignored or given only minor
credence, humanitys understanding of sexuality will remain, at best,
incomplete. This chapter has attempted to remedy some of these shortcomings with a summary of current literature and a preliminary empirical
analysis of extensive data collected that analyzes several components of
sexual phenomenological experience.
References
Barger, S. D. (2002). The Marlowe-Crowne affair: Short forms, psychometric structure, and social desirability. Journal of Personality Assessment, 79, 286306.
Bharati, A. (1965). The tantric tradition. London: Rider.
Bloch, I. (1933). Anthropological studies in the strange sexual practices of all races in
all ages, ancient and modern, oriental and occidental, primitive and civilized. New
York: Anthropological Press.
Boorstein, S. (1996). Transpersonal psychotherapy. Albany: State University of
New York Press.
Boorstein, S. (1997). Clinical studies in transpersonal psychotherapy. Albany: State
University of New York Press.
Brecher, E. M. (1976). History of human sexual research and study. In B. J. Sadock,
H. I. Kaplan, & A. M. Freedman (Eds.), The sexual experience (pp. 7178).
Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins.
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349354.
Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1964). The approval motive. Studies in evaluative
dependence. New York: Wiley.
Davidson, J. M. (1980). The psychobiology of sexual experience. In J. M. Davidson & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), The psychobiology of consciousness (pp. 271332).
New York: Plenum.
de Riencort, A. (1974). Sex and power in history. New York: David McKay.
Eliade, M. (1969). Yoga: Immortality and freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Eliade, M. (1971). Spirit, light, and seed. History of Religions, 11, 130.
Farber, B. A., Brink, D. C., & Raskin, P. M. (1996). The psychotherapy of Carl
Rogers. New York: Guilford.
207
208
Altering Consciousness
Johari, H. (1986). Tools for tantra. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International.
Kirschenbaum, H., & Henderson, V. L. (1989). The Carl Rogers reader. Boston:
Houghton-Mifin.
Kleinplatz, P. J. (1998). Sex therapy for vaginismus: A review, critique, and
humanistic alternative. Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 38, 5181.
Kleinplatz, P. J. (2001a). On the outside looking in: In search of womens sexual
experience. Women and Therapy, 24, 123132.
Kleinplatz, P. J. (2001b). New directions in sex therapy: Innovations and alternatives.
New York: Brunner-Routledge.
Kockelmans, J. J. (1987). Phenomenological psychology: The Dutch school. Boston:
Nijhoff.
Koestenbaum, P. (1974). Existential sexuality: Choosing to love. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Laski, M. (1961). Ecstasy. London: Cresset Press.
Lewis, I. (1969). Spirit possession in northern Somaliland. In J. Beattie & J.
Middleton (Eds.), Spirit mediumship and society in Africa. London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul.
Lewis, I. (1971). Ecstatic religion. New York: Penguin.
Lewis, I. (1977). Symbols and sentiments. New York. Academic Press.
Lewinsohn, R. A. (1958). A history of sex customs. London: Green.
Maliszewski, M. (1993). The phenomenology of meditation: A reassessment of models,
templates and traditions. Institute of Noetic Sciences, unpublished monograph.
Maliszewski, M., & Vaughan, B. (1978). Psychological dimensions of sexual experience inventory, Form I. Chicago: Unpublished psychological test.
Maliszewski, M., Twemlow, S. W., Brown, D. P., & Engler, J. M. (1981). A phenomenological typology of intensive meditation: A suggested methodology
using the questionnaire approach. ReVision, 4(2), 327.
Maliszewski, M., Vaughan, B., Krippner, S., & Holler, G. D. (2008). Transcendent
parameters of human sexual experience among 102 questionnaire respondents from
the United States. Paper delivered at the Annual Convention of the Society for
the Scientic Study of Sexuality, November 9, 2008, San Juan, Puerto Rico.
Marglin, F.A. (1980). Wives of the god-king: The rituals of the Hindu temple courtesans.
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Brandeis University, Department of Anthropology.
Maslow A. H. (1965). A critique and discussion: Part I. In J. Money (Ed.), Sex research:
New developments (pp. 135146). New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Maslow, A. H. (1987). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper & Row.
May, R. (1969). Love and will. New York: Norton.
Masters, W. H., & Johnson, V. E. (1966). Human sexual response. Boston:
Little, Brown.
Meston, C. M., Heiman, J. R., Trapnell, P. D., & Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Socially
desirable responding and sexuality self-reports. Journal of Sex Research, 35,
148157.
Mookerjee, A. (1991). Kundalini: The arousal of the inner energy. Rochester, VT:
Destiny Books.
Mullin, G.H. (trans). (1981). Bridging the sutras and tantras. Dharamsala: Tushita
Books.
Padoux, A. (1981). A survey of tantric Hinduism for the historian of religions.
History of Religions, 20, 345360.
Parrinder, G. (1980). Sex in the worlds religions. New York: Oxford University Press.
Passie, T., Hartmann, U., Schneider, U., & Emrich, H. M. (2003). On the function of groaning and hyperventilation during sexual intercourse: Intensication of sexual experience by altering brain metabolism through hypnocapnia.
Medical Hypothesis, 60, 660883.
Passie, T., Wagner, T., Hartmann, U., Schneider, U., & Emrich, H. M. (2004).
Acute hyperventilation syndromes induced by sexual intercourse: Evidence
of a psychophysical mechanism to intensify sexual experience. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 33, 525526.
Passie, T., Hartmann, U., Schneider, U., Emrich, H. M., & Kruger, T. H. C.
(2005). Ecstasy (MDMA) mimics the post-orgasmic state: Impairment of sexual drive and function during acute MDMA-effects may be due to increased
prolactin secretion. Medical Hypothesis, 6, 899903.
Reich, W. (1980). Character analysis (3rd ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus, &
Giroux. (Original work published 1933)
Rowan, J. (1988). Ordinary ecstasy: Humanistic psychology in action. New York:
Routledge.
Sargant, W. W. (1974). The mind possessed. Philadelphia: Lippincott.
Schultheiss, O. C., Dargel, A., & Rhode, W. (2003). Implicit motives and sexual
motivation and behavior. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 224230.
Sussman, N. (1976). Sex and sexuality in history. In B. J. Sadock, H. I Kaplan, & A. M.
Freedman (Eds.). The sexual experience (pp. 770). Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins.
Tart, C. T. (1971). On being stoned: A psychological study of marijuana intoxication.
Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books.
Tart, C. T. (1975). States of consciousness. New York: Dutton.
Tart, C. T. (1978). Sex and drugs as altered states of consciousness. Unpublished
manuscript.
Taylor, G. (1953). Sex in history. London. Thames and Hudson.
Valle, R. (Ed.). (1998). Phenomenological inquiry in psychology: Existential and
transpersonal dimensions. New York: Plenum.
Von Urban, R. (1949). Sex perfection and marital happiness. New York: Dial Press.
Von Urban, R. (1958). Beyond human knowledge: A consideration of the unexplained
in man and nature. London: Rider.
Wade, J. (2004). Transcendent sex. New York: Paraview.
Washburn, M. (1994). Transpersonal psychology in psychoanalytic perspective.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Wiederman, M. W., & Whitley, B. E. (2002). Handbook for conducting research on
human sexuality. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Wile, D. (1992). Art of the bedchamber: The Chinese sexual yoga classics including
womens solo meditation texts. Albany: State University of New York Press.
209
CHAPTER 10
212
Altering Consciousness
adolescence, adulthood, and old age. We will also discuss relevant genetic
and environmental factors on the propensity to enter ASC (e.g., the heritability for dissociation, as well as how the attachment quality between
children and their primary caregivers can inuence the risk for dissociation
later in life). This chapter, however, does not cover the different issue of proposed frameworks for how modes of consciousness may manifest different
levels irrespective of age (e.g., Wilber, 1998, p. 43). Wilber has also proposed a developmental scheme in which there is a chronological sequence:
magic (25 years), mythic (611 years), rational (11 onward), and vision
logic (adulthood, if at all; 1998, p. 109). However, matters are far more
complicated than this scheme. For instance, Gopnik (2009) has reviewed
the literature showing that although infants and children engage in a lot of
counterfactual, fantasy thought from early on they are also engaging in
establishing causal events in their surroundings.
Genetic Predispositions
A review of anomalous experiences and related constructs such as hypnotizability and dissociation strongly suggests that some individuals are
more likely than others to experience a variety of alterations of consciousness, irrespective of whether they also manifest psychopathology or not
(Cardena, Lynn, & Krippner, 2000). Cross-cultural research has suggested that such phenomena as shamanism runs in families (cf. Halifax,
1980) and it is likely that this marked, cross-cultural individual difference
has a genetic component. A diathesis for dissociation and hypnotizability
has been proposed (e.g., Butler et al., 1996) and there is evidence for a
genetic contribution to dissociation (Becker-Blease et al., 2004; Jang,
Paris, Zweig-Frank, & Livesley, 1998), hypnotizability (Morgan, 1973),
and absorption (Tellegen et al., 1988). Hypnotizability has also been associated with the COMT gene (Lichtenberg, Bachner-Melman, Ebstein, &
Crawford, 2004). Furthermore, hypnotizability has been related to the
construct of mental boundary thinness and the character trait of selftranscendence (Carden a & Terhune, 2008). The latter shows a 90%
unique variance when analyzed along other major character/temperament
constructs (Gillespie, Cloninger, Heath, & Martin, 2003). Thus, different
strands of evidence support some type of heritability for the propensity
to alter ones consciousness, although a number of questions remain
unanswered, including to what extent various related constructs (e.g.,
absorption, dissociation, schizotypy) are manifestations of one or more
latent variables and how they manifest across the lifespan.
Arousal States of the Neonate, Differentiation, and the Emergence of Basic Emotions
When conceptualizing the states of the neonate, it is common to simply
distinguish between different states of arousal, ranging from regular deep
sleep (non-REM or State I) and irregular dream sleep (REM or State II), via
alert inactivity (drowsiness or State III) to quiet alertness (State IV), to waking activity (bursts of uncoordinated motor activity) and crying (State V;
213
214
Altering Consciousness
215
216
Altering Consciousness
If they are also fortunate enough to be cared for by accepting and sensitive caregivers, they will typically come to learn that distress that cannot be
avoided by shifting attention can nevertheless be managed so that it does
not become overwhelming. This reassurance is initially accomplished by
the caregivers comforting behaviors but will get increasingly internalized
with maturation (Cassidy, 1994; Stern, 1985). Partly for these reasons, the
intensity of distress signals is typically attenuated from the newborns relatively ungraded high-intensity crying to the growing infants and toddlers
more graded distress responses (i.e., they take more time to build up to full
crying). In other words, the states experienced and their behavioral expressions will increasingly come under the developing individuals own control.
Children whose self-regulation skills fail to develop favorably during the
rst 2 years of life are sometimes thought to possess a difcult temperament (Thomas & Chess, 1977), characterized by, for example, impulsivity
(associated with states of frustration and urgency), negative emotionality
(associated with states of anger and distress), or marked behavioral inhibition to novelty (i.e., amygdala-based hyperreactivity, associated with states
of fear and weariness; Buss & Plomin, 1984; Kagan, 1984; Rothbart,
2003). Although temperamental dispositions are at least partially malleable
by contextual factors, such as an environment that provides a goodness of
t with the childs disposition (Thomas & Chess, 1977), they are also moderately heritable (Wachs & Bates, 2001). Furthermore, these dispositions
tend to become increasingly stable and predictive of other aspects of development with maturation. For example, temperament inhibition (i.e., a failure to down-regulate fear responses) during the second year of life has
been found to predict social anxiety in adulthood (Schwartz, Snidman, &
Kagan, 1999). Thus, a failure to develop self-regulation skills is not just
associated with unfavorable high-intensity experiential states but may also
pave the way for later adjustment problems.
for the self to be affected by the states of others naturally lingers throughout
the life cycle (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). The comparatively basic emotional contagion phenomenon may in fact be a developmental precursor
not just of empathy but also of suggestibility in general, including hypnotizability (cf. Cardena, Terhune, Loof, & Buratti, 2009).
Self-awareness unfolds during the rst 2 years of life from a presumably mere implicit capacity for selfother distinctions in the case of the
neonate (e.g., he/she rotates more reliably when another person touches
the babys cheeks rather than the baby him/herself; Rochat & Hespos,
1997), via the 4- to 6-month-olds gradual realization that the hands and
other body parts do not only belong to the self but can actually be volitionally controlled by the self, to the toddlers explicit realization that the self
is what is reected in a mirror (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; see also
Gopnik, 2009). In the wake of such increases in self-awareness comes a
capacity for self-control/regulation (as described above) and the experience of being an intentional agent. Also, unlike the infant, the toddler will
typically start to experience self-conscious states of pride, shame, selfdoubt, and embarrassment, which build upon and are believed to reect
complex combinations of the basic emotions that gradually unraveled
during infancy (Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss, 1989).
However, it should be understood that not only does self-development
affect states of consciousness. Even more importantly, states of consciousness
also affect and indeed partly organize self-development. From a developmental perspective, organization and integration of experiences in general,
including states of consciousness, is what denes the self (Loevinger,
1976). Daniel Stern has vitally contributed to our understanding of the experiential states of the infant and how they are intertwined with the developing
self. His (1985) contention that the experience of self not only requires that
the individual distinguish the self from others but also identify the self with
others highlights the intersubjective nature of much of the young infants
experiential states. Indeed, the affective valence of the experiences of being
with another (at the beginning, usually the mother) may be a foundation
for the infants development of a sense of self and other(s). In favorable conditions, the infant sees him/herself in the caregivers gaze of reverie. This is
presumably associated with a pleasant affective tone (i.e., a vitality affect)
on part of the infant. Moreover, consistently responsive caregiving throughout infancy is likely to enable the recognition of consistency in the self and
affective experience across time and context, whereas aberrant, abusive, or
neglecting caregiving may thwart the developing organization of the self,
which may instead wind up as fragmented (Carlson et al., 2009).
217
218
Altering Consciousness
219
220
Altering Consciousness
and sophisticated. It is thus not too surprising that even young children
report transcendental near-death experiences occurring even with their
limited exposure to cultural and religious inuences (Greyson, 2000).
Largely because of continued neurological developments in frontal and
cortical areas, early childhood is also typically associated with substantial
gains in sustained attention, effortful control, and executive functioning
(e.g., behavioral inhibition, working memory, planning; Barkley, 1997;
Rothbart, 2003). As a consequence, children of these ages acquire an
increased capacity for remaining focused and concentrated on any task
at hand while excluding competing, task-irrelevant information from
ongoing processing. Thus, the seed for a state of absorption (i.e., episodes
of total attention that fully engage ones representational . . . resources,
Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974, p. 268) is sown during the course of the preschool years. Not coincidentally, preschool children tend to remain
engaged with one activity for longer bouts of time than earlier in development (Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000), and their playing often consists of prolonged bouts of make-believe play. Children who have failed to
make such a normative gain in sustained attention and executive functioning by school age are potential candidates for a diagnosis of attention decit hyperactivity disorder (Barkley, 1997).
Thus, both metacognitive capacities and episodes of absorption will
typically increase in this life period. However, when all (or most) processing resources are occupied, as in absorbed states, the usual metacognitive
monitoring of ones perceptions and thoughts is likely counteracted
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). Perhaps for this reason, later in development a propensity for absorption is one of the most reliable personality
predictors of suggestibility in general and hypnotizability in particular
(Roche & McConkey, 1990).
Although not immune to methodological criticisms, research suggests
that hypnotic responsiveness can be rst measured around 5 years of
age, reaches a peak in the preteen years, and then diminishes slightly
(Olness & Kohen, 1996) but remains fairly stable throughout adulthood
(Piccione, Hilgard, & Zimbardo, 1989). This statement hides some complexities, however, in that some hypnotic suggestions such as posthypnotic amnesias may not be even comprehensible to a very young child,
while at the same time younger children may become more absorbed in
their fantasy lives than older children.
Research on the lifespan of dissociation, a related but by no means
identical construct to hypnotizability, shows a similar developmental line.
Dissociation has been posited to be higher in younger children of around
5 to 6 years of age and then to generally decline with age for both
221
222
Altering Consciousness
223
224
Altering Consciousness
In their turn, dopamine and serotonin have been called the accelerator
and the brakes, respectively, in the drive to risky behavior, particularly in
the area of drug use and abuse (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). Dopamine
has been associated with novelty seeking and plays an essential role in the
brains reward circuitry. The increase in dopamine activity in the prefrontal
cortex during (early) adolescence suggests that rewarding stimuli are experienced as more rewarding, which might be an explanation of the increase
in sensation seeking during this developmental stage (Steinberg, 2008).
And all this takes place in the context of a relatively immature serotonergic
system; studies suggest that a more mature serotonergic system would have
an inhibitory control function (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000).
We hasten to add here that although the emergence of drug use and
sexual behaviors may be characterized as risky in terms of future adaptation and development, we have no desire to express alarmism surrounding their occurrence in adolescence. For example, according to data from
the San Francisco Bay area, experimentation with (as opposed to frequent
usage of and complete abstinence from) drugs such as alcohol and marijuana may be associated with favorable adolescent development, and sensitive parenting in childhood may be a precursor of drug experimentation
in adolescence (Shedler & Block, 1990). It has also been noticed that most
sensation seeking by adolescents is realized in the company of peers
(Steinberg, 2008). Although relationships with parents typically still tend
to be the principal attachment throughout adolescence, concurrent with
reinitiated and intensied autonomy strivings, adolescents gradually
transfer the components of attachment from parents to peers, most typically love partners and close friends, with whom they prefer to spend
increasing amounts of time and to whom they start to turn when distressed (Zeifman & Hazan, 2008). The immense inuence that peers have
on the adolescent individual could be related to the inuence of gonadal
steroids on the increase of receptors for oxytocin, for this might lead to a
heightened salience of peer relations (Steinberg, 2008), because oxytocin
is associated with social bonding and the memory and recognition of
social stimuli (Winslow & Insel, 2004). Perhaps that is why the drug use
of peers has been commonly acknowledged as a strong predictor of the
adolescents own drug use (Bauman & Ennett, 1996).
Adolescence may be associated with emotional turbulence, especially
for those with a history of insecure attachment (Allen, 2008). Not coincidentally perhaps, a century of research indicates that adolescence also represents an age of religious awakening (Argyle & Beit-Hallahmi, 1975),
which may also include ritually induced ASC [see St John, Volume 1]. As
225
226
Altering Consciousness
Consequently, as sensory acuity lessens, the elderly report lower selfefcacy, more loneliness and depressive symptoms, and smaller social networks (e.g., Kramer, Kapteyn, Kuik, & Deeg, 2002).
In spite of such general declines in sensory and cognitive functions,
most elderly people are capable of experiencing at least low to moderate
levels of the states of consciousness that they acquired a capacity for earlier
in the lifespan, as well as to manage and enjoy their everyday activities.
However, pathological aging such as dementia, which results from
progressive structural damage to the brain (most notably the cortical
regions), is a contrary example. Initially, dementia is associated with
memory loss, states of spatial disorientation, distorted body perception,
and depression (Yaari & Corey-Bloom, 2007). As dementia progresses,
metacognition, autobiographical memory, and executive functioning are
decreased, and generalized distress, delusions, and basic arousal states
(such as alert inactivity and crying) may ensue (Gwyther, 2001), which
illustrates that although prospective differentiation, increased complexity,
and integration are the norm in (healthy) development, the progression of
dementia represents a reversed process.
Although the loss through death of loved ones may occur at any point in
the life cycle, it is clearly overrepresented among the elderly. Thus, grief or
mourning is close to normative for the elderly, in particular following the
death of a spouse, typically the principal attachment gure of adulthood
(Bowlby, 1980). Loss of a principal attachment gure is a powerful stressor,
indeed a potentially traumatic event. Consequently, spousal bereavement
is associated with depression as well as with elevated risks for suicide
(Rosenzweig, Prigerson, Miller, & Reynolds, 1997). To proceed favorably
in terms of promoting adaptation to a life without the spouse, the mourning
process requires that bereaved individuals eventually accommodate information regarding the permanence of the spouses death into their representational world (Bowlby, 1980). Otherwise, the individual is at risk of
remaining unresolved or disorganized with respect to the loss; for example,
they may display continued searching for the spouse and slip into states of
disbelief regarding the spouses death (Main, Goldwyn, & Hesse, 2003).
Research and theorizing on aging has consistently documented that
many (but by no means all) elders also experience profoundly positive
states. For example, research relating to Eriksons idea (1998) of ego
integrity (or wisdom) as a favorable developmental outcome of aging
indicates that elderly who have attained ego integrity report high levels
of psychological well-being such as an upbeat mood, self-acceptance,
and marital satisfaction (James & Zarrett, 2007). In particular, with the
integrity-related realization that ones own life is part of an extended chain
227
228
Altering Consciousness
of human existence, death may lose its sting (Vaillant, 2002). Relatedly,
religious beliefs and spirituality often gain increased importance for the
elderly (Krause, 2006) and may offer additional benets to the states experienced such as a sense of the interrelatedness of all things, of life as meaningful, and of security within a transcendent realm. The term
gerotranscendence (Tornstam, 1997) has been coined in the literature to
characterize the states of inner calm and serenity, of peace of mind when
engaging in quiet reection and reminiscence, which characterizes favorable development in the very nal stages of life. This term refers to nothing
less than a cosmic and transcendent perspective, directed forward and
outward, beyond the individuals self, and is consistent with the postulate
that a transcendent stage of development may include but go beyond
rationality rather than being just a regression to a prerational state (see
Wilber, 1998, p. 90) [see also Beauregard, this volume].
At the very end of the day, some people who are about to die (Osis &
Haraldsson, 1977) or who have encountered near-death experiences
(NDEs), which may happen at any age but are more likely as the individual suffers a serious illness, report that as the brain discharges its nal
electrical impulses before closing shop, an ASC ensues associated with
a profound sense of promise. This state is marked by, among other phenomena, a sense of peace and painlessness, unconditional love, and an
experience of light at the end of a tunnel. A purely neurophysiological
decit explanation for NDEs may be inadequate to explain all the available
data (Greyson, 2000), so a fair and comprehensive explanation remains a
challenge for the future. It is, however, paradoxical that for some, the vast
expansion of consciousness present after birth may have some parallel
with their experiences at the moment of dying.
References
Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E., & Wall, S. (1978). Patterns of
attachment: A psychological study of the strange situation. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Alcorta, C. S., & Sosis, R. (2005). Ritual, emotion, and sacred symbols. The evolution of religion as an adaptive complex. Human Nature, 16, 323359.
Allen, J. P. (2008). The attachment system in adolescence. In J. Cassidy & P. R.
Shaver (Eds.), Handbook of attachment: Theory, research, and clinical applications
(2nd ed., pp. 419435). New York: Guilford.
Allport, G. W. (1950). The individual and his religion. New York: Macmillan.
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed., text revision). Washington, DC: Author.
Argyle, M., & Beit-Hallahmi, B. (1975). The social psychology of religion. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
229
230
Altering Consciousness
Cardena, E., & Terhune, D. (2008). A distinct personality trait? The relationship
between hypnotizability, absorption, self-transcendence, and mental boundaries.
Proceedings of the 51st Annual Convention of the Parapsychological Association, 6173.
Cardena, E., Terhune, D. B., Loof, A., & Buratti, S. (2009). Hypnotic experience
is related to emotional contagion. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 57, 3346.
Carlson, E. A. (1998). A prospective longitudinal study of attachment disorganization/disorientation. Child Development, 69, 11071128.
Carlson, E. A., Yates, T. M., & Sroufe, L. A. (2009). Dissociation and development of the self. In P. Dell & J. A. ONeil (Eds.), Dissociation and the dissociative
disorders: DSM V and beyond (pp. 3952). New York: Routledge.
Cassidy, J. (1994). Emotion regulation: Inuences of attachment relationships. In
N. A. Fox (Ed.), The development of emotion regulation. Monographs of the
Society for Research in Child Development, 59, 228249.
Cassidy, J., & Berlin, L. J. (1999). Understanding the origins of childhood loneliness: Contributions of attachment theory. In K. J. Rotenberg & S. Hymel
(Eds.), Loneliness in childhood and adolescence (pp. 3455). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Chambers, R. A., Taylor, J. R., & Potenza, M. N. (2003). Developmental neurocircuitry of motivation in adolescence: A critical period of addiction vulnerability. American Journal of Psychiatry, 160, 10411052.
Coles, R. (1990). The spiritual life of children. Boston: Houghton Mifin.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New
York: Harper Collins.
Emde, R. N. (1991). Positive emotions for psychoanalytic theory. Surprises from
infancy research and new directions. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic
Association, 39(Suppl.), 544.
Epley, N., Converse, B. A., Delbosc, A., Monteleone, G. A., & Cacioppo, J. T.
(2009). Believers estimates of Gods beliefs are more egocentric than estimates
of other peoples beliefs. PNAS, 106, 21,53321,538.
Erikson, E. H. (1998). The life cycle completed. Extended version with new chapters
on the ninth stage by Joan M. Erikson. New York: Norton.
Gibbs, J. C. (2003). Moral development and reality: Beyond the theories of Kohlberg
and Hoffman. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Gillespie, N. A., Cloningerr, C. R., Heath, A. C., & Marti, N. G. (2003). The genetic
and environmental relationship between Cloningers dimensions of temperament and character. Personality and Individual Differences, 35, 19311946.
Gopnik, A. (2009). The philosophical baby. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Granqvist, P., Fransson, M., & Hagekull, B. (2009). Disorganized attachment,
absorption, and New Age spiritualityA mediational model. Attachment and
Human Development, 11, 385403.
Granqvist, P., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. (2008). Attachment and religious representations and behavior. In J. Cassidy & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Handbook of attachment
theory and research (2nd ed., pp. 906933). New York: Guilford.
231
232
Altering Consciousness
Kramer, S. E., Kapteyn, T. S., Kuik, D. J., & Deeg, D. J. (2002). The association of
hearing impairment and chronic diseases with psychosocial health status in
older age. Journal of Aging and Health, 14, 122137.
Krause, N. (2006). Religion and health in late life. In J. E. Birren & K. W. Schaie
(Eds.), Handbook of the psychology of aging (6th ed., pp. 499518). San Diego,
CA: Academic Press.
Lauman, F. O., Gagnon, J. H., Michael, R. T., & Michaels, S. (1994). The social
organization of sexuality: Sexual practices in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lavelli, M., & Fogel, A. (2005). Developmental changes in the relationship
between the infants attention and emotion during early face-to-face communication: The 2-month transition. Developmental Psychology, 41, 266280.
Lewis, M., & Brooks-Gunn, J. (1979). Social cognition and the acquisition of self.
New York: Plenum.
Lewis, M., Sullivan, M. W., Stanger, C., & Weiss, M. (1989). Self development
and self-conscious emotions. Child Development, 60, 146156.
Lichtenberg, P., Bachner-Melman, R., Ebstein, R. P., & Crawford, H. J. (2004).
Hypnotic susceptibility: Multidimensional relationships with Cloningers tridimensional personality questionnaire, COMT polymorphisms, absorption, and
attentional characteristics. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental
Hypnosis, 52, 4772.
Liotti, G. (1992). Disorganized/disoriented attachment in the etiology of the dissociative disorders. Dissociation, 5, 196204.
Liotti, G. (2006). A model of dissociation based on attachment theory and
research. Journal of Trauma and Dissociation, 7, 5573.
Loevinger, J. (1976). Ego development. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Main, M., Goldwyn, R., & Hesse, E. (2003). Adult attachment scoring and classication systems. Unpublished manuscript. University of California at Berkeley.
Main, M., & Morgan, H. (1996). Disorganization and disorientation in infant
Strange Situation behavior: Phenotypic resemblance to dissociative states. In
L. Michelson & W. Ray (Eds.), Handbook of dissociation: Theoretical, empirical,
and clinical perspectives (pp. 107138). New York: Plenum.
Maslow, A. H. (1976). Religions, values, and peak experiences. New York: Penguin.
Mills, R. S. L. (2005). Taking stock of the developmental literature on shame.
Developmental Review, 25, 2663.
Morgan, A. H. (1973). The heritability of hypnotic susceptibility in twins. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 82, 5561.
Natsoulas, T. (1983). Concepts of consciousness. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 4,
1359.
Nelson, E. A., & Dannefer, D. (1992). Aged heterogeneity: Fact or ction? The
fate and diversity in gerontological research. The Geronotologist, 32, 1723.
Ogawa, J. R., Sroufe, L. A., Weineld, N. S., Carlson, E., & Egeland, B. (1997).
Development and the fragmented self: Longitudinal study of dissociative
233
234
Altering Consciousness
Tellegen, A., Lykken, D. T., Bouchard, T. J., Wilcox, K. J., Segal, N. L., & Rich, S.
(1988). Personality similarity in twins reared apart and together. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 10311039.
Thomas, A., & Chess, S. (1977). Temperament and development. New York:
Brunner/Mazel.
Tolmunen, T., Maaranen, P., Hintikka, J., Kylma, J., Rissanen, M. L., Honkalampi,
K., Haukijarvi, T., & Laukkanen, E. (2007). Dissociation in a general population
of Finnish adolescents. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 195, 614661.
Tornstam, L. (1997). Gero-transcendence: A reformulation of disengagement
theory. Aging, 1, 5563.
Vaillant, G. E. (2002). Aging well. Boston: Little, Brown.
Vanderlinden, J., van der Hart, O., & Varga, K. (1996). European studies of dissociation. In L. K. Michelson & W. J. Ray (Eds.), Handbook of dissociation: Theoretical, empirical and clinical perspectives (pp. 2549). New York: Plenum.
Van IJzendoorn, M. H., Schuengel, C., & Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. (1999).
Disorganized attachment in early childhood: Meta-analysis of precursors, concomitants, and sequelae. Development and Psychopathology, 11, 225249.
Wachs, T. D., & Bates, J. E. (2001). Temperament. In G. Bremner & A. Fogel
(Eds.), Blackwell handbook of infant development (pp. 465501). Oxford, UK:
Blackwell.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind
development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655684.
Wilber, K. (1998). The essential Ken Wilber: An introductory reader. Boston:
Shambhala.
Winslow, J. T., & Insel, T. R. (2004). Neuroendocrine basis of social recognition.
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 14, 248253.
Wolff, P. A. (1987). The development of behavioral states and the expression of
emotions in early infancy: New proposals for investigation. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Wulff, D. M. (2000). Mystical experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S. Krippner
(Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience (pp. 397440). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Yaari, R., & Corey-Bloom, J. (2007). Alzheimers disease. Seminars in neurology,
27, 3241.
Yates, T. M., Carlson, E. A., & Egeland, B. (2008). A prospective study of child maltreatment and self-injurious behavior in a community sample. Development and
Psychopathology, 20, 651671.
Zeifman, D., & Hazan, C. (2008). Pair bonds as attachments: Reevaluating the
evidence. In J. Cassidy & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), Handbook of attachment theory
and research (2nd ed., pp. 436455). New York: Guilford.
Zuckerman, M., & Kuhlman, D. M. (2000). Personality and risk-taking: Common
biosocial factors. Journal of Personality, 68, 9991029.
PART II
Psychological Perspectives
CHAPTER 11
238
Altering Consciousness
altered consciousness, we rst discuss the nature of the bodily self and
introduce the concept of altered states of bodily consciousness.
The bodily self is a more restricted concept than the notion of embodiment, which can be dened as the idea that cognitive functions such as
perception, language, reasoning, and social interaction are grounded on
bodily processing (Gibbs, 2006). By contrast, the bodily self as a theoretical concept refers to those aspects of the self that can be associated with
the structure and functions of the individuals body. Culture, society, personal memories, and politics can probably be embodied to some extent,
but the bodily self only relates to an organisms more basic properties,
such as how we localize our own body in the environment, perceive its
ongoing posture and movement, detect changes in internal homeostasis,
experience its actions to be self-generated, and identify its parts as selfbelonging (Bermudez et al., 1995; Legrand, 2006).
The bodily self is historically associated to other concepts such as corporeal awareness, cenesthesia, the body schema, and the body image.
Generally, all these notions refer to how the body is consciously or unconsciously experienced and represented. The brain is constantly receiving
and sending, as well as updating, information from and to the body.
Giving rise to the bodily self thus involves the dynamic integration of visual, tactile, proprioceptive, vestibular, auditory, olfactive, visceral, and
motor information, as well as higher-order representations such as beliefs,
desires, memories, and knowledge about bodies in general. This integration is achieved not by a single system in the brain but by a wide array
of subsystems and bodily representations that, when impaired, can lead
to altered states of bodily consciousness.
The very idea of the bodily self is closely tied to clinical neurology. The
concept was born out of the observation of neurological disturbances affecting how some patients perceived their own body. French otologist Pierre
Bonnier (1905) coined the word aschematie in 1905 precisely to refer to
such disorders following severe vestibular impairments. The schema of the
body, according to Bonnier, is a general sense of space, mostly unconscious,
that transcends sensory modalities. This sense allows one to locate ones
own body in the environment, feel the space it is occupying, know its current posture, and localize tactile sensations on its surface. Some neurological symptoms, Bonnier realized, seemed to suggest that such a sense
existed and was disturbed in specic occurrences. Other authors independently presented similar ideas. British neurologists Henry Head and Gordon
Holmes (19111912) notably highlighted the importance of motor mechanisms and the ability of the body schema to automatically and involuntary
Whereas body schema is somewhat closer to our use of bodily self, the term body image has
often been used to refer to the conscious apraisal of ones body, involving visual, mnesic,
verbal, emotional, sexual, social, and cultural information pertaining to ones own body.
Both termsbody schema and body imagewere and still are often used interchangeably
(for a recent discussion, see de Vignemont, 2010).
239
240
Altering Consciousness
different experiential approaches from each other: A person might be indifferent to what he or she is experiencing, critical about the illusory or unusual
nature of his or her experiences, or delusional about certain specic beliefs
concerning the bodily self (Dieguez, Staub, & Bogousslavsky, 2007).
Neurological patients who are indifferent do not notice that their perception and experience of their bodily self is anomalous. Such disorders
are thus found only when an external person (e.g., the clinician) specically
investigates and detects the disorder. Thus the patient may be asked, for
example, to move a limb or to describe her current bodily experience and
only then respond in a way that is indicative of an altered state of bodily
consciousness. In some cases, patients cannot even be brought to realize
that they are misguided about their perceptions and beliefs concerning their
bodies. This is the case of neurological patients who ignore their paralysis
(anosognosia) or fail to pay any attention to the existence of half of their
body (hemiasomatognosia).
In other instances, patients are critical of the alteration of the bodily
self they are undergoing, and a rational evaluation as well as a generally
accurate perception of the illusory nature of the experience can be
achieved. For instance, patients retaining full awareness during migraine
or seizure episodes may be able to describe in some detail, even during
such experiences, how they perceive their bodies as abnormal.
Finally, patients presenting delusional alterations of bodily consciousness hold false beliefs that are impervious to any attempt at correction.
Such patients not only perceive and report that something is wrong about
their bodies but also claim that the alteration is actually happening or really has happened. Examples include reduplication of body parts, disownership of ones body parts, and claims of being invaded by bugs or
having ones internal organs rotting. In the next sections, we describe in
more detail such instances of altered states of bodily consciousness.
241
242
Altering Consciousness
and most often the frontal and parietal but also the temporal cortex
(Feinberg et al., 2000). It is also possible to induce illusory movements
by stimulating electrically the right temporo-parietal junction (Blanke,
Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck, 2002), in which case the illusion may have
not only sensorimotor but also visual characteristics such as seeing that
ones own limbs are approaching ones face.
Such phenomena should be distinguished from supernumerary phantom limbs, a condition dened as the perceptual experience of an additional body part, felt as an entity sharing properties of a real body part
and occupying a different place in space. Unlike patients with illusory
movements, patients with supernumerary phantom limb distinctly experience a third arm. Some can critically evaluate the feeling as an illusion,
but others will entertain the delusion that they actually own an additional
limb or even experience more numerous duplications of arms or legs and
perceive these multiple limbs as real. In the latter case, the term delusional
reduplication of body parts has been proposed (Weinstein, Kahn, Malitz, &
Rozanski, 1954). Most supernumerary phantom limbs involve a somesthetic perception of an immobile limb, localized separately but on the
same side as the paralyzed limb (Antoniello, Kluger, Sahlein, & Heilman,
2009). Movements of such phantoms are usually rare and most often automatic or involuntary. It can also happen that the extra limb simply
mimics the movements of the contralateral real limb or follows with some
delay the movements of the ipsilateral real limb (McGonigle et al., 2002).
There are, however, two cases in the literature describing intentional
supernumerary phantoms in which the patients, paralyzed on one side,
nevertheless experienced the movement of a phantom limb whenever
(and only when) they wished to move it (Khateb et al., 2009; Staub et al.,
2006). What is more, one of these patients also claimed to be able to see
the phantom and use it to scratch her own face (Khateb et al., 2009),
pointing to multimodal pathomechanisms [mechanisms by which a pathological conditions occurs] and similarities to heautoscopy, exosomesthesia,
and asomatoscopy (see below). Lesions have involved the right basal ganglia (Halligan, Marshall, & Wade, 1993), the right subcortical capsulolenticular region (Khateb et al., 2009), the left anterior choroidal artery
territory (Staub et al., 2006), the right frontomesial cortex (McGonigle
et al., 2002), and parietal structures in the case of delusional reduplications
(Weinstein et al., 1954). A few functional neuroimaging studies have been
conducted in such patients, showing activity in the supplemental motor
area during phantom movements mimicking movements of the duplicated
limb (McGonigle et al., 2002), abnormal activity in subcortical thalamocortical loops during intentional movements of the phantom (Staub et al.,
2006), and activity in somatosensory and visual areas correlating with the
patients claim of being able to feel and see her intentionally moved supernumerary phantom limb (Khateb et al., 2009). Given the variety of phenomenological proles, it is unlikely that a single explanation can
account for all cases of supernumerary phantom limb. Purely postural
phantoms probably can be explained as the result of a conict between
impaired current proprioceptive afferences, caused by thalamo-cortical
disconnections, and a spared internal representation of the body. Kinesthetic phantoms may best be conceptualized as the result of preserved
motor efferences and action planning in the context of defective multimodal integration (Khateb et al., 2009). Additional pathomechanisms involving other modalities and higher cognitive functions could be involved in
cases with delusional beliefs.
The diversity of phantom limb phenomena, whether arising from
amputation or brain damage, points to a complex and highly efcient network of body-related brain functions that smoothly provide a coherent
bodily self in healthy persons.
243
244
Altering Consciousness
needles, numbness, and alterations in the experience of weight, size, temperature, and motricity, even in the absence of motor disorders. In turn,
such feelings can lead to an experience of alienation from ones body parts
and even partial depersonalization, perhaps underlying rare cases of apparently healthy persons who wish to be amputated (Blanke, Morgenthaler,
Brugger, & Overney, 2009).
Neurologists have also observed mislocalizations of touch following
brain damage. The phenomenon of alloesthesia refers to the perceptual
transfer, usually from left to right (in the case of right-sided brain damage), of tactile sensations (Bender, 1970). Such patients are usually not
aware of their mistakes. Although alloesthesia is most often caused by
large lesions in the temporo-parietal areas of the right hemisphere, similar
tactile mislocalizations are easily induced in about a quarter of healthy
participants under laboratory conditions (Marcel et al., 2004).
Perhaps more strikingly, touch can sometimes be experienced outside
of ones body. This is what some rare reports have referred to as exosomethesia. This experience can happen under a variety of conditions, for instance during testing for alloesthesia (Shapiro, Fink, & Bender, 1952)
and in Tourettes syndrome (Karp & Hallett, 1996). As mentioned earlier,
amputees sometimes report tactile sensations in their phantom limbs.
However, there is at least one instance of phantom exosomesthesia in
which an amputee has reported a referred touch as arising from slightly
outside of the phantom (Cronholm, 1951). Some persons otherwise
healthy also report feeling touch when they see someone else being
touched, a synesthetic experience related to empathic tendencies (Banissy
& Ward, 2007). However, it does not seem that these individuals actually
feel touch as if it arose in the other person (i.e., they feel it in their own
body concomitantly to the touch they see on the other person). It is nevertheless relatively easy to induce the experience of touch as arising from
objects or fake body parts, usually by inducing visuo-tactile conicts (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998), but also after practice with an extended tool (Maravita & Iriki, 2004) and the induction of spatially contiguous tactile inputs
(Miyazaki, Hirashima, & Nozaki, 2010). A feeling of numbness seemingly
arising from someone elses nger can also be achieved simply by simultaneously touching ones own nger together with another persons nger
(Dieguez, Mercier, Newby, & Blanke, 2009).
Hemiasomatognosia, Anosognosia
The term hemiasomatognosia was coined by French neurologist Jean
Lhermitte (1939) to refer to unawareness of a body part or a hemibody.
Frederiks (1963a) tried to clarify some conceptual issues by distinguishing
between conscious and nonconscious hemiasomatognosia. Conscious
hemiasomatognosia refers to patients who perceive their body as incomplete
or amputated while realizing that what they experience is an illusion (see
above, Bodily transformations), whereas nonconscious hemiasomatognosia
245
246
Altering Consciousness
refers to the disappearance of body parts from ones awareness, the patient
being unable to notice or report this disappearance.
Subforms of nonconscious hemiasomatognosia are currently known as
personal neglect, motor neglect, or anosognosia for hemiplegia. In all
these conditions, there is indifference, forgetfulness, or unawareness for
parts of ones own body. Personal neglect refers to the classical picture
where a patient forgets to comb, shave, or make up the left side of his or
her face. Motor neglect refers to patients who underuse or fail to use
altogether their left limbs despite having no motor impairment. Conversely, patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia behave as if they were
not paralyzed, as they ignore their left hemibody altogether and/or deny
that there is anything wrong with it. Nevertheless, anosognosia for hemiplegia is a complex phenomenon, with patients differing widely as to
their explicit and implicit insight of being paralyzed (Cocchini, Beschin,
Fotopoulou, & Della Sala, 2010). For instance, some patients deny their
impairment but nevertheless never act as if they were not paralyzed, while
others might admit being paralyzed but still attempt actions that are
impossible for them.
Recent lesion-mapping analyses comparing patients with righthemispheric damage with and without anosognosia have highlighted the
specic involvement of the right posterior insula (Baier & Karnath,
2008; Karnath, Baier, & Nagele, 2005) and an additional network of sensorimotor areas including the somatosensory, primary motor, and premotor cortices, as well as the inferior parietal lobule (Berti et al., 2005).
Anosognosia is a multifaceted syndrome involving defective awareness of
motor control, impaired integration of multimodal information, and disturbances of attentional and cognitive monitoring (Orfei et al., 2007).
Somatoparaphrenia
German neurologist Joseph Gerstmann sought to distinguish between
particular cases of hemiasomatognosia and used the term somatoparaphrenia
for strongly delusional instances (Gerstmann, 1942). Somatoparaphrenia
thus refers to false beliefs concerning a body part or a hemibody, the most
frequent being disownership of ones hand (whereby patients repeatedly
claim that their own left hands do not belong to them, or more explicitly
that they belong to someone else, the doctor, a nurse, a roommate, or some
undetermined person; review in Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). However, such
delusions can vary considerably, suggesting that the notion covers various
disorders. Some patients will deny the ownership of a limb without attributing it to someone else explicitly. Others will state spontaneously that their
limb belongs to someone specic, even someone altogether absent from the
current environment or already dead. Some patients will elaborate their
claim by stating that their limb has vanished or has been stolen, sometimes
leading to complaints to the hospital staff. The strength of the delusion can
also vary, some patients being able to acknowledge that there is something
bizarre about their belief and others maintaining their claims despite overwhelming counter-evidence.
Moreover, there are two types of misattribution in somatoparaphrenia:
Parts of ones own body can be attributed to someone else or, conversely,
parts of someone elses body can be attributed to oneself (Gertmann,
1942). Patients with somatoparaphrenia can display strong emotional
reactionsfor instance, they can fall from their bed after trying to kick
out what they think is an alien limb. Similarly, patients presenting with
misoplegia can display hatred of the paralyzed limb that borders on the
delusional but without presenting explicit feelings of disownership
(Loetscher, Regard, & Brugger, 2006).
Some cases of somatoparaphrenia suggest an association with other
disorders of the body schema such as supernumerary phantom limbs,
when a limb is disowned while an extra one is present, or the feeling
of a presence, when the disowned limb is perceived as a whole person
lying nearside in the bed.
Most of the reported cases of somatoparaphrenia involve the left side of
the body following a right-sided stroke. Lesions generally involve an
extended fronto-temporo-parietal network, with a predominance of posterior areas, such as the temporo-parietal junction, the posterior insula,
as well as subcortical structures (Vallar & Ronchi, 2009). Involvement of
medial frontal and orbitofrontal areas seems to distinguish delusional
types of disownership from mildest types of limb estrangement (Feinberg
et al., 2010). Interestingly, the posterior insula is the most commonly
involved area in both somatoparaphrenia and anosognosia for hemiplegia
(Baier & Karnath, 2008). Although these two disorders can be separated,
this nding nevertheless suggests that, at both the clinical and anatomical
level, awareness of action and ownership of body parts are tightly linked
(Baier & Karnath, 2008).
247
248
Altering Consciousness
self as spatially localized outside of the physical body and experiences seeing the latter from an elevated perspective (see below).
Another related illusion, referred to as the feeling of a presence, is characterized by a closely projected double that is not visible (Brugger, Regard,
& Landis, 1997). The presence of a person can be felt sideways, behind,
or in front of ones physical body, and may even involve multiple presences (Brugger, Blanke, Regard, Bradford, & Landis, 2006). Such a feeling
of presence has been induced by cortical electrical stimulation of the posterior part of the left superior and middle temporal gyrus (Arzy, Seeck,
Ortigue, Spinelli, & Blanke, 2006). For both heautoscopy and the feeling
of presence, damage to or abnormal activity in parietal and temporallimbic structures, and a resulting vestibular dysfunction, have been posited
as plausible pathomechanisms underlying such complex experiences.
249
250
Altering Consciousness
2007), synesthetic tendencies (Terhune, 2009), as well as personality factors such as absorption, dissociation, schizotypy, and body image dissatisfaction (reviewed in Blanke & Dieguez, 2009) are associated with the
experience of disembodiment and altered states of bodily consciousness
involving the whole body.
Such mechanisms are also likely involved in OBEs that occur under
stressful events or extreme medical situations, so-called near-death experiences (Blanke & Dieguez, 2009; Holden, Greyson, & James, 2009). In
addition to disembodiment, such experiences may be associated with the
experience of a passage through darkness or a tunnel, the perception of
a divine light, a panoramic review of ones life memories, and encounters
with spirits or deceased relatives. As one early observer put it, the NDE, by
its very nature, seems made to astonish; fast, unexpected, extraordinary,
usually poorly understood, it takes the appearance of an internal marvel; it
gives rise to illusions and legends (Egger, 1896, p. 367). Mild disturbances
of the temporal lobe and altered sleep patterns have been found in a
restricted sample of persons with NDE (Britton & Bootzin, 2004), as well
as a higher prevalence of REM intrusions in waking life than in a control
group (Nelson, Mattingly, Lee, & Schmitt, 2006), pointing to similar
sleep-related mechanisms as for OBEs. Nevertheless, at this stage it is difcult to envision a neurocognitive account of NDEs as there is a dearth of systematic empirical neuroscientic research on this class of phenomena,
perhaps due to its paranormal overtones and the lack of a consistent and
operational denition. Indeed, a number of conditions have been reported
to induce similar experiences, most often involving some alteration of
the bodily self and not being necessarily life-threatening, such as syncope
(Lempert, Bauer, & Schmidt, 1994), intracranial brain stimulation (Vignal,
Maillard, McGonigal, & Chauvel, 2007), the perception of danger (Noyes
& Kletti, 1977), and psychological stress (Siegel, 1984).
All in all, it seems that the OBE in neurological patients, healthy persons, and under life-threatening situations, is associated with a disintegration of sensory modalities, notably vestibular, visual, and proprioceptive
information, together with a variety of factors reecting cognitive, emotional, and perhaps cultural factors, leading to failures of self-localization
and displacement of the rst-person perspective.
Mystical States
Altered states of consciousness associated with mystical states or meditation have been reported to induce alterations of bodily consciousness
from times immemorial. In these states, dissolution of the ego or pure
consciousness are often reported, referring to an experienced merging
of the self and bodily self with external space and accompanied by a felt
transcendence from spatial and temporal constraints, a sense of sacredness
and ineffability, and an overall positive mood (Pahnke & Richards, 1990/
1966; Wulff, 2000). Such states can also be close to, or even cause, OBEand NDE-like episodes. An involvement of the limbic system, associated
to a sudden release of endorphins (Prince, 1982) or in the form of ecstatic
epileptic seizures of temporal lobe origin (Picard & Craig, 2009), has been
highlighted as a neurobiological correlate of such experiences. A recent
investigation of the impact of brain damage on the personality trait transcendent self also suggests the importance of the temporo-parietal junction (Urgesi, Aglioti, Skrap, & Fabbro, 2010), an area also involved in
other cases of altered bodily awareness of body parts (such as anosognosia
and somatoparaphrenia) as well as illusory full-body perceptions (such as
out-of-body experiences). Physical and environmental factors can also be
involved, as experiences of bodily dissolution and separation of the self
and body have been reported during physical exhaustion of runners
(Morgan, 2002) and in high-altitude mountaineers (Brugger, Regard,
Landis, & Oelz, 1999).
Hypnosis
Hypnosis is perhaps the most compelling area of overlap between neurology and ASC, at least historically [see Cardena & Alvarado, Volume 1].
Early investigation of hysteric patients suggested an inuence of hypnosis on bodily function and experience. At least in certain persons,
neurological-like symptoms have been relieved or induced by different
methods of hypnosis. Most notably, anaesthesia/analgesia and paralysis
during hypnosis have been the focus of much attention and recently been
revived in neuroscientic research (Cojan et al., 2009). Hypnotic induction of altered states of bodily consciousness has also been incorporated
as a tool in the cognitive neurosciences of belief formation in healthy participants (e.g., Cox & Barnier, 2010). We also note that hypnosis has been
used to induce OBEs (Irwin, 1989). Although the mechanisms underlying
hypnosis are far from understood, these ndings point to the importance
of suggestibility and higher-order belief systems, as well as the inuence
251
252
Altering Consciousness
Drugs
Drugs have probably been the most salient articial inducer of ASC
throughout history, and complex alterations of the bodily self have long
been reported following intoxication by a wide array of substances [see
Presti, this volume]. For instance, Havelock Ellis vividly described the
bodily experiences of a mescal user, who reported feelings of heaviness
in one leg while the rest of the body seemed to dematerialize, the back of
his head splitting in two and releasing ows of vivid colors, wind rushing
through his hair, sensations of lightness and contraction, visual hallucinations of parts of his own body, and the feeling of being inside his own
body and looking through it as through a thin transparent skin (in
Lhermitte, 1939, pp. 167168). In addition to feelings of dissolution
and various forms of transformations, getting high often involves the
sensation of levitating and ying, as well as leaving ones body, as
described by French poet and painter Henri Michaux in his monograph
on the effects of marijuana (Michaux, 1967, pp. 132135).
Indeed, apart from well-known effects such as distortion of sense of
time, increase in self-condence, heightened awareness, and complex
mental associations (Hastings, 1990/1969), marijuana is also well known
to inuence bodily consciousness. Charles Tart (1971) conducted a survey of marijuana users that showed a very wide range of bodily self alterations: Users sometimes experience their whole body as bigger or smaller
than usual, the shape of their body as strangely altered, the body felt as
numb, as well as full-blown OBEs.
The Good Friday experiment conducted by Pahnke in 1962 (see
follow-up by Doblin, 1991) demonstrated that psilocybin, unlike a placebo,
allowed inducing mystical states along with alterations of bodily consciousness sometimes similar to OBEs and NDEs. More recently, Grifths and collaborators replicated this nding in a better-controlled setting, and
participants likewise reported experiences of unity with their surroundings,
loss of self, somaesthetic hallucinations and sensations similar to OBEs and
NDEs (Grifths, Richards, McCann, & Jesse, 2006). Reporting on the
effects of LSD, Pahnke and Richards (1990/1966) also described a wide
range of bodily effects, such as intriguing somatic sensations, feeling as
though [the] body is melting, falling apart, or exploding into minute fragments (p. 493), changes in kinesthetic and cutaneous reception and
claims of merging with oorboards or feeling unity with the walls of a
room (p. 497). Finally, anesthetics are also known to induce alterations of
bodily consciousness for body parts (including feelings of disownership;
Paqueron et al., 2003), as well as OBEs and NDEs (Corazza & Schifano,
2010).
Experimental Procedures
Experiments in sensory deprivation have been used as a powerful scientic tool for investigating the interactions between bodily awareness and
cognition. In such studies, participants lie in an isolation tank, deprived of
as many sensory signals as possible (Zubek, 1969). The effects of such
experiments have been compared to medical conditions involving sensory
and motor impairments (Jackson, Pollard, & Kansky, 1962) and more
recently to the effects of mind-altering drugs (Mason & Brady, 2009).
Altered states of bodily consciousness have also been reported during such
conditions, with illusory movements, complex tactile hallucinations, feelings of a presence, depersonalization, and OBEs (Heron, 1957).
As is the case with other ASC, it is known that OBEs are favorably
induced when lying down or relaxing (Zingrone, Alvarado, & Cardena,
2010), an important observation in the light of accounts of the OBE in
terms of vestibular hallucination (Schwabe & Blanke, 2008). Individuals
claiming to be able to deliberately self-induce OBEs have also used a variety of sensory deprivation and meditation methods (reviewed in Blackmore, 1982). More recently, laboratory investigations have delineated
controlled approaches to induce, or at least mimic, some aspects of OBEs.
Most notably, visuo-tactile conicts have been exploited to investigate the
OBE (Ehrsson, 2007; Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, & Blanke, 2007).
These studies have used virtual reality as a method to provide participants
with visual perceptions of their own bodies (via a recording camera feeding a head-mounted display) while experiencing tactile sensations congruent or incongruent with those applied to their visual double. Measures of
self-location and subjective reports about self-identity in such experiments
have revealed the importance of congruent visuo-tactile information for
the bodily self (review in Aspell & Blanke, 2009).
These paradigms have been inspired by experimental approaches to
modify bodily consciousness of body parts. The rubber-hand illusion,
for instance, operates under similar visuo-tactile conicts, whereby a person looks at a fake hand being stroked by a brush while feeling the same
sensation on her real (and hidden) hand. In such circumstances, it is often
reported that the felt brushes seem to be located onto the fake hand, and
objective measures reveal that participants experience their real hand to
253
254
Altering Consciousness
be located closer to the fake hand than it really is (Botvinick & Cohen,
1998). Interestingly, feelings of illusory ownership during the rubberhand illusion have been found to correlate with objective changes in temperature in the real hand (Moseley et al., 2008), suggesting that similar
processes underlie experimentally-induced illusory ownership in healthy
persons and a number of psychiatric and neurological conditions involving altered states of bodily consciousness (reviewed in Moseley et al.,
2008). Coupled with clinical investigations, the experimental study of
full-body illusions provides a very promising approach for understanding
the neurocognitive processes underlying the bodily self and altered states
of bodily consciousness.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have covered a wide array of altered states of bodily
consciousness. Perhaps most striking is the sheer phenomenological variety of these bodily experiences. Misrepresentations of the physical body
can involve selected body parts, half of the body, or the entire body and
self. Whereas some of them are critically perceived as illusory by the experient, even sought after in some cases, others can be outright delusional.
Their content can involve varied phenomena such as mislocalizations,
illusory movements, presence of nonexistent body parts, disappearance
of body parts, size and shape transformations, denial of ownership, incorporation of external objects, merging of boundaries, complete disembodiment, and denial of impairment.
At this stage, an encompassing theoretical framework to explain and
reliably induce such states is not available. It is indeed difcult to assess
to what extent these complex misrepresentations, which can occur after
neurological damage or in psychiatric conditions but also spontaneously
and under experimental circumstances, are comparable. Nevertheless,
the distinction between altered states of bodily consciousness involving
body parts and the whole body (Dieguez et al., 2007) and the segregation
of the bodily self into three core constituents (namely, the rst personperspective, self-location, and self-identication) suggest preliminary
frameworks (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009). Notably, a network in the right
hemisphere involving the temporo-parietal junction, the posterior insula,
and the basal ganglia, as well as premotor and primary sensory structures,
has been identied to be crucially involved in the integration of body parts
and representations of the whole body, as well as the calibration of an egocentric spatial frame of reference allowing one to coherently locate ones
body with respect to gravity and the surrounding environment. Future work
should allow scientists to ne-grain these observations and disentangle the
systems underlying specic alterations of the bodily self. A worthwhile
question, for instance, would be whether body parts and whole-body
alterations can be mapped unto an anatomo-functional continuum or
whether they arise from different processes altogether.
Most importantly, any insights have been and will be the result of
investigations carried out from a wide range of perspectives, including
analytical philosophy, phenomenology, clinical neuropsychology, experimental psychology, and the cognitive neurosciences. New therapeutic
methods and creative experimental paradigms, incorporating pharmacological improvements, braincomputer interfaces, as well as robotic and
virtual reality technology, will also emerge in the near future. Merged with
the insights offered by approaches and traditions often considered as outside the reach of science, such as hypnosis, shamanism, mysticism, religious rituals, and the use of mind-altering drugs, the study of altered
states of bodily consciousness holds the potential to offer important scientic insights about the brain processes involved in creating our everyday
experience of the self. Conversely, careful theoretical and conceptual work
on the bodily self can guide our understanding and the development of
experimental approaches to ASC at large.
References
Alvarado, C. S. (2000). Out-of-body experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, &
S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 183218). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Andre, J. M., Martinet, N., Paysant, J., Beis, J. M., & Le Chapelain, L. (2001).
Temporary phantom limbs evoked by vestibular caloric stimulation in amputees. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology and Behavioral Neurology, 14, 190196.
Antoniello, D., Kluger, B. M., Sahlein, D. H., & Heilman, K. M. (2009). Phantom
limb after stroke: An underreported phenomenon. Cortex, doi:10.1016/
j.cortex.2009.10.003.
Appenzeller, O., & Bicknelle, J. M. (1969). Effects of nervous system lesions on
phantom experience in amputees. Neurology, 19, 141146.
Arzy, S., Overney, L. S., Landis, T., & Blanke, O. (2006). Neural mechanisms of
embodiment: Asomatognosia due to premotor cortex damage. Archives of Neurology, 63, 10221025.
Arzy, S., Seeck, M., Ortigue, S., Spinelli, L., & Blanke, O. (2006). Induction of an
illusory shadow person. Nature, 443, 287.
Aspell, J. E., & Blanke, O. (2009). Understanding the out-of-body experience
from a neuroscientic perspective. In C. D. Murray (Ed.), Psychological and
255
256
Altering Consciousness
391
Index
shaman and pilgrims, 15456; symbols
and visions, 15657
Huichol Indians: Mexico, 147; plant
knowledge, 155 n.4
Human development: adolescence,
22326; adulthood, 226; complexity
and differentiation, 214, 215, 218;
consciousness, 21112; early
childhood, 21922; infant and toddler,
213, 21519; late adulthood, 22628;
middle childhood, 222; self-awareness,
217; self-regulation, 215, 216
Human sexuality: cultural relativity of
practices, 190; studies of, 18990. See
also Sexuality
Hunt, H. T., 291, 31819
Husserl, Edmund G., 329, 330, 346
Huxley, Aldous, 77
Hypertensive crisis, tyramine-rich foods,
104
Hyperventilation, 56; sexuality and
ASC, 195
Hypnagogic sleep stage, 360, 361, 367
Hypnopompic sleep stage, 360
Hypnosis, 331, 33536; bodily
consciousness in, 25152; and
emotion, 28182; ESP experience,
36364; fMRI studies, 334; healing
effects, 335
Hypnosis Induction Prole (HIP), 68
Hypnotic responsiveness, 221
Hypnotic susceptibility, ultradian cycle, 8
Hypnotizability, 338; genetic
component, 212
Hypothermic cardiac arrest, 76
Iatrogenic problems, misdiagnosed
VSEs, 317
Ictal period, temporal lobe epileptic
seizure, 64, 65
Ictus-related religious experience, TLE,
6465
Igoga plant, 51
Illusory amputation, 24445
Illusory movements, 241
Imaginary gures, childhood, 220
Immortality, daoist yoga, 197
Inca Cueva site, Argentina, 86
Blanke, O., Ortigue, S., Landis, T., & Seeck, M. (2002). Stimulating illusory ownbody perceptions. Nature, 419, 269270.
Bonnier, P. (1905). Laschematie [Aschematia]. Revue Neurologique, 54, 605609.
Botvinick, M., & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands feel touch that eyes see.
Nature, 391, 756.
Britton, W. B., & Bootzin, R. R. (2004). Near-death experiences and the temporal
lobe. Psychological Science, 15, 254258.
Brugger, P. (2002). Reective mirrors: Perspective taking in autoscopic phenomena. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 7, 179194.
Brugger, P. (2005). From phantom limb to phantom body: Varieties of extracorporeal awareness. In G. Knoblich, I. Thornton, M. Grosjean, & M. Shiffrar
(Eds.), Human body perception from the inside out (pp. 171209). New York:
Oxford University Press.
Brugger, P., Blanke, O., Regard, M., Bradford, D. T., & Landis, T. (2006). Polyopic heautoscopy: Case report and review of the literature. Cortex, 42, 666
674.
Brugger, P., Regard, M., & Landis, T. (1997). Illusory reduplication of ones own
body: Phenomenology and classication of autoscopic phenomena. Cognitive
Neuropsychiatry, 2, 1938.
Brugger, P., Regard, M., Landis, T., & Oelz, O. (1999). Hallucinatory experiences
in extreme altitude climbers. Neuropsychiatry, Neuropsychology and Behavioral
Neurology, 12, 6771.
Cardena, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and physically active. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 53, 3759.
Cheyne, J. A., & Girard, T. A. (2009). The body unbound: Vestibular-motor hallucinations and out-of-body experiences. Cortex, 45, 201215.
Cocchini, G., Beschin, N., Fotopoulou, A., & Della Sala, S. (2010). Explicit and
implicit anosognosia or upper limb motor impairment. Neuropsychologia, 48,
14891494.
Cojan, Y., Waber, L., Schwartz, S., Rossier, L., Forster, A., & Vuilleumier, P.
(2009). The brain under self-control: Modulation of inhibitory and monitoring cortical networks during hypnotic paralysis. Neuron, 62, 862875.
Corazza, O., & Schifano, F. (2010). Near-death states reported in a sample of
50 misusers. Substance Use and Misuse, 45, 916924.
Cox, R. E., & Barnier, A. J. (2010). Hypnotic illusions and clinical delusions:
Hypnosis as a research method. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry, 15, 202232.
Cronholm, B. (1951). Phantom limbs in amputees: A study of changes in the integration of centripetal impulses with special reference to referred sensations.
Acta Psychiatrica et Neurologica Scandinavica (Supplementum), 72, 1310.
Damasio, A. R. (1999). The feeling of what happens: Body and emotion in the making
of consciousness. London: Heinemann.
De Leon, J., Antelo, R. E., & Simpson, G. (1992). Delusion of parasitosis or
chronic tactile hallucinosis: Hypothesis about their brain physiopathology.
Comprehensive Psychiatry, 33, 2533.
257
258
Altering Consciousness
De Ridder, D., Van Laere, K., Dupont, P., Menovsky, T., & Van de Heyning, P.
(2007). Visualizing out-of-body experience in the brain. New England Journal
of Medicine, 357, 18291833.
De Vignemont, F. (2010). Body schema and body imagepros and cons. Neuropsychologia, 48, 669680.
Dieguez, S., Mercier, M., Newby, N., & Blanke, O. (2009). Feeling numbness for
someone elses nger. Current Biology, 19, R11089.
Dieguez, S., Staub, F., & Bogousslavsky, J. (2007). Asomatognosia. In O. Godefroy
& J. Bogousslavsky (Eds.), The behavioral and cognitive neurology of stroke (pp.
215253). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Doblin, R. (1991). Pahnkes Good Friday experiment: A long-term followup and
methodological critique. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 23, 128.
Egger, V. (1896). Le moi des mourants: Nouveaux faits [The I of the dying. New
facts]. Revue Philosophique de la France et de lEtranger, 47, 337368.
Ehrsson, H. (2007). The experimental induction of out-of-body experiences.
Science, 317, 1048.
Fasold, O., von Brevern, M., Kuhberg, M., Ploner, C. J., Villringer, A., Lempert, T.,
& Wenzel, R. (2002). Human vestibular cortex as identied with caloric stimulation in functional magnetic resonance imaging. Neuroimage, 17, 13841393.
Feinberg, T. E., Roane, D. M., & Ali, J. (2000). Illusory limb movements in anosognosia for hemiplegia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 68, 511513.
Feinberg, T. E., Venneri, A., Simone, A. M., Fan, Y., & Northoff, G. (2010). The
neuroanatomy of asomatognosia and somatoparaphrenia. Journal of Neurology,
Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 81, 276281.
Fenelon, G., Thobois, S., Bonnet, A. M., Broussolle, E., & Tison, F. (2002). Tactile
hallucinations in Parkinsons disease. Journal of Neurology, 249, 16991703.
Ferret, S. (1998). Lidentite [Identity]. Paris: Flammarion.
Fotopoulou, A., Tsakiris, M., Haggard, P., Vagopoulo, A., Rudd, A., & Kopelman,
M. (2008). The role of motor intention in motor awareness: An experimental
study on anosognosia for hemiplegia. Brain, 131, 34323442.
Frederiks, J. A. M. (1963a). Anosognosie et hemiasomatognosie [Anosognosia
and hemiasomatognosia]. Revue Neurologique, 109, 585597.
Frederiks, J. A. M. (1963b). Macrosomatognosia and microsomatognosia. Psychiatria, Neurologia, Neurochirurgia, 66, 531536.
Gerstmann, J. (1942). Problem of imperception of disease and of impaired body territories with organic lesions. Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 48, 890913.
Gibbs, R. W. (2006). Embodiment and cognitive science. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Giummarra, M. J., Gibson, S. J., Georgiou-Karistianis, N., & Bradshaw, J. L.
(2007). Central mechanisms in phantom limb perception: The past, present
and future. Brain Research Reviews, 54, 219232.
Grifths, R. R., Richards, W. A., McCann, U., & Jesse, R. (2006). Psilocybin can
occasion mystical-type experiences having substantial and sustained personal
meaning and spiritual signicance. Psychopharmacology, 187, 268283.
Halligan, P. W., Marshall, J. C., & Wade, D. T. (1993). Three arms: A case study
of supernumerary phantom limb after right hemisphere stroke. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry, 56, 159166.
Hastings, A. C. (1990/1969). The effects of marijuana on consciousness. In C.
Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness (3rd ed., pp. 407431). New York:
HarperCollins.
Head, H., & Holmes, H. G. (19111912). Sensory disturbances from cerebral
lesions. Brain, 34, 102254.
Hecaen, H., & Ajuriaguerra, J. (1952). Meconnaissances et hallucinations corporelles
[Bodily unawareness and hallucinations]. Paris: Masson.
Heron, W. (1957, January). The pathology of boredom. Scientic American, 196,
5256.
Heydrich, L., Dieguez, S., Grunwald, T., Seeck, M., & Blanke, O. (2010). Illusory
own body perceptions: Case reports and relevance for bodily selfconsciousness. Consciousness and Cognition, 19, 702710.
Holden, J. M., Greyson, B., & James, D. (2009). The handbook of near-death experiences: Thirty years of investigation. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
Irwin, H. J. (1989). Hypnotic induction of the out-of-body experience. Australian
Journal of Clinical Hypnotherapy and Hypnosis, 10, 17.
Jackson, C. W., Pollard, J. C., & Kansky, E. W. (1962). The application of ndings from experimental sensory deprivation to cases of clinical sensory deprivation. American Journal of the Medical Sciences, 243, 558563.
Karnath, H. O., Baier, B., & Nagele, T. (2005). Awareness of the functioning of
ones own limbs mediated by the insular cortex. Journal of Neuroscience, 25,
71347138.
Karp, B. I., & Hallett, M. (1996). Extracorporeal phantom tics in Tourettes syndrome. Neurology, 46, 3840.
Khateb, A., Simon, S. R., Dieguez, S., Lazeyras, F., Momjian-Mayor, I., Blanke, O.,
et al. (2009). Seeing the phantom: A functional magnetic resonance imaging
study of a supernumerary phantom limb. Annals of Neurology, 65, 698705.
Legrand, D. (2006). The bodily self: The sensori-motor roots of pre-reective selfconsciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 5, 89118.
Lempert, T., Bauer, M., & Schmidt, D. (1994). Syncope and near-death experience. Lancet, 344, 829830.
Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T., & Blanke, O. (2007). Video ergo sum:
Manipulating bodily self-consciousness. Science, 317, 10961099.
Lhermitte, J. (1939). Limage de notre corps [The image of our body]. Paris:
Nouvelle Revue Critique.
Loetscher, T., Regard, M., & Brugger, P. (2006). Misoplegia: A review of the literature and a case without hemiplegia. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and
Psychiatry, 77, 10991100.
McGonigle, D. J., Hanninen, R., Salenius, S., Hari, R., Frackowiak, R. S., & Frith,
C. D. (2002). Whose arm is it anyway? An fMRI case study of supernumerary
phantom limb. Brain, 125, 12651274.
259
260
Altering Consciousness
Maravita, A., & Iriki, A. (2004). Tools for the body (schema). Trends in Cognitive
Sciences, 8, 7986.
Marcel, A. J., Postma, P., Gillmeister, H., Cox, S., Rorden, C., Nimmo-Smith, I., &
Mackintosh, B. (2004). Migration and fusion of tactile sensation: Premorbid susceptibility to allochiria, neglect and extinction? Neuropsychologia, 42, 17491767.
Mason, O. J., & Brady, F. (2009). The psychomimetic effects of short-term sensory deprivation. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 197, 783785.
Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge:
MIT Press.
Michaux, H. (1967). Connaissance par les gouffres [Light through darkness]. Paris:
Galimmard.
Mitchell, S. W. (1905/1866). The case of George Dedlow. In S. W. Mitchell, The
autobiography of a quack and other stories (pp. 83109). New York: Century.
Miyazaki, M., Hirashima, M., & Nozaki, D. (2010). The cutaneous rabbit hopping out of the body. Journal of Neuroscience, 30, 18561860.
Mogar, R. E. (1990/1965). Current status and future trends in psychedelic (LSD)
research. In C. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness (3rd ed., pp. 461480).
New York: HarperCollins.
Morgan, W. P. (2002). Hypnosis in sport and exercise psychology. In J. L. Van
Raalte & B. W. Brewer (Eds.), Exploring sport and exercise psychology (2nd ed.,
pp. 151181). Washington DC: American Psychological Association.
Moseley, G. L., Olthof, N., Venema, A., Don, S., Wijers, M., Gallace, A., &
Spence, C. (2008). Psychologically induced cooling of a specic body part
caused by the illusory ownership of an articial counterpart. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Science USA, 105, 13,16913,173.
Nelson, K. R., Mattingly, M., Lee, S. A., & Schmitt, F. A. (2006). Does the arousal
system contribute to near death experience? Neurology, 66, 10031009.
Nelson, K. R., Mattingly, M., & Schmitt, F. A. (2007) Out-of-body experience and
arousal. Neurology, 68, 794795.
Nielsen, T. (2007). Felt presence: Paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social
imagery? Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 975983.
Noyes, R., & Kletti, R. (1977). Depersonalisation in response to life-threatening
danger. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 18, 375384.
Orfei, M. D., Robinson, R. G., Prigatano, G. P., Starkstein, S., Rusch, N., Bria, P.,
Caltagirone, C., & Spalletta, G. (2007). Anosognosia for hemiplegia after
stroke is a multifaceted phenomenon: A systematic review of the literature.
Brain, 130, 30753090.
Pahnke, W. N., & Richards, W. A. (1990/1966). Implications of LSD and experimental mysticism. In C. Tart (Ed.), Altered states of consciousness (3rd ed.,
pp. 481515). New York: HarperCollins.
Paqueron, X., Lequen, M., Rosenthal, D., Coriat, P., Willer, J. C., & Danziger,
N. (2003). The phenomenology of body image distortions induced by regional
anaesthesia. Brain, 126, 702712.
Picard, F., & Craig, A. D. (2009). Ecstatic epileptic seizures: A potential window on
the neural basis for human self-awareness. Epilepsy and Behavior, 16, 539546.
Podoll, K., & Robinson, D. (2002). Splitting of the body image as somesthetic
aura symptom in migraine. Cephalalgia, 22, 6265.
Prince, R. (1982). Shamans and endorphins: Hypotheses for a synthesis. Ethos,
10, 409423.
Ramachandran, V. S. (1995). Anosognosia in parietal lobe syndrome. Consciousness and Cognition, 4, 2251.
Ramachandran, V. S., & Hirnstein, W. (1998). Perception of phantom limbs: The
D. O. Hebb lecture. Brain, 121, 16031630.
Revonsuo, A., Kallio, S., & Sikka, P. (2009). What is an altered state of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology, 22, 187204.
Sang, F. Y., Jauregui-Renaud, K., Green, D. A., Bronstein, A. M., & Gresty, M. A.
(2006). Depersonalisation/derealisation symptoms in vestibular disease. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 77, 760766.
Scharfetter, C. (1981). Ego-psychopathology: The concept and its empirical
evaluation. Psychological Medicine, 11, 273280.
Shapiro, M. F., Fink, M., & Bender, M. B. (1952). Exosomesthesia or displacement of cutaneous sensation into extrapersonal space. AMA Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, 68, 481490.
Schwabe, L., & Blanke, O. (2008). The vestibular component in out-of-body experiences: A computational approach. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 2, 17.
Siegel, R. K. (1984). Hostage hallucinations: Visual imagery induced by isolation
and life-threatening stress. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 172,
264272.
Staub, F., Bogousslavsky, J., Maeder, P., Maeder-Ingvar, M., Fornari, E., Ghika, J.,
et al. (2006). Intentional motor phantom limb syndrome. Neurology, 67, 2140
2146.
Tart, C. (Ed.). (1990/1969). Altered states of consciousness (3rd ed.). New York:
HarperCollins.
Tart, C. (1971). On being stoned: A psychological study of marijuana intoxication.
Palo Alto, CA: Science and Behavior Books.
Terhune, D. (2009). The incidence and determinants of visual phenomenology
during out-of-body experiences. Cortex, 45, 236242.
Tiliket, C., Ventre-Dominey, J., Vighetto, A., & Grochowicki, M. (1996). Room tilt
illusion: A central otolith dysfunction. Archives of Neurology, 53, 12591264.
Todd, J. (1955). The syndrome of Alice in Wonderland. Canadian Medical Association Journal, 73, 701704.
Urgesi, C., Aglioti, S. M., Skrap, M., & Fabbro, F. (2010). The spiritual brain:
Selective cortical lesions modulate human self-transcendence. Neuron, 65,
309319.
Vallar, G., & Ronchi, R. (2009). Somatoparaphrenia: A body delusion. A review of
the neuropsychological literature. Experimental Brain Research, 192, 533551.
261
262
Altering Consciousness
Vignal, J. P., Maillard, L., McGonigal, A., & Chauvel, P. (2007). The dreamy state:
Hallucinations of autobiographic memory evoked by temporal lobe stimulations and seizures. Brain, 130, 8899.
Weinstein, E. A., Kahn, R. L., Malitz, S., & Rozanski, J. (1954). Delusional reduplication of parts of the body. Brain, 77, 4560.
Wulff, D. M. (2000). Mystical experience. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence
(pp. 397440). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Young, A. W., & Leafhead, K. M. (1996). Betwixt life and death: Case studies of the
Cotard delusion. In P. W. Halligan & J. C. Marshall (Eds.), Method in madness:
Case studies in cognitive neuropsychiatry (pp. 147171). London: Psychology
Press.
Zampini, M., Moro, V., & Aglioti, S. M. (2004). Illusory movements of the contralesional hand in patients with body image disorders. Journal of Neurology,
Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 75, 16261628.
Zingrone, N. L., Alvarado, C. S., & Cardena, E. (2010). Out-of-body experiences
and physical body activity and posture: Responses from a survey conducted in
Scotland. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 198, 163165.
Zubek, J. P. (Ed.). (1969). Sensory deprivation: Fifteen years of research. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
CHAPTER 12
264
Altering Consciousness
265
266
Altering Consciousness
Figure 12.2 The wide frontoparietal network supposed to be involved in consciousness. The network encompasses the polymodal associative cortices: lateral
and medial frontal regions bilaterally, parieto-temporal and posterior parietal areas
bilaterally, posterior cingulate and precuneal cortices. The internal awareness network, also known as the default mode network, includes the more active areas at
rest. The level of consciousness is linked to activity in both internal and external
networks and in the thalami as well as the connectivity between them. (Adapted
from S. Laureys. (2007). Eyes open, brain shut. Scientic American, 296, 8489).
267
268
Altering Consciousness
269
270
Altering Consciousness
terminate with impaired awareness and are called complex partial seizures. Otherwise, if they terminate without impaired consciousness, they
are called simple partial seizures. Loss of responsiveness and awareness
in complex partial seizures usually persists for up to several minutes,
and epileptic patients may show oral and manual automatisms (e.g., picking, fumbling, and cycling). They are followed by amnesia for the episode.
Simple partial seizures stay in the temporal lobe while complex partial
seizures show marked bilateral deactivation in frontal and parietal association cortex. By contrast, simple partial seizures (where patients remain
conscious) are not accompanied by these widespread changes. Complex
partial seizures can propagate to the rest of the brain to produce a secondarily generalized tonic-clonic seizure (Englot & Blumenfeld, 2009) [see
Cardena, this volume, for some specic changes in the content of consciousness during seizures].
diagnostic criteria of brain death, however, are widely accepted and are
based on the loss of all brain stem reexes and the demonstration of continuing termination of respiration (by carefully performing an apnea test) in an
irreversibly comatose patient. There should be an evident cause of coma and
confounding factors such as hypothermia and drug intoxication should be
excluded. Conrmatory tests include a at electroencephalogram and
absence of arterial circulation to the brain shown by arteriography or
echo-Doppler techniques. Brain death is most often caused by a massive
brain lesion (e.g., trauma, intracranial hemorrhage, anoxia) that increases
intracranial pressure, causing the intracranial circulation to cease and damaging the brain stem because of herniation. Functional imaging studies have
shown an empty skull sign (i.e., only the skin surrounding the skull shows
preserved metabolic activity on functional brain scans) conrming the
absence of all neural activity (Laureys, 2005b). The frontoparietal network
linked to consciousness in sleep and anesthesia studies was deactivated in
brain death when studied with functional magnetic resonance imaging
(Boly et al., 2009).
Coma
Coma is characterized by the absence of arousal and thus also of consciousness. It is a state of unarousable unresponsiveness in which the
patient lies with the eyes closed and has no awareness of self and surroundings. The patient lacks the spontaneous periods of wakefulness
and eye-opening induced by stimulation that can be observed in the vegetative state. To be clearly distinguished from syncope, concussion, or
other states of transient unconsciousness, coma must persist for at least 1
hour. In general, comatose patients who survive begin to awaken and recover gradually within 2 to 4 weeks. Coma can result from bilateral widespread hemispheric cortical or white matter damage or from more focal
brainstem lesions, affecting the subcortical reticular arousing systems.
The prognosis depends on the etiology, the patients general medical condition, age, clinical signs, and results from complementary examinations.
Traumatic etiology is known to have a better outcome than nontraumatic, especially anoxic cases. In the latter case, as for cardiac arrest
survivors, after 3 days of observation a bad outcome is heralded by the
absence of papillary or corneal reexes, stereotyped or absent motor
response to noxious stimulation, absent cortical responses of somatosensoryevoked potentials, and biochemical markers, such as high levels of serum
neuron-specic enolase.
271
272
Altering Consciousness
Following severe brain damage and coma, some patients may awaken
(that is, open the eyes) but remain unresponsive, only showing reex
movements. In Europe, this clinical syndrome was initially termed apallic
syndrome and coma vigil, but it was later redened as vegetative state (VS).
Since its description more than 35 years ago, an increasing number of
functional neuroimaging and event-related potential studies have shown
that it sometimes may be difcult to make strong claims about vegetative
patients awareness. This situation is further complicated when they have
underlying decits in verbal or nonverbal communication functions, such
as aphasia, agnosia, or apraxia (Majerus, Bruno, Schnakers, Giacino, &
Laureys, 2009). It appears that part of the healthcare, media, and lay public continues to feel some unease regarding the unintended denigrating
vegetable-like connotation seemingly intrinsic to the term VS. The European Task Force on Disorders of Consciousness therefore recently proposed an alternative name (Laureys et al., 2010). Hence, physicians have
recently offered to refer to these patients as being in unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) a more neutral and descriptive term pertaining to
patients showing a number of clinical signs (hence syndrome) of unresponsiveness (that is, without response to commands or oriented voluntary movements) in the presence of wakefulness (that is, eye opening). In
contrast to coma, which is an acute condition lasting no more than some
days or weeks, UWS can be a chronic condition lasting years or becoming
permanent. The vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome may
be a transition to further recovery or may be permanent.
Permanent vegetative state is a term that refers to patients whose chances
for recovery are close to zero. This is the case when the condition lasts
more than 1 year after traumatic or 3 months after nontraumatic (anoxic)
injury. The VS has been characterized as persistent when a patient is in this
state for more than 1 month. As both terms are abbreviated as PVS, we
suggest avoiding these terms and, instead, using unresponsive wakefulness
syndrome with the etiology and the time spent in the condition. At present,
there are no validated prognostic markers for individual patients except
that the chances for recovery depend on patients age, etiology, and time
spent in the UWS. In the vegetative state/unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, global metabolic activity decreases to about 50% of normal levels.
Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have identied the frontoparietal network previously presented in sleep and anesthesia as the network showing
metabolic dysfunction as compared with the conscious resting state in
healthy controls (Figure 12.2) (Laureys, 2005a).
The minimally conscious state was dened in 2002 by the Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference Workgroup to subcategorize patients above the
VS/UWS but unable to functionally communicate their thoughts and feelings. Minimally conscious state patients show inconsistent but discernible
signs of behavioral activity that is more than reexive in at least one of the
following behavioral ways: (1) purposeful behavior, including movements
or affective behavior that occurs in contingent relation to relevant environment stimuli and is not caused by reexive activity, such as: pursuit eye
movement or sustained xation occurring in direct response to moving
or salient stimuli, smiling or crying in response to verbal or visual emotional but not neutral stimuli, reaching for objects, demonstrating a relationship between object location and direction of reach, touching or
holding objects in a manner that accommodates the size and shape of
the object, and vocalizations or gestures occurring in direct response
to the linguistic content of questions; (2) following simple commands;
(3) gestural or verbal yes/no response, regardless of accuracy; and
(4) intelligible verbalization.
Emergence from the minimally conscious state is dened by the ability
to exhibit functional interactive communication or functional use of
objects. Given that the criteria for the minimally conscious state have only
recently been introduced, there are few clinical studies of patients in this
condition. Similar to the vegetative state, traumatic etiology has a better
prognosis than nontraumatic anoxic brain injuries. Preliminary data show
that the overall outcome in the minimally conscious state is more favorable
than in the vegetative state. At present, no time intervals for permanent
minimally conscious state have been agreed on. Akinetic mutism (a condition
characterized by severe poverty of movement, speech, and thought without associated arousal disorder or descending motor tract impairment) is
an outdated term that should be avoided and is now considered to be a
subcategory of the minimally conscious syndrome.
Neuroimaging studies on the minimally conscious state show that
overall cerebral metabolism is decreased to values slightly higher than
but comparable to those observed in the VS/UWS (Laureys, Perrin,
Schnakers, Boly, & Majerus, 2005). Nevertheless, minimally conscious
state patients can show brain activities similar to the activity of a healthy
brain in response to sensory stimuli. Furthermore, the activity inside the
frontoparietal network and the connectivity between the different areas
of the network was found to be negatively correlated with the degree of
clinical consciousness impairment, ranging from healthy controls and
273
274
Altering Consciousness
motor areas] and imagine walking around your house [activating parahippocampal brain regions]). Four out of 23 clinically vegetative patients
showed fMRI signs of command following and hence of consciousness. In
addition to showing proof of consciousness, fMRI can now be used to communicate with some (very exceptional) patients. Indeed, one clinically noncommunicative patient studied in the Lie`ge University Hospital was shown
to correctly answer ve out of six simple questions regarding the names of
his family members (Monti et al., 2010). Evidently, these data should be
seen as clarications of the condition rather than as a practical means to
truly assure long-term communication.
275
276
Altering Consciousness
and lateral and medial frontal cortices) pathways have identied states of
altered consciousness.
Consciousness can be viewed as the emergent property of the collective
behavior of widespread thalamo-cortical frontoparietal network connectivity. The above-presented studies on physiological (e.g., sleep), pharmacological (e.g., general anesthesia), and pathological alterations of
consciousness (e.g., coma and related conditions) provide evidence in
favor of this hypothesis [cf. Beauregard, this volume]. Once conscious sensory content is established, it is distributed widely to a decentralized
audience of expert networks, or executive interpreters (Baars, 1988,
2005). Consequently, conscious perception involves widespread frontoparietal brain sources, and unconscious sensory processing leads to much
more limited and disconnected brain activation. Synchronized specialized
brain regions are thought to share their information into a common workspace, which is a complex network of cortico-cortical and thalamo-cortical
functional connections. Other cerebral systems would permit those
synchronized neural networks to put their own elements of the mental
content forward, in the front of the scene of consciousness. Mental content
would, therefore, be the result of converging information from lowerorder functional neural assemblies toward higher-order assemblies, a
hypothesis currently being tested in neural modeling studies (Seth,
Dienes, Cleeremans, Overgaard, & Pessoa, 2008).
References
Alkire, M. T., Hudetz, A. G., & Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness and anesthesia.
Science, 322(5903), 876880.
Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baars, B. J. (2005). Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience. Progress in Brain Research, 150, 4553.
Bassetti, C., Vella, S., Donati, F., Wielepp, P., & Weder, B. (2000). SPECT during
sleepwalking. Lancet, 356(9228), 484485.
Blumenfeld, H., & Taylor, J. (2003). Why do seizures cause loss of consciousness? Neuroscientist, 9(5), 301310.
Boly, M., Tshibanda, L., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q., Schnakers, C.,
Ledoux, D., et al. (2009). Functional connectivity in the default network
during resting state is preserved in a vegetative but not in a brain dead patient.
Human Brain Mapping, 30, 23932400.
Boveroux, P., Bonhomme, V., Boly, M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Maquet, P., & Laureys,
S. (2008). Brain function in physiologically, pharmacologically, and pathologically
altered states of consciousness. International Anesthesiology Clinics, 46(3), 131146.
Boveroux, P., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Lauwick, S., Bruno, M. A., Noirhomme, Q.,
Faymonville, M. E., et al. (2010). Within- and between-networks resting state
fMRI connectivity reects the level of consciousness during anesthesia Anesthesiology, 113, 10071009
Englot, D. J., & Blumenfeld, H. (2009). Consciousness and epilepsy: Why are
complex-partial seizures complex? Progress in Brain Research, 177, 147170.
Fisher, R. S., van Emde Boas, W., Blume, W., Elger, C., Genton, P., Lee, P., et al.
(2005). Epileptic seizures and epilepsy: Denitions proposed by the International
League Against Epilepsy (ILAE) and the International Bureau for Epilepsy (IBE).
Epilepsia, 46, 470472.
Hobson, J. A. (2005). Sleep is of the brain, by the brain and for the brain. Nature,
437(7063), 12541256.
Holzinger, B., LaBerge, S., & Levitan, L. (2006). Psychophysiological correlates of
lucid dreaming. Dreaming, 16(2), 8895.
Horovitz, S. G., Braun, A. R., Carr, W. S., Picchioni, D., Balkin, T. J., Fukunaga,
M., et al. (2009). Decoupling of the brains default mode network during deep
sleep. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106, 11,37611,381.
Laureys, S. (2005a). The neural correlate of (un)awareness: Lessons from the vegetative state. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 9(12), 556559.
Laureys, S. (2005b). Science and society: Death, unconsciousness and the brain.
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 899909.
Laureys, S., Celesia, G. G., Cohadon, F., Lavrijsen, J., Leon-Carrion, J., Sannita,
W. G., et al. (2010). Unresponsive wakefulness syndrome: A new name for
the vegetative state or apallic syndrome. [Debate paper]. BMC Medicine, 8:68
Laureys, S., Pellas, F., Van Eeckhout, P., Ghorbel, S., Schnakers, C., Perrin, F.,
et al. (2005). The locked-in syndrome: What is it like to be conscious but
paralyzed and voiceless? Progress in Brain Research, 150, 495511.
Laureys, S., Perrin, F., Schnakers, C., Boly, M., & Majerus, S. (2005). Residual
cognitive function in comatose, vegetative and minimally conscious states.
Current Opinion in Neurology, 18, 726733.
Laureys S. (2007). Eyes open, brain shut. Scientic American, 296(5), 849.
Majerus, S., Bruno, M. A., Schnakers, C., Giacino, J. T., & Laureys, S. (2009). The
problem of aphasia in the assessment of consciousness in brain-damaged
patients. Progress in Brain Research, 177, 4961.
Majerus, S., Gill-Thwaites, H., Andrews, K., & Laureys, S. (2005). Behavioral
evaluation of consciousness in severe brain damage. Progress in Brain Research,
150, 397413.
Maquet, P., Ruby, P., Maudoux, A., Albouy, G., Sterpenich, V., Dang-Vu, T., et al.
(2005). Human cognition during REM sleep and the activity prole within
frontal and parietal cortices: A reappraisal of functional neuroimaging data.
Progress in Brain Research, 150, 219227.
Monti, M. M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Pickard, J. D.,
Tshibanda, L., et al. (2010). Willful modulation of brain activity in disorders
of consciousness. New England Journal of Medicine, 362, 579589.
277
278
Altering Consciousness
Serfontein, L. (2010). Awareness in cardiac anesthesia. Current Opinion in Anaesthesiology, 23(1), 103108.
Seth, A. K., Dienes, Z., Cleeremans, A., Overgaard, M., & Pessoa, L. (2008).
Measuring consciousness: Relating behavioural and neurophysiological
approaches. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(8), 314321.
Thonnard, M., Vanhaudenhuyse, A., & Laureys, S. (2009). Les experiences de mort
imminente et les souvenirs de la periode de coma: Reels ou imagines? [Near-death
experience and memories during coma: Real or imaginary?] (Master thesis
report). Lie`ge: University of Lie`ge.
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Demertzi, A., Schabus, M., Noirhomme, Q., Bredart, S.,
Boly, M., et al. (2010). Two distinct neuronal networks mediate the awareness
of environment and of self. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23, 19.
Vanhaudenhuyse, A., Noirhomme, Q., Tshibanda, L. J., Bruno, M. A., Boveroux,
P., Schnakers, C., et al. (2010). Default network connectivity reects the level
of consciousness in non-communicative brain-damaged patients. Brain, 133
(Pt 1), 161171.
Voss, U., Holzmann, R., Tuin, I., & Hobson, J. A. (2009). Lucid dreaming: A state
of consciousness with features of both waking and non-lucid dreaming. Sleep,
32(9), 11911200.
CHAPTER 13
This chapter has benetted from the astute reading of Martina Belz, Ken S. Pope, and
Sophie Reijman
280
Altering Consciousness
The other side of the equation, namely ASC producing notable emotional experience, has produced considerably more research. Hobson
(1994) found that, in order, the three most common emotions present in
dreams were anxiety or fear, joy-elation, and anger, with more than half
of all dreams presenting strong emotions and a bit more than two-thirds
of all dreams having an unpleasant emotional tone.
In contrast with this preponderance of negative emotions, the great
majority of reports from near-death experiences (NDEs) include a sense of
unconditional love, bliss, and joy, although some NDEs can produce distress (Greyson, 2000). Similarly, the majority of mystical experiences,
which refer to a sense of transcendence and connectedness, are described
as blissful or subsuming some type of equanimity that has a very positive
emotional valence, a peace that passeth understanding, although not every
mystical experience is interpreted positively (Wulff, 2000). In a similar vein,
a temporary lack of discursive reasoning and even of a recognizable content
of consciousness is considered highly desirable in many meditative practices (cf. Forman, 1999: see also Shear, Volume 1, and Beauregard, this volume), but an emotional state without any clear content may be distressing.
In a self-account of schizophrenia, Hyllyer (1926, in Landis, 1964, p. 321)
described an experience in which she came as close . . . as I ever have to a
state of emotion unaccompanied by thought, I simply felt . . . a feeling of
being lost . . . lost in mind and body and soul . . . there was a sickening,
acute moment, then a welding. The emotion became me.
Positive mystical experiences have been reported as well after the ingestion of psychedelic drugs, although of course toxic levels of a substance,
psychological disturbance, or negative set or setting can produce bad occurrences or trips [see the various chapters on psychoactive drugs, this volume]. With a group of individuals selected for psychological balance,
Grifths, Richards, McCann, and Jesse (2006) found that ingesting psilocybin produced what the majority of volunteers rated as one of the ve most
meaningful experiences in their lives, from which we can infer that they
had a deep emotional experience. In this well-designed study, the results
could not be explained by a placebo effect and were corroborated by people
close to the experients.
With respect to procedures that may evoke an ASC and are associated
with emotional changes, hypnotic virtuosos (i.e., the around 23% of
the population that is most responsive to hypnotic suggestions) reported
spontaneous mystical-type experience of connectedness with everything,
love, euphoria, serenity, being at home, and so on when they experienced being in a very deep state (Cardena, 2005). This is not likely to
have been the effect of the simple induction of counting from 1 to 30 in
281
282
Altering Consciousness
283
284
Altering Consciousness
is to conduct far more thorough phenomenological evaluations. For example, despite a considerable overlap in other dimensions, the auditory hallucinations of those who did not meet criteria for a formal diagnosis had less
negative and more controllable voices than those of individuals fullling
diagnostic criteria (Bentall, 2000). It is also important to situate an ASC longitudinally and in the context of the persons attributions, as some manifestations may emerge or become distressing particularly in the context of
ongoing stressful events or negative evaluations by the person or others
(Bentall, 2000).
In what follows, I will concentrate on alterations of consciousness as
the or a major manifestation of a psychopathological process, but it should
be borne in mind that the same content in consciousness may be found in
nonpathological and sometimes even desirable experiences, as I will also
illustrate. In Table 13.1, I list the major topics I will discuss later, providing examples from both psychiatric conditions and nonpathological processes. I also give a brief denition of the diagnostic labels used in the
table. There are neurological conditions, including seizure disorders, and
various other pathologies of the central nervous system that can produce
some of the ASC discussed below, but they are not the focus of this chapter.
Diagnostic Taxonomies
Various models to organize the vast region of human dysfunction and
suffering known as psychopathology have been offered. These models may
be considered as different, potentially valid and not mutually exclusive
perspectives on a very complex domain, with none being able to encompass all valid views on pathology. For this chapter on altered consciousness, explanatory models that emphasize hypothesized psychological or
neurological processes, such as psychodynamic, neurobiological, or
behavioral processes, are not as relevant as those that describe immediate
conscious experience (cf. Sims, 1995). A phenomenological, descriptive
approach to psychopathology favors descriptions of experience as it is
lived by an agent and was developed by the psychiatrist and philosopher
Karl Jaspers (18831969) in his General Psychopathology (1913/1963). In
it, he privileged the form of symptoms (e.g., the way that individuals hold
a delusional belief, such as it being central to their notion of reality and
being impermeable to any discussion) rather than their content (e.g.,
believing that there is some kind of improbable conspiracy against the
group that the person belongs to), an approach that is congenial with
looking at states of consciousness according to their systemic properties
rather than their content (cf. Tart, 1975). R. D. Laing (19271989) is
Table 13.1
CONDITIONS*
PATHOLOGICAL
Dissociative dx.
PTSD
Sleep paralysis
Panic attack
Borderline p. d.
Schizotypal p. d.
Somatoform dx
Psychosis
Mood dx
NONPATHOLOGICAL
Spirit possession/
Ritual ASC
Meditation
Mystical/visionary
Hypnosis
Trauma reaction
Erotism
No- or
narrow
Cs.
Changes
in body
Delirium image
Depers. Fusion
xx
x
x
x
xx
x
No
agency
Id
Strong
changes emotions Halluc.
Trans.
xx
xx
x
?
x
x
x
x
x
?
x
x
x
x
x
xx
x
x
xx
x
x
x
x
?
x
xx
x
x
x
x
x
?
?
x
x
?
x
x
xx
x
x
xx
?
xx
x
xx
x
x
?
?
xx
x
xx
xx
x
?
x
x
x
x
x
x
xx
xx
x
?
?
xx
x
?
xx
x
xx
x
xx
?
x
xx
x
xx
?
xx
x
?
xx
xx
x
xx
?
?
?
?
(Continued)
another major author who emphasized that how a particular mental content is lived by the person may be more revealing than how it may seem to
an external observer (Laing, 1967). In the following sections, I will not
discuss pathology that does not directly and importantly affect the
persons state of consciousness, such as most personality, learning, or
other disorders.
287
288
Altering Consciousness
289
290
Altering Consciousness
It is also pertinent to mention here the dark night of the soul experience, which can happen as a transitional stage in a mystics life. Roberts
(1933, in Hunt, 2007, p. 214) recounts:
Suddenly I was aware that all life around me had come to a complete standstill. Everywhere I looked, instead of life, I saw a hideous nothingness
invading and strangling the life out of every object . . . a world being choked
to death by an insidious void . . . a scene of death, dying, and decay.
Hunt proposes that these experiences are similar to those found in the
anhedonia (inability to feel pleasure) in chronic psychosis (or, I would
add, also in major depression). According to him, as part of spiritual
development, they may lead to an enhancement of Being, whereas they
represent a decay of that sense of Being when they are a symptom of a
psychopathological process [see Lukoff, this volume]. Also relevant here is
Formans discussion (1999) of episodes of pure consciousness in the context of meditative practice where, paradoxically, experiential emptiness in
the context of an organized, purposeful practice to alter consciousness can
lead to an actual enhancement of the sense of being alive [see also Shear,
Volume 1]. Similarly, Mishara and Schwartz [this volume] propose that a
transient dissolution of the self may lead to a greater overall integration.
At the other end, extreme elation or mania, a variation of bipolar disorder, transforms the whole state of consciousness to bring about delusions
of power and grandeur (in a sense I am God. I see the future, plan the
universe), a heightened sense of reality (the outer world makes a much
more vivid and intense impression than usual), a sense of revelation
(The sense of being intimately in tune with the ultimate stuff of the universe), overwhelming emotions and loss of inhibition, and even ight of
ideas and incoherence (essential to x my exact position (y on the pipe)
in the space-time continuum, at any rate by what the sailors call D. R.
(dead reckoning)) (in Landis, 1964, pp. 285294).
Another emotion, extreme fear or panic, can bring about periods
of depersonalization and other changes in consciousness such as the
following report: (A panic attack) surges with an indescribable intensity
of Horror. Home again becomes immeasurable distance, only more
immeasurable. And the distance of three blocks . . . is, I feel, an innity
of street in the sun . . . I sometimes feel faint (Leonard, 1939, in Landis,
1964, p. 247).
Alterations in Perception/Hallucinations
Schizophrenia is often portrayed in TV shows and lms as involving dramatic visual and auditory hallucinations and far-fetched delusions, but one
should speak of different types of schizophrenia or, at least, different types
of symptoms (APA, 2000). Negative symptoms involve a diminution of
291
292
Altering Consciousness
293
294
Altering Consciousness
Belz (in print) has also discussed recently diagnostic and therapeutic
issues related to distressing ASC and EHE and how they are treated by the
Counseling Department of the Institut fur Grenzgebiete der Psychologie
und Psychohygiene a clinic devoted to these problems in Freiburg. This is
an area that deserves much greater attention by both clinicians and
researchers, and one of the major motivations for this chapter has been
not only to look at the various links between ASC and psychopathology
but also to point out how ASC occurring in nonpathological contexts could
be easily mistaken as indicators of dysfunction.
Putnam (2005) made a strong case that clinical psychology and psychiatry must pay far more attention to states of consciousness, both
because they are necessary to understand certain forms of pathology and
because one of the major tasks in therapy is to modify the clients consciousness, of which the current reliance on such techniques as mindfulness and mentalization are primary examples. ASC are part and parcel of
the human experience, both in pathology and in health, as the various
contributions to these two volumes attest. A clinical science of altered consciousness is fundamental to understanding what may go wrong in a persons mind but also what may bring about recovery and provide greater
existential joy and meaning.
References
Alvarado, C. S. (2000). Out-of-body experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, &
S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 183218). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. (4th ed.). Text revision. Washington, DC: Author.
Appelle, S., Lynn, S. J., & Newman, L. (2000). Alien abduction experiences. In
E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience:
Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 253282). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Baars, B. (2000). Conscious emotional feelingsbeyond the four taboos. Consciousness & Emotion, 1, 1114.
Belz, M. (in print). Exceptional experiences and mental health. In C. SimmondsMoore (ed.), Essays on health and exceptional human experiences. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland.
Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive inuences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100, 407425.
Bentall, R. P. (2000). Hallucinatory experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, &
S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 85120). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
295
296
Altering Consciousness
Berenbaum, H., Kerns, J., & Raghavan, C. (2000). Anomalous experiences, peculiarity, and psychopathology. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S. Krippner (Eds.),
Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 2546).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Breuer, J., & Freud, S. (18931895). Studies on hysteria. The Standard Edition
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 2). London: Hogarth
Press.
Cardena, E. (1989). The varieties of possession experience. Association for the
Anthropological Study of Consciousness Quarterly, 5 (23), 117.
Cardena, E. (1996). Just oating on the sky. A comparison of shamanic and
hypnotic phenomenology. In R. Quekelbherge & D. Eigner (Eds.), 6th Jahrbuch fur Transkulturelle Medizin und Psychotherapie [6th yearbook of crosscultural medicine and psychotherapy] (pp. 367380). Berlin: Verlag fu r
Wissenschaft und Bildung.
Cardena, E. (1997). The etiologies of dissociation. In S. Powers & S. Krippner
(Eds.), Broken images, broken selves (pp. 6187). New York: Brunner.
Cardena, E. (1999). You are not your body. Commentary on The motivation for
self-injury in psychiatric patients. Psychiatry, 62, 331333.
Carden a, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and
physically active. International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 53,
3759.
Cardena, E. (2008). Consciousness and emotions as interpersonal and transpersonal systems. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, 249263.
Cardena, E., & Gleaves, D. (2007). Dissociative disorders. In M. Hersen, S. M.
Turner, & D. Beidel (Eds.), Adult psychopathology & diagnosis (5th ed.,
pp. 473503). New York: Wiley.
Cardena, E., Lehmann, D., Jonsson, P., Terhune, D., & Faber, P. (2007). The
neurophenomenology of hypnosis. Proceedings of the 50th Annual Convention
of the Parapsychological Association, 1730.
Cardena, E., Lynn, S. J., & Krippner, S. (Eds.). (2000). Varieties of anomalous
experience: Examining the scientic evidence. Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Cardena, E., & Spiegel D. (1993). Dissociative reactions to the Bay Area Earthquake. American Journal of Psychiatry, 150, 474478.
Duke, L. (2004, February 5). Vanishing point: The monologuist transformed his
life into art, but left the nal chapter unnished. Washington Post, p. C01.
Forman, R. K. C. (1999). Mysticism, mind, consciousness. Albany: State of New
York University Press.
Foulkes, D., & Vogel, G. (1965). Mental activity at sleep onset. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 70, 231243.
Frijda, N. H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fromm, E. (1955). The sane society. New York: Fawcett.
Gabbard, G. O., Twemlow, S. W., & Jones, F. C. (1982). Differential diagnosis
of altered mind/body perception. Psychiatry, 45, 361369.
Gifford-May, D., & Thompson, N. L. (1994). Deep states of meditation: Phenomenological reports of experience. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 26, 117138.
Gopnik, A. (2009). The philosophical baby. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego. Fabrication and revision of personal history. American Psychologist, 35, 603618.
Greyson, B. (2000). Near-death experiences. In E. Carden a, S. J. Lynn, &
S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 315351). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Grifths, R. R., Richards, W. A., McCann, U., & Jesse, R. (2006). Psilocybin can
occasion mystical-type experiences having substantial and sustained personal
meaning and spiritual signicance. Psychopharmacology, 187, 268283.
Halifax, J. (1980). Shamanic voices. Middlesex, England: Penguin.
Hartmann, E. (1991). Boundaries of the mind: A new psychology of personality.
New York: Basic Books.
Hastings, A. (1991). With the tongues of men and angels. A study of channeling. Fort
Worth, TX: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Hinton, D. E., Pich, V., Chhean, D., & Pollack, M. H. (2005). The ghost pushes
you down: Sleep paralysis-type attacks in a Khmer refugee population. Transcultural Psychiatry, 42, 4677.
Hobson, J. A. (1994). The chemistry of conscious states. How the brain changes its
mind. Boston: Little, Brown.
Holroyd, J. (2003). The science of meditation and the state of hypnosis. American
Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 46, 109128.
Hufford, D. J. (2005). Sleep paralysis as spiritual experience. Transcultural Psychiatry, 42, 1145.
Hunt, H. T. (2007). Dark night of the soul: Phenomenology and neurocognition
of spiritual suffering in mysticism and psychosis. Review of General Psychology,
3, 209234.
James, W. (1961). The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature.
New York: Collier. (Original work published 1902).
Jaspers, K. (1963). General psychopathology. Manchester: Manchester University
Press. (Originally published 1913).
Kramer, W. H. (1993). Recent experiences with psi counseling in Holland. In
L. Coly & J. D. S. McMahon (Eds.), Psi and clinical practice (pp. 124145).
New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Laing, R. D. (1967). The divided self. New York: Pantheon.
Landis, C. (1964). Varieties of psychopathological experience (F. A. Mettler, Ed.).
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Lanius, R. A., Vermetten, E., Loewenstein, R. J., Brand, B., Schmahl C., Bremner,
J. D., & Spiegel, D. (2010). Emotion modulation in PTSD: Clinical and neurobiological evidence for a dissociative subtype. American Journal of Psychiatry,
167, 640647.
Laski, M. (1980). Everyday ecstasy. London: Thames and Hudson.
Lewis, I. M. (1989). Ecstatic religion (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
297
298
Altering Consciousness
Litwin, R., & Cardena, E. (2000). Demographic and seizure variables, but not
hypnotizability or dissociation, differentiated psychogenic from organic seizures. Journal of Trauma and Dissociation, 1, 99122.
Menezes Jr., A., & Moreira-Almeida, A. (2010). Religion, spirituality, and psychosis. Current Psychiatric Research, 12, 174179.
Moreira-Almeida, A., Lotufo Neto, F., & Carden a, E. (2008). Comparison
between Brazilian Spiritist mediumship and dissociative identity disorder.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 196, 420424.
Morante, E. (1988). Alibi. Italy: Garzanti. (Originally published 1958)
Murphy, J. M. (1976). Psychiatric labeling in cross-cultural perspective. Science,
191, 10191028.
Nijenhuis, E. R. S., Spinhoven, P., Van Dyck, R., Van der Hart, O., & Vanderlinden,
J. (1998). Degree of somatoform and psychological dissociation in dissociative
disorders is correlated with reported trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 11,
711730.
Oakley, D. A., & Halligan, P. W. (2009). Hypnotic suggestion and cognitive
neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 264270.
Oohashi, T., Kawai, N., Honda, M., Nakamura, S., Morimoto, M., Nishina, E.,
et al. (2002). Electroencephalographic measurement of possession trance in
the eld. Clinical Neurophysiology, 113, 435445.
Osuch, E. A., Noll, J. G., & Putnam, F. W. (1999). The motivation for self-injury
in psychiatric inpatients. Psychiatry, 62, 334346.
Otis, L. S. (1984). Adverse effects of transcendental meditation. In D. H. Shapiro
& R. N. Walsh (Eds.), Meditation: Contemporary and classical perspectives (pp.
201208). New York: Aldine.
Putnam, F. W. (1988). The switch process in multiple personality disorder and
other state-change disorders. Dissociation, 1, 2432.
Putnam, F. W. (2005, November). States of being. Invited address presented at the
22nd Annual Meeting of the International Society for the Study of Dissociation, Toronto, Canada.
Radin, D., & Schlitz, M. (2005). Gut feelings, intuition, and emotions: An exploratory study. Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 11, 8591.
Reed, G. (1988). The psychology of anomalous experience (rev. ed.). Buffalo, NY:
Prometheus.
Rouget, G. (1985). Music and trance: A theory of the relations between music and possession. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Sabell, A., Clarke, C., & Fenwick, P. (2001). Inter-subject EEG correlations at a
distance: The transferred potential Proceedings of the 44th Annual Convention
of the Parapsychological Association, 419422.
Simeon, D., Knutelska, M., Nelson, D., & Guralnik, O. (2003). Feeling unreal:
A depersonalization disorder update of 117 cases. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry,
64, 990997.
Sims, A. (1995). Symptoms in the mind. An introduction to descriptive psychopathology
(2nd ed.). London: W. B. Saunders.
299
CHAPTER 14
Visionary Spirituality
and Mental Disorders
David Lukoff
Overlap of Mental Disorders and Visionary Spiritual Experiences
Several descriptive categories have been proposed for psychotic-like
episodes that have potential for positive outcomes: problem-solving schizophrenia (Boisen, 1962); positive disintegration (Dabrowski, 1964); creative
illness (Ellenberger, 1970); spiritual emergencies (Grof & Grof, 1989); mystical experience with psychotic features (Lukoff, 1985), metanoiac voyages
(Laing, 1972); and visionary states (Perry, 19771978). In this chapter,
the term visionary spiritual experience (VSE) will be used to encompass such
experiences [see Geels, Volume 1]. The term visionary is used in the
anthropological and religious literature to refer to a mental condition that
leads an individual to propose radical changes for the entire culture. Such
visionary experiences have led to major social movements and are more
likely to occur in societies undergoing rapid and devastating social change,
such as with the Iroquois Indian leader Handsome Lake. In the late 1700s,
he spent 6 months in a state of catatonia accompanied by visions. Following
these experiences, he underwent a personal transformation, communicated
his visions and new insights to others, and synthesized old and new beliefs
into a new religion and way of living that revitalized the culture (Wallace,
1956).
However, in most cases, a VSE does not transform the culture but adds
a new dimension to the individuals spiritual life. Spirituality is used to
refer to an inner experience of connection to something greater than oneself, a personal sense of the sacred and meaningful. People in the midst of
a VSE often traverse the range of the worlds religions and cultural history
in the form of spiritual content and experiences that are similar to hallucinations and delusions (explored in more depth below). When they return,
302
Altering Consciousness
they often view the episode as a part of their spiritual awakening and an
initiation for their spiritual journey. Jungian analyst John Perry (1998)
noted that after a VSE: What remains . . . is an ideal model and a sense
of direction which one can use to complete the transformation through
his own purposeful methods (pp. 3435).
well as traditional cultures, some people have been esteemed for their
visionary experiences and enjoyed privileged status as shamans, prophets,
visionaries, or saints, as was Handsome Lake described above.
Phenomenological Similarities
The similarity between psychotic symptoms and mystical experiences
has received acknowledgment and discussion in the mental health eld
(Arieti, 1976; Boisen, 1962; Buckley, 1981; James, 1902/1958). Both
involve escaping the limiting boundaries of the self, which leads to an
immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the conning selfhood
meltdown [see Mishara & Schwartz, this volume]. The need to transcend
the limiting boundaries of the self has been postulated to be a basic neurobiological need of all living things (Newberg, DAquili, & Rause 2001).
However, in persons with psychotic disorder, the sense of embodied self
is transcended before it has been rmly established . . . disintegration and
further fragmentation are the likely results (Mills, 2001, p. 214).
Campbell (1972) maintained that the psychotic individual, the mystic,
the yogi, and the LSD user are all plunged into the same deep inward sea.
However,
The mystic, endowed with native talents for this sort of thingand following stage by stagethe instruction of a master, enters the waters and nds
he can swim: whereas the schizophrenic, unprepared, unguided, and
ungifted, has fallen or has intentionally plunged, and is drowning. (p. 216)
303
304
Altering Consciousness
Mystical Experience
Studies of this phenomenon date back to William James, who saw
mystical experience as being at the core of religion and maintained that
such experiences led to the founding of the worlds religions ( James,
1902/1958). Denitions used in research and clinical publications vary
feelings of unity
sense of harmonious relationship to the divine
euphoria
sense of noesis (access to the hidden spiritual dimension)
loss of ego functioning
alterations in time and space perception
sense of lacking control over the event
305
306
Altering Consciousness
subliminal self is found. In persons prone to mystical experience, the subliminal self is relatively large and active and the margin of the conscious
eld relatively leaky and permeable.
However, Wulff (2000) cites research and supports a more favorable
viewaccording to which, even though pathology may indeed mark some
mystics lives, mystical experience per se is not pathological but a factor for
growth. This idea nds substantial support in the contemporary empirical
and transpersonal literatures. There are, rst, of all, several studies suggesting that measures of mystical experience tend not to be correlated with
measures of pathology (Wulff, 2000, p. 410).
A survey found that most clinicians do not currently view mystical experiences as pathological (Allman, De La Roche, Elkins, & Weathers, 1992).
To some degree, this may reect a change that is partly attributable to
Abraham Maslow. His studies of peak experiences, which he considered religious experiences for many individuals, validated their importance and nonpathological nature. In addition, studies have found that people reporting
mystical experiences scored lower on psychopathology scales and higher
on measures of psychological well-being than controls (Wulff, 2000).
Mystical experiences can be overwhelming for individuals who do not
have a strong sense of ego. In addition, another risk observed following an
ecstatic mystical experience is ego ination, in which the individual develops highly grandiose beliefs or even delusions about his or her own spiritual stature and attainment (Rosenthal, 1990). Individuals in the midst of
intense mystical experiences have been hospitalized and medicated when
less restrictive interventions could have been utilized (Chapman & Lukoff,
1996; Lukoff & Everest, 1985).
The DSM-IV-TR highlights the need for cultural sensitivity when clinicians assess for schizophrenia in socioeconomic or cultural situations different from their own (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 306):
Ideas that may appear to be delusional in one culture (e.g., sorcery and witchcraft) may be commonly held in another. In some cultures, visual or auditory
hallucinations with a religious content may be a normal part of religious
experience (e.g., seeing the Virgin Mary or hearing Gods voice).
Near-death Experience
The near-death experience (NDE) is a subjective event experienced by
persons who come close to death or who confront a potentially fatal situation
and escape uninjured. Since 1975 when Raymond Moody rst focused public attention on the NDE in his book Life After Life, the NDE has been the
focus of considerable scientic research (Greyson, 1993, 1997; Ring, 1990).
The person often feels unconditionally accepted and forgiven by a loving source. Life review is also common, and the person returns with a mission or vision, believing that there is still more to be done in this life.
Greyson (2000) has pointed out the many similarities to the prototypical
features of shamanic soul ight, OBE, and deep hypnotic experiences.
Modern medical technology has resulted in many persons experiencing NDEs. Near-death experiences are reported by 35% of individuals
who come close to death. Gallup Polls estimated that about 5% of the
adult American population, approximately 13 million American adults,
have had a NDE with at least some of the features described above, making
it a clinically signicant and pervasive phenomenon (Gallup, 2002).
The nonpathological nature of the NDE is documented by the growing
literature on its aftereffectsin particular, positive attitude and value
changes, personality transformation, and spiritual development. Ring
(1990) has conducted studies on NDE and found that these changes occur
within 5 years and are stable over time.
Despite generally positive outcomes, signicant intrapsychic and interpersonal difculties frequently arise in the wake of an NDE. Intrapsychic
problems associated with NDE include:
anger or depression related to losing the near-death state
difculty reconciling the NDE with previous religious beliefs, values, or lifestyle
the fear that the NDE might indicate a mental disorder
307
308
Altering Consciousness
Psychic Experiences
Psychic experiences are a hypothetical construct relating to the presumed
transfer of information or energy for which there is arguably objective evidential support (Targ, Schlitz, & Irwin, 2000) [see Luke, this volume]. Thus
most denitions dene it negatively, after excluding other reasonable
explanations. Examples include:
309
310
Altering Consciousness
People can and do make use of books and audiovisual material to practice
on their own without the supervision of a knowledgeable teacher. Anxiety,
dissociation, depersonalization, agitation, and muscular tension have been
reported in western meditation practitioners (Walsh & Roche, 1979).
Transient psychotic-like episodes associated with qigong practice are
well-documented as a culture-bound syndrome that is similar to
311
312
Altering Consciousness
Possession
In possession states, a person enters an altered state of consciousness and
feels taken over by a spirit, power, deity, or other person who assumes control over his or her mind and body. Generally, the person has no recall of
these experiences in the waking state. The deliberate induction of possession
states has been part of valued religious rituals in many cultures (Behrend &
Luig, 2000), and research has found that people who experience possession
in the midst of a ritual do not have more pathology (actually may be
healthier) than the people at large. In a comparison of Brazilian Spiritistic
mediums and North American dissociative identity disorder, (DID) patients,
The mediums differed in having better social adjustment, lower prevalence of
mental disorders, lower use of mental health services, no use of antipsychotics,
and lower prevalence of histories of physical or sexual childhood abuse, sleepwalking, secondary features of DID, and, symptoms of borderline personality.
(Moreira-Almeida, Neto, & Cardena, 2008, p. 420)
313
314
Altering Consciousness
Auditory and visual hallucinations have played an essential role in religion for thousands of years. Accounts range from Biblical prophets and
saints to shamans, as well as Socratess famous Daemon voice that guided
him. Later, psychiatrists have retroactively diagnosed all of them as having
had mental disorders (Leuder & Thomas, 2000). However, the DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) specically notes that clinicians
assessing for schizophrenia in socioeconomic or cultural situations different from their own must take cultural differences into account: In some
cultures, visual or auditory hallucinations with a religious content may
Delusions
315
316
Altering Consciousness
both religious and deluded call into question diagnostic criteria for delusions that emphasize the content (i.e., bizarreness or falsity) of beliefs to
classify them as pathological (Brett, 2002). Delusions and spiritual experiences cannot be distinguished by form and content but need to be
assessed in the light of the cultural values and beliefs of the individual.
In addition, holding a delusion with absolute conviction is not a sign of
pathology in itself because all beliefs that are personally signicant tend to
be held with absolute conviction (Maher, 1988). A feature of normal cognition is a conrmation bias that allows us to be impervious to contradictory evidence and only notice information that conrms our preexisting
beliefs (Alloy & Tabachnik, 1984).
Altered Structure of Experience
The proposal for this new category evolved from the transpersonal psychology literature on spiritual emergency (Lukoff, Lu, & Turner, 1998).
Although this category includes problems that often involve less distress,
such as converting to a new faith and questioning ones faith, the authors
(Lukoff, 2007; Lukoff & Lu, 2005) have argued in previous publications
that VSEs warrant the DSM-IV diagnosis of Religious or Spiritual Problem
even when there may be psychotic symptoms present, including hallucinations and delusions. In this way, Religious or Spiritual Problem is comparable to the category Bereavement, for which the DSM-IV notes that
even when a persons reaction to a death meets the diagnostic criteria for
Major Depressive Episode, the diagnosis of a mental disorder is not given
because the symptoms result from a normal reaction to the death of a
loved one. Similarly, in VSEs, transient hallucinations, delusions, disorientation, and interpersonal difculties occur so frequently that they
should be considered normal and expectable reactions.
Iatrogenic problems may occur if VSEs are misdiagnosed and mistreated as psychotic disorders. The clinicians initial assessment can signicantly inuence whether the experience is integrated and used as a
stimulus for personal growth or repressed as a sign of mental disorder,
thereby intensifying an individuals sense of isolation and blocking his or
her efforts to understand and assimilate the experience. Instead of unusual
subjective experiences being embraced in our culture as an opportunity
and invitation to enlarge a persons circle of being, they are routinely psychopathologized and pharmaceutically suppressed. In an interview study,
the most subjectively frightening aspect of their experience was psychiatric hospitalization itself ( Jackson, 2001, p. 189). The pathologizing and
stigmatizing medical approach may account for the surprising nding that
the cure rate and level of dysfunction of persons with psychotic disorders
317
318
Altering Consciousness
and death of feeling that are also part of the inner dynamics of the deletion
of presence extending from the early onset phases of schizophrenia to its
chronic terminus in anhedonia and social withdrawal. (p. 227)
Thus altered states that are at the heart of many intense spiritual experiences need to be carefully evaluated so they arent confused or confounded
with psychopathology, which can include acknowledging areas of
overlap.
Treatment of VSEs
Some residential treatment approaches have addressed spiritual dimensions of psychosis. Perry (1974) founded Diabysis, a Jungian-based group
treatment home for people experiencing a rst psychotic episode. He
encouraged clients to express and explore the symbolic aspects of their psychotic experiences. Therapy, conducted thrice weekly, consisted of listening to clients and helping them interpret the powerful and spiritual
symbols within their hallucinations and delusions. Medications were rarely
used. Perry reported that severely psychotic clients became coherent within
2 to 6 days without medication. The outcomes appeared better for those
who had had fewer than three previous psychotic episodes. Diabysis closed
down in 1980 because of budget cutbacks in the mental health system.
A similar program, Soteria House, located in San Jose, California,
provided more empirical support for this model. Soteria House ran from
19711983 and roomed six clients, with three to four staff on premises at
one time. The staff was trained to view psychotic experiences as a developmental stage that can lead to growth and often contains a spiritual component
of mystical experiences and beliefs. Medication was typically not prescribed
unless a client showed no improvement after 6 weeks (only 10% of clients
used medication at Soteria), because it was believed to stunt the possible
growth-enhancing process of the psychotic episode (Mosher & Menn, 1979).
Outcomes from Soteria were compared to a traditional program, a community mental health center inpatient service consisting of daily pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, occupational therapy, and group therapy.
Clients length of stay was longer at Soteria than in the comparison program (mean of 166 days versus 28 days). But most patients recovered in
6 to 8 weeks without medication (Mosher, Hendrix, & Fort, 2004). A
recent meta-analysis of data from two carefully controlled studies of Soteria
programs found better 2-year outcomes for Soteria patients in the domains
of psychopathology, work, and social functioning compared to similar clients treated in a psychiatric hospital (Bola & Mosher, 2003). Soteria
319
320
Altering Consciousness
References
Allman, L. S., De La Roche, O., Elkins, D. N., & Weathers, R. S. (1992). Psychotherapists attitudes towards clients reporting mystical experiences. Psychotherapy, 29,
564569.
Alloy, L. B., & Tabachnik, N. (1984). Assessment of covariation by humans and
animals: The joint inuence of prior expectations and current situational
information. Psychological Review, 91, 112149.
American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual
(4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manualtext
revision, fourth edition. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Appelle, S., Lynn, S., & Newman, L. (2000). Alien abduction experiences. In E.
Cardena, S. Lynn, & S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience:
Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 253282). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Arieti, S. (1976). Creativity: The magic synthesis. New York: Basic Books.
Assagioli, R. (1989). Self-realization and psychological disturbances. In S. Grof &
C. Grof (Eds.), Spiritual emergency: When personal transformation becomes a
crisis. Los Angeles: Tarcher.
Barnhouse, R. T. (1986). How to evaluate patients religious ideation. In L. Robinson
(Ed.), Psychology and religion: Overlapping concerns. Washington, DC: American
Psychiatric Press.
Barret, T. R., & Etheridge, J. B. (1992). Verbal hallucinations in normals, I: People who hear voices. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 6, 379387.
Behrend, H. A., & Luig, U. (Eds.). (2000). Spirit possession, modernity, and power
in Africa. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Berenbaum, H., Kerns, J., & Raghavan, C. (2000). Anomalous experiences, peculiarity, and psychopathology. In E. Cardena, S. Lynn, & S. Krippner (Eds.),
Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 3546).
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Boisen, A. T. (1962). The exploration of the inner world. New York: Harper and Row.
Bola, J. R., & Mosher, L. R. (2003). Treatment of acute psychosis without neuroleptics: Two-year outcomes from the Soteria project. Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease, 191(4), 219229.
Brett, C. (2002). Psychotic and mystical states of being: Connections and distinctions. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 9, 321326.
Buckley, P. (1981). Mystical experience and schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin,
7, 516521.
Bullard, T. (1989a). Hypnosis and UFO abductions: A troubled relationship.
Journal of UFO Studies, 1, 342.
Bullard, T. (1989b). The inuence of investigators on UFO abduction reports:
Results of a survey. In A. Pritchard, D. Pritchard, J. Mack, P. Kasey, & C. Yapp
(Eds.), Alien discussions: Proceedings of the Abduction Study Conference held at
MIT (pp. 571619). Cambridge, MA: North Cambridge Press.
Campbell, J. (1972). Myths to live by. New York: Viking.
Caplan, M. (1999). Halfway up the mountain: The error of premature claims to
enlightenment. Prescott, AZ: Hohm Press.
Cardena, E., Lewis-Fernandez, R., Bear, D., Pakianathan, I., Kubin, M., & Spiegel,
D. (1994). Dissociative disorders. In A. Frances (Ed.), Sourcebook for DSM-IV.
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Cardena, E., Lynn, S., & Krippner, S. (Eds.). (2000). Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Chapman, J., & Lukoff, D. (1996). The social safety net in recovery from psychosis: A therapists story. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 47(3), 6970.
Clarke, I. (2001). Cognitive behavior therapy for psychosis. In I. Clarke (Ed.),
Psychosis and spirituality: Exploring the new frontier (pp. 1526). London: Whurr.
Dabrowski, K. (1964). Positive disintegration. Boston: Little, Brown.
Dodds, E. (1951). The Greeks and the irrational. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Ellenberger, H. (1970). The discovery of the unconscious: The history and evolution of
dynamic psychiatry. New York: Basic Books.
Epstein, M. (1990). Psychodynamics of meditation: Pitfalls on the spiritual path.
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 22, 1734.
Epstein, M., & Topgay, S. (1982). Mind and mental disorders in Tibetan medicine. ReVision, 5, 6779.
Forrer, G. R. (1960). Benign auditory and visual hallucination. Archives of General
Psychiatry, 3, 119122.
Frank, J. D., & Frank, J. B. (1991). Persuasion and healing: A comparative study of
psychotherapy (3rd ed.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press.
Freud, S. (1989). The future of an illusion. New York: W. W. Norton (Originally
published 1927).
Gallup, G. (2002). The 2001 Gallup poll: Public opinion. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littleeld.
Gallup, G., & Jones, T. (2000). The next American spirituality: Finding God in the
twenty-rst century. Colorado Springs, CO: Chariot Victor.
Greenberg, D., & Witztum, E. (1991). Problems in the treatment of religious
patients. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 65, 554565.
321
322
Altering Consciousness
Greenberg, D., Witzum, E., & Buchbinder, J. (1992). Mysticism and psychosis:
The fate of Ben Zoma. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 65, 223235.
Greyson, B. (1993). Varieties of near-death experience. Psychiatry, 56, 390399.
Greyson, B. (1997). The near-death experience as a focus of clinical attention.
Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 185, 327334.
Greyson, B. (2000). Near-death experiences. In E. Cardena, S. Lynn, & S. Krippner
(Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp.
315352). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Greyson, B., & Bush, N. (1992). Distressing near-death experiences. Psychiatry,
55, 95110.
Grof, S., & Grof, C. (Eds.). (1989). Spiritual emergency: When personal transformation becomes a crisis. Los Angeles: Tarcher.
Halifax, J. (1979). Shamanic voices. New York: Dutton.
Hastings, A. (1983). A counseling approach to parapsychological experience.
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 15(2), 143167.
Heery, M. (1989). Inner voice experiences: An exploratory study of thirty cases.
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 21, 7382.
House, R. (2001). Spiritual experience: Healthy psychoticism? In I. Clarke (Ed.),
Psychosis and spirituality: Exploring the new frontier (pp. 107126). London:
Whurr.
Hunt, H. (2007). Dark nights of the soul: Phenomenology and neurocognition
of spiritual suffering in mysticism and psychosis. Review of General Psychology,
11, 209234.
Jackson, M. C. (2001). Psychotic and spiritual experience: A case study comparison. In I. Clarke (Ed.), Psychosis and spirituality: Exploring the new frontier
(pp. 165190). London: Whurr.
Jackson, M. C., & Fulford, K. W. (1997). Spiritual experience and psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, 1, 4165.
James, W. (1958). The varieties of religious experience. New York: New American
Library of World Literature (Originally published 1902).
Jung, C. G. (1960). The psychogenesis of mental disease. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Univ. Press.
Kennedy, J. E., & Kanthamani, H. (1995). Association between anomalous experiences and artistic creativity and spirituality. Journal of the American Society for
Psychical Research, 89, 333343.
Kirkness, B. (Ed.). (1997). Target schizophrenia. London: National Schizophrenia
Fellowship.
Korneld, J. (1993). A path with heart: A guide through the perils and promises of
spiritual life. New York: Bantam Books.
Krippner, S. (1991). Advances in parapsychological research 6: Jefferson, NC:
McFarland.
Laing, R. D. (1972). Metanoia: Some experiences at Kingsley Hall. In H. M.
Ruitenbeck (Ed.), Going crazy. New York: Bantam.
Lata J. (2005). Visual hallucinations in Hispanic clinic patients: A need to assess for
cultural beliefs. Puerto Rico: Carlos Albizu University.
Leuder, I., & Thomas, P. (2000). Voices of reason, voices of insanity. Philadelphia:
Routledge.
Liester, M. (1996). Inner voices: Distinguishing transcendent and pathological
characteristics. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 28, 130.
Lukoff, D. (1985). The diagnosis of mystical experiences with psychotic features.
Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 17, 155181.
Lukoff, D. (1988). Transpersonal therapy with a manic-depressive artist. Journal
of Transpersonal Psychology, 20, 1020.
Lukoff, D. (1991). Divine madness: Shamanistic initiatory crisis and psychosis.
Shamans Drum, 22, 2429.
Lukoff, D. (2007). Visionary spiritual experiences. Southern Medical Journal, 100,
635641.
Lukoff, D., & Everest, H. C. (1985). The myths in mental illness. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 17, 123153.
Lukoff, D., & Lu, F. (2005). A transpersonal integrative approach to spiritually
oriented psychotherapy. In L. Sperry & E. Shafranske (Eds.), Spiritually oriented psychotherapy (pp. 177205). Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association Press.
Lukoff, D., Lu, F., & Turner, R. (1998). From spiritual emergency to spiritual
problem: The transpersonal roots of the new DSM-IV category. Journal of
Humanistic Psychology, 38, 2150.
Mack, J. (1999). Passport to the cosmos: Human transformation and alien encounters.
New York: Crown.
Maher, B. A. (1988). Delusions as the product of normal cognitions. New York: John
Wiley.
Maslow, A. (1973). The farther reaches of human nature. New York: Pelican.
Mills, N. (2001). The experience of fragmentation in psychosis: Can mindfulness
help? In I. Clarke (Ed.), Psychosis and spirituality: Exploring the new frontier
(pp. 222235). London: Whurr.
Moody, R. (1975). Life after life. New York: Bantam.
Moreira-Almeida, A., Neto, F., & Cardena, E. (2008). Comparison of Brazilian
Spiritist mediumship and dissociative identity disorder. Journal of Nervous
and Mental Disease, 196, 420424.
Mosher, L., Hendrix, V., & Fort, D. (2004). Soteria: Through madness to deliverance. Philadelphia: Xlibris.
Mosher, L., & Menn, A. (1979). Soteria: An alternative to hospitalization. In H. R.
Lamb (Ed.), Alternatives to acute hospitalization (pp. 7384). San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Murphy, J. (1978). The recognition of psychosis in non-Western societies. In
R. L. Spitzer & D. F. Klein (Eds.), Critical issues in psychiatric diagnosis. New
York: Raven Press.
323
324
Altering Consciousness
Targ, R., & Hastings, A. (1987). Psychological impact of psychic abilities. Psychological Perspectives, 18, 3851.
Tart, C. (1995). Parapsychology and spirituality. ReVision, 18, 210.
Taylor, E. (1983). William James on exceptional mental states: The 1896 Lowell Lectures. New York: Scribner.
Thomas, L., & Cooper, P. (1980). Incidence and psychological correlates of
intense spiritual experiences. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 12, 7585.
Ullman, M., Krippner, S., & Vaughan, V. (2003). Dream telepathy: Experiments in
nocturnal extrasensory perception. Charlottesville, VA: Hampton Roads.
Van Ommeren, M., Komproe, I., Cardena, E., Thapa, S., Prasain, D., de Jong, J.
(2004). Mental illness among Bhutanese shamans in Nepal. Journal of Nervous
and Mental Diseases, 192, 313317.
Wallace, A. (1956). Stress and rapid personality changes. International Record of
Medicine, 169, 761774.
Walsh, R. (1990). The spirit of shamanism. Los Angeles: Tarcher.
Walsh, R., & Roche, L. (1979). Precipitation of acute psychotic episodes by intensive meditation in individuals with a history of schizophrenia. American Journal of Psychiatry, 136, 10851086.
Wilber, K. (1980). The spectrum of consciousness. Wheaton, IL: Quest.
Wilber, K. (1984). The developmental spectrum and psychopathology: Part I.
Stages and types of pathology. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 16, 75118.
Wilber, K. (1993). The pre/trans fallacy. In R. Walsh & F. Vaughan (Eds.), Paths
beyond ego (pp. 124130). Los Angeles: Tarcher.
Wulff, D. (2000). Mystical experience. In E. Cardena, S. Lynn & S. Krippner
(Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence
(pp. 397440). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association Press.
325
CHAPTER 15
328
Altering Consciousness
require the presence of an ASC and therefore do not address the question of
why many practictioners, both previously and currently, hold the view that
deliberately inducing ASC is healing.
Altered states of consciousness comprise a wealth of diverse, loosely
related experiences. In their recent review, Vaitl and coworkers (2005)
include the following experiences as ASC: states of drowsiness, daydreaming, hypnagogic states, sleep and dreaming, near death experiences,
extreme environmental conditions (pressure, temperature), starvation
and diet, sexual activity and orgasm, respiratory maneuvers, sensory deprivation, sensory homogenization and overload, rhythm-induced states
(drumming and dancing), relaxation, meditation, hypnosis, biofeedback,
psychotic disorders, epilepsy, coma and vegetative state, and pharmacologically induced states. Moreover, one could easily argue for the inclusion
of spiritual transcendent experiences, social and sleep deprivation (see
Mishara, 2010a), and dissociative states. That is, ASC comprise a diverse
range of human experiences that have been viewed as both pathological
and healing [see Cardena, this volume].
Given the scope and heterogeneity of such experiences, they are difcult to dene conceptually (Revonsuo, Kallio, & Sikka, 2005; Rock &
Krippner, 2007) [see Cardena, Volume 1]. Classic denitions that require
that the individual identify the experience as an ASC are inadequate . . . for
the simple reason that ASCs may well occur without the subject having any
idea, either at the time of the experience or later (Revonsuo et al., 2005).
Although we agree with Revonsuo and colleagues proposed redenition
of ASC as an alteration in the informational or representational relationships between consciousness and the world, we nevertheless add the following caveat. Denitions of altered states as deviations from normal
baseline consciousness, presumed to more or less accurately represent
the world, are problematic when trying to ascertain the healing properties
of ASC that may occur in meditation, hypnosis, shamanistic practices, narrative, and related therapies.
Denitions of ASC as distortions of our otherwise relatively accurate
grasp of reality are unsatisfactory in that they rule out the possibility that
such states may enable a heightened or expanded awareness of reality or at
least alternative reality. Philosophic phenomenology (Mishara & Schwartz,
1995, 1997) offers a means of circumventing this dilemma by proposing a
neutral denition: ASC involve the suspension, disruption, or bracketing
of the natural attitude, our usual commonsense ways of constructing reality. In the everyday natural attitude, we assume reality is obviously given
to us. Recent ndings in cognitive science/neuroscience, however, support
the view that our everyday experience of a consensual reality is far from
329
330
Altering Consciousness
331
332
Altering Consciousness
333
334
Altering Consciousness
awareness. It involves the deactivation of vigilance characteristic of posterior antentional systems, mediated by parietal/occipital areas. However,
it is interesting to note that the neural correlates for attentional networks
overlap with those frontal parietal networks recruited for eye movement
(reviewed by Mishara, 2010a). Therefore, the reduction of peripheral
awareness and reduced orienting to external environment subserved by
the posterior attentional system described by Spiegel (2008) may involve
the disabling of what has been described in the neurologic tradition as
the body schema of possible movements. As elaborated below, the body
schema underlies the experience of a voluntary motoric-agentic self,
which includes eye movements associated with executive attention and
inhibiting saccades to distracting stimuli (Mishara, in press a). In hypnosis
and related ASC, the body schema then becomes detached from its preattentive binding with body image, the conscious experience of a
perceptual-social self (see below; Mishara, 2007a).
We therefore propose a second phase in the induction of ASC in hypnosis and related states almost antithetical to the initial phase of effortfully
directing attention back on task. This is symbolized by the imagery of the
death and rebirth of self, the mythological inner heros journey often
invoked in shamanic narratives and related healing traditions. By examining
the neural processes underlying hypnosis and their putative role in shamanistic healing, we nd support for this hypothesis below. Moreover, this paradox reects the fundamental, existential structure of self as a self experienced
in time, a dialectical self that only becomes itself by giving itself up, that
continually transcends itself and its current perspective (Mishara, 2007a).
335
336
Altering Consciousness
narrative and is an early form of experiencing the embodied self from both
internal and external viewpoints, as doubled. When we speak or gesture,
we hear our own voice and partially see our bodily gestures. That is, we
take an external, doubled perspective on ourselves to communicate with
others (Mishara, 2009, 2010a) [see Cousins, Volume 1]. As we indicate
below, the shamanic symbolism of rebirth reects the structure of human self
as socially embodied.
The anthropologist Levi-Strauss (1963) describes the shamans practice of placing a tuft of down into his mouth, biting his own tongue and
then spitting out the bloody feather as if it were the pathological foreign
body extracted from the patient. To cure the patient, he must somehow
believe his own performance to be convincing. Cardena and Cousins
(2010) observe that the sleight of hand or trickery often found in shamanic healing is nevertheless an illusion that becomes real for the self
and the audience. It is one component of a triad that includes the acting
body of the shaman (as if in a theatrical performance) and the importance
of the presence of other people.
One example of such mutual hypnotic-trance induction between the
shaman and audience is found among the nomadic Rabaris in western
India. The shaman (bhopa or bhopi) acts as a means of communication
between the Rabaris and the Mataji or mother goddess. After a period of
listening to intense drumming, the shaman starts to shake, and, as a result,
falls over (sometimes fainting), and is caught by members of the audience,
indicating a possessed state [see Fachner, Sluhovsky, St John, Volume 1].
Another indication of such transformed mental state is when the shaman
starts to unravel (in a distracted manner) his brightly red turban or chiri.
Not only is the shaman the only member of the community permitted to
wear such a red turban, but also removal of the turban is considered to
break the modesty code. It is here tolerated to indicate the exceptionality
of the shamans state as it is displayed to the community. The unraveled
chiri may function as a physical link between the everyday, mundane
world and the realm of the goddess that the bhopa thereby accesses, perhaps in a temporary form of axis mundi. To further facilitate the ASC,
the bhopa may use the chiri as a sort of ail to whip himself and ingest
opium water quaffed from the palm of the hand of an attendant Rabari
(Dr. Eiluned Edwards, Nottingham Trent University, personal communication). We interpret such practices to indicate the shamans use of a mimetic, hypnotic state induction in self and audience as a means of
optimizing the brains healing powers. That is, the mimetic performative
function is central to the healing mechanisms of the human brain as it
has evolved to become a social brain.
337
338
Altering Consciousness
339
340
Altering Consciousness
self-awareness in motor activity). In the last case, the nding that repetitive activity does not have to be attended . . . once the whole organism
becomes attuned to the specic rhythm and then maintains residual unreective awareness (pp. 47, 52) has direct relevance for ritual shamanic
mimetic healing. We believe that a similar phenomenological investigation
of the experience of ASC of the healer and audience would help elucidate
the cognitive and neural mechanisms of shamanic healing.
In summary, we claim that the healing mechanisms of the shamanic ASC
as mimetically induced hypnotic state involve a collective group experience.
These mechanisms cannot be reduced to any one single factor (e.g., parasympathetic relaxation, symbolic meaning, or group processes), but rather,
all these factors contribute in concert to healing. This is so precisely because
the human brain has evolved both in its cognitive architecture and its
underlying neural circuitry to be an embodied social brain.
Just as there is apparent similarity to psychosis, there is a close relationship between dream experiences and shamanistic practices (Law &
Kirmayer, 2005).
In sleep and anesthetics, there is a reduction of consciousness associated
with a breakdown of cortical connectivity and thus of integration of information (Alkire, Hudetz, & Tononi, 2008). Tononi (2008) denes this
breakdown as a reduction in the ability of different cortical regions to interact effectively (p. 232). Presumably, such reduced cortical connectivity also
occurs in hypnosis, as suggested by Fingelkurts and coworkers (2007) and,
as we propose here, in the ASC of shamanic healing. The Rabari shamanic
ritual fainting reported above, for example, supports this view.
341
342
Altering Consciousness
Nir and Tononi (2010) observe: The most obvious difference between
dreaming and waking consciousness is the profound disconnection of the
dreamer from their current environment (p. 100). However, this disconnection, the aperspectival, the overwhelming of the actual by the inner
(Wyss, 1973) with an attendant confusion between experiential modalities
(e.g., perceiving, remembering, imagining) are also found during acute
drug intoxication, psychosis, hypnotic narrative framing (Mishara,
1995), andas we argue herein shamanic healing. The shamanic metaphoric heros journey during initiation (Randal et al., 2008) is a temporary suspending of current reality to undertake a confrontation with the
inner world. Here there is an overwhelming of the actual by the boundless
possibilities of inner experience, where perceiving, imagining, remembering, and thinking no longer remain separate experiential modalities. The
discovery of the inner as boundless and dangerous is also reected in
Jungs (1969) work in which the self comes to terms with this inner
boundlessness by means of a metaphoric journey of rebirth. The journey
to the interior of the self as descent to an underworld or endless journey
is also suggested by Kafkas stories (Mishara, 2010a).
In our account of the healing factors of ACS in shamanism, we nd
ourselves confronted with the following paradox. How can what
appears as a loss of cortical large-scale integration in hypnosis (Fingelkurts et al., 2007), which we propose to be also central to shamanic
healing, lead to psychological integration, that is, the incorporation of
new symbolic material and positive suggestions, that contribute to both
mind and body healing? How can a reduction in cortical neural integration lead to the increased integration of symbolic mental and physical
healing?
Mishara (2010a) describes a similar symbolism of rebirth as metaphoric inner journey in Kafkas writings: The self, which comes to expression
343
344
Altering Consciousness
Integrating classical philological scholarship and archaeology, Knight (1936) traces the
history (and prehistory) of the labyrinthine symbol beginning with the spiral shapes carved
into stone before and inside prehistoric burial caves in which the dead were placed in fetal
position to indicate a journey of rebirth after death. Mishara (2010a) describes how the
labyrinth later serves as a symbol of rebirth of the human self in Kafkas writings [see
Ustinova, volume 1].
2
The neurologic opposition of body schema vs. body image (originally proposed by Head,
1920; Head & Holmes, 1911) is not easy to grasp. Consider the following exercise: Ask a
friend to close his eyes and draw the face of a clock on his forehead, the hands of which
say 3 oclock from your perspective. Ask him what time it is. He may respond either 3 or 9
oclock depending on whether he reports from your (external) or his (internal) perspective
(see Mahoney & Avener, 1977). What is of interest is the ambiguity of the situation; your
friend may report his bodily experience either from your or his perspective. The two systems,
kinesthetic (9 oclock from his perspective) and perceptual, are organized in terms of two different reference frames or coordinate systems. The rst, body schema, is egocentric, or body
centered, and the second, body image, is computed from an allocentric or object-centered
frame of reference. These two attitudes correspond roughly to being a body self, a body
schema, or I, and having a body, a body image or social self as me (discovering that my
body has an outside perceived by others precisely by empathizing with their perspective).
The duality of both being/having a body-self is required for social roles. The fact that we
are able to take both an internal-vital (i.e., proprioceptive-vestibular-interoceptive) and external (exteroceptive, social-objectifying) relationship to our own bodies is the precondition for
any vulnerability to the disruption of self-experience in neuropsychiatric disorders and
anomalous conscious states (Mishara, 2010b, p. 621).
345
346
Altering Consciousness
to reect on ourselves, to narrate our experience to others and thus transcend our temporary current online perspective. It is also this ability
that, we contend, leads to shamanic use of ASC during ritual enactment
as healing.
Hence, what is uniquely human may not be, as many assume, the ability to say I, but the ability to reectively access a me, an external relationship to my own bodily self as the precondition of a social
relationship to others. What is generally neglected in the literature is that
any claims about self must be made from a reective perspective that
requires that the experience be retrospectively mediated by a change of
reference frame, whether the experience be held in working memory or
already converted into an episodic memory, what Husserl called the
retention of the just past experience (Mishara, 2007a, 2010a, 2010b).
In the phenomenologist Plessners (1965; 19801985) terms, what is
uniquely human is not the so-called I (centric being) but the ec-centric
relation to bodily self, being able to experience ones bodily self from outside, as others might experience it, the foundations of uniquely human
social cognition (Mishara, 2009). It is also this ability to consider oneself
from an observers perspective that enables conscious episodic memory,
the ability to narrate ones experience, the time travel of autonoetic episodic remembering, the ability to have explicit retrospective and prospective episodic memories (Tulving, 2002). The neuroscience that supports
being able to be both a centered self and the ability to envision oneself
from an ec-centric (allocentric) perspective is complex and implicates
ongoing transformation of reference frames between a motoric body
schema and a perceptually based body image.
While online egocentric representations are continuously updated by
self-motion, allocentric representations play a role in spatial memory even
over very short delays and distances (Burgess, Becker, King, & OKeefe,
2001). It is not possible to reect on, narrate, or impart an experience
(even if it be through nonverbal performance in a prelinguistic mimetic
culture as in Donalds [1991] theory of cognitive evolution) without displacing our initially centric experience, by taking up a position that situates the embodied self in a shared community experience, which implies
many viewpoints different from my own. That is, an initially egocentric, viewpoint orientation (Brewin et al., 2010; Byrne et al., 2007; Decety, 2007)
must be translated into an allocentric frame of reference. Although the
hippocampus is specically involved in storing allocentric (or
viewpoint-independent) representations, an imageable egocentric representation is then produced in the precuneus via translation in the posterior cortex, making use of current head direction (Burgess et al.,
347
348
Altering Consciousness
Conclusions
We have described diverse ways that healing and ASC are associated
and have examined healing and shamanic practices, meditation, mindfulness, hypnosis, acute psychosis and its psychomimetic drug models, narratives, community rituals through the lens of the social brain, and social
neuroscience. One achieves integration in mental and physical healing
paradoxically through rst yielding to its loss in a temporary dissolution
of embodied self and the feeling of being in control in the ASC. The phemenological psychiatrist, Wyss (1973) connects inner experience, especially when controlled processing decreases as in ASC, with a boundless
and sometimes dangerous loss of perspectivity in which the possible overwhelms the actual. The shamanic metaphors of inner journey and rebirth
refer to the paradoxical healing power of the ASC and may help elucidate
the structure of the human self and how the self may play a role in its own
healing in meditation, mindfulness, hypnosis, and narrative.
References
Abram, D. (2005). Between the body and the breathing earth: A reply to Ted
Toadvine. Environmental Ethics, 27, 171190.
Alkire, M. T., Hudetz, A. G., & Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness and anesthesia.
Science, 322, 876880.
Baruss, I. (2003). Alterations of consciousness. An empirical analysis for social scientists. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Benham, G., & Younger, J. (2008). Hypnosis and mindbody interactions. In
M. R. Nash & A. J. Barnier (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of hypnosis (pp. 393
435). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Blankenburg, W. (2001). First steps toward a psychopathology of common sense.
Trans. by A. L. Mishara. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8, 303315.
Brewin, C. R., Gregory, J., Lipton, M., & Burgess, N. (2010). Intrusive images and
memories in psychological disorders: Characteristics, neural basis, and treatment implications. Psychological Review, 117, 210232.
Bridgeman, B., & Hoover, M. (2008). Processing spatial layout by perception and
sensorimotor interaction. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 61,
851859. doi: 10.1080/17470210701623712.
Burgess, N., Becker, S., King, J. A., & OKeefe, J. (2001). Memory for events and
their spatial context: Models and experiments. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 356, 14931503.
Byrne, P., Becker, S., & Burgess, N. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining
the future: A neural model of spatial memory and imagery. Psychological
Review, 114, 340375.
Carli, G., Manzoni, D., & Santarcangelo, E. L. (2008). Hypnotizability-related
integration of perception and action. Cognitive Neuropsychology, doi: 10.1080/
02643290801913712.
Cardena, E. (2005). The phenomenology of deep hypnosis: Quiescent and physically active. International Journal of Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis, 53, 3759.
Cardena, E. (2008). Consciousness and emotions as interpersonal and transpersonal systems. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15, 249263.
Cardena, E., & Cousins, W. E. (2010). From artice to actuality: Ritual, shamanism, hypnosis and healing. In J. Weinhold & G. Samuel (Eds.), Varieties of ritual experience (pp. 315329). Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz.
Cardena, E., Terhune, D. B., Loof, A., & Buratti, S. (2009). Hypnotic experience
is related to emotional contagion. International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 57, 3346.
Chisea, A., Brambilla, P., & Serretti, A. (2010). Functional neural correlates of
mindfulness meditations in comparison with psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy
and placebo effect. Is there a link? Acta Neuropsychiatrica, 22, 104117.
Dakwar, E., & Levin, F. R. (2009). The emerging role of meditation in addressing
psychiatric illness, with a focus on substance abuse disorders. Harvard Review
of Psychiatry, 17, 254267.
Decety, J. (2007). A social cognitive neuroscience model of human empathy. In
E. Harmon-Jones & P. Winkelman (Eds.), Social neuroscience: Integrating biological and psychological explanations of behavior (pp. 246270). New York: Guilford.
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of modern mind: Three stages in the evolution of culture.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dow, J. (1986). Universal aspects of symbolic meaning: A theoretical synthesis.
American Anthropologist, 88, 5669.
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology, 6,
178190.
Farb, N. A. S., Segal, Z. V., Mayberg, H. S., Bean, J., McKeon, D., Fatima, Z., &
Anderson, A. K. (2007). Attending to the present: Mindfulness meditation
reveals distinct neural modes of self-reference. Social Cognitive & Affective
Neuroscience, 2, 313322.
Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A.A., Kallio, S., & Revonsuo, A. (2007). Cortex
functional connectivity as a neurophysiological correlate of hypnosis: an EEG
case study. Neuropsychologia, 45, 14521462.
349
350
Altering Consciousness
Fiske, S. T. (2010). Social beings, core motives in social psychology (2nd ed.). Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley.
Fortney, L., & Taylor, M. (2010). Meditation in medical practice: A review of the
evidence and practice. Primary Care, 37, 8190.
Grant, J. A., & Rainville, P. (2009). Pain sensitivity and analgesic effects of mindful
states in Zen meditators: A cross-sectional study. Psychosomatic Medicine, 71,
106114.
Head, H. (1920) Studies in neurology 2. London: Oxford University Press.
Head, H., & Holmes, G. (1911). Sensory disturbances from cerebral lesions.
Brain, 34, 102254.
Hoffman, R. E. (2007). A social deafferentation hypothesis for induction of active
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33, 10661070.
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. H. (2002). The neural basis of human error
processing: Reinforcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psychological Review, 109, 679709.
Horowitz, S. (2010). Health benets of meditation: What the newest research
shows. Alternative and Complementary Therapies, 16(4), 223228. doi:10.1089/
act.2010.16402.
Jung, C. G. (1969). The psychology of the transference. Princeton, NJ: Bollingen.
Knight, W. F. J. (1936). Cumaen gates. A reference of the 6th Aeneid to the initiation
pattern. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell.
Krippner, S., & Achterberg, J. (2000). Anomalous healing experiences. In E.
Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 353395). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Law, S., & Kirmayer, L. J. (2005). Inuit interpretations of sleep paralysis. Transcultural Psychiatry, 42, 93112.
Lee, B.-O., Kirmayer, L. J., Groleau, D. (2010). Therapeutic processes and perceived helpfulness of Dang-ki (Chinese shamanism) from the symbolic healing
perspective. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 34, 56105.
Levi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural anthropology. New York: Basic Books.
Lynn, S. J., Kirsch, I., & Hallquist, M. N. (2008). Social cognitive theories of hypnosis. In: M. R. Nash & A. J. Barnier (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of hypnosis
(pp. 111140). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Mahoney, M. J., & Avener, M. (1977). Psychology of the elite athlete: An exploratory study. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 1, 135141.
McGeown, W. J., Mazzoni, G., Venneri, A., & Kirsch, I. (2009). Hypnotic induction
decreases anterior default mode activity. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 848855.
Mishara, A. L. (1995). Narrative and psychotherapy: The phenomenology of healing. American Journal of Psychotherapy, 49, 180195.
Mishara, A. L. (2001). On Wolfgang Blankenburg, common sense and schizophrenia. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 8, 317322.
Mishara, A. L. (2007a). Missing links in phenomenological clinical neuroscience?
Why we are still not there yet. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 60, 559569.
Mishara, A. L. (2007b). Is minimal self preserved in schizophrenia? A subcomponents view. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 715721.
Mishara, A. L. (2009). Human bodily ambivalence: Precondition for social cognition and its disruption in neuropsychiatric disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry &
Psychology, 15, 234237.
Mishara, A. L. (2010a). Kafkas doubles, paranoia and the brain: Hypnagogic vs.
hyper-reexive models of disruption of self in neuropsychiatric disorders
and anomalous conscious states. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine
(PEHM), 5, 13; doi:10.1186/1747-5341-5-13.
Mishara, A. L. (2010b). Autoscopy: Disrupted self in neuropsychiatric disorders and
anomalous conscious states. In S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (Eds.), Handbook of
phenomenology and cognitive science (pp. 591634). Berlin, Germany: Springer.
Mishara, A. L. (2010c). Klaus Conrad (19051961): Delusional mood, psychosis
and beginning schizophrenia. Clinical concept translation-feature. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 36, 913.
Mishara A. L. (in press a). The unconscious in paranoid delusional psychosis?
Phenomenology, neuroscience, psychoanalysis. In D. Lohmar & J. Brudzinska
(Eds.), Founding psychoanalysis. New York: Springer.
Mishara, A. L. (in press b) Where is point of view in the coherence/incoherence
of traumatic memories debate? Consciousness and Cognition.
Mishara, A. L., Bell, M. D., Fiszdon, J., Bryson, G., Nicholls, S., & Wexler, B. E.
(2006). Cognitive remediation improves but does not normalize brain function in schizophrenia: fMRI of a novel working memory task pre- and posttreatment. Biological Psychiatry, 59, S313.
Mishara, A. L., & Corlett, P. (2009). Are delusions biologically adaptive? Salvaging the doxastic shear pin. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 530531.
Mishara, A. L., & Schwartz, M. A. (1995). Conceptual analysis of psychiatric
approaches: Phenomenology, psychopathology and classication. Current
Opinion in Psychiatry, 6, 312317.
Mishara, A., & Schwartz, M. (1997). Psychopathology in the light of emergent
trends in the philosophy of consciousness, neuropsychiatry and phenomenology. Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 10, 383389.
Nir, Y., & Tononi, G. (2010). Dreaming and the brain: From phenomenology to
neurophysiology. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 88100.
Oakley, D. A. (2008). Hypnosis, trance and suggestion: Evidence from neuroimaging. In M. R. Nash & A. J. Barnier (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of hypnosis
(pp. 365392). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
ORegan, B., & Hirshberg, C. (1993). Spontaneous remission: An annotated bibliography. Sausalito, CA: Institute for Noetic Sciences.
Ospina, M. B., Bond, T. K., Karkhaneh, M., Tjosvold, L., Vandermeer, B., Liang,
Y., et al. (2007). Meditation practices for health: State of the research. Evidence
ReportTechnology Assessment, 155, 1263.
Paus, T. (2001). Primate anterior cingulate cortex: Where motor control, drive
and cognition interface. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 2, 417424.
351
352
Altering Consciousness
Plessner, H. (1965). Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch [The steps of the
organic and the person] (2nd ed.). Berlin, Germany: de Gruyter.
Plessner, H. (1970). Laughing and crying: A study of the limits of human behavior.
Trans. S. J. Churchill & M. Grene. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press.
Plessner, H. (19801985). Gesammelte Schriften [Collected writings]. Frankfurt,
Germany: Suhrkamp.
Rainville, P., Hofbauer, R. K., Paus, T., Duncan, G. H., Bushnell, M. C., & Price,
D. D. (1999). Cerebral mechanisms of hypnotic induction and suggestion.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 11(1), 110125.
Ramsperger, A. G. (1940). Objects perceived and objects known. Journal of Philosophy, 37, 291297.
Randal, P., Geekie, J., Lambrecht, I., & Taitimu, M. (2008). Dissociation, psychosis, and spirituality: Whose voices are we hearing. In: A. Moskowitz, I. Schaefer, J. Martin, & M. J. Dorahy (Eds.), Psychosis, trauma and dissociation:
Emerging perspectives on severe psychopathology (pp. 333345). Hoboken, NJ:
Wiley.
Rechtschaffen, A. (1978). The single-mindedness and isolation of dreams. Sleep 1,
97109.
Revonsuo, A., Kallio, S., & Sikka, P. (2005). What is an altered state of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology, 22, 187204.
Reynolds, J., Zacks, J. M., & Braver, T. S. (2007). A computational model of event
segmentation from perceptual prediction. Cognitive Science, 31, 613643.
Rock, A. J., & Krippner, S. (2007). Does the concept of altered state of consciousness rest on a mistake? International Journal of Transpersonal Studies,
26, 3340.
Safran, J. D., & Muran, J. C. (2000). Negotiating the therapeutic alliance. New York:
Guilford.
Schneider, R., Nidich, S., Kotchen, J. M., Grim, C., Rainforth, M., et al. (2009).
Effects of stress reduction on clinical events in African Americans with coronary heart disease: A randomized controlled study (abstr 1177). Circulation,
120,(18suppl), S461.
Schwartz, M. A., & Wiggins, O. P. (2010). Psychosomatic medicine and the philosophy of life. Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine, 5, 2.
Spiegel, D. (2008). Intelligent design or designed intelligence? Hypnotizability as
neurobiological adaptation. In M. R. Nash & A. J. Barnier (Eds.), The Oxford
handbook of hypnosis (pp. 179200). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. Biological Bulletin, 215, 216242.
Tononi, G., & Laureys, S. (2008). The neurology of consciousness: An overview.
In S. Laureys & G. Tononi (Eds.), The neurology of consciousness (pp. 375412).
Oxford, UK: Elsevier.
Tulving, E. (2002). Episodic memory: From mind to brain. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 125.
Vaitl, D., Birbaumer, N., Gruzelier, J., Jamieson, G., Kotchoubey, B., Kubler, A.,
et al. (2005). Psychobiology of altered states of consciousness. Psychological
Bulletin, 131, 98127.
Vollenweider, F. X., & Geyer, M. A. (2001). A systems model of altered consciousness: Integrating natural and drug-induced psychoses. Brain Research
Bulletin, 56, 495507.
Vollenweider, F. X., Leenders, K. L., ye, I., Hell, D., & Angst, J. (1997). Differential psychopathology and patterns of cerebral glucose utilisation produced
by (S)- and (R)-ketamine in healthy volunteers using positron emission tomography (PET). European Neuropsychopharmacology, 7, 2538.
Weidner, K. E. (2010) Evolution, facial expression, recognition, and social relationships. Unpublished paper, Chicago School of Professional Psychology.
Weizsacker, V. von. (1950). Der Gestaltkreis. Theorie der Einheit von Wahrnnehmen
und Bewegen [The Gestalt-circle. A theory of unity between perception and
movement]. 4. Au. Stuttgart, Georg Thieme Verlag.
Winkelman, M. (2004). Shamanism as the original neurotheology. Zygon, 39,
193217.
Witek-Janusek, L., Albuquerque, K., Chroniak, K. R., Durazo-Arvizu, R., &
Mathews, H. L (2008). Effect of mindfulness-based stress reduction on
immune function, quality of life and coping in women newly diagnosed with
early stage breast cancer. Brain Behavior, and Immunity, 22, 969981.
Wyss, D. (1973). Beziehung und Gestalt [Relationship and gestalt]. Goettingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
353
CHAPTER 16
356
Altering Consciousness
any known physical source (p. 208). Such physical systems may include
living organisms, and so PK incorporates psi-mediated healing and hexing
as well. Parapsychologists also study other ostensibly paranormal or anomalous phenomena, some of which may have a psi component, and these
include near-death experiences, out-of-body experiences, supposed pastlife recall, apparitions, hauntings, poltergeists (often considered to be a type
of PK), and mediumship (putative communication with the dead). The
region of overlap between anomalous phenomena, including psi, and ASC
falls within the remit of other aligned elds of research too, such as transpersonal psychology, which tends to focus more on subjective experience
than objective measurement and so is a healthy hermeneutic and normative
complement to parapsychologys positivist approach to this area of study.
This chapter considers a number of different ASC and their relationship to spontaneous or actively induced anomalous events, such as with
the attempted production of psi under laboratory conditions. Often, the
specic states themselves have not been clearly dened either phenomenonologically or physiologically, but rather only the induction procedure is
known, such as with those states possibly arising following meditation,
the ingestion of psychoactive substances, or hypnosis, if they do produce
ASC [see Cardena, Volume 1]. In some cases, however, the anomalous
experience is the state because the experience is dened by the phenomenological characteristics of the experience, such as with sleep paralysis
or near-death experiences, the latter of which, arguably, may occur even
in the absence of life-threatening circumstances (Greyson, 2000). Following the trend in the greater part of the extant experimental literature, and
because of the limitations of space, the present chapter focuses on the
induction procedures that have been attempted, (e.g., hypnosis) rather
than spontaneous states (e.g., near-death experiences).
One consideration is that those anomalous experiences occurring under
nonexperimental conditions cannot conclusively be considered to be genuinely as they seem. There may be any number of cognitive errors occurring
that cause the individual to misinterpret the event, be they caused by individual knowledge, beliefs, misjudgements of probability, misperception,
misremembering, confabulation, or the context of the situation (Pekala &
Cardena, 2000). Nevertheless, researchers should be wary of simply labelling as hallucination those perceptions in altered states that they do not
understand (Shanon, 2003). Further, those experiences occurring under
nonexperimental conditions offer an insight into the conditions under
which, for instance, genuine psi may occur. Studying nonexperimental
experiences also provides a naturalistic context in which to understand
these experiences and the inuence that altered states may have on them.
357
358
Altering Consciousness
359
360
Altering Consciousness
The results of these experiments, which began in the 1950s, varied in their
degree of success, most likely in relation to the methodology involved (for a
review, see Luke, 2008). The most successful experiments tended to utilize
participants experienced with the use of psychedelics and also utilized freeresponse testing procedures with open-ended mentation regarding their
internal state rather than forced-choice guessing scenarios that tend to be
repetitive and thus rather boring under the inuence. In retrospect, it is
easy to see how the more navely designed projects lost any hope of sensibly
testing for anything, let alone psi, once their inexperienced participants
began succumbing to the mystical rapture of their rst trip.
Overall, few conclusions can be drawn concerning the induction of
genuine psi with psychedelics because of the lack of systematically controlled experiments, although, at best, the results suggest a promising line
of enquiry. Furthermore, this approach is useful for understanding the
neurobiological processes that may be at work during anomalous experiences, whether they are genuinely paranormal or not. Indeed, there exist
some well-evidenced and -reasoned conjectures about the role of psychedelic tryptamines, beta-carbolines, and NMDA-antagonists in the function
of OBEs, NDEs, and apparent psi experiences (Luke & Friedman, 2010).
Nevertheless, the neurochemical changes need to be mapped to the phenomenology of the experience (the state) and the personality traits of the
individual before any real headway can be made, though this may be premature given the dearth of research in recent years.
Sleep States
Although psychedelically induced states in humans vary considerably
and have been neglected as an area of study since the late 1960s, the
psychophysiology of sleep states has been more thoroughly explored and
these states are seemingly more predictable in form . Furthermore, the differing states produced, often relating to the different stages of sleep, are
more clearly identied than with other induction procedures. However,
sleep differs from these other states in that it is natural, regular, and
unavoidable, so it is not strictly induced as with other procedures [see
Kokoszka & Wallace, this volume].
Those stages entering and exiting sleep, hypnagogic and hypnopompic
respectively, are characterized by experiences of increased mental imagery
(in up to 75% of survey respondents; Sherwood, 2002), decreased awareness
of mental content, increased internal absorption, loss of volitional control
over mentation, reduced awareness of the environment, and reduced reality
testing. Both transitional sleep stages are related to anomalous experiences,
specically ESP, apparitions, mediumship, OBEs, past life visions, and entity
encounters (Sherwood, 2002). Sleep paralysis, a fairly common sleep disorder whereby people believe themselves to be awake but unable to move, also
tends to occur during hypnagogia at least once in the life of 40 to 50% of normal people. In addition to the usual anomalous experiences occurring during
hypnagogia, sleep paralysis has been associated with psychokinetic and neardeath experiences (Sherwood, 2002).
Evaluating the occurrence of psi phenomena, Sherwood (2002) considers that hypnagogia may be both conducive to anomalous experiences
and misinterpreted as involving paranormal processes or agencies. There
have been only a handful of experiments exploring the production of psi
in these states, yet the results were positive and possibly better than dream
states for inducing psi in the laboratory (Sherwood, 2002). Nevertheless,
much further research in this area is required.
Moving into the less ambiguous middle sleep stages, much has been
done to identify their characteristics. Although it was once considered that
dreams almost only occur in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, it is now
known from naturalistic studies that non-REM sleep also produces dreams
almost as often as during REM, although the dreams tend to be qualitatively different (e.g., Stickgold, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 1994). In a review
of case collections of independently veried psi experiences, 33 to 68%
involved dreams, and in about a further 10% of cases, the percipient was
in a borderland awake/sleep state. Considering cases of telepathy,
approximately 25% involved dreams, whereas in precognition cases, in
which a future event is partially or totally foreseen, approximately 60%
involved dreams (Van de Castle, 1977). Females are approximately twice
as likely as males to be the percipient, whereas males are the agent in
approximately 60% of cases. Surveys from Europe, the United States,
Africa, Brazil, Puerto Rico, and India indicate that ostensible psychic
dream experiences are universal phenomena and are typically reported
by 36 to 76% of respondents (Alvarado, 1998; Van de Castle, 1977).
However, the mean percentage of people reporting ESP in dreams
(51.3%) does not differ signicantly from those (48.7%) reporting waking
ESP experiences according to one review (Alvarado, 1998), although the
frequency of experience in either state may differ.
Unlike the individual reports of psychedelically induced anomalous
experiences, many of the case study collections reviewed by Van de Castle
(1977) have been ltered so that only those cases that have independent
verication have been included. Nevertheless, corroboration does not negate the possibility that the dreams are just unlikely chance occurrences.
However, Van de Castle (1977) notes that psychic dreams are frequently
361
362
Altering Consciousness
unusually vivid and intense, though clearly this does not make them unarguably genuine. Fortunately, there have been a host of experimental
approaches to researching psychic dreaming since Wesermans (1819)
apparently partially successful attempt to induce specic dream images
in people nave to his attempts. The most concerted program of research
in recent years was instigated by Montague Ullman and collaborators at
the Maimonides Medical Centre in Brooklyn in 1962. The Maimonides
dream laboratory protocol made use of the recently discovered production
of dreams during REM and employed EEG to monitor the percipients
sleep stages. Once the percipient was asleep, a target image was selected
using a randomized process in a distant room from the percipient, and a
sender would concentrate on psychically transmitting the image to the
percipient in the sound-proof room. Percipients were woken during each
REM sleep period and then, under the free-response design, described
their dreams in as much detail as possible, each of which was recorded.
In the morning, the percipients would typically judge 8 or 12 art prints,
one of which was a duplicate of the target, and they would select the one
that most resembled their dreams of the previous night. Several independent judges would also be sent the dream transcripts and images and
would rank them for correspondence. Rank scores were reduced to binary
hits or misses (Van de Castle, 1977).
The Maimonides program produced more than 50 research articles,
condensed for a popular book (Ullman, Kripnner, & Vaughan, 2002),
and the entire research output has been independently reviewed by several
researchers (Radin, 1997; Sherwood & Roe, 2003; Van de Castle, 1977)
with positive conclusions. Overall, the 15 studies returned a combined
hit rate of 63% compared to the chance rate of 50%, which, with more
than 300 trials, was highly signicant (r .33, p .13 107; Radin,
1997). Despite some contentions from critics, which were successfully
rebutted, no plausible counterexplanations exist for the results (Roe,
2010; Sherwood & Roe, 2003). However, few exact replications have been
attempted because of a lack among later researchers of the resources that
were available to the Maimonides team. Alternatively, a number of controlled but simplied conceptual replications have been conducted without EEG monitoring by having percipients dream at home. These later
studies also incorporate clairvoyance designs, without a sender, and precognition designs, where the target is selected after the judging procedure.
In a review of 21 studies since 1977, the combined results of more than 400
trials were positive overall but with a smaller effect size (r .14) than the
combined Maimonides studies (Sherwood & Roe, 2003). Nevertheless,
there may be some good reasons why the Maimonides series was more
successful than the later studies. Aside from waking up percipients during
REM, participants in the Maimonides experiments had been previously
screened for ability, whereas those in later studies were unselected. The
laboratory environment was also suspected to provide a stronger motivational factor for success (Roe, 2010). Overall, however, the Maimonides
and post-Maimonides dream ESP research has demonstrated the weak
but consistent ability of individuals to demonstrate psi during dreaming.
363
364
Altering Consciousness
Meditation
Reaching back before Mesmer to antiquity, Patanjalis Yoga Sutras
describe how psychic powers, called Siddhis, are a common side effect of
yoga but a distraction on the path to liberation. Such practices therefore
drew the attention of parapsychologists during the early 1970s (e.g., Honorton, 1974). Somewhat supporting Patanjalis claims, a random survey found
that the practice of meditation was signicantly associated with reports of
OBEs, apparitions, and aura vision (Palmer, 1979). As discussed, surveys
have also produced consistent correlations between the report of anomalous
phenomena generally and kundalini-type experiences, which constitute a
syndrome of anomalous phenomena that may occur through the practice
of yoga or spontaneously (Luke, 2008). Theorizing why psi might be associated with meditation and other ASC, Honorton (1974) proposed the process of relaxation, the passive state of mind, the inward turning of
attention, and an openness to others as psi-conducive. Consequently,
some researchers turned their attention toward meditation of all varieties
and conducted controlled psi experiments.
Honorton (1977) reviewed 16 studies testing either ESP or PK published during the period between 1970 and 1976 and found 9 of these
to be independently signicant, with all studies combined being highly
signicant also (p 6 10 12). Honortons ndings in support of the
psi-conducive nature of meditation were later conrmed with a review of
six ESP studies conducted between 1978 and 1992, four of which were
signicantly positive (Schmeidler, 1994). Reviewing the eight studies published between 1971 and 1988 investigating PKwhereby psi is indicated
by signicantly improbable deviations in random event generator (REG)
output during test periods7 of the studies produced positive effects,
typically signicantly different than control conditions (Braud, 1990).
This trend of a positive relationship between meditation, sometimes tested
in groups, and signicant RNG deviations has continued in recent experiments (e.g., Ivtzan, 2008; Nelson et al., 1996, 1998; Radin, Rebman, &
Cross, 1996; Radin et al., 2008; Rowe, 1998). However, Braud (1990)
notes that the earlier methodologies did not allow for the ultimate discernment of the appropriate psi-conducive factor, whether it was prior meditation history, the immediate effects of the meditation session, the
meditators personality and reasons for meditating in the rst place, or a
combination of these factors.
Addressing these limitations to some degree, during the early 1990s, a
new test paradigm termed the attention focusing facilitation experiment
(AFFE) received repeated independent investigation in a series of 12 conceptually identical studies conducted between 1993 and 2006. The protocol
assesses the ability of one meditator to assist a distant meditator in focusing
attention on a candle by monitoring the periods in which the distant meditators indicated with a button press their awareness of being distracted. A
meta-analysis of the 12 studies revealed a small but highly signicant distant
facilitation effect (d .11, p .009), which was superior to control periods
and independent of both the investigator and the degree of methodological
rigor, thereby bypassing ordinary methodological criticisms and supporting
a psi interpretation for the effect (Schmidt, in press).
Despite the positive ndings, whether either the helper or helpee meditators were actually in an altered state is unknown, and the ndings might
be at best considered as the result of having meditated, rather than as a consequence of being in a meditative state (Roe, 2010). Further, the actual term
meditation was used in its loosest denition in the AFFE studies, as it
merely involved maintaining ones attention on the task and has been
described as protomeditational in nature (Schmidt, in press). The earlier
studies, however, used a variety of different forms of meditation including
mandala gazing, pranayama, kundalini yoga, mantra yoga, karma yoga,
Zen meditation, and transcendental meditation, as well as meditation
practices developed by the researchers or those known and preferred by
the participants. Clearly, different techniques may result in very different
ASC, if at all, and meditation research generally has been criticized for
assuming that all meditation techniques are the same (e.g., Schmidt, in
press). More recently, Roney-Dougal has conducted psi experiments
informed by her own ethnographic research conducted during 6 years
living in ashrams and monasteries in India. Consequently, she has begun
to investigate which types of meditation practice are most psi conducive.
The main consistently signicant effect overall, however, is that years of
meditation correlates positively with psi performance (Roney-Dougal &
Solfvin, 2006; Roney-Dougal, Solfvin, & Fox, 2008), with an apparent
365
366
Altering Consciousness
Ganzfeld Induction
Growing out of observations that ASC and perhaps even just relaxation
are conducive to psi, a new methodology was adopted in the early 1970s
to reduce the percipients sensory input so that attention could be turned
inward to mental content and imagery. The technique, called ganzfeld
(meaning whole eld), involves covering the eyes of the percipients with
half ping-pong balls to diffuse the red light being used. White or pink
noise is played through headphones and the percipients rest in a comfortable chair and describe their imagery into a microphone, often after a
period of systematic relaxation. The reduced and homogenized sensory
input was thought to induce sensory hunger and be conducive to the
ow of spontaneous creative ideation and imagery (Roe, 2010). Typically,
while the percipients mentation was being recorded, a sender in a remote
location would be attempting to psychically transmit a particular image or
lm clip to them, and after the session, the mentation would be blind
judged on its similarity to the target and three decoys.
Between 1974 and 2003, there were more than 100 formal ganzfeld
experiments performed at numerous laboratories, and various metaanalyses of those have been conducted, though few methodologies in parapsychology have caused as much controversy (Palmer, 2003). The ongoing
debate concerning the outcome of the ganzfeld studies is complex and will
be only very briey summarized here. The original meta-analysis controversy centered on the methodology being used up until the mid-1980s,
the outcome of which greatly improved the research protocol and resulted
in the development of an artifact-free automated technique termed the
auto-ganzfeld (Hyman & Honorton, 1986). The following auto-ganzfeld
meta-analysis a few years later produced positive and highly signicant
results overall (Bem & Honorton, 1994), which satised critics at that time
that the statistical effect was genuine, though it was argued by them that
there must be some other, albeit unknown, explanation for the effect.
A new controversy emerged with an updated meta-analysis a few years
later that found no signicant psi effect in the auto-ganzfeld (Milton &
Wiseman, 1999). This negative review was heavily criticized by other
researchers (e.g., Bem, Palmer, & Broughton, 2001), particularly for the
inclusion of process-oriented studies exploring novel aspects of the
ganzfeld protocol, such as a study with particularly negative results that
explored the use of auditory targets instead of the standard visual ones.
Indeed, some of the studies included in the Milton and Wiseman metaanalysis were specically designed to destroy test the ganzfeld protocol
and had predicted impoverished results through the negative manipulation of salient variables, and so arguably these should not have been
included in the meta-analysis (Roe, 2010). In response to this, a number
of independent judges were asked to rate the Milton and Wiseman metaanalysis studies for standardness as ganzfeld studies, revealing a signicant positive correlation between study standardness and degree of success (Bem, Palmer, & Broughton, 2001). Further, when those studies
rated below the mean on standardness were excluded, the meta-analysis
once again became highly signicant. In addition, a further 10 studies
have been published during the period between 2000 and 2004 that provide a combined positive hit rate that is marginally signicant (Roe, 2010).
Clearly, although the ganzfeld effect is detectable and arguably replicable,
it is barely large enough to consistently deect critical accusations of nonrepeatability, and so the debate continues.
The latest addition to this debate sheds some light on the utility of the
ganzfeld procedure in comparison to other ASC induction procedures.
Storm, Tressoldi, and Di Risio (2010) conducted a meta-analysis comparing homogenous free-response ESP studies published between 1992 and
2008, nding that the combined effect of the 29 ganzfeld studies from that
period was indeed signicant (Stouffer Z 5.48, p 2.13 108) and
higher than the combined effect of 16 comparable nonganzfeld ASC
induction free-response studies, utilizing either meditation, dream psi,
relaxation or hypnosis (Stouffer Z 3.35, p 2.08 104). However,
the difference between the ganzfeld and other ASC induction procedure
studies was not signicant. Nevertheless, compared to the combination
of 14 standard non-ASC free response studies (Stouffer Z 2.29,
p .989), the ganzfeld database was signicantly more effective in eliciting psi, although the ASC database was not, indicating that the ganzfeld
process at least is more psi conducive than normal waking consciousness.
Further, Storm, Tressoldi, and Di Risio (2010) report a highly signicant
meta-analysis statistic for all the108 published ganzfeld studies up to
2008 (Stouffer Z 8.31, p < 1016), perhaps afrming the effectiveness
of ganzfeld psi for the time being.
One concern salient to the current chapter is that few of the ganzfeld
studies have investigated the actual state of the percipient following induction, and it was generally assumed that the procedure generated a state
comparable to the dreamlike hypnagogia (Roe, 2010). However, when
the brain state of the ganzfeld was explored using EEG, it was found that
367
368
Altering Consciousness
369
370
Altering Consciousness
of the experimenters own psi on the data. Similarly, comparing the results
of a meta-analysis of ordinary-state free-response ESP studies with the signicant auto-ganzfeld meta-analysis, the ganzfeld effect size was superior
to that of the non-ASC studies, but both signicantly (Storm et al., 2010)
and not signicantly so (Milton, 1997; but see Storm et al., 2010). Such
ndings may be explainable by the small scale of the results being
compared, but they are still somewhat discouraging for the hypothesis
that ASC, other than the ganzfeld, are more conducive to psi, at least in
the laboratory.
Nevertheless, some researchers remain optimistic about the relationship of ASC to ESP and indicate that such research would benet hugely
from procedures that assess the degree to which the percipient is actually
in an altered state (Cardena, 2009; Roe, 2010). In some cases, the degree
of shift in consciousness has correlated with ESP task performance, so this
would seem a valuable variable to monitor, although such an omission is
just one of a number of pitfalls common to ASC research generally. Other
concerns include the conation of states with induction procedures, illdened terminology, and the overlooking of individual differences and
the mutability of altered states (Carden a, 2009). Potentially, however,
the study of psi and altered states can bear much fruit in helping us to
better understand the nature of both anomalous phenomena and ASC,
and therefore consciousness itself. Indeed, a good deal of the research on
ASC thus far has addressed ostensible anomalous events and/or has been
conducted by parapsychologists. The implications of this research for consciousness studies per se are potentially enormous, as the ndings frequently challenge the materialist assumptions regarding the fundamental
nature of the relationship between brain and mind. It is here, in the
research at the limits of consciousness, that the most profound questions
concerning ontology are being asked.
References
Alvarado, C. S. (1998). ESP and altered states of consciousness: An overview of
conceptual and research trends. Journal of Parapsychology, 62, 2763.
Alvarado, C. S. (2000). Out-of-body experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, & S.
Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining the scientic evidence (pp. 183218). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Bem, D., & Honorton, C. (1994). Does psi exist? Replicable evidence of an
anomalous process of information transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 418.
Bem, D., Palmer, J., & Broughton, R. (2001). Updating the ganzfeld database:
A victim of its own success? Journal of Parapsychology, 65, 207218.
371
372
Altering Consciousness
Luke, D. P. (2010). Anthropology and parapsychology: Still hostile sisters in science? Time and Mind: The Journal of Archaeology, Consciousness & Culture, 3,
245266.
Luke, D., & Friedman, H. (2010). The neurochemistry of psi reports and associated experiences. In S. Krippner, and H. Friedman (Eds.), Mysterious minds:
The neurobiology of psychics, mediums and other extraordinary people (pp. 163185).
Westport, CT: Greenwood/Praeger.
Luke, D. P., & Kittenis, M. (2005). A preliminary survey of paranormal experiences with psychoactive drugs. Journal of Parapsychology, 69, 305327.
McClenon, J. (2002). Wondrous healing: Shamanism, human evolution, and the origin
of religion. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
Milton, J. (1997). Meta-analysis of free-response ESP studies without altered
states of consciousness. Journal of Parapsychology, 61(4), 279319.
Milton, J., & Wiseman, R. (1999). Does psi exist? Lack of replication of
an anomalous process of information transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 125,
387391.
Myers, F. (1903). Human personality and its survival of bodily death (2 vols.).
London: Longmans Green.
Nelson, R. D., Bradish, G. J., Dobyns, Y. H., Dunne, B. J., & Jahn, R. G. (1996).
FieldREG anomalies in group situations. Journal of Scientic Exploration, 10,
111141.
Nelson, R. D., Jahn, R. G., Dunne, B. J., Dobyns, Y. H., & Bradish, G. J. (1998).
FieldREG II: Consciousness eld effects: Replications and explorations. Journal
of Scientic Exploration, 12, 425454.
Palmer, J. (1979). A community mail survey of psychic experiences. Journal of the
American Society for Psychical Research, 73, 221251.
Palmer, J. (2003). ESP in the ganzfeld: Analysis of a debate. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(67), 5168.
Parker, A. (2005). Psi and altered states of consciousness. In M. A. Thalbourne &
L. Storm (Eds.), Parapsychology in the twenty-rst century: Essays on the future of
psychical research (pp. 6589). Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Pekala, R., & Cardena, E. (2000). Methodological issues in the study of altered
states of consciousness and anomalous experiences. In E. Cardena, S. J. Lynn, &
S. Krippner (Eds.), Varieties of anomalous experience: Examining to scientic evidence
(pp. 4781). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Pekala, R. J., Kumar, V. K., & Marcano, G. (1995). Anomalous/paranormal experiences, hypnotic susceptibility, and dissociation. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 89, 313331.
Radin, D. I. (1997). The conscious universe: The scientic truth of psychic phenomena.
New York: HarperEdge.
Radin, D. I., Rebman, J. M., & Cross, M. P. (1996). Anomalous organization of
random events by group consciousness: Two exploratory experiments. Journal
of Scientic Exploration, 10, 143168.
Radin, D. I., Stone, J., Levine, E., Eskandarnejad, S., Schlitz, M., Kozak, L., Mandel,
D., & Hayssen, G. (2008). Compassionate intention as a therapeutic intervention by partners of cancer patients: Effects of distant intention on the patients
autonomic nervous system. Explore: The Journal of Science and Healing, 4,
235243.
Roe, C. A. (2010). The role of altered states of consciousness in extrasensory
experiences. In M. Smith (Ed.), Anomalous experiences: Essays from parapsychological and psychological perspectives (pp. 2549). Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Roney-Dougal, S., & Solfvin, J. (2006). Yogic attainment in relation to awareness
of precognitive targets. Journal of Parapsychology, 20, 91120.
Roney-Dougal, S., Solfvin, J., & Fox, J. (2008). An exploration of degree of meditation attainment in relation to psychic awareness with Tibetan Buddhists.
Journal of Scientic Exploration, 22, 161178.
Rowe, W. D. (1998). Physical measurement of episodes of focused group energy.
Journal of Scientic Exploration, 12, 569581.
Schmeidler, G. (1994). ESP experiments in 19781992: The glass is half full. In
S. Kripnner (Ed.), Advances in parapsychological research 7 (pp. 104197). Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Schmidt, S. (in press). What meditation can do: Mental health and exceptional
experiences. In C. Simmonds-Moore (Ed.), Exceptional human experiences,
health and mental health. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Shanon, B. (2003). Hallucinations. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 331.
Sherwood, S. (2002). Relationship between the hypnagogic/hypnopompic states
and reports of anomalous experiences. Journal of Parapsychology, 66, 127150.
Sherwood, S. J., & Roe, C. A. (2003). A review of dream ESP studies conducted
since the Maimonides dream ESP programme. Journal of Consciousness Studies
10, 85109.
Simmonds-Moore, C., & Holt, N. (2007). Trait, state and psi: A comparison of
psi performance between clusters of scorers on schizotypy in a ganzfeld and
waking control condition. Journal of the Society of Psychical Research, 71, 197
215.
Simmonds-Moore, C. (in press). Exploring ways of manipulating anomalous
experiences for mental health and transcendence. In C. Simmonds-Moore
(Ed.), Exceptional human experiences, health and mental health. Jefferson, NC:
McFarland.
Stanford, R. G. (1990). An experimentally testable model for spontaneous psi
events: A review of related evidence and concepts from parapsychology and
other sciences. In S. Krippner (Ed.), Advances in parapsychological research
(Vol. 6, pp. 54167). Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Stanford, R. G., & Stein, A. G. (1994). A meta-analysis of ESP studies contrasting
hypnosis and a comparison condition. Journal of Parapsychology, 58, 235269.
Stevenson, I. (1995). Possession and exorcism: An essay review. Journal of Parapsychology, 59, 6976.
373
374
Altering Consciousness
Advisory Board
378
Advisory Board
380
clinical neuropsychologist before joining the Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience at the Brain Mind Institute of the Lausanne Technological Institute
(EPFL), where he is currently completing his Ph.D. in neuroscience.
Jorg C. Fachner, Ph.D., is senior research fellow at the Finnish Centre of
Excellence in Interdisciplinary Music Research at University of Jyvaskyla,
Finland. Dr. Fachner has authored a doctoral thesis (2001) on cannabis,
EEG, and music perception, and various publications on music and
altered states, music therapy, addictions, drug culture, and the social
pharmacology of music.
Cheryl Fracasso, M.S., is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in clinical psychology
at Saybrook University. She serves as faculty member at the University of
Phoenix, research assistant at Saybrook University for Stanley Krippner,
and associate managing editor with the International Journal of Transpersonal Studies.
Pehr Granqvist got his Ph.D. from Uppsala University, 2002, and is an
associate professor in developmental psychology at Stockholm University,
Sweden. His research has applied attachment theory to the psychology of
religion. For example, he has suggested that a propensity for experiencing
absorption mediates a relation between disorganized attachment and
certain spiritual experiences.
Gregory Holler, Ph.D., earned his doctorate in psychology from Saybrook
University in 2005. His background and research interests are in human
sexuality. He was trained as a marriage and family therapist. Dr. Holler
works as a senior clinician and behavior consultant in San Francisco, CA.
Andrzej Kokoszka, M.D., Ph.D., is professor of psychiatry, Head of the II
Department of Psychiatry, Medical University of Warsaw, Poland, CBT
therapist, group analyst, psychologist, and professor at the Warsaw School
of Social Sciences and Humanities. He wrote a series of articles on consciousness, reformulated in the book States of Consciousness: Models for
Psychology and Psychotherapy.
Steven Laureys, M.D., Ph.D., heads the Coma Science Group, www
.comascience.org, Department of Neurology and Cyclotron Research
Center of the University and University Hospital of Lie`ge, Belgium. He is
a senior research associate at the Belgian National Fund of Scientic
Research and invited professor at the Belgian Royal Academy of Sciences.
381
382
383
Index
Alcohol, sedative-hypnotic, 31
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), alteration of
consciousness approach, 173
Alcorta, C. S., 225
Alibi (Morante), 279
Alice in Wonderland Syndrome, 245
Alien abduction experiences (AAEs), 293,
31011
Allocentric perspective, 346
Alloesthesia, 244
a1-adrenergic receptor sites, 135
Alterations in mood, 29091
Alterations in sense of agency, 289
Alterations in sense of attribution, 290
Alterations in sense of self, 28890
Altered states of consciousness (ASC):
adolescent risky behavior, 223;
biological rhythm impact, 8; and bodily
self, 23740; and development,
21112; denition, 328; dissociation,
21819; and drug consumption,
16768; and emotions, 27982; and
ESP, 355, 370; experiences of, 328;
genetic predisposition, 212; and
healing, 32731; late adulthood, 228;
and LSD, 121, 123; nonpathological,
28384, 285t86t; orgasm as, 19495;
pathological, 26975, 285t86t; and
peyote, 147, 149; pharmacological,
26768; physiological, 26567; and
psychopathology, 28294, 285t86t;
range, 43; reward system, 17779; in
386
Index
sexual activity, 19192; stability, 34;
subjective reections, 128; therapeutic
recommendations, 294, 295; timelimited, 174; young adults, 226
Altered states of consciousness with
distorted reality (ASCDRs): differences,
4647; and dopamine, 45, 46, 48;
range, 4344
Altered structure of experience,
in VSEs, 316
Alternations in perception, 29193
Alvarado, C. S., 361, 363, 368
Amaritia muscaria, 51
American Psychiatric Association, on
possession trance, 313
Amygdala, glutamate, 137; and olfactory
information, 152
Anadenanthera: leaves, 86, 87t, 88t, 93,
109, 111; snuff, 33, 10910
Anesthetics, and bodily
consciousness, 253
Anhedonia, 291
Anomalous experiences, 35657; history,
357; and sleep, 36063; trait variables,
36869. See also Extrasensory
perception, Parapsychology, Psi
phenomena
Anosognosia, 241, 245, 246
Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), in
meditation, 333, 334
Anticholinergic drugs, in shamanistic
practice, 51
Anticipation of reward, and
dopamine, 180
Apallic syndrome, 272
Aperspektivitat, loss of perspective, 342, 343
Areca nut, 32
Asomatoscopy, 245
Aspen Neurobehavioral Conference
Workgroup, 273
Assagioli, Roberto, 314
Atropine: in shamanistic practice, 51; in
South American Solanaceae, 112
Attachment: development infancy, 215;
disorganized, 218
Attention control, in meditation, 331
Attention focusing facilitation experiment
(AFFE), psi effects, 365
387
Index
procedures, 25354; in hypnosis,
25152; in mystical states, 251;
near-death-experiences, 250;
neurological disorders, 24049;
out-of-body experience, 24950;
and parietal lobe, 74
Body armoring, Reich, 193
Body schema; in hypnosis and meditation,
335; vs. body image, 344 n.2, 34445
BOLD (blood oxygen level dependent)
signal changes, 71, 72, 74
Borderline personality disorders,
emotional shifts, 29394
Boundary thinness, 36869
Bowlby, J., 218
Brain: complexity, 25; signaling structure,
25, 26f
Brain death, 27071
Brain imaging studies: conscious
awareness of emotion, 7374; future
directions, 7779; positive emotions,
7273; religious experience, 6972
Brain-mind connection, chemical nature,
25, 36
Brain waves, sleep cycles, 6f
Braver, T. S., 334
Breathing control, in meditation, 331
Breuer, J., 219
Brief Psychotic Disorder (DSM-IV-TR),
VSEs, 316
Buchbinder, J., 315, 316
Bufotenine (5-hydroxy-DMT): chemical
structure, 99t; endogenous, 85,
90t, 94, 101
Burroughs, William, 169 n.1
Caffeine, stimulant, 3031
Cakras, 198
Calabrese, Joseph, 176, 177
Campbell, Joseph, 303
Cannabinoids, 32; and dopamine, 48
Caplan, M., 311
Cardena, Etzel, 149, 312, 337,
338, 33940
Caregiver, source of childs stress, 219
Carlson, E. A., 218
Carmelite nuns, brain imaging
participation, 7172, 74
388
Index
Cotard syndrome, 288
Coulson, Sheila, 55 n.1
Cousins, W. E., 337
Craving, 171
Creativity-related states, young
adulthood, 226
CRED (cAMP response element binding),
and addiction, 18182
Culture, and drug use, 171, 172
Cyclothymic disorder, 294
Csikszentmihalyi, M. and I. S., 14
Dakwar, E., 331
Daoist yoga, 19697
Dark night of the soul, 29091
Davidson, Julian, 194
Davy, Humphrey, 23
De la Cruz, San Juan, 279
de Lima, Goncalves, 88t, 92
de Quincey, Thomas, 169 n.1
Decety, J., 345
Deep sedation, 265, 268
Deep sleep, unconscious state,
264f, 265
Delayed sleep phase syndrome
(DSPS), 16
Delirium tremens, hallucinations and
GABA, 4748
Delirium, 287
Delphi oracle, 313, 358
DeltaFoS-B, and addiction, 182
Delusional parasitosis, 243
Delusional reduplication of body parts,
24243, 248
Delusions, 292, 31516; cultural
impact, 315
Dementia, late adulthood, 227
Dependence: contracted state of
consciousness, 174, 176; medical
denitions, 17071
Depersonalization, 218, 288; and
vestibular disturbances, 248
Depression, 290
Derealization, 218, 288
Descartes, Rene, 22, 248
Designs, peyote ASC, 150, 156
Di Risio, L., 367
Diabysis, treatment home, 310
389
Index
Drugs: and addiction, 16869; bodily
consciousness impact, 25253;
dysfunction effects/adaptive
advantages, 168
DWSC (differentiated waking state of
consciousness), 9
Early childhood cognitive development,
21922
Ecstasy, emotion, 279; in sexual activity,
191
Ecstasy, drug. See MDMA
Edwards, Eiluned, 337
EEG (electroencephalography), mystical
condition measurement, 74
Ego integrity, late adulthood, 22728
Egocentric representations, 346
Ekboms syndrome, 243
Ekstasis, dened, 46
Electrical synapses, 25
Eliade, M., 198
Ellis, Havelock, 252
Emotional contagion, 338;
infancy, 21617
Emotions: and ASC, 28082; and ecstasy,
279; traditional view, 280
Endocannabinoids, 33; receptor system,
17879
Endogenous DMT, 85, 94, 101;
biosynthesis, 107; function, 1078. See
also Bufotenine, 5-MeO-DMT
Endogenous reward system, 178
Endorphins, 30, 178
Entheogens, 33, 121
Entrancement, 336
Environment, and drug use, 171
Ephedrine, stimulant, 31
Epigentic factors, human evolution, 44, 58
Epilepsy, 26970
Ergolines, tetracyclic compounds, 12930
Ergot alkaloids, 124
Ergot fungus, 34
Erikson, Erik, 227
Euphoria, and opioid receptors,
48, 49
European Task Force on Disorders of
Consciousness, 272
Evangelical Christian possession, 313
390
Index
Freud, Sigmund: on hysteria, 219;
paranoia theory, 292; pre/transpersonal
fallacy, 318; on sexual repression,
19293
Fromm, Erich, 282
Frontal lobe: 5-HT2a receptor sites, 132;
and portentousness, 129
Furst, P. T., 148 n.1
Fusional experiences, 289
Gamma-amino butyric acid (GABA): and
hallucinations, 4748; inhibitory
effects, 29; interneurons, 135, 137;
receptors, 30; and sedative-hypnotics,
3132
Ganzfeld induction, 36668
Geekie, J., 341
General anesthesia, unconscious state,
264f, 265, 268
Generalized tonic-clonic seizures, 269
Gerotranscendence, 228
Gerstmann, Joseph, 246
Geschwind syndrome, 66
Gesture and dance, in shamanism,
336, 337
Geyer, M. A., 127, 338, 340
Gilman, A. G., 122
Global brain metabolism, and awareness,
275
Glossolalia, 71
Glutamic acid (glutamate): excitatory
signaling, 29; and hallucinogens, 132;
receptors, 30
Goldberg, L. R., 201, 202
Goodman, T. W., 122
Gopnik, Alison, 213
GPCR (G-protein coupled receptor),
2528, 29, 30; and opioids, 32; and
psychedelics, 3435; and THC, 3233;
transduction, 27f
Granqvist, P., 68
Gray, Spalding, 288
Greeley, Andrew M., 191
Greenberg, D., 315, 316, 318
Grey, Alex, 113
Greyson, B., 307
Grief and mourning, late adulthood, 227
Grifths, R., 126, 252
392
Index
Ketamine: dissociative anesthetic, 36, 268;
out-of-body experiences, 358, 359
Kleitman, Nathan, 11, 12
Knowing medium, ASC, 128
Known object, focal awareness, 128
Kokoszka, A., 13
Krippner, S. 330, 333
Kundalini, 198, 358
Lambe, E. K., 132
Lambrecht, I., 341
Landis, C., 290, 291, 292
Lantern consciousness, infancy, 213
Laski, Marghanita, 191
Lata, J., 315
Late adulthood cognitive development,
22628
Laureys, Steven, 342
L-dopa, 47, 49
Left hemisphere: dopaminergic
transmission, 54; dreams, 47;
emotional regulation, 49
Levine, F. R., 331
Levi-Strauss, Claude, 337
Lhermitte, Jean, 245, 252
Life After Life (Moody), 306
Ligand-gated ion-channel receptor, 25
Limb ownership denial, 24647
Limbic-marker hypothesis, TEs, 6667
Liotti, G. 219
Locked-in syndrome, 264f, 26465, 274
Locus coeruleus (LC), 133, 135
LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), 34; and
bodily consciousness, 25253;
chemical structure, 130f; discovery,
123, 124; ergot alkaloid product, 130
Lucid dreaming, 264f, 266, 341
Macro and micro context effects, 172
Magic consciousness, 2 to 5 years, 212
Maimonides Medical Centre, psi research,
362, 363
Main, M., 219
Maithuna, 198
Maliszewski, M., 196
Malpighiaceaous woody liana, 92f, 100
Mammals, typical waking EEG, 43
Manske, Richard, 89t, 91
393
Index
Mind-body problem, 22; and
neuroscience, 37; and transcendent
experiences, 7577
Mindfulness-based stress reduction
(MBSR), 332
Mindfulness meditation (MM), fMRI
studies, 333
Miner, L. A., 132
Minimally conscious state, 27374
Minimally sedative agents, 268
Mirror neuron system, 216
Mishara, Aaron L., 291, 343, 344 n.1
Mislocalizations, tactile, 243, 244, 248
Misoplegia, 247
MMPI, Goldberg modications, 201,
202, 203
Modulation, AIM model of
consciousness, 7
Monoamine oxidase (MAO), 103
Monoamine oxidase inhibitor (MAOI),
103, 104, 112; and peyote, 150
Monoamines (-NH2), 2930
Montgomery, Gary, 160 n.6
Monthly biological rhythms, 5
Monti, M. M., 274
Mood alteration, hallucinogens, 52
Mood disorders, 29091
Moody, Raymond, 306
Moral indignation, childhood, 220
Morante, Elsa, 279
Moreira-Almeida, A., 283, 312
Motor neglect, bodily consciousness, 246
Mullin, G. H., 198
Muscarinic drugs, in shamanistic
practice, 51
Muzet, A., 174
Myers, Frederick, 355
Mystical experiences: bodily
consciousness in, 251; characteristics,
6364; and emotion, 281; and fusion,
289; in sexual activity, 191
Mysticism Scale, 72
Mythic consciousness, 6 to 11 years, 212
Nave realism, 329, 345
Narcolepsy, 293
Narrative autobiographic
remembering, 345
394
Index
Nonhuman primates, hallucinogen
avoidance, 52
Nonpathological ASC, characteristics,
283, 285t86t
Noradrenaline, 45; in dreaming, 47
Norepinephrine, 29; and mescaline, 150
NREM (non-REM) sleep, 9, 266; cycle,
56
Oceanic boundlessness, 338, 339, 340
Oceanic sex, 196
Ololiuqui, 124
Opiates, endogenous receptors, 178
Opioids, analgesia/sedation, 32
Ordinary waking consciousness, external
adaptive state, 128
Orgasm: as ASC, 194195; sexual
response cycle phase, 200
Orgasmic reex, Reich, 193
Ospina, M. B., 332
Ott, Jonathan, 114
Otto, Rudolph, 129
Out-of-body experience, 24950, 288;
under hypothermic cardiac arrest, 76;
and mystical states, 251
Out-of-body journeying, 50
Out-of-body sensations: in ASCRs, 47;
and dopamine, 45, 46
OWSC (ordinary waking state of
consciousness), 9
Oxytocin, 30
Pahnke, Walter N., 125, 252
Pain modulation, meditation, 333
Paleomammalian brain, limbic system,
154, 178
Pane, Ramon, 86, 88t
Panic, and depersonalization, 291
Paradoxically healing, ASC as, 327
Parapsychology, 355356. See also Psi
phenomena
Parasympathetic dominance, dopamine,
45, 46, 4950
Paresthesias, 24344
Parkinsons disease, 45, 47; tactile
hallucinations, 243
Passie, Torsten, 195, 196
Passive state of mind, 14
395
Index
Positive emotions, and brain structures,
7273
Possession, 31213
Postictal period, temporal lobe epileptic
seizure, 64, 65
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD):
depersonalization, 288; emotional
shifts, 293
Prana, 199
Precognition: and dreaming, 361;
psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy,
358
Prefrontal cortex (PFC): adolescent
remodeling, 223; awareness of
emotions, 73; in meditation, 348
Prenatal experience, 16162
Prepersonal experiences, 318
Presence experience, 249
Previc, Fred, 167
Priestly, Joseph, 23
Prince, R. H., 302
Principles of Psychology, The (James), 22
Protective mechanisms: cultural practices,
14; exogenous agents use, 14;
information inow balance, 1314;
meditation, 14; natural rhythmicity,
1213; physiological, 13
Psi, dened, 355
Psi phenomena, 35556; in crisis
situations, 280; ganzfeld induction,
36668; and hypnosis, 36364; and
meditation, 36466; psychedelically
induced, 35760; and sleep,
36063; states and traits, 36869;
therapeutic recommendations,
294, 309
Psilocin (4-hydroxy-DMT), 47, 51, 100;
chemical structure, 100t; U.S. studies,
53
Psilocybe mushrooms, 33, 101
Psilocybin, 124, 126; and bodily
consciousness, 252; chemical structure,
130f; entity encounter experiences, 359
Psychedelic-assisted psychotherapy, ESP
occurrence, 358
Psychedelic experience, facets, 95
Psychedelics, 33, 34, 12122; addiction
treatment, 11314, 153, 176; and ESP,
396
Index
Reality, visionary state, 129
Reich, Wilhelm, orgasmic reex, 193
Religion, adolescent appeal, 224, 225
Religious attributions/experience, brain
imaging experiment, 70
Religious experience, and TLE, 64, 65
Religious or Spiritual Problem (DSM-IV),
NDEs, 308, 317
REM (rapid eye movements) sleep, 264f,
266, 293; cycle, 5; and DMT, 1067;
newborns, 160, 213, 214; and raphe
cell rhythmic rate, 130; state of
consciousness, 9
Reptilian brain, behavior and habit, 154
Repulsion (lm), 292
Resolution phase, sexual response
cycle, 200
Retrograde signaling, synapse, 28, 33
Retrospective perspective, 346
Reuptake transport, 26f, 27
Revonsuo, A., 340, 341
Reward-reinforcement pathways, 33
Reynolds, J., 334
Reynolds, Pam, 75, 76, 77
Rhino Cave, Botswana, 5556, 56 n.1
Rhythmic drumming, 50
Richards, Keith, 169 n.1
Right hemisphere, and TEs, 67
Ring, K., 307
Risky behavior: dopamine and serotonin,
224; prefrontal cortex, 223
Ritualistic ingestion, 175
Rock art, shamanistic themes, 5556
Roney-Dougal, S., 365
Rossi, E. 13, 14
Rubber-hand illusion, 253
Running, and mystical state, 251
Sabina, Mara, 53
Sabom, Michael, 75
Sacks, Oliver, 312
Sadism, psychoanalytic perspective, 193
Sakti, female deities, 198
Salvia divinorum, 35, 51
San people, ASC practices, 51
Sanchez-Vives, M. V., 136
Sane Society, The (Fromm), 282
Santo Daime, Ayahuasca sect, 86t, 113
397
Index
Sexuality: and ASC, 19195; experimental
study, 2025; phenomenological
dimensions, 199202; and social
desirability, 2012; studies of, 18990;
transpersonal experiences, 19699
Shamanism: and dream experiences, 341;
genetic component, 212; healing
effects, 33540; Huichol culture,
15456; mutual hypnotic-trance, 337;
narrative in, 347; neurochemical
contributions, 50; nondrug practices,
50; transactional symbols, 339
Sherwood, S., 361
Shift work variation, 16
Shiva, pure consciousness, 198
Shulgin, A., 100
Shumala Caves, 148 n.1
Siddhis, yoga psychic powers, 364
Sigma-1 receptor, 105
Simmonds-Moore, C., 368, 369
Simple partial seizures, 270
Sleep, 26566; deprivation, 51; and psi
phenomena, 36063. See also
Dreaming, REM sleep
Sleep paralysis, 293; OBE-like
experiences, 249; and
psychokinesis, 361
Sleep/wake cycle, 5; AIM model, 67;
disturbances, 1516
Smith, E. O., 168
Smith, Huston, 123
Snuff products, 1089
Social brain, 329, 331, 336, 345
Social neuroscience, 329
Social science models of addition,
17172
Society for Psychical Research, 355
Sociocultural context,
psychopathology, 283
Socrates: Daemon voice guide, 314; on
madness, 302
Solanaceae plants, 35, 357
Somatoform disorders, 289
Somatoparaphrenia, 24647
Somnambulism, 266
Sosis, R. 225
Soteria House, 31920
Soul ight, 50
398
Index
Temperament and Character
Inventory, 71
Temporal lobe: stimulation experiments,
6769; TEs, 72
Temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE), 6465; and
religiosity, 66
Temporal lobe seizures, 26970
Teonanacatl, 124, 125
Tetrahydroisoquinolines, peyote alkaloids,
149
Thalamo-cortical frontoparietal network,
consciousness, 267f, 276
Thalamo-cortical interconnectivity, 5, 77,
128, 133
Thalamus: 5-HT2a receptor sites, 137; and
hallucinogens, 139; reticular nucleus
dysfunction, 13738
Thalbourne, M., 355, 368
THC (delta-9-tetrahydorcannabinol), 32
Therapeutic recommendations, psychic
experiences, 294, 309
Thoughtless phenomenon, 13
Tibetan Buddhism, 19899, 318
Time perception, 22
Tobacco: and peyote interaction, 15254,
q56; use in Alzheimers and
Parkinsons, 153
Tolerance, 171; opiates, 180
Tomkins, Silvan, 280
Tononi, G., 127, 128, 342
Torda, C., 131
Total drug effects, 172
Tourettes syndrome, 244
Trace amines (TA), 30; receptors and
DMT activity, 1045
Trance, 287; possession, 313
Transactional symbols, shamanistic
ritual, 339
Transcendent experiences (TEs), 6364;
brain imaging studies, 6975, 78;
clinical observations, 6465; with at
EEG, 77; future neuroimaging studies,
7980; limbic-marker hypothesis,
6566; and mind-brain problem,
7577; temporal lobe stimulation
experiments, 6769; triggers, 64, 78
Transcendent self, and brain damage, 251
Transcendental spiritual experiences, 309
399
Index
Vision logic consciousness,
adulthood, 212
Visionary restructuralization, 338, 339, 340
Visionary spiritual experience (VSE), 301;
clinical practice implications, 31619;
cross-cultural, 3023; difference from
psychotic, 31416; mystical, 304;
near-death experience, 3068;
phenomenology, 315; psychic,
30814; treatment, 31920
Visual imagery vividness, ultradian cycle,
8, 11
Vollenweider, Franz, X., 78, 127, 133,
338, 340
Volume conduction, neurotransmitters,
30, 34
Von Weizsacker, Viktor, 343, 345
Wade, Jenny, 192
Wakefulness, 263, 264f, 266, 272; and
suppressed information, 342
Wake/sleep cycles, regulation, 133
Water lily, Mayan in shamanistic practice, 52