tke an “axiom of uncountabiliy”, that i, it must have 2 formula with uncountable models but no countable models, If the uncountable is no logical cancept, one is tempted to regard this consequence asa proof that there are no complete logics extend- ing elementary logic. However that would be a mistake. Elementary logic alresdy has “axioms of infinity” in a similar sense, That is, there are formulas with models of all infinite cardinalities bat with no finite models, even though infinite” isnot a logical concept in the sense of there being a ‘quantifier expressing “for infinitely many 2” Being able to distinguish the uncountable by ‘means of axioms of uncountabilty is evidently 2 ‘much weaker property than having a quantifier “for uncountably many 2”. Further, if one allows even weiker criteria, elementary logic is already able to distinguish the uncountable from the coun- table, Call theory with infinite models categorical in the cardinal ¥ if all models of cardinality 8 are isomorphic, It ie known that there also theories categorical in Ny but in no uncountable cardinal ‘There are also theories categorical in all uncoun- table cardinals but not in No; theories categorical in all infinite cardinals; and theories categorical in io infinite cardinals. Morley’s theorem demon- strates that for infinite cardinals, these are the only possible categories. In this sense, elementary logic cannot distinguish two uncountable cardi nals, although it can distinguish the countably infinite from the uncountably infinite. "From this extensional viewpoint, Shelab’s quan~ tier “cofinality w” fares considerably better than the quantifier (Us). One has axioms of uncount- ability in precisely the sme sense one has axioms of infinity, aamely formulas with predicate letters satisfiable in, and only in, the uncountable uni verses. Other gross properties seem reasonable also: just as one cannot have formulas satisfiable cxactly in finite universes, this logic has no formu las satisfiable exactly in countable universes. The ‘obvious objection against the Sheleh loge is that fone would never have supposed that a technical notion like cofinality was a logical concept. Unless it could be shown equivalent to some more palatable notion, dhis must remain a serious objec Continuity of the Standard Quantifiers fone considers, instead of the entire logic EL, the standard quantifiers, it would appear that there Which Logic is the Right Logic? must be some sense in which V and 3 are very Simple and primitive. Ie may be posible to state some natral condition which expreses this sim plisiy, and which, at che same time, rules out {uantfiers one feels are no part of gi. To start With, Vand may be egarded as extrapolations of the trath functional connectives A and V oinfnite domains. To see how one can make such extrapo- Invions, take the infinite fist of sententialletrs PyP,Pay ony and suppose one i given an arbi tray truth assignment that fonction which assigns atrath valu (2) to cach lever P, By the truth ble res, ¢ may be extended to assign a ale (sf) fo each formula of of semen logic Consider, for increasing m the wl (Pp AP) ‘A. MPa) asiged othe iit conjunctions, One Seesat once that no matter what assignment 5, the Timi im n+ 00 1€Pp A Py A.» Na) bas a clear vale there ea Gite point N’ such thatthe eon- Junction (Py Py A.A Py) is assigned a value HPAP) AcvAPy)y and for all m preter than MiP APL Ao APy).i6 the same as HOA Py Aree Py) Tes ely sen that exactly the same propery is rue offsite disjunctions. ‘Compare another familiar binary connective, the bicondonal , Tt is also commattve and associative so that parentheses may be dropped, and (Po ++ Py + formula, However inthis case there i no evident limit ofthe values (Pp w+ Pj n+... Py) 35-8 inereases, This isnot merely due tothe unfani- larity of the construction. If for example, (P) is “L(llsehood) for all” then the value of Hyer Phew oe Pa) is T for even, and 1 for m odd. There is simply no wel-defined Lit value to be wed fran infinite quaniaton “These considerations canbe estatd in the lan- rage of quuntfers and predicates. Suppose 2 motel As given which interes a one-place Jeter F. In each Gite submodel J with universe {{do, .-+e},¥xF(z) has a truth value, the same, aloe as (F (lo) A Flat) A.A ley) has in J. js continuous in the sense that for cach model theresa nite submodel Jin which F(x) takes a truth valve and holds that truth value forall submodels K between 7 and M, including M. ‘Thus if one thinks of the model Mas being reveled step by step, there i faite portion at ‘hich VeP(s) assumes a tuth value and holds that truth ale no mater how moch the model further reveled, and even if is woally revealed "This is the Continuity condition we wish w ibolate, and of course the quansifer 3, a5 wel as @ + Py) considered to be 2