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kh
21 April 2016
azi
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South
Ossetia
Adjara
orno
Nag bakh
Kara
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Oil Price Shocks and Monetary Policy in Azerbaijan: Challenges and Opportunities
By Jeyhun Mammadov, Baku
11
16
STATISTICS
22
CHRONICLE
25
This special issue is funded by the SNSF research project Energy and Power at the Department of
History of the University of Zurich, Switzerland.
Research Centre
for East European Studies
University of Bremen
Center
for Security Studies
ETH Zurich
Caucasus Research
Resource Centers
Abstract
Despite the accumulation of significant revenues from crude oil exports and remarkable economic growth
over the past 15 years, Azerbaijans economy has been hit hard by the recent drop in global oil prices and
has experienced aperiod of painful economic adjustments. The government has attempted to change the
traditional distributive approach that is based largely on oil revenue distribution in favor of anew earningoriented model that is expected to benefit from arobust non-oil sector. It is clear that the oil price slump
caught the government off guard and poorly prepared to cope with the new low price environment. Clearly,
it will be difficult to build anew model of development quickly and thoroughly in ashort period of time.
While the availability of the state oil fund reserves mitigates the risk of financial and macroeconomic collapse in the near future, the effects of alarge informal economy make it difficult to regulate the economy
using only conventional instruments, such as money supply and credits. Thus, to be effective, authorities
anti-crisis measures should be accompanied by institutional and administrative reforms.
Figure 1: Devaluation of the National Currencies in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia in Light of Low Oil Prices
0
-10
-20
-30
-40
-50
-60
-70
-80
AZN
TENGE
RUB
GDP
Jul
Jan-16
Jul
Jan-15
Jan-14
Jul
Jul
Jan-13
Jul
Jan-12
Jul
Jan-11
Jan - 10
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
Non-oil GDP
The government is taking active steps to tackle the challenges of macroeconomic balancing. Its policy actions
so far may be divided into three groups:
It is clear that an essential reason for the painful ramifications of the commodity price decline in Azerbaijan is
4 Paul Collier, The Decision Chain of Natural Resource Management (I), Global Heritages, February 5, 2016, <https://glo
balherit.hypotheses.org/4710>.
Conclusion
Abstract
This article examines the transition from afixed to amanaged floating exchange regime in Azerbaijan and
discusses the potentially stabilizing effects of monetary policy instruments on the Azerbaijani economy following oil price shocks. It argues that aproactive and credible fiscal policy and monetary expansion (albeit
temporary) are indispensable measures to defend the domestic economy against external supply shocks. However, monetary expansion as atraditional approach to crisis management during recession has proven ineffective in the Azerbaijani case due to public panic over the possibility of further devaluation of the Azerbaijani currency (manat) and unofficial dollarization incentives. Faced with new challenges, the Central Bank
of Azerbaijan adopted atightening monetary policy to curb further devaluation of the manat, unofficial dollarization and inflation. However, establishing an effective monetary policy requires substantially enhancing credibility by creating asafer and sounder financial sector. In this regard, financial liberalization and
greater ease of entry for foreign banks can lead to benefits connected with the development of the domestic
financial system. The article also suggests that national currency devaluation has potential implications for
the increase in exports and the inflow of import substituting foreign direct investment. However, adegree
of uncertainty and turbulence surrounding the financial situation and weak institutional quality are barriers to external funding and can exacerbate the contraction of domestic credit for the time being.
over the long term and that this fall in supply would
appreciate the real exchange rate (by increasing the value
of the manat).2 However, private agents incentives for
unofficial dollarization seemed not to be considered, and
this resulted in the ineffectiveness of expansionary monetary policy in further stimulating domestic investment.
Unofficial dollarization exerted a contractionary effect, i.e., it led to areduction in official foreign
exchange reserves and the money base in manat. Expectations of continuous devaluation and inflation frightened the population into converting their deposits from
the manat into US dollars, which increased demand for
US dollars and created the conditions for further devaluation of the manat.3 This also led to amismatch between
deposits and bank loans. Consequently, in contrast to
our hypothesis, areduction in the money multiplier was
observed (see Table 2 on p.10). Over time, triggered
by afall in foreign exchange reserves, the broad money
supply M3 (money in the hands of people, demand and
time deposits in the manat and foreign currency) also
decreased (see Table 2 on p.10).
The CBA has spent more than half of its foreign exchange
reserves to maintain the level of the manat. Supported
by the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), the CBA
continues holding foreign exchange auctions to help
banks by selling dollars in exchange for manat (while
simultaneously pursuing a tightening monetary policy). This is ashort-term measure that offers little hope
in the face of prevailing international and domestic economic pressures.
On the other hand, from an economic theory perspective on long-term sustainability, the devaluation of
the national currency has created better economic prospects and opportunities, accompanied by exogenous and
endogenous risk factors.
When the manat was devalued, its value declined relative to the value of other currencies such as the US Dollar and Euro. This exchange rate movement has potential implications for foreign direct investment (FDI). It
reduces production costs in Azerbaijan relative to those
in foreign investor countries, thereby enhancing Azerbaijans location advantage for foreign investors contemplating investment projects in Azerbaijan. A depreciated
exchange rate can attract FDI concentrated on import
substitution (producing goods previously imported) and
export promotion (seeking new sources of inputs). In
turn, higher foreign capital inflow can compensate for
4 Expected tight monetary policy in the US may increase the cost of external financing and also lead to capital outflow from emerging and
transitioning countries. This can cause further devaluation of these countries currencies against the US dollar. Additionally, considering
that the exchange rate of the manat depends on the dollareuro basket, the impact of tight monetary policy in the US is inevitable.
5 For more information on the institutional quality in Azerbaijan, see Ahmadov I., Mammadov J., and Aslanli K., Assessment of Institutional
Quality in Resource Rich Caspian Basin Countries, 2013.
10
Q2
013
Q3
2013
Q4
2013
Q1
2014
Q2
2014
Q3
2014
Q4
2014
Q1
2015
Q2
2015
Q3
2015
Q4
2015
Q1
2016
SOFAZ
revenue %
22.5
20.9
13.6
GDP
Current
428
2,320 2809
3,276 3,333 3,166 2,793 1,139 108
-45
177
na
na
account
Foreign
trade bal5,906 4,578 4,924 5,428 5,544 5584
5,080 2,720 1,758 2000
1,544
na
na
ance
Export
8,289 7,571 7,950 7,947 7,504 8,090 7,338 5,328 4,250 4427
3,646
na
na
- Oil-gas
7,842 7,116 7,588 7,458 7,139 7,661 6,952 4,875 3,797 4,053 3,357
na
na
sector
- Other
447
455
362
489
365
429
386
453
453
374
289
na
na
sectors
Import
2,383 2993
3,026 2,520 1,960 2,506 2,258 2608
2,492 2,427 2102
na
na
- Oil-gas
281
237
292
356
272
409
326
431
344
590
571
na
na
sector
- Other
2,102 2,756 2,734 2,164 1,688 2,097 1,932 2,177 2,148 837
531
na
na
sectors
FDI
1,420 1,547 1,678 1,646 1,911 1,956 1,951 2,231 1,845 1,956 1,936
na
na
Repatriation of in-841
-871
-952
-998
-970
-826
-858
-982
-829
-830
-856
na
na
vestments
Official average exchange rates of the manat
US dollar
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.78
1.05
1.05
1.05
1.23
1.58
EURO
1.02
1.04
1.05
1.07
1.09
1.07
1.01
0.97
1.14
1.18
1.18
1.34
1.72
Inflation
1.2
2.0
2.3
2.4
2.0
1.6
1.5
1.4
2.8
3.5
3.7
4
13.6
(CPI)
Sources: The Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA), the State Statistical Committee and State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ).
Table 2: Key Monetary Indicators: Money Aggregates, Monetary Base (mln. AZN)
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016/01
5,456
6,839
8,298
10,528
4,638
5,889
6,408
6,397
1.30
7,158
8,796
10,997
13,903
7,850
6,054
10,482
8,275
1.33
9,257
11,122
13,807
16,775
8,283
8,492
11,695
10,515
1.31
10,459
12,737
16,435
19,290
9,903
9,387
14,152
11,642
1.41
10,153
12,830
17,435
21,566
10,492
11,076
13,758
11,542
1.51
4,776
6,897
8,613
21,319
11,056
10,263
5,017
6,902
1.25
4,485
6,273
7,937
19,965
10,571
9,393
4,026
5,787
1.37
na
na
0.1
- Corridor ceiling
na
na
- Refinancing rate
4.75
0.5 (July)
0.1 (May)
5 (July)
6 (May)
3.5 (July)
4.25 (May)
17 (March)
10 (Feb)
7 (March)
5 (Feb.)
Money aggregates
M0
M1
M2
M3
- Net foreign assets
- Net domestic assets
Official FX reserves (mln. USD)
Money base (mln. Manat)
Money multiplier, M2/MB
Interest rates %
- Corridor floor
5.25 (May)
5 (Feb.)
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
11
Table 3: The Structure of Loans to the Economy by Type of Credit Institution (mln. AZN)
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016/01
Total loans
9,163
9,850
12,244
15,423
18,543
21,718
21,186
State-owned banks
3,902
3,300
4,137
5,300
6,144
7,289
7,707
Private banks
5,070
6,299
7,786
9,689
11,874
13,863
12,884
2,306
3,002
3,394
4,613
5,580
6,394
55,944
as % of total loans
25
30
28
30
30
29
26
464
586
759
1,035
1,389
1,565
1,546
192
251
321
433
525
566
596
Lower Oil Revenues, Higher Public Debt: The Fiscal Policy Implications of
Low Oil Prices in Azerbaijan
By Kenan Aslanli, Baku
Abstract
This article examines fiscal policy and the main parameters of Azerbaijans fiscal position in the context of
the severe constraints (namely, reduced budget revenues and cuts in government spending) posed by the
decline in crude oil prices. Azerbaijans fiscal balances have deteriorated considerably as crude oil prices have
tumbled. A worsening of Azerbaijans fiscal balance could gradually contribute to an increase in the public debt burden and threaten fiscal sustainability in the long term. The sovereign wealth fund of Azerbaijan,
SOFAZ, now has very limited profits from the sale of oil, and will contribute less to the fiscal revenues of the
state as aconsequence. The national state-owned oil-gas company, SOCAR, temporarily cancelled its plans
for anew oil-gas refining and petrochemical complex because of the rapid fall in crude oil prices. However,
at the same time, the new low oil price environment also offers an opportunity to boost anew wave of fiscal and public administration reforms in Azerbaijan.
The drop in oil prices and resultant waves of devaluation hit Azerbaijans economy and fiscal balance especially hard by diminishing oil revenue inflows to the
fiscal system and decreasing budget incomes. Oil, gas
and mineral revenues accounted for more than 77% of
Azerbaijani budget revenue in 2014,1 and low oil prices
affected almost every aspect of the countrys fiscal policy. Fiscal policy adjustments made in response to the
1 Azerbaijan EITI Report for 2014, <https://eiti.org/files/azerbi
ajian_eiti_report_2014.pdf>
new reality include changes in governmental budget revenues; changes in the structure of governmental budget
spending, including cuts to capital and recurrent expenditures; new sources of financingfor thebudget deficit;
changes in the State Oil Funds (SOFAZ) assets; and
changes in the State Oil Companys (SOCAR) operations. Both revenue and spending aspects of fiscal policy have encountered severe constraints due to low oil
prices, namely the shortfall in budget revenues and cuts
in government spending. Current fiscal balances have
deteriorated amid plunging oil prices.
Decreased crude oil and natural gas production coupled with lower crude oil prices led to acontraction of
500
0
12
Low oil prices in international markets had an immediate adverse impact on national budget implementation: in
2015 budget revenues fell by 12% and state expenditures
dropped by 16% compared to figures approved in the previous years state budget. These figures indicate that actual
total budget revenue figures are falling behind initial forecasts. First, SOFAZ was the primary source of budget revenues, contributing 48% to total revenues. These transfers
were 21.7% lower than the original approved forecasts.
Second, taxes and other mandatory payments collected
and transferred to the Ministry of Taxes accounted for
42% of state budget revenues. Income from the non-oil
sector constitutes 71% of that amount, which is 17%
more than in 2014. Third, the State Customs Committee generated 9% of total revenues, which was 5% more
than the previous year in absolute terms.
Finally, Figure 2 demonstrates that three institutions (SOFAZ, the Ministry of Taxes and the State Customs Committee) carved out the vast majority of fiscal revenues (98.2%), but the dominance of SOFAZ as
acommodity-based extra-budgetary saving and stabilization fund jeopardizes fiscal sustainability in the long
Figure 2: Main Sources of State Budget Revenues in 2015
-500
State Oil
Fund
(SOFAZ)
47.4%
-1,000
Others
1.8%
-1,500
-2,000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
11.1%
Budget revenues
Budget spending
Ministry of
Taxes
41.5%
Sources: Authors calculations based on data from the Azerbaijan Republic Ministry of Finance, <http://www.maliyye.gov.
az> and Budget.az, <http://www.budget.az>.
State
Customs
Committee
9.3%
10,669.0
10,000
8,181.4
8,000
6,711.5
6,000
4,578.5
4,000
2,000
0
SOFAZ
initial
budget
revenues
SOFAZ
revised
budget
revenues
SOFAZ SOFAZ
initial
revised
budget budget
expenses expenses
Expenditures of the state budget in 2015 were implemented at the level of 17 billion manats instead of the
forecasted 21 billion manats, representing adecrease of
16%. Current expenditures (58% of total expenses) were
more than capital expenditures (38%) in 2015. Four percent of all expenditures were allocated to finance related
costs for the maintenance of state debts and other commitments during 2015. The public investment program
accounted for 28.1% of the expenditures of the state
budget (33% in 2014). The state budget of Azerbaijan
is socially oriented, and therefore, one-third of its total
expenses were allocated to financing social expenses.
13
After the rapid decline of crude oil prices and after experiencing arelatively high budget deficit, the Ministry of
Finance decided to hold regular auctions of state bonds
by registered emission prospectus for an amount totaling US$ 500 million until the end of 2016.5 For the year
2015, government indebtedness stands at just over 12%
of GDP. During that period, the country accumulated
substantial foreign currency reserves of approximately
US$ 39 billion (73% of GDP, although these reserves
then decreased to US$ 33.5 billion), which provided
asufficient guarantee against any possible adverse external and internal shocks. However, the situation deteriorated in 2016.
Public debt will increase in 2016, reaching 50.5% of
budget revenues and 46% of budget expenditures. Furthermore, Azerbaijans tax debt is estimated at AZN
2.4 billion. The budget burden for the payment of the
national debt increased considerably in 2015 and 2016.
Ricardian equivalence theory assumes that when the
government attempts to stimulate demand by increasing debt-financed government spending, demand can
remain unchanged; this is because the public will retain
its savings to pay for possible future tax increases that
will be applied to paying off the debt burden.6 This has
5 The Ministry of Finance successfully issues state bonds, February 8, 2016, <http://www.maliyye.gov.az/en/node/1885>
6 Robert J. Barro, The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3: 2 (1989): 3754, <http://fac
ulty.georgetown.edu/mh5/class/econ102/readings/budget_def
icits.pdf>
two implications: (a) debt burden increases make citizens more cautious about consumption; (b) public debt
will be replaced by atax burden on the population in
the long run.
State-owned oil companies such as SOCAR find themselves with fewer financial resources to spend on costly
upstream or downstream projects. SOCAR is the key
player in Azerbaijans energy sector, but it does not transfer its total oil revenues to the state budget. In 2015,
SOCAR paid 1.48 billion manats to the state budget,
which was 20% less than the previous year (SOCARs
total revenue figures for 2015 are not available to compare budget transfers with revenues). Moreover, the company directly finances some energy-related (and in some
cases, even non-energy related) projects. Due to low oil
prices, SOCAR decreased crude oil and natural gas production in 2015 and suspended some new projects. It
announced the termination of its project to build anew
oil-gas refining and petrochemical complex. National
or state-owned oil-gas companies such as SOCAR seem
insufficiently prepared to lower oil price conditions considering the importance of cost effectiveness, efficiency
maximization, and their fiscal roles as taxpayers. As in
the case of SOFAZ, there are no rules to regulate the portion of revenue that must be transferred or invested by
SOCAR. After lower crude oil prices, SOCAR did not
cancel any planned major projects including the modernization of an existing main refinery in Baku. However, the company had borrowed 1.86 billion manat
from International Bank of Azerbaijan with astate guarantee provided by the ministry of finance.7
As part of aseries of institutional changes, the Azerbaijani President established anew position and appointed
the former deputy tax minister as the Presidents economic reforms assistant. Azerbaijan began to introduce
aBOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) model for construction
and infrastructure projects to attract alternative financing sources. The government also exempted investors
(investment certificate holders) from some taxes and customs duties (by up to 50% for 7 years) and prepared
anti-dumping duties to prevent import growth. Due
to latest changes in the Tax Code, owners of retail service and catering service entities with annual turnover
7 SOCAR 2016
200 [In 2016, SOCAR will attract 200 million AZN more from IBA], Caspian Barrel, April 6, 2016, <http://
caspianbarrel.org/?p=41181>
14
Conclusion
15
16
Fiscal revenues from SOFAZ The share of SOFAZs budget The share of SOFAZs budget
(transfers)
transfers in total budget
transfers in GDP, %
revenues, %
2003
100
8.2
1.3
2004
130
8.8
1.5
2005
150
7.2
1.2
2006
585
15.1
3.2
2007
585
9.7
2.1
2008
3,800
35.3
9.5
2009
4,915
47.6
14.2
2010
5,915
51.9
14.2
2011
9,000
57.3
18.0
2012
9,905
57.3
18.3
2013
11,350
58.2
19.7
2014
9,337
50.7
15.8
2015
8,130
47.6
14.2
2016 (projected)
7,615
45.3
12.6
Abstract
This article looks at the impact of low oil prices and the resulting shortfall in oil rents on the Azerbaijani governments social-assistance policies and related expenditures and discusses its implications for social cohesion in the long run. It argues that the deployment of strategic fiscal reserves and citizens continuing reliance on informal safety nets have cushioned the negative social impacts of the oil plunge. However, there
is arisk that the deepening of an economic crisis exacerbated by weak private sector development and missing major reforms in education and social sectors across the board might undermine the social contract. To
mitigate the adverse social impacts of the ongoing crisis, the government must conduct amore comprehensive and wide-ranging reform of the labor market, of the access to and quality of education and of the private business sector to stimulate formal job creation, especially among youth and rural populations as well
as in health care to provide quality and affordable health care, in education to improve human capacity
and domestic labor skills, and in social policies to ensure inclusive and sustainable social welfare provision.
Introduction
The oil price slide that began in June 2014 and continues
to this day ended adecade-long oil boom in Azerbaijan.
Boom turned to bust. The words crisis (iqtisadi bhran)
and post-oil era (post-neft dvr) entered the vocabulary of policy makers, shaping anew public discourse
around Azerbaijans petroleum wealth and apocalyptic
predictions about afuture without oil. Everyone, from
the average person on the street to high-ranking officials, seemed worried about the troubling times ahead.
Rising food prices without an equivalent rise in wages
worsened peoples living standards. During the booming times, many citizens borrowed loans from banks to
pay for mortgage (ipoteka krediti) or to purchase acar.
However, as some loans were issued in foreign currency,
the depreciation of the Manat relative to the U.S. dollar made it hard to pay back bank loans. A loss of faith
in the Manat forced many borrowers to convert savings
into U.S. dollars. Annual inflation in Azerbaijan is fast
accelerating and will reach 12% this year, up from 4%
in 2015. Fitch predicts arise in inflation upwards of 14%
by year end. All these developments fueled the sense of
economic insecurity for many Azerbaijanis. More people today than in the oil-boom decade are questioning government effectiveness in managing the countrys oil revenues and the quality of public spending in
general. As everyone now realizes, times will never be
the same again.
One area that has arguably been particularly vulnerable to the shortfall in resource revenues is the social
sphere: (un)employment, poverty, and social welfare.
While the oil price fall will have an incremental impact
on the governments social assistance policy, there are
some early warning signs that the problems of social
welfare, unemployment (especially youth unemployment) and quality of education are becoming critical
in atime of crisis.
1
2
17
Social Expenditures
fact that state revenues are heavily dependent on oil revenues and transfers from the state oil fund (SOFAZ) make
up 43% of the overall budget revenues for 2016. In fact,
in late February the parliament adopted revisions to the
2016 state budget based on an average oil price of $25
per barrel. In the revised budget, the share of socially
oriented expenditures was increased by 1.7 % (i.e. an
additional 1.29 billion AZN) and is now forecasted at
38% of total budget expenses.6 Amendments were also
made to the budget of the State Social Protection Fund
(SSPF) with a projected 7% increase in expenditures
totaling 3.3 billion AZN (US$ 2.12 billion).
However, in across-national comparison, Azerbaijans welfare spending as apercentage of GDP is modest, social sectors are underfinanced, and human capital development is weak compared to other countries
with similar economic growth levels or natural resource
endowments.7 Azerbaijan spends 5% of its GDP on
healthcare and only approximately 2.5 % of GDP on
education. According to World Bank estimates, Azerbaijans public expenditure on education was less than 3% of
its GDP on average between 2007 and 2011. This is less
than that in comparable countries such as Malaysia and
Poland, where education spending is 5% of GDP. The
quality of education in Azerbaijan is also substandard.
Azeri students show poor results on international education tests. Azerbaijan ranked 74 out of 75 countries on
the 2009 PISA international education assessment survey
(OECD, <https://www.oecd.org/pisa/46643496.pdf>).
Labor market specialists believe that Azerbaijans
unreformed education system as well as the outdated
system of vocational training fail to provide job seekers
with the necessary skills for the job market. For example, there were fewer than 500 graduates to match the
specialty requirements for almost 15,000 jobs created
in agriculture in the 20072011 period. Poor education
quality and lack of skilled workers hurt the employment
opportunities and life satisfaction for the current generation (and possibly their offspring). The lack of prospects
drives many talented people to seek jobs (and better life
chances) abroad, which impedes productivity and innovation in the private sector domestically. The economic
crisis will likely reinforce this tendency for outmigration.
Over the past years, the governments social assistance projectsthrough the state budget and SSPF
6
18
Social Tensions
19
cutting bread prices and increasing the salaries of public sector employees by 10%.
Outlook
With alack of state funds and due to apoor diversification record, there will be more pressure on the government to deliver social benefits in the future while
government resources will be further strained by dwindling fiscal revenues from the export of oil. Two aspects
of government control will largely determine the outcome: 1) relinquishing control over independent business and 2) enforcing the rule of law over the grabbing
hands of rent-seeking officials at all levels and over the
informal reign of ahandful of state-linked monopolies
that dominate all sectors of the economy.
Open protest in the tightly controlled political space
of Azerbaijan is an act of desperation. Protesters in Azerbaijan face three main challenges: the repressive state
apparatus, the shortage of resources, and the difficulty of
oppositional coordination. The outburst of social discontent in January was aseries of typical pocketbook protests sprang from uncoordinated efforts by residents of
some of the poorest rayons and towns beset by extreme
levels of unemployment and income decline, and hit
hard by the drop in remittances from Russia. (The total
volume of remittances fell from US$ 1.7 billion in 2014
to US$ 1.18 billion in 2015, according to Central Bank
data).14 As one of the protesters in Quba noted, Our
protest was not organized We did not have aleader,
but about 5,000 people came and protested, because we
could not tolerate it any more.15
Less oil revenues will significantly diminish extensive patronage opportunities in the hands of the incumbent elite and will widen the social gap. This, however,
will not necessarily make the regime more vulnerable
(relative to the existing political opposition forces) as
the elite still enjoys access to oil wealth. True, cheap oil
means less revenue, but there are other sources of rent
(not just oil) that elites can tap into. While economic
crises sometime create acritical juncture for aprofound
political change, much depends on whether societal
actors will have the capacity and ingenuity to make use
of this opportunity. Azerbaijani opposition groups, both
old and new, are simply too feeble to threaten the status
quo. This makes the prospects of political change even
more dangerous as unmediated social discontent may
result in social turmoil and permanent economic crisis.
See overleaf for information about the author.
<http://www.tol.org/client/article/24753-azerbaijan-the-pipedream-of-economic-diversification.html>
14 CBA Monetary Policy Review, December 2015, <http://en.cbar.
az/assets/4059/MPR_-_2015_-_eng.pdf>
15 Reuters, January 18, 2016, <http://reut.rs/1PlJosR>
20
21
Table 1: Azerbaijan: Budget Expenses on Education, Health and Social Assistance, 20112016
(mln. AZN)
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016 (proj.)
Education
1,399.8
1,575.9
1,530.4
1,653.4
1,711.2
1,713.5
Healthcare
563.2
662.7
669.3
725.6
777.7
744.9
1,611.8
1,781.6
1,813.6
2,072.2
2,040.5
1,896.6
Source: Azerbaijan Ministry of Finance, Draft Budget Presentations, various years, <http://www.maliyye.gov.az/node/1128>
Sector activities
Pasha
Synergy
Ata
Gilan
Azersun
CRA
Garant
AF
Silkway
Source: Doing Business and Investing in Azerbaijan, PWC, 2015 edition, p. 8. <http://www.pwc.com/az/en/publications/assets/
dbg-2015.pdf>
22
STATISTICS
50.419
50
45.625
44.527
43.389
43.484
42.022
41.689
2012
2013
2014
2015
40
30
20
10
0
2008
2009
2010
2011
Source: Caspian Barrel and NRGI, 2016, <http://psaagreement.org/>. Reproduced with permission.
Figure 2: Assets of the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ, end of year, in billion USD)
$120
40
35
$100
30
$80
25
20
$60
15
$40
10
$20
$0
5
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
$99.3
$62.7
$81.1
$113.7
$112.4
$113.2
$100.9
$53.6
11.2
14.9
22.7
29.8
34.1
35.8
37.1
34.7
Source: Caspian Barrel and NRGI, 2016, <http://psaagreement.org/>. Reproduced with permission.
23
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
3,800
4,915
5,915
9,000
9,905
11,350
9,337
8,130
493
379
471
606
668
952
780
1,426
Source: Caspian Barrel and NRGI, 2016, <http://psaagreement.org/>. Reproduced with permission.
Figure 4: State Revenues from Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and Transfers to the
State Budget (in billion AZN)
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
11.56
7.60
12.61
15.25
13.10
13.09
12.31
9.70
3.80
4.92
5.92
9.00
9.91
11.35
9.34
8.13
Source: Caspian Barrel and NRGI, 2016, <http://psaagreement.org/>. Reproduced with permission.
*Note: The PSA Agreement (Production Sharing Agreement) is aspecial form of agreement on the establishment of an enterprise to carry out joint activities. Usually PSAs are signed between aforeign company(ies) (contractor) and the state or the company representing
the state (customer) for the extraction of oil, gas and mineral resources. In the period 19912015, Azerbaijan signed more than 30 PSAs
with foreign oil companies, attracting more than $55 billion in foreign direct investments. List of on-shore and off-shore PSAs is available here: <http://psaagreement.org/psa-list/>. For more on PSAs in Azerbaijans energy sector, see: Nurlan Mustafayev, Productionsharing agreements in the petroleum industry of Azerbaijan, Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 8:4 (2015): 362384, <http://
jwelb.oxfordjournals.org/content/8/4/362>
Figure 5: Total Government Revenues from PSA Agreements: Savings vs. Spending, 20082015
(in million AZN)
Total saved
27,093
28%
Total spent
68,127
72%
Source: Caspian Barrel and NRGI, 2016, <http://psaagreement.org/>. Reproduced with permission.
24
CHRONICLE
The Speaker of the Georgian Parliament Davit Usupashvili meets King Salman of Saudi Arabia in Riyadh,
stating that it is important that an influential country like Saudi Arabia is interested in close ties with Georgia
22 March 2016
The Georgian authorities announce that security measures have been reinforced at airports in Georgia in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Brussels
25 March 2016
Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian states after ameeting with his Georgian counterpart Mikheil
Janelidze in Yerevan that there are no problems in the relationship between the two Caucasus countries
29 March 2016
The Deputy Head of the Georgian State Security Service, Levan Izoria, says that the outflow of Georgian citizens heading to join the Islamic State in Syria has sharply declined
31 March 2016
US Secretary of State John Kerry calls for an ultimate resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during
talks with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Washington
31 March 2016
Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili announces that member parties of the Georgian Dream ruling coalition will participate separately in the upcoming parliamentary elections
2 April 2016
The EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship, Dimitris Avramopoulos, visits Tbilisi
and expresses hopes that aproposal on visa liberalization with Georgia will be adopted very soon
3 April 2016
Heavy fighting in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh is reported with Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian saying that 18 ethnic Armenian soldiers were killed and 35 others wounded and the Azerbaijani Defense
Ministry reporting the death of 12 Azerbaijani soldiers
3 April 2016
Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili expresses concern over heavy fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh
region and convenes ameeting of security, senior government and parliamentary officials to discuss the situation
4 April 2016
Georgian Defense Minister Tina Khidasheli has atelephone conversation with her Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts to discuss heavy fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. She expresses hopes that aceasefire will be achieved
5 April 2016
A ceasefire is announced in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh following heavy fighting and amid
international calls for restraint
5 April 2016
Georgian President Giorgi Margvelashvili announces 8 October 2016 as the date for the next parliamentary
elections in Georgia
6 April 2016
Irans President Hassan Rohani offers to mediate between Azerbaijan and Armenia to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He has telephone conversations with his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts,
Serzh Sarkisian and Ilham Aliyev
6 April 2016
Kazakhstans Prime Minister Karim Masimov proposes Moscow as an alternative venue for the summit of the
Eurasian Economic Union (EES) scheduled to take place in Armenias capital Yerevan on 8 April
7 April 2016
Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev says his country is ready to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. He expresses hopes that the ceasefire agreement will hold during
his visit to Armenia
7 April 2016
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov praises the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh region amid claims of
breaches by Armenian-backed and Azerbaijani-backed forces
7 April 2016
The Georgian Energy Ministry announces that Georgia and the Russian gas company Gazprom have signed
adeal to extend an agreement on the transit of gas from Russia to Armenia via Georgia
8 April 2016
The former deputy head of the Constitutional Security Department (CSD) under the Interior Ministry and
four other former security officers are arrested in Georgia on charges of recording sex videos of politicians in
2012 which were posted on YouTube in March 2016
9 April 2016
The Vatican press office says that Pope Francis will visit Armenia in June 2016 and Georgia and Azerbaijan
in September and October 2016
11 April 2016
Thousands of people march in Yerevan in commemoration of the deaths of ethnic Armenians as aresult of
fighting in the Nagorno-Karabakh region
25
Editors
Tamara Brunner, Lili Di Puppo, Iris Kempe, Natia Mestvirishvili, Matthias Neumann, Jeronim Perovi,
Heiko Pleines
About the Caucasus Analytical Digest
The Caucasus Analytical Digest (CAD) is amonthly internet publication jointly produced by the Caucasus
Research Resource Centers (<http://www.crrccenters.org/>), the Research Centre for East European Studies at
the University of Bremen (<www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de>), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH
Zurich (<www.css.ethz.ch>), and the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Caucasus Analytical Digest analyzes the political, economic, and social situation in the three South Caucasus states of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia within the context of international and security dimensions of this regions development.
To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Caucasus Analytical Digest, please visit our web page at
<http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/cad.html>
An online archive with indices (topics, countries, authors) is available at <www.laender-analysen.de/cad>
Participating Institutions
Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich
The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich) is aSwiss
academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and information services in the fields
of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as aconsultant to various political bodies and
the general public.
Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen
Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to the interdisciplinary analysis of socialist and post-socialist developments
in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Caucasus Research Resource Centers
The Caucasus Research Resource Centers program (CRRC) is anetwork of research centers in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. We strengthen social science research and public policy analysis in the South Caucasus.
A partnership between the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation, and
local universities, the CRRC network integrates research, training and scholarly collaboration in the region.
Any opinions expressed in the Caucasus Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors.
Reprint possible with permission by the editors.
Editors: Tamara Brunner, Lili Di Puppo, Iris Kempe, Natia Mestvirishvili, Matthias Neumann, Jeronim Perovi, Heiko Pleines
Layout: Cengiz Kibaroglu, Matthias Neumann, and Michael Clemens
ISSN 1867 9323 2016 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zrich
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Phone: +49 421-218-69600 Telefax: +49 421-218-69607 e-mail: fsopr@uni-bremen.de Internet: www.laender-analysen.de/cad/
26