os a a J =r 4 ti a) s5 S PATH Renewed Filipino attention to the territorial and ‘artim disputes inthe South China Sea has brought wit new questions over the ability ofthe Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to ull its mandate to protect Philippine terior integrity and sovereignty Inthe advent of fresh tensions over the disputes inthe West Philippine and South China Seas, the success of the Modernization Program has become a mater of publi Interest in adaltion to being a national interest. Despite this, the Modemization Program's, 2° foals and processes are not easily communicated, and thus easly misunderstood CMU e rn Us Giisai tTWhen there is a gap between the people's interest in military affairs and their understanding of how these affairs proceed, there is a greater risk that the Department of National Defense (DND) land the AFP will mismanage the public's expectations for the AFP's ability to de- liver in a near-term crisis. When high ex pectations combine with a dynamic threat environment, the domestic politcal ct mate could turn—whether from apprecia- tion to ambivalence, or from ambivalence to discontent. This should be a concern for the Philippine defense establishment, whose own history demonstrates the way that shifting political winds affect its development, In advancing this argument, this paper aims to situate the current AFP Modernization Program within key themes from historical, technical, and Journalistic research on the development. Of the Philippine military and perceived changes in the country's threat enwiron- ment. In addition to previous scholarship, itdraws on open-access military reportage, OND policy documents, and political statements to piece together ‘@ multi-sided picture of the Moderniza- ton Program in its original and revised forms. Many features of the program are, by necessity, confidential; yet, in some instances, it has been possible to enter some level of detail The story of the AFP's Modernization Program begins with the Philippine military's institutional identity. The AFP's history as an army-centtic institution without a history of threats from foreign states, combined with the Philippines- United States security alliance, helps to ‘account for the AFP’s primarily internal focus up to 1994. In that year, the ‘ST QUARTER 2016 SPARK 03ON THE COVER le ganda at Can Aguile ‘ABOUT THE AUTHOR Ageia Manges golca Mangahas is Deputy Exoutve Dro of ADR and alec wih te Ieabonal Sues He curent Pipgine and 04 SPARK ‘ST QUARTER 2016 FEATURES 06 PHILIPPINE DEFENSE Ferman in te Pipes sna 07 SOUTHEAST ASIA’S EXPERIENCE perdi ti acum rir 09 THE 1995 MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ‘Marthe i THE REVISED MODERNIZATION PROGRAM O * IneAFP inno worse poston bt wiht the mandate o purse modenzaon, PUBLIC TRUST FOR ABETTER PEACE etn, the motaizatin program and defense parsing recess in genera ‘esi beady nor wal understo ¢ af CONTENTSmilita funding Philippine Senate rejected a proposed treaty with the United States (US) that would have extended the land lease for the American bases by another ten years. The departure of the United States from its bases did not end the alliance nor result in (as some projected at the time) tremendous, economic losses to the Philippines overall. Their departure did, however, have a strong impact on the AFP, which then had to contend with both external and internal threats while foreign military assistance simultaneously dwindled. When Congress first passed the AFP Modernization Act of 1995, the law sought to bridge the newly widened gap between the military's mandate and its funding, In the twenty five years since 1991, the AFP has struggled at different stages to obtain political support and a mandate to modernize, to generate predictable sources of funding, and to follow through on its plans. The military has run up against the limits ofits own organization's professional and technical capac ties; highly publicized corruption scandals; shifting executive and legislative priorities; and, for much of that time, the country’s Weak economic standing. At present, only some of these challenges have been successfully overcome, Since the passage of the 2012 “Revised Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Act” (RA 10349), the AFP may be in its first ‘Goldilocks moment’ since the end of the Cold Wer. The pressing external threat environment in the South China Sea and (at least temporarily) a quieter domestic front have combined With fresh promises from Congress for fifteen years of funds. In 2016, the military will receive the third-highest share of funds from the General Appropriations Act. This figure does not yet, consider other sources of material support, such as rent from land holdings and materia from foreign partners. The relatively permissive economic environment of the last several years has allowed the DND to obtain new hardware for the Philippine Army, Navy, and Air Force. Some planned projects have nevertheless been beset with delays or have been post- pponed. Among them are new frigates for the Navy, close air sup- port aircraft and long-range patrol aircraft for the Al Force, and a shore-based missile system for the Army, all of which would introduce ‘or enhance key capabilities for their respective services. Even at its fastest, however, procure- ‘ment happens over the span of years ‘and, importantly, over the span of successive elected administrations. ‘The first of the program’s three five- year phases (called ‘horizons') ends in 2017; for ths first horizon, acquisitions have been primarily directed toward Improving the military's ability to moni- tor Philippine territory, as opposed to ‘engaging in combat. The latter, and only on a limited basis, is a project for the final ten years of the program, which runs through to 2028 and with deliveries until afterward, Garnering Philippine public and political support has been necessary for the DND and AFP to secure continued funding, pursue modernization, and work toward achieving a selfeliant force. The challenge for the DND and AFP will be twofold: first, to take advan- tage of the current window of support by ‘moving quickly on the planned projects ‘and, second, to extend the window of ‘opportunity for as long as possible. The latter should occur even in the absence of troubling external events, which are unpredictable. Instead, the DND and AFP should work past their difficulties, and project themselves as institutions that the public at large can trust. By improving the clarity and depth of its relationship with the publi, the AFP can take strong steps in that direction. STQUARTER2016 SPARK 05Philippine Defense and the “Inescapable Overlay of History" For many in the Philippines and elsewhere, the importance of having a credible and capable armed forces, by any definition, is not automatically appreciated, let alone deeply so. The very term ‘national defense’ presumes an ‘offense’ or threat from which 1@ Eovernment is bound to protect you. After prolonged periods without an external threat, likelihood and severity of future threats, Thus, outside the defense establishment, ‘national security is not always @ national priority Depending on the location, questions over the role and importance of the Armed Forces are especially heightened because of mil tarism’s historical role in or against a given society. A state’ armed fore history with its and others’ pre. ce in general as well s influences its society's z ciation for the role of fo as for the country’s military in particular. History, both positive and negativ the d Improvernent of capabilities.* Public discussion over these histories, especially if controversial, will tend to be revisited at any time new investment or change of dir in Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan, Marwah and Pollack writ, for instance, that “any arguments seeking to deny the validity of acquiring [military] power must override an incon- trovertible fact-an acute remembrance within these societies of their abilities when superior force was employed against them, will affe sion to invest or not in the military's ‘modernization’ ot ion is proposed. vul For some societies, the use of military fo home has receded from living memory; for many in Asia, the post World periods have not engendered the same quietude. Accepting that the otect citizens ces against individuals or groups at military is an instrument of force whose formal mandate is to from armed threats both internal and external, a citizen may nevertheless believe that in his society the milta personal or political purposes. Marwah and Pollack continue: whatever policies now exist or are likely to emerge must be seen in terms of the inescapable overlay of the past."* more likely to be used for harmful ‘thus, Even when societies have developed a benign view of the possibilities, use of their armed forces, there is a secondary belief that it may be irresponsible for developing states with other pressing concerns (e.g. OUTSIDE THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT. "NATIONAL SECURITY’ IS NOT ALWAYS A NATIONAL PRIORITYwidespread poverty) to prioritize military ‘spending. In its most extreme form, the im age of a militaristic government in a develop- ing country evokes comparisons with states like the Democratic People’s Republic of Ko- rea, which are mote frequently derided than ‘admired. In summary, there are two principal reasons that have underwritten objections toward increased military expenditure: 4. The fear that coercive power is more likely to be used domestically than in maintaining territorial integrity and. national sovereignty against external ‘threats, and 2. The assumption that attention to the military can only be to the detriment of extremely pressing social, economic, ‘and educational inequalities. Before and After Martial Law In the Philippine setting, the ‘inescapable ‘overiay of the past’ and the first reason (above) is most easily represented by the 1972-1981 Martial Law period and the ‘succeeding years up to the 1986 People Power Revolution. Justified by the alleged looming threat of communist rebels and Moro insurgents, the Martial Law period saw increases in the AFP’s budget and manpower allocations and, with the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, a freer rein to act do: ‘mestically. Soon after declaring martial law, President Ferdinand Marcos increased the pay of all commissioned officers by 150% in a bid to guarantee their loyalty tothe regime Malacafiang's support for the military was Not directed toward strengthening or ‘modernizing the institution out of principle. Despite the salary increases, overall Philippine defense spending did not keep pace with the rest of Southeast Asia from 1972-1980. By 1980, for example, despite being of similar size to the Philippines, both Malaysia and Thailand spent grea- ter percentages of their national budgets for defense than did Manila. Earlier studies show that the Philippine trend had been to reduce military expenditure 2s a percentage of the government budget and of the Gross National Product When President Corazon Aquino took office in 1986, she was less inclined to entangle herself with the military establishment. Notwithstanding the role of military mutiny in her ascent to office, she herself fended off six coup d'état attempts by military rebels. If she had entered office uncertain whether her ‘armed forces might use their weapons against the civilian government, the successive attempts would have done litle to change her mind. Instead, Aquino took other measures: for example, having identified association with the First ‘Scout Ranger Regiment as common thread among coup leaders, she dismantled the regiment and redistributed its members across the Army's infantry. Elaborating further in his History of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Cesar Pobre posits that Aquino's distrust of her own military helped propel her to support exten-ding the soon-expiring lease ‘agreement for United States bases in the country.” The second reason, that military spending takes away from other important domestic priorities, is just as compelling. Successive Philippine presidencies worked to associate the AFP’s objectives with a larger project of economic development and national unification. By its own account, the AFP has “a long tradition of civic action programs", taking an early form in engineer battalions during the Ramon Magsaysay administration, these situate the military's role in Philippine society as secondary to and a contributing force in national development. Overall, defense strategy and doctrine “are the products of the political elites experience and learning [,]" Thus, Malacafiang’s relationship with the AFP is ‘as much of a variable in the military's development as the overall threat environment. De Castro writes: “if the elite believe that the international environment is benign, they might forgo arms buildup in favor of allocating scarce resources for economic de- velopment or for their narrow political interests. If they see that increasing the defense spending will threaten their interests and will be detrimental to the country’s long-term economic development, they might just rely on ‘a more powerful state and limit the country's defense budget. And if they perceive that the more immediate threat is the enemy within rather than the adversary from the outside, they will direct the national strategy and resources to internal security concerns.® Southeast Asia's Experience Where the Philippines had kept its defense spending at low levels, other countries in Southeast Asia used that period in time to expand and develop their own military forces. This occurred despite similar experiences in each of ‘STQUARTER2016 SPARK 07these countries with the use of military force against them and by their armed forces against domestic insurgent ‘groups. The latter, in particular, did not result in the same erosion of ‘support for the military to the extent seen in the Philippines. ‘further three reasons could explain why the relationship between the military and the remainder of society was better preserved in other contexts, First, the country's negative experi- ence of war was channeled against a concretely defined and present threat (le.a “never again” sentiment) or an overriding national interest. Second, the country’s experience with the use of force against domestic groups was wellcontained to a similarly well- defined internal threat and did not spill over significantly to the civilian population, especially to political oppo- nents of the ruling regime. Finally, the relative weakness of their international military alliances prevented them from developing dependence on outside actors for defense. In Thailand's case, around 200,000 Vietnamese troops inside neighboring Cambodia from 1978 presented the external threat. Thai and Vietnamese forces clashed on the Thai-Cambodian border on multiple occasions, making the external threat material to the territorial integrity of Thailand Second, Thailand had had a historically closer relationship with China rather than the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which reportedly had provided 5,000 to 6,000 ‘advisors’ in Vietnam. Thalland thus found itself both concerned by and involved in the ‘Sino-Soviet dispute and split through out the decade that followed.® ‘Malaysia called on both China and the USSR to keep out of Indochina and allow Southeast Asian regional differences to be solved only by the countries directly involved (a refrain often repeated today, albeit with a different cast of characters). Although to lesser extent than Thailand, Malay- sia also faced concerns with regional stability during the period. Kuala Lum- pur and Bangkok went so far as to co- operate on military operations against Hanoi-supported communist groups ac tive near their shared border. In a more enduring sense, however, Malaysia has traditionally valued the patrol and defense of the Strait of Malacca because of the stralt's importance to the country’s economy.? Into the 1980s, neither Thailand nor Malaysia kept extensive security relations with foreign countries. Malaysia had, intially, hosted British ‘and Australian forces. These were kept at low levels, however; by 1983, only one of the two Australian Air Force ‘squadrons remained in country, Having signed up to the Manila Pact creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Thailand became a United States ally, About 80% of all US Air Force air strikes over North Vietnam during the Vietnam War were flown from bases in Thailand. Yet, as the US never had a formal basing agreement with Thailand, it withdrew from the‘country and continental Southeast Asia once its missions had been ‘completed in Vietnam. In these cases, there were readily present fears in both countries over ‘external threats, justifying continued Increases in defense expenditures. The Philippine experience was markedly different: thanks to its archipelagic nature, the country was shielded from the rest of Southeast Asian upheaval; its military, empowered in the face of an allegedly looming communist threat, had also been used against the regime's political opponents and ‘everyday civilians; and the presence of United States bases added a layer of reliability to the US-Philippines security alliance. As a result, the Philippines did not participate in Southeast Asia’s arms buildup of the 1980s.* Starting from Scratch Following the end of Martial Law, Philippine and American government Negotiators began work on what would become the “RP-US Treaty of Friend: ship, Cooperation, and Security’, re rnewing the United States’ military bas- ing agreement in the Philippines, which ‘was set to expire in 1994. The Philip, pine government began a review of its relationship with the United States under the Mutual Defense Treaty; Con- gress would decide whether to extend the United States’ lease.** Under the agreement, the United States would be permitted to maintain its bases for a further 10 years in exchange for “modest compensation” and continued military assistance. President Aquino herself led @ march to the Philippine ‘Senate to appeal the body to pass the treaty. With a close 12-14 vote, the measure failed in 1991. Across the globe, and with some excep- tions, the end of the Cold War augured THE MAIN VEHICLE FOR MODERNIZATION IS REPUBLIC ACT 7898, KNOWN AS THE “AFP MODERNIZATION ACT." THE LAW'S PRIMARY THRUST WAS THE “DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-RELIANT AND CREDIBLE STRATEGIC ARMED FORCES," WHICH WOULD, GUIDE THE RESTRUCTURING PROCESS AND THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF ITS FORCES. ‘a new period of perceived peace ‘among countries; military responses to internal security threats would be cast {as “new” wars requiting new social science perspectives and new military doctrine. Against the trend, by the 1990s the Armed Forces of the Philip, pines had a long and rich history com- batting insurgent groups and often, ‘as with the Hukbalahap in the 1950- 60s, with success. Early into the Fidel Ramos administration, the protracted cconfiict between the Philippine govern- ment and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) promised to wind-down with the start of peace talks and, in 1996, the peace agreement. Instead, the Philippines appeared more vulnerable to external, rather than internal, threats, even if these threats had not yet been made ‘concrete to the general public. By the early 1990s, the AFP had already Identified the South China Sea 188 2 pressing security threat. The 1995 Modernization Program After the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed Philippines-United States treaty in 1994, the AFP adapted to take on external defense, Necessary 1s it was, adjustment was dificult: the prolonged presence of the United States in the country had resulted in the military's dependency and inexperience in handling the chal- lenges of modernization. Beyond the ‘supposed deterrent effect of the US presence for Philippine security, the AFP itself had also benefited from US. military assistance in terms of arms ‘and equipment grants; 80% of Philip: pine money put into the AFP prior to 1992, for example, had simply covered manpower costs, with litleto-no funds, allocated for capital outlays or main tenance of existing capabilities. When AFP Chief of Staff General Renato De Villa, announced to the public in June 1990, the AFP’s intention to begin a modernization program, he provided three reasons. Chief amnong them was. the expected cut in grants from the United States via the Foreign Military Sales program “by as much as $100 million a year” (around $164 million or P75 billion adjusted for inflation). In launching its Modernization Pro gram, the AFP intended to shift its defense priorities from internal to external defense, which included the restructuring of the Armed Forces to elevate the role of the Philippine Air Force and Navy. Four Senators intro. duced a bill to Congress in 1992, soon after the United States withdrew from its bases in Subic and Clark. The bill turned into law only three years later in February 1995. In January of that year, China had bested the Philippines and taken control of Mischief Reef, which the Philippines had been occupying and continues to claim. Galvanized by Mischief Reef, Congress moved ‘Quickly to pass the law. ‘The main vehicle for modernization is Republic Act 7898, known as the "AFP Modernization Act." The law's primary thrust was the “development ofa self-reliant and credible strategic ‘armed forces,” which would guide the restructuring process and the profes: sionalization of its forces. As provided in the law, modernization would have ‘STQUARTER2016 SPARK 08five components: force restructuring toward a “compact, efficient, responsive ‘and modern” AFP; capability, materiel and technology development; bases/ ‘support system development; human resource development; and doctrine development. The law also required the AFP to submit to Congress its detailed arms modernization plan within 90 days, which would be adopted by Congress through a Joint Resolution. It took another year and four months before the detailed plan was submitted to Congress in June 1996 That plan “stipulated the size and shape of the AFP in terms of personnel, equipment, and facilities during the various phases of the program. It also contained the projects under it, including the major weapon and. non-weapon equipment and technology acquisitions being considered by the different major services.” Congress adopted the plan through Joint Resolution 28, which passed on December 19 nearly two years since Mischief Reef” ‘The law sends mixed messages over the purpose of AFP modernization. Although various passages refer to the importance of transforming the AFP into an externally oriented force, the laws’ expansive objectives include protecting the national patrimony, to include “living and nonliving marine, submarine, mineral, forest and other resources” and protecting Filipinos from the consequences of natural disasters (i. “typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions” and so on). ‘Altogether, the 1995 Modernization Act lists seven objectives, as seen below. Figure 1 The AFP’s formal responsibilities grew further in February 1998, with the passage of R. A. 8554, or the “Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998," The PNP reform law explicitly relieved the Department of the Interior and, Local Government of ‘primary responsibilty” for counterinsurgency (see Figure 2). ‘As a result, the detailed modernization plan adopted by Joint Resolution 28 adapted to focus on internal security operations and postpone projects for external defense.® This realignment of internal conflict coincided with the priorities of newly elected President Joseph Estrada, Who took office in 1998. New and expanded mandates aside, the Modernization Program suffered the most in receiving and making use of funding. The 1995 Act promised the AFP a sum of P50 billion for its first five years, with amounts AFP Modernization Act (Republic Act No. 7898), Sec. 3 CObjectves of the AFP modernization program. The AFP moderrizaion program shall be implemented in accordance with the folowing objectives: 2) To deveiop ts eapbity to upeld the sovereign and tector integry of he Repubic and te secure the national terion fem a forms of irvuion hd encroachment; 1) To evel its cpebity o asst chan agencies inthe preservation ofthe national pation including the county’ hing ond honing marine, submarina, mineral, forest end other natural respureelacted within i erty end is exclusive economia one ex; ©) To enhance ts copoly to fui ts mandate to prtee the Flpino people not an from armed threats but rom thei effects of We treating and destructive consequences of natural and marvmade dster and clams, including typhoons, eathguakes, velesric eruptions, major acidents in far fungo nacoessbie train oat sea ad rom al forme of ecological damage, 4) To improve ta capably to east cther agencies in the enforcement of demestc and foreign potas on wel as iterations covenants against poe, white slavery, mugging, drug aficing locking of aicraft and seacat and the anspor of tonic and ‘ter ecologealipnermfl substances taking pice in or trough Pnipine tern 1) Toenhanceitscapabity to assist the Phiipsine National Pole in aw enforcement and interne securty operations; 1) Toenhance its copay to fll the cunts international commitments: ond To develops capably o suppor raionl development. 40 SPARK ‘ST QUARTER 2016Figure 2 Philippine and Re (Republic Act No.8551), Sec. 3 ‘Se. 2 of Repub At No.5 Ise endo red flows: National Police Reform eorganization Act of 1998 "See. 12 Reletonship fhe Deparment wah the Deparment of National Defense. ~The Departmen of he torr an Lact Goverment ‘hal be reed of he prima responsibly on mater Iwai the supresin o insurgency ana cer svus Uveas to natal Securty. Tha Pipine Natonal Pose sha troup nfmstongaterrg and porermanca of i olny poles furore, spp ‘Armes Fores ofthe Pipines on ater ling supoesion of rsurasey, xcept n cases were the Preside shal aon the PNP tosuppot the AP mn combat operations. for the last ten years left in the air. None of the promised funding, however, ever, ‘materialized. in 1997, the Asian Financial Crisis had a severe impact on the health of ‘the Philippine national budget, as it did for the budgets of other countries in the region. The AFP Modernization Program would first receive funding only four years after the law's passage, in 2000, when the Bases Conver- sion and Development Authority (CDA) remitted to the AFP its share of the proceeds from the sale of land part of the former Fort Bonifacio. The amount from BCDA, P5.484 billion, represented only 10% of what \was promised to the AFP by Congress for the first tranche2* Just a a variety of reasons have been provided for the particular development path Of the Philippine military, so too have there been a variety suggested for the failure of the 1995-era Modernization Program to upgrade Philippine miltary capabilities. Among them, the “discrepancies with funding allotment; depreciation of the Philippines Peso; the political elites reluctance to increase the military budget; and the government's priority to improve the military's counter insurgency capabilities rather than that of external defense."** Further reasons have been provided, including that delays in the equipment acquisition process were due to “problems in terms of policy, procedure, and organization.” Policy problems in the past have included recommendations that the government “[identity] clear lines of authority, responsibilty and accountability."2? Program implementation, on the other hand, “is hampered by the tedious and cumbersome rules and regulations.“ For the fifteen years of the first program, its failure to proceed as planned can be directly linked to a shift in threat environment; a shift in the sitting admin- istration’s political priorities; and simple bureaucratic delays. Citing the AFP Modernization Program's Annual Accomplishment Reports from 2001 to 2006, ‘Thomas Sedano writes that internal deficiencies made it difficult for the DND to ‘work on program effectively, even when projects could receive funding: “{Failures could be explained by] a cumbersome procurement process and complex acquisition structure; the failure of the AFP to meet its target to ‘ign contracts and to obligate funds; inexperience in the conduct of large- scale biddings involving foreign proponents; changes in procurement laws; the uncertainty of funding, especially for projects with multi-year contracts; and changes in officers."* By 2007, “except for a few acquisitions to enhance the troop communication, force protection, and firepower, much of the envisioned capabilities, particularly for the air force and navy, hald] yet to be realized.”** Eleven years, into the program, the Philippine Congress allocation had not even reached 10% of the sub-program I requirements. The Revised Modernization Program Despite the effort placed into the 1995 Modernization Program, it ended without having much impact on the present-day effectiveness of the armed forces. By 2011, the law expired, leaving the AFP in no worse a position but without the mandate to pursue modernization. The lack of legal mandate, however, was @ minimal concer in the face of other problems in the program's ‘continuity: inconsistent political leadership and Congressional ‘support, and, most of all, an unreliable funding situation. The rebirth of the Modernization Program in 2012 mirrored the sequence of its predecessor in 1995. The “Revised AFP Modernization Act” passed in July 2012, mere weeks after the Philippines and China found themselves in the middle of another stand-off, this time at Scarborough Shoal. The three-month stand-off graced the front pages of Philippine newspapers for weeks, situating the story definitively in the public eye and galvanizing Filipino political interest in the South China Sea. ASTQUARTER 2016 SPARK 11Figure 3: Comparison of Promised Funding Under the 1995 and 2012 Modemization Programs 1995 AFP Modernization ‘2012 Revised AFP Program Modernization Program Fist years Php 50 bilion Php 75 billion: Full 15 years Php 331 billion Php 81 bilion (thus far, with 7) ‘Total Released Php 53 billion (in total) billion from GAA) The loss of Scarborough Shoal—much like the loss of Mischief Reef in January 1995—provided a lightning rod for public support for the AFP’s Modernization Program, ‘As with the 1995 program, the revised act provided fifteen years for modernization, divided into three five-year hori zons. As the first modernization program had not resulted in successful big-ticket acquisitions, the AFP’s revised wish list is expected to largely reflect the contours of the original plan as adopted in Joint Resolution 28 and as adapted following the PNP reform law. In keeping with the 1995 program, there are deficiencies in the 2012 Revised Act. Critiques of the 1995 program's, mixed message of objectives and priorities can be applied to the 2012 law, which kept the objectives of the original in tact. The expansiveness of the law’s objectives, as in 1995, provides a great deal of room for new political leadership 10 ‘realign’ the program with short-term security priorities (e.g. an expansion of the internal security component) in accordance with the sense of the times. The adaptive possibilities of the law could, however, undermine the purpose of envisioning a long-term structure and strength Figure 4: Comparison of Funding Sources under the 1995 and 2012 (Revised), [AFP Modernization Acts 7995 Program 2072 Program ‘General Appropriations, ‘General Appropriations: Proceeds from the sale/lease of Miltary Reservations not covered by the BCDA law ‘Proceeds from the sale/lease of Miltary Reservations not covered by the BCDA law Proceeds from the sale/lease of Miltary Reservations covered by the BCDA law ‘Proceeds from the sale/lease of Miltary Reservations covered by the BCDA law_ Proceeds from the sales of Government Arsenal Products Proceeds from the sale of miliary ‘camps and 50% of the net proceeds from the lease of joint venture ‘agreements of military camps. Proceeds from the sale Of 6058 oF ‘uneconomical assets ‘Proceeds from public-private partnerships Funds from budgetary surplus Proceeds from the sales of Government Arsenal products Taiereat income of the AFP Modernization’s Tse Fund: Funds from budgetary surplus ‘Donations coming from focal and foreign sources specifically earmarked forthe program Interest income ofthe AFP ‘Modemization’s Trust Fund 42 SPARK {ST QUARTER 2016 of the armed forces, which lies at the core of a strategic planning process. Other changes in the text are more clariicatory, perhaps to take into account the primary responsibility accorded to the AFP in the 1998 PNP reform law. For example, the Act no lon- ger directs the human resources com. ponent of modernization into develop- ing an externally oriented force, but instead into a *multi-mission oriented force capable of effectively addressing internal and external security threats.” Having been given 60 days in the law (as opposed to 90 in the 1995 law), the DND submitted its detailed program to the Department of Budget ‘and Management, and not yet, Congress, in February 2013, Further changes to the program include an expansion of the program’s funding sources. The original program provides for seven sources of fund ing. The revised program provides for eleven sources (see Figure 4). The ad. dition of new sources of funding on top of the yearly General Appropriations Act should, in principle, help shelter the AFP from the effects of political transitions and future shortfalls in the national budget. The extent to which the AFP has received funding outside of the General Appropriations Act is not clear, especially figures Pertaining to donations from local or foreign sources.Under the Revised Modernization Program, there are 20-25 known and openly discussed projects for all the services and for General Headquarters under the first horizon (see Figure 5). The majority of the projects are the latter stage of procurement, with many having already been awarded, delivered, or scheduled for delivery in upcoming years. There has been surprisingly litle press on a few key projects, especially considering their value to their respective services and the scale of outlay involved. These projects include the Navy's frigates and the Al Force’s close air support aircraft and long-range patrol aircraft. In addition to looking ahead to the second horizon's shopping lis, these projects will be especially interesting to monitor as the first horizon wraps up by the end of 2047. Figure 5 List and Status of Known “Big Ticket" Items (Non Exhaustive) Tem Service | Cost. ‘Status and Date T Medumiftairratt | AirForce | $113 Final delivery February 16, 206° for interisland million transport (3) 2. Lightift aircrafttor | AirForce | Php814 | Expected delivery 20167 inter-island transport million %, Bell4i2 combat __| ArForce | 4.Bbilion | Final delivery August 18, 2015° uility helicopters (8) “,_ AW109 Power Attack | Navy Three delivered commissioned August helicopters for COIN 10, 2015% ‘and HADR (8) 5, Close airsuppon | AirForce | 4.96bilion | Aquino announced he would award= alrcraft (6) G._FA5O Jets (12) ‘Airforce | 48.5 bilion_| Delvery begun in 2005 (2)= 7. Ammunition for FASO | AirForce | 106.138 | Bidding Open™ Jets million B._Flignt Simulator AirForce | 2464 ‘Awaiting notice of award milion ®, Shore Based Missile | Army Realigned to ‘second horizon’ System US sending High-Mobility Rocket Systems to Philippines 0. ArDefense Tir Force ‘Awaiting notice of award.=> Suneeiliance System Ti LongRange Patrol | Ar Force | 598bilion | In bidding process/procurement. No Aircraft (2) notice of award.%® T2.VHF Handheld Radio| Amy 430.8 ‘Awarded on February 2016.7 Communications million System TS_Night fighting System _[ Amy Ti bilion | Invitation to bid Decomber 5, 2015 14. 5OW AV Configuration | Army 144 million_| Delivery in 2015. 5. MPAC MIKI (fully | Navy 8B milion” | Awarded, uncertain delivery> mission capable) T6.Amphibious Assault | Navy 23bilion | Awaiting notice of award as of Vehicle (8) January 2016.4 Tr. Frigates (2) Navy iB pilion _ | Delayed. No update since 2014 TB Ant-submarine Navy 5405 ‘Awaiting notice of award helicopter (2) billion. 9, CAISTAR AP 7.496 ‘No update since 2012. billion 20. Engineering AFP 607 milion_| No update™ Equipment ZL Light Uuilty Vehicle AFPGHQ [133.4 No update=™ million 722, Marine Forces Naw 684 milion | Awaiting notice of award as of Jal Imagery and 201647 Targeting Support ‘System (drones) ‘ASTGUARTER 2016 SPARK 13While the projects continue to display some balance be- tween external and internal security operations, there is a clearer focus on externally oriented hardware for both the Navy and the Air Force. More important than the external orientation, however, is that many of these projects indicate a need to build on the country’s awareness of its maritime domain, whether through signal or geospatial information (eg. alr defense radar or imaging) or through enhanced patrols (e.g. frigates or long.range patrol aircraft). These are ‘supplemented by better command and control (CAISTAR or command, control, communications, computers, informa- tion, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance) which will coordinate and better promote joint operations between the services. These are necessary precursors to the future development of active defense and warfighting capabilities, which is expected to be the focus of the later stages of the program, Nevertheless, the first horizon will be useful in providing. sufficient information in aid of other tools of statecratt, Including diplomacy and crisis management. This assess- ‘ment is largely in line with an earlier statement from Fer- nando Manalo, Defense Undersecretary for Finance, Muni Figure 6: Other Kems Received by the AFP through Donation/Cooperation Item Service Status Source Landing Ship Heavy _| Nav Delivered ‘Australia ‘Coast Guard Cutters | Navy Delivered ust ‘Armored Personnel _| Army Delivered Us? Carriers ‘Chemical-Biological- [ Army Delivered uss Radiological-Nuclear Weapons Prevention | System C-130 Cargo planes | Air Force Delivery March: US: (2) 2016 and September 2016°2 Long-range ASW Air Force: Leased Japan (leased) as patrol aircraft alternative to Lockheed® Martin P30 14° SPARK ‘AST QUARTER 2016 tions, and Materiel. Manalo is quoted {as saying that the second horizon “will probably be heavy on HADR and the West Philippine Sea and not so much con the ISO [.|" Based on Manalo’s esti- mates, the second horizon will require ‘a budget far larger than the frst, and therefore will depend once more on the continuing interest of Congress after the election concludes in 2016. Of course, modernization is more than simple hardware acquisition. The four ‘other components of the Moderniza- tion Program, such as the profession- alization of the forces and doctrine development, will be instrumental in maximizing the effectiveness of newly ‘acquired platforms. These components (of modernization, however, may be least advertised of the AFP's modern- ization achievements and failures. This ‘software’ components of modernize. tion should not, by any means, be underestimated. The components will help to determine the capacity of the organization to absorb new hardware, maximize their potential, and ensure continuity of effort even in periods of ‘weaker political support. Ina final set of changes, the Revised Modernization Act includes, for the first time, a Congressional Oversight ‘Committee with members from the Senate and the House of Representa- tives alike. This Committee is tasked to conduct a ‘sunset’ review of the Modernization Program's implementa: tion before the end of the first horizon in 2047, The review could be the venue for Congress to assess the continued value and relevance of the revised program.Conclusion The modernization program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has been fol- lowed by significant public attention since its rebirth in 2012. The arrival of new hardware, like the lead-in fighter trainers (the FA-SOPH Fighting Eagles); the testing of new platforms, like the Indonesianmade strategic sealift vessels; and the bidding out of new systems, like the long-range patrol aircraft or the integrated coastal radars; tend to be met with ‘excitement among observers who have not ‘seen a similar concerted effort from the armed forces in the past. ‘The buzz around the modernization program ‘may be one sign of the public's aspirations for an underdog success story in the high- profile territorial disputes in the South China ‘Sea. In this regard, modernization activity has helped to signal the strength of both execu- tive and legistative support for Philippine soldiers and sailors operating in contested waters. Few things show a country’s resolve more effectively than a government putting its money where its mouth is. Public Trust for a Better Peace Despite its attention, the modernization program and the Philippine defense plan. ring process in general are neither broadly nor well understood. The primary objectives ‘of modernization, the intended and possible purposes of the different Philippine acquisi- tions, and other related topics are not always easily accessible to the interested public. It ‘can be intimidating to approach the ‘black hole’ of defense planning, which has a lan- ‘Buage, culture, and gatekeepers all its own, 4s a result, few outside of the defense agen cies have been able to identify and articulate their own aspirations and concems over the purpose and progress of the program. These difficulties are unfortunate, as ultimately the AFP's new or regained capabilities will be used in various scenarios to achieve ‘a better peace,’ which is at its heart a political objective. Some within the armed forces may view this effort to cast light on its activities askance. Any light that this paper may provide is only intended to promote a shared understanding of national inter- ests and promote deeper trust between the military and the people. Modernization is the project of a generation; and so building @ generation's worth of trust will be important. Understanding Modernization No story of military modernization is complete without a story of domestic constraint. The second attempt at modernization has taken place under what has been—for the momenta politically and financially permissive environment the likes of which have not been seen in Philippine politics in recent memory. Nevertheless, the threat of renewed constraints should be ‘a motivating force for the military, whose leadership must recall periods of more severe budgetary hardship. The next few months presents a period of uncertainty for the military. The reali- ties of political and financial cycles mean that the opportunity to jump ahead does not always come around. The challenge for the DND and AFP will be to take advantage of the current window support by, first, moving quickly Con the planned projects and, second, to extend the window of opportunity for as long as possible. In highlighting the Modernization Program as the investment of a generation, the DND and AFP will create its own opportunity for sustained and predictable ‘support, even if less ardent. The good fortune of well-timed external crises—as in Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal—has resulted in galvanized support in the past; yet, the volatile nature of such encounters and thelr propensity to occur ‘too late’ makes them an unreliable variable. The DND and AFP must continually manage the public's expectations, and communicate both to the political elite and to the people at large the importance of long-term strategic planning, ‘STQUARTER 2018 SPARK 15endnotes inthe Philippine case, modernization is lstingushed fom upgrading which i 10 enhance existing platforms (eg to install new radar in old lanes 2s oppose to new platform purchases Mod ferizaton however, implies mere tan mamterance ‘orpecemeal capital cul, but an overall smut Ingand restocking othe forces imvoved. » Foe a recent example, consider Japars protests in the summer of 2015 by pact taers ecking 19 prevent the tenterpretatior of ther con- tution to expand the definition of. deense: > OnkarMarwah and Jonathan Polack Asia and the Intemational Statege System” in Miltary Power and Policy in Asian States: Ching Ind, Japan «eds, Onkar Marwah and Jonathan Polack (Colorado: ‘Westview Press Colorado, 1980) 25. i 5 wlam € Ben, "The Changing ole of ‘the Philppine Miltary’ in The Aimed Faces in Cor- temporary Alan Societies Edvard A. Olen and Se- pen Jka J, 24 London: Westview Special Studies In itary Afi, 1986) 22 ta * Cosa Robe, The History ofthe Armed Forces ofthe Fiipina People (Quezon Ci: New Day. 2000) 632. + Renato Gre De Castro, "Congressional n= ‘erventon in Philopine post-Cold War defense poy, 1961-2003" Phippine Potial Science Journal 25 (2008,3081 »—wilam Bey, 226 Renato Cuz De Castro, ‘Adsting to the Post-US, Bases Er: The Orel ofthe Phillppine Mil- tary Modernization Program’ Armed Forces and So- ety (1999, 119, "© bhlipine Army Weapon Systems Hend= book (Washington imemationa) Business PUbICa- tions, 201). Case Poe, 632 i Renato Cuz De Castro, ‘Aajsting to the Post US, Bases Ea"119-120, Thomas Sedan, “An Assessment of the Armed Forces ofthe Philippines Modernization Fro- ‘ram (Masters Thesis US Army Command and Gen- eal StaffColege 13, Sedan, “Asessment of the AFP Modern veaon Progam 14 Philippine Senate Resolution No, 12 “Resolution Dieting the Commitee on National Defense and Secuty to Conduct an Inquty in Aid ‘of egiiton, into the Implementation of the med Forces of the Pilppines Modernization Progam, vith focus en its objectives, pratization in equ ‘ment acqustion and funding requirements and Sources in vlan tothe county’ present needs Deemer 2008, ® Francis Domingo The contents of secu ty asa guide lo defense panning inthe Pilppenes” Defense and Security Anas 31 (2015), 158, tps ‘4019/10 1080/14751758.2015.1069108, 2% Sedano, 17 ® UTC Reynaldo. Mutangpli strengthen ing the DND-AFP Acquiston System’ 2005, as cted in Sedan, 17, vdeo Basin Assessment ofthe im plementation ofthe AFP Mademizaon Programs Funding are Acquistion Process adits Implications for National Security 2003), 25 itedin Sedan, 18 % —Sedano, 17.20, = Sedano,64 2% __hilppines Received Tid and Fra i bus C295 anspor ira Defensor February 16,2016 avaiable at hepiwendefensencridnen” ‘news/15359/Philppines_Reccives_Third_And F ral Airous_C295_Transpor_ Aircraft WETE96HO Frances Mangosing “More ships planes, combat gear for AFP in 20167 Phiipine Daly Inqu er January 1.2016. % Richard Tomkins Palippnes receives f al ell uty helicopter Une Press international ‘August 18,2015 _Philipine News Agency PH Nowy Pow: attack helicopters deployable’ despte weapons traning: anuary 15,2016 Philippines totes planes fom panto aol dsputed sea Reuters, March 9, 2016 8 Frances Mangosing Moe ships, planes, ‘combat gearfor AFP in 2016; Philippine Daly Inqu January 1.2016 = Jule M. Aurelio, “DND to buy PIOOMt arnmo for FASO fighter ets Philippine Daly Inquires, Sanaa 42016, © Aloe Romero, 4 AFP projects awalt award noice! Pikppine ta, anuary 4 2016. * ime snap, PH Batata spokesman Antiarctaft ystem tbe deployed in Pawan rerasyon March 21,2016 % Aled. Romero, “8 AFP projects nat wad noice Philippine Star January 42018 % Philippines to ease plone om Japan to atl aspute se0"Revters March, 2016 2» Ichael Peck “Pitgpins awards S126 radio contact for mitary comms, CAR & Neeworks February25, 2016. 2% John GrevattPhipinesretendersight- fighting systems procurement Janes, December 8 ams. > Alexis Romer, “Mitary 10 get 7-8 up grades this year Philippine Sar Ace Dela Cuz fae arming Philppines attack cats wth missles; Updateph,Februny 25, 2016. © ess Romero," AFP projects await award notice Philippine Star January 4, 2016, © Charisa Luci “Gov't allocating P35B to buy 12 fohterplanes,2Figates Manila Bulletin Sep> tember 9, 2015, © -aw.n59— Asian Navies Evaluate Acquis tion of ASW Helicopters DeferseUpdatecom, Febru: 23,2016, “ARP seting up cybersecurity War room GMA Network November 19,2012, —Frolan Magtoto and. Anthony Vargas, “Aquino OKs Pal defense spending’ Manila Times, November 28,2015 ia © Alesis Romero, "4 AFP projects anait ard notice Philippine Star January 42016, Alesis Romero, ‘Navy to commission 2 landing craft heavy ships ftom Austral Pilppine Star, Juy 12,2015. © Carmela Fonbuena, PH ta get 3rd Harm itmcass warship from US, Rapper November 18, 2015 Roel Pare, “US wansfers 114 armored personne cers to AFF Phiippine Star, December 12015, ‘lis Romero, “AFP receives equipment aganst chemical warfare fom US, Pippi Star, September 17,2015 © Philippines Acquis 2 Aditional C130, TTanspot Planes Fom US, Defenseord March 8, 2016. = -Bhiippinesolease planes rom Japan to ato sputedsea"Reuers, March 9, 2018 (STQUARTER2018 SPARK 17the key eon IDEAS and ACTION The article featured in this series is the sole property of Copyright 2015 SEC RO aU Sea ng tions tS oe aa 4 en papper ees