G.R. No.

L-29320 September 19, 1988

FELIPE SEGURA, ANTONIA SEGURA, NICANORA SEGURA, BERNANDINA SEGURA,
ALIPIO SEGURA and MONSERRAT SEGURA, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
NICOLAS SEGURA, SANTIAGO SEGURA, GAUDENCIO SEGURA, EMILIANO AMOJIDO,
MILDRED ELISON VDA. DE JAVELOSA, ERNESTO AMOJIDO, EPIFANIA DE AMOJIDO,
IGMEDIO AMOJIDO, and THE RURAL BANK OF SANTA BARBARA, defendants-appellees.
Robert B. Maroma for plaintiffs-appellants.
Estefano Caspe for defendants-appellees.
CRUZ, J.:
This is another distasteful case where kin is pitted against kin in a bitter dispute over property
inherited from a common ancestor who probably would have been distressed to see her
progeny quarreling over it as if they were hostile strangers.
The land in question consists of 4,060 square meters and was originally registered under
Original Certificate of Title No. 1994 in the Registry of Deeds of Iloilo in the name of Gertrudes
1
Zamora. She died intestate and without debts in 1936 and was survived by four children, who
never got around to dividing the property among themselves. This controversy is not among
the four brothers, who are now also deceased. It is Gertrudes's grandchildren by three of her
sons (the fourth having died without issue) who are involved in this complaint for recovery of
ownership and possession of the disputed inheritance, plus damages.
The conflict began when on April 6, 1941, three of these nine grandchildren, namely, Nicolas,
Santiago and Gaudencio Segura, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the
2
entire property to themselves alone as equal pro indiviso owners (thereby, curiously,
excluding Nicolas and Santiago's own brother and two sisters, and Gaudencio's own sister,
besides the other two co-heirs.) This partition was not registered immediately, but only in 1946,
or five years later.
Before and after such registration, the following developments transpired:
1. The land was sold for P50.00 to Emiliano Amojido, with right to repurchase on or before
3
February 15, 1942. This right was not exercised.
2. On November 28, 1946, Amojido executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and
4
obtained TCT No. 28336, with a reservation of the rights of the other heirs annotated therein.
3. On March 31, 1953, Amojido sold the land for P1,500.00 to Mirope Mascareias vda. de
5
Elison, who obtained TCT No. T-19396 in her name, which did not retain the annotation.
4. On May 28, 1956, the plaintiffs filed Civil Case No. 3941, for recovery of possession and
6
ownership of the subject land from Nicolas, Santiago and Gaudencio Segura.
5. On February 14, 1957, Elison sold the land for P1,000.00 to Mildred Elison vda. de
7
Javelosa, who obtained TCT No. 22074 in her name.

6. On January l5, 1958, Mildred sold the land for P1,500.00 to Ernesto and Igmedio Amojido,
8
who obtained TCT No 24342 in their names.
7. On January 16,1958, Civil Case No. 3941 was dismissed on motion of the plaintiffs' counsel.
8. On July 23, 1961, the land was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara, which is one of
the appellees herein.
The complaint in the case at bar was filed on January 11, 1968, and docketed as Civil Case
No. 7477 in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. In it, the six excluded grandchildren alleged that
the partition and all subse quent transfers of the subject land were null and void insofar as
these transactions deprived them of their shares as co-owners of the said property. The
defendants moved to dismiss, contending that the action was barred by prior judgment and
that in any event whatever rights might have pertained to the plaintiffs had already prescribed
under the Rules of Court and the Civil Code. The plaintiffs opposed the motion. Thereafter,
9
issues having been joined, the trial courts issued its order of March 28, 1968, dismissing the
complaint on the ground of prescription. The motion for reconsideration was denied in an order
dated May 28, 1968, on the further ground, as if it were an afterthought, of res judicata. The
plaintiffs then appealed to this Court and now ask that the said orders be reversed and the
complaint reinstated.
We hold at the outset that the present action is not barred by prior judgment as the dismissal of
the earlier complaint was without prejudice to its refiling at a future date. It appears that when
Civil Case No. 3941 was called for hearing, the plaintiffs' counsel himself moved for its
dismissal on the ground that his clients had gone to Mindanao and he did not know when they
10
would be returning. There is here no showing of failure to prosecute, such as an
unreasonable delay on the part of the complainants, and the appellees have not so contended.
It was clear that the plaintiffs' counsel had the intention of reviving the case, and that must
have been the impression too of the trial judge because his order of dismissal did not state that
11
it was with prejudice to the refiling of the case. The applicable rule is Rule 17, Section 2, of
the Rules of Court reading thus:
Dismissal by order of the court.-Except as provided in the preceding section, an
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of the court
and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim
has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs
motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall
be without prejudice.
It follows that even, if, as noted by the trial court in its Order of May 28, 1968, "the same case
Civil Case No. 3941 of this Court. Exh. 'A' with the same subject matter, with the same
plaintiffs, almost with the same defendants, and the same theory, was dismissed by this Court
on January 16,1958," the present action is not barred by res judicata.
The second ground is not as simple.
The claim of prescription is based first on the contention that under the Rules of Court the deed
of extrajudicial partition should have been impugned within two years from the date of its
execution in 1941. As the challenge in the instant case was made only in 1956, when Civil
Case No. 3941 was filed, that first case, and more so the case at bar which was commenced in
1968, should be and were properly dismissed for tardiness under Rule 74, Section 4, of the
Rules of Court.

This section provides in gist that a person who has been deprived of his lawful participation in
the estate of the decedent, whether as heir or as creditor, must assert his claim within two
years after the extrajudicial or summary settlement of such estate under Sections 1 and 2
respectively of the same Rule 74. Thereafter, he will be precluded from doing so as the right
will have prescribed.
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null
and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The rule covers only valid partitions. The
partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were
entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As
the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the
trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from
its execution in 1941.
The appellees invoke a second basis for their claim of prescription and argue that even under
the Civil Code the complaint should also be deemed prescribed pursuant to the following
provisions:
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years (1957a).
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
It is recalled that following the execution of the deed of partition, the owners named therein
sold the entire land to Emiliano Amojido who, after the vendors had failed to exercise their right
of repurchase, executed an affidavit of consolidation in his favor on November 28, 1946. He
subsequently obtained a transfer certificate of title in his name, but this contained the following
annotation:
This land is subject to any claim that may be presented by any heir or any other
person deprived of his lawful participation in the estate of Gertrudes Zamora, within
12
two years from date of the Extra-judicial Settlement and distribution of the estate.
As a person can sell only what he owns or is authorized to sell, the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the seller can legally transfer. The deed of partition
being invalid as to the other heirs, the vendors could dispose only of their respective shares in
the land, or one-third only of the property and not the other two-thirds as well which did not
belong to them.
Article 493 of the Civil Code reads as follows:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall

be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.
Applying this provision, we have held in previous cases:
When a real property belongs pro indiviso to three persons, who acquired it
by inheritance from a common ancestor, the action for recovery by the legal
representative of one of the heirs can only concern one-third of the property;
and if the other co-owners have, by sale to third person, disposed of onethird of the said pro indiviso property, the plaintiff who sues for recovery is
not entitled to ask for the annulment of the sale, inasmuch as the latter
merely exercised their rights; such alienation does not affect the rights of the
heir who claims only one-third, which belongs to the other two co-owners
whose
rights
must
be
respected
by
the
13
plaintiff.
Every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the community property
and may alienate, assign or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal
rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be
14
awarded to him upon the partition of the property.
None of the other co-heirs who did not participate in the sale can demand the
nullification of the same, inasmuch as every co-owner may alienate, transfer, or
mortgage his share in the common thing, and even substitute another person in
the enjoyment thereof, unless personal rights are in question; although the effect of
the alienation or mortgage, in relation to the co-owners shall be limited to the
15
portion that may be adjudicated to him when the community ceased.
To repeat, the general rule is that no one can give what he does not have nemo dat quod
non habet. Hence, even if it be assumed that Amojido had bought the land in good faith from
the parties to the extrajudicial partition, only so much of their share could be validly acquired by
him, with the rest of the property remaining under the ownership of the six excluded co-heirs In
other words, Amojido became pro indiviso co-owner of the land with the other six heirs, who
retained title to their respective shares although he had possession of the entire property. The
portion pertaining to the herein appellants should be deemed held by Amojido under an implied
16
trust for their benefit, conformably to the ruling in Bargayo v. Camumot, thus:
In law it is understood that the co-owners or co-heir who is in possession of an
inheritance pro indivisofor himself and in representation of his co-owners or coheirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof with the
obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same situation
as a depository, a lessee, or a trustee.
There is no question that an action for reconveyance of property held in implied trust is
17
imprescriptible. However, this is true only as long as the trustee continues to acknowledge
the title of the cestui que trust, or, otherwise stated, provided he does not repudiate such
18
title." The moment he does so, the prescriptive period will begin to run and may eventually
operate to divest the real owners of their right to the property after the lapse of the applicable
statutory period. Under the provision above-quoted, that period is fixed at ten years, whether
the claim be based upon an obligation created by law under Article 1144 or covered by Article
1134 on rights over immovable property.
When did such prescriptive period start in the case at bar?

It is noted that when Amojido secured the registration of the land in his name following the
deed of sale executed in his favor by the parties to the extrajudicial partition, his certificate of
title carried an express reservation of whatever rights might pertain to the other heirs. This
annotation constituted an acknowledgement of the possibility that a portion of the land might
not belong to him and the commitment that he would be holding such part as impliedly
conveyed to him in trust by and for its true owners. However, when Amojido himself sold the
land to Mirope Mascareas vda. de Elison on March 13, 1953, the transfer certificate of title
issued in her name no longer carried the said encumbrance. By the deletion of this annotation,
Mirope, as the new transferee, repudiated as of the date of registration the claim of the other
heirs to their shares in the property. From then on her assertion of ownership over the whole
land became adverse even as against the appellants herein. And as the certificate of title was
notice to the whole world of her exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the
said heirs and started as against them the period of prescription.
The record does not show when TCT No. T-19396 in the name of Mirope Mascareas vda. de
Elison was issued, but it can be conjectured that this was done before February 14, 1957,
when she sold the land to Mildred Elison vda. de Javelosa. On the assumption that the land
was registered in the name of Mirope in 1953 following her purchase without acknowledgement
of the co-heirs' rights, the 10-year prescriptive period would have started from that year.
Suspended on May 28, 1956, when the first complaint was filed, it began running again on
February 16, 1958, 30 days after it was dismissed, and was completed after seven more years
in 1965, two years before the second complaint was filed in 1968. Hence, that complaint was
barred by prescription, as correctly held by the trial court, although the different starting point it
used, erroneously, was 1941, date of the extrajudicial partition.
The unavoidable consequence of all this is that whatever claims the co-heirs could have validly
asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time. They have let the time
inexorably pass while they were slumbering on their rights, and now it is too late.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED, with costs against the appellants. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 120864

October 8, 2003

MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division) and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his
Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-Rivera, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the 22 August 1994 Decision as well as
the 27 June 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875. The Court of
3
Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court ("trial court") of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 8796-M. The trial courts Decision ordered petitioner Manuel T. De
Guia ("DE GUIA") to turn over to private respondent Jose B. Abejo ("ABEJO") possession of
the one half () undivided portion of a fishpond and to pay actual damages and attorneys
fees.
The Antecedents
4

On 12 May 1986, ABEJO instituted an action for recovery of possession with damages
against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that he is the owner of the undivided
portion of a property used as a fishpond ("FISHPOND") situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and
covered by TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. He alleged ownership over
approximately 39,611 square meters out of the FISHPONDs total area of 79,220 square
meters. ABEJO further averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND
without any contract and without paying rent to ABEJOs damage and prejudice. ABEJO also
complained that DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the FISHPOND
despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIAs sublease contract over the FISHPOND
had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to vacate an approximate area of
39,611 square meters as well as pay damages.
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his Answer on 12
January 1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved several issues concerning the validity of the
service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state
a cause of action and has prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally owned by
Maxima Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to him,
ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva Lejano who
authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJOs ownership of the
undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed ownership over an undivided half
portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA sought payment of damages and
reimbursement for the improvements he introduced as a builder in good faith.
The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their pre-trial briefs. ABEJO filed
5
6
his pre-trial brief on 05 April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial brief on 31 July 1990. DE
GUIAs pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the case the amount of damages in the form of
rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to
7
Compromise, offering to settle ABEJOs claim for P300,000 and to lease the entire
FISHPOND to any party of ABEJOs choice.

Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case on 4 December 1990. DE
GUIAs last witness completed her testimony on 22 November 1991. The trial court
summarized the evidence presented by ABEJO and DE GUIA as follows:
Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land covering a fishpond
with a total area of 79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan and
covered by TCT No. 6358 equally owned by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to
Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one half undivided portion owned by Lorenza Araniego
corresponding to 39,611 sq. m. was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo
(Exh. B), the only heir of the original owner on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July
30, 1974 the whole fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a "Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng
Palaisdaan" executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with the knowledge and consent of
Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and defendant. The contract provided that the
period of lease shall be until November 30, 1979. When the contract expired and defendant
failed to surrender the fishpond, written demands the last of which was on November 27, 1983
were made for defendants to pay back rental and to vacate the premises in question (Exh. D &
E). Defendant refused to deliver possession and also to pay the rentals due. In anticipation,
however, that defendant will vacate the fishpond, plaintiff, on December 21, 1983 entered into
a two year "Kasunduan ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for a
consideration of P50,000.00 (Exh. G). This contract, despite its execution and even already
notarized, had to be cancelled and the amount of P50,000.00 returned by plaintiff to Villarico
when the defendant did not heed the demand to vacate the fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual
as well as moral and exemplary damages, plaintiff asks payment of P450,000.00
and P20,000.00 attorneys fees.
On the other hand, defendants evidence tends to show that the entire fishpond with an area of
79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano. Subsequently, defendant
became the absolute owner of one half of the undivided area of the fishpond and he
questioned plaintiffs ownership of the other half as void and fraudulent. As to the area
pertaining to plaintiff, defendant claimed that he introduced improvements worth P500,000 and
being in good faith, he asked that he should be reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial brief,
however, defendant raised the only issue which is the amount of damages plaintiff is entitled to
in the form of rental. Hence, the thrust of the testimonies of defendants witnesses particularly
Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea was the amount of rental of fishponds in the
same locality as the fishpond in question at a given time. However, the documentary evidence
8
(Exhs. 1 and 2) in support of their testimony were not offered as evidence.
The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant and hereby orders that:
1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half undivided portion of the
79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall enjoy the benefits and fruits in equal share with the
defendant effective immediately until such time that partition of the property is
effected;
2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of P262,500.00 by way of actual or
compensatory damages;
3 Defendant shall pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
4. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court erred in ordering him
to vacate and surrender possession of the undivided portion of the FISHPOND and to pay
actual damages and attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals found DE GUIAs appeal without
merit and affirmed the trial courts decision. Upon DE GUIAs motion for reconsideration, the
appellate court reduced the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500.
Hence, the instant petition.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and adopted in toto by the Court of Appeals
are restated as follows:
1. The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a fishpond
situated in Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned by Primitiva
Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo.
2. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza
Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:

DE GUIA offers the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Contract of
Lease with Preliminary Injunction signed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano as proof of his
ownership of the other undivided half portion of the FISHPOND. Records show that DE GUIA
filed the complaint for himself and as attorney-in fact of the heirs of Primitiva Lejano ("Lejano
10
Heirs") against Spouses Teofilo Morte and Angelina Villarico, Spouses Ruperto and Milagros
Villarico, et al. ("Defendants"). The case was raffled to Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil Case. No. 86-27-M. The complaint alleged that DE
GUIA acquired his undivided share in the FISHPOND from the Lejano Heirs in February
1986.
DE
GUIA
and
the
Lejano
Heirs
sought
to
annul
the Kasulatan
ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan, executed on 10 November 1979
by Primitiva Lejano in favor of the Defendants. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs claimed that
Primitiva Lejano signed these documents under duress and without consideration.
11

The trial court rendered judgment on 28 February 1992 against DE GUIA and the Lejano
Heirs as follows:
WHEREFORE, the evidence having shown the plaintiffs, particularly Manuel De Guia, their
successor-in-interest, not entitled upon the facts and the law to the relief prayed for in the
amended complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED with costs against said plaintiff. Instead,
as prayed for by defendants, judgment is hereby rendered:

PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single - share; and LORENZA

ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, share, ---

1. Declaring the "Kasulatan ng Sanglaan" (Exhs. "A" & "1") dated November 10,
1979, and the "Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan" (Exhs. "C" &"3") also dated
November 10, 1979, as valid for all legal intents and purposes;

3. The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square meters.
ABEJO is seeking to recover possession of the undivided portion of the
FISHPOND containing 39,611 square meters.

2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage; and

4. DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired possession of the entire
FISHPOND by virtue of a document captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng
Palaisdaan ("Lease Contract") executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974 up to 30 November
1979 for a consideration of P100,000.
5. The Lease Contract was executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo
Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo. Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza
Araniego Abejos undivided share in the FISHPOND by intestate succession.
6. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his undivided share in the FISHPOND to his
son, ABEJO, on 22 November 1983.
7. DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to derive income from
the property despite the expiration of the Lease Contract and several demands to
vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO. The last
demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.

3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorneys fees in the amount

of P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

12

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 38031. The Court of Appeals found the claim of force and intimidation in the execution
of the documents as highly improbable since Primitiva Lejanos son, Renato Davis, witnessed
the signing of the documents and found nothing irregular at the time. The appellate court also
held that assuming Defendants threatened DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs with immediate
foreclosure, Defendants were merely exercising their legitimate right of foreclosing the
mortgaged property for non-payment of the loan. In addition, Primitiva Lejanos lawyer and
notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abao, testified that the parties appeared before him to affirm the
contents of the documents. He also stated that he was present when Defendants paid Primitiva
Lejano Davis and her son Renato. As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In the event the Court of Appeals Decision attains
finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he claims over the FISHPOND.
The Trial Courts Ruling

8. ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against DE
GUIA on 12 May 1986.
9. DE GUIAs claim of ownership over the other undivided portion of the
FISHPOND has not been finally adjudicated for or against him.

The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and surrender
an area equivalent to ABEJOs undivided share in the FISHPOND. The trial court explained
that DE GUIAs sublease contract expired in 1979 and ABEJO acquired his fathers share in
1983. However, the trial court pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of the judicial
or extra-judicial partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the specific area pertaining to
ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession of real property.

Nevertheless, the trial court declared that pending partition, it is only just that DE GUIA pay
ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJOs share in the FISHPOND. DE
GUIA admitted this obligation when he raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent
he should pay ABEJO. DE GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the reasonable amount but
under certain conditions which ABEJO found unacceptable.
In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court considered the Lease Contract
between ABEJO and a certain Ruperto C. Villarico which provided for a yearly rent of P25,000
for undivided portion of the FISHPOND. The trial court declared that the total amount of rent
due is P212,500, computed from November 1983 when ABEJO became a co-owner of the
13
FISHPOND up to 1991 or a period of eight and one half years. The trial court further ordered
DE GUIA to pay an additional P50,000 which represents the amount ABEJO returned to
Ruperto C. Villarico when they cancelled the Lease Contract between them due to DE GUIAs
refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the right to possess
the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the benefits from the FISHPOND effective
immediately. Until there is a partition, and while there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code
provisions on co-ownership shall govern the rights of the parties.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION

DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA FOR DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER
DIRECTING PETITIONER TO TURN OVER THE ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF THE
FISHPOND WHICH IS STILL UNDER A STATE OF CO-OWNERSHIP;
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN PART, THE AWARD OF ACTUAL OR
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES DESPITE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE SAME;
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES IN
14
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAVOR.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision. The Court of Appeals debunked DE
GUIAs claim that partition and not recovery of possession was the proper remedy under the
circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that DE GUIAs failure to respect ABEJOs
right over his undivided share in the FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of
possession. The trial courts decision effectively enforces ABEJOs right over the property
which DE GUIA violated by possession and use without paying compensation. According to the
Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision just like
accounting when necessary.
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIAs claim that the award of compensatory
damages of P242,000, computed based on the rent stipulated in the Lease Contract between
ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico, is grossly exorbitant. The Court of Appeals clarified that the
amount the trial court awarded was P262,500 and not P242,000 as erroneously alleged by DE
GUIA. The Court of Appeals pointed out that the notarized Lease Contract between ABEJO
and Ruperto C. Villarico carries more evidentiary weight than the testimonies of DE GUIAs
witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Pea. The Court of Appeals also upheld
the award of attorneys fees since the parties could have avoided litigation had DE GUIA
heeded the justifiable demands of ABEJO.
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced the compensatory damages
from P262,500 toP212,500. The Court of Appeals explained that the trial court correctly
computed the total amount of rent due atP212,500. The trial court erred, however, in adding
the sum of P50,000 representing the rent for 1983 and 1984 which ABEJO returned to Ruperto
C. Villarico. The appellate court clarified that the sum of P212,500 was arrived at by multiplying
the rent of P25,000 by 8 years. The 8 year period already included the two months rent
received from and then subsequently reimbursed to Ruperto C. Villarico.

In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an action for recovery of possession and
turn-over of the undivided portion of a common property is proper before partition; and (2)
whether there is sufficient basis for the award of compensatory damages and attorneys fees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of Possession
DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the property owned in
common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO should have filed an action for
partition instead of recovery of possession since the court cannot implement any decision in
the latter case without first a partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for recovery of
possession cannot prosper when the property subject of the action is part of an undivided, coowned property. The procedural mode adopted by ABEJO, which is recovery of possession,
makes enforcement difficult if not impossible since there is still no partition of the subject
property.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, "there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an
undivided thing or right belongs to different persons." A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land
is an "owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at
15
the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract." On the other hand, there is no
co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already concretely
16
determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically described.

The Issues
DE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
I.

Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, "[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment." This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession
(accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary
actions of forcible entry and unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only.

These actions are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession.
However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to possess, falls
under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year. Accion de reivindicacion, which seeks the recovery of ownership, also
17
falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court. 1awphi1.nt

actual partitioning of the co-owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is

necessary to effect physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An
action for partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA from
the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition, ABEJO shall
exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire FISHPOND.

Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but
also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive
18
ownership of the property. In the latter case, however, the only purpose of the action is to
obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant
from the property because as co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot
19
recover any material or determinate part of the property.

DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred when they ordered the
recovery of rent when the exact identity of the portion in question had not yet been clearly
defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order to pay damages in the form of rent is
premature before partition.

In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and

20
Herminio De La Cruz, we reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a material or
determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is actually partitioned,
all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire
property. A co-owner has no right to demand a concrete, specific or determinate part of the
thing owned in common because until division is effected his right over the thing is represented
only by an ideal portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner will be to obtain
recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be excluded from a specific portion of
the property because as a co-owner he has a right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover
any material or determinate part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they
ordered the delivery of one-half () of the building in favor of private respondent.
Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND since July
1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJOs claim of ownership over the undivided portion of
the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized ABEJOs undivided share by offering
to settle the case for P300,000 and to vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither DE
GUIA nor ABEJO asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the
entire FISHPOND.1a\^/phi1.net Before this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of
bringing an action for recovery of possession and the recovery of compensatory damages.
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and DE GUIA have
equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have the same right in a
qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE GUIA are owners of the whole
and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However, they are at the same time
individual owners of a portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such
21
portion remains indeterminate or unidentified. As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may
jointly exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the
FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-judicial partition
is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is imprescriptible and not subject to
22
laches. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property unless
23
a co-owner has repudiated the co-ownership under certain conditions. Neither ABEJO nor DE
GUIA has repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.

We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other co-owners. A
co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to the prejudice of the co24
ownership. Hence, if the subject is a residential house, all the co-owners may live there with
their respective families to the extent possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the
entire house without opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the
other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an agreement
to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-owner who dwells in the
house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to lease it. If
they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear the consequences. It would be unjust
to require the co-owner to pay rent after the co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use
25
the property.
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner cannot retain it
26
for his use without paying the proper rent. Moreover, where part of the property is occupied
exclusively by some co-owners for the exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become
27
co-participants in the accessions of the property and should share in its net profits.
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE GUIA. After
DE GUIAs lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire FISHPOND without paying
rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire FISHPOND without paying rent would
prejudice ABEJOs right to receive rent, which would have accrued to his share in the
28
FISHPOND had it been leased to others. Since ABEJO acquired his undivided share in the
FISHPOND on 22 November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his
possession and use of ABEJOs portion beginning from that date. The compensatory damages
of P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation
29
for the use and occupation of the leased property, considering the circumstances at that time.
DE GUIA shall continue to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding to ABEJOs
undivided share in the FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has the option either to exercise an
equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial court to fix a new
rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20 years.1a\^/phi1.net
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November 1983
demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per annum from 27
30
November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code.
31
Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from finality of this decision until full payment.
Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of Compensatory Damages

To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of possession against a
co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-owned property. However, the only
effect of such action is a recognition of the co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the

DE GUIA contends the P212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is exorbitant. He assails as

doubtful and self-serving evidence the Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C.
Villarico that served as basis for the yearly rent ofP25,000 for ABEJOs share in the
FISHPOND.

recognized without prejudice to the outcome of CAG.R. CV No. 38031 pending

before the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the same property;
2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy possession and use of
the entire FISHPOND prior to partition;

DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given credence to the testimonies of
his witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo ("Camargo") and Marta Fernando Pea ("Pea") that
rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity are for much lesser considerations.

3. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per annum representing rent from 27

November 1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum from 27
November 1983 until finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum until
full payment;

This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh
32
again the evidence considered in the proceedings below. More so in the instant case, where
33
the Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court.

4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of P25,000 from June
1992 until finality of this decision, with interest at 6% per annum during the same
period, and thereafter at 12% interest per annum until full payment;

It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies of Camargo and Pea because DE
GUIA failed to present documentary evidence to support their testimonies. Actually, the trial
and appellate courts found the testimonies of Camargo and Pea unconvincing. Judges cannot
be expected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they
determine who are credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before
34
them.
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts evaluation of the witnesses
testimonies. We likewise find reasonable the P25,000 yearly compensation for ABEJOs
undivided share in the FISHPOND. Indeed, being a question of fact, it is for the trial and
appellate courts to decide and this Court will not disturb their findings unless clearly baseless
or irrational. The exception does not obtain in this case.
Fourth Issue: Attorneys Fees
The trial court did not err in imposing attorneys fees of P20,000. Attorneys fees can be
awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code specifically:
xxx
(2) Where the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
xxx
DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take exclusive
possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle the case out of court,
such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put
to unnecessary expense and trouble to protect his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of
the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution dated 27 June 1995 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect to that portion ordering
Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory damages of P212,500 and attorneys
fees of P20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:
1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo over the entire
FISHPOND covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds is

5. After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de Guia exclusively
possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental
of P25,000 for the latters undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B.
Abejo secures from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in view of
possible changed circumstances.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184454

August 3, 2011

Petitioners, the legal heirs of Lun who died on 12 January 1997, filed a complaint for partition
and damages against Co with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gubat, Sorsogon, Branch 54.

CO GIOK LUN, as substituted by his legal heirs namely: MAGDALENA D. CO,

MILAGROS D. CO, BENJAMIN D. CO, ALBERT D. CO, ANGELITA C. TENG, VIRGINIA C.
RAMOS, CHARLIE D. CO, and ELIZABETH C. PAGUIO, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE CO, as substituted by his legal heirs namely: ROSALINA CO, MARLON CO,
JOSEPH CO, FRANK CO, ANTONIO CO, NELSON CO, ROLAND CO, JOHNSON CO,
CORAZON CO, ADELA CO, SERGIO CO, PAQUITO CO, JOHN CO, NANCY CO, and
TERESITA CO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 23 April
3
2008 and Resolution dated 10 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 85920.

Claim of Petitioners
Petitioners claimed that Lun and Fieng came to the Philippines from China in 1929. Lun
allegedly acquired the Gubat property from the P8,000.00 capital the brothers inherited from
their father, Co Chaco (Chaco), before Chaco returned to China in 1926 due to old age. The
Gubat property was named under Fieng only since it has been a common practice and custom
in China that properties intended for the children are placed in the name of the eldest child.
The Barcelona property, on the other hand, was acquired by Chaco in 1923 while he was still
doing his business in Gubat.
Lun and Fieng set up a business, selling and trading of dry goods, called the Philippine Honest
and Company. Using the companys funds, they rented the property of Crispina Rocha
(Rocha), which was mortgaged and finally sold to them in 1935. Later, from the income of the
business, they acquired the two adjoining residential and commercial lots which increased the
size of the Gubat property to its present area of 720.68 square meters.
In 1946, Lun and Fieng dissolved and liquidated the business. After receiving his share
of P26,000 from the liquidation, Lun established his own dry goods business called Shanghai
Trading. Fieng, on the other hand, entered into other businesses with different partners.

The Facts
This case involves two lots allegedly co-owned by two brothers, petitioner Co Giok Lun (Lun)
and Co Bon Fieng (Fieng), the father of respondent Jose Co (Co). The lots, which are situated
in Sorsogon province, one in the town of Gubat and the other in the town of Barcelona, are
described as:
Gubat Property
A parcel of commercial/residential land, located at Poblacion, Gubat, Sorsogon, containing an
area of 720.68 square meters, more or less, bounded on the North by Angel Camara, on the
East by Rodolfo Rocha, on the South by Guaria Street and on the West by Zulueta Street
declared under Tax Declaration No. 11379 in the name of Co Bon Fieng and assessed
4
at P12,370.00.
Barcelona Property
Terreno cocal radicada en el sitio de Telegrafo barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I. F.
cabida de sesenta y cinco (65 a.) lindates por Norte Hertrudes Casulla, por sur Antonio
Evasco, por Este con los manglares y por Oeste Atanacio Espera y Eugenio Esteves.
Terreno cocalero ubicado en el barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon, I.F. cabida de una
hectaria dies y ocho areas y sesenta y ciete centiarias (1 hects. 18 hareas 67 centiareas)
lindantes al Norte Cementerio Municipal antes Eugenio Esteves, al Este Gabriel Gredoa y
Laudia Asis, al Sur Amando Torilla y Florentino Mercader, y al Oeste Carretera Provincial.
Terreno solar con doce ponos de coco situada en el barrio de Luneta, Barcelona, Sorsogon,
I.F. cabida de dos riales y quevalente a trienta y cuatro areas y un camarin de materiales
fuertes y deficada dentro de la misma lindante al Norte Camino para S. Antonio, al Sur
Eugenio Esteves, al Este Carretera Provincial y al Oeste a los herederos del defunto Feliciano
5
Fontelar.

Petitioners claimed that Lun stayed at the Gubat property from the time he arrived in China in
1929. Lun was the one who religiously paid for the realty taxes and made several repairs on
the building to make the Gubat property habitable. It was only sometime in 1946 when Lun and
Fieng decided to divide the two lots. However, the partition did not push through on the
insistence of their mother, Po Kiat, who wanted to preserve and maintain close family ties.
Petitioners also alleged that Lun prevented the Gubat property from being appropriated when
the lot was used by Fieng as a loan guarantee. Fieng incurred the P4,500 obligation from
Erquiaga Corporation which Lun assumed and paid without any contribution from respondents,
specifically Co. After Fieng suffered financial bankruptcy in Manila, he went back to Gubat.
Upon the request of their mother, Lun lent his brother P30,000 which Fieng used to start up a
business. However, until Fiengs death on 8 July 1958, the amount which Lun lent was never
returned to him.
Lun even extended financial assistance to Co amounting to no less than P30,000 which
remained unpaid. Later, when Lun already refused to lend money to Co, the latter made
himself the administrator of the Gubat property without Luns knowledge. Thereafter, Co filed a
case for unlawful detainer against Lun with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gubat, docketed
as Civil Case No. 210. This case was decided by the MTC in favor of Co but was reversed by
the RTC in its Decision dated 28 April 1994. The RTCs decision was later affirmed by the CA
and this Court.
Claim of Respondents
On the other hand, respondents, in their Amended Answer, maintained that the Gubat property
is the exclusive property of their father. They asserted that Fieng acquired the lot by purchase
from Rocha in 1935 or nine years after Chaco left for China in 1926. While Lun was still in
China, Fieng and Rocha entered into an agreement for the use of the lot where Fieng built a
"camalig" and started his sari-sari store business. On 13 March 1929, Fieng and Rocha
entered into another contract extending Fiengs right to occupy the lot until 17 August 1938. On
16 March 1930, another extension was given until 19 August 1940. On 13 October 1935, Fieng

and Rocha executed a Deed of Absolute Sale where Rocha sold the lot to Fieng for P3,000.
On 6 August 1936, Ireneo Rocha also sold a parcel of the adjoining land to Fieng which
increased the size of the Gubat property to its present area. Both documents had been
properly notarized.
Fieng used the property not only as the familys residence but also for business and trade
purposes until his death in 1958. It was even Fieng who had constructed the commercial
building on the property in 1928. From 1937 to 1983, the land and tax declarations of the
property was in the sole name of their father. In 1983, Co became the administrator of the
Gubat property and had the property declared in his own name in substitution of his father
without any objection from Lun.
Respondents denied that Lun and Fieng entered into any business together. Respondents
claim that it was only in 1956 or 1957 when Lun was taken in by Fieng, who was then ill and
could not manage his general merchandising business. Fieng allowed Lun to use the lower
portion of the Gubat property and let him manage his business and properties as administrator.
Lun was in possession of the property even after Fiengs death in 1958 because of the consent
and tolerance of the respondents who were still young at that time.
Respondents further insisted that Chaco gave the Barcelona property to Fieng exclusively as
advance inheritance and denied that Co ever borrowed money from Lun. As a counterclaim,
respondents asked for the payment of rent for the use by Lun of the Gubat property, as well as
moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated 10
September 2008.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The main issue is whether the CA erred in holding that no co-ownership existed between Lun
and Fieng over the Gubat and Barcelona properties and in declaring Fieng as the exclusive
owner of both properties.
The Courts Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The original complaint filed by Lun involves an action for partition and damages. A division of
property cannot be ordered by the court unless the existence of co-ownership is first
10
established. In Ocampo v. Ocampo, we held that an action for partition will not lie if the
claimant has no rightful interest over the property. Basic is the rule that the party making an
allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of evidence.
Article 484 of the Civil Code which defines co-ownership, states:

The RTCs Ruling

7

In a Decision dated 21 July 2004, the RTC decided the case in favor of petitioners. The RTC
stated that the documentary evidence presented in court showed that the Gubat property is
indeed under Fiengs name. However, the chain of events prior to the purchase of the
property and the evidence submitted by the petitioners prove the presence of co-ownership.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is
hereby rendered that the Heirs of Co Chaco are pro indiviso owners of the Gubat and
Barcelona properties which are to be partitioned among these heirs. They are hereby directed
to cause the survey of the property and to submit to this Court the plan of partition for approval.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The Court of Appeals Ruling

Respondents appealed to the CA. In a Decision dated 23 April 2008, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and ruled in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gubat, Sorsogon (Branch 54) in Civil Case No. 1601, is
REVERSED. The order of the trial court to cause the survey of the subject properties for the
partition thereof is SET ASIDE. The subject properties are declared exclusively owned by Co
Bon Fieng, and now by his legal heirs, herein appellants.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs
to different persons. x x x
In the present case, petitioners insist that their predecessor-in-interest Lun co-owned the
Gubat and Barcelona properties with his brother Fieng. To prove co-ownership over the Gubat
property, petitioners presented: (1) tax declarations from 1929 to 1983 under the name of
Fieng but paid by Lun; (2) the renewal certificate from Malayan Insurance Company Inc.; (3)
the insurance contract; and (4) the statements of account from Supreme Insurance
Underwriters which named Lun as administrator of the property. Likewise, to prove their right
over the Barcelona property as legal heirs under intestate succession, petitioners presented a
Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923 between Chaco, as buyer, and Gabriel Gredona and
Engracia Legata, as sellers, involving a price consideration ofP1,200.
On the other hand, respondents presented notarized documents: (1) Deed of Sale dated 13
October 1935, and (2) Sale of Real Property dated 6 August 1936 showing that the former
owners of the Gubat property entered into a sale transaction with Fieng, as buyer and Lun, as
a witness to the sale. They also presented tax declarations in the name of Fieng from 1937 to
1958. After Fiengs death, Co declared the Gubat property in his name in the succeeding tax
declarations. Likewise, the respondents presented documents proving the declaration of the
Barcelona property in the name of Co.
After a careful scrutiny of the records, we hold that the evidence of petitioners were insufficient
or immaterial to warrant a positive finding of co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona
properties. The CA correctly observed that petitioners failed to substantiate with reasonable
certainty that (1) Chaco gave Fieng a start-up capital of P8,000 to be used by Lun and Fieng in
setting up a business, (2) that the Philippine Honest and Company was a partnership between
Lun and Fieng, and (3) that the Deed of Sale dated 24 August 1923 involving the Barcelona
property is sufficient to establish co-ownership. Also, petitioners were not able to prove the
existence of the alleged Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest child
11
as provided under Article 12 of the Civil Code.

In contrast, respondents were able to show documents of sale from the original owners of the
12
Gubat property rendering the claim of custom as immaterial. Also, respondents sufficiently
established that Fieng was the registered owner of the Gubat and Barcelona properties while
Lun was merely an administrator.
The relevant portions of the CA decision provide:
x x x As to the Gubat property, appellee (petitioner Co Giok Lun in this case) failed to
establish the following with reasonable certainty: a) that Co Chaco gave Co Bon Fieng
P8,000.00 as business capital for him and his brother; and b) that Philippine Honest and
Company is a partnership between him and Co Bon Fieng.Appellees testimony is that his
father told him that the latter gave Co Bon Fieng P8,000.00 is hearsay since he had no
personal knowledge of the fact that Co Chaco gave Co Bon Fieng said amount. Even if the trial
court admitted said testimony, it remains without probative value. x x x Allegedly, this amount
was the contribution of appellee and Co Bon Fieng to the capital of their partnership
Philippine Honest and Company. Nevertheless, by reason of appellees failure to prove the
existence of this amount, the existence of the partnership remains doubtful. Appellee
present[ed] the certification of registration of the Philippine Honest and Company to prove the
existence of the partnership but the registration indicates only the name of Co Bon Fieng as
the owner thereof. Without the capital contribution and the partnership, appellees claim of coownership over the Gubat property does not have any basis.
To further prove his claim of co-ownership over the Gubat property, appellee presents Tax
Declarations pertaining to the subject property from 1929 to 1983, renewal certificate from
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc., insurance contract and statements of accounts from
Supreme Insurance Underwriters. These documents, however, uniformly indicate Co Bon
Fieng as the owner of the subject property and appellee as mere administrator thereof. Too,
appellee proffers utility bills and receipts indicating payment to Erquiaga, Inc., a creditor of Co
Bon Fieng, in support of his claim of co-ownership. These documents however, find no
relevance in this case. Appellees assumption of Co Bon Fiengs liabilities and his payment of
utilities without getting any contribution from appellants are kind acts but certainly do not prove
his claim of co-ownership. Neither do the court declarations in Civil Case No. 210 prove
appellees claim of co-ownership, for only issues concerning possession were resolved in said
unlawful detainer suit. Lastly, contrary to the claim of appellee, the affidavit of Co Che Bee,
which recognizes appellee as a co-owner of the subject property, cannot bind Co Bon Fieng,
for well-settled is the rule that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
or omission of another. Hence, appellees claim of co-ownership over the Gubat property must
fail.
Concerning the Barcelona property, appellee proffers a deed of sale dated 24 August 1923 to
support his claim that he and Co Bon Fieng are co-owners thereof. Under said deed, the
subject property was sold to Co Chaco. Nevertheless, the deed proves just that Co Chaco
purchased the subject property. It does not establish subsequent events or validly dispute the
transfer of the subject property by Co Chaco to Co Bon Fieng. Moreover, said document does
not have any probative value to refute the real property tax declarations of the subject property
in the name of appellant Jose Co. This document is inadequate to establish co-ownership
between appellee and Co Bon Fieng over the Barcelona property.
In fine, appellees evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant
the finding that the subject properties fall under the purview of co-ownership. Appellee failed
to prove that he is a co-owner of the subject properties.1awphil
In contrast, appellants offer convincing evidence that their father, Co Bon Fieng owns the
subject properties exclusively. In the "Deed of Sale" dated 13 October 1935 and the "Sale of
Real Property" dated 6 August 1936, the former owners of the Gubat property sold the same to
Co Bon Fieng only. Although appellees signature appears in the first document as a witness to

its execution, there is no indication in said document or in the other that he was purchasing the
subject property together with Co Bon Fieng. Appellee interjects that the foregoing deeds
indicate Co Bon Fieng as the owner of the subject property because of the Chinese custom
that in similar transactions, the eldest son of the family is normally placed as the purchaser of a
property. Appellee, however, failed to prove this custom as a fact; hence cannot be given
weight.
xxx
After purchasing the Gubat property, Co Bon Fieng declared the same in tax declarations from
1937 to 1958 as his property. After the death of Co Bon Fieng, appellant Jose Co declared the
Gubat property in his name in ensuing tax declarations over the same. As well, the Barcelona
property is declared in the name of Jose Co. The Barcelona property was even surveyed for
the benefit of appellants, as heirs of Co Bon Fieng.
xxx
x x x Here, we find compelling reasons to reverse the findings of the trial court and hold that
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the subject properties were owned exclusively by Co Bon Fieng, and now by his legal heirs.
We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. Petitioners failed to substantiate their claim
of co-ownership over the Gubat and Barcelona properties. The action for partition cannot be
acted upon since petitioners failed to establish any rightful interest in the properties. Petitioners
also failed to prove that co-ownership existed between the parties predecessors-in-interest.
Thus, respondents, as legal heirs of Fieng, are entitled to the exclusive ownership of the Gubat
and Barcelona properties.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 23 April 2008 and
Resolution dated 10 September 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 85920.
SO ORDERED.