Feati University V Bautista

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G.R.No.L21278
TodayisTuesday,June14,2016
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L21278December27,1966
FEATIUNIVERSITY,petitioner,
vs.
HON.JOSES.BAUTISTA,PresidingJudgeoftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsandFEATIUNIVERSITY
FACULTYCLUBPAFLU,respondents.
FEATIUNIVERSITY,petitionerappellant,
vs.
FEATIUNIVERSITYFACULTYCLUBPAFLU,respondentappellee.
FEATIUNIVERSITY,petitionerappellant,
vs.
FEATIUNIVERSITYFACULTYCLUBPAFLU,respondentappellee.
RafaelDinglasanforpetitioner.
CiprianoCidandAssociatesforrespondents.
ZALDIVAR,J.:
ThisCourt,byresolution,orderedthatthesethreecasesbeconsideredtogether,andthepartieswereallowedto
fileonlyonebriefforthethreecases.
On January 14, 1963, the President of the respondent Feati University Faculty ClubPAFLU hereinafter
referredtoasFacultyClubwrotealettertoMrs.VictoriaL.Araneta,PresidentofpetitionerFeatiUniversity
hereinafterreferredtoasUniversityinformingheroftheorganizationoftheFacultyClubintoaregisteredlabor
union. The Faculty Club is composed of members who are professors and/or instructors of the University. On
January22,1963,thePresidentoftheFacultyClubsentanotherlettercontainingtwentysixdemandsthathave
connectionwiththeemploymentofthemembersoftheFacultyClubbytheUniversity,andrequestingananswer
withintendaysfromreceiptthereof.ThePresidentoftheUniversityansweredthetwoletters,requestingthatshe
begivenatleastthirtydaystostudythoroughlythedifferentphasesofthedemands.Meanwhilecounselforthe
University, to whom the demands were referred, wrote a letter to the President of the Faculty Club demanding
proofofitsmajoritystatusanddesignationasabargainingrepresentative.OnFebruary1,1963,thePresidentof
theFacultyClubagainwrotethePresidentoftheUniversityrejectingthelatter'srequestforextensionoftime,and
onthesamedayhefiledanoticeofstrikewiththeBureauofLaborallegingasreasontherefortherefusalofthe
Universitytobargaincollectively.ThepartieswerecalledtoconferencesattheConciliationDivisionoftheBureau
ofLaborbuteffortstoconciliatethemfailed.OnFebruary18,1963,themembersoftheFacultyClubdeclareda
strike and established picket lines in the premises of the University, resulting in the disruption of classes in the
University. Despite further efforts of the officials from the Department of Labor to effect a settlement of the
differences between the management of the University and the striking faculty members no satisfactory
agreementwasarrivedat.OnMarch21,1963,thePresidentofthePhilippinescertifiedtotheCourtofIndustrial
RelationsthedisputebetweenthemanagementoftheUniversityandtheFacultyClubpursuanttotheprovisions
ofSection10ofRepublicActNo.875.
InconnectionwiththedisputebetweentheUniversityandtheFacultyClubandcertainincidentsrelatedtosaid
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1966/dec1966/gr_21278_1966.html
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dispute,variouscaseswerefiledwiththeCourtofIndustrialRelationshereinafterreferredtoasCIR.Thethree
casesnowbeforethisCourtstemmedfromthosecasesthatwerefiledwiththeCIR.
CASENO.G.R.NO.L21278
On May 10, 1963, the University filed before this Court a "petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction", docketed as G.R. No. L21278, praying: (1) for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunctionenjoiningrespondentJudgeJoseS.BautistaoftheCIRtodesistfromproceedinginCIRCasesNos.
41IPA,1183MC,andV30(2)thattheproceedingsinCasesNos.41IPAand1183MCbeannulled(3)thatthe
orders dated March 30, 1963 and April 6, 1963 in Case No. 41IPA, the order dated April 6, 1963 in Case No.
1183MC, and the order dated April 29, 1963 in Case No. V30, all be annulled and (4) that the respondent
JudgebeorderedtodismisssaidcasesNos.41IPA,1183MCandV30oftheCIR.
On May 10, 1963, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the University's filing a bond of
P1,000.00, ordering respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista as Presiding Judge of the CIR, until further order from
thisCourt,"todesistandrefrainfromfurtherproceedinginthepremises(CasesNos.41IPA,1183MCandV30
oftheCourtofIndustrialRelations)."1OnDecember4,1963,thisCourtorderedtheinjunctionbondincreasedto
P100,000.00 but on January 23, 1964, upon a motion for reconsideration by the University, this Court reduced
thebondtoP50,000.00.
AbriefstatementofthethreecasesCIRCases41IPA,1183MCandV30involvedintheCaseG.R.No.L
21278,isherenecessary.
CIRCaseNo.41IPA,relatestothecaseinconnectionwiththestrikestagedbythemembersoftheFacultyClub.
Aswehavestated,thedisputebetweentheUniversityandtheFacultyClubwascertifiedonMarch21,1963by
the President of the Philippines to the CIR. On the strength of the presidential certification, respondent Judge
BautistasetthecaseforhearingonMarch23,1963.Duringthehearing,theJudgeendeavoredtoreconcilethe
part and it was agreed upon that the striking faculty members would return to work and the University would
readmitthemunderastatusquoarrangement.Onthatverysameday,however,theUniversity,thrucounselfiled
a motion to dismiss the case upon the ground that the CIR has no jurisdiction over the case, because (1) the
IndustrialPeaceActisnotapplicabletotheUniversity,itbeinganeducationalinstitution,nortothemembersof
theFacultyClub,theybeingindependentcontractorsand(2)thepresidentialcertificationisviolativeofSection
10 of the Industrial Peace Act, as the University is not an industrial establishment and there was no industrial
disputewhichcouldbecertifiedtotheCIR.OnMarch30,1963therespondentJudgeissuedanorderdenying
themotiontodismissanddeclaringthattheIndustrialPeaceActisapplicabletobothpartiesinthecaseandthat
the CIR had acquired jurisdiction over the case by virtue of the presidential certification. In the same order, the
respondent Judge, believing that the dispute could not be decided promptly, ordered the strikers to return
immediatelytoworkandtheUniversitytotakethembackunderthelasttermsandconditionsexistingbeforethe
disputearose,asperagreementhadduringthehearingonMarch23,1963andlikewiseenjoinedtheUniversity,
pending adjudication of the case, from dismissing any employee or laborer without previous authorization from
theCIR.TheUniversityfiledonApril1,1963amotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofMarch30,1963bythe
CIRenbanc,andatthesametimeaskingthatthemotionforreconsiderationbefirstheardbytheCIRenbanc.
Without the motion for reconsideration having been acted upon by the CIR enbanc, respondent Judge set the
caseforhearingonthemeritsforMay8,1963.TheUniversitymovedforthecancellationofsaidhearingupon
thegroundthatthecourtenbancshouldfirsthearthemotionforreconsiderationandresolvetheissuesraised
therein before the case is heard on the merits. This motion for cancellation of the hearing was denied. The
respondentJudge,however,cancelledthescheduledhearingwhencounselfortheUniversitymanifestedthathe
would take up before the Supreme Court, by a petition for certiorari, the matter regarding the actuations of the
respondent Judge and the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, specially the issue relating to the
jurisdictionoftheCIR.TheorderofMarch30,1963inCase41IPAisoneoftheorderssoughttobeannulledin
thecase,G.R.No.L21278.
Before the abovementioned order of March 30, 1963 was issued by respondent Judge, the University had
employedprofessorsand/orinstructorstotaketheplacesofthoseprofessorsand/orinstructorswhohadstruck.
On April 1, 1963, the Faculty Club filed with the CIR in Case 41IPA a petition to declare in contempt of court
certainparties,allegingthattheUniversityrefusedtoacceptbacktoworkthereturningstrikers,inviolationofthe
returntowork order of March 30, 1963. The University filed, on April 5,1963, its opposition to the petition for
contempt,denyingtheallegationsoftheFacultyClubandallegingbywayofspecialdefensethattherewasstill
themotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofMarch30,1963whichhadnotyetbeenacteduponbytheCIRen
banc.OnApril6,1963,therespondentJudgeissuedanorderstatingthat"saidreplacementsareherebywarned
and cautioned, for the time being, not to disturb nor in any manner commit any act tending to disrupt the
effectivity of the order of March 30,1963, pending the final resolution of the same."2 On April 8, 1963, there
placing professors and/or instructors concerned filed, thru counsel, a motion for reconsideration by the CIR en
bancoftheorderofrespondentJudgeofApril6,1963.ThisorderofApril6,1963isoneoftheordersthatare
soughttobeannulledincaseG.R.No.L21278.
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CIRCaseNo.1183MCrelatestoapetitionforcertificationelectionfiledbytheFacultyClubonMarch8,1963
before the CIR, praying that it be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
employeesoftheUniversity.TheUniversityfiledanoppositiontothepetitionforcertificationelectionandatthe
sametimeamotiontodismisssaidpetition,raisingtheverysameissuesraisedinCaseNo.41IPA,claimingthat
thepetitiondidnotcomplywiththerulespromulgatedbytheCIRthattheFacultyClubisnotalegitimatelabor
unionthatthemembersoftheFacultyClubcannotunionizeforcollectivebargainingpurposesthatthetermsof
theindividualcontractsoftheprofessors,instructors,andteachers,whoaremembersoftheFacultyClub,would
expireonMarch25or31,1963andthattheCIRhasnojurisdictiontotakecognizanceofthepetitionbecause
theIndustrialPeaceActisnotapplicabletothemembersoftheFacultyClubnortotheUniversity.Thiscasewas
assigned to Judge Baltazar Villanueva of the CIR. Before Judge Villanueva could act on the motion to dismiss,
however, the Faculty Club filed on April 3, 1963 a motion to withdraw the petition on the ground that the labor
dispute(CaseNo.41IPA)hadalreadybeencertifiedbythePresidenttotheCIRandtheissuesraisedinCase
No.1183MCwereabsorbedbyCaseNo.41IPA.TheUniversityopposedthewithdrawal,allegingthattheissues
raised in Case No. 1183MC were separate and distinct from the issues raised in Case No. 41IPA that the
questions of recognition and majority status in Case No. 1183MC were not absorbed by Case No. 41IPA and
thattheCIRcouldnotexerciseitspowerofcompulsoryarbitrationunlessthelegalissueregardingtheexistence
ofemployeremployeerelationshipwasfirstresolved.TheUniversityprayedthatthemotionoftheFacultyClubto
withdraw the petition for certification election be denied, and that its motion to dismiss the petition be heard.
JudgeBaltazarVillanueva,findingthatthereasonsstatedbytheFacultyClubinthemotiontowithdrawwerewell
taken,onApril6,1963,issuedanordergrantingthewithdrawal.TheUniversityfiled,onApril24,1963,amotion
forreconsiderationofthatorderofApril6,1963bytheCIRenbanc.ThisorderofApril6,1963inCaseNo.1183
MCisoneoftheorderssoughttobeannulledinthecase,G.R.No.L21278,nowbeforeUs.
CIRCaseNo.V30relatestoacomplaintforindirectcontemptofcourtfiledagainsttheadministrativeofficialsof
the University. The Faculty Club, through the Acting Chief Prosecutor of the CIR, filed with the CIR a complaint
docketed as Case No. V30, charging President Victoria L. Araneta, Dean Daniel Salcedo, Executive Vice
PresidentRodolfoMaslog,andAssistanttothePresidentJoseSegovia,asofficialsoftheUniversity,withindirect
contemptofcourt,reiteratingthesamechargesfiledinCaseNo.41IPAforallegedviolationoftheorderdated
March30,1963.BasedonthecomplaintthusfiledbytheActingChiefProsecutoroftheCIR,respondentJudge
BautistaissuedonApril29,1963anordercommandinganyofficerofthelawtoarresttheabovenamedofficials
oftheUniversitysothattheymaybedealtwithinaccordancewithlaw,andthesametimefixedthebondfortheir
releaseatP500.00each.ThisorderofApril29,1963isalsooneoftheorderssoughttobeannulledinthecase,
G.R.No.L2l278.
The principal allegation of the University in its petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in
CaseG.R.No.L21278,nowbeforeUs,isthatrespondentJudgeJoseS.Bautistaactedwithout,orinexcessof,
jurisdiction,orwithgraveabuseofdiscretion,intakingcognizanceof,andinissuingthequestionedordersin,CIR
Cases Nos. 41IPA 1183MC and V30. Let it be noted that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction was filed on May 10, 1963 in this case, the questioned order in CIR Cases Nos. 41IPA,
1183MC and V30 were still pending action by the CIR enbanc upon motions for reconsideration filed by the
University.
On June 10, 1963, the Faculty Club filed its answer to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction,admittingsomeallegationscontainedinthepetitionanddenyingothers,andallegingspecialdefenses
whichboildowntothecontentionsthat(1)theCIRhadacquiredjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofCaseNo.41
IPAbyvirtueofthepresidentialcertification,sothatithadjurisdictiontoissuethequestionedordersinsaidCase
No.41IPA(2)thattheIndustrialPeaceAct(RepublicAct875)isapplicabletotheUniversityasanemployerand
tothemembersoftheFacultyClubasemployeeswhoareaffiliatedwithadulyregisteredlaborunion,sothatthe
CourtofIndustrialRelationshadjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofCasesNos.1183MCandV30andtoissuethe
questioned orders in those two cases and (3) that the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction was prematurely filed because the orders of the CIR sought to be annulled were still the subjects of
pendingmotionsforreconsiderationbeforetheCIRenbancwhensaidpetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionwith
preliminaryinjunctionwasfiledbeforethisCourt.
CASEG.R.NO.L21462
Thiscase,G.R.No.L21462,involvesalsoCIRCaseNo.1183MC.AsalreadystatedCaseNo.1183MCrelates
toapetitionforcertificationelectionfiledbytheFacultyClubasalaborunion,prayingthatitbecertifiedasthe
soleandexclusivebargainingrepresentativeofallemployeesoftheUniversity.Thispetitionwasopposedbythe
University, and at the same time it filed a motion to dismiss said petition. But before Judge Baltazar Villanueva
couldactonthepetitionforcertificationelectionandthemotiontodismissthesame,FacultyClubfiledamotion
towithdrawsaidpetitionuponthegroundthattheissueraisedinCaseNo.1183MCwereabsorbedbyCaseNo.
41IPAwhichwascertifiedbythePresidentofthePhilippines.JudgeBaltazarVillanueva,byorderApril6,1963,
grantedthemotiontowithdraw.TheUniversityfiledamotionforreconsiderationofthatorderofApril6,1963by
theCIRenbanc. That motion for reconsideration was pending action by the CIR enbanc when the petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. no. L21278 was filed on May 10, 1963. As
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earlier stated this Court, in Case G.R. No. L21278, issued a writ of preliminary injunction on May 10, 1963,
ordering respondent Judge Bautista, until further order from this Court, to desist and refrain from further
proceedinginthepremises(CasesNos.41IPA,1183MCandV30oftheCourtofIndustrialRelations).
OnJune5,1963,thatis,afterthisCourthasissuedthewritofpreliminaryinjunctioninCaseG.R.No.L21278,
theCIRenbancissuedaresolutiondenyingthemotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofApril6,1963inCase
No.1183MC.
On July 8, 1963, the University filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the
resolutionoftheCIRenbanc,datedJune5,1963,denyingthemotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofApril6,
1963 in Case No. 1183MC. This petition was docketed as G.R. No. L21462. In its petition for certiorari, the
University alleges (1) that the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations of June 5, 1963 was null and void
becauseitwasissuedinviolationofthewritofpreliminaryinjunctionissuedinCaseG.R.No.L21278(2)that
the issues of employeremployee relationship, the alleged status as a labor union, majority representation and
designation as bargaining representative in an appropriate unit of the Faculty Club should have been resolved
firstinCaseNo.1183MCpriortothedeterminationoftheissuesinCaseNo.41IPAandthereforethemotionto
withdrawthepetitionforcertificationelectionshouldnothavebeengranteduponthegroundthattheissuesinthe
first case have been absorbed in the second case and (3) the lower court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition for certification election and that the same should have been
dismissed instead of having been ordered withdrawn. The University prayed that the proceedings in Case No.
1183MCandtheorderofApril6,1963andtheresolutionofJune5,1963issuedthereinbeannulled,andthat
theCIRbeorderedtodismissCaseNo.1183MConthegroundoflackofjurisdiction.
TheFacultyClubfileditsanswer,admittingsome,anddenyingother,allegationsinthepetitionforcertiorariand
speciallyallegingthatthelowercourt'sordergrantingthewithdrawalofthepetitionforcertificationelectionwasin
accordancewithlaw,andthattheresolutionofthecourtenbanconJune5,1963wasnotaviolationofthewritof
preliminaryinjunctionissuedinCaseG.R.No.L21278becausesaidwritofinjunctionwasissuedagainstJudge
Jose S. Bautista and not against the Court of Industrial Relations, much less against Judge Baltazar Villanueva
whowasthetrialjudgeofCaseNo.1183MC.
CASEG.R.NO.L21500
Thiscase,G.R.No.L21500,involvesalsoCIRCaseNo.41IPA.Asearlierstated,CaseNo.41IPArelatestothe
strikestagedbythemembersoftheFacultyClubandthedisputewascertifiedbythePresidentofthePhilippines
totheCIR.TheUniversityfiledamotiontodismissthatcaseuponthegroundthattheCIRhasnojurisdictionover
the case, and on March 30, 1963 Judge Jose S. Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and
declaring that the Industrial Peace Act is applicable to both parties in the case and that the CIR had acquired
jurisdictionoverthecasebyvirtueofthepresidentialcertificationandinthatsameorderJudgeBautistaordered
the strikers to return to work and the University to take them back under the last terms and conditions existing
beforethedisputearoseandenjoinedtheUniversityfromdismissinganyemployeeorlaborerwithoutprevious
authorityfromthecourt.OnApril1,1963,theUniversityfiledamotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofMarch
30,1963bytheCIRenbanc.ThatmotionforreconsiderationwaspendingactionbytheCIRenbancwhenthe
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction in Case G.R. No. L21278 was filed on May 10,
1963.Aswehavealreadystated,thisCourtinsaidcaseG.R.No.L21278,issuedawritofpreliminaryinjunction
on May 10, 1963 ordering respondent Judge Jose S. Bautista, until further order from this Court, to desist and
refrainfromfurtherproceedinginthepremises(CasesNos.41IPA,1183MCandV30oftheCourtofIndustrial
Relations).
On July 2, 1963, the University received a copy of the resolution of the CIR en banc, dated May 7, 1963 but
actually received and stamped at the Office of the Clerk of the CIR on June 28, 1963, denying the motion for
reconsiderationoftheorderdatedMarch30,1963inCaseNo.41IPA.
On July 23, 1963, the University filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, by way of an appeal from the
resolutionoftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsenbancdatedMay7,1963(butactuallyreceivedbysaidpetitioner
onJuly2,1963)denyingthemotionforreconsiderationoftheorderofMarch30,1963inCaseNo.41IPA.This
petitionwasdocketedasG.R.No.L21500.InitspetitionforcertioraritheUniversityalleges(1)thattheresolution
oftheCIRenbanc,datedMay7,1963butfiledwiththeClerkoftheCIRonJune28,1963,inCaseNo.41IPA,is
nullandvoidbecauseitwasissuedinviolationofthewritofpreliminaryinjunctionissuedbythisCourtinG.R.No.
L21278(2)thattheCIR,throughitsPresidingJudge,hadnojurisdictiontotakecognizanceofCaseNo.41IPA
andtheorderofMarch30,1963andtheresolutiondatedMay7,1963issuedthereinarenullandvoid(3)that
thecertificationmadebythePresidentofthePhilippinesisnotauthorizedbySection10ofRepublicAct875,but
is violative thereof (4) that the Faculty Club has no right to unionize or organize as a labor union for collective
bargainingpurposesandtobecertifiedasacollectivebargainingagentwithinthepurviewoftheIndustrialPeace
Act,andconsequentlyithasnorighttostrikeandpicketonthegroundofpetitioner'sallegedrefusaltobargain
collectivelywheresuchdutydoesnotexistinlawandisnotenforceableagainstaneducationalinstitutionand(5)
thatthereturntoworkorderofMarch30,1963isimproperandillegal.Thepetitionprayedthattheproceedings
inCaseNo.41IPAbeannulled,thattheorderdatedMarch30,1963andtheresolutiondatedMay7,1963be
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revoked,andthatthelowercourtbeorderedtodismissCase41IPAonthegroundoflackofjurisdiction.
OnSeptember10,1963,theFacultyClub,throughcounsel,filedamotiontodismissthepetitionforcertiorarion
the ground that the petition being filed by way of an appeal from the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations
denying the motion to dismiss in Case No. 41IPA, the petition for certiorari is not proper because the orders
appealedfromareinterlocutoryinnature.
This Court, by resolution of September 26, 1963, ordered that these three cases (G.R. Nos. L21278, L21462
andL21500)beconsideredtogetherandthemotiontodismissinCaseG.R.No.L21500betakenupwhenthe
casesaredecidedonthemeritsafterthehearing.
Brushing aside certain technical questions raised by the parties in their pleadings, We proceed to decide these
threecasesonthemeritsoftheissuesraised.
The University has raised several issues in the present cases, the pivotal one being its claim that the Court of
IndustrialRelationshasnojurisdictionoverthepartiesandthesubjectmatterinCIRCases41IPA,1183MCand
V30,broughtbeforeit,uponthegroundthatRepublicActNo.875isnotapplicabletotheUniversitybecauseitis
an educational institution and not an industrial establishment and hence not an "employer" in contemplation of
saidActandneitherisRepublicActNo.875applicabletothemembersoftheFacultyClubbecausethelatterare
independentcontractorsand,therefore,notemployeeswithinthepurviewofthesaidAct.
InsupportofthecontentionthatbeinganeducationalinstitutionitisbeyondthescopeofRepublicActNo.875,
theUniversitycitescasesdecidedbythisCourt:Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Juliana Araos, L10091, Jan.
29, 1958 University of San Agustin vs. CIR, et al., L12222, May 28, 1958 Cebu Chinese High School vs.
PhilippineLandAirSeaLaborUnion,PLASLU,L12015,April22,1959LaConsolacionCollege,etal.vs.CIR,et
al.,L13282,April22,1960UniversityofthePhilippines,etal.vs.CIR,etal.,L15416,April8,1960FarEastern
Universityvs.CIR,L17620,August31,1962.Wehavereviewedthesecases,andalsorelatedcasessubsequent
thereto,andWefindthattheydonotsustainthecontentionoftheUniversity.ItistruethatthisCourthasruled
thatcertaineducationalinstitutions,liketheUniversityofSantoTomas,UniversityofSanAgustin,LaConsolacion
College,andotherjuridicalentities,liketheBoyScoutsofthePhilippinesandManilaSanitarium,arebeyondthe
purview of Republic Act No. 875 in the sense that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of charges of unfair labor practice filed against them, but it is nonetheless true that the principal
reasonofthisCourtinrulinginthosecasesthatthoseinstitutionsareexcludedfromtheoperationofRepublicAct
875isthatthoseentitiesarenotorganized,maintainedandoperatedforprofitanddonotdeclaredividendsto
stockholders.ThedecisioninthecaseofUniversityofSanAgustinvs.CourtofIndustrialRelations,G.R.No.L
12222,May28,1958,isverypertinent.Wequoteaportionofthedecision:
ItappearsthattheUniversityofSanAgustin,petitionerherein,isaneducationalinstitutionconductedand
managed by a "religious nonstock corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines."Itwasorganizednotforprofitorgainordivisionofthedividendsamongitsstockholders,but
solelyforreligiousandeducationalpurposes.ItlikewiseappearsthatthePhilippineAssociationofCollege
and University Professors, respondent herein, is a nonstock association composed of professors and
teachersindifferentcollegesanduniversitiesandthatsinceitsorganizationtwoyearsago,theuniversity
has adopted a hostile attitude to its formation and has tried to discriminate, harass and intimidate its
members for which reason the association and the members affected filed the unfair labor practice
complaint which initiated this proceeding. To the complaint of unfair labor practice, petitioner filed an
answerwhereinitdisputedthejurisdictionoftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsoverthecontroversyonthe
followinggrounds:
"(a) That complainants therein being college and/or university professors were not "industrial"
laborers or employees, and the Philippine Association of College and University Professors being
composed of persons engaged in the teaching profession, is not and cannot be a legitimate labor
organizationwithinthemeaningofthelawscreatingtheCourtofIndustrialRelationsanddefiningits
powersandfunctions
"(b) That the University of San Agustin, respondent therein, is notan institution established for the
purpose of gain or division of profits, and consequently, it is not an "industrial" enterprise and the
membersofitsteachingstaffarenotengagedin"industrial"employment(U.S.T.HospitalEmployees
Association vs. Sto. Tomas University Hospital, G.R. No. L6988, 24 May 1954 and San Beda
College vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, G.R. No. L7649, 29 October
195551O.G.(Nov.1955)56365640)
"(c) That, as a necessary consequence, alleged controversy between therein complainants and
respondentisnotan"industrial"dispute,andtheCourtofIndustrialRelationshasnojurisdiction,not
onlyonthepartiesbutalsooverthesubjectmatterofthecomplaint."
Theissuenowbeforeusis:SincetheUniversityofSanAgustinisnotaninstitutionestablishedforprofitor
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gain,noranindustrialenterprise,butoneestablishedexclusivelyforeducationalpurposes,canitbesaid
thatitsrelationwithitsprofessorsisoneofemployerandemployeethatcomesunderthejurisdictionofthe
CourtofIndustrialRelations?Inotherwords,dotheprovisionsoftheMagnaCartaonunfairlaborpractice
applytotherelationbetweenpetitionerandmembersofrespondentassociation?
The issue is not new. Thus, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L
10091,promulgatedonJanuary29,1958,thisCourt,speakingthruMr.JusticeMontemayor,answeredthe
queryinthenegativeinthefollowingwise:
"The main issue involved in the present case is whether or not a charitable institution or one
organized not for profit but for more elevated purposes, charitable, humanitarian, etc., like the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines, is included in the definition of "employer" contained in Republic Act 875,
andwhethertheemployeesofsaidinstitutionfallunderthedefinitionof"employee"alsocontainedin
the same Republic Act. If they are included, then any act which may be considered unfair labor
practice,withinthemeaningofsaidRepublicAct,wouldcomeunderthejurisdictionoftheCourtof
Industrial Relations but if they do not fall within the scope of said Republic Act, particularly, its
definitionsofemployerandemployee,thentheIndustrialCourtwouldhavenojurisdictionatall.
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"On the basis of the foregoing considerations, there is every reason to believe that our labor
legislationfromCommonwealthActNo.103,creatingtheCourtofIndustrialRelations,downthrough
theEightHourLaborLaw,totheIndustrialPeaceAct,wasintendedbytheLegislaturetoapplyonly
to industrial employment and to govern the relations between employers engaged in industry and
occupationsforpurposesofprofitandgain,andtheirindustrialemployees,butnottoorganizations
andentitieswhichareorganized,operatedandmaintainednotforprofitorgain,butforelevatedand
lofty purposes, such as, charity, social service, education and instruction, hospital and medical
service, the encouragement and promotion of character, patriotism and kindred virtues in youth of
thenation,etc.
"Inconclusion,wefindandholdthatRepublicActNo.875,particularly,thatportionthereofregarding
labor disputes and unfair labor practice, does not apply to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and
consequently,theCourtofIndustrialRelationshadnojurisdictiontoentertainanddecidetheaction
orpetitionfiledbyrespondentAraos.Wherefore,theappealeddecisionandresolutionoftheCIRare
herebysetaside,withcostsagainstrespondent."
There being a close analogy between the relation and facts involved in the two cases, we cannot but
concludethattheCourtofIndustrialRelationshasnojurisdictiontoentertainthecomplaintforunfairlabor
practicelodgedbyrespondentassociationagainstpetitionerand,therefore,weherebysetasidetheorder
andresolutionsubjecttothepresentpetition,withcostsagainstrespondentassociation.
The same doctrine was confirmed in the case of University of Santo Tomas v. Hon. Baltazar Villanueva, et al.,
G.R.No.L13748,October30,1959,wherethisCourtruledthat:
In the present case, the record reveals that the petitioner University of Santo Tomas is not an industry
organized for profit but an institution of learning devoted exclusively to the education of the youth. The
CourtofFirstInstanceofManilainitsdecisioninCivilCaseNo.28870,whichhaslongbecomefinaland
consequently the settled law in the case, found as established by the evidence adduced by the parties
therein (herein petitioner and respondent labor union) that while the University collects fees from its
students, all its income is used for the improvement and enlargement of the institution. The University
declares no dividend, and the members of the corporation who founded it, as ordained in its articles of
incorporation,receivenomaterialcompensationforthetimeandsacrificetheyrendertotheUniversityand
its students. The respondent union itself in a case before the Industrial Court (Case No. 314MC) has
averred that "the University of Santo Tomas, like the San Beda College, is an educational institution
operated not for profit but for the sole purpose of educating young men." (See Annex "B" to petitioner's
motiontodismiss.).Itisapparent,therefore,thatonthefaceoftherecordtheUniversityofSantoTomasis
notacorporationcreatedforprofitbutaneducationalinstitutionandthereforenotanindustrialorbusiness
organization.
InthecaseofLaConsolacionCollege,etal.vs.CIR,etal.,G.R.No.L13282,April22,1960,thisCourtrepeated
thesamerulingwhenitsaid:
Themainissueinthisappealbypetitioneristhattheindustrytrialcourtcommittedanerrorinholdingthatit
has jurisdiction to act in this case even if it involves unfair labor practice considering that the La
ConsolacionCollegeisnotabusinessenterprisebutaneducationalinstitutionnotorganizedforprofit.
Iftheclaimthatpetitionerisaneducationalinstitutionnotoperatedforprofitistrue,whichapparentlyisthe
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case, because the very court a quo found that it has no stockholder, nor capital . . . then we are of the
opinionthatthesamedoesnotcomeunderthejurisdictionoftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsinviewofthe
ruling in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana V. Araos, G.R. No. L10091, decided on
January29,1958.
It is noteworthy that the cases of the University of San Agustin, the University of Santo Tomas, and La
ConsolacionCollege,citedabove,allinvolvechargesofunfairlaborpracticeunderRepublicActNo.875,andthe
uniformrulingsofthisCourtarethattheCourtofIndustrialRelationshasnojurisdictionoverthechargesbecause
saidActdoesnotapplytoeducationalinstitutionsthatarenotoperatedormaintainedforprofitanddonotdeclare
dividends.Ontheotherhand,inthecasesofFarEasternUniversityv.CIR,etal.,G.R.No.L17620,August31,
1962,thisCourtupheldthedecisionoftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsfindingtheFarEasternUniversity,alsoan
educational institution, guilty of unfair labor practice. Among the findings of fact in said case was that the Far
Eastern University made profits from the school year 19521953 to 19581959. In affirming the decision of the
lower court, this Court had thereby ratified the ruling of the Court of Industrial Relations which applied the
IndustrialPeaceActtoeducationalinstitutionsthatareorganized,operatedandmaintainedforprofit.
ItisalsonoteworthythatinthedecisionsinthecasesoftheBoyScoutsofthePhilippines,theUniversityofSan
Agustin,theUniversityofSto.Tomas,andLaConsolacionCollege,thisCourtwasnotunanimousintheviewthat
the Industrial Peace Act (Republic Act No. 875) is not applicable to charitable, eleemosynary or nonprofit
organizations which include educational institutions not operated for profit. There are members of this Court
whoholdtheviewthattheIndustrialPeaceActwouldapplyalsotononprofitorganizationsorentitiestheonly
exception being the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof, in so far as
governmental functions are concerned. However, in the Far Eastern University case this Court is unanimous in
supporting the view that an educational institution that is operated for profit comes within the scope of the
Industrial Peace Act. We consider it a settled doctrine of this Court, therefore, that the Industrial Peace Act is
applicabletoanyorganizationorentitywhatevermaybeitspurposewhenitwascreatedthatisoperated
forprofitorgain.
DoestheUniversityoperateasaneducationalinstitutionforprofit?Doesitdeclaredividendsforitsstockholders?
Ifitdoesnot,itmustbedeclaredbeyondthepurviewofRepublicActNo.875butifitdoes,RepublicActNo.875
mustapplytoit.TheUniversityitselfadmitsthatithasdeclareddividends.3TheCIRinitsorderdatedMarch30,
1963 in CIR Case No. 41IPA which order was issued after evidence was heard also found that the
University is not for strictly educational purposes and that "It realizes profits and parts of such earning is
distributedasdividendstoprivatestockholdersorindividuals(Exh.Aandalso1to1F,2x3xand4x)"4Under
thiscircumstance,andinconsonancewiththerulingsinthedecisionsofthisCourt,abovecited,itisobviousthat
RepublicActNo.875isapplicabletohereinpetitionerFeatiUniversity.
ButtheUniversityclaimsthatitisnotanemployerwithinthecontemplationofRepublicActNo.875,becauseitis
not an industrial establishment. At most, it says, it is only a lessee of the services of its professors and/or
instructors pursuant to a contract of services entered into between them. We find no merit in this claim. Let us
clarifywhoisan"employer"undertheAct.Section2(c)ofsaidActprovides:
Sec.2.Definitions.AsusedinthisAct
(c) The term employer include any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shallnotincludeanylabororganization(otherwisethanwhenactingasanemployer)oranyoneactingin
thecapacityoragentofsuchlabororganization.
Itwillbenotedthatindefiningtheterm"employer"theActusestheword"includes",whichitalsousedindefining
"employee".[Sec.2(d)],and"representative"[Sec.2(h)]andnottheword"means"whichtheActusesindefining
theterms"court"[Sec.2(a)],"labororganization"[Sec.2(e)],"legitimatelabororganization[Sec.2(f)],"company
union"[Sec.2(g)],"unfairlaborpractice"[Sec.2(i)],"supervisor"[Sec.2(k)],"strike"[Sec.2(l)]and"lockout"[Sec.
2(m)]. A methodical variation in terminology is manifest. This variation and distinction in terminology and
phraseologycannotbepresumedtohavebeentheinconsequentialproductofanoversightrather,itmusthave
been the result of a deliberate and purposeful act, more so when we consider that as legislative records show,
Republic Act No. 875 had been meticulously and painstakingly drafted and deliberated upon. In using the word
"includes" and not "means", Congress did not intend to give a complete definition of "employer", but rather that
suchdefinitionshouldbecomplementarytowhatiscommonlyunderstoodasemployer.Congressintendedthe
term to be understood in a broad meaning because, firstly, the statutory definition includes not only "a principal
employer but also a person acting in the interest of the employer" and, secondly, the Act itself specifically
enumeratedthosewhoarenotincludedintheterm"employer",namely:(1)alabororganization(otherwisethan
whenactingasanemployer),(2)anyoneactinginthecapacityofofficeroragentofsuchlabororganization[Sec.
2(c)],and(3)theGovernmentandanypoliticalsubdivisionorinstrumentalitythereofinsofarastherighttostrike
for the purpose of securing changes or modifications in the terms and conditions of employment is concerned
(Section 11). Among these statutory exemptions, educational institutions are not included hence, they can be
included in the term "employer". This Court, however, has ruled that those educational institutions that are not
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operatedforprofitarenotwithinthepurviewofRepublicActNo.875.5
Asstatedabove,RepublicActNo.875doesnotgiveacomprehensivebutonlyacomplementarydefinitionofthe
term "employer". The term encompasses those that are in ordinary parlance "employers." What is commonly
meant by "employer"? The term "employer" has been given several acceptations. The lexical definition is "one
whoemploysonewhousesonewhoengagesorkeepsinservice"and"toemploy"is"toprovideworkandpay
fortoengageone'sservicetohire."(Webster'sNewTwentiethCenturyDictionary,2nded.,1960,p.595).The
Workmen's Compensation Act defines employer as including "every person or association of persons,
incorporatedornot,publicorprivate,andthelegalrepresentativeofthedeceasedemployer"and"includesthe
ownerorlesseeofafactoryorestablishmentorplaceofworkoranyotherpersonwhoisvirtuallytheowneror
manager of the business carried on in the establishment or place of work but who, for reason that there is an
independent contractor in the same, or for any other reason, is not the direct employer of laborers employed
there."[Sec.39(a)ofActNo.3428.]TheMinimumWageLawstatesthat"employerincludesanypersonacting
directlyorindirectlyintheinterestoftheemployerinrelationtoanemployeeandshallincludetheGovernment
and the government corporations". [Rep. Act No. 602, Sec. 2(b)]. The Social Security Act defines employer as
"anyperson,naturalorjuridical,domesticorforeign,whocarriesinthePhilippinesanytrade,business,industry,
undertaking,oractivityofanykindandusestheservicesofanotherpersonwhoisunderhisordersasregards
the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
includingcorporationsownedorcontrolledbytheGovernment."(Rep.ActNo.1161,Sec.8[c]).
ThisCourt,inthecasesoftheTheAngatRiverIrrigationSystem,etal.vs.AngatRiverWorkers'Union(PLUM),
etal.,G.R.Nos.L10934andL10944,December28,1957,whichcasesinvolveunfairlaborpracticesandhence
withinthepurviewofRepublicActNo.875,definedthetermemployerasfollows:
Anemployerisonewhoemploystheservicesofothersoneforwhomemployeesworkandwhopaystheir
wagesorsalaries(BlackLawDictionary,4thed.,p.618).
Anemployerincludesanypersonactingintheinterestofanemployer,directlyorindirectly(Sec.2c,Rep.
Act875).
Under none of the above definitions may the University be excluded, especially so if it is considered that every
professor,instructororteacherintheteachingstaffoftheUniversity,asperallegationoftheUniversityitself,has
acontractwiththelatterforteachingservices,albeitforonesemesteronly.TheUniversityengagedtheservices
of the professors, provided them work, and paid them compensation or salary for their services. Even if the
UniversitymaybeconsideredasalesseeofservicesunderacontractbetweenitandthemembersofitsFaculty,
stillitisincludedintheterm"employer"."Runningthroughtheword`employ'isthethoughtthattherehasbeen
anagreementonthepartofonepersontoperformacertainserviceinreturnforcompensationtobepaidbyan
employer. When you ask how a man is employed, or what is his employment, the thought that he is under
agreement to perform some service or services for another is predominant and paramount." (Ballentine Law
Dictionary,Philippineed.,p.430,citingPinkertonNationalDetectiveAgencyv.Walker,157Ga.548,35A.L.R.
557,560,122S.E.Rep.202).
TobolsteritsclaimofexceptionfromtheapplicationofRepublicActNo.875,theUniversitycontendsthatitisnot
statethattheemployersincludedinthedefinitionof2(c)oftheAct.Thiscontentioncannotbesustained.Inthe
firstplace,Sec.2(c)ofRepublicActNo.875doesnotstatethattheemployersincludedinthedefinitionofthe
term "employer" are only and exclusively "industrial establishments" on the contrary, as stated above, the term
"employer"encompassesallemployersexceptthosespecificallyexcludedbytheAct.Inthesecondplace,even
the Act itself does not refer exclusively to industrial establishments and does not confine its application thereto.
ThisispatentinasmuchasseveralprovisionsoftheActareapplicabletononindustrialworkers,suchasSec.3,
whichdealswith"employees'righttoselforganization"Sections4and5whichenumerateunfairlaborpractices
Section8whichnullifiesprivatecontractscontraveningemployee'srightsSection9whichrelatestoinjunctionsin
any case involving a labor dispute Section 11 which prohibits strikes in the government Section 12 which
providesfortheexclusivecollectivebargainingrepresentationforlabororganizationsSection14whichdealswith
the procedure for collective bargaining Section 17 which treats of the rights and conditions of membership in
labor organizations Sections 18, 19, 20 and 21 which provide respectively for the establishment of conciliation
service, compilation of collective bargaining contracts, advisory labormanagement relations Section 22 which
empowerstheSecretaryofLabortomakeastudyoflaborrelationsandSection24whichenumeratestherights
oflabororganizations.(SeeDissentingOpinionofJusticeConcepcioninBoyScoutsofthePhilippinesv.Juliana
Araos,G.R.No.L10091,January29,1958.)
ThisCourt,inthecaseofBoyScoutsofthePhilippinesv.Araos,supra,hadoccasiontostatethattheIndustrial
Peace Act "refers only to organizations and entities created and operated for profits, engaged in a profitable
trade,occupationorindustry".Itcannotbedeniedthatrunningauniversityengagestimeandattentionthatitis
anoccupationorabusinessfromwhichtheoneengagedinitmayderiveprofitorgain.TheUniversityisnotan
industrial establishment in the sense that an industrial establishment is one that is engaged in manufacture or
trade where raw materials are changed or fashioned into finished products for use. But for the purposes of the
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IndustrialPeaceActtheUniversityisanindustrialestablishmentbecauseitisoperatedforprofitanditemploys
persons who work to earn a living. The term "industry", for the purposes of the application of our labor laws
shouldbegivenabroadmeaningsoastocoverallenterpriseswhichareoperatedforprofitandwhichengage
theservicesofpersonswhoworktoearnaliving.
The word "industry" within State Labor Relations Act controlling labor relations in industry, cover labor
conditions in any field of employment where the objective is earning a livelihood on the one side and
gainingofaprofitontheother.LaborLawSec.700etseq.StateLaborRelationsBoardvs.McChesney,27
N.Y.S.2d866,868."(WordsandPhrases,PermanentEdition,Vol.21,1960editionp.510).
The University urges that even if it were an employer, still there would be no employeremployee relationship
betweenitandthestrikingmembersoftheFacultyClubbecausethelatterarenotemployeeswithinthepurview
ofSec.2(d)ofRepublicActNo.875butareindependentcontractors.Thisclaimisuntenable.
Section2(d)ofRepublicActNo.875provides:
(d)Theterm"employee"shallincludeanyemployeeandshallnotbelimitedtotheemployeeofaparticular
employerunlesstheactexplicitlystatesotherwiseandshallincludeanyindividualwhoseworkhasceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practiceandwhohasnotobtainedanyothersubstantiallyequivalentandregularemployment.
This definition is again, like the definition of the term "employer" [Sec. 2(c)], by the use of the term "include",
complementary.Itembracesnotonlythosewhoareusuallyandordinarilyconsideredemployees,butalsothose
whohaveceasedasemployeesasaconsequenceofalabordispute.Theterm"employee",furthermore,isnot
limitedtothoseofaparticularemployer.Asalreadystated,thisCourtinthecasesofTheAngatRiverIrrigation
System,etal.v.AngatRiverWorkers'Union(PLUM),etal.,supra,hasdefinedtheterm"employer"as"onewho
employs the services of others one for whom employees work and who pays their wages or salaries.
"Correlatively, an employee must be one who is engaged in the service of another who performs services for
another who works for salary or wages. It is admitted by the University that the striking professors and/or
instructors are under contract to teach particular courses and that they are paid for their services. They are,
therefore,employeesoftheUniversity.
InsupportofitsclaimthatthemembersoftheFacultyClubarenotemployeesoftheUniversity,thelattercitesas
authorityFrancisco'sLaborLaws,2nded.,p.3,whichstates:
Whiletheterm"workers"asusedinaparticularstatute,hasbeenregardedaslimitedtothoseperforming
physical labor, it has been held to embrace stenographers and bookkeepers. Teachers are not included,
however.
It is evident from the abovequoted authority that "teachers" are not to be included among those who perform
"physicallabor",butitdoesnotmeanthattheyarenotemployees.Wehavecheckedthesourceoftheauthority,
whichis31Am.Jur.,Sec.3,p.835,andthelattercitesHuntworthv.Tanner,87Wash670,152P.523,AnnCas
1917D676.AreadingofthelastcaseconfirmsOurview.
That teachers are "employees' has been held in a number of cases (Aebli v. Board of Education of City and
County of San Francisco, 145 P. 2d 601, 62 Col. App 2.d 706 Lowe & Campbell Sporting Goods Co. v.
TangipahoaParishSchoolBoard,La.App.,15So.2d98,100SisterOdeliav.ChurchofSt.Andrew,263N.W.
111,112,195Minn.357,citedinWordsandPhrases,Permanented.,Vol.14,pp.806807).ThisCourtintheFar
Eastern University case, supra, considered university instructors as employees and declared Republic Act No.
875 applicable to them in their employment relations with their school. The professors and/or instructors of the
University neither ceased to be employees when they struck, for Section 2 of Rep. Act 875 includes among
employees any individual whose work has ceased as consequence of, or in connection with a current labor
dispute.Strikingemployeesmaintaintheirstatusasemployeesoftheemployer.(WesternCartridgeCo.v.NLRB,
C.C.A.7,139F2d855,858).
ThecontentionoftheUniversitythattheprofessorsand/orinstructorsareindependentcontractors,becausethe
Universitydoesnotexercisecontrolovertheirwork,islikewiseuntenable.ThisCourttakesjudicialnoticethata
universitycontrolstheworkofthemembersofitsfacultythatauniversityprescribesthecoursesorsubjectsthat
professors teach, and when and where to teach that the professors' work is characterized by regularity and
continuityforafixeddurationthatprofessorsarecompensatedfortheirservicesbywagesandsalaries,rather
thanbyprofitsthattheprofessorsand/orinstructorscannotsubstituteotherstodotheirworkwithouttheconsent
of the university and that the professors can be laid off if their work is found not satisfactory. All these indicate
that the university has control over their work and professors are, therefore, employees and not independent
contractors.Thereareauthoritiesinsupportofthisview.
The principal consideration in determining whether a workman is an employee or an independent
contractoristherighttocontrolthemannerofdoingthework,anditisnottheactualexerciseoftheright
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byinterferingwiththework,buttherighttocontrol,whichconstitutesthetest.(AmalgamatedRoofingCo.v.
Travelers'Ins.Co.,133N.E.259,261,300Ill.487,quotedinWordsandPhrases,Permanented.,Vol.14,
p.576).
Where, under Employers' Liability Act, A was instructed when and where to work . . . he is an employee,
and not a contractor, though paid specified sum per square. (Heine v. Hill, Harris & Co., 2 La. App. 384,
390,inWordsandPhrases,loc,cit.).
Employees are those who are compensated for their labor or services by wages rather than by profits.
(Peoplevs.DistributorsDivision,SmokedFishWorkersUnionLocalNo.20377,Sup.7N.Y.S.2d185,187
inWordsandPhrases,loc,cit.)
Servicesofemployeeorservant,asdistinguishedfromthoseofacontractor,areusuallycharacterizedby
regularity and continuity of work for a fixed period or one of indefinite duration, as contrasted with
employmenttodoasingleactoraseriesofisolatedactsbycompensationonafixedsalaryratherthan
oneregulatedbyvalueoramountofwork...(Underwoodv.CommissionerofInternalRevenue,C.C.A.,
56F.2d67,71inWordsandPhrases,op.cit.,p.579.)
Independentcontractorscanemployotherstoworkandaccomplishcontemplatedresultwithoutconsentof
contractee,while"employee"cannotsubstituteanotherinhisplacewithoutconsentofhisemployer.(Luker
Sand&GravelCo.v.IndustrialCommission,23P.2d225,82Utah,188,inWordsandPhrases,Vol.14,p.
576).
Moreover, even if university professors are considered independent contractors, still they would be covered by
Rep. Act No. 875. In the case of the Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Juliana Araos,supra, this Court observed
thatRepublicActNo.875wasmodelledaftertheWagnerAct,ortheNationalLaborRelationsAct,oftheUnited
States, and this Act did not exclude "independent contractors" from the orbit of "employees". It was in the
subsequentlegislationtheLaborManagementRelationAct(TaftHarley
Act) that "independent contractors" together with agricultural laborers, individuals in domestic service of the
home,supervisors,andotherswereexcluded.(SeeRothenbergonLaborRelations,1949,pp.330331).
It having been shown that the members of the Faculty Club are employees, it follows that they have a right to
unionizeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofSection3oftheMagnaCartaofLabor(RepublicActNo.875)which
providesasfollows:
Sec. 3. Employees' right to selforganization.Employees shall have the right to selforganization and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collectivebargainingandothermutualaidorprotection....
Weagreewiththestatementofthelowercourt,initsorderofMarch30,1963whichissoughttobesetasidein
theinstantcase,thattherightofemployeestoselforganizationisguaranteedbytheConstitution,thatsaidright
wouldexistevenifRepublicActNo.875isrepealed,andthatregardlessofwhethertheiremployersareengaged
incommerceornot.Indeed,itisOurconsideredviewthatthemembersofthefacultyorteachingstaffofprivate
universities,colleges,andschoolsinthePhilippines,regardlessofwhethertheuniversity,collegeorschoolisrun
forprofitornot,areincludedintheterm"employees"ascontemplatedinRepublicActNo.875andassuchthey
mayorganizethemselvespursuanttotheabovequotedprovisionofSection3ofsaidAct.Certainly,professors,
instructorsorteachersofprivateeducationalinstitutionswhoteachtoearnalivingareentitledtotheprotectionof
ourlaborlawsandonesuchlawisRepublicActNo.875.
ThecontentionoftheUniversityintheinstantcasethatthemembersoftheFacultyClubcannotunionizeandthe
Faculty Club can not exist as a valid labor organization is, therefore, without merit. The record shows that the
FacultyClubisadulyregisteredlabororganizationandthisfactisadmittedbycounselfortheUniversity.5a
TheotherissueraisedbytheUniversityisthevalidityofthePresidentialcertification.TheUniversitycontendsthat
underSection10ofRepublicActNo.875thepowerofthePresidentofthePhilippinestocertifyissubjecttothe
followingconditions,namely:(1)thathereisalabordispute,and(2)thatsaidlabordisputeexistsinanindustry
that is vital to the national interest. The University maintains that those conditions do not obtain in the instant
case.Thiscontentionhasalsonomerit.
We have previously stated that the University is an establishment or enterprise that is included in the term
"industry"andiscoveredbytheprovisionsofRepublicActNo.875.Now,wastherealabordisputebetweenthe
UniversityandtheFacultyClub?
RepublicActNo.875definesalabordisputeasfollows:
Theterm"labordispute"includesanycontroversyconcerningterms,tenureorconditionsofemployment,
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orconcerningtheassociationorrepresentationofpersonsinnegotiating,fixing,maintaining,changing,or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether the disputants stand in
proximaterelationofemployerandemployees.
The test of whether a controversy comes within the definition of "labor dispute" depends on whether the
controversyinvolvesorconcerns"terms,tenureorconditionofemployment"or"representation."Itisadmittedby
the University, in the instant case, that on January 14, 1963 the President of the Faculty Club wrote to the
President of the University a letter informing the latter of the organization of the Faculty Club as a labor union,
duly registered with the Bureau of Labor Relations that again on January 22, 1963 another letter was sent, to
whichwasattachedalistofdemandsconsistingof26items,andaskingthePresidentoftheUniversitytoanswer
withintendaysfromdateofreceiptthereofthattheUniversityquestionedtherightoftheFacultyClubtobethe
exclusive representative of the majority of the employees and asked proof that the Faculty Club had been
designated or selected as exclusive representative by the vote of the majority of said employees that on
February1,1963theFacultyClubfiledwiththeBureauofLaborRelationsanoticeofstrikeallegingasreason
therefortherefusaloftheUniversitytobargaincollectivelywiththerepresentativeofthefacultymembersthaton
February18,1963themembersoftheFacultyClubwentonstrikeandestablishedpicketlinesinthepremisesof
theUniversity,therebydisruptingthescheduleofclassesthatonMarch1,1963theFacultyClubfiledCaseNo.
3666ULP for unfair labor practice against the University, but which was later dismissed (on April 2, 1963 after
Case 41IPA was certified to the CIR) and that on March 7, 1963 a petition for certification election, Case No.
1183MC,wasfiledbytheFacultyClubintheCIR.6Alltheseadmittedfactsshowthatthecontroversybetween
the University and the Faculty Club involved terms and conditions of employment, and the question of
representation.Hence,therewasalabordisputebetweentheUniversityandtheFacultyClub,ascontemplated
byRepublicActNo.875.IthavingbeenshownthattheUniversityisaninstitutionoperatedforprofit,thatisan
employer,andthatthereisanemployeremployeerelationship,betweentheUniversityandthemembersofthe
FacultyClub,andithavingbeenshownthatalabordisputeexistedbetweentheUniversityandtheFacultyClub,
thecontentionoftheUniversity,thatthecertificationmadebythePresidentisnotonlynotauthorizedbySection
10ofRepublicAct875butisviolativethereof,isgroundless.
Section10ofRepublicActNo.875provides:
When in the opinion of the President of the Philippines there exists a labor dispute in an industry
indispensabletothenationalinterestandwhensuchlabordisputeiscertifiedbythePresidenttotheCourt
ofIndustrialRelations,saidCourtmaycausetobeissuedarestrainingorderforbiddingtheemployeesto
strikeortheemployertolockouttheemployees,andifnoothersolutiontothedisputeisfound,theCourt
mayissueanorderfixingthetermsandconditionsofemployment.
ThisCourthadoccasiontoruleontheapplicationoftheabovequotedprovisionofSection10ofRepublicActNo.
875.InthecaseofPampangaSugarDevelopmentCo.v.CIR,etal.,G.R.No.L13178,March24,1961,itwas
held:
ItthusappearsthatwhenintheopinionofthePresidentalabordisputeexistsinanindustryindispensable
tonationalinterestandhecertifiesittotheCourtofIndustrialRelationsthelatteracquiresjurisdictiontoact
thereon in the manner provided by law. Thus the court may take either of the following courses: it may
issueanorderforbiddingtheemployeestostrikeortheemployertolockoutitsemployees,or,failinginthis,
itmayissueanorderfixingthetermsandconditionsofemployment.Ithasnootheralternative.Itcannot
throwthecaseoutintheassumptionthatthecertificationwaserroneous.
xxxxxxxxx
...Thefact,however,isthatbecauseofthestrikedeclaredbythemembersoftheminorityunionwhich
threatensamajorindustrythePresidentdeemeditwisetocertifythecontroversytotheCourtofIndustrial
Relationsforadjudication.ThisisthepowerthatthelawgivestothePresidenttheproprietyofitsexercise
being a matter that only devolves upon him. The same is not the concern of the industrial court. What
mattersisthatbyvirtueofthecertificationmadebythePresidentthecasewasplacedunderthejurisdiction
ofsaidcourt.(Emphasissupplied)
To certify a labor dispute to the CIR is the prerogative of the President under the law, and this Court will not
interfere in, much less curtail, the exercise of that prerogative. The jurisdiction of the CIR in a certified case is
exclusive(RizalCementCo.,Inc.v.RizalCementWorkersUnion(FFW),etal.,G.R.No.L12747,July30,1960).
Oncethejurisdictionisacquiredpursuanttothepresidentialcertification,theCIRmayexerciseitsbroadpowers
asprovidedinCommonwealthAct103.Allphasesofthelabordisputeandtheemployeremployeerelationship
maybethreshedoutbeforetheCIR,andtheCIRmayissuesuchorderorordersasmaybenecessarytomake
effectivetheexerciseofitsjurisdiction.ThepartiesinvolvedinthecasemayappealtotheSupremeCourtfrom
theorderorordersthusissuedbytheCIR.
And so, in the instant case, when the President took into consideration that the University "has some 18,000
studentsandemployedapproximately500facultymembers",that`thecontinueddisruptionintheoperationofthe
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Universitywillnecessarilyprejudicethethousandofstudents",andthat"thedisputeaffectsthenationalinterest",7
andcertifiedthedisputetotheCIR,itisnotfortheCIRnorthisCourttopassuponthecorrectnessofthereasons
ofthePresidentincertifyingthelabordisputetotheCIR.
ThethirdissueraisedbytheUniversityreferstothequestionofthelegalityofthereturntoworkorder(ofMarch
30,1963inCase41IPA)andtheorderimplementingthesame(ofApril6,1963).Itallegesthattheordersare
illegal upon the grounds: (1) that Republic Act No. 875, supplementing Commonwealth Act No. 103, has
withdrawnfromtheCIRthepowertoissueareturntoworkorder(2)thattheonlypowergrantedbySection10
of Republic Act No. 875 to the CIR is to issue an order forbidding the employees to strike or forbidding the
employertolockouttheemployees,asthecasemaybe,beforeeithercontingencyhadbecomeafaitaccompli
(3)thatthetakinginbytheUniversityofreplacementprofessorswasvalid,andthereturntoworkorderofMarch
30,1963constitutedimpairmentoftheobligationofcontractsand(4)theCIRcouldnotissuesaidorderwithout
havingpreviouslydeterminedthelegalityorillegalityofthestrike.
The contention of the University that Republic Act No. 875 has withdrawn the power of the Court of Industrial
RelationstoissueareturntoworkorderexercisedbyitunderCommonwealthActNo.103cannotbesustained.
WhenacaseiscertifiedbythePresidenttotheCourtofIndustrialRelations,thecasetherebycomesunderthe
operationofCommonwealthActNo.103,andtheCourtmayexercisethebroadpowersandjurisdictiongranted
toitbysaidAct.Section10ofRepublicActNo.875empowerstheCourtofIndustrialRelationstoissueanorder
"fixingthetermsofemployment."ThisclauseisbroadenoughtoauthorizetheCourttoorderthestrikerstoreturn
toworkandtheemployertoreadmitthem.ThisCourt,inthecasesofthePhilippineMarineOfficersAssociation
vs. The Court of Industrial Relations, Compania Maritima, et al. and Compaia Martima, et al. vs. Philippine
MarineRadioOfficersAssociationandCIR,etal.,G.R.Nos.L10095andL10115,October31,1957,declared:
We cannot subscribe to the above contention. We agree with counsel for the Philippine Radio Officers'
AssociationthatuponcertificationbythePresidentunderSection10ofRepublicAct875,thecasecomes
under the operation of Commonwealth Act 103, which enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor
disputes in industries indispensable to the national interest when the President certifies the case to the
CourtofIndustrialRelations.TheevidentintentionofthelawistoempowertheCourtofIndustrialRelations
toactinsuchcases,notonlyinthemannerprescribedunderCommonwealthAct103,butwiththesame
broadpowersandjurisdictiongrantedbythatact.IftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsisgrantedauthorityto
find a solution to an industrial dispute and such solution consists in the ordering of employees to return
back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of Industrial Relations does not have the power or
jurisdictiontocarrythatsolutionintoeffect.Andofwhatuseisitspowerofconciliationandarbitrationifit
doesnothavethepowerandjurisdictiontocarryintoeffectthesolutionithasadopted?Lastly,ifthesaid
courthasthepowertofixthetermsandconditionsofemployment,itcertainlycanorderthereturnofthe
workerswithorwithoutbackpayasatermorconditionofemployment.
TheforegoingrulingwasreiteratedbythisCourtinthecaseofHindSugarCo.v.CIR,etal.,G.R.No.L13364,
July26,1960.
WhenacaseiscertifiedtotheCIRbythePresidentofthePhilippinespursuanttoSection10ofRepublicActNo.
875, the CIR is granted authority to find a solution to the industrial dispute and the solution which the CIR has
found under the authority of the presidential certification and conformable thereto cannot be questioned (Radio
OperatorsAssociationofthePhilippinesvs.PhilippineMarineRadioOfficersAssociation,etal.,L10112,Nov.29,
1957,54O.G.3218).
UntenablealsoistheclaimoftheUniversitythattheCIRcannotissueareturntoworkorderafterstrikehasbeen
declared,itbeingcontendedthatunderSection10ofRepublicActNo.875theCIRcanonlypreventastrikeora
lockoutwheneitherofthissituationhadnotyetoccurred.ButinthecaseofBisayaLandTransportationCo.,
Inc.vs.CourtofIndustrialRelations,etal.,No.L10114,Nov.26,1957,50O.G.2518,thisCourtdeclared:
ThereisnoreasonorgroundforthecontentionthatPresidentialcertificationoflabordisputetotheCIRis
limitedtothepreventionofstrikesandlockouts.EvenafterastrikehasbeendeclaredwherethePresident
believesthatpublicinterestdemandsarbitrationandconciliation,thePresidentmaycertifytheeaseforthat
purpose.ThepracticehasbeenfortheCourtofIndustrialRelationstoorderthestrikerstowork,pending
thedeterminationoftheuniondemandsthatimpelledthestrike.Thereisnothinginthelawtoindicatethat
thispracticeisabolished."(Emphasissupplied)
Likewise untenable is the contention of the University that the taking in by it of replacements was valid and the
returntowork order would be an impairment of its contract with the replacements. As stated by the CIR in its
order of March 30, 1963, it was agreed before the hearing of Case 41IPA on March 23, 1963 that the strikers
wouldreturntoworkunderthestatusquoarrangementandtheUniversitywouldreadmitthem,andthereturnto
work order was a confirmation of that agreement. This is a declaration of fact by the CIR which we cannot
disregard. The faculty members, by striking, have not abandoned their employment but, rather, they have only
ceasedfromtheirlabor(KeithTheatrev.Vachonetal.,187A.692).Thestrikingfacultymembershavenotlost
their right to go back to their positions, because the declaration of a strike is not a renunciation of their
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employmentandtheiremployeerelationshipwiththeUniversity(RexTaxicabCo.vs.CIR,etal.,40O.G.,No.13,
138).TheemploymentofreplacementswasnotauthorizedbytheCIR.Atmost,thatwasatemporaryexpedient
resorted to by the University, which was subject to the power of the CIR to allow to continue or not. The
employmentofreplacementsbytheUniversitypriortotheissuanceoftheorderofMarch30,1963didnotvestin
the replacements a permanent right to the positions they held. Neither could such temporary employment bind
theUniversitytoretainpermanentlythereplacements.
Striking employees maintained their status as employees of the employer (Western Castridge Co. v.
NationalLaborRelationsBoard,C.C.A.139F.2d855,858)thatemployeeswhotooktheplaceofstrikers
donotdisplacethemas`employees."'(NationalLaborRelationsBoardv.A.Sartorius&Co.,C.C.A.2,140
F.2d203,206,207.)
Itisclearfromwhathasbeensaidthatthereturntoworkordercannotbeconsideredasanimpairmentofthe
contractenteredintobypetitionerwiththereplacements.Besides,laborcontractsmustyieldtothecommongood
and such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and similar
subjects(Article1700,CivilCode).
LikewiseunsustainableisthecontentionoftheUniversitythattheCourtofIndustrialRelationscouldnotissuethe
returntoworkorderwithouthavingresolvedpreviouslytheissueofthelegalityorillegalityofthestrike,citingas
authoritythereforthecaseofPhilippineCanCompanyv.CourtofIndustrialRelations,G.R.No.L3021,July13,
1950.Therulinginsaidcaseisnotapplicabletothecaseatbar,thefactsandcircumstancesbeingverydifferent.
The Philippine Can Company case, unlike the instant case, did not involve the national interest and it was not
certifiedbythePresident.Inthatcasethecompanynolongerneededtheservicesofthestrikers,nordiditneed
substitutesforthestrikers,becausethecompanywaslosing,anditwasimperativethatitlayoffsuchlaborersas
werenotnecessaryforitsoperationinordertosavethecompanyfrombankruptcy.Thiswasthereasonofthis
Court in ruling, in that case, that the legality or illegality of the strike should have been decided first before the
issuanceofthereturntoworkorder.TheUniversity,inthecasebeforeUs,doesnotclaimthatitnolongerneeds
theservicesofprofessorsand/orinstructorsneitherdoesitclaimthatitwasimperativeforittolayoffthestriking
professorsandinstructorsbecauseofimpendingbankruptcy.Onthecontrary,itwasimperativefortheUniversity
tohirereplacementsforthestrikers.Therefore,therulinginthePhilippineCancasethatthelegalityofthestrike
shouldbedecidedfirstbeforetheissuanceofthereturntoworkorderdoesnotapplytothecaseatbar.Besides,
asWehaveadvertedto,thereturntoworkorderofMarch30,1963,nowinquestion,wasaconfirmationofan
agreementbetweentheUniversityandtheFacultyClubduringaprehearingconferenceonMarch23,1963.
TheUniversityalsomaintainsthattherewasnomorebasisfortheclaimofthemembersoftheFacultyClubto
returntotheirwork,astheirindividualcontractsforteachinghadexpiredonMarch25or31,1963,asthecase
may be, and consequently, there was also no basis for the returntowork order of the CIR because the
contractualrelationshipshavingceasedtherewerenopositionstowhichthemembersoftheFacultyClubcould
return to. This contention is not well taken. This argument loses sight of the fact that when the professors and
instructorsstruckonFebruary18,1963,theycontinuedtobeemployeesoftheUniversityforthepurposesofthe
laborcontroversynotwithstandingthesubsequentterminationoftheirteachingcontracts,forSection2(d)ofthe
IndustrialPeaceActincludesamongemployees"anyindividualwhoseworkhasceasedaconsequenceof,orin
connection with, any current labor dispute or of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other
substantiallyequivalentandregularemployment."
The question raised by the University was resolved in a similar case in the United States. In the case of Rapid
RollerCo.v.NLRB126F.2d452,weread:
On May 9, 1939 the striking employees, eightyfour in number, offered to the company to return to their
employment.Thecompanybelievingithadnotcommittedanyunfairlaborpractice,refusedtheemployees'
offer and claimed the right to employ others to take the place of the strikers, as it might see fit. This
constituteddiscriminationinthehiringandtenureofthestrikingemployees.Whentheemployeeswentout
onastrikebecauseoftheunfairlaborpracticeofthecompany,theirstatusasemployeesforthepurpose
ofanycontroversygrowingoutofthatunfairlaborpracticewasfixed.Sec.2(3)oftheAct.PhelpsDodge
Corp.v.NationalLaborRelationsBoard,313U.S.177,61S.Ct.845,85.L.ed.1271,133A.L.R.1217.
Forthepurposeofsuchcontroversytheyremainedemployeesofthecompany.Thecompanycontended
thattheycouldnotbetheiremployeesinanyeventsincethe"contractoftheiremploymentexpiredbyits
owntermsonApril23,1939."
In this we think the company is mistaken for the reason we have just pointed out, that the status of the
employees on strike became fixed under Sec. 2 (3) of the Act because of the unfair labor practice of the
companywhichcausedthestrike.
The University, furthermore, claims that the information for indirect contempt filed against the officers of the
University (Case No. V30) as well as the order of April 29, 1963 for their arrest were improper, irregular and
illegal because (1) the officers of the University had complied in good faith with the returntowork order and in
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G.R.No.L21278
thosecasesthattheydidnot,itwasduetocircumstancebeyondtheircontrol(2)thereturntoworkorderand
theorderimplementingthesamewereillegaland(3)evenassumingthattheorderwaslegal,thesamewasnot
Yetfinalbecausetherewasamotiontoreconsiderit.
AgainWefindnomeritinthisclaimofPetitioner.WehavealreadyruledthattheCIRhadjurisdictiontoissuethe
order of March 30, 1963 in CIR Case 41IPA, and the returntowork provision of that order is valid and legal.
NecessarilytheorderofApril6,1963implementingthatorderofMarch30,1963wasalsovalidandlegal.
Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 empowers the Court of Industrial Relations of any Judge thereof to
punishdirectandindirectcontemptsasprovidedinRule64(nowRule71)oftheRulesofCourt,underthesame
procedure and penalties provided therein. Section 3 of Rule 71 enumerates the acts which would constitute
indirect contempt, among which is "disobedience or resistance to lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or
commandofacourt,"andthepersonguiltythereofcanbepunishedafterawrittenchargehasbeenfiledandthe
accusedhasbeengivenanopportunitytobeheard.Thelastparagraphofsaidsectionprovides:
Butnothinginthissectionshallbesoconstruedastopreventthecourtfromissuingprocesstobringthe
accusedpartyintocourt,orfromholdinghimincustodypendingsuchproceedings.
Theprovisionauthorizesthejudgetoorderthearrestofanallegedcontemner(Francisco,etal.v.Enriquez,L
7058,March20,1954,94Phil.,603)andthis,apparently,istheprovisionuponwhichrespondentJudgeBautista
reliedwhenheissuedthequestionedorderofarrest.
The contention of petitioner that the order of arrest is illegal is unwarranted. The returntowork order allegedly
violatedwaswithinthecourt'sjurisdictiontoissue.
Section14ofCommonwealthActNo.103providesthatincasesbroughtbeforetheCourtofIndustrialRelations
underSection4oftheAct(referringtostrikesandlockouts)theappealtotheSupremeCourtfromanyaward,
orderordecisionshallnotstaytheexecutionofsaidaward,orderordecisionsoughttobereviewedunlessfor
special reason the court shall order that execution be stayed. Any award, order or decision that is appealed is
necessarilynotfinal.YetunderSection14ofCommonwealthActNo.103thataward,orderordecision,evenif
notyetfinal,isexecutory,andthestayofexecutionisdiscretionarywiththeCourtofIndustrialRelations.Inother
words, the Court of Industrial Relations, in cases involving strikes and lockouts, may compel compliance or
obedience of its award, order or decision even if the award, order or decision is not yet final because it is
appealed,anditfollowsthatanydisobedienceornoncomplianceoftheaward,orderordecisionwouldconstitute
contemptagainsttheCourtofIndustrialRelationswhichthecourtmaypunishasprovidedintheRulesofCourt.
ThispoweroftheCourtofIndustrialRelationstopunishforcontemptanactofnoncomplianceordisobedience
ofanaward,orderordecision,evenifnotyetfinal,isaspecialoneandisexercisedonlyincasesinvolvingstrikes
and lockouts. And there is reason for this special power of the industrial court because in the exercise of its
jurisdiction over cases involving strikes and lockouts the court has to issue orders or make decisions that are
necessary to effect a prompt solution of the labor dispute that caused the strike or the lockout, or to effect the
promptcreationofasituationthatwouldbemostbeneficialtothemanagementandtheemployees,andalsoto
thepublicevenifthesolutionmaybetemporary,pendingthefinaldeterminationofthecase.Otherwise,ifthe
effectivenessofanyorder,award,ordecisionoftheindustrialcourtincasesinvolvingstrikesandlockoutswould
besuspendedpendingappealthenitcanhappenthatthecoercivepowersoftheindustrialcourtinthesettlement
ofthelabordisputesinthosecaseswouldberendereduselessandnugatory.
TheUniversitypointstoSection6ofCommonwealthActNo.103whichprovidesthat"Anyviolationofanyorder,
award,ordecisionoftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsshallaftersuchorder,awardordecisionhasbecomefinal,
conclusiveandexecutoryconstitute contempt of court," and contends that only the disobedience of orders that
arefinal(meaningonethatisnotappealed)maybethesubjectofcontemptproceedings.Webelievethatthereis
no inconsistency between the abovequoted provision of Section 6 and the provision of Section 14 of
CommonwealthActNo.103.ItwillbenotedthatSection6speaksoforder,awardordecisionthatisexecutory.
BytheprovisionofSection14anorder,awardordecisionoftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsincasesinvolving
strikes and lockouts are immediately executory, so that a violation of that order would constitute an indirect
contemptofcourt.
We believe that the action of the CIR in issuing the order of arrest of April 29, 1963 is also authorized under
Section19ofCommonwealthActNo.103whichprovidesasfollows:
SEC. 19. Implied condition in every contract of employment.In every contract of employment whether
verbalorwritten,itisanimpliedconditionthatwhenanydisputebetweentheemployerandtheemployee
orlaborerhasbeensubmittedtotheCourtofIndustrialRelationsforsettlementorarbitrationpursuantto
theprovisionsofthisAct...andpendingaward,ordecisionbytheCourtofsuchdispute...theemployee
orlaborershallnotstrikeorwalkoutofhisemploymentwhensoenjoinedbytheCourtafterhearingand
when public interest so requires, and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon
order of the Court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so requires or when the
disputecannot,initsopinion,bepromptlydecidedorsettledandiftheemployeesorlaborersfailtoreturn
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G.R.No.L21278
to work, the Court may authorize the employer to accept other employees or laborers. A condition shall
further be implied that while such dispute . . . is pending, the employer shall refrain from accepting other
employeesorlaborers,unlesswiththeexpressauthorityoftheCourt,andshallpermitthecontinuationin
the service of his employees or laborers under the last terms and conditions existing before the dispute
arose. . . . A violation by the employer or by the employee or laborer of such an order or the implied
contractual condition set forth in this section shall constitute contempt of the Court of Industrial Relations
and shall be punished by the Court itself in the same manner with the same penalties as in the case of
contemptofaCourtofFirstInstance....
WeholdthattheCIRactedwithinitsjurisdictionwhenitorderedthearrestoftheofficersoftheUniversityupona
complaintforindirectcontemptfiledbytheActingSpecialProsecutoroftheCIRinCIRCaseV30,andthatorder
wasvalid.Besidesthoseorderedarrestedwerenotyetbeingpunishedforcontemptbut,havingbeencharged,
theyweresimplyorderedarrestedtobebroughtbeforetheJudgetobedealtwithaccordingtolaw.Whetherthey
areguiltyofthechargeornotisyettobedeterminedinaproperhearing.
LetitbenotedthattheorderofarrestdatedApril29,1963inCIRCaseV30isbeingquestionedinCaseG.R.
No.L21278beforethisCourtinaspecialcivilactionforcertiorari.TheUniversitydidnotappealfromthatorder.
Inotherwords,theonlyquestiontoberesolvedinconnectionwiththatorderinCIRCaseV30iswhethertheCIR
hadjurisdiction,orhadabuseditsdiscretion,inissuingthatorder.WeholdthattheCIRhadjurisdictiontoissue
thatorder,andneitherdiditabuseitsdiscretionwhenitissuedthatorder.
In Case G.R. No. L21462 the University appealed from the order of Judge Villanueva of the CIR in Case No.
1183MC, dated April 6, 1963, granting the motion of the Faculty Club to withdraw its petition for certification
election,andfromtheresolutionoftheCIRenbanc,datedJune5,1963,denyingthemotiontoreconsidersaid
orderofApril6,1963.ThegroundoftheFacultyClubinaskingforthewithdrawalofthatpetitionforcertification
election was because the issues involved in that petition were absorbed by the issues in Case 41IPA. The
Universityopposedthepetitionforwithdrawal,butatthesametimeitmovedforthedismissalofthepetitionfor
certificationelection.
It is contended by the University before this Court, in G.R. L21462, that the issues of employeremployee
relationshipbetweentheUniversityandtheFacultyClub,theallegedstatusoftheFacultyClubasalaborunion,
itsmajorityrepresentationanddesignationasbargainingrepresentativeinanappropriateunitoftheFacultyClub
shouldhavebeenresolvedfirstinCaseNo.1183MCpriortothedeterminationoftheissuesinCaseNo.41IPA,
and,therefore,themotiontowithdrawthepetitionforcertificationelectionshouldnothavebeengranteduponthe
groundthattheissuesinthefirstcasewereabsorbedinthesecondcase.
WebelievethatthesecontentionsoftheUniversityinCaseG.R.No.L21462havebeensufficientlycoveredby
the discussion in this decision of the main issues raised in the principal case, which is Case G.R. No. L21278.
Afterall,theUniversitywantedCIRCase1183MCdismissed,andthewithdrawalofthepetitionforcertification
electionhadinawayproducedthesituationdesiredbytheUniversity.Afterconsideringtheargumentsadduced
bytheUniversityinsupportofitspetitionforcertioraribywayofappealinCaseG.R.No.L21278,Weholdthat
theCIRdidnotcommitanyerrorwhenitgrantedthewithdrawalofthepetitionforcertificationelectioninCase
No. 1183MC. The principal case before the CIR is Case No. 41IPA and all the questions relating to the labor
disputesbetweentheUniversityandtheFacultyClubmaybethreshedout,anddecided,inthatcase.
InCaseG.R.No.L21500theUniversityappealedfromtheorderoftheCIRofMarch30,1963,issuedbyJudge
Bautista,andfromtheresolutionoftheCIRenbancpromulgatedonJune28,1963,denyingthemotionforthe
reconsiderationofthatorderofMarch30,1963,inCIRCaseNo.41IPA.WehavealreadyruledthattheCIRhas
jurisdictiontoissuethatorderofMarch30,1963,andthatorderisvalid,andWe,therefore,holdthattheCIRdid
not err in issuing that order of March 30, 1963 and in issuing the resolution promulgated on June 28, 1963
(althoughdatedMay7,1963)denyingthemotiontoreconsiderthatorderofMarch30,1963.
INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionwithpreliminaryinjunctioninCaseG.R.
No.L21278isdismissedandthewritsprayedforthereinaredenied.Thewritofpreliminaryinjunctionissuedin
CaseG.R.No.L21278isdissolved.Theordersandresolutionsappealedfrom,inCasesNos.L21462andL
21500, are affirmed, with costs in these three cases against the petitionerappellant Feati University. It is so
ordered.
Concepcion,C.J.,Dizon,Regala,Makalintal,Bengzon,J.P.,SanchezandCastro,JJ.,concur.
Reyes,J.B.L.,J.,concursbutreserveshisvoteontheteacher'srighttostrike.
Footnotes
1AsquotedfromthewritofpreliminaryinjunctionissuedbythisCourt.
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2AsquotedfromtheorderofApril6,1963.
3Petitioner'sbriefp.29alsopp.89petitioner'sreplybrief.
4Seeorderascopiedonp.118ofpetitioner'sbrief.
5WehavepointedoutthatthisisnotaunanimousviewofthisCourt.
5aSeep.140,RecordofG.R.No.L21278.
6Petitioner'sBrief,pp.1,2,3,7and8.
7WordsinquotationmarksareasquotedfromtheletterofcertificationofthePresidentdatedMarch21,
1963addressedtothePresidingJudgeoftheCIR.
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