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1.

In a petition for a pre-proclamation controversy, petitioner, who lost in the election,


assigned as error of the COMELEC, the following.

QUESTION: On the basis of the facts above stated, who should be the rightful winner of
the election?

No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly
and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. and Sec. 26, Rule XV of COMELEC
Resolution No. 1450 dated February 26, 1980, which reads: In deciding contests, the
Commission shall follow the procedure prescribed for the Supreme Court in Secs. 8 and 9,
Art. X of the Constitution of the Philippines.

Jose Nunag, the petitioner should be the rightful baangay captain. By analogy, the case of
GUIEB is applicable.(G.R. No. 118118,August 14, 1995ALFREDO GUIEB vs. LUIS M.
FONTANILLA, ET AL.) The private respondent should have appealed the decision of the
MTC to the COMELEC; the MTC should not have given due course to the appeal; and the
RTC should have dismissed outright the appeal for want of jurisdiction.In accepting the
appeal and deciding the case on its merits, the respondent judge manifested either
ignorance or palpable disregard of the aforesaid constitutional provision and decision. It
must be noted that a judge is presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority
or jurisdiction of his court. He is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the laws; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal
principles. 16 Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that a judge should be
"studious of the principles of the law." Thus, if the respondent judge were only aware of
the aforementioned constitutional provision and decision, he would have cut short the
journey of a very simple case and put an end to the litigation. What this Court stated in
Aducayen vs. Flores 17 deserves reiteration:Nor is this all that has to be said. There is
need, it does seem, to caution anew judges of inferior courts, which according to the
Constitution refer to all those outside this Tribunal, to exercise greater care in the
discharge of their judicial functions. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Moreover, while it becomes
hourly difficult to keep abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum of effort
should be exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too much to expect that they
betray awareness of well-settled and authoritative doctrines. If such were the case, then
resort to us would be less frequent. That way our time could be devoted to questions of
greater significance. Not only that, there would be on the part of party litigants less
expense and greater faith in the administration of justice, if there be a belief on their part
that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent deficiency in
their grasp of legal principles. Such an indictment unfortunately cannot just be dismissed
as a manifestation of chronic fault-finding. The situation thus calls for a more
conscientious and diligent approach to the discharge of judicial functions to avoid the
imputation that there is on the part of a number of judges less than full and adequate
comprehension of the law.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged
decision of 31 August 1994 of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and
its order of 25 November 1994 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the said court to
entertain and decide the appeal. The decision of 27 May 1994 of the Municipal Trial Court
of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, is hereby declared final for failure of the private respondent
to appeal the same before the proper forum, and the writ of execution to enforce the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

It appears on record that the COMELEC did not consider petitioner's evidence, particularly
the Memorandum Report of Atty. Mamasapunod Aguam, Regional Election Director for
Region XII, to the effect that there was failure of election in Sultan Gumander.
Question: Was there grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC?
Answer:(G.R. No. L-58309-10,February 25, 1982,MANGACOP MANGCA vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS) Petitioner's contention that the March 31, 1981, resolution is null and void for
being violative of Sec. 9, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec 26, Rule XV of COMELEC
Resolution No. 1450 is untenable. Firstly, both cited provisions are inapplicable to the case
at bar since the constitutional requirement applies only to courts of justice which the
COMELEC is not (Lucman vs. Dimaporo, L-31558, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 387) while
COMELEC Resolution No. 1450, per Sec. I thereof, applies only to "election contests" and
"quo warranto proceedings" which the pre- proclamation cases are not
3. The (Jose Nunag) petitioner and the private respondent (Pedro Datoy) were candidates
for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in
the barangay election of 9 May 1994. After the canvass of votes in the said barangay, the
former was proclaimed as the winning candidate. The latter then seasonably filed an
election protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
On 27 May 1994, the MTC, per Judge Lilia C. Espaol, rendered a decision confirming the
proclamation of the petitioner and dismissing the protest of the private respondent.
The private respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan
City. The case was assigned to Branch 42 thereof.
In its decision 2 of 31 August 1994, the RTC, per respondent Judge Luis M. Fontanilla,
reversed the decision of the MTC, annulled the proclamation of the petitioner, and
declared the private respondent as the winning candidate with a plurality of four votes
over the petitioner.
After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied on 25
November 1994, the private respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution

4. These cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private respondent,
Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was
elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card
holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.

G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988
of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3') petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC
No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87- 595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January
18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the
decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing
the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of
municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his
being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him
by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of the
United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may
freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children
there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he voted in
all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.
After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish
that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his
green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in
Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As the
respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to
elective local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code,
there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
QUESTION: Is the ruling of the COMELEC correct? Discuss. ANSWER:The comelec is
INCORRECT.Miguel did not posses the proper qualification. (G.R. No. 88831November 8,
1990MATEO CAASI vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.) Respondent Merito Miguel
admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or
immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof
that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor of
Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a
candidate for that office.The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not
hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for
at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the
qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1,
Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was
a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only
three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and
before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.In banning from elective
public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign
country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the
right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual loyalties and

allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with
our country "without mental reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that
those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to
the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here,
they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their
choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.Miguel insists that
even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he
never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to
enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this Court
believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time
he only had one foot in the United States but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if
that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting
him to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.Miguel's
application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession
of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent
resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such
immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence
that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his green card to
the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections
on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office,
hence, his election thereto was null and void.
5. During the May 8, 1995 elections, Borja and private respondent Jose T. Capco vied for
the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Pateros, which was won by Capco by a margin
of 6,330 votes. Capco was consequently proclaimed and has since been serving as Mayor
of Pateros.
Alleging lack of notice of the date and time of canvass, fraud, violence terrorism and
analogous causes, such as disenfranchisement of voters, presence of flying voters, and
unqualified members of the Board of Election Inspectors, Borja filed before the COMELEC
a petition to declare a failure of election and nullify the canvass and proclamation made
by the Pateros Board of Canvassers.
The COMELEC en banc dismissed his petition.
Aggrieved by said resolution, petitioner elevated the matter to Supreme Court, arguing
the same matters while claiming that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the questioned resolution of May 25, 1995. He avers that the COMELEC en banc
does not have the power to hear and decide the merits of the petition he filed below
because under Article IX-C, Section 3 of the Constitution, all election cases, including preproclamation controversies, "shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions
for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
QUESTION: Is the contention of the petitioner tenable? Is the procedure adopted proper?
On the above facts, who should be the rightful mayor? Contention is not tenable; the
procedure adopted was improper; Capco thenis the rightful mayor.(G.R. No.
120140,August 21, 1996BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL).
In reality, Borja's petition was nothing but a simple election protest involving an elective
municipal position which, under Section 251 of the Election Code, falls within the

exclusive original jurisdiction of the appropriate Regional Trial Court. Section 251
states:Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. A sworn petition contesting the
election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same
office, within ten days after proclamation of the results of the election. (Emphasis
supplied)The COMELEC in turn exercises appellate jurisdiction over the trial court's
decision pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of the Constitution which states:Sec. 2. The
Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:xxx(2) Exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.The
COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss Borja's petition, not only for being
deficient in form but also for having been filed before the wrong tribunal. This reason
need not even be stated in the body of the decision as the same is patent on the face of
the pleading itself. Nor can Borja claim that he was denied due process because when the
COMELEC en banc reviewed and evaluated his petition, the same was tantamount to a fair
"hearing" of his case. The fact that Capco was not even ordered to rebut the allegations
therein certainly did not deprive him of his day in court. If anybody here was aggrieved by
the alleged lack of notice and hearing, it was Capco whose arguments were never
ventilated. If he remained complacent, it was because the COMELEC's actuation was
favorable to him.Certainly, the COMELEC cannot be said to have committed abuse of
discretion, let alone grave abuse thereof, in dismissing Borja's petition. For having applied
the clear provisions of the law, it deserves, not condemnation, but commendation.
6. For your resolution is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to annul and
set aside the resolution dated May 7, 2001 of the Commission on Elections as well as the
resolution dated May 12, 2001 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
This petition originated from a case filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001 for the
disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was previously
convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery penalized under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that on July 25, 1995, petitioner was sentenced

to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months and 11 days of arresto mayor as


minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision correccional as maximum, for each of
the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter, petitioner applied for probation and was
discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.
On May 7, 2001, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting
the petition of private respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from
running for the position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
QUESTION: IS THE COMELEC correct in its ruling? Explain your answer. ANSWER: COMELEC
was wrong.THE appplicable provision is the Local Government Code, which states that a
person convicted of a crime is still qualified to run after two years from service of
sentence or in the case at bar from discharge of probation.
8. As a general rule, the filing of the election protest or a petition for quo warranto
precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amount to the
abadonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire
into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.
1.What is the reason for this general rule?
2.What are the exceptions to the general rule above cited.
ANSWER:Conformably therewith, we have ruled in a number of cases that a proclamation
has been made a pre-proclamation case before the COMELEC is, logically, no longer
viable.(Gallardo v. Rimando, G.R. No. 91798, 13 July 1990, 187 SCRA 463; Casimiro v.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 84462-63, 29 March 1989, 171 SCRA 468; Salvacion v. COMELEC,
G.R. Nos. 84673-74, 21 February 1989, 170 SCRA 513; Padilla v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos.
68351-52, 9 July 1985, 137 SCRA 424.) The rule admits of exceptions, however, as where:
(a) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the
proper remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election
protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filling of a quo warranto petition or
an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad cautelam; and, (e) the proclamation was null and void.(see
Laodenio and Samad, or p. 514, Agpalo)