Chapter Seven: Hume

Key Points
One of the major areas of dispute in ethical philosophy
involves the question of whether the ground for moral
distinctions is to be found in reason, on the one hand, or
in the passions or emotions, on the other.
It is for the purpose of shedding light on this vital
question that Hume has undertaken his analysis of
morality in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of
Morals.
Hume's own position falls squarely on the side of those
who place the greater emphasis on feelings rather than
reason as the basis for moral judgments.

Chapter Seven: Hume

Although reason is essential for the purpose of supplying
the necessary information about what is useful and
agreeable, it is insufficient to produce either blame or
approbation.
Reason, according to Hume, may tell us what is an
adequate means toward a given end, but it cannot tell us
whether a particular end is good or bad.
Only feeling or sentiment has the power to do that:
approbation or blame, Hume tells us, cannot be the
work of the judgment, but of the heart; and is not a
speculative proposition or affirmation, but an active
feeling or sentiment.

Chapter Seven: Hume

Sentiment is necessary for moral judgments and by
sentiment Hume signifies a feeling of approval for that
which promotes the happiness of humanity and a
resentment toward that which produces misery in place
of happiness.
In support of this claim, Hume calls attention to the
following considerations:
The first is that reason is capable of judging only two
things: (1) matters of fact and (2) the relations which
exist between things. Neither of these suffices to cause
approval or disapproval of an action. The fact that a
murder has been committed does not by itself constitute
any grounds for favorable or unfavorable sentiments.

Chapter Seven: Hume

In other words, what makes an act a crime is not
something that exists separately from the minds of the
people who are thinking about it. That which is praised or
blamed is not merely an awareness of the facts.
It is only when the mental action or quality creates in the
spectator a sentiment of approbation that we call it a
virtuous act, or when it arouses a sentiment of blame
that we call it a vicious one.
In the concluding section of the Enquiry, Hume remarks
that common sense alone suffices to make clear that the
principles of morality are all based on the approval of
what is pleasant and useful either to ourselves or to
others and the disapproval of what is contrary to these
ends.

Chapter Seven: Hume

The fact that Hume places so much emphasis on the
matter of approval or disapproval as a criterion of
morality has led some critics to reject his doctrine as an
essentially selfish one.
A careful reading of the Enquiry, however, shows beyond
any doubt that this charge is ill-founded.
Hume calls attention to the presence in all human beings
of a kind of humanitarian sentiment which naturally
approves of all that is useful and serviceable to humanity
and looks with disfavor on all those actions that are
dangerous and pernicious.

Chapter Seven: Hume

This of course does not mean that selfishness is not
an aspect of human nature; in fact it is very much a
part of human nature and in many instances is so
much more powerful than any altruistic or
humanitarian element.
Just how much more powerful we cannot say,
although this suffices, in Humes mind at least, to
rebut the position of those who hold that the
principles of morality are in every instance the
expression of a purely selfish concern if it can be
shown that there is some spark of friendship for all
mankind.

Chapter Seven: Hume

This of course does not mean that selfishness is not
an aspect of human nature; in fact it is very much a
part of human nature and in many instances is so
much more powerful than any altruistic or
humanitarian element.
Just how much more powerful we cannot say,
although this suffices, in Humes mind at least, to
rebut the position of those who hold that the
principles of morality are in every instance the
expression of a purely selfish concern if it can be
shown that there is some spark of friendship for all
mankind.

Chapter Seven: Hume

This benign fellow-feeling admittedly may be
relatively weak, but still it is enough to exercise
an important influence on the mind.
It is this influence that causes us, when other
factors are equal, to produce a cool preference
of what is useful and serviceable to mankind,
above what is pernicious and dangerous."