Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Souter,* Associate Justice,
and Selya, Circuit Judge.
In pertinent part,
the AEDPA instructs that a writ of habeas corpus may issue upon a
showing that the state court's decision "was contrary to, or
involved
an
unreasonable
application
of,
clearly
established
Id. 2254(d)(1).
clearly
established
constitutional
rule:
when
The
trial, the Commonwealth argued that he had shot and killed the
victim. At an earlier state-court trial, however, the Commonwealth
-2-
argued
that
the
defendant
in
that
case
(the
petitioner's
accomplice) had shot and killed the victim. The petitioner asserts
that, under clearly established law, these inconsistent approaches
rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and deprived him of his
constitutional right to due process.
After careful consideration of this asseverational array
against the backdrop of an amplitudinous record, we affirm the
district court's denial of habeas relief.
I.
BACKGROUND
We touch lightly upon the factual findings of the state
2010).
consult
the
underlying
opinion
of
the
Massachusetts
Supreme
Leftwich v.
Three
-3-
Hecker sold
According to
and saw a man sprinting into the common hallway while Cannon, with
a look of shock on his face, stood still.
Cannon fled.
Hecker, who had been shot twice in the neck and once in
the wrist, was bleeding profusely.
A second-floor tenant
likewise heard two people running down the stairs immediately after
hearing the gunshots.
-4-
Hecker
and
that,
when
the
robbery
attempt
soured,
the
At
that point, the petitioner turned to flee but Cannon, who was
standing behind him, began firing at Hecker.
-5-
but
they
did
so
through
general
verdict
without
advocacy,
albeit
in
different
trials,
of
The SJC
See Housen I,
Mass.
Apr.
appealability
17,
on
the
2013),
but
evidentiary
granted
sufficiency
certificate
and
due
of
process
ANALYSIS
In this instance, the district court did not conduct an
record for Latimore error and finding none the SJC effectively
2
at 24.
The petitioner does not dispute this point but, rather,
challenges the SJC's application of the Jackson standard.
He
petitioner's
reading
of
the
record
is
overly
inference that only the petitioner and Cannon were in the room with
Hecker at the time of the murder.
the living room and, within a matter of seconds after hearing the
shots, saw only Cannon and one other man in the living room.
Although Murphy could not identify the second man, the petitioner's
blood was found in the room and, in any event, the petitioner
admitted that he was there.
petitioner were alone with Hecker is bolstered by the fact that the
neighbors heard only two voices and two sets of footsteps running
down the stairs.
from this evidence that only two men had visited the apartment
and that those two men were Cannon and the petitioner.
Our holding that there was sufficient evidence to support
the inference that only two visitors were in the living room is
fatal to the petitioner's more general claim that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he was the shooter.
Murphy testified
that, immediately after the shooting, Cannon did not appear to have
a gun.
Cannon was not the shooter and, therefore, the petitioner must have
-9-
O'Laughlin v. O'Brien,
While
the evidence may have permitted an inference that there were three
visitors in the apartment, it was not equally supportive of that
inference.
habeas court may not freely reweigh competing inferences but must
accept those reasonable inferences that are most compatible with
the jury's verdict."
In
last-ditch
endeavor
to
turn
the
tables,
the
The
court rested this finding in part on the likelihood that three men
(other than Hecker) may have been in the apartment at the time of
the murder.
The
there were only two men running down the stairs after the shooting
-11-
See id.
In light of
that
the
jury's
finding
is
infirm
because
of
the
Prosecutorial Inconsistency.
28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1).
The
-12-
The
of
material
evidence
favorable
to
the
accused,
Id. at 187.
alleged inconsistency was not clear, the Court reserved the hybrid
question of "whether the prosecutor's actions amounted to a due
process violation, or whether any such violation would have been
prejudicial."
Id.
further consideration.6
Id. at 406.
This circumstance,
See id.
flexibility here.
We think that the simplest way to approach this claim of
error is by gauging the reasonableness of the SJC's application of
clearly established due process principles to the petitioner's
prosecutorial inconsistency claim. The SJC implicitly acknowledged
the viability of the petitioner's due process theory, see Housen I,
940 N.E.2d at 444 (reviewing and distinguishing cases addressing
the inconsistent prosecution issue); considered whether the theory
applied to the facts presented; and concluded that it did not, see
id.
-15-
permits
such
course
of
action.
Here,
moreover,
two
that appeal after it had held in a separate case that there was
insufficient evidence to convict Cannon as the shooter, vacated
Cannon's conviction, and remanded for trial on a theory of joint
venture
liability
only.
See
Cannon,
869
N.E.2d
at
605.
we
disagree
with
the
petitioner
that
the
Petitioner's
of unfair manipulation.
-16-
the
Commonwealth
used
Id. at 1052.
mostly
the
Here unlike in
same
evidence
in
Id.
Put
focus
is
on
the
objective
reasonableness
of
that
prosecution
of
different
individuals
on
inconsistent
CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
Affirmed.
-17-